Journal of Rising Powers

CONTENTS

GLOBAL ECONOMIC & MILITARY RIVALRIES CAUSING ENVIRONMENT DETERIORATION BAHAUDDIN FOIZEE THAAD MAD BAD PART I: US-CHINA RIVALRY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA PART II: DECOMPILING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA PART III: THE TRUE NATURE OF SOUTH CHINA SEA TRIANGULATION PART IV: GREAT POWER GEOSTRATEGIC PLAY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON THE U.S.-CHINA MILITARY BALANCE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC JOHN GENNACE ABU DHABI: BOLDLY BUILDING A NATIONAL SECURITY SCHOLARLY COMPLEX DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON AN UNEVEN BALANCE: ANALYSIS OF INTERNET CENSORSHIP IN ZIMBABWE, ZAMBIA, AND SWAZILAND ARTHUR GWAGWA TURKEY’S STATE OF EMERGENCY DECREES: A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH FOR ERDOGAN OR FOR TURKISH DEMOCRACY? AHMET S. YAYLA, PH.D. PKK VS. TURKEY: BROTHERS OF NIHILISM AND NON-EMPATHY DR. ALI CAN THE NEXUS BETWEEN GLOBALIZATION AND JUSTICE EMANUEL L. PAPARELLA, PH.D. IMAGING THE FUTURE: A POST-MUGABE ZIMBABWE ENOCK T. VERA

WHY AFRICA UNITED TO FIGHT ILLEGAL FISHING SAMANTHA MALOOF THE BAQEE ORGANIZATION TO WASHINGTON TO DENOUNCE CULTURAL GENOCIDE MARWA OSMAN THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN OPEC AND NON-OPEC COUNTRIES GIANCARLO ELIA VALORI BATTLING THE TIGER: COMBATING CORRUPTION IN THE SINOWORLD LINGBO ZHAO CHINA’S SILK ROAD LOOKS TO REVIVE ITS ECONOMIC FORTUNES YURIY KOROL DEMONETIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON INDIAN ECONOMY JAYANTI KUMARI INDIA, MYANMAR AND THE INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC CORRIDOR TRIDIVESH SINGH MAINI GLOBAL RISE OF CITIES POSES CHALLENGE TO SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STELLA PAPADOPOULOU DOES ECONOMIC GROWTH ALLEVIATE POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? ENRIQUE MUNOZ-SALIDO INDIA’S ENERGY SUPPLY SECURITY: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES SANJAY KUMAR KAR AND PRAJIT GOSWAMI

editorial BACK IN 2008 it was easy to see scholars, analysts, and diplomats

Dr. Matthew Crosston Editor-in-Chief Journal of Rising Powers: A Global South Policy Initiative

all clamoring about the coming global transformation, where American hegemony would be on the wane and ultimately overcome by new powers and new power organizations like BRICS and MINT. That prophecy no longer seems destined for realization. And yet it also does not signal that American power remains ascendant or that the ‘West’ will remain the cultural and economic hegemon for the entire globe. Back when rising powers were in style, theorists diverged on what to expect from their foreign policies. Some expected the leading democracies to align with Washington, whereas others foresaw a solid political bloc of BRICS-type countries holding Western influence in check. Neither vision came true. This reality is what gave birth to the vision that is the Journal of Rising Powers.

Indeed, if anything, the new geopolitical calculus of global aairs and power positioning is one of constant flux, dynamic interaction, and unreliability. The Journal of Rising Powers was created to dive deep into these processes, revealing the subtle nuances rarely addressed in media and scholarly analyses today. Geographically open and thematically broad, the Journal of Rising Powers is most interested in analyses that are able to document the connective bridges (or failed attempts, as it were) between established powers and rising powers. JRP is also intrigued by the new initiatives, strategies, and policies that potentially challenge the global order and how, conversely, counter-strate gies seek to concretize the existing system. As such, JRP will dive across politics, diplomacy, military, science and technology, economic development, foreign policy, and intelligence in each and every issue.

JRP does not represent a chronicle of anti-Americanism or some tired testimony to the ‘rise of the rest.’

Rather, JRP is a pragmatic and realist admission that the world system is, for the foreseeable future, going to remain chaotic, ever-changing, unstable, and ill-defined. But this does not mean our job as analysts is to give up and walk away despondent. Rather, the contributors to JRP believe this chaos gives unique opportunity: it is a chance for new voices and new subjects to emerge center-stage and be given a spotlight that up to now has been too rarely offered.

“There will be no bloc of ‘emerging economies’ rising up to challenge the Western order. But what comes next may be more chaotic and dangerous.” ~ Suzanne Nossel, July 6, 2016 Foreign Policy We are especially pleased that while JRP operates on the standard open, blind, peer-reviewed system common to all academic journals of quality, the editorial team makes every effort to establish contacts with scholarly voices far outside of the traditional Western canon. We believe those voices deserve to be heard and these analyses deserve attention. The frustration that so many writers ‘from the rest’ feel in trying to get published ‘in the West’ is proactively engaged by JRP. Given the plethora of fine writers within the West that also submit to JRP, it means this journal will hopefully be a unique mosaic that represents the best of ‘new research:’ intellectually rigorous, academically relevant, empirically accurate, and policy impactful.

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This work hopefully gives reason for all those who want to believe that not only is the Cold War 2.0 not nearly as authentic or as menacing as they are being driven to believe, but that there is a place intellectually, diplomatically, and academically for those who do not wish to mindlessly follow an orthodox line of thinking that is hindering new ideas and new thinkers from gaining the stage.

Matthew Crosston

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Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Analyst and Columnist on international affairs, specializes on Middle Eastern, greater Asia-Pacific & European geopolitics. Primarily associated with law practice, formerly taught law at Dhaka Centre for Law & Economics and was Researcher at Bangladesh Institute of Legal Development. Holds law degree from University of London.

Global economic & military rivalries causing environment deterioration Bahauddin Foizee

The very uneasy & unbearable weaTher and the overall deteriorating environmental conditions in coastal areas all over the world have become the new trend of our planet’s environment. The economic & military rivalries among different countries around the world are to be blamed.

Modern Diplomacy Such rivalries have been causing excessive industrialization and increasing trend of production & usage of military hardwares for conflicts & wars that are further causing environment of our planet to deteriorate drastically.

The global & regional economic rivalries are pushing the rival states to thrust for an unprecedented & unchecked militarization of different geopolitical hotspots of our globe and to propel for producing, acquiring & using destructive weapons. Such economic & military rivalries have been the reason behind worsening weather conditions in victim countries with flat & low-lying coastal areas.

Geo-economic rivalries & the resulting pollution The “industrialized” countries had already done enormous damage to our planet’s environment in each of their attempt to supersede the other in industrial revolution and in terms of the size of economy. The same is happening in case of “young industrialized” economies and in case of the current “industrializing” economies. In the race of economic might, the victims have always been the environment and the human beings.

The effects of industrial competition among the economic powers are far reaching and liable to affect the eco-system for many years to come. One particularly damaging effect is the dumping of harmful used-water from industrial sites into open oceans, seas or rivers, damaging many of the water sources around the globe and, thus, causing health issues to the people who use such water for different purposes. For instance, the same water is used by the farmers for irrigation purpose which affects the quality of food that is produced, causing health issues to the people who consume those foods. Moreover, industrial competition among the economic powers have pushed them to increase their industrial capacities to an excessive level and, thus, causing immense air pollution which has taken toll on the environment and the health of the human being. The human and the environment are at risk from exposure to radiation from different sources, including radioactive materials, accelerators, electrical installations, mobile broadcasting centres etc.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 The most alarming effect of this economic competition among the economic powers is the global warming, which result from the smoke and greenhouse gases that are being released by industries into the air. environmental impacts of militarization The heavy economic competitions among the global & regional economic powers are resulting in geopolitical rivalries among themselves. These countries, therefore, are resorting to heavily arming their arsenals with weapons, from light firearms to heavily destructive firearms, to barrel bombs and chemical weapons, to nuclear missiles. Some state-players are also resorting to wars & proxy wars.

The wars around the globe have been seriously impacting the natural environments of not only the war-torn countries, but also most of the countries around the globe. The weaponry & military vehicles used in the war zones have been producing many hundreds of thousands of tons of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons and sulphur dioxide – all of which are immensely injurious to our planet’s environment. Air pollutions from weaponry & military vehicles have, over the years, adversely affected human health.

Increase in cancer, birth defects, and other adverse health conditions are associated with war-related environmental damage. rise in temperatures & sea-level The urge for economic supremacy among the powerful economies around the globe has increased the human activities of burning fossil fuels such as coal, oil and natural gas. Such a trend is altering the relatively stable and liveable environmental conditions of our planet. Such burning of fossil fuels, which release carbons that have previously been locked up in coal, oil and natural gas for millions of years, cause gradual rise in average global temperatures. Such gradual rise in average global temperatures (global warming) poses a number of threats: (i) the threat to human health increases by many times, (ii) ecosystem is damaged due to higher temperatures, (iv) changing weather patterns cause irreversible damage to agriculture, (iv) coastal areas are vulnerable to the lethal combination of “rising sea level” and increasing number of severe ocean storms that are caused by the melting of mountain-ice and polar glaciers.

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The effects of the continuation of the rise in sea-levels are deep. It would submerge under water many areas around the globe, especially the coastal ones; and perhaps it will not take decades for the coastlines to change. The rise in sea-levels has been causing more floods, especially during storms. Higher sea-levels have increased the size of the flow of water that the super-storms generally bring into inland from the ocean.

Some short term impacts of rise in sea-level are regularly experienced these days by many victims around the globe. The Tsunami is an ideal example of what sort of disaster the rise in sea-level could lead us up to.

Developing countries with flat & low-lying coastal areas The global & regional economic & military rivalries have been causing environmental deterioration around the globe and developing countries having flat & low-lying coastal areas are among the victims of such deteriorating environmental conditions. Besides the major problems of poverty and illiteracy, these countries’ vulnerability to environmental deterioration is very alarming. The overall economic developments of these countries have been troubled to a considerable extent by the adverse effects of deteriorating global environmental conditions.

With flat and low-lying landscape, the coastal areas of these countries are highly vulnerable to floods and storms. Among the major impacts of the environmental deterioration – particularly of the global warming – the increasing rise in sea-level every year has been the most alarming one so far, with the possibility of submerging a substantial percentage of the total coastal landmass of these countries under water.

A prediction made in 2007 by the UK Department for International Development suggests that there is the possibility that 6-8% of ‘flood-prone’ Bangladesh may be submerged under water by 2030. From the 4th assessment report published by the International Panel on Climate Change or IPCC, it appears that a substantial portion of coastal areas of Myanmar is predicted to be submerged under water by 2050.

In long run, the coastline and coastal cities of many developing countries having flat & low-lying landscape will be lost because of rise in sea-level.

But in the short term, sea-level rise will cause more damage through floods and powerful storms that might bring water into inland with them, causing devastation like that of the Tsunami. Substantial portion of the total population of these countries live in the coastal areas, where majority

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 of the population are affected, directly or indirectly, by coastal floods or tidal flows, salinity, tropical cyclones, erosion of river-bank etc. With the rise of sea-level “even by a metre”, these countries could lose a substantial percentage of their total landmass under water, turning millions of inhabitants living in the coastal areas into climate refugees.

Observations German scholars from Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PICIR) warned that if incentives of the global warming are not reduced immediately worldwide, a series of unstoppable events will be triggered, causing dramatic rise in sea-levels and the total annihilation of coastal

cities inhabited by millions of people. Therefore, in line with the suggestion from PICIR, the incentives of global warming, which, among others, includes the worldwide economic & military competition, must be reduced. Otherwise, millions of coastal inhabitants around the globe would face a survival threat.

Developing countries with flat & low-lying coastal areas are likely to experience more ‘immediate’ adverse impacts of environmental deterioration. Agriculture, industry, school, hospitals, roads, bridges, livelihoods, marine resources, forestry, biodiversity, human health and other utility services will suffer severely.

All in all, it is high time for “affected” & “to be affected” countries to start working together on real solutions with utmost urgency in the global & regional level.

Modern Diplomacy Dr. Matthew Crosston is Vice Chairman of Modern Diplomacy and member of the Editorial Board at the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. He is Senior Research Fellow for the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, Israel, Senior Advisor for the Research Institute for European and American Studies in Athens, Greece, Senior Fellow at the China Eurasia Council for Political and Strategic Research in Nanjing, China, and was the first American invited to conduct a political analysis blog for the Russian International Aairs Council in Moscow, Russia

THAAD Mad Bad, Part I

US-China Rivalry in the South China Sea dr. Matthew Crosston

The Terminal hiGh alTiTuDe area Defense is a US Army anti-ballistic missile system designed to shoot down short, medium, and longrange ballistic missiles in their terminal phase, utilizing a hit-to-kill approach. THAAD missiles carry no warheads whatsoever, rather relying on the kinetic energy of impact to destroy any incoming missile.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 A kinetic energy hit in theory will minimize the risk of exploding conventional warhead ballistic missiles. Nuclear tipped ballistic missiles won't explode upon a kinetic energy hit, thus adding an extra security element to the system for strategic destruction. There is the possibility that chemical or biological warheads may disintegrate or explode and thus pose a risk of contaminating the environment. If there is any doubt about the importance of the THAAD system to the overall American military-industrial complex one only need read the participant construction list involved in the development and deployment of the system: Lockheed Martin Space Systems is the prime contractor but Honeywell, Raytheon, Boeing, Aerojet, Rocketdyne, and BAE Systems are also involved. This is basically a Who’s Who list of primary players within the American defense industry.

A THAAD battery is comprised of nine launcher vehicles, each one containing eight missiles. It also comes with two mobile tactical operations centers and a ground-based radar system. Although explicit tactical numbers remain classified, most estimates give THAAD missiles a 200km range and an ultimate altitude capability of 150km. The very first THAAD unit was activated at Fort Bliss in Texas in May 2008. Thus, THAAD is by no means an old traditional system but represents the current cutting edge in missile defense. Its subsequent deployments since 2008 not only give testimony to this but also reveal part of the strategic problem for China that has driven a huge part of its objectives in the South China Sea.

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In July 2009 a THAAD system was deployed on Hawaii as a safeguard against a potential North Korean incursion or threat to the islands. Interestingly, most of the main powers around the South China Sea never really considered this logic to be all that sound: given the range of THAAD missiles it meant a North Korean threat toward and American defense of Hawaii would have to take place relatively close to the archipelago. Most did not think such a threat emerging from North Korea was realistic. China certainly found the argumentation to be dubious. The next THAAD deployments only solidified that skepticism.

In April 2013 a new THAAD system was deployed to the island of Guam.

Once again the strategic rationale given was to now protect Guam from a potential imminent attack from North Korea. In November 2015, the Japanese Defense Minister, General Nakatani, publicly said he would consider allowing the US to deploy a THAAD system on the Japanese mainland in order to, once more, answer a potential North Korean ballistic missile threat to Japan. Finally, in July 2016, the US and South Korea finally agreed on an alliance decision to deploy a THAAD system to the peninsula. The Department of Defense emphasized that this initiative was to ensure the security of South Korea and its people, while protecting the military alliance from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile systems. Brian McKeon, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy at the Pentagon answered rather creatively when asked by media if China should be concerned about the progression of THAAD deployments closer and closer to the Chinese mainland: “They are not happy about it, [but] it’s not about China. It’s not a threat to China and we have made that plain to them and offered to explain it to them.”

The problem, of course, is that this quote first of all contradicts itself. Has the United States made it plain to China that the various THAAD deployments are not a threat to Chinese interests or has it offered to explain to China why this is so?

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 The first version intimates already transpired attempts while the second version simply indicates a willingness to offer an explanation if China wants it. What seems to be the more accurate version, however, is just the public declaration that the United States feels THAAD deployments should not matter to China because they have been officially defined as defensive measures against North Korea. Formal declarations, however, seem to have little calming effect on Chinese strategic perspective.

Accurate or not, proven or not, there can hardly be any doubt that China views the gradual march westward of THAAD deployments as an initiative using North Korea as a cover to mask what is ultimately an anti-Chinese deterrence strategy. Indeed, some of the comments made in 2015 before the final agreement between South Korea and the United States shows just how seriously China takes the symbolic damage THAAD may represent: Whenever a state places defensive weapons and systems at forward bases to protect forward forces from a specific adversary, this can easily give rise to political misunderstandings by neighboring states, resulting in unintended military escalation. For China, the deployment of THAAD to South Korea is just such an apparent provocation.

The deployment would imply that South Korea is part of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) led by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. South Korea is also developing an indigenous missile defense system against North Korean threats, the Korea Air Missile Defense (KAMD) system, which is less likely to antagonize China than THAAD, since it will not be integrated into the wider BMD system designed to counter Iran in Europe and China in the Asia-Pacific.

Moreover, operating THAAD in South Korea represents an explicit threat to China’s asymmetric AntiAccess/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, which aims to exclude forwarded U.S. forces from the so-called first island chain. So China could interpret THAAD deployment by South Korea as a major military posture by the U.S. intended to neutralize China’s A2/AD strategy[1].

Modern Diplomacy This is what remains intensely intriguing over the THAAD/South China Sea issue. It comes across as a strategic-diplomatic chicken-and-egg controversy: the United States feels its positions with THAAD are forced to the forefront because of Chinese initiatives in the South China Sea; China, on the other hand, feels the THAAD deployments have made South China Sea initiatives de facto necessary and logical. Regardless of where anyone falls within the debate, it is clear that there are competing narratives facing off against one another within the South China Sea. Mainstream media covers it almost exclusively from a global rivalry perspective, pitting the United States against China. This narrative most certainly exists. But it is not the only one and not necessarily the most pertinent for determining how the region evolves in the coming years.

[1] Sukjoon Yoon, “Are China’s THAAD Fears Justified?” The Diplomat, 20 Feb 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/are-chinas-thaad-fearsjustified/, accessed on 13 Sep 2016.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017

THAAD, MAD, BAD, part II

Decompiling the South China Sea dr. Matthew Crosston

The american backsTOry The American positions for the past two years have focused on China’s relatively aggressive and unchallenged construction of seven artificial islands and at least three airstrips in the South China Sea. Despite neighborly protests, China has refused to even take part in legal arbitration that was initiated in 2013 by the Philippines at a U.N.-backed tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands.

Modern Diplomacy Chinese officials have repeatedly asserted its right to reclaim land within its own sovereign territory, while warning that the US needs to keep out of regional territorial disputes that it has no business being a part of. US President Barack Obama, while visiting Jamaica, declared that China “was using its sheer size and muscle to force countries into subordinate positions.” The US president continued to bolster the hopes of the smaller South China Sea neighbors by staunchly stating that “just because the Philippines or Vietnam are not as large as China doesn't mean that they can just be elbowed aside.”

Adding to the growing American alarm about China’s “aggressive” activities in the South China Sea comes from the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Scott Swift. He went on record saying China was provoking an unprecedented military build-up in the region. Swift also complained that the acceleration of China’s “disruptive activities” in contested waters was causing widespread anxiety in the Indo-Pacific region.

How did this widespread anxiety manifest itself? Scott emphasized that the lack of transparency around China’s behavior had caused other Asia-Pacific nations to respond by spending more on their own military build-up. Ultimately, China’s socalled defensive measures were in fact creating a runaway escalation that hindered deterrence stability rather than promoted it. In February 2016, Admiral Harry Harris of US Pacific Command, appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee to give testimony about events transpiring in the South China Sea, bluntly stated that China is “clearly militarizing” and the “you'd have to believe in a flat Earth to believe otherwise.”

The obvious first counterargument to President Obama’s commentary is that it seems to be ignoring what has been basic reality around the South China Sea for decades: China has not dominated the region simply because of size and sheer force but also because of its industrial, financial, diplomatic, and political prowess compared to its South China Sea neighbors. The comments from the commanders of the US Pacific Fleet also come off more like political positioning that objective analysis: no matter how much militarization or competitive force build-up is supposedly taking place within countries like the Philippines or Vietnam, it is not possible for these countries to be militarily competitive in the region with China. It is this relatively easy ability to always counter American rhetoric that gives insight into China’s formal South China Sea backstory.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 The chinese backstory In addition to the aforementioned perspective that China sees as ‘creeping THAADism’ and has little to do with the formally declared need to deter North Korean ambitions and aggression, US forces have been negotiating new access to as many as five Philippine military bases, with some of them strategically positioned in the disputed South China Sea. Also of great concern to Chinese military analysts are negotiations that will see new US military deployments to Australia and Singapore as supplemental parts of the Philippine plan already under way. China feels this is a disingenuous approach to bilateral diplomatic negotiation, as it has long been in discussion with the Philippines over various South China Sea disputes. Ironically, China saw Philippine entreaties to engender great American support and participation as pure manipulation, especially given that parts of the South China Sea are also currently claimed by Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam. These claims have been largely ignored by the United States. While Manila has been encouraging the US to play a more active role in resisting what it regards as Chinese aggression in so-called Philippine waters, China sees it as highly suspicious that America finds only the claims of its closest military ally in the region compelling.

China not only sees America as attempting to project its global power in the South China Sea disputes. It sees the US doing this while simultaneously preaching that China should not project any regional power in waters that have always been directly impacting Chinese national interests.

Thus, in a way, China is quietly characterizing itself as a victim because it claims to have never seized a single islet in the waters from others, whereas countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam have occupied Chinese islands and islets for years.

Modern Diplomacy China also pressed Japan not to broach its disputes with Beijing with regional neighbors in the South China Sea at the Group of Seven summit that was held in Japan in May. It argued that touching on the issue would hamper efforts to improve bilateral relations, even somewhat ominously warning that the ‘approach’ Japan chooses to employ to address such issues will have a long-lasting impact on overall Chinese-Japanese relations.

This last position is very important to the overall understanding of how China feels South China Sea disputes should be engaged and resolved: it is a local issue best negotiated by the local powers. It is a fundamental question about power disbalance and good faith negotiation: on the Chinese side, it maintains integrity and mutual respect makes ‘outside influences’ only a hindrance (read America), while on the smaller power side of South China Sea littorals, they maintain that not leveraging a bigger player for their position will leave them hopelessly subordinate (read America).

