Special Reports 02 by Modern Diplomacy

Anis H. Bajrektarevic Former legal practitioner and the president of Young Lawyers Association of BiH Bar (late 1980s). Former MFA official and career diplomat (early 1990s). Research Fellow at the Institute for Modern Political-history analyses, Dr. Bruno Kreisky Foundation as well as the Legal and Political Advisor for CEE at the Vienna-based Political Academy, Dr. Karl Renner (mid 1990s). Senior Legal Officer and Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Vienna of the Intergovernmental Organization ICMPD (1990s). Attached to the IMC University of Austria as a Professor and Chairman for Intl. Law and Global Political Studies (2000s – 10s). For past 15 years, he teaches subjects of Geo-political Affairs, International Law (including Intl. Relations, Law of IOs and EU Law) and Sustainable Development (Institutions and Instruments of ). Besides, he served as a pro bono expert numerous academic institutions, think-tanks and intergovernmental institutions (such as the UN ECE, OSCE, Council of Europe, American Bar, Oxford Academy of Total Intelligence, etc.). Professor is editor of the NYbased GHIR (Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations) journal and editorial board member of numerous similar magazines on three continents. The International Institute IFIMES has recently entrusted him as its Department Head for Strategic Studies on Asia, and its Permanent Representative to Austria and Vienna-based IOs. Prof. Bajrektarevic is the author of dozens presentations, publications, speeches, seminars, research colloquiums as well as of numerous public events (round tables & study trips, etc.). His writings are frequently published on all five continents (in over 50 countries and in 20 languages). Author of the book Is There Life After Facebook? - Geopolitics of Energy and other Foreign Policy Essays (Addleton Academic Publishers, New York, 2013), and the forthcoming book No Asian Century. He lives in Vienna, Austria. Prof. Anis Bajrektarevic Professor and Chairperson Intl. Law & Global Political Studies E-mail: anis[at]bajrektarevic.eu

MODERN DIPLOMACY INTERNATIONAL EDITION www.moderndiplomacy.eu

ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC Between the Environmental hazard, geo-economic opportunity, geopolitical and security dilemma Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic

CONTENTS 08. Polar Caps at Glance Defining the Poles Population of the Polar Regions Environmental hazard and the impact of Global Warming

12. Legal Regimes The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Maritime Zones Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) The Antarctic Treaty Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) The Antarctic Treaty System

18. Circumpolar States â&#x20AC;&#x201C; The Arctic five The Russian Federation The United States The U.S. Standing on the UNCLOS Position of the Non-party claimant Canada Denmark (Greenland and Faroe Islands) Towards the Danish Commonwealth Norway The smallest by size â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the biggest by expertise Svalbard

30. Areas of Claims Lomonosov Ridge Mendeleev Ridge Hans Island Barents Sea â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Loop Hole Beaufort Sea Antarctic Country Claims

Northwest Passage Northern Sea Route Arctic Bridge Challenges of Shipping in the Arctic Natural Resources

40. Other Parties at Stake Iceland, Finland and Sweden Arctic Council OSCE, NATO, EU and the Nordic Council

46. Economic Development Shipping Routes

54. Security challenge Conclusion Post Scriptum List of References Extract from UNCLOS

Arctic and Antarctica, the world’s two regions within the polar circles of the Northern and Southern hemispheres, were rarely discussed in the past (be it in general literature on geopolitics, law or international relations), but lately have gained the attention of the international community. At first glance it seems that the two opposite but complementary polar caps have much in common – for a general audience the differentiating point might be only a TV quiz-like question: “Where polar bears and where penguins live?” However, when taking a closer look, a significant difference becomes apparent: the two opposing poles are of a different morphological and tectonic, climatic, anthropo-biological, political and indeed of different legal standing. The South Pole – Antarctica – is the region governed by a treaty which is fully accepted by the entire international community (that includes all of the neighboring and interested states), but is, however, of a limited timeline (50 years). In the North – Arctic – on the contrary, the setup of a special legal framework is still under discussion. Due to the current global warming, vast perennial ice sheets are melting, resulting not only in an environmental threat but also marking an opening of certain economic opportunities(including alternative transportation and shipping routes, namely the Northwest Passage,