Thus, the Chinese backstory for the South China Sea, whether it is in considering the true purpose of THAAD or the ‘interference’ in individualized bilateral relations or even the philosophical meaning of regional hegemony, revolves significantly around the exercise of American power and its interplay with what China considers legitimate Chinese national security interests. This, of course, does not take place in a vacuum: there are other voices expressing opinions beyond America and China. The ‘smaller’ littoral voices of the South China Sea have their arguments. And while they are more on the side of American assistance, they are not wholly dependent on American foreign policy. This will be the subject of the upcoming part III of THAAD MAD BAD.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017

THAAD MAD BAD, Pt III

The True Nature of South China Sea Triangulation dr. Matthew Crosston

iT is easy TO miss The nuanceD maneuverinGs of the other states surrounding the South China Sea because of the giant political and diplomatic rumblings the two Great Powers of China and the United States create.

But those initiatives, while smaller and less explosive to mass media, are very important in understanding how the two Great Powers compete for attention, respect, and primacy in the region.

Modern Diplomacy A Reuters piece from April 2016 illustrates this effectively: In telling the Group of Seven (G7) yesterday to butt out of its controversial maritime claims in East Asia, China has doubled down on an historic strategic blunder. Beijing’s belligerence in the South China Sea is especially imprudent.

By refusing to compromise on its outrageous sovereignty claims, the government of Xi Jinping discredits its “peaceful rise” rhetoric and complicates efforts by member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to “triangulate” between China and the United States. Continued Chinese muscle-flexing will only undermine support for president Xi Jinping’s signature One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative and push regional fence-sitters into the U.S. embrace. The most promising outcome for all concerned would be a facesaving climb-down by China.

While most western media reported this as a fairly benign constructive critique of Chinese transgressions, it is important to note how many subtle digs are embedded within the critique that can be taken as a direct threat to Chinese power. Bringing up the possibility of undermining the One Belt, One Road initiative is overtly hostile, given how much time, investment, and diplomatic cache China has put into the endeavor. More importantly, until that moment events in the South China Sea and development of OBOR were never conflated together. The former was traditionally seen as military/political power-flexing, while the latter has been rather expansively characterized in terms of mutually beneficial economic development. Trying to connect the two into some sort of quid pro quo for acquiescence is likely to only incite Chinese ire rather than capitulation.

This is also how the term ‘face-saving climb-down’ would be inevitably interpreted in Beijing – as acquiescence and capitulation, not as the ‘most promising outcome for all.’

Most intriguing of all was the rather tame admission that China’s maneuvers are making it more complicated for ASEAN member states to ‘triangulate’ between the United States and the People’s Republic. It is easy to glance over that phrase as insignificant but it is not: in real terms ‘triangulation’ is not so much about seeking mutually-beneficial compromise or finding resolutions to problems that let all prosper and save face.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Triangulation is strategic Machiavellianism: it is the eort to play the interests of the United States o of the interests of China, trying to leverage each so as to make individual gains for the strategizing smaller country.

Triangulation takes place at every level of global interaction, all the way down to the smallest local level. This is no surprise. But journalism like the piece above is somewhat disingenuous: triangulating between China and the United States is not a benign activity that carries no loss and no sacrifice. Triangulation always involves such things. And China knows this. Writing pieces that try to overlook this reality simply avoids the diplomatic space China both operates in and is not willing to be outcompeted for.

Triangulation is also not uni-directional: going only from the lesser South China Sea littorals to China or the United States. Both of the Great Powers try quite diligently to angle on the triangulation: not only trying to maximize their bilateral relations with individual ASEAN members, but also outflanking and outwitting each other. A clear example of this just happened in the fall of 2016 when Philippine President Duterte made an oďŹƒcial visit to Beijing and shockingly declared that he was basically done with the United States and was doing his own pivot to China. The fallout from this announcement is likely to be felt for years. The Philippines, after all, was arguably one of the most vociferous opponents of China in terms of South China Sea maneuvers and most aligned with US perspectives. Even now many analysts in America are unwilling to believe Duterte was not somehow coerced to make this declaration. But this is American hubris failing to note important aspects of the South China Sea dynamic: narratives change and change often.

Modern Diplomacy For example, non-Western media sources have been documenting several personal-political reasons that might have motivated Duterte before making his China visit: he is convinced the united states engages important issues like human rights only in the areas that directly benefit its strategic objectives, rather than as a universal dispassionate position. There are historical examples within Philippine history itself that make Duterte convinced of this with great passion. he feels strongly about a long-standing American tendency to take the Philippines for granted as ‘brown little brothers’ (a reference all the way back to President Taft), rather than as a legitimate ally deserving equal respect. as mayor of Davao city there were at least two incidents that left a diplomatic distaste in his mouth: first involved a supposed illegal extradition of an American citizen out of the Philippines by the CIA (though the Agency denies this) and second revolved around alleged mistreatment in an American airport as he transited through the United States to another country. Both instances represent to Duterte that the US does as it pleases and is ‘uneven’ in how it respects supposed allies.

This is why the positions of the competing sides in the South China Sea are not nearly as clear as the United States tries to portray it. It is not a single ‘good’ American narrative valiantly trying to push back an opposing ‘bad’ Chinese narrative. The competing narratives interact, engage, and evolve according to varying targets and objectives, sometimes on an almost daily basis. Most of the discussion of these narratives simply tackles actual military, political, and diplomatic maneuvers. Talk of island-building and weapons-systems carry the day, every day, with little attention paid to strategic theory. But strategic thinking, the disposition of philosophy, is something deeply important to China as it formulates and prioritizes its South China Sea policy. This is an area that America ironically downplays in the media while emphasizing within corridors of power. A simple analysis of strategic discussions that took place in the United States about the area, not even classified but actually public discussions accessible to all, quickly reveal why the Chinese narrative might have became obsessed with ‘defensive positioning’ within the South China Sea. That strategic analysis is the focus for part IV.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017

THAAD MAD BAD, Pt. IV

Great Power Geostrategic Play in the South China Sea dr. Matthew Crosston

There is a fascinaTinG inTerplay that goes on today on the global level when it comes to foreign aairs. On the whole, the United States often feels that it can present information across enough disparate venues that potential adversaries will not be able to strategically connect the dots in a manner that they might find threatening.

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Many times this has often proved true.

But in the case of the South China Sea it has horribly backfired against American objectives. Two primary examples illustrate this point. First, War on the Rocks contributor Robert Haddick analyzed an intriguing piece written earlier in the year by David Barno and Nora Bensahel, who argued that U.S. policymakers and military planners should think about how to prepare for the next big war. Their stimulating essay identified six gaps — munitions, weapons platforms, manpower, planning, technology, and stamina — that a big war against a peer competitor could reveal.

These important articles combined together were ultimately a de facto call for the United States to improve its planning for mobilization and on a surface level would seem fairly benign to almost all readers, ie, there is no specific ‘big target’ named in either article or intimation against whom the next big war and American mobilization should be aimed. At least, there isn’t until a completely separate piece of information is connected to it.

On March 18, 2016, Deputy Secretary for Defense for South and Southeast Asia, Amy Searight, told reporters that the Department of Defense had already submitted notification to Congress about a new maritime capacitybuilding initiative for Southeast Asian states near the South China Sea. While the DoD has been relatively secretive about the exact details, some information has leaked out about the point and purpose of the initiative: Speaking generally due to the sensitivity of the issue, [a DoD source] said that more advanced intelligence, surveillance and radar (ISR) capabilities might enhance ‘sensing’ of allies and partners in the South China Sea; technical “supporting infrastructure” would facilitate ‘sharing’ maritime information across the region to build a common operating picture; and expanded exercises, training and other engagements would lead to more ‘contributing’ from allies and partners. MSI is more about equipment, supplies, training and small-scale construction that fit within this broad approach, rather than hardware.“ What you hear is improving the ability of allies and partners to sense, share and contribute,” the source said.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 In other words, this maritime capacity initiative is built around improving planning, manpower, platforms, technology, and stamina of most if not all of the smaller littoral South China Sea states. It is built around improving the abilities of American allies in exactly the manner in which contributors to the War on the Rocks articles declared as being crucial for US readiness in fighting the next big war. The idea that China would be unable to piece this together or draw its own stark strategic conclusions was wishful diplomatic thinking, at best. As it turns out, it was wishful thinking misplaced.

At almost exactly the same time period as when the above events were transpiring, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a huge announcement to ‘buoy the country’s faltering economy’ by bringing military research and development back under the jurisdiction of the People’s Liberation Army.

The reason for this new restructuring was in order to launch a new agency that would be modeled directly after the famous US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). This new agency will aim to ‘strengthen management of defense science and technology, promote indigenous innovation in national defense, and coordinate integrated development of military and civilian technologies.’ In other words, China, having connected the dots between disparate American strategic analyses and policy developments, responded with basically doing the exact same maneuvers and initiatives. Arguably, the timing and speed of the Chinese response is directly predicated upon what it considers to be disconcerting American initiatives that seem more potentially offensive and aggressive rather than defensive and reactive. Even this distinction, between offensive and defensive, between action and reaction, is a constant source of opacity between China and the United States when it comes to the South China Sea.

Modern Diplomacy The following are excerpts taken from an assessment of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper given to Sen. John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. It was a formal letter meant to address the ‘Chinese reclamation and militarization of disputed holdings in the South China Sea.’ Feb. 23, 2016 Dear Chairman McCain: Thank you for your letter of 29 January 2016 in which you articulated concerns about China’s reclamation activity in the South China Sea and the impact this will have on China’s ability to deploy military capabilities across the area. Unclassified answers to the specific questions contained in your correspondence follow: would you assess china has militarized its reclaimed features in the spratly islands?

We judge that China has the capability to provide basic self-defense at its Spratly Islands outposts. China has also installed surveillance systems to improve situational awareness and is building airfields and ports that can support military operations. Based on the extent of land reclamation and construction activity, we assess that China has established the necessary infrastructure to project military capabilities in the South China Sea beyond that which is required for point defense of its outposts. These capabilities could include the deployment of modern fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), and coastal defense cruise missiles, as well as increased presence of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) surface combatants and China Coast Guard (CCG) large patrol ships. has the united states observed the construction of infrastructure or deployment of capabilities that would enable military-grade early warning, target acquisition, and/or target track radars?

China has installed military radars, most likely air-surveillance/early warning radars, at Cuarteron and Fiery Cross Reefs and a beacon for aircraft direction at Fiery Cross. Additionally, China is employing a combination of solar, wind, and stable base-load generators to power the outposts. has the united states observed the construction of infrastructure or deployment of capabilities by china that would enable the deployment of surface-to-air missile systems?

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 None of the infrastructure developed to date is consistent with the deployment of SAM systems to any of China’s Spratly Islands outposts. However, China’s mobile SAMS are field-deployable and do not require fixed, prepared sites Do you assess china will pursue further reclamation in the south china sea or east china sea?

While we have no evidence that China has plans for any significant additional land reclamation at its Spratly Islands claims, there is sufficient reef area at Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reefs to reclaim more than 1,000 additional acres. We further assess that the underwater features at the four smaller reefs would support additional land reclamation. We do not assess that China will conduct reclamation efforts in the East China Sea. Do you assess china will seek to militarize its reclaimed features in the spratly islands in the 2016-2018 time period?

We assess that China will continue to pursue construction and infrastructure development at its expanded outposts in the South China Sea. Based on the pace and scope of construction at these outposts, China will be able to deploy a range of offensive and defensive military capabilities and support increased PLAN and CCG presence beginning in 2016.

Once these facilities are completed by the end of 2016 or early 2017, China will have significant capacity to quickly project substantial offensive military power to the region. China’s continued construction activity and press reporting indicate that Beijing may view the establishment of “defensive” capabilities similar to what some other claimants have installed as consistent with not “militarizing” the dispute. The Intelligence Community continues to monitor these and other critical developments in the region using our full array of collection capabilities to produce analysis with explanatory and predictive power to inform decision makers ahead of emerging trends. Please contact me with any additional questions you might have.

Sincerely, James R. Clapper

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What usually gets overlooked on the American side (but emphasized on the Chinese side) is how much Clapper’s analysis confirms maneuvers that are being positioned militarily and declared diplomatically as ‘defensive’ in nature, only to quickly counter with the retort that America believes it would not be difficult to adapt and transform such defensive postures into dangerous offensive ones. But that same retort was used by the Chinese in not only discussing the creeping deployments of the THAAD missile defense system but with general American postures and initiatives throughout the region: China has taken aim at the United States over its criticism of what it considers China’s militarization of the disputes in the East and South China Seas. Washington has considered such actions as violations of “international norms.” As a result, it resumed freedom of navigation patrols in the western Pacific last year. But China considers Washington’s reaction as hypocritical. How, Chinese officials ask, can the United States criticize China for militarizing the South China Sea, when it uses military forces to conduct its freedom of navigation patrols near Chinese-held islets and has expanded its Asian military alliances, most notably through the Expanded Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines?

The purpose of these excerpts, indeed of the entire analysis, is to show just how much of the disputes and tension in the South China Sea are about competing narratives over intentions, objectives, and ‘real’ meanings. It has very little to do with verifiable dispassionate evidence based on military action. Most important is to acknowledge that these competing narratives do indeed exist and that the effort to characterize one as wholly righteous and another as wholly unjustified is not only unhelpful but actually exacerbates conflict in the region. There is strategic manipulation, diplomatic exploitation, and military posturing going on all over the South China Sea today. But it would be naïve and unproductive to think all of this is happening only on the Chinese side. It is happening on all sides, by and against all the players, and will likely continue for the foreseeable future.

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John Gennace holds a Bachelors degree in international relations from Harvard University and a Masters in international public policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is currently exploring career opportunities in public policy.

The U.S.-China Military Balance in the Western Pacific John GennaCe

he securiTy cOnDiTiOn in The sOuTh anD easT china seas has worsened over the past few years as territorial disputes have increased and mistrust deepened. China has grown increasingly assertive in each of the seas, which has caused suspicion among key states in the region.

Moreover, regional institutions have had little impact, international law is being disregarded, and Sino-American relations appear increasingly driven by competition rather than shared interests.

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The stakes for the United States in the South China Sea are high. Freedom of navigation through the sea facilitates $5.3 trillion in global trade each year, $1.2 trillion of which passes through American ports. The South China Sea is considered by many to be a “strategic bellwether” for assessing the future of American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region.

According to some analysts, whether the Western Pacific remains a peaceful maritime commons or a flashpoint for conflict between the U.S. and China, reminiscent of Cold War tensions, is likely to be decided in the South China Sea. The U.S., therefore, must preserve free access to these critical sea-lines of communication (SLOC) to maintain peace and prosperity throughout the region. However, the inability for the U.S. to project sufficient military power into the South China Sea would dramatically alter the state of affairs for the entire Asia-Pacific region. The balance that must be assessed is the ability of the U.S. military to project whatever military power it might require to prevail in a future armed confrontation with China. Equally, China’s ability to disrupt or deny U.S. force projection must also be assessed.

A cornerstone of U.S. defense strategy since World War II has been the ability to rapidly project military power worldwide to protect the nation’s interests. These interests include, but are certainly not limited to, spreading and protecting democratic governance, preserving access to strategic trading partners and resources, and reassuring allies and partners who cooperate with the United States in protecting common interests.

Throughout the Cold War era, the Soviet Union presented a formidable military challenge to American power-projection capabilities. Fortunately, the superpowers succeeded in avoiding a major conflict. Even so, the U.S. military’s unrivaled ability to project and sustain large military forces around the globe was demonstrated in wars in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, as well as in numerous other, smaller conflicts. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s downfall the U.S. military’s power-projection abilities in defense of the nation’s interests were essentially uncontested.

This state of play is clearly coming to an end, with major implications for U.S. national security. With the diffusion of innovative military technologies to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, the U.S. military’s ability to maintain military access to the Western Pacific region is being increasingly tested. While China proclaims nonthreatening intentions, “it is an old military maxim that since intentions can change overnight—especially in authoritarian regimes—one must focus on the military capabilities of other states.”

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Without question, preserving the U.S. military’s power projection capabilities will be crucial to maintaining military preeminence well into the twenty-first century. Since force projection remains foundational to U.S. defense strategy, the nation’s rebalance to the Asia- Pacific region not only revalidates this posture, but it also marks a shift that stresses the necessity for far-reaching naval and air force capabilities. This shift was made clear in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which stressed that “U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign.” background There were two events in the 1990s which served as the impetus for China to develop an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. First was the overwhelming success of the U.S.-led 1991 Persian Gulf War. PLA analysts were forced to rethink their ability to fight an adversary armed with technologically advanced weapons. Operation Desert Storm did conform to the Chinese view of modern wars as being fast and intense. However, the effectiveness with which the U.S. military employed airpower and joint operations to destroy an Iraqi army that was sometimes armed with Chinese weapons caused worry within the PLA that it was grossly ill prepared (both in terms of technology and military doctrine) to fight and prevail in a similar kind of war. According to one Chinese analyst: [w]hat PLA analysts saw was not a war of the future, but a war as it could be fought today by a post-industrial power. Little the PLA had achieved by reorganization, modifying its force structure, building a better educated officer corps, reconceptualizing the manner it planned to conduct future wars, and more realistic training could offset the impact of technology on operations by well-trained, properly organized joint forces exploiting the technological sophistication of their armaments and supporting systems.

The PLA study of the Gulf War devoted significant attention to the role of the U.S. military’s intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) assets. The role of airpower garnered attention for its ability to destroy air defense and command-and-control (C2) nodes, while the U.S. use of stealth aircraft and cruise missiles underscored the problems the PLA would have in defending against an attack from a technologically advanced air force.

Modern Diplomacy The U.S. reliance on force projection and forward deployment to prosecuting that successful campaign was not overlooked by PLA planners.

Should a technologically and militarily superior adversary such as the U.S. be allowed to “arrive in force and on time, it will almost certainly prevail.”12 Moreover, for the U.S. to arrive in force and on time, it must have the “ability to deploy forces into theater with little risk of hostile interference.” Likewise, should war occur with the United States, PLA planners have concluded that “The U.S. military deployment process must be disrupted or neutralized and [the PLA] have successfully developed and fielded military capabilities designed to fulfill this need.”

The second event motivating the development of A2/AD strategies was the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Furious that Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui had been granted a visa to speak at Cornell University, China, fearing promotion of his nation’s independence movement, conducted missile tests in the Strait to deter the island nation from promoting its pro- independence inclinations. Consequently, the U.S. responded by deploying two aircraft carrier strike-groups into the area as a reminder of its commitment to defend Taiwan in the event of hostilities. The U.S. response “lit a fire under the Chinese military and civilian leadership,” which convinced them to develop “a variety of capabilities intended to target American aircraft carriers.” Therefore, China concluded that it was necessary to “limit America’s access to critical battlefield areas.”

The means for the United States to project sufficient military power in response to a new crisis in the South China Sea or anywhere else along China’s littorals rests largely on three pillars: carrier strike-groups, bases in Okinawa, Japan and the U.S. island territory of Guam. As China continues to invest heavily in new A2/AD capabilities, all three will become increasingly vulnerable.16 Therefore, it is worth recalling the warning issued by US Pacific Command (PACOM) in 2010: China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and concepts of operation that support anti-access and area denial strategies in the Western Pacific by holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended distances from the [People’s Republic of China] coastline. The PLA Navy is continuing to develop “Blue Water” capability that includes the ability to surge surface combatants and submarines at extended distances from the [Chinese] mainland.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 some ways to measure the balance a. What are the long-term strategic goals of the U.S. and China in the Western Pacific? b. Is it possible for both to achieve its goals short of armed conflict? c. How has China’s A2/AD strategy developed since 1995 and how has the U.S. responded militarily, economically and politically?

D. What will the competition will look like in 5-10 years based on the previous twenty? Who has/will have the advantage? e. How would the U.S. and Chinese fight? Knowing how critical force projection is to the U.S. military, would China attack preemptively to deny U.S. access to regional basing? Should the U.S. attack preemptively to ensure access to basing? f. Have the Chinese embarked on a cost-imposing strategy vis-à-vis the U.S. by pitting inexpensive missiles against expensive missile defenses?

G. What is the role of U.S. allies and partners in the region?

Objectives The nature of China’s emergence as a strong regional power has presented the United States with a major challenge. Although China has been a great beneficiary of the U.S.-led international order in the Asia-Pacific, it has been reluctant to embrace all aspects of that system. Indeed, China perceives aspects of the system as threatening and objectionable, and because of its growing power it is increasingly willing to challenge the status quo – from unification with Taiwan to territorial claims and maritime rights in the South China Sea – make China a formidable rival. China’s external objectives are clearly to exercise greater control over its periphery, achieve unification with Taiwan and to become the dominant power in Asia – objectives that will necessitate the diminishment of U.S. power and influence throughout the region. China’s achievement of these objectives would severely damage U.S. security by enabling China to become the first East Asian power to threaten the Western Pacific and the U.S. homeland since 1941.

The U.S.-China strategic competition is therefore driven by competing visions for Asia and how to achieve national security. The objectives of the U.S. are to preserve the post-war status quo in the Asia-Pacific. That is, a region that consists of strong, independent, democratic, and free-market states that are free from domination by China or any regional hegemon.

Modern Diplomacy Alternatively, China’s overriding objectives are to safeguard the Chinse Communist Party’s (CCP) hold on power; maintain domestic stability; sustain economic growth and development; defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity; secure China’s status as a great power and, ultimately, reacquiring regional preeminence; and safeguard China’s interests abroad.

It has seemingly determined that these key strategic objectives are best served by completing its task of recovering territory lost in past wars, controlling its periphery, and slowly becoming the dominant power in Asia – for reasons of strategic culture China believes this is a position it should naturally assume.

Should China succeed in becoming the dominant hegemon in Asia the consequences for the U.S. could be quite severe. An Asia-Pacific dominated by China would likely develop economic and military spheres of influence where the U.S. would be essentially “boxed-out” – an outcome that would radically alter the international economic and security orders.24 The U.S. therefore has a vital interest in both preventing a hegemonically dominated Asia and in promoting an Asia “whole and free,” consisting of democratic nations trading among themselves and incorporated into the international economy. For the foreseeable future at least, the U.S. will need to maintain its role in preserving the status quo in the Asia-Pacific.

For it to do so, it is incumbent upon the U.S. to develop new and innovative ways to continue to deter conflict and coercion, reassure allies, and to project military power into the Western Pacific in the event of conflict.

If the U.S.-China strategic competition is about competing visions for Asia,

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 then it is also about access. China’s objective is to deny the U.S. access into many critical areas of the Western Pacific where the U.S. military will need to continue operating. The primary implements for the U.S.-China military competition will be maritime and shore-based forces with the ability to influence events in the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese have two mutually supporting concepts that appear to drive their strategic approach to areas on their periphery. First, the PLAN’s objective is to establish “control” over the waters extending 200 nautical miles out from China’s coast to freely conduct what it calls “independent operations.” These operations include the ability to attack Taiwan for the purposes of reunification and to secure and develop claims to maritime resources in those waters. Second, the Chinese have been shifting slowly to an “offshore defense strategy” meant to engage potential enemies at greater distances from its major urban areas along its coast. This strategy not only emphasizes the Second Artillery Force’s (SAF) missile-centric approach to both denial and coercive operations but also its so- called string of pearls strategy of establishing relations along the Indian Ocean to lay the foundation for greater control over the Malacca Strait and other critical transit nodes (air, sea and land) into East Asia.

Considering China’s aggressive military modernization plans and its stated objective to “contest” the “second island chain,” it is wise to expect that China will seek to develop capabilities that both deny U.S. access to areas within the Western Pacific and pose a credible conventional threat to the U.S. homeland to discourage U.S. intervention in a potential Chinese sphere of influence closer to China’s littorals.

Indeed, one of the key takeaways for China from the Taiwan Strait crisis was that “aircraft carriers [are] a key element of the U.S. ability to project power.” Therefore, considerable effort is being dedicated to ways of neutralizing the combat effectiveness of carrier battlegroups. Chinese analysts are studying what they believe to be key vulnerabilities of carriers and their supporting vessels. According to these analysts, carrier battlegroups are especially vulnerable when being redeployed, during resupply, transiting a narrow waterway, [such as the Malacca Strait] or during poor weather conditions. The PLAN has observed that the U.S. derives as much as 80 percent of its airpower from carrier based aircraft during combat operations in littoral areas. Consequently, the PLAN describes U.S. carrier battlegroups as “a great threat to anti-air operations in littoral areas and should be resolutely countered.”

Modern Diplomacy

Looking out to 2020-2025, the military competition will be characterized by increasing Chinese efforts to control its periphery for extended periods, to intimidate U.S. allies and attempt to weaken U.S. influence, and to project power to defend its increasingly widespread economic interests.The U.S. will work to preserve its position in the region, reassure allies of its willingness and ability to defend them, and complicate China’s capability to project power in ways that threaten U.S. interests.

Trends and asymmetries China is making substantial investments in military programs and weapons designed to improve extended-range power projection, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), and operations in emerging domains such as cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. China’s military modernization has already weakened the U.S. ability to project power into the Western Pacific, a trend that will be difficult to reverse given the prevailing technological, geographic, and financial constraints. Recent trends

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017

in China’s weapons development not only improve China’s capabilities to deal with contingencies along its periphery, such as a new Taiwan crisis, but will also allow the PLA to conduct a range of military operations in Asia outside China’s traditional territorial claims. According to one China analyst, "A key trend in [Asia-Pacific] is the shift from a traditional focus on territorial defense towards power projection – [t]his is new for the region and is likely to increase military-to-military contact between states."

China's defense spending is expected to balloon to $233 billion in 2020, up from $123 billion in 2010, according to a new report by IHS Jane's. Important systems that either have been fielded or are under development include ballistic missiles (including anti-ship versions), anti-ship and landattack cruise missiles, new surface ships, nuclear submarines, and an aircraft carrier.

The necessity to protect key trade routes, principally petroleum supplies from the Middle East, has driven the PLAN to conduct counterpiracy operations around the Horn of Africa. Clashes with Japan over maritime claims in the East China Sea and with several Southeast Asian claimants to all or parts of the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea have caused increased tensions in these areas. Volatility on the Korean Peninsula such as the collapse of the North Korean regime could also produce a regional crisis involving the PLA. The CCP has also tasked the PLA with developing the expertise required for missions such as UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO), Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and counterterrorism operations. These capabilities will enhance China’s options for using its military influence to support its diplomatic agenda, press regional and international interests, and resolve disputes in its favor. Simultaneously, China is surrounded by other regional powers that likely have an incentive to balance against its rise, many of whom are already U.S. allies or emerging strategic partners. Furthermore, even more so than the U.S., China is confronting a number of challenges (social, economic, demographic) that cast doubt over its ability to sustain its decadeslong growth – challenges that could spark widespread internal dissent.

As of this writing U.S. President-Elect Donald Trump maintains that his goal of abandoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will be his first order of business upon entering the oval office in January 2017. TPP (which excludes China) aims to deepen economic ties between its twelve member states, reducing tariffs and promoting trade to spur growth.

Modern Diplomacy

Members had also hoped to develop a closer relationship on economic policies and regulation. The agreement was designed to potentially create a new single market, something akin to the EU. TPP members have a population of roughly 800 million people (nearly twice the size of the EU market) and presently account for 40% of global trade – therefore the significance of the agreement is difficult to understate. Although TPP is an economic agreement it is considered by some in the U.S. defense community to have significant security value. In a speech delivered on April 6, 2015 regarding the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter commented on the strategic value of the agreement to the U.S.[TPP] is probably one of the most important parts of the rebalance, and that’s why it has won such bipartisan support. In fact, you may not expect to hear this from a Secretary of Defense, but in terms of our rebalance in the broadest sense, passing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier. It would deepen our alliances and partnerships abroad and underscore our lasting commitment to the Asia-Pacific. And it would help us promote a global order that reflects both our interests and our values.

In fact, Carter may be understating the strategic value of TPP in that the agreement is probably as important as several aircraft carriers. The collapse of TPP leaves a void in Asia that certainly undermines U.S. economic power and possibly its military power as well – a void that will certainly be filled by China.

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The objective of TPP was always partially strategic. The U.S. and others alongside it, from Australia to Singapore, hoped the agreement would allow them to shape the structure of international trade in Asia and beyond. It was also meant to signal the U.S.’s long-term commitment to the region – something that allies and China are now understandably questioning. Consequently, the collapse of TPP may represent a fait accompli for China in damaging U.S. power and prestige in the Asia-Pacific. asymmetries to consider Although it is outside the scope of this writing to provide a complete and comprehensive assessment of all the trends and asymmetries defining the U.S.-China military competition, the author believes there are two that are especially challenging to U.S. forces and thus deserve special attention. First, is the transformation of the Second Artillery Force (SAF) – the branch of the PLA responsible for most of China’s conventional and nuclear ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles – one of the pillars of China’s military modernization effort.

China has rapidly advanced from a limited and vulnerable nuclear ballistic missile capability to one of the most imposing nuclear and conventional ballistic missile programs in the world. According to a recent U.S. Department of Defense report on the PLA, “China has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile programs in the world.” In doing so China has managed to exploit restrictions placed on the U.S. under the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. As a signatory to the treaty, the U.S. (and Russia) is prohibited from producing nuclear and conventional ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 300-3,400 miles and was forced to destroy existing stockpiles. Chinese ground launched cruise missiles at the upper limit of these ranges have the ability to hold at risk or attack fixed bases and ships at distances well beyond the second island chain.

With the overarching goal of denying the U.S. military access to the Western Pacific in mind, the PLA has paid particular attention to acquiring systems with the capability to detect, track and engage U.S. carrier battlegroups at greater distances from its littorals – increasing the costs of entry for the U.S. at minimal cost to China. According to the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), China is “developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.”

Modern Diplomacy To accomplish the goal of increasing the cost of entry China has embarked on a cost imposing strategy vis-à-vis U.S. carrier battlegroups. According to U.S. naval strategist James Holmes, the U.S. is burdened by a huge cost disadvantage in its maritime competition with China. In The State of the U.S.-China Competition, Holmes points to the estimated $10.5 billion cost of building the next generation aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford – not including its air wing or escort ships. He estimates that if the average PLA antiship cruise missile (ASCM) costs as much as a U.S. Navy Harpoon Block II ASCM (which he doubts) the PLA Navy could afford 8,750 missiles for the price of a single Ford-Class carrier.

Launch of a 'Tomahawk-like' PLA-N YJ-62/C-602 cruise missile from a three round 8 x 8 TEL vehicle.

Source: Air Power Australia

This is clearly an unfavorable ratio and considering the cost of the USS Gerald R. Ford has ballooned to nearly $13 billion since Holmes’ writing, it is even more so.

Second, the Chinese have made significant investment in various types of antiship mines with an arsenal estimated to range from 50,000 to 100,000 individual weapons. Sea mines are growing more sophisticated and their development is outpacing countermeasures in mine detection and clearing technologies. Modern sea mines possess stealthy shapes and nonmagnetic materials to prevent detection, delayed activation timers, ship counters, rocket propulsion, and sophisticated multisensory detonators.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 More advanced versions will have the capability to bury themselves in the seabed and reposition after initial planting, while others will target ships with torpedoes.

The U.S. Navy has acknowledged the severity of the sea mine threat. According to the 2010 Navy Operations Concept (NOC), the sea mine is considered “the greatest area-denial challenge in the maritime domain … capable of constraining maneuverability from deep waters past the surf zone to the maximum extent of the littoral.” James FitzSimonds agrees. A research professor with the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, FitzSimonds posits that “among all the naval warfare areas, the mine versus mine countermeasures competition might represent the most radical war-fighting asymmetry and the most disproportionate offense-defense cost exchange ratio.” That is, a mine costing a few thousand dollars has the potential to achieve at the very least a “mission kill” against a U.S. aircraft carrier costing several billion dollars. Even so, U.S. and Chinese mine capabilities are moving on opposite trajectories as the U.S. has significantly underinvested in this area. Although the U.S. confronts a potentially severe mining threat from China, it has no comparable capability either to deter China or to divert China’s military resources. FitzSimonds concludes that the principal reason for this huge disparity is a culture within the U.S. Navy that has failed to embrace mine and countermine operations as a primary focus. Unlike surface ships, aviation and submarines, there is no officer career path in mine warfare and therefore no established body of expertise that is developed and maintained within the U.S. Navy officer corps. Consequently, it may require the outbreak of hostilities to incent the U.S. Navy to develop a competitive mine warfare strategy vis-à-vis China.

Types of sea mine and environment classifications Source: ThinkDefence

Modern Diplomacy hOw china views The miliTary balance The History of the U.S.-China Maritime Competition Although the U.S.-China strategic competition dates back to the Chinese Civil War when the U.S. (1945-1949) directly supported Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces against Mao’s communists, the military competition as we understand it today began in earnest for the Chinese in the early 1990s.

As was noted above, there were two events that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership regarded as pivotal to its long-term strategic competition with the U.S. – the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis – the latter event fully exposing PLA weaknesses vis-à-vis the U.S military. It was the Chinese response to these events a quarter century ago which largely defines today’s U.S.-China military competition in the Western Pacific. The overwhelming success of the U.S.-led Persian Gulf War forced PLA analysts to rethink their ability to fight an adversary armed with technologically advanced weapons.

Although the war did conform to the Chinese view that modern wars were fast and intense, the effectiveness with which the U.S. military employed air power and joint operations to destroy an Iraqi army that was sometimes armed with Chinese weapons, caused worry within the PLA that it was grossly ill prepared (both in terms of technology and doctrine) to fight and prevail in a similar kind of war. Chinese strategists studied the failings of the Iraqi army in great detail and concluded that China must build a professional, mechanized, and “informatized” military to compete with the U.S. in the Western Pacific.

As surprising as the outcome of the Gulf War was to the PLA, it was the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis that set in motion today’s maritime competition. In an attempt to intimidate Taiwanese voters who were preparing to elect pro-independence presidential candidate Lee Teng-hui, the PLA Second Artillery Force lobbed several ballistic missiles into the Strait.

Consequently, the U.S. responded by deploying the USS Nimitz and USS Independence aircraft carrier battlegroups into the area to deter further Chinese aggression. The PLA found itself unable to detect or even target the enormous U.S. task forces patrolling the waters of Taiwan. The U.S. response “lit a fire under the Chinese military and civilian leadership,” which convinced them to develop “a variety of capabilities intended to target American aircraft carriers.”

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Determined to prevent a repeat of this humiliation, the Chinese military concluded that it must deny the U.S. Navy some control over its coastal waters and deter it from intervening in future crises. Therefore, from the perspective of China’s leadership, the long-term competition with the U.S. has already been underway for several decades. how china views u.s. maritime strategy The 2007 U.S. Maritime Strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, stresses that “U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflicts, deter major wars, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign.”

Although China is never mentioned specifically, many Chinese strategists, such as Lu Rude, perceive U.S. maritime strategy in the Western Pacific as part of a ploy for “implementing strategic encirclement of different kinds of maritime flashpoints and ‘potential enemy’ through military deployment in ‘chokepoints’ of navigation and strategic nodes.”

Furthermore, Chinese experts view the 2012 U.S. rebalance from Europe to Asia “as an offensive policy meant to contain the rise of China as a world power.”77 China’s 2013 defense white paper explicitly mentioned the U.S. in this way, indirectly criticizing the U.S.’s growing presence in the AsiaPacific region as well as stressing the growing complexity of international relations: There are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism. Local turmoils occur frequently. Hot-spot issues keep cropping up. Traditional and non- traditional security challenges interweave and interact. Competition is intensifying in the international military field.

International security issues are growing noticeably more abrupt, interrelated and comprehensive. The Asia-Pacific region has become an increasingly significant stage for world economic development and strategic interaction between major powers. The US is adjusting its Asia-Pacific security strategy, and the regional landscape is undergoing profound changes. ….

Some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser.

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On the issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries are taking actions that complicate or exacerbate the situation….

Major powers are vigorously developing new and more sophisticated military technologies so as to ensure that they can maintain strategic superiorities in international competition in such areas as outer space and cyber space.

China’s media and population have also voiced apprehension over the US rebalance to Asia. China does not publish official assessments of U.S. military strategy and plans like those the U.S. Department of Defense publishes on Chinese strategy and military forces. At the same time, China does firmly dictate what its press is allowed to publish, and the following quotes – characteristic of many comparable examples – suggest that China’s strategic patience with the U.S. has limits that are important in considering how China may view the military balance: Renmin Ribao, January 30, 2013: The United States is boosting old military alliances, damaging the political foundation of East Asian peace, sharpening the territorial sovereignty contradictions between China and the countries around it, building a united front aimed at China, forcibly pushing the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, and disrupting the self-determined cooperation and regional integration process between the East Asian countries…in order for China to achieve strategic balance in the Asia Pacific region, it must greatly increase its military presence…. [China] should give full play to the strategic role of Russia and DPRK. People’s Daily Online, April 10, 2013: Ever since U.S. President Barack Obama proposed the high-keyed “return to the Asia- Pacific” at the end of 2011, the U.S. has begun to frequently organize joint military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region. For those exercises conducted in 2012 by the U.S. in the Western Pacific region alone, there were as many as 17 code names. Why is the U.S. so interested in AsiaPacific region? Why does it frequently conduct such “exercises”? In a geostrategic sense, containing China in the Asia-Pacific region is the basic content of the U.S. policy toward China. There are three major means for the U.S. to conduct deep involvement in the Asia-Pacific region: first, wide alliance to win over various countries in the Asia-Pacific region; second, military forward deployment to realize strategic “rebalancing”; and third, occupy a “leading” position in the region to play “pro-active role.”

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 scenarios and implications Although it is beyond the scope of this assessment to cover the full breadth of possible scenarios in the U.S.-China military balance, this section will briefly examine one of the most persistent: a major conflict with China over Taiwan Taiwan appears to represent an imbalance of sorts between the U.S. and China. For China the matter of Taiwan is clear – it considers Taiwan a breakaway province and it wants the island unified with the mainland. For the U.S. the issue is one of strategic ambiguity.

Policy statements say little more than committing the U.S. to the peaceful resolution of differences between China and Taiwan. Therefore, an imbalance exists in how the U.S. and China view the value of Taiwan and to what extent each will go to achieve its objectives. For China there appears to be far more at stake, which would affect its decision calculus to go to war over the issue as well as the capabilities it may bring to bear in a war.

As the U.S.-China competition intensifies, however, it is possible that Taiwan could play a more prominent role in U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy in the years ahead. President-Elect Trump’s recent telephone call with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen challenges the decadeslong “One China” policy and it could mark the beginning of an increasingly confrontational U.S.-China relationship under the new U.S. administration. According to An Fengshan, a spokesman for China's policy-making Taiwan Affairs Office, he has warned of more serious consequences should the U.S. alter its policy. Mr. An commented:

Modern Diplomacy Upholding the "One China" principle is the political basis of developing China-US relations, and is the cornerstone of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait," he said."If this basis is interfered with or damaged then the healthy, stable development of China- U.S. relations is out of the question, and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait will be seriously impacted."

The circumstances under which the CCP has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time in response to Taiwan’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included: • • • • •

Formal declaration of Taiwan independence Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence Internal unrest on Taiwan Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification • Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs • Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan Article 8 of the March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces… cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “redlines” preserves China’s flexibility.

For U.S. allies and partners in the region, the forcible reunification of China and Taiwan could be seen as an advanced warning that China may also use force to settle other disputes. China scholar Dan Blumenthal suggests that an attack on Taiwan could be perceived as an attempt to alter the balance of power in Asia for four reasons. First, although U.S. policy toward Taiwan is intentionally ambiguous, allies in the region have long considered Taiwan an ally of the U.S. and the Taiwan Relations Act essentially as a defense commitment. A scenario in which China forcibly unifies with Taiwan may be viewed by allies as irreversible Chinese domination. Second, key allies such as Japan could view the prospect of Chinese control over Taiwan as a serious threat to Japanese security. Should China militarize Taiwan, it could pose a direct threat to Japan’s sea-lanes of communication and on the Ryuku island chain. Third, control of Taiwan would enable China to exert far greater control over the South China Sea. Lastly, China’s concept of operations concerning Taiwan may have the effect of forcing the U.S. into a war.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Although China could try to limit an attack to Taiwan, it could also carryout preemptive strikes against U.S. bases in the region and Japan to prevent forces from these countries from intervening. Indeed, China could carry out air and missile strikes on the Kadena and Iwakuni air bases in Japan, despite the escalatory risks of striking Japanese territory. Should China deem it necessary to engage U.S. forces to prevail in Taiwan, the PLA will certainly execute a sea denial strategy that threatens U.S. aircraft carrier battlegroups.

China can use land-based attack aircraft to launch cruise missiles, attack submarines, and land-based ballistic missiles equipped with maneuverable warheads against ships at sea. The PLAN is likely to use submarines armed with ASCMs and torpedoes to attack carrier battlegroups operating within tactical aircraft range of China’s mainland. The PLAN’s submarine force could also try to execute a blockade that threatens commercial shipping in and out of Taiwan. In conjunction with its sophisticated mining capabilities, PLAN submarines have the capability to effectively cutoff maritime trade to Taiwan.

Because China has developed effective air and missile capabilities, the U.S. cannot rely upon purely defensive measures to end an air and missile assault against Taiwan. The U.S. Navy and Air Force would likely be forced to “shoot the archer” rather than the arrow to stop or at least limit those assaults. This scenario raises the risks of serious escalation. Shooting the archer requires striking a large number of targets on mainland China (command and control nodes, storage facilities, ISR, airbases and industrial facilities) that directly support PLA air and missile operations. Carrying out deep strikes against a nuclear China might represent the sort of risk that the U.S. may be unwilling to take.

For China to carry out a successful operation against Taiwan, it may have to inflict extensive damage on the U.S. and Japan. Successful strikes against U.S. bases and maritime forces would force the U.S. to project power from distances beyond the second island chain to suppress China’s air defenses and air and missile forces. For the U.S. to mount an effectivecounterattack it may have no alternative to striking targets on mainland China.

Neither the U.S. nor the Chinese should assume a high nuclear threshold in such a scenario. Punishing strikes on the mainland or on U.S. bases and maritime forces that inflict heavy losses could increase the potential for miscalculation leading to potentially grave consequences.

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Overall, the balance of power between China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities in the first and second island chains, and the ability of the U.S. to project power into the Taiwan Strait to defeat a Chinese attack, has significantly shifted, and in a way that raises doubts about strategic stability.

China has the capability to carry out devastating preemptive strikes against U.S. forces throughout the Western Pacific and on Taiwan. It can raise the costs of entry considerably for U.S. aircraft carrier battlegroups and other forces attempting to intervene in the conflict, conduct a blockade against Taiwan, and shield its strike assets behind a sophisticated air defense system. China may determine that these capabilities will prevent the U.S. from defending Taiwan. However, it is also possible that the U.S. will view a Chinese attack on Taiwan through the lens of increased Chinese assertiveness and a perception that China is attempting to dominate the Western Pacific. In this scenario, the U.S. retains several advantages it can leverage to sustain its power projection capabilities. Among the most important are its numerous allies and partners who share U.S. concerns about an aggressive and potentially hegemonic China. conclusions and final thoughts China’s apparent goal of exercising military control over significant parts of the Western Pacific is certain to be the cause for increased regional tensions and instability in the coming years. China has invested heavily over the past two decades in order to challenge U.S. military dominance in the Asia Pacific. During this time the U.S. has been focused mostly on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has only responded in recent years to the shifting military balance. The overall assessment is that the military balance in the Western Pacific has shifted dramatically in favor of China and against the U.S. and its allies.

Although it is generally believed that the U.S. combined with its allies far outspends China in overall defense, this net assessment briefly analyzed two key asymmetries in the areas of ASBMs and sea mines that reveal a disturbing trend in the military balance – large U.S. defense expenditures may not translate into military effectiveness. Naturally this raises not only serious questions concerning the ability of the U.S. to maintain the status quo in the Western Pacific, but also to assure allies as well as defend U.S. territory in the region from attack. If over the next five to 15 years, U.S. and PLA forces continue on approximately current trajectories, “Asia will witness a progressively receding frontier of U.S. dominance,” one RAND Corporation report concludes.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017

To shift the balance back in its favor, the U.S. must take measures to restore its historic advantages in power projection. To do so, it will have to develop not only more innovative alliance strategies that exploit both their growing capabilities and their weariness of China, but the U.S. will also need to develop innovative military capabilities to restore its dominance.

“The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools�

Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Dr. Matthew Crosston is Vice Chairman of Modern Diplomacy and member of the Editorial Board at the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

He is Senior Research Fellow for the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, Israel, Senior Advisor for the Research Institute for European and American Studies in Athens, Greece, Senior Fellow at the China Eurasia Council for Political and Strategic Research in Nanjing, China, and was the first American invited to conduct a political analysis blog for the Russian International Aairs Council in Moscow, Russia

Abu Dhabi: Boldly Building a National Security Scholarly Complex Dr. Matthew Crosston

THOUGH FEW IN THE WEST TOOK NOTE OF THE OCCASION, back in late 2013 Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, oďŹƒcially opened to much local acclaim the National Defense College.