the Northern Sea Route and the Arctic Bridge, but also large mineral resources exploitation prospects). A new environmental reality unleashed a commercially–driven run on the Arctic, often described by the media as “land grab in the Arctic” or “new gold rush in the High North” (five circumpolar states are the major players striving to acquire substantial geoeconomic and geopolitical shares in the northern region and by doing so, conflicting over the possible demarcation lines). The question arises if the absence of a definite legal setting in the Arctic and the increased focus on national (geoeconomic and geopolitical) interests (and prides) by the five concerned states might trigger border tensions, domestic unrest, an open armed conflict and hence, endanger the global security. Among the Five there is a lot: two P-5 members and both of them (former) superpowers, four are NATO members facing Russia on the other edge, three European versus two American, one in the EU, three of the G–8, and all of them the OSCE members. What is to preserve the major powers’ balance – a change or the maintenance of the current Arctic and Antarctica status quo?

POLAR CAPS AT GLANCE

esides the fact that the two opposite poles are permafrost encircling the geographic and magnetic poles of the planet within the parameters of the polar circle, nearly everything else is diﬀerent. The following lines are a brief overview on the Arctic and Antarctica, including their location, characteristics and environmental factors.

Defining the Poles The geographic literature defines the Arctic by the limitation of the Arctic polar circle, a line drawn at latitude 66°33’. It marks the area where at least one day per year the sun does not rise and one during which it does not set. The general literature operates with other definitions, often less accurate but more descriptive, e.g. by claiming that the Arctic region is further north of the tree line. The name Arctic originates from the old Greek word for bear (arktos) due to the stellar constellation of Bear/Polaris overseeing the Northern Pole. On the other hand, the land mass of Antarctica is a continent located around the South Pole, hence representing the opposite of the Arctic (which is the original meaning of its word: “opposite of the Arctic”). The Antarctic region is referred to the area south of the Antarctic Convergence, including oceanic areas as well as all of the gravitating islands. The Arctic is often regarded as an oceanic mass completely covered by ice. However, it holds the truth for only 2/5 of the entire Arctic region. The remaining area – dispersed land mass without continental continuity – is characterized by tundra and boreal forests (e.g. Greenland).

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Population of the Polar Regions The Earth’s southernmost continent (with its 14 mil. km², roughly twice the size of Australia), Antarctica is 98% permafrost. Therefore, we may assume that the Arctic is an ocean encircled by land, whereas the Antarctica is a continent surrounded by ocean. Another significant diﬀerence is the annual average air temperature: While temperatures of the South Pole are around –50°C, the North Pole’s average is –17°C. Regarding flora and fauna, the two regions diverge as well. Probably, the most known diﬀerence, is the fact that polar bears live in the North and penguins can be found on the South Pole. The Arctic is also a habitat to mammals like reindeers, caribous, bears, foxes and others. The Antarctica is not inhabited by any terrestrial mammals. In Climate change both oceanic areas the whales, porin polar regions poises and seals can is expected to be be observed, and in among the largest the Arctic Ocean and most rapid also amphibious of any region on the Earth, mammals. Having a and will cause look at the fauna, major physical, ecological, the Antarctica is sociological, only sparely popuand economic impacts, lated with plants especially in the Arctic… and only on its edges and has no (Hassol, tree line. On the Impacts of a warming Arctic) contrary, the Arctic has tundra marked by a visible tree line.

The Arctic region is inhabited by approximately 4 million people; 10% of which are of indigenous origins. The Canadian part of Arctic is the home for roughly half of the population of the indigenous tribes. In Greenland, the indigenous Inuit people hold the majority but in the rest of the Arctic region, the non-native settlers have already outnumbered the natives (this demographic change coincided with the increased economic activity aﬀecting most of the Arctic during the 20th century). Basically, there are over 30 diﬀerent indigenous peoples and dozens of languages (some of them on the brink of extinction). The natives will have to adapt to the current economic development (exuberated with the new economic possibilities) as well as to the sociopolitical and demographic changes going on in the region. Traditionally bound to their own intact way of life, the natives are additionally challenged with the grave consequences of the compromised and unbalanced ecosystem. The Antarctica, however, is uninhabited – no evidence of any human presence has ever been recovered. The only presence dates to the modern times – expeditions of scientists residing on a basis of short-term shifts in several scientific observatory stations scattered throughout the continent.