The College, which is under the general command of the Armed Forces, is not just aiming to train the next generation of Emirati leaders but to become an intellectual hub for the region in terms of innovative education and scholarship within the disciplines of strategic studies, national security, diplomacy, and intelligence studies.

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Zayed himself praised the mission of the College, hoping it would truly accomplish its ambitious goals of becoming world famous in preparing both military and civilian leaders in all realms of national, regional, and global affairs.

The level of vision and innovation shown by the Emirates in launching this educational institute should not be underestimated. It truly represents one of the only contemporary efforts in the greater Middle East region to create and promote a native expertise that is wholly independent and not influenced by external partnerships. Most of the major educational organizations that get the bulk of media attention in the region have largely achieved that focus by virtue of the bilateral collaborations established with major American universities. These places can be found in Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain and are fine institutions, without a doubt.

But they are not truly native efforts nor is the intellectual leadership of said institutions oriented around the elevation of the domestic scholarly and strategic leadership complex within the region. This has always been a flaw in how the West engaged the greater Middle East intellectually: while readily admitting the continued importance of the region in terms of resources, diplomacy, and strategic value, the West has never developed REAL academic partnerships in the region, where both parties – Western and Arab – are co-equals and co-leaders.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 This is at least partially to blame for a lack of native development like the one constructed in Abu Dhabi: everyone wants the money, notoriety, and prestige of having a connection to a well-established American university.

But this short cut has arguably been extremely detrimental in the cultivation of native talent and leadership from within the region itself. The National Defense College was specifically set up to answer that challenge and the Emirates need to be commended for the attempt.

After all, it would have been quite understandable for the Emirates to not make the effort. The UAE has long been the unquestioned leader in the region in terms of commerce, finance, banking, and numerous other business endeavors.

Dubai has become synonymous with leading industry and avant-garde architecture and economy. No one would have blamed the Emirates for resting on those laurels and focusing on its ‘niche’ well into the 21st century. But to launch an institute that is meant “to analyze how domestic, national, transnational, and international factors shape strategy; to understand the relationship between political objectives, strategy, and the use of instruments of national power (e.g. diplomatic, military, economic, information - including cyber) to resource strategy in peace, crisis and war; to develop appropriate strategies and crisis-management responses; and, to examine how strategic leaders shape and implement policy and strategy” when there was no strong foundation for such ambition is beyond praise-worthy.

Modern Diplomacy It should be seen as a crucial step of strategic leadership progress in the region that has been heretofore very slow to develop for various cultural, structural, and financial-educational reasons already mentioned.

This is not to say the Emirates are trying to set up a prejudicial or biased academic center. On the contrary, it openly welcomes cooperative interaction and engagement with institutes and scholars from all over the globe. The crucial dierence, however, between the National Defense College and many of its forerunners throughout the region is that the NDC is an EMIRATI initiative and Emirati-controlled and led. It is responsible for the exclusive structure, dynamic, and direction of the college heading o into the future and no partnerships or cooperative agreements with other educational bodies, no matter where they are from or how historically prestigious they may be, is going to change that basic executive structure.

This is a wonderfully bold and daring challenge and one that was desperately needed in the greater Middle East. It is important to have nativegrown and cultivated schools of thought and centers of strategic education in the region, where no one can question the origin of the intellectual product or the true purpose behind the scholarly initiatives and endeavors. Even if that is the proclaimed desire in other places around the Middle East, the intensity and depth of the American institutional, structural, and scholarly saturation prevents these comparable centers from ever being able to truly lay claim to such a lofty title: a GULF school of thought, fostered and cultivated through GULF leadership alone. Even the school emblem of the NDC drives home the uniqueness of the initiative and its aim to be independent in perpetuity.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 As with any institution, if one wishes to understand the commitment behind it and whether it is here for the long-term or is a poorly-organized attempt destined for dissolution in the near-term, an examination of the governing council, or board of directors as it is often called in Western education, is all that is needed. In this analysis, the National Defense College holds great promise indeed, for the representatives of its higher council happen to also hold the following high offices in Emirati governance: Minister of the Interior; Foreign Minister; National Security Advisor; Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research; Minister of Cabinet Affairs; Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces; Secretary General of the Supreme National Security Council; and Director General of the Emirates Centre of Strategic Studies and Research. It is difficult to imagine a more directly impactful and relevant Higher Council representing the leadership of an institution. The National Defense College is still very young. Its student body even younger and still finding its way. But what matters most is this attempt at building a truly local, truly Emirate, national security scholarly complex is educational and strategic leadership vision at its best. The world should not only be watching. It should be hoping for its success.

Modern Diplomacy Arthur Gwagwa is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law at Strathmore University, Kenya and The Open Technology Fund in Washington DC.

An uneven balance: Analysis of Internet Censorship in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Swaziland arthur GwaGwa

THIS REPORT DOCUMENTS INTERNET-BASED INFORMATION control systems, policies and practices in three Southern African nations; Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Swaziland.The document explores implications for the free flow of information and proposals for policy alternatives based on best practices where appropriate.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017

In this study, information controls is utilized as a broad term to define actions that governments, the private sector, and other actors take through the internet and other information communications technologies to deny (e.g, internet filtering), disrupt (e.g., network shutdowns), monitor (e.g, network surveillance), or secure (e.g., encryption) information for political ends. Information controls can also be non-technical and implemented through legal and regulatory frameworks, including informal pressures placed on private companies.

The individual country reports can either be read separately as ‘standalone’ reports or conjunctively in order gain a deep regional comparative perspective. All the reports rely on research questions based on Citizen Lab’s ‘mixed methods’ research approach. In the case of Zimbabwe, we further relied on the framework by Deibert and Rohinski which classifies information controls into first, second and third generations ; while in Zambia’s case, we relied on the criteria set out in what is commonly known as the APC-LA RUE Framework for Assessing Freedom of Expression and Related Rights on the Internet (APC-LA RUE Framework). In respect to Swaziland, the report classifies content controls in accordance with the criteria set out in the 2011 report of the former Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue.

Modern Diplomacy Zimbabwe Network measurements undertook did not seem to reveal any strong evidence of censorship happening on any content during the testing period.

This does not mean that censorship is not happening at all inside of Zimbabwe, but only that from the specific vantage point from which we ran measurements on a set of specific URLs we could not find signs of internet censorship occurring. The internet remains accessible and relatively free.

While connectivity may be poor and unreliable, and suffer from the usual rent-seeking distortions found in other developing country environments, the same basic content is available there as in the most open-country contexts.

However, the fact that Zimbabweans can access most of the internet is by no means an indication that there are no state-sponsored internet information controls. Rather they are different and largely assume other forms such as those in the second and third generation of internet information controls. Through reliance on public order laws such as the Public Order and Security Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, social media such as WhatsApp and Facebook are monitored for content that is critical of the president, the police, and the army. Legitimate expression online is therefore criminalized, which leads to an environment of self-censorship.

Information controls in Zimbabwe present a mixed picture, influenced by a number of factors, mainly the government’s determination to entrench political domination. “Government is very conscious of security particularly where it relates to political power, political influence, undermining the state and state authorities” . Through a reliance on third-generation controls, the Zimbabwean government relies on a highly sophisticated, multidimensional approach to enhancing state control over national cyberspace. It concentrates on building capabilities for competing in informational space with potential adversaries and competitors. The focus is less on denying access than successfully competing with potential threats through effective counter-information campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or demoralize opponents. It is also actively using surveillance and data-mining as means to confuse and entrap opponents. The state is enhancing jurisdiction over national cyberspace and expanding the powers of state surveillance. These include warrantless monitoring of internet users and usage.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Zambia In recent years, Zambia witnessed an increased reliance on both second and third generation internet controls, driven by diverse motives. Under the second-generation controls, both administrations of Presidents Sata and Lungu legalized content controls through the enforcement of the existent public order, secrecy, and morality laws. This includes, for example, anti-pornography, slander, and defamation across the online environment in an uneven and partial manner. The country also faced connectivity problems due to poor internet resources infrastructure. Although the country continued to block and filter “offensive” websites during the period under review, the picture changed in the period leading up to and including the 2016 elections. Out of a total of 1,303 websites tested for censorship in Zambia during and following its 2016 general election period, only 10 of those sites presented signs of DNS, TCP/IP and HTTP interference. Previously blocked news outlets appeared to be accessible throughout the duration of the testing period. However no blocked pages detected as part of this study could confirm cases of censorship. The findings illustrate that connections to the websites of the World Economic Forum, the Organization of American States (OAS), and an online-dating site (pof.com) failed consistently from Zambia’s MTN network across the testing period, while failure rates from control vantage points were below 1%, indicating these sites might have been blocked.

Pornography and sites supporting LGBT dating also appeared to be inaccessible throughout the testing period and such blocking can potentially be legally justified under Zambia’s Penal Code and Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 2009. However, it remains unclear why connections to other websites, such as Pinterest, may have been tampered with during Zambia’s 2016 general elections. The network tests run in Zambia aimed at identifying “middle boxes” capable of performing internet censorship did not reveal the presence of censorship equipment.

However, this does not mean that censorship equipment is not present in the country, just that these particular tests were not able to highlight its presence.

The results from the technical measurements appear to confirm views from some of our interviewees that the government had realised the futility of mass blockades, but instead chose to resort to a number of third generation controls in the run up tothe 2016 presidential elections: first, it created an environment that promoted mass blogging- the intent of

Modern Diplomacy such information revolution or campaigns is to eect cognitive change rather than to completely deny access to online information or services.

Government also delayed the passage of an access to information law, thus creating an environment where it can either allow or deny access to information at whim. On a positive note, the current and previous governments supported Internet Government Forums and actively take part in them.

Nevertheless, government is not consistently taking steps to protect human rights online. For example, there are specific restrictions on online content, which include the criminalization of legitimate expression, including that of defamation. Such criminalization contributes to an environment of self-censorship. Second, although the law does not impose intermediary liability on ISPs, Zambia does not have a framework that provides detailed guidance on the issue, thereby leaving the door open for future governments to impose such liability. Third, Zambia, like most African countries, lacks laws that adequately protect the right to privacy, treatment of private data, and facilitation of access to information.

Swaziland Despite being a small, predominantly rural country with a proportionately small population, Swaziland severely lacks proper communication facilities, including the internet. The internet facilities are very poor and the population doesn’t enjoy much internet coverage. Since the internet is not firmly established in Swaziland, there isn’t a well-developed internet governance framework in the country.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Despite the fact that internet in Swaziland dates back to early 1995, cyber security awareness is a new phenomenon and there is little discourse on it so far, save for such basics as digital security training. The Swaziland government, mostly through ISPs, disrupts and disconnects network infrastructure for political and partisan reasons. There are recorded cases of “just on time” denial of service, especially to disrupt trade union activities that may expose the monarch to international censure. There have also been incidents of internet blocking and filtering, especially those of the political opposition and trade unions.

Further, the Swazi government criminalises and attributes political meaning to online speech. Government officials announced plans to censor any information shared on the internet via social media platforms. If passed, the law will ban Facebook and Twitter users from criticising its autocratic ruler, King Mswati III. Also, the Swaziland Constitution does not grant absolute rights for freedom of expression. The freedoms are limited by broad interpretations of statutes that restrict expression in the interest of public order and safety, national security, morality, and health. For instance, the Sedition and Subversive Activities Act and the Suppression of Terrorism Act (STA) 2008 are used by officials to suppress freedom of expression on the internet and induce an environment of self-censorship. The political environment in Swaziland, presided over by an absolute monarch and characterised by culture of deference and fear, contributes to a culture of self-censorship. It is because of this environment that not much is known or written on Swaziland.

Overall, while there are unconfirmed reports that numerous African countries are increasing their first-generation technical capabilities, it appears second- and third-generation controls are increasing. These cannot be detected through technical network measurements, but require detailed local political economy knowledge. Future information controls research should increasingly combine technical data and in-country political economy context. Technical partners such as OONI would contribute technical capacity while local partners in repressive environments assist in deploying probes and country context analysis. This first step should be just that: a first step with many more to come. Otherwise, Africa will remain unknown in terms of true internet freedom and the danger of virtual censorship.

Modern Diplomacy Ahmet S. Yayla, Ph.D. is co-author of the just released book, ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate. He is Adjunct Professor of Criminology, Law and Society at George Mason University. He formerly served as Professor and the Chair of the Sociology Department at Harran University in Turkey. He is the former Chief of Counterterrorism and Operations Division for the Turkish National Police with a 20�year career interviewing terrorists.

Turkey’s State of Emergency Decrees

A Matter of Life and Death for Erdogan or for Turkish Democracy? ahMet s. YaYla, Ph.D.

TURKEY HAS BEEN RULED BY A DECLARED State of Emergency since the July 2016 coup attempt, allowing President Erdogan to consolidate additional powers and target not just those responsible for the coup, but allegedly also those who hold or express opposing political views.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017

The Turkish Government has been using State of Emergency Decrees to fire people, close media outlets, and swiftly pass regulations and laws they deem necessary without going through parliament and the normal checks and balances – regulations and laws which would be expected to face harsh criticism and opposition under normal circumstances. Since the coup, over 135,000 people have lost their jobs, 85,000 have been detained, and almost 45,000 arrested in a wide-ranging purge from dierent segments of the state and society, including the military, judiciary, national police, academics, doctors, teachers and low skilled workers. In addition, over 180 journalists have been arrested and hundreds of businesses, NGOs, and associations were closed. Amid unconfirmed allegations of torture and killing during detentions and inside prisons, many people have felt the need to escape Turkey and go into hiding abroad to save themselves from an unknown and potentially deadly future.

Erdogan appears to be using State of Emergency Decree powers to shape the future of Turkey and to guarantee his own safety and fate. Two recent batches of the State of Emergency Decrees (SED) signed by Erdogan include critical rulings that will shape Turkey’s short and long-term governing future. These decrees are essentially turning Turkey into a de facto dictatorship and harming Turkish society in a way that will not be easily undone. One decree on January 6, 2017 has a special impact.

Modern Diplomacy The decree fires 1699 Ministry of Justice personnel. This is significant because a large portion of the forensic doctors who were working for the Medical Forensic Examination Divisions were fired. These doctors are the forensic examiners who issue reports regarding detainees, arrestees, and inmates to ensure they were not mishandled and tortured and who examine bodies to reveal the cause of death. According to media reports, after the coup attempt over 40 prisoners were reported dead through “suicide” in Turkish prisons, along with hundreds of torture allegations.

This decree opens the door to ensure torture and deaths are not going to be reported, that torturers who support Erdogan will feel freer to engage in such activities, and that there will be an increase in so-called “suicides” in prison. This risks moving Turkey towards a Police State.

The new decrees are also reshaping and restructuring the Turkish military. Erdogan has seen the military as a rival since the beginning of his rule. The coup attempt, which he called “a gift from God”, has enabled him to act against the military, firing and arresting thousands of officers, over half of the generals, and more than 2/3 of military pilots, most of whom did not have direct ties with the coup attempt. Many positions after this extensive purge were filled with generals and high-level military officers known to have ties to Dogu Perincek and considered to be pro-Russian or Shanghai-Five. Perincek is a former Maoist and communist terrorist leader from the 1970s who turned into an ultra-leftist nationalist political leader with his Vatan Party. Several retired generals aligned themselves with Perincek after they left the military, receiving high level positions in his party, still others writing as columnists in his media. In the interests of transparency, I myself arrested Perincek in 1998 while I was working for the Ankara Counter-terrorism and Operations Division, due to his ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

I was very surprised to find copies of Top Secret Turkish Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) decisions in his safe at his office, the highest secrecy level documents in Turkey. Finding copies of Top Secret documents in his office prompted to me look further into Perincek’s background in the archives.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 I discovered he had been sentenced to prison after the March 1971 coup in Turkey as the leader of a Revolutionary Youth (Dev-Genç) terrorist movement. More surprising is that even though several of the suspects in the main Dev-Genç case were military academy students or young military officers, they were not fired and by 1998 they were on active duty, mostly as colonels, a high rank.

In November 2016, Erdogan signed an SED which opened a path back into the military for officers who were previously fired from the military (mainly before 2010) due to their connections with different Islamist groups. As a secular institution, the Turkish military has always deemed officers who had any ties with Islamist groups in Turkey as an essential threat to its existence, firing them if the connections are discovered.

Through the SED, Erdogan has basically invited back over 8000 officers who were fired in the past.

Those officers are also expected to start work within the military at the ranks they would be if they had not been fired. The result is that all of a sudden Erdogan now has numerous high-level military officers that are supportive of him. Several of those are also affiliated with a private company named “SADAT International Defense Consulting”, led by another previously-fired general, Adnan Tanriverdi, who serves as chief military advisor to Erdogan. New SEDs signed on January 6, 2017 put into place further measures to strengthen Erdogan’s position. Among the most critical ones are the fact that the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) was sidelined.

This commission used to decide on the future and critical assignments of the military, such as the commanders of the military branches and other critical commanders. Now, with the decree, the Defense Ministry will simply offer the names of the proposed commanders and they will be appointed by the Prime Minister’s signature and President’s approval.

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In addition, the mandatory service time for different branches and the age of retirement for the top commanders was amended, enabling Erdogan to keep the generals he likes and force others into retirement.

The new SEDs have also canceled the requirement of having advanced degrees to become military corporals and sergeants, decreasing the education requirement to the completion of elementary school, which in Turkey is only four years of education. There are several reasons behind this significant change. The first is that SADAT has been having difficulties finding suitable candidates to recruit due to the previous higher education requirements. Similarly, several other Islamist groups who were working with Erdogan had the same problem: not being able to find suitable candidates to recruit for the military, including the AKP's known and assigned Islamist teacher, Nurettin Yıldız.

With this change in education requirement, SADAT and Erdogan’s close circles will be able to hire anyone they want, as they have claimed that educated people were not good for them because they would think and not carry out orders. Now they will have elementary school graduates who will more readily follow orders without question. In addition to the changes in the military, another essential SED was granting permission to private security guards to carry weapons. In the past, only specifically trained guards working for specific industries, like state banks, could receive such special permission. Now all will be armed. Another important SED concerns the revocation of citizenship of those alleged to be part of the July coup attempt.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 The government has decreed it will cancel the citizenship of any suspects being tried due to alleged ties to the coup attempt and/or are living abroad if they do not go back to Turkey within three months. According to this decree, all suspects fleeing Turkey will be stripped of their citizenship, in most cases rendering the person stateless. In addition to rendering many Turks stateless, the decree also appears to be contrary to International Law. The SEDs continue to give additional powers to the government. For example, the police were given the authority to determine who owns which internet IP addresses throughout the country, an authority previously only available through a court warrant to a limited number of specific IPs. The police were also given the authority to obtain any internet traďŹƒc they want, without a court order, with just the signature of a police chief, a power that again in the past was only available for limited IPs and for certain times through court warrants. In addition, the government now has the authority to shut down any media establishment they want if the media does not comply with the press bans which are increasingly issued by courts as a means of controlling the population.

These new regulations are in eect as of January 6, 2017, resulting in a Turkey that is more anti-democratic, dangerous and becoming close to a lawless state, to a real dictatorship. Time will soon tell who will win one of the most dangerous and bloody chess games in the region: who will be leading Turkey in the coming years and, more importantly, what kind of political system will it be and will rule of law still be known there?

Modern Diplomacy Dr. Ali Can is a faculty member in the School of Security Studies at the Police Academy of Turkey. He received a PhD from the University of North Texas.

PKK vs. Turkey: Brothers of Nihilism and Non-empathy Dr. ali Can

ABDULLAH OCALAN WAS A MEMBER of a Marxist Kurdish movement.

Initially, he disseminated opinions of social injustice within Kurdish identity and used the grievances to foment military operations against Kurds as a means to recruit many young Kurds to his cause. His statements flourished in the economically undeveloped eastern part of Turkey. Ultimately, Ocalan wrote “The Way of Kurdistan’s Revolution – Manifesto (Kurdistan Devriminin Yolu-Manifesto)” and established the PKK on 27 November 1978 in the village of Fis in Diyarbakir.

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The primary aim of the PKK as an ethnic insurgent group is to create a separate state or to elevate the social status of the Kurds (Byman 1998). The main argument of PKK is that historic grievances over the last century under both the Ottoman Empire and then the Republic of Turkey left no option other than strategic violence. Harsh counter policies by the Turkish government were subsequently used by the PKK to further legitimate its existence, not just locally but internationally (Ekici, Ozkan and Demir 2007). The group placed a great deal of emphasis on language as it is a powerful trait of national identity (Weber 1978). Through language the PKK attempted to strengthen the idea that ‘to be a Kurd’ meant ‘to not be a Turk’ as envisioned and promulgated by the Turkish government. Distinguishing and psychologically pushing an ethnic identity that is separate from the dominant secular Turk identity promotes great sympathy if not outright allegiance to the PKK as an ethnic insurgent group. The PKK, for example, forces the Kurds to use Kurdish language in both social and official life.

Modern Diplomacy The PKK has employed psychological operations (psy-ops) to force noncompliant or rival groups to emigrate from the southeast region. Ultimately, it wants to strengthen ethnic identity by literally changing the demographic makeup and character of surrounding regions. The PKK is eectively using this method in East Anatolia. In order to obtain a more expansive population advantage, PKK operatives force Kurds to migrate from heavily-populated Kurdish areas to less-populated ones. With this tactic, the aim is to win mayoralty elections and ultimately achieve extended autonomy for radical Kurdish politics.

Thus, political activities are also very important for the PKK. A formal political party serves as a legal home-base for urban militants. Through this legal structure, new members are recruited to more radical insurgent operations.

During the mayoralty elections in 2009 in Van, members of the Peace and Democracy Party (Baris ve Demokrasi partisi – BDP) created great fear amongst the public to force a heavy voter turnout for BDP. In this manner, the PKK becomes institutionalized under the legal structure of the Turkish state and organizes a second front of political struggle against the government.

The fog of war between the PKK and Turkish government resulted in the victimization of non-aligned Kurdish civilians. On 20 June 1987, PKK killed 30 villagers - 16 of them children - in Mardin (Ergil 2000). After this attack, the government decided to employ several methods in retaliation. First, the government deployed military troops in the southeast region. The army initiated counter-operations, conducting routine patrols and providing convoy protection. Additionally, two elite Special Forces units were created to counter PKK terrorism: Special Teams working as a unit of gendarmerie in rural areas and Special Operation Teams working as a unit of police in urban areas. Finally, the government also deployed air forces and conducted air attacks against PKK camps in mountainous regions.

Perhaps more controversially, the government organized an armed village guard system from Kurdish villages. Tribal leaders were assigned as the head of the village guard system. By using this system, the government was aiming to create local opposition against PKK militants.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 This system, however, brought about the misuse of power by tribal leaders and antagonism between Kurdish villagers and PKK militants. Beginning in 1985, PKK threats and attacks dramatically increased against Kurdish civilians who were suspected of supporting the village guard system. Allegedly, Abdullah Ocalan even ordered to kill families of village guards as they were seen as ‘state collaborators’ (Imset 1993). This violent polarization forced people to pick sides. Due to societal deficiencies in education and a lack of communication technologies such as internet and TV broadcasting to Kurdish areas, many young Kurds were convinced by the PKK to fight against the Turkish government. With this increased number of militants, the PKK created new units of fighters.

The government could not establish an effective way to prevent the enlarging popularity of the PKK. It declared a regional "State of Emergency" (Olaganustu Hal Yonetimi - OHAL) in Kurdish-inhabited zones, including the cities of Bingol, Diyarbakir, Elazig , Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli, and Van in 1987. A short time after this declaration, the region of "emergency management" was expanded and continued for an almost inexplicable 20 years. After the declaration of the OHAL, severe armed fighting with PKK militants became more common. Turkish military authorities had outlawed Kurdish organizations and banned all forms of ethnic and leftist movements with the coups of 1971 and 1980. Many people, including Kurdish nationalists, were jailed, the use of Kurdish language was forbidden, Kurdish village names were changed to Turkish ones, and Kurdish families were coerced to give Turkish names to their children (Ergil 2000).

These military coups, aimed to ensure the ‘integrity’ of Turkish society, instead created the perception of deliberate discrimination and assimilation by the Turkish government, trying to annihilate Kurdish nationalism.

These maneuvers and counter-maneuvers are what started the truly destructive war with the PKK. The primary victims of this war were civilians who were stuck between Turkish security forces and PKK fighters. They had to endure dual atrocities: suppression and execution by the PKK when suspected of collaborating with the state and the evacuation and destruction of Kurdish villages by the Turkish military when suspected of helping the PKK.

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According to the U.S. Department of State’s 1996 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2297 villages had been evacuated or destroyed and 2 million Kurds had been forced to leave their homes or villages (Ergil 2000). From 1996 the OHAL was gradually softened and in 2002 it was finally lifted. The policies implemented during the OHAL process, however, continued to restrict daily social life and caused bitter grievances within the Kurdish population.

Thus, restrictions on social practices and cultural freedom, police discrimination, and oppressive regime operations, all intensified by the military coups, strengthened Kurdish separatism/nationalism. These things not only helped spur the creation of the PKK, they unintentionally helped foment its deepening ties within Kurdish society. Turkish counter-policies stirred up the Kurdish problem; ruthlessly suppressing demands for cultural, linguistic, and political rights ironically caused the solidifying of Kurdish extremism (Olson, 1996).

The devolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey represents the destructive eects of poorly thought state actions trying to force a uniform national identity. All of this chaos between the PKK and Turkish government has forced tens of thousands of families to migrate to other cities. This migration consequently increased the poverty level and street crime in various regions, stressing the already weak welfare state in Turkey (Durna and Hancerli 2007). In addition, as this crisis became a globalized phenomenon, supporters of the Kurds living in Iran and Syria, as well as the strategic involvement of European countries, made the Kurdish question far more complicated than just labeling the PKK a terrorist organization.

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With the new millennium, the Turkish government started to develop more moderate policies by trying to develop improved economic and social conditions in Kurdish regions. This effort to strengthen the ‘loyalty’ of Kurds to the state is called the "democratic opening" in Ankara. However, the trends seen so far in the "democratic opening" movement indicates a lack of optimism based on the non-transparent and non-inclusive nature of the project. Both sides accuse each other of being insincere and having secret, hidden agendas.

In sum, the Kurdish question is the product of a negative blending of social, economic, cultural, and political factors in an environment in which both sides have been unwilling to empathize with each other. Misperception and prejudice prevents them reaching the roots of the problem. The authorities’ unwillingness to understand the concerns of the Kurds is perceived as humiliation and discrimination. This perception brings about hate, loss of identity, and an increased risk for fanaticism and terrorism.

The Kurds argue that the government’s approach left them no choice but to resort to collective violence and terrorism. The Turkish government may need to accede to the idea that addressing different perceptions about identity does not necessarily entail accepting them as reality; but taking them into account can provide a true progressive first step to solving what has up to now been an intractable social problem throughout an important part of the Turkish state. * This piece is partially excerpted from a larger article from Springer International Publishing AG 2016, A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, DOI 10.1007/9783-319-31816-5_2977-1

Modern Diplomacy Professor Paparella has earned a Ph.D. in Italian Humanism, with a dissertation on the philosopher of history Giambattista Vico, from Yale University. He is a scholar interested in current relevant philosophical, political and cultural issues; the author of numerous essays and books on the EU cultural identity among which A New Europe in search of its Soul, and Europa: An Idea and a Journey. Presently he teaches philosophy and humanities at Barry University, Miami, Florida.

The Nexus between Globalization and Justice eManuel l. PaParella, Ph.D.

IN 1973, E.F. SCHUMACHER WROTE A BOOK entitled Small Is Beautiful.

The book was well reviewed and was read by many people concerned with the global ecological disaster, but perhaps it was a bit ahead of its time. That was after all the time of agribusiness and the widely held idea that “big is always better.� That in turn was integral part of a positivist approach which believes that progress is inevitable, it is always scientific and what comes at the end and is most modern is always the best of all possible worlds.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Now we are more likely to be persuaded by those who insist, as Schumacher did, that a more localized decentralized approach to economics may be the more sensible and humane approach.

The question arises: why is that? Quite simply because economic globalization has taken center stage while global warming is often derided and ignored, more often than not by those who are supposed to be our leaders. Some say that globalization actually began with the era of Western colonialism and imperialism and it is unstoppable like the idea of progress.

Closer to us, in modern times, while welcomed and seen as a panacea at its inception in the last quarter of the 20thcentury, it has by now transmuted into a great debate on whether globalization is capitalism at its most pernicious or a promising way to reduce poverty world-wide. The sad truth is that while wealth has been increased it has mostly gone to the one per cent on top of the economic pyramid while the poor and middle class have seen no economic process.

Laissez-faire liberal capitalists of various stripes and assorted entrepreneurs searching for world-wide market opportunities a la Trump naturally support globalization and argue that becoming part of the world economy is the only chance for developing countries and those living in abject poverty at grasping economic opportunities and lift themselves out of poverty. They see absolutely nothing wrong with globalization per se; at best they suggest some reforms in its methods and its side eects on regional cultures. They may pay lip service to regional cultures and even religious heritages and tradition while at the same time deriding them as retrograde but necessary superstitions to keep the people docile and exploitable (hence Marx critique of religion as the opium of the people), but essentially they have reduced human beings to mere consumers within the global market place.

As William James used to quip: do not pay attention to what people say, pay attention to what they do and you will know what they really believe in. People willing to ruin reputations and impugn the professional integrity and career of their critics for an ideology reveal with their ad hominem attacks better than with their scholarly treatises the extreme measure to which they are willing to resort to in defense of their pet unexamined ideology.

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And that may indeed be the reason why, on the other hand, the protesters believe that globalization is merely an excuse for big business to run roughshod over the developing world. For them "free trade," so called, simply enables multinationals to dominate developing markets and push out local enterprise. They call for alternative ways of reducing poverty that prioritize environmental and human rights. They argue that by reducing ancient heritages and cultures to their lowest common denominator one dissolves most conflicts and distinctions among them and trivializes them.

The protesters, who have been at it for the last twenty years or so are convinced that Global capitalization is all about getting the rich to be even richer. They cite examples such as this: ten years ago a US company director got 40 times the wages of an average blue collar worker - their wages are now over 400 times as much. Just 400 families have more than half the world's theoretical wealth. Yet calling this insanity is sneered at. Capitalism requires expansion, there has to be year on year growth, and that's simple math: if you must expand your economy by an average of 3% a year, in a hundred years you need to consume in a day what we currently consume in a year.

In the world of culture a dichotomy seems to exist between the world of science and that of the liberal arts and the humanities, something I have written at length in previous articles. Indeed, a novel by a great novelist such as Dostoyevsky or Joyce, or a poem by Dante or Shakespeare represents a world rooted in numerous particularities where people from dierent backgrounds encounter one another and are trying to connect and influence each other; a world complicated by memories and ambitions and multiple connections and displacements. It’s a world wherein its unique rounded characters refuse simplifications.

On the other hand, what Globalization with its reductionistic tendencies seems to produce is the disembowelment of the complexity of world cultures, forcing their dierences into the blender of consumerism and accumulation of wealth, to then regurgitate shallow formulaic platitudes, reducing the narrative of those cultures and their heritage of millenarian religious traditions, to a singular outcome; that of universal consumerism and happiness, Disney or McDonald or soccer games style, where business need not be responsive to the people or to truly democratic institutions but to the happiness of its shareholders. This is achieved by moving factories and businesses to the cheapest labor markets and keeping pays low.

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According to this severe critical view, history has taught us that globalization means only one thing: the rich get richer, the poor get poorer. Corporate globalization and financial globalization without a buttressing ethical value system which sees the unity of humanity and its nexus to the earth, inevitably becomes dominated by greed and the profit motive.

The critics also point out that those societies with the highest standard of living are those which allow some degree of capitalism, but combine it with a strong sense of social justice as exemplified by their social programs designed to help the less privileged and the least fortunate. The richest country in the world may not necessarily be the country with the highest standard of living. It appears that the element of distributive justice, whether it is taken seriously or it is simply ignored and considered unimportant, makes all the dierence Obviously there are two contrasting ways of looking at Globalization and the question arises: are the two views irreconcilable or is a synthesis of sort possible? While the developing world needs help from the developed world, does such help have to come at the price of pollution and unsustainable technologies under the title globalization? Does globalization have to imply that transporting goods and foodstus thousands of miles using valuable fossil fuels and creating massive pollution is a good thing? It appears that Globalization as envisaged by the visionless current world leaders and economic pundits measuring wealth and ignoring justice is likely to damage the developing world more than help it.

What the developing and the developed world need are initiatives that allow countries to be self-supporting and less dependent on the vagaries of world exchange rates, transport costs and international sanctions. However those promoting world trade and entrepreneurial capitalism do not want this, they want to the developing world be dependent on to their technologies and trade tie-ins. The problem is not free trade as such, but the unfair way with which it is implemented. It is apparent to any dispassionate observer that far from upholding the principles of democracy, the exigencies of commerce has served often to thwart them.

Modern Diplomacy All one has to do is recall that Britain's colonial adventures in India, China and the East Indies were perpetuated by what was felt to be an inalienable right to force nations half way across the world to trade with them on their own terms.

Some have suggest that socialism is the solution, but socialism is often seen historically tied to the ideology of communism, adhered to by China’s ruling party, and this despite the fact that it is practiced in genuinely democratic countries in Scandinavia as well as in most industrialized democratic countries of the world which have social services that can only be characterized as socialistic, including the US which has social programs such as Social Security, Welfare benefits, Unemployment benefits, Medicare, Medicaid etc.

The Chinese are out to prove that democracy is not necessary for material prosperity; it is mere frosting on the cake, never mind Marx’s injunction that power ought to always proceed from the people, that is to say, from the bottom up and not from the top down. Hence ideological cultural battles invariably and regularly ensue and as it can be expected they become not part of the solutions but part of the social problems of our global village.

In point of fact, the battle between capitalism and anti-globalization, socialism, communism and all the other -ism's one can think of is quite pointless - none of these ideologies stand up in extremis. A harmonious balance between regulation and freedom in the markets seems to be the only way forward to benefit all with at least a minimum of egalitarianism and distributive justice while preserving and enhancing freedom and democracy.

There is one glaring example that can be brought to bear to better illustrate the unfair business practices of the developed world toward the developing one. Both Britain and the US make strenuous eorts to sell cigarettes to poor countries. They give no health warnings against smoking as they do by law in their own countries.

One can easily imagine how the precarious health services of these developing countries are going to cope in 20 year time with all the smoking related diseases we in the West are imposing upon them. I suppose that at that point in time the rapacious entrepreneurs of our brave new world will get busy selling them expensive medicines manufactured and developed in the West.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 The major issue with globalization seems to be that corporate chairmen have power without representation. One of them is all set to become the next US Secretary of State. If we were to think of consumerism as a new political idea, corporate chairmen are the politicians, advertisements are the party broadcasts or propaganda, and the products are the manifesto.

The result as advertised is happiness, fulfillment and wealth for everyone concerned. Donald Trump has promised as much to the ignorant and gullible and many are now waiting for the check in the mail. Good luck!

This analysis points to the fact that in effect we live in a semblance of democracy but in reality we live in a deterministic universe wherein we have been reduced to consuming automatons and our personhood and our very humanity has been robbed. It is now impossible to vote a corporation out of power. There is something fundamentally wrong in this situation. Branding globalization protesters as "anarchists" playing at revolution, as the media tends to do, will not lead to any solution either.

Schumacher made similar points in the above mentioned book.

In this article I have simply outlined the problematic of Globalization as presented by those on opposite sides of its analysis. Those readers who may wish to further deepen their knowledge and even attempt a solution to the conundrum would be well advised to peruse a seminal and influential article by Steven Weber, Naazneer Barma, Mathew Kroenig and Ely Ratner titled “How Globalization Went Bad” which appeared in Foreign Policy of Jan/Feb 2007.

In conclusion let me say this on the present perplexing and ambiguous age of globalization, the era of the so called interrelated “global village” with its Facebook and Twitter and the Internet: it is both the best of times and the worst of times. The outcome, I suppose, will depend on how well we can hold together in our mind those two contrasting notions and wrap them around our minds as a paradox. I sincerely doubt that logical positivists and assorted entrepreneurs will be of much help here, but I would suggest that the novels of a Dickens or a Dostoyevsky, not to speak of sages and philosophers, may provide some hints on how best to bridge the chasm.

Modern Diplomacy Enock T. Vera, holds a Masters of Science in International Relations from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, UK. Previously he was a Parliamentary Assistant to the Shadow Minister for International Development, Kate Osamor. At present working as a Research Associate in a think tank called Vestra Sententia

Imaging the Future: A Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe enoCk t. Vera

IN AUGUST 2016, AMIDST ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTEST, President Robert Gabriel Mugabe made it inescapably clear that there will be no Arab Spring in Zimbabwe. The 92-year-old president has ruled Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980, a time when he was told he had “ the jewel of Africa� in his hands by Presidents Machel and Nyerere of Mozambique, and Tanzania, respectively.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Thirty-six years later, Zimbabwe now resembles an ordinary rock rather than the much-coveted jewel it once was. There is no denying it, for better or worse, Zimbabwe’s politico-economic sphere has been dominated by Mugabe’s ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front) since independence. The party has led the country down the path of hyperinflation, laughable corruption and political insecurity due to a lack of good economic and political reforms.

Only after the sharp economic decline from 200008 did a strong opposition; The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerge. Consequently, the emergence of a strong opposition resulted in the country’s first-ever coalition government in 2009. And due to the coalition government, from 2009-13, there were improved economic policies resulting in a healthy growth for the country. Sadly and predictably, this was short-lived. The MDC were once again in opposition after the highly controversial elections of 2013 that saw ZANU increase its margins. With increased civil unrest, and protests, by any forecast, it would now seem that Zimbabwe is steering full steam ahead towards an iceberg with no signs of stopping, and at the helm is Mugabe. Compounded by internal power struggles within the party, the uncertain leadership succession is likely to result in an unpredictable and violent political transition. The question many political pundits are now asking is what Zimbabwe will look like during, and after this impending interregnum.

Mugabenomics Much of the protest in Zimbabwe is against the bad economic policies of the regime which have resulted in egregiously high unemployment, unpaid civil and public servants, put simply, the government has no money.

The portmanteau word: Mugabenomics, is not a celebration of his economic astuteness, but rather a clear warning against poor economic planning, corruption and over zealous monetary easing. Unlike Abenomics, which sought to stimulate the stagnant Japanese economy through fiscal stimulus, monetary easing (QE) and structural reform; Mugabenomics only had one policy, Quantitative Easing, which inevitably led to devaluation and hyperinflation.

Modern Diplomacy Controversially, the cash-strapped government is now in a process of printing yet again more money, but this time a surrogate currency: Bond Notes. These notes are said to hold a 1:1 value as the US dollar, however, this move has been unwelcomed by many zimbabweans as the Bond Notes are practically worthless outside Zimbabwe. Economics Professor, Steve Hanke (Johns Hopkins University) warned the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, explaining that "...bond notes would create chaos”.

We must note that Zimbabwe was not always in this economic state. After gaining independence, the Zimbabwe dollar was more valuable than the US dollar at the exchange rates. Throughout the 1980s, Zimbabwe enjoyed the positive economic growth of 5% GDP growth per year, in the 90s, 4.3%, however, the new millennium saw a decline in GDP. In 2000, there was a sharp decline of 5% in GDP, then 8% in 2001, 12% in 2002 and 18% in 2003. The Mugabe administration continued its policy of printing money in an attempt to revive the dying economy resulting in hyperinflation and mass unemployment. At the height of inflation (2008-09), the inflation rate was an estimated at 79.6 billion% in November, 2008. By 2009, the Zimbabwean dollar was quickly abandoned, and replaced by the US dollar. As a result of hyperinflation, there has not been any substantial Foreign Direct investment (FDI) in the country, only receiving $ 2billionin FDI, barely doing better than war-torn Somalia’s $1.7billion.

The causes of such economic degradation can be traced to three main factors; namely war, land reform and corruption. Firstly, in 1997, in an effort to buy political support from the Independence war veterans, the government announced that it would pay bonuses to the veterans equivalent to 3% of the GDP. This, of course, translated into an electoral victory in 2000 where Mugabe won with 48.6% of the votes, compared to MDCs 47%. Moreover, Zimbabwe’s unnecessary involvement in the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2002 badly drained the economy, further weakening an economy that was going through a drought. As a result, Zimbabwe could not pay off its debt to the IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank and other Western states, and thus defaulted on its debts. Secondly, Land Reform policy played a major role in destabilising Zimbabwe. In short, it was the effort to equality redistribute land between black farmers and white Zimbabweans, who at that time made up 5% of the population but owned 70% of the most fertile land. It’s crucial to note that the Land reform was part of the Lancaster House Agreement 1979 and that white farmers were being compensated for their land. The agreement stipulated a 10-year wait before Mugabe's government could insti-

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 tute land reform, which it did. From 1979-1997 the principle of “willing buyer, willing seller” was applied with Britain providing £44 million to the government for land reform. However, Blair’s Minister for International Development, Ms Clare Short, stated that the “UK did not accept that Britain had a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe” thus the Blair administration ended all payments.

What followed next was a reaction to the failures to uphold the commitments of Lancaster House, which was the introduction of the “Fast-track Land Reform Programme 2000”; a programme that gained notoriety due to the violent evictions of white Zimbabwean farmers. A referendum held in 2000 denied Mugabe increased powers to confiscate white-owned land, without compensation, by 54.7%, however, the Mugabe administration went on with the programme regardless. Instead of redistributing the land into the hands of black farmers, Mugabe gave most of the land to the top echelons of his government, top generals and war veterans, with some receiving as much as 5-10 farms. The international community (IMF, EU, US and the UK) responded with heavy sanctions on Mugabe’s government which had adverse consequences on the economic. The situation was further exacerbated due to the fact that these new “farmers” had no business or farming experience, thus leading to a sharp fall in food production (-45%) and manufacturing (-29%) resulting in price increase, and mass unemployment (-90%).

Modern Diplomacy Now these farms are once again being used as political tools to control those whose have fallen out of favour with the party, like Mr Temba Mliswa, whose farm is being confiscated by the state.

To continue, corruption played a huge role in Zimbabwe’s economic state.

Like all African states, Zimbabwe is very resource rich i.e., resources like gold, platinum and diamonds are amongst its main exports. However, the revenues from most of those resources are unaccounted for. The Marange diamond fields produced 13% of the world’s rough diamond, an estimated £15 billion in revenues, however, these revenues never made it back to the exchequer instead lined the pockets of Mugabe and his cronies. The sad thing about this situation is that with this one haul alone, Zimbabwe could have paid off its foreign debt worth £6-8 billion, created jobs, reducing unemployment instead of adding to it by cutting a further 25 000 civil service jobs. Sadly enough, with one of the highest literacy rates, both in the world and in Africa, at 90%, the population is one of Zimbabweans greatest assets. However years of corruption and poor economic planning has seen scores of unemployed graduates and profession, further damaging the economy, and the upcoming leadership succession is unlikely to resolve this issue.

House of cards The party’s dictatorial behaviour stems from its dominance in the political field, aided by the weaknesses of the opposition parties. However, with the vast majority of the public demanding a regime change, the impending interregnum will be the opportune time for Mugabe’s house of cards to fall. An interregnum is generally described as a period where leadership is either unclear or influx leaving the future unknown. In political terms, Mugabe will leave a massive power vacuum with various factions vying for power and control which, if we look at history, tends to end up violent.

In a thinly veiled threat Mugabe warned that “our patience has limits” in reference to the dissatisfied protesters who took to the streets to protest, brandishing the Zimbabwean flag, against Mugabe’s failed economic policies, corruption and wanted a regime change.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 The Zimbabwe Flag Act has made it illegal for the citizenry to produce, sale and use of the national flag without official permission after activists from the #Thisflag movement turned it into a symbol of anti-government protests. In every sense of the word, Zimbabwe is becoming an Orwellian state.

Article 59 of the Zimbabwean Constitution explicitly states that “[E]very person has the right to demonstrate and to present petitions, but these rights must be exercised peacefully”, the government has met the peaceful protesters with brutality, arbitrary imprisonment and fines of up to $200 (when most people live on $2 per day). To make matters worse, when Mugabe recently opened parliament, he introduced a new cybersecurity bill designed to monitor the internet and social media in order to find and arrest “dissidents”, violating the Article 61 of the Constitution (freedom of expression). In an ironic twist and a bid to control the citizenry, Mugabe is both, constraining the freedoms he and the early ZANUPF so valiantly fought for, and setting up the regime for a violent overthrow.