Environmental hazard and the impact of Global Warming The Arctic is one of the world’s regions most aﬀected by climate change: average temperatures are rising twice as fast as at any other spot on the planet. The perennial ice sheets are melting with an unexpected speed coupled with the ever-shorter winter snow season. With the shrinking snow-covered area (deglaciation), less sunlight is refracted back to the atmosphere – a pattern that further accelerates the rise of temperature (due to increased sun-radiation, the absorption by the less refractable and more absorptive, dark-coloured ocean) – Albedo.

The WMO/IPCC expect an increase of about 6 to 7°C in the course of this century (surely with some microclimatic variances). Although there is no scientific consensus on the cause/s, the effects are undisputed; The Arctic (being more vulnerable than any other region on earth) is responding rather fast to the climate change. Figure nr. 1 shows the retreat of sea ice which had reached a record minimum in the summer of 2007. Based on incomplete and inconclusive scientific data, the belief that the Antarctic region has opposite trends to the global warming recorded all over the planet proved to be quite the contrary. In short, it was assumed that the Antarctic would cool while the rest of the planet would warm up. Regrettably enough, the latest satellite images are highly disturbing: the western part, the Antarctic Peninsula, is strongly affected by climate change and hence the local glaciers are melting faster than those on the rest of the continent. The thinned and permeable ozone layer will further accelerate the warming process in this particular area. In addition to the fact that the polar caps are the main stabilizers and regulators of the planet’s climate (with all weather patterns), they are also the biggest reserves of fresh water. Through the rapid and stark deglaciation of Greenland and Antarctic, and the melting of the Arctic ice sheets, a spill of fresh water is released. This additional water quantity is seriously affecting: oceanic volumes (a sea level rise), their temperatures, density and salinity which all may alter the oceans’ circulation system through the oceanic conveyor belt and consequently the climate all over the world. It remains unclear what consequences this might have on Europe’s climate and general weather conditions. SPECIAL REPORTS 10

Map 1: Ice Extension in the Arctic

The future scenarios are ranging from a substantial warming (coupled with severe droughts and extreme weather conditions), up to a subsequent cooling. Another consequence affecting the Arctic is the thawing of permafrost (permanently frozen land). Through the thawing of the soil, methane that was trapped for centuries is released into the atmosphere, which further contributes to the greenhouse effect. In addition to a dangerous methane release, the very defrosting of permafrost will cause the destruction of buildings, communicational infrastructure such as roads and airports, as well as deviations of industrial facilities and oil/gas pipelines within the Arctic Circle. Flora and fauna will definitely undergo significant changes. Oceanic and terrestrial species will move further north, some of them already under stress of extinction as their natural habitats of vegetation zones are affected too. The Arctic region is experiencing a profound change and has to face severe challenges, which are to be felt far beyond its polar parameters.

LEGAL REGIMES

s the morphological, climatic and other natural characteristics of Arctic and Antarctic are in striking diďŹ&#x20AC;erence, so is the legal position of the two. While the Southern Pole is governed by the international treaty (proclaimed de facto as res communis), the Northern Pole displays an absence of any such international stipulations. The Antarctica has a treaty system (ATS of 1961) brokered by the 12 nations active in the Antarctica during the IGY 195758 (Intl. Geophysical Year). By banning any military activity on the only continent without permanent human presence, the ATS has opened the Antarctica for the pacific scientific use to any nation â&#x20AC;&#x201C; it was the very first arms control accord established in direct Soviet-American negotiations during the Cold War. Celebrated as a big success of the Cold War, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) was simply a virtue out of necessity. To proclaim the geographically remote, irrelevant for transportation, militarily inaccessible and economically nonviable unpopulated continent as the demilitarized zone free to all peace loving nations was absolutely logical and one of very few clear-cuts of mankind.