Robert Mugabe is most likely to hand-pick his next successor to continue his policies, though, admittedly, none will have his political astuteness.

During this uncertain time, one of five events may happen; 1. Business as usual. ZANU-PF has been the only dominant political force in Zimbabwe for decades, winning elections by hook or crook. Also, in rural areas, there is still strong support for ZANU-PF, and considering the president’s age, people may prefer the devil they know as he is entering his twilight. Furthermore, factions within ZANU-PF (Generation 40) are attempting to make Mugabe president-for-life. This scenario will be much welcomed by Mugabe as it will save him from being called up to the Hague for the egregious human rights violations.

2.Infighting. The warring factions of ZANU-PF are sharpening their swords for battle. Already we have seen those who no longer agree with the party, like Mr Agrippah Mutambara, have his farms confiscated. Furthermore, the fiercely loyal War veterans have abandoned Mugabe accusing him of being a dictator, already setting the stage for messy leadership succession.

On the other hand, The Zanu-PF Generation 40, (G40) are working hard to ensure Mugabe should be made President for life, and/or that dynastic politics continue with Grace Mugabe taking up the mantle. In direct competition with them, is the so-called Lacoste Faction (due to the T-shirts

Modern Diplomacy they wore to an event) whose goal is to crown the VP, Emmerson Mnangagwa, President as he is seen to be a stabilising figure and favourable to the Chinese. The infighting will serve one of two ends, the first being the disbandment of the party as opined by the political scientist, Ibbo Mandaza. The downside to this is that these factions were contained within the party, now have free, political violence is likely to ensue across the country. Second, it will serve to consolidate and concentrate power in the hands of ZANU-PF which will lead to a one party state, in all but name leading to further constraints on civil liberties and violent crackdowns on any opposition.

3.Civil War. Due to Southern Africa, as a whole, being relatively peaceful in comparison to its North or Western counterparts, this is highly unlikely to occur. Furthermore, Zimbabwe's neighbours and trading partners in Southern African Development Community (SADC) will push for a peaceful political transition as, (a) the civil war will be bad for business for the whole region, (b) the resulting displacement of people will put major economic strains and increase xenophobic attacks as seen in South Africa , and (c) the spill from the civil war will result in neighbouring states being inadvertently dragged into the war and used as proxy bases. However, if we look at the Gukurahundi operation (1983-87) in which the army's Fifth Brigade (answerable to the president only) identified and eliminated suspected anti-government elements among the Ndebele community resulting in up to 80 000 deaths, something like this is plausible.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 4.Opposition landslide. The upcoming election of 2018, in which the ageing president is standing in, will allow the electorate to vent their frustration against the ruling party. This, in turn, will result in the lifting of some sanctions by the West and the IMF, perhaps debt forgiveness, allowing Zimbabwe to rebuild itself economically and politically. However, if history is anything but a teacher, Mugabe will employ the same tricks he used to win previous elections such as intimidation, electoral fraud and having the dead vote for him. Though this will be the most peaceful event, the election will be highly contested.

A mixture of poor economic planning, corruption and overzealous monetary easing has eroded trust in Zimbabwe’s political and financial systems, at this stage, people just want something new. Consequently, this internal power struggle will end up eating the country exposing deadly fissures, ostracizing old faithful retainers and dividing allegiances. If anything is to be taken way from this, dear reader, is that ZANU-PF is Robert Mugabe and Robert Mugabe is ZANU-PF. In his 36 years in power, he has not received any credible challenge from within the party proving that either (a), as long as the upper echelons of the party receive their cut, they will be quite and obedient, (b) none of them have the political astuteness to overthrow him and successfully run the country, and (c) if they do, they are too scared to challenge someone with seemingly endless power. Despite eorts by the opposition and the protesters, I have a feeling that the upcoming election in 2018 is most likely going to be rigged leading yet to another ZANU victory. Regardless of people’s own personal feeling towards Mr Mugabe, he has come to define and shape Zimbabwean politics for generations to come. The sad conclusion is that history will not absolve Mr Mugabe. History will remember him as a great liberator of a by-gone era, who, like many in his era, stayed in power for too long. An authoritarian dictator who drove the economy and the country into the ground, violated many human rights, and a leader who often mistook his own personal interest to that of the country. His song will not be that of a glorious revolutionary legacy but rather, one of absolute power corrupting, absolutely.

Modern Diplomacy Samantha is a freshly minted graduate in International Relations based in Cairo, currently working as a research assistant in a small think tank looking at development and inequality in Africa

Why Africa united to fight illegal fishing saMantha Maloof

EARLIER THIS MONTH, OVER 40 AFRICAN UNION (AU) NATIONS signed a binding agreement to curb piracy and other maritime crime on the continent’s coastlines. The meeting in Lomé, Tongo, drew 18 heads of state – considerably more than most African Union meetings – a fact that demonstrates the importance to African leaders of curbing piracy, illegal fishing, and other crime on Africa’s economically endangered coastlines.

The deal will establish a maritime security fund, and is also meant to strengthen cooperation and communication between governments.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 The Lomé agreement brings together more than 40 nations with mutual interest in securing the continent’s shores. 90 percent of African imports and exports are transported by sea, making maritime security essential to the economic success of all African countries. Coastal states in West Africa are losing about $1.3 billion annually, just to illegal fishing alone. It is no wonder then that the agreement was praised as “historic” by Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso, while President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya said that it demonstrated an increasing ability to work together as a continent to solve such problems. Only a few years ago, outside powers such as the EU needed to be called in to help control piracy off the coast of Somalia.

The attention given to this problem is evidence of the vast economic impact of maritime criminal activity. South Africa alone loses billions of dollars every year to illegal fishing, especially to the poaching of abalone and lobster, prized by poachers for their high demand in places such as Hong Kong, China, and other parts of East Asia. Last year, 74 fishing vessels operated by Chinese Distant Water Fishing companies were found to be fishing illegally in prohibited West African fishing grounds and falsifying their gross tonnage, according to a two-year Greenpeace investigation. Most of those cases dated between 2000 and 2014, off the coasts of Guinea, Ghana, Senegal, and Guinea-Bissau. One report by the Overseas Development Institute estimates that West Africa could create as many as 300,000 jobs by ending illegal fishing.

Modern Diplomacy Much of the illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing that goes on in West African waters is at the hands of Chinese vessels. Chinese companies have expanded operations in the region from 13 vessels in 1985 to 462 in 2013. IUU fishing by Chinese vessels has been increasing in other parts of the world as well, but in Africa, these practices pose a particular threat. African governments have historically had limited ability to enforce maritime law. One third of all fish caught in waters off of West Africa is obtained illegally by Chinese fishing vessels. Traditional fishermen, using wooden canoes and small nets are now forced to compete with Chinese fishermen using some of the most destructive and large-scale fishing methods the world has ever seen. For example, many of these vessels use massive “drift nets”, which were banned by the UN in 1992. These nets can range from 10 to 100 nautical miles long, connected between buoys on the surface and lead weights 40 feet below.

Since many impoverished Africans rely exclusively on fishing for not only income, but also basic sustenance, the influx of IUU fishing is an especially serious problem. In Mozambique, IUU fishing has reached critical proportions. A 2013 study revealed that out of the 130 ships operating off its coast 129 were foreign, and concerns increasing that within 10 years, the Mozambique Channel may be all but bereft of maritime life. With the country losing 65 million dollars a year to illegal fishing, Mozambique’s state-backed tuna fishing company EMATUM bought several patrol vessels to help protect the nation’s waters. The country is now embroiled in a multimillion-dollar international controversy, after creditors deemed the purchase too expensive.

Meanwhile, piracy in West African waters has increased, as pirate activity off the coast of Somalia has finally started to decline. Fueled by the rise of militant rebels on land in places like Nigeria, economic pressure on a rapidly expanding population, and slumping oil prices, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has yielded some of the world’s most dangerous waters for seafarers. One report said that 1,225 seafarers were attacked by pirates there in 2015 alone. African nations have tried to deal with this problem on their own, but have found little success.

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While efforts by individual nations are commendable, the nature of the causes and effects of piracy and IUU fishing mean that cooperation between governments is essential to tackling the problem. International policy observers have suggested that more regional coordination could be the next step for Africa’s maritime security. Coastal waters must be protected as a shared resource. Furthermore, nations could fill the gaps in their own security infrastructure with assistance from private sector security firms. Finally, African partners in China and the rest of East Asia must pressure Beijing to reign in illegal fishing operations.

The Lomé agreement is a step towards the kind of cooperation that is necessary to secure Africa’s coastline. The signatories should ratify the agreement as fast possible in order to reap the benefits from its operation. With so many countries dependent on fishing and other economic activity on the African coastline, measures like this one are crucial to stem a still growing problem.

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Ms. Marwa Osman. PhD Candidate located in Beirut, Lebanon. University Lecturer and host of the political show “The Middle East Stream” broadcasted on Al-Etejah English Channel. Member of the Blue Peace Media Network and political commentator on issues of the Middle East on several international and regional media outlets.

The Baqee Organization to Washington to denounce cultural genocide Marwa osMan

CIVILIZATIONS ARE PROUD OF TRADITIONS and construct relics to build heritage sites honoring revered personalities. The Saudi government defies normal traditions by destroying the relics & shrines of all religions including Islam. Baqee is a cemetery in Saudi Arabia where Prophet Mohammed’s children, wives, companions, and relatives are buried. Since the destruction of Baqee in 1925 AD, it has become a symbol of the atrocities and brutality committed by Saudi Arabia and like-minded terrorist organizations such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Boko Haram and other offshoots.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 This is the exact same ideology that resulted in the destruction of Gautama Buddha statues in Afghanistan, Temple of Palmyra in Syria and the Tomb of Prophet Jonah in Iraq. These atrocities are a direct result of theWahhabi (Salafi) sect teachings, promoted by Saudi Arabia and exemplify their lack of tolerance, respect, peace and humanity. Apart from the destruction of heritage sites, the Saudi police display physical aggression on pilgrims visiting the cemetery especially women, which is a humanitarian issue.

A protest against Saudi Human Rights abuse held on July 13th in Washington DC, organized by The Baqee Organization, to denounce the disappearing of Islam’s holy sites. Since Wahhabism (Saudi Arabia’s state religion) first rose its head in the desert of Nejd in the Hijaz, in the 18th century Islam, Christianity, Judaism and all other religious denominations have suffered a veritable cultural genocide.

Over 7000 Islamic sites have been destroyed to assuage Wahhabis’ own sense of self-righteous bigotry, still the world has sat in silence. Firmly anchored in intolerance for they think their ideology holy, and pure, Wahhabi clerics have rationalized religious oppression and brutality, turning it into a well-honed system.

Amid the many crimes which were committed over the years one has towered over all as it spoke of a hate so entrenched in itself it could never be defined other than in ideological absolutism.

Modern Diplomacy In 1925, Al-Saud regime took its wrath on al Baqee cemetery, where some of Islam’s most noble personalities, including members of the Prophet Muhammad’s family, are buried. As it lies in ruins, al Baqee came to represent Resistance – the call of a people against the injustice of radicalism, the need for a people to reclaim its History so that cultural and religious identity would not be lost.

Wahhabism has claimed many holy sites over the centuries — Gautama Buddha statues in Afghanistan, the Temple of Palmyra in Syria and the Tomb of Prophet Jonah in Iraq. Before Wahhabism, the world stands to see its memory erased. It is this violence, this insane pursuit for religious absolutism which the Baqee Organization ambitions to denounce, and oppose so that justice could be reclaimed.

Muslims and non-Muslims – beyond creed, ethnicity, and political persuasions, people from across the United States will stand in solidarity with the embattled citizens of Saudi Arabia and the countries it oppresses. Similar protests were also held at Saudi Arabian Consulates and Embassies in Los Angeles.

In the face of tyranny, we are all minorities. It is how we face injustice which truly defines our character.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 MD Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders.

Mr Valori has lectured on international aairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.

The agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries GianCarlo elia Valori

OPEC, WHICH IS THE CARTEL of the 14 major oil producers, has recently adopted a policy that is bound to change all future political, strategic and economic equilibria.

With a view to contributing to support the oil barrel price, the Viennabased organization of the major Middle East oil producers has agreed to accept a very considerable output reduction, together with the Russian Federation and other countries, which is worth at least fewer 1.8 million oil barrels per day.

Modern Diplomacy Also all the non-OPEC oil producing countries, as well as Russia, shall follow suit and play along, otherwise the six-month agreement - which can be renewed indefinitely - will have no value. Obviously Russia plans to reduce its oil output and it is worth recalling that, in 2014, it was exactly the excess of Russian and North American oil supply to bring down the cost of crude oil below $ 100.

Currently, after Russia’s victory in Syria, it is precisely geopolitics which is knocking on the door of those who manage oil prices.Russia wants to resume its growth pathway and recover the costs of the war in Syria and of its future power projection onto the Middle East.The Sunni and the Shiite world want either to grow and diversify or recover from the long season of international sanctions - as is the case for Iran.

It is worth noting that the non-OPEC producers or, better, oil extractors, are Canada, Mexico, the United States, Bahrain - where only 8% of its GDP is generated by oil and gas, although it is a great centre of Islamic finance and aluminium production - Oman and, in Asia, China, Kazakhstan and obviously the Russian Federation, as well as, in Europe, Norway. Saudi Arabia will account for approximately 50% of the expected total reduction in oil production, that is 486,000 out of the 10 millions produced every day.

Iran, which is very tried by sanctions, accepts the reduction which is implicit in the agreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia, but drops from 3.975 million barrels per day to 3.797.

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OPEC will cut production by 1.2 million barrels per day, thus reaching 32.5 at the end of January 2017.If the cut had not been made, the oil price per barrel would have fallen below 30 dollars, but currently the most reliable analysts estimate that oil prices may grow from 50/65 US dollars up to 70.

The higher cost of crude oil is quickly reflected in all related prices, thus favouring the start of inflation that many people - again with some naivety - are waiting in Western economies.

Incidentally, Russia does not trust much of OPEC promises but, together with other countries such as Kuwait, Algeria and Venezuela (all OPEC members), Oman (non-OPEC member), and Russia, it manages the "Review Committee on the evaluation of production agreements". As a result of the agreements, also Russia has cut production by 100,000 barrels per day.

In this regard, it is also worth recalling that the agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries would enable the US shale oil producers to stabilize production or even to increase it.At strictly technical level, Iran participates in the operation only considering the strategic situation in the Greater Middle East, while it would even need to increase its oil supply by at least one million barrels per day so as to regain its position and recover from the long period of sanctions.However, as also the Iranian authorities know all too well, the country’s oil production is even on the wane, from 3.85 to 3.60 barrels per day.

After the end of the embargo, the Iranian ayatollahs have succeeded in increasing production only from 2.8 to 3.8 million barrels per day, but the problem is that, in such a market, the increase in supply immediately depresses the oil barrel price.In fact, operators naively expected an unlimited oil flow from Iran which, however, failed to increase production and, indeed, OPEC itself has recently recorded a drop in the oil extracted by Iran from 3.85 to 3.60 million barrels a day, a clear sign of damage to the extraction system and of technological obsolescence - problems which cannot certainly be solved in a day.

The booming prices, caused by a substantial oil barrel market manipulation, will also benefit the Iranian Shiites, without diminishing Saudi Arabia’s economic and military chances.At qualitative level, which is not a secondary aspect in these situations, the production of light and sweet crude oil typical of US oil fields has not much favoured the recent excess of production, unlike the OPEC sulphurous and medium-quality oil.

Modern Diplomacy In recent years, the OPEC increase in oil production has originated over 50% of its excess supply exactly from Saudi Arabia and Iraq, namely 1.5 million oil barrels a day, while shale oil - which is the main enemy of the Vienna-based cartel - has decreased by over 500,000 barrels a day, considering that it is more sensitive than other sectors to the profitability guaranteed by its high price.

It is equally true that currently the increase in the oil barrel price favours even the US and Canadian shale oil, which becomes economically viable only above 60 US dollars per barrel. Some analysts even maintain that currently 60% of the remaining world oil production is precisely in the US shale oil sector, whose companies should gain a competitive advantage over the next five years.Furthermore, it is worth noting that in recent years the production cost of the US oil barrel has dropped by 30-40%, while it has declined by only 20% in the OPEC area.

Hence, paradoxically, a clearly anti-American geoeconomic choice becomes an asset for the new US economy - halfway between oil and domestic manufacturing companies - according to Donald J. Trump’s designs.Moreover, currently Saudi Arabia has reached its maximum production level, but it may have technological capabilities to increase it by 25% for a short lapse of time.

Today, after the agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, the Brent futures maturing in February 2017 have temporarily exceeded 57 US dollars - a rise by over 5% compared to the closing of last Friday.According to Merrill Lynch, the agreement between the two groups of oil producers - an agreement that Russia has developed for years (and it is worth recalling Putin's statements in favour of Russia’s becoming an OPEC member) - will make the oil barrel price rise to 70 dollars by mid-2017.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Hence speculative capital will come back on oil markets, thus temporarily abandoning the other alternatives: non-oil commodities, currencies, gold and precious metals, as well as many government bonds.

Behold, Italy shall recalibrate its supply of public debt securities. It will not be an easy task.Nothing, however, is yet decided and stable. In fact, you may recall the underground war against OPEC waged by Kuwait in 1985, when the OPEC countries reported much larger oil reserves than the real ones because this boosted their production quota.

In principle, the OPEC reserves are supposed to be only 0.8 billion barrels as against the 1.3 billion barrels reported by the Vienna-based cartel.In general terms, all OPEC official oil reserves could be larger than the actual ones by over one third.Not to mention the fact that the real data on Saudi oil and gas reserves is still a state secret in the country.

Therefore the current OPEC's policy line is to attract in the cartel, at least indirectly, all the external oil production, by marginally favouring even the US and Canadian production, which had been the target of the long bearish fight of Middle East oil countries.The geopolitical effects are before us to be seen: much of the Middle East is united in adhering to the Russian strategies, while the United States - not to mention the ludicrous EU - are left at the starting post.

Egypt will receive one million Iraqi oil barrels a day, at a much lower price than Saudi Arabia’s, which had been initially promised to Al Sisi in the framework agreement envisaging 23 billion US dollars of aid on a yearlybasis.Saudi Arabia did not implement the agreement with Egypt so as to punish it for its participation in the Russian-Alawite system in Syria.Al Sisi has even reopened the hidden channels with the Lebanese Hezb'ollah and will contribute to the construction of an oil pipeline from Iraq to Egypt through Jordan - not to mention the fact that Egypt is already training four Iraqi army units for anti-terrorist operations.

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Moreover, Egypt is fighting actively against the "Islamic State" in Libya, and especially in the Sinai region, and Daesh can now hit Egypt from its bases in Southern Libya.Hence Al Sisi has envisaged to strengthen his ties with Algeria, which has similar problems.

In fact, this is exactly where the new oil proceeds will be channelled. They will be used to defend the extreme lines against the jihad – hence Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Syria.

They will also be used to stabilize the situation in Syria and the increase in crude oil price will also fund the modernization and diversification of the Russian economy.

Europeans will not jump on the bandwagon and, like the kids living in the outskirts, will remain in the railway stations to watch the trains leaving.

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Ms. Lingbo ZHAO is a candidate of the Hong Kong Baptist University, Department of Government and International Studies. Her research interest includes Sino-world, Asia and cross-Pacific.

Battling the Tiger: Combating corruption in the Sinoworld Lingbo Zhao

After the eighteenth nAtionAl Congress of the Communist Party of China, a new round of anti-corruption campaign has been going on. With almost fifty provincial officials, more than 600 director-level officials and more than 200,000 petty officials snared, this campaign is being conducted in a harsh way on a large scale.

More importantly, as Vice Primer WANG Qishan pointed out, the ultimate goal is to reach the “would not think of it”stage from the current “would not dare”stage. In order to realise this goal, the passive control and surveillance measurements which have been carried on over decades may not be able to meet the demand. What should be prior taken into consideration is institutional designs for a clean government.

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If we look for a successful example for China on anti-corruption reform, Hong Kong may be a good one. During the 1960s, with the increasing population and the rapid expansion of manufacturing industry, Hong Kong was faced with a similar situation which corruption was wide-spread around the force and the community in mainland China nowadays. (Manion, 2004)And yet since 1974 when the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was created, the anti-corruption interventions has empowered to accomplish the transformation. This commission, according to the Basic Law, functions independently and is directly accountable to the Chief Executive. (Scott, 2011 So the paper is conducted by analysis on causes of corruption and anticorruption measurements in mainland China, followed by the evaluation and comparison of Hong Kong and mainland China. Though sharing a Chinese culture, great difference remains between each other. Especially when we focus on the anti-corruption achievement, Hong Kong, considered as the freer market from government intervention, has incredible achievements in combatting institutionalised corruption while China, during two decades of anti-corruption campaign, remains one of the most corrupt countries.This paper considers the rooted causes and problems of the anti-corruption strategy in mainland China. By introducing the incidence of Chen Xitong and the general situation on state personnel corruption, it argues extent, forms and characteristics and the institutional loopholes of Chinese government. Meanwhile, the process of the transformation in Hong Kong will be illustrated empirically and compared with the process in mainland China. The key part——ICAC will be evaluated.

And the suggestions of establishing such commission in mainland China will be introduced and tested. The main researching method is new institutionalism by focusing on the institutional design and informal practice in mainland China. the definition of corruption Corruption, simply speaking, means the abuse of power for illegal monetary transaction. One of the most comprehensive definitions that by a short simply wording incudes both a public and private sector corruption comes from a Vienna-based prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic: “Seemingly victimless, hidden trade-off between influence and gain” (Bajrektarevic, Palermo Treaty system, Addleton NY, 2011). The World Bank defines (public) corruption as the abuse of public office for private gains. However, when it comes to a definition in concrete terms which contain too much connotation.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 In addition, the causes and the results of public-private sector corruption are diverse. It can be traced in governments and civil societies, which include economic systems, administrative systems, judiciary systems and so on. (Harris, 2003) No matter how broad and complicated the concept is, it can reflect rules and violators who against those rules can be identified and punished. (Gambetta, 1999) In the Chinese context, there are two major definitions that can be applied to China in the transition period. For those who are in favor of a tough enforcement and party disciplinary, they would like to provide a more broadbased definition which includes public offices, public interest and public opinions factors. By contrast, for those who are in favor of an effective effacement and market efficiency, they would focus on the abuse of public office.

(Sun, 2004) Though there is no formalistic answer to the question on what the definition is, this paper would use a definition corresponding with the Chinese context.

The corruption is defined as the abuse of authority or the public power by occupants in the government or the party to gain private interests. This interpretation narrows down to the public office level that focuses on the abuse of public power in the political activities.

Corruption in Mainland China The process of corruption in China after 1949 can be roughly divided into two periods. There is the classical communist period from 1949 to 1976 and the socialist market from 1976 to the present. (Harris, 2003) From 1980 on, the development of corruption took place together with the legitimating of financial pursuit, delegation of power to an individual or an agency, fast expansion of the market economy, deficiency of the Party’s discipline as well as delaying in introducing regulatory control and required on time legislative renewal. (Kwong, 1997)

Modern Diplomacy One case disclosure shocked the public. That is that the mayor of Beijing— —Chen Xitong was found directly engaging in bribe taking, with numerous bribe givers and huge material rewards. Even for Chen Xitong, whose downfall is often interpreted as political, the size of his booty warranted his fate. Two private villas, where Chen spent his leisure time and kept his mistresses between January 1993 and February 1995, cost the public nearly Y40 million in maintenance fees, and Y1.05 million in catering expenses. According to Sun (2004), “The villas were filled with luxuries ranging from gold doors and agate floors to extensive maintenance and security. Eventually, he was sentenced to 16-year jail term. ”(p. 148).

In Alan Liu’s categories, the forms of corruption in mainland China can be roughly divided into three groups. The first one is universal in all political systems including bribery, embezzlement and abuse. The state property is still a main target but not the only one. Instead, it is the greater inducement from and dependence on the market that now defines the forms and methods of violation. The second type is related to the economic reform, such as accounting violation and privilege seeking. When decentralisation was carried on gradually, autonomy and increasing resources have facilitated corruption dynamically. Precisely, there is linkage between economic liberalisation and corruption. Third one is resulted from moral degradation in a broad way. Sun (2004) states that “even here the marketplace has stimulated distinctive forms of moral deviation in recent years.”(p. 51).

Causes of corruption in China The growth of corruption is considered as a policy outcome.(Gong, 1997)It results from mainly the economic reform in an unconscious way during the reforming and opening period. In general, economic reform which is for market development and economic growth, has built up the advantageous condition for the explosion of corruption. Increasing business opportunities, the looser economic policies and the higher payoffs motivated officials to get involved in corruption.

To break through the planned economy which made the economy in China stall market economy was introduced to China 30 years ago. Wedeman (2012) states “this reform help China accomplish an economic miracle,” which also makes China lie on the top in the international community.

As the continuous development of market economy and reform and opening going deeper, corruption has come out as an ineluctable social phenomenon.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 During the reform of economy, market competition is one of the most important factors which cannot be underestimated. When analysing the relationship between market economy and corruption, both western and Chinese scholars found out the paradox. There is a negative correlation between economic growth and corruption. Firstly Paolo Mauro, followed by other economists, found that the higher the rate of corruption is, the lower the rate of development is. Empirically, they drew out a conclusion that when the rate of corruption increases one point, it results in the reduction of one percent in economic growth. Theoretically, this statement also can be correct because equality and justice are the key factors of market competition. However, this kind of developmental corruption model cannot successfully reflect the facts in Mainland China where we can see the increasing corruption rate together with the fast development of market and economic growth. Some severe realities are quite obvious. The number of oďŹƒcials corrupting keeps increasing. The involvement in business field of governmental oďŹƒcials is enlarged. Corruption, originally a concealed individual behaviour, is turning into an organised collusion such as Shanghai Gang. (Gong, 1997)

As I mention before, there is a paradox about the relationship between market economic growth and corruption. Admittedly, corruption keeps developing in Mainland China together with the rapid growth economy.

Gong Ting (1997) uses a conceptual framework which is the interactions of formal and informal practice from new institutionalism to give the explanation. She believes that corruption, as an informal practice, is actually a production of formal practice with loophole. They are interactional to some extent. To stamp out corruption, the starting stage should be on the amendment towards formal practice such as legal framework, judicial system and institutional design.

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As for the judicial system, she also points out that the wide spread of corruption is facilitated by the way the courts are organized and supervised.

The courts, in mainland China, are not different from other governmental agencies. They are not independent. The local government decides the finances of the courts. Senior judges are nominated by the local CPC Committee and endorsed by the local People’s Congress, meaning judges whose decisions are seen to violate Party policy may be discharged or otherwise punished. The courts are subject to the extra-legal authority of the Political-Legal Secretary of the local Party Committee, which deals with difficult and important cases referred to it. (Manion, 2004) Anti-corruption strategy in hong Kong What makes Hong Kong’s economy successful? Several points below are worthy being remarked such as low tax collection, freedom in market competition, a relatively efficient legal system, an efficient and effective network on transportation and communication and “a competent workforce working along with a pool of enterprising entrepreneurs”described

by Howlett (1997, p.47) (as cited in Manion, 2004). Those factors not only significantly contribute to the economic development in Hong Kong but also enable Hong Kong’s economic wealth which does good to combatting corruption as the government can afford the salaries of civil servants and enough human and financial resources can be committed. (Quah, 2003) Different from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China (Zhongjiwei), the ICAC operates independently in terms of structure, power, finance and personnel. Before 1997, there was a direct access between its Commissioner and the Governor. After July 1997, the ICAC is directly responsible to the Chief Executive. So far, the ICAC has developed into three major functions which are investigation, prevention and education to fight against corruption in Hong Kong.

(Scott, 2011) the structure of the iCAC As for its structure, there are main three unequal branches and the Administration Branch. Among the three departments, the largest one which is the Operation Department takes the responsibility of the investigative function. The over nine hundred employees takes up 73% of the ICAC human resource. The head of the Department also serves as the Deputy Commissioner, assisted by two Directors who are in charge of the government sector and the private sector respectively. The second largest one is the Community Relations Department.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 The two divisions of this Department are mass media and the public. It has 202 staff which is 16% of the total staff in the ICAC. Intensive education projects are conducted in schools and business sectors. In addition, it also builds up a close relationship between mass media and district organisations in order to raise the public awareness and gain their support towards the anti-corruption movement. The smallest department is the Corruption Prevention Department (CPD), taking up 4% of the total employees in the ICAC. In concrete terms, the objectives of the CPD is to inspect the practice and procedures of government and public bodies. Also, it takes the responsibility of making amendments and suggestions on the working methods. Training for civil servants is also offered by the CPD for the purpose of prevention. Apart from these three departments, there is a separated administration department. It is in charge of human and financial resources and general matters such as accommodation and technologic service. Besides, an advisory committee is to examine the work of each department.

The ICAC also has its own recruitment practice. The employees are recruited out of the control of the Public Service Commission, which makes the staff of the ICAC separate from other governmental sections. During the recruitment process, the ICAC itself takes the whole responsibility of promotion, screening, interviewing and other process. As for the financial fund of it, by the 2001/2002 financial year, its budget has reach 81 times compared from the first year when it was established. This rapid increasing in budget reflects the strong will of the government on the support of the ICAC anti-corruption enforcement. (Quah, 2003) Comparison on Anti-corruption strategy in Mainland China and hong Kong - institutional Designs The main difference in mainland China and Hong Kong is the anti-corruption agencies. In Hong Kong, the ICAC is an independent agency with power and increasing budget. More importantly, the Commissioner of the ICAC is directly answerable to the Chief Executive, which makes the ICAC a separated agency apart from other governmental departments. (Harris, 2003) However, in mainland China, unclear boundary exists between the party and government branch. Junctional jurisdictions are dominated by communist party committee generalists at each level. The second point is the institutional design. In Hong Kong, one of the three important methods of anti-corruption is the prevention through institutional design is; in mainland China, certain economic reform policies actually stimulate corruption.

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Reorganisation of procedures to reduce incentives for corrupt transaction has been shown recently. Finally, the analysis will go back to the basic ground of anti-corruption strategy which is the constitutional design. This essential difference lies in the two different regimes. Hong Kong has a functioning rule of law regime and effective civil liberty while mainland China is conducted by a rule of law regime less constructively and neglect of civil liberty. (Manion, 2004) Hong Kong’s institutional design not only focus on the enforcement measures but also pays high attention to the prevention by offering suggestion.

The ICAC’s Corruption Prevention Department is to study the work procedures in governmental departments to identify opportunities for corruption. (Manion, 2004) Having studied and analysed, suggestions would be offered so as to reduce the possibility of corruption by redesigning the working procedures. Further, after the suggestions are given, the Department is still in charge of checking the effectiveness of the suggestions, making sure the new design would not offer ground for new chances for corruption. The function as consultant is one of the key and unique notion of this department, especially when the government is on its way to draft and amend legislative text and policies. To a great extent, this function makes sure the anti-corruption movement starts from the beginning level where new laws are introduced for an incentive purpose.

Also in mainland China recently, more attention has been paid towards designing incentive structures from the original forcemeat stage. In Anhui province in 2000, the “taxed for fees” reform was adopted from the perspective of being incentive. The reform is to reduced possibility of corruption in the township governments and villages by reforming the basic collection system.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 It replaces a single agricultural tax, capped at about 7 percent of income and collected by higher level governments, for various fees and charges levied by township and village administrations. Compared with the previous regulations against illegal fees in 1990s, Manion (2004) described that “the reform frees officials at the rural grassroots level from fee collection and makes corruption at the township and village more difficult.”(p.

205) In 2003, this reform was successfully adopted nationwide, becoming a good example in mainland China of transforming to the incentive structure.

According to policy analysts, the key part of institutional design in Hong Kong is the independence of the ICAC and it is what mainland China should emulate when reforming the anti-corruption strategy. This refer to the exclusive anti-corruption mission of the agency: “The ICAC is not embedded in the civil service or any other larger organisation with multiple goals”. Among this, the most important is the police force remaining independent, especially in the 1973 context of a public perception of that department as the most corrupt of all. Agency independent worked in Hong Kong primarily because this agency design worked as a signal, a public announcement of an “equilibrium switch”——but it worked especially well in a particular context. With corruption structured this way, the creation of an agency that effectively rejected the police as anti-corruption agents helped legitimate the government effort and enlisted ordinary citizens as voluntary enforcers. Independent was complemented by power, also an element of agency design: the ICAC was given strong investigate powers and considerable financial resources. legal framework Difference also lies in the law set in Hong Kong and mainland China. The reasons behind it are partly contributed by the different policy choices which illustrate different experience and views. From a perspective of a higher degree, however, basic difference on constraints of power should be noticed.

A solid legal foundation has become the base of Hong Kong’s anti-corruption reform.

Modern Diplomacy Two important legislative context have to be introduced. The Prevention of Bribery Ordinance was strengthened in 1971. It provided with a clear definition by including “unexplained income or property”which can serve as the evidence of corruption practices. Clarity, stability, scope and whether it is easy for application, all the points above greatly influence on whether and how a corrupt official can be punished according to law.

(Quah, 2003) To build up a clear legal basis, several points should be well defined. Legal clarity, breadth, stability, and ease of application all contributed to a situation where corrupt officials were routinely punished according to law. And the public confidence of the anti-corruption enforcement is also, to some extent, basing on whether the law is harsh without loopholes.

On the contrary, in mainland China, the main force on combatting corruption is centralised by the CDIC which plays as a leading and administrative role. But as for the legal system itself, it remains weak.

What depletes the development of law and a legal-based authority in mainland China? One point should be noticed that under the leading of the CDIC, the investigation and punishment are conducted within the party system. This makes lag when a criminal case is transferring into the prosecution process. So the agency design which makes anti-corruption enforcement outside the criminal procuratorates system may be one of answers to the question above. (Gong, 2004) Besides, the law making process is also not propitious. The first criminal code was passed in 1979. Then comes rapid changes on political economy which forced law makers refine the law with taking lots of new factors into consideration. The role of law and its distinction between party leadership shows a fundamental contradiction in mainland China. The law should serve as a powerful tool to fight against the abuse of official power. (Manion, 2004)

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Conclusion China’s path of corruption is actually quite similar to the process in Hong Kong, rapid growth in population and economic transition. By viewing Hong Kong as a good example of mainland China, we can find basically one main loophole which is the ambiguity of power between the party and judiciary from both legal and institutional prospective. If mainland China are going to set up an independent agency like ICAC in Hong Kong, a clear boundary must be well-defined. First of all, as for the institutional setting, it is to avoid the interference from the government and the party in order to ensure authority and transparency of this agency. Second, it is to reduce delay when a corruption crime transferred from the investigation of the party to the prosecutors. Further, even though the “fight against tigers�movement achieve success for the current situation, refining the present legal framework still remains the determinant.

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China’s Silk Road Looks to Revive its Economic Fortunes YuriY KoroL

n JAnuAry 18 A loCoMotive with 34 carriages pulled into Barking Rail Freight Terminal in London’s east end. Normally, this would not be in any way out of the ordinary. This particular train, however, had travelled 7,456 miles to reach its destination. Departing from Yiwu, China, the journey took 16 days and travelled across eight different countries to deliver its goods to the UK market.

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The Yiwu-London route is just the most recent development of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) policy; a massive international infrastructure development program which spans Eurasia and aims to remove the divide between separate European and Asian trading blocs. This investment program is the brainchild of current president Xi Jinping who sees it vital to the success of his presidency and China’s future economic prosperity.

A slowing economy As Mr. Xi succeeded the outgoing Hu Jintao in 2013, it became clear that the country as a whole was also beginning to transition. China has been the engine of world economic growth for the last several decades due to its large manufacturing sector, powered by an almost unlimited supply of cheap labor in a constant human stream moving from rural areas to urban ones. This job powered movement has been described as the greatest migration of people in human history. The parallel construction of factories and accommodating infrastructure helped China achieve double digit economic growth rates during Mr. Jintao’s decade long presidency.

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This remarkable growth started to slow as Mr. Xi took office partly due to the increasing wages and gradual aging of the working population. With an annual growth rate of 6.7% in 2016, the lowest in 25 years, concern has started to spread. Foreign owned factories began looking towards other regions to build their facilities. Countries like Vietnam have seen an increase in investment both in their development and in migrants working across the border in China for smaller wages. Worldwide commodity prices have tumbled at any rumor of a slowdown of the Chinese economy. Additionally, the 2008 economic crisis brought with it a massive debt burden.

Currently nearing 44% of debt to GDP, China’s borrowing has not slowed, which makes it susceptible to another 2008 style crisis.

Mr. Xi’s answer to the economic slowdown came in the form of a throwback to China’s Golden Age; a time when a romanticized silk road linked the European and Asian markets in a constant stream of merchants, goods, and ideas. Much more than a romanticized notion, the economic benefits of an infrastructure and capital injection of a scale not seen since the post-war Marshall Plan, could rejuvenate a faltering economy and make Beijing a center of world trade and diplomacy. silk road redux OBOR, at its heart, is a trade infrastructure investment program which aims to build or upgrade existing overland and maritime trade routes. The official figures associated with OBOR are so impressive that it is difficult to find a historical precedent which matches it in scale (apart from the aforementioned Marshall Plan). There are roughly 900 projects currently underway according to official state media. This puts a total valuation of both overland and maritime routes at approximately $890 billion. The Chinese ambassador to the UK even boasted that OBOR would include 60 different countries with about two-thirds of the world’s population. Clearly these figures should be taken with a grain of salt, but if they are anywhere close to reality, then it would be plain to see that China is tying much of its economic and strategic future to OBOR. Individual projects include a planned dam in Pakistan, a new railroad in Uzbekistan, a transport hub in Germany as well as a stake in Greece’s second largest port, among many others. The Chinese government finances these projects through its sovereign wealth fund as well as through an investment bank created specifically for OBOR, called the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These combined funds currently provide a startup amount of about $140 billion.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Additionally, private enterprise is encouraged to take part with Chinese regions and companies attempting to connect to the Silk Road network.

The increased activity of Chinese construction companies is a central facet of OBOR as the country looks abroad for economic opportunity. As part of its attempt to reign in state credit lending and debt, China is trying to offset the increasing production costs associated with Chinese goods with lower transportation costs to European and Asian markets. It also stands to make Chinese banks attractive to foreign lending as they standby to lend increasing amounts of currency in the form of Yuan to Silk Road countries to finance OBOR construction. Naturally, there are also some soft power incentives for Chinese officials as well. At a time when the struggles for influence over Central Asia, the Middle East, and even parts of Europe dominate the headlines, a potential finance power like China could consolidate its influence over these regions through strategic lending. If managed correctly, OBOR could be a multi-pronged approach to ensuring long term economic and diplomatic success for China.

If managed incorrectly, however, China could potentially be in a more precarious economic situation. As discussed previously, the $140 billion raised through the sovereign wealth fund and the AIIB is far short of what is needed for an $890 billion valuation of the projects. There has been little mention of how China may go about funding the rest of OBOR, but if the decision is made to risk borrowing the required funds, the world’s second biggest economy will be disappointed with anything short of complete success. The situation may become more unstable when taking into account the endemic corruption and potential for default of many of OBOR nations.

Modern Diplomacy Also, any nation involved in such an extensive undertaking would be in untested waters. Would Chinese construction companies and banks be capable and flexible to manage diverse projects in dozens of countries?

And finally, the lack of clear framework and timeframe for completion leaves plenty of ambiguity for what a completed Silk Road may look like.

The One Belt, One Road development program is still in its initial stages.

What becomes of it is still entirely up in the air with plenty of variables, moving parts, and agreements still to be made. The program’s ambition, however, cannot be doubted. If nothing else, an attempt to seamlessly link European and Asian markets is a noble one in terms of diplomacy.

Economically, China has much riding on OBOR’s outcome. Its economy will not return to being what it once was, nor do most Chinese want that to happen. With new environmental regulations and a growing middle class, China seeks a new more modern way to prosperity. The foreign adviser to Mr. Xi, Yang Jiechi, who is also closely tied to OBOR, outlined China’s aims of being a well-off society by 2020 and a strong and prosperous one by 2050. If China’s future reality matches its present ambitions, then it is extremely likely that Mr. Yang’s aims will be realized.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Research Scholar, Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies, School of Social Sciences. Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

Demonetization and its impact on Indian Economy JaYanti Kumari

n noveMber 8, inDiAn PriMe Minister Narendra Modi took a historic decision by announcing that the high-denomination notes (Rs 500 and Rs 1,000) then in circulation would cease to be legal tender.

With demonetization effort 86% of India’s currency was nullified that aimed to wash the stock of ‘black market's cash supply’ and counterfeit notes out of the economy and convert it into the licit, banked and taxable, part of the economy. To reduce the impact of sudden commercial collapse, a 50 day period ensued where the population could (ideally) exchange their canceled cash for newly designed 500 and 2,000 rupee notes or deposit them into bank accounts.

Modern Diplomacy Irrespective of the widespread anguish and household disturbances, an optimistic sentiment shown in favour of the decision.

Cash is the preferred mode of transaction in India and only less than half the population uses banking system for monetary transactions.

An immediate public anger appeared against the mismanaged and unprepared banking system. The banks didn’t have enough of the newly designed banknotes (Rs 500 and Rs 2000) to distribute in exchange for the canceled notes.

The move has also led to a shortage of lower denomination notes such as Rs 100 and Rs 50 that are still legal tender, as people have taken to conserving whatever cash they have in hand.

The demonization initiative has caused a sudden breakdown in India’s commerce and the unbanked and informal economy is hard hit. Trade across all aspects of the economy has interrupted, and sectors like agriculture, fishing, and the huge informal market were almost shut down during the initial days of announcement. The informal sector in India employs more than a majority of the workers and most transactions are in cash. Disruption to this system could endanger the employment and livelihood of weaker sections of society. The change disturbed the lives of ordinary people, led to widespread need and major job losses for the poor.

Nevertheless, although India’s demonetization move was apparently mismanaged in the beginning, the effects at micro level look advantageous.

For instance, all sorts of illegal activities, like terrorist financing, etc. have been completely hit after the announcement. The demonetization process has also repaired India's counterfeiting problem for the near to mid-term.

The cash-centric black market for the most part ceased to function with the nullification of the bulk of its currency. It has also been reported that the new 500 and 2,000 rupee notes are less vulnerable to counterfeiting, having advanced security features. It is also thought that the drive will wipe out a measure of corruption and tax evasion in India’s real estate market. Growth in cash-intensive sectors such as real estate, construction and FMCG is likely to take a hit in the short term as consumers are deferring purchases. The real-estate market is likely to come to a standstill with property prices likely to fall and the possible tax inquiries following demonetization will affect both consumption and investment in the formal and informal sectors.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 However, there is a positive side to the story, over the medium term, there would be benefits through higher government spending and greater financial inclusion. Also, the movement of household savings from physical to financial will help boost growth, according to Yes Bank BSE 0.90 % report.

With exchange of the old currency notes coming to an end, many people are forced to open accounts to save their money. It is estimated that banks have opened about 30 lakh (and still counting) new accounts since the demonetization drive began on November 8. India's largest bank, State Bank of India (SBI), with its 17,097 branches -- half of which are in the rural and semi-urban areas – is opening 50,000 accounts a day. The leading consumer internet companies in India (Flipkart, Snapdeal, Shopclues, CCAvenues, Ola and Oyo Rooms) have applauded the move, saying it will pave the way for digital payments, aid the process of financial inclusion and the overall transformation in the economy will translate into long-term benefits for the industry. Payments companies Paytm and Freecharge saw a surge in adoption of their digital wallets. According to market experts, the growth of digital payments and wallets is the first phase of the impact and will give big boost to lending and credit as the digital records of merchants will expand and create more demand in the second phase.

Even though demonetization move created adverse short-term policy impact the real impact of must be assessed in the medium/long term. The reduction in overall investments, both in the formal and informal sectors, would certainly reduce economic growth potential. However, the move need to be followed up with ensuing actions to remain effective. These actions relate primarily to structural changes to make the system more lawful, reducing too much bureaucracy, make the tax system simple and transparent. In addition, a greater effort is required to include the informal sector and ensure effectiveness and the illegal activities such as generation of black money and corruption should not be channeled back into the economy.

Modern Diplomacy Tridivesh Singh Maini is a New Delhi based Policy Analyst associated with The Jindal School of International Affairs, Sonipat (India). One of his areas of interest is India’s Act East Policy with specific reference to India-Myanmar ties.