While the Antarctica has not scored any terrestrial human presence before well into the 19th century, the Arctic has been traditionally inhabited by indigenous peoples. Already by pre-modern times, most of the Nordics as well as Russians have established the parameters of their state territories exercising their domestic jurisdiction well over the Arctic and its natives.

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This fact, combined with the absence of any comprehensive international instrument on the Arctic, opened the road to the so-called Eight Arctic States to govern the polar territory by their respective national legislations. Historically, a major portion of the Arctic (especially beyond the TW or EZ) has not been (successfully) claimed by any external party, as it is practically inaccessible for any relevant human activity. Besides political constrains and frictions, the harsh climatic conditions kept the Arctic away from the (urgency of ) establishment of a comprehensive legal framework for most of the 20th century. However, the climate change of the late 20th century and the rapid melting of the ice cap currently revealed the prospect of an accessible and economically exploitable Arctic – all necessitating the comprehensive international legal settlement. The economic, political and legal race for the Arctic has (again) begun. Responding to this new situation, the EU and the US have opted for creation of a legal framework similar to the Antarctic Treaty. On the contrary, seeing the North Pole as their own inner lake, the states acceding the Arctic strongly opposed any ATS-like internationalization of the Arctic.

Recalling the fact that the Arctic does not represent a compact land mass in continuity, the Five Arctic States by the Ilulissat Declaration have rejected the notion of creation of a new legal regime, stating that the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) should remain as the basic applicable law. The Five strongly acclaimed the UNCLOS as the only governing framework for the Arctic continental shelf, the seabed, the protection of the marine environment (including ice-covered areas), freedom of navigation, marine scientific research and other uses of the sea. Interestingly enough, the US as the single major country in the world that has repeatedly rejected to ratify the UNCLOS was a participatory and signatory party of the Declaration of the Five from Ilulissat – by doing so, indirectly accepting the UNCLOS as the main sea-related international treaty.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Since Hugo Grotius’s famous Mare Liberum of 1609 the accessibility of the international waters (free naval regime) has been the international custom observed by all (civilized) nations (in fact, an instrumental tool for the European colonial expansion). Ever since, the so-called Freedom of the Seas Doctrine has gradually elaborated on the notion of territorial waters, continental shelf, economic zones and its demarcation distances. As the technological breakthroughs made economic exploitation possible and military oﬀences probable, the international community repeatedly tried to codify the customary rules into the text of the comprehensive universal legally binding instrument. Not before after WWII, which was extensively fought on the seas by nearly all major belligerent parties, the critical momentum has been built. The first two negotiation rounds have been conducted in 1950s leading to the successful closure of the UNCLOS I (1956) and UNCLOS II (1958, 1960). With over 160 participatory states and after nine consecutive years of heavy negotiations, the UNCLOS III was closed in 1982 (entering into force by 1994).

Maritime Zones Without a wish to recapitulate on all details stipulated by the UNCLOS, let us only make a brief reference to the zones. The UNCLOS recognizes the right of the states to extend the national territory by several maritime zones from their respective coastlines. Thus, the international instrument diﬀerentiates: Internal Waters (land-coast – baseline) – no passage prior to explicit permission; Territorial Waters (from baseline up to 12nM seawards, with the possible extension for additional 12nM of so-called Contiguous Zone) – innocent passage right; Inner Sea (archipelago states only) – innocent passage right; Prolongation of the Continental Shelf /PCS/ (territorial extension for up to 150nM seawards from baseline based on a confirmed geo-morphological proof ) – innocent passage right; Exclusive Economic Zone /EEZ/ (from baseline up to 200nM seaward, upon the UNCLAS ratification) – innocent passage right; PCS and EEZ (up to 350nM seawards from baseline approved by the CLCS 10 years after the UNCLAS ratification); High Seas (beyond the limits of 200nM/350nM) – open for free passage and exploitation to all states. The recognition of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and PCS (prolongation of the continental shelf ) by the UNCLOS surely obliges the Arctic states to grant innocent passage right to all foreign vessels. However, it firmly awards the Five since both zones are exclusive belts for any economic activity, be it seabed exploitation (ore, gas, oil, other minerals, and the like) or exclusivity in the fishing rights (marine biota). SPECIAL REPORTS 14

Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) The UNCLOS established the CLCS (Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ) as the standing (scientific) panel of the instrument to deal with the claims beyond the 200nM parameter. The CLCS is mandated to examine the maritime claims per individual state requests. Recommended deliberations of the CLCS are becoming final and binding if no contradictory claim is lodged (art.76). In case of disputes, the final settlement is subjected either to the Hague-based ICJ or to the Intl. Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. After this brief elaboration on rather technical details, it becomes clear why the Arctic Five reaﬃrm the UNCLOS. Any Antarctica-like treaty would deprive the Five from their exclusive economic rights in the Arctic region, which they would like to preserve as their own “inner lake” and eventually maximize the partition among them. Despite the fact that some of the Five suﬀer considerable geomorphologic disadvantages (as lacking the continental shelf extension or credible proof of it), none of them wants the international instrument which would ultimately turn the Arctic to res communis. No matter how tedious the extension verification process is or how cost-intensive the development of specific technologies for the Arctic exploitation is, the Five remain dismissive and assertive.

The very strategy of the Five displays some striking similarities with the so-called Eastern Diplomatic Question of the late 19th century (and to it related the British 2+3 formula); 1.Dismissive Slow down the process of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and of the external parties interference – erode the efforts of international community for creation of the Antarctica-like treaty (by keeping the UNCLOS referential); 2.Assertive Maximize the shares of the spoils of partition – extend the EEZ and continental shelf as to divide most if not the entire Arctic only among the Five; 3.Reconciliatory Prevent any direct confrontation among the European powers over the spoils – pass the claims without arbitration of the III parties (preferably CLCS). By 2009, the deadline for numerous states ran out to hand in their claims on an extended continental shelf. With the present number of claims and several UNCLOS articles of the imprecise wording (which do leave room to states for different interpretations of the continental shelf extension as well as modalities of EEZ), it is estimated that the comprehensive evaluation of the CLCS will not be successfully completed in the next 15 to 20 years. Noting these difficulties some voices called upon the creation of a special (sub) commission to deal exclusively with the Arctic claims.

The Antarctic Treaty The Antarctica Treaty and to it acceding instruments generally referred to in literature as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) form the comprehensive international regime on the Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty (main instrument) was negotiated in the late 1950s by the twelve parties – all of them also its original signatories (1959). The main treaty entered into force in 1961 with 47 participatory states. Declaring the Pole as res communis free of any military activity, this instrument further stipulates the freedom of scientific investigation, enhances cooperation and data exchange. The important notion is a prohibition of nuclear testing as well as of the nuclear waste disposal (marking it the first Nuclear Arms Agreement and to some extend the first environmental accord). Any territorial claim on land or ice shelves south of 60°S latitude is not recognized while the treaty is in force. For the stationary scientific personnel the treaty suggests their respective national jurisdiction as the applicable one.

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) The governing body to the treaty (a sort of monitoring of compliance but also legislative machinery) is situated with the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) – a clearing house that meets annually. The decision-making powers in administering and managing the Antarctica are unevenly distributed by diﬀerentiating among current 47 parties: the signatory states, the consultative and other parties to the treaty. Based on the explicit scientific interest and active research presence in Antarctica, only 28 states are having decisive say in the decision-making process; besides the original 12, these are another 16 states that joined the treaty system in the last decades of the 20th century. (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, 2008) On its monitoring of a compliance role, the ATCM oversees that no activities contrary to the treaty are taking place in the Antarctica and that any eventual dispute between the parties is resolved peacefully (or as the last arbitrary resort by the International Court of Justice deliberations). Necessitating the explicit prior consent of all contracting parties, any eventual amendments or modifications to the treaty are to be directed through the ATCM. The accession of the new members is also channelled via the ATCM. Serving also as the principal legislative machinery, the ATCM has brokered over 200 recommendations, of which many have turned into the legally binding instruments that gradually brought into existence the comprehensive Antarctica Treaty System. SPECIAL REPORTS 16

The Antarctic Treaty System Celebrating the 50th anniversary of the original treaty in Washington in early December 2009, the ATS parties have organized the Antarctic Treaty Summit “Science-Policy Interactions in International Governance” as a brainstorming framework for scientists, politicians, scholars and other interested stakeholders to discuss the existing regulations and future developments of the Antarctic Treaty System. As stated before, the International Regime on Antarctica (ATS) is composed of the main treaty (1961) and of additional instruments, namely the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1982), the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (singed 1988, not in force yet), and finally the Protocol on Environmental Protection (1998). (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2009)

The Antarctic Treaty is often referred to as one of the most outstanding, fair and transparent agreements ever concluded. Still, the dismissive notion of the ATS participatory parties towards the rest of international community is nearly identical to the dismissively positioned five Arctic states. Hereby, the supporting argument: Pre-empting the large-scale exploitation of natural resources, the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties have formulated the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CRAMRA). It is the text by which the signatories basically declared that no commercial activity should be done on the expenses of the environment. However, the convention was never ratified as it lacks the high-standard environmental regulations as demanded by many members (especially France and Australia).

Consequently, another agreement was required and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, also known as the Madrid Protocol, was brokered. It prohibits any commercial activity for 50 years (until 2048) and describes the Antarctica as a â&#x20AC;&#x153;natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.â&#x20AC;? Additionally, the instrument provides guidelines and principles for other activities as tourism or the construction and maintenance of the Antarctic research bases. In order to monitor the compliance with the protocol, the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) was founded. The consultative parties may call for a review of the Protocol within the set timeframe of 50 years but amendments need a unanimous vote. The ban on mineral resource activities cannot be declared void unless another binding instrument is in place. It is apparent that beyond declared (but not followed by many parties all over planet) environmental consideration, the ATS parties meant to use the Protocol as an operative tool to discourage and alienate externals (dismissive stance), and most importantly to maintain and prolong their own exclusivity on the Antarctica with all its scientific and commercial benefits (assertive stance).

CIRCUMPOLAR STATES THE ARCTIC FIVE

ne of the climaxes of the Cold War (and its logics of total geostrategic confrontation) has been surely reached at the North Pole; concentration of submarines and intercontinental missiles all over the Pole turned the Arctic into the world’s most militarized maritime space. Nowadays, with the melting of the sea ice, the Arctic Ocean is in the very focus of the world’s interest again. The Arctic is physically surrounded by five littoral circumpolar states. Demonstrating their geographic proximity, power and presence, the Five are steadily handing in competing claims on the northwards territorial extension aiming to reduce the portion of international waters on the Arctic and to maximize the national rights of navigation and the eﬀective control over resources in the area (EEZ). At the southern edge of the planet, the Antarctic Treaty is restraining the neighbouring states and interested parties from any territorial claims, marking it as the legalistically less contested Pole but equally attractive as the last dividable geoeconomic and geopolitical shares of the planet. The following pages will elaborate on the five littoral states and their increasingly assertive positions. SPECIAL REPORTS 18

The Russian Federation By its size the largest country of the world (17,075,200 km², or 1/8 of the world’s land surface, with roughly 142 million inhabitants), Russia has nearly one-third of its territory located on the Arctic and sub-Arctic. Just a quick look at the map will indicate that roughly half of the entire circumpolar territory is of Russia. The Russophones has penetrated the Arctic as early as in the 11th century but the systematic exploration starts only in the 16th century. Late Tsarist and early Soviet Russia have settled nearly 2 million people to the polar circle marking the large scale systematic research, economic and military activity which with some oscillation lasts uninterrupted until the very day. Thus, in the course of subsequent centuries, Russia (besides Denmark and Norway) has acquired enormous knowledge and uncontested expertise in polar exploration. Reacting to the current climate change eﬀects, which are simultaneously revealing economic (and geopolitical) opportunities, the Putin cabinet was the first government of the five Arctic states to lodge the oﬃcial requests for the northwards territorial extensions. Continued with the Medvedev cabinet, Russia clearly conducts a very assertive and bold Arctic policy.

Consequently, the Russian territorial claim is rather ambitious: extending to an area of about 1.2 million square kilometres of the Arctic seabed with the (geographic) North Pole as the outermost point. In 2001, Russia submitted as the first nation of the Arctic Five its prolongation of the continental shelf claim to the CLCS, which includes parts of the Barents Sea as well as the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridge. The claimed area shows a triangular shaped form (with the arches closing the eastern and western flank of Russia’s northern border), topping at the North Pole. (Górski, 2009) However, only one year later the Commission informed Russia that it should further engage in research activities as the information provided was insuﬃcient (lacking important concussive data) for making the Commission’s final recommendations. The revised version has been submitted in 2009, and the Commission is examining it. Russia’s economy heavily depends on the cash-flows maintained by the gas and oil exports to Europe and other parts of the world. Its Arctic region plays already a significant role in the national economy as it accounts for 11% of the country’s GDP and for 22% of all export earnings.

With the northwards territorial extension these figures are nearly sure to surge, as additional hydrocarbon, ore and other mineral fields locked in the Arctic seabed are very probable. Despite promising oﬀshore and costal mineral deposits, Russia will depend on foreign cooperation regarding the high-tech know-how in exploitation under harsh Arctic conditions. (E.g. Russian state-holdings of Gazprom and Rosneft are already planning joint exploration sites, like Shtokman field, with the Norwegian StatoilHydro and French Total.) Visibly demonstrating the capability to patrol, secure and defend its territory has also high priority for the Kremlin’s policy–makers. Therefore, the Federation (like some other Arctic states) has been lately allocating considerable funds into the development and construction of new (generation of ) ice breakers, submarines and polar patrol ships. To better monitor the vast area, the government has recently ordered three additional nuclear ice breakers to the already large and well-equipped fleet. Clearly, Russia has increased its military budget and has retaken its assertive patrolling activities by water and air – the largest ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. SPECIAL REPORTS 20

One of the geographic handicaps that Russia has suﬀered throughout its history was impossibility to connect its 5 fleets: the Baltic, Northern, Pacific, Black Sea and Caspian. As its military establishment well knew that who rules the oceans rules the world, ever since the Peter the Great, Russia has pressed westwards and southwards in a desperate attempt to connect its fleets: the warmseas quest. It was the same reason which drove the Soviet Russia into the development of impressive submarine fleets. Suddenly and rather unexpectedly, the opportunity to connect may arise in the rapidly melting north.

The United States Ironically enough, it was Russia which brought the US to the Arctic. Being a huge country with wide open access to both Atlantic and Pacific, it is no wonder that the US by gradually articulating its might was the only (successful) successor of the old British geostrategic imperative “who rules the oceans rules the world”. Directly facing two most important oceans and controlling other oceans and seas with its numerous fleets (as the predominant naval power of the world), the US portrays itself as a “fish of high seas”. Still, the US is primarily the “fish of warm seas”, and not a typical Arctic state. Firstly, its border edge with the polar region suﬀers from the territorial discontinuity (between the mainland US and Alaska there is a vast territory of central and western Canada), and secondly at its northern tip the US has relatively small circumpolar share.

Despite the fact that the US is technologically the most advanced country in the world, the hi-tech solutions are not focusing on utilization of Arctic resources, even not on an extensive maritime patrolling (with only three aged and not always combat-ready ice-breakers at disposal, the US Navy is still not considering a purchase of any new polar vessels). However, as a supreme global power, it has to keep its own stake in the strategically and economically important region which is eventually to face the partition. The current eﬀorts of the U.S. are neither substantial nor verifiable enough to actually gain a considerable say in the territorial claims dispute. Its present position is the weakest of all the Arctic Five, since the US never ratified the UNCLOS and, therefore, cannot access the CLCS claims mechanism. As a matter of fact, only recently the US undertook the joint program with Canada (with the lead of the second, as the polar exploration more advanced partner) of a detailed mapping of America’s Arctic costal reefs, precise baselines and the nearby Arctic seabed and ridges. (Extended Continental Shelf Project, 2009)

The U.S. Standing on the UNCLOS Back in 1982 President Ronald Reagan rejected the ratification of the UNCLOS with the argument that the instrument creates unacceptable limitation and that, therefore, is unfavourable for the U.S. However, after the treaty revisions in 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the UNCLOS but the very ratification was rejected by the US Senate. Further attempts by the Bush Administration in 2004 failed as well. Stacking in the congressional labyrinth of bipartisan confrontations (the U.S. Navy high seas patrolling rights) and divergent interest groups lobbying (deep seabed natural resources exploitation), the final justification was given as that the finalized navigation rights should be compatible with the commonly practiced international customs. In a nutshell: “Might makes the right”. Acting in the typical great power manner, the US indeed actively participates in negotiations of legal instruments, does support and encourage other states to ratify them (to maintain a level of predictability and obedience internationally), but on the other hand does not like to be constrained by many international instruments (reserving itself the freedom of action), be it the vital protocol to the UNFCCC, the ICC– related Rome Convention or the UNCLOS. The great powers will have diﬀerent justifications, but the reason will be always the same. Realizing that the U.S. is one of the few United Nations (UN) member states and the only one of the Arctic Five that has repeatedly declined to ratify the treaty (to the disadvantage of its Arctic position), the current Obama Administration has announced its objective to pass the legislation through the Houses. SPECIAL REPORTS 22

Simultaneously, an extensive Arctic cooperation with (its more experienced partner) Canada is underway. Having the more pressing domestic and foreign issues on the agenda like the health-care reform, financial crises and the military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not very probable that the current Congress will ratify the UNCLOS anytime soon.

Position of the Non-party claimant As the non-UNCLOS party, the U.S. centres its current claims on the continental shelf customary law reinforcing Harry S. Truman’s presidential Proclamation No.2667 that ”any hydrocarbon or other resources discovered beneath the U.S. continental shelf are property of the U.S.”. Additionally, the U.S. actively participates in bilateral negotiations as well as in regional summits such as the Ilulissat Arctic Ocean Conference. In total, the U.S. claims the rights The U.S. is the prime on the continental importer and shelf extension in consumer of nine different areas hydrocarbons and of the Arctic reother natural gion, in three areas resources and should off the U.S. West therefore expectedly Coast (including the extension off take more proactive the west side of stance towards Guam/Northern the region which Mariana Islands), estimated holds are and in two areas in as much as 20% the Gulf of Mexico. of the globally (Seidler, 2009, pp. unexploited resources 166-175)

Canada As the world’s second largest country (roughly 60% of the size of the largest, Russia), Canada has the second longest circumpolar border (about 244,000 kilometres) with the Arctic theatre. While one-third of the total Russian territory is within the Arctic Circle, Canada’s share is even larger: roughly 40% of its territory is within the Arctic Circle – equivalent to Europe’s entire land mass. Canada is one of the most disproportionate countries when it comes to the relation between size (9,093.507 km²) and number (33,5 million) of inhabitants (as well as its concentration). The entire northern and central portions of this huge federation are practically empty, either inhospitable or extremely underpopulated. Over 90% of Canadians essentially live on the borderline to the U.S., mostly centred in larger cities like Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal. Although Canada should be regarded as a typical Arctic state, in reality it has little resources and domestic popular support to eﬀectively exercise its military or/and economic presence in the Arctic. In response to the renewed Russian assertiveness over the Pole, Canada is lately trying to gain the popular support from its traditionally non–Arctic minded population and gradually mobilize the government, business and research community as well as the civil sector.

Like the Russian moves, the Canadian ones are also symbolic and practical. They range from the selection of location for the early 2010 summit of the G– 7 Finance Ministers, through the orders of new polar-patrolling planes and vessels including the ice–breakers for its armed forces, up to the joint USCanada mapping project, e.g. the 2009 Extended Continental Shelf Project. One of the main security concerns of Canada is to protect the northern shipping route and the entire Arctic and sub-Arctic territory against environmental disasters through increased transportation and exploitation of natural resources. Canada’s environmental provisions the so-called Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act defines a (environmentally contagious) zone of 100 nM seawards from its coastline to be an environmental protection area. (De La Fayette, 2008, p. 544) In conformity with that provision Canada persistently claims its sovereignty on the Northwest Passage justifying it with its environmental concerns (increased transport, especially of vessels inadequately equipped to meet the environmental or/and special polar standards as well as the frequency and severity of accidents occurred). Sensing that behind the cover of environmental concern, Canada might have the geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons to deter; both the U.S. and the EU repeatedly protested the treatment