India, Myanmar and the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor tridivesh singh maini

ChinA’s AMbitious one belt one roAD ProJeCt is drawing a lot of attention due to its scale as well as strategic implications. What is often overlooked is efforts being made by other countries in the context of enhancing connectivity within Asia, Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) may not appear to be as grand as the OBOR, but it has the ability to create not just top class infrastructure, but also enhance the level of connectivity within Asia.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 indo-Pacific economic Corridor: role of us, india and Myanmar The US has also been seeking to enhance connectivity between South Asia with South East Asia and beyond, through the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC). The project complements India’s Act East Policy, and also its desire to play a role in the Indo-Pacific. In 2015, a release by the State Department clearly highlights IPEC as an important priority for the US. Says the statement, "Complementing India’s Enhanced Look East Policy, the United States envisions an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor that can help bridge South and Southeast Asia – where the Indian and Pacific Oceans converge and where trade has thrived for centuries’.

While the US and India are key stakeholders, other members include Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal. The US has also recently asked Sri Lanka to become part of this project Myanmar, India’s bridge to South East Asia is a key player within this project. India and Myanmar have had a number of high level interactions with Indian Foreign Minister, Sushma Swaraj visited Myanmar, this was followed

by Myanmar President Htin Kyaw visit to New Delhi. Amongst the key issues, there was an emphasis on accelerating the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, and upgradation of key sections of the highway.

Modern Diplomacy During the ASEAN Summit at Laos, Prime Minister Modi spoke about the emphasis his government is laying on robust connectivity between India and ASEAN. Significantly, the PM proposed the setting up of a Joint Task Force on connectivity to work on extension of India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

Aung san suu Kyi us visit While during the upcoming visit of Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi to the US, the focus is likely to be on the lifting of sanctions and key challenges which Myanmar is facing.The economic reforms being undertaken are also likely to be discussed and the US President is likely to encourage enhanced trade relations with the outside world as well as connectivity. A number of US investors are keen to invest in Myanmar, and they could benefit through Myanmar’s integration with other markets in South East Asia as well as South Asia. While IPEC may not find specific mention during their meeting the project seems to be high on the US agenda.

Only recently, Neha Desai Biswal Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs while commenting on the US role in IPEC stated: “We see ourselves as a convener and a partner. We can help identify projects that have multiplier effects, bring all stakeholders to the table, support and catalyse the early stages of development, and provide the necessary technical support to make sure it gets done right,”

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role of india and us All stakeholders need to play an important role. India needs to focus not just on land connectivity with Myanmar, but seamless connectivity within India itself. India needs to accord higher priority to stong maritime connectivity between Southern India and South East Asia, this can complement the current efforts to connect North Eastern India with Myanmar.

Apart from physical connectivity, India also needs to integrate with the larger Asia-Pacific region by becoming part of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). The US needs to back India’s membership a number of other countries like Australia have strongly backed the same.

For any substantial progress, the stakeholders will also have to decide the appropriate forum for IPEC. While Myanmar, India, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh have been working jointly in BIMSTEC, it is doubtful whether this would be appropriate. A forum bereft of infighting is needed for ensuring that IPEC is successful.

Conclusion In conclusion, while India-US and other countries in ASEAN may have found common ground in the strategic sphere, there is no clarity with regard to enhanced connectivity and integration. 'The US and other key stakeholders in IPEC should not get distracted by OBOR. The thrust should be on accelerating connectivity between South Asia and South East Asia through a pragmatic vision and efficient implementation.India and Myanmar which would benefit significantly from IPEC would be advised to take the lead.

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Global Rise of Cities Poses Challenge to Sustainable Urban Development steLLa papadopouLou

the globAl rise of Cities hAs been unPreCeDenteD. Every week, nearly 1.5 million people become urban dwellers. By 2050, the urban population will account for more than two-thirds of the world’s population. “Cities are evolving faster than ever and encountering unprecedented demographic, environmental, economic and social challenges. Sustainable urban development is the current global priority; however, most cities lack the capacity and resources to ensure that the city develops in a sustainable manner.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Multistakeholder cooperation is essential to fill this gap and build transformation strategies to better shape urbanization outcomes and lead cities towards growth, well-being and prosperity for all,” said Alice Charles, Community Lead, Infrastructure and Urban Development, World Economic Forum.

In recognition of the new challenges facing cities and the need to reinvigorate the global commitment to sustainable urbanization, the UN General Assembly convened the United Nations Conferences on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) in Quito, Ecuador, on 17-20 October 2016. The conference resulted in the adoption of the New Urban Agenda, a concise and action-oriented plan that provides a new global strategy for sustainable urban development and housing over the next two decades.

Joan Clos, Undersecretary-General and Executive Director of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), said, “The New Urban Agenda is a set of strategies that provide concrete actions to achieve sustainable urban development, setting out clear funding mechanisms and effective means of implementation and monitoring. It is an ambitious agenda that aims at paving the way towards making cities and human settlements more inclusive and ensuring that everyone can benefit from urbanization.”

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The World Economic Forum has been actively engaged with UN-HABITAT to strengthen the implementation of the New Urban Agenda. In its report on Harnessing Public-Private Cooperation to Deliver the New Urban Agenda, the Forum highlights the role of the private sector in the delivery of urban infrastructure and services in all aspects of the urban value chain, including policy-making, planning, design, implementation, operation and maintenance, monitoring and the financing of urban service delivery.

Gregory Hodkinson, Chairman of Arup Group in the United Kingdom, said, “To address city challenges and achieve positive transformation, city leaders and the private sector need to be engaged in an environment based on integrity and trust to encourage the private sector to commit its resources, skills and experience towards the development and operation of the efficient, liveable, resilient and prosperous cities that the world needs.”

The public and private sectors must create a structured engagement either through informal consultation or formal agreements to drive cities towards social, environmental and economic sustainability while enhancing urban equity, quality of life, social services, resiliency, trust, integrity, innovation, cohesion and inclusiveness, he said.

Mauricio Rodas, Mayor of Quito, Ecuador, said, “City authorities are closest to the citizens and ground-level realities and therefore play a key role in providing the impetus for progress.

With the formal adoption of the New Urban Agenda, the Municipality of Quito has commenced the process of translating the principles of the New Urban Agenda into policies and actions, and looks forward to the participation of the private sector and the value they bring in terms of innovation, resources and expertise.”

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Hazem Galal, Global Leader of Cities and Local Government at PwC, United Arab Emirates, said, “Urbanization dynamics have evolved over time and call for a transition from a business-as-usual approach to one that is highly collaborative, enabling the private sector to co-create and co-design sustainable urban transformation agendas. Government and the private sector must play their part by prioritizing their actions to reflect cities’ unique context, immediate and long-term priorities, and the created impact to achieve sustainable development.”

The World Economic Forum plans to continue the exchange of ideas on sustainable urban development among corporate leaders in infrastructure, engineering, construction and urban services, and senior level policy-makers and city officials with the aim of implementing the New Urban Agenda.

Working in collaboration with local partners, the World Economic Forum’s Future of Urban Development and Services Initiative serves as a partner in transformation to cities around the world as they seek to address major urban challenges and transition towards smarter, more sustainable cities in a rapidly urbanizing world.

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MSc Candidate in Economics and Finance, University of Brighton. Master's Specialisation Student in Mixed Methods Research, OUDCE, University of Oxford.

University of Brighton Santander Scholar. Co-Founder and Secretary of the Brighton University Economics Society.

Does Economic Growth Alleviate Poverty in Developing Countries? enrique muĂąoZ-saLido

Poverty AlleviAtion hAs iMPlieD An iMPortAnt goAl for developing countries and policy-makers throughout the last century. Recently, organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank have reported an increasing necessity for centring eorts on facing determinant factors of poverty growth in such countries.

In light of this claim, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has reminded the paramount role of the economic growth as a powerful factor for reducing poverty in developing countries.

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Incidentally, this positive effect can be drawn from empirical evidence such as the unprecedented poverty reduction associated with economic growth in the India since 1980, the poverty reduction—from 69% to 54%—in Mozambique caused by a 62% economic growth between 1996 and 2002, or the Chinese’s economic growth, which have lifted 450 million of people out of poverty since 1979.

Since back in time, a set of growth models have tried to address the complex mechanics of economic growth. Albeit started with a neo-Keynesian focus on savings (Harrod’s model in 1939 and 1948; and Domar’s model in 1946 and 1947), the dominant economic-growth strand over time has been that based on the exogenous Solow-Swan’s model, of 1956 and 1957, and the endogenous model proposed by Paul Romer and Robert Lucas, in 1986 and 1988, respectively. Solow-Swan’s states the capital accumulation—allowing for slow-down returns in capital and labour as it continues—as the main factor for boosting economic growth, which leads to a steady-state where, without technological progress, a country’s economic growth does stop. As that neo-classical model exogenously assumes the technological advance, this deficiency led economists Paul Romer and Robert Lucas to calibrate the economic growth theory by mathematically demonstrating the endogeneity of technological progress, which assumes the human capital and the technological change (i.e. investment in Research & Development) as main causal determinants.

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Subsequently, traditional policy recommendations towards increasing economic growth have been aligned with the aforesaid factors drawn from such models, i.e. foreign direct investment, international trade, fiscal measures, etc. Nevertheless, since recent evidence drawn from the seminal work of Dani Rodrik, which points to the undervaluation of a country’s currency as a robust, determinant factor for boosting economic growth, his consistent real-exchange-rate-based endogenous model has brought much of the aforesaid traditional literature into disrepute. Incidentally, the real exchange rate not only achieves to accelerate economic growth but also has a positive impact boosting export flows.

In order to put this mechanics into context, let us reflect upon the undervaluation (also called real-depreciation) of a country’s currency within an international arena. In such context, if a country’s currency becomes undervalued/real-depreciated, the international arbitrage does play a crucial role that results in boosting economic growth. This hypothetical prediction associates the misallocation of an economy’s resources—when taxes on tradable goods are higher than those on non-tradable goods—with a suboptimal economic growth—which is a consequence of the resulting small dimensions of the economy’s tradable sector—setting a set of conditions for real-depreciations to boost economic growth if considering the comparative advantage that it might result for international arbitrage.

In short, the calibration of Dani Rodrik demonstrates that real-depreciations can boost economic growth under the assumption that taxes on tradable goods are higher than those on non-tradable goods, which also increases profits on the tradable sector.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 In light of the common claims in research, such as that by Anna Buchanan in her paper “Impact and knowledge mobilisation: what I have learnt as Chair of the Economic and Social Research Council Evaluation Committee”, it can be identified a paramount necessity for economic policies to be based on empirical evidence, which is suggested by the governments’ particular inclination for this type of policy recommendations. Such preferences can be understood as the evidence-based policies are more likely to succeed and have a real impact on the target issue, which contributes to avoid eventual risks and difficulties that may arise from well-intentioned policies without a scientific root.

The conclusion arising from this article is the following. First, there exist an obvious empirical linkage between poverty alleviation and economic growth. Second, since back in time, traditional models have sown the seeds of a theoretical controversy and hence of a controversial effectiveness of the economic growth in fighting poverty. Third, Rodrik’s proposed misallocation of economy’s resources has implied an answer for disentangling theory from pragmatism. To sum up, Rodrik’s well-managed real exchange rate might imply an excellent evidence-based tool for future, powerful measures aimed at effectively alleviating countries’ poverty with such particular characteristics, which might allow public policies to go beyond traditional paradigms.

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Dr. Sanjay has been publishing in numerous peer reviewed journals such as Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews. In addition, he serves as a reviewer to many prestigious journals. Also, regularly writes columns for Financial Express (India), DNA, South Asia Monitor, Iran Review, and HansIndia. His coedited book “Energy Sustainability Through Green Energy” published by Springer in 2015.

India’s energy supply security: prospects and challenges sanJaY Kumar Kar and praJit goswami

inDiA is one of the fAstest growing eConoMies in the world.

It had been growing at a rapid rate of 7 percent for the last 10 years. Further, it is expected to grow over 7% percent in the coming decade. To fuel projected economic growth and cater growing energy needs, India requires a lot of energy.

With an area of 1.26 million square miles with diverse landscape and difficult terrain, India comprises around 1.2 billion people and their ever increasing needs.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 Currently India imports 70-80% of its oil and 30-40% of its natural gas requirements. Historically India’s energy import dependency rests on Middle East. Coal is the most important and widely available fossil fuel in India. It supplies 55 percent of the country’s primary energy needs. According to BP Statistical Review, 2016 at the end of 2015, India had 60600 million tons of coal reserves with a global share of 6.8% and R/P ratio of 89 years. Compared to other fossil resources like oil & gas, India is better placed with coal resources for future production and use.

India intends to reduce coal imports by exploiting its own reserves. Import of coal has already decreased, by around 19 percent to 16.38 million tons in the month of May 2016 as compared to around 20.29 million tons in May 2015.

India’s current renewable energy capacity, 45 GW, is just about 14.7% of total installed grid connected electricity generation capacity of 306 GW in the country. Some of the major challenges faced by renewable sector are lower capacity utilization, lack of evacuation infrastructure, and funding for large scale expansions. Coal still the cheapest source for power production with per unit tariff in the range of Rs. 2.3-4.00. However, renewable sources like wind and solar are competing well to achieve grid parity. Current wind tariff is in the range of Rs. 3.39-Rs.5.92/kWh and recently solar tariff reached as low as Rs.4.34/kWh. In the beginning Government encouraged feed-in tariff but now the market is moving towards competitive bidding tariff. Therefore, renewable tariff is moving closer to grid parity.

Despite all kind of limitations the Government targets to achieve renewable installation capacity of 175 GW by 2022. Further, multiple initiatives are being taken by the Government to promote off-grid or captive renewable energy along with decentralized renewable applications.

Modern Diplomacy The Government is actively pushing installation and production of renewable energy through schemes like accelerated depreciation, generation based incentives (GBI), and viability gap funding. The Government already funded Rs. 25075 million under the GBI scheme for solar and wind power production.

Decentralized renewable applications are expected improve livelihood of millions of Indians in the rural as well as urban India. Because holds will have access to energy which would be helpful for enhancing scope of economic activity, thereby improve economic productivity and revenue generation. Further, aordable energy accessible to all citizens could improve situation of primary education in the country.

As India needs to diversify its energy mix and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuel nuclear energy could play a very important role in ensuring energy security of the country. Application of nuclear for electricity generation needs to be actively pushed forward. Media reports suggest that nuclear power cost is in the range of Rs.9-12/kWh. India’s largely indigenous nuclear power program resulted in capacity installation of 5780 MWe. With the support of Russia and many other partnering countries India is expected to achieve 14.6 GWe nuclear capacity by 2024. It is high time for India to intensify strategic measures to address its energy security challenges like: making energy accessible, aordable, and available to all its citizens.

At least, India could aim to manage energy supply security if not complete energy security. One of the important source of energy could be natural gas as a transit fuel for meeting emerging energy needs.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017

Natural gas can gradually reduce: (i) use of diesel and petrol in the transport sector, (ii) use of coal in the power sector, (iii) use of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in the domestic cooking, heating, and cooling; and (iv) use of coal and liquid fossil fuel in various industries like ceramic, textile, steel, etc. Further, natural gas could be used to produce hydrogen used in the refineries and in the transport sector.

India’s domestic natural gas production remains a big concern and future addition of new gas reserves provide no better comfort. As a result India’s import dependency continue to grow and we believe that the import trend may very much continue in future too. Unless domestic unconventional sources of gas offer some surprise, import of liquefied natural gas (LNG) would continue to play a critical to bridge the demand-supply gap.

For the time being India’s over dependence on Middle-East for fossil energy is not a concern from supply point of view. However, India should expand its energy sources basket carefully and strategically to avoid any future supply constraints. Considering the current supply glut of fossil fuel, this is the right time to expand the range of sourcing destinations. In the recent past, India actively searched for alternative or complementary destinations for sourcing natural gas. In the process, emerging destinations like the US and Australia were added.

India’s domestic gas production fallen from about 51 billion cubic meter (BCM) in 2010-11 to 31 BCM in 2015-16. As a result the gap between demand and supply has been widening. As results natural import dependency has been increasing which is evident from increase in LNG import from 12.9 BCM in 2010-11 to 21.3 BCM in 2015-16.

Natural gas is certainly tipped as the transition green fuel especially in the transport in sector. It has comparatively lower carbon footprint-thus more environment friendly compared to coal and oil. The uses of gas in cooking, heating and power generation stand to benefit millions of stakeholders.

Apart from the above purposes use of natural gas for mobility sector addresses many concerns including the environmental concerns faced by urban cities. So, city gas distribution is poised to offer green energy solution to many struggling cities and upcoming smart cities.

In the present scenario India imports gas only through LNG carrier. It is believed that transporting natural gas through pipelines is found be cost effective over LNG carriers.

Modern Diplomacy For example, in 2013 China received pipeline gas imports at an average price of US$ 9.78 per MMBtu compared to average price of LNG import price of US$ 13.8 per MMBtu. LNG is costlier because the gas has to be liquefied to reduce its volume and transported using specially designed cryogenic tanks. Also at the receiving end specialised LNG terminals have to be built to store and re-gasify. Essentially the countries which import natural gas through pipelines enjoy cost advantage over import of LNG. India has been pushing for transnational pipelines with limited success. However looking at India’s strategic location it would be viable for India to take gas from gas rich Iran, and Turkmenistan through pipelines. India already has agreed upon much talked about Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline which starts from Turkmenistan and passes through Afghanistan & Pakistan before reaching India. TAPI pipeline with a length of 1124.68 miles passes through terror affected areas of Kandahar and Herat. Thus this makes it a very risky project to operationalize. Although NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan would ensure to protect the part of the pipeline passing through terror prone territories but future sabotage and attack may not completed ruled out. The project is due to be completed by 2019 and India would receive 1341.78 million cubic feet per day of gas. Operationalization of TAPI would certainly improve gas supply security for India.

Another transnational pipeline project namely Iran-Pakistan-India couldn’t happen due to very many reasons including sanctions on Iran, geopolitical pressure, and security concerns. In a report published in the Indian Express on 22nd April 2016 the Iranian Ambassador was stated saying that this project should be forgotten.

Discussions with Iran is on for a deep sea 868 miles pipeline via the Oman Sea and Indian Ocean. Iran-Oman-India pipeline from Iranian port of Chabahar to India’s Gujarat Coast would transport 1098.141 million standard cubic feet of gas per day. This might compensate for the almost failed IPI project and also there would be no issue of any other transit country conflict.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 India has also invested for the development of the Chabahar port and also funding a rail link between Chabahar and Zahedan in Iran. The completion of the rail link would connect Chabahar to North South Transport Corridor (NSTC). These investments are moulding the bilateral ties of India and Iran.

This deep sea pipeline will not only connect India to Iran’s Gas fields but Oman is also slated to join the pipeline at a later stage. This would give India a strong foothold to the Gas trade in both Iran and Oman. Also it would boost India’s stand in comparison to China’s One Belt One Road Program (OBOR).

Besides Iran, Oman and Turkmenistan, India also has a potential import source towards its north-eastern side which is Myanmar. The main advantage with Myanmar is its proximity to India and that it shares its borders with North-eastern part of India. Myanmar large untapped reserves. According to BP statistical review report 2016 Myanmar has 18.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas with an R/P ratio of 27 years. But until now the investments that India has made in Myanmar although substantial are very less in comparison to China. According to a report in Journal Of Energy Security India’s investment in Myanmar Oil and Gas sector is around US $1.6 billion while Chinese investments is around US$ 8 billion. The 1.04 US$ Sino-Myanmar gas pipeline has been functional since 2013 transporting 423.72 billion cubic feet (bcf ) gas to China annually. Lack of proper funding and coordination between public and private owned firms has resulted in India loosing important bids to other countries. Therefore, impacting India’s intention to secure long term energy supply.

Further, India failed to bring to table Myanmar-Bangladesh-India transnational pipeline because of Bangladesh’s unwillingness to act as a transit country. Although an alternative to this route was by bypassing Bangladesh and building a pipeline through North-East India that could connect to pipelines of East India.

This deal also never came to reality due to multiple reasons including lack of funding.

And thus China took advantage of this situation and entered into the gas pipeline market of Myanmar and built a similar transnational pipeline to China’s comparatively less developed Yunnan province.

Modern Diplomacy However, an agreement with Myanmar through North-eastern states may increase the pipeline costs but it would also give India long term gas sourcing from Myanmar. The problems that India faces on its north-western part because of hostile relationships with Pakistan and with issues of pipeline security in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. This however is not the case with Myanmar. Therefore having a gas trade relationship with Myanmar is much secure and mutually beneficial. In-case any problem occurs in the north-western side this may act as a contingency plan. This also has another benefit; the gas pipeline from Myanmar via North-East India can be used to develop the region which otherwise due to its difficult terrain is not easy to develop. Development of North-East provides a major strategic advantage to India in dealing with China in terms of monitoring and also preparing required infrastructure to handle any unforeseen situation.

To ensure long-term energy security for its all citizens India should continue to actively pursue multi-pronged strategies. Currently, the Government is focussing on exploiting domestic fossils fuel and renewable energy resources to address ever increasing demand. Simultaneous, New Delhi’s energy diplomacy with energy resource rich countries like the US, Russia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Australia has been unfolding. Even Prime Minister Mr. Modi’s look Africa energy policy adds new dimensions to India’s interest in securing energy equity in Africa and enhancing India’s energy security. Further, clean coal technologies are being pushed to improve supply of much greener energy.

Journal of Rising Powers, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 So in order to secure India’s energy future it is necessary for India to explore and exploit domestic fossil resources but seriously acquire fossil resources outside India. To improve energy supply security emphasis should be given to energy diplomacy, international collaborations, and efficient trade partnership. Building necessary energy infrastructure like LNG terminal and pipeline should be pursued with utmost priority. India should take advantage of global supply glut to improve accessibility, affordability, and availability of energy for its citizens. Further, creating investment climate for renewable energy should be facilitated at all levels to bring renewable energy revolution at the earliest.

Decontrol of petroleum product pricing especially petrol and diesel prices takes energy pricing toward market determined pricing. Even gas pricing is more market oriented than ever before. Direct cash transfer on use liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for domestic cooking purpose is a step forward to address energy accessibility and affordability. Judiciary and environment regulatory authorities are seriously pushing use of natural gas or green fuels to improve air quality in metro cities. Within a decade the Government intends to increase city gas distribution to 200 geographical areas from current level of 70 geographical areas.

India is certainly capable of addressing existing and future challenges to improve its energy security in the long-run. Moreover, green and renewable energy would play an important role to improve future energy security in the country.

“The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools�

Thucydides

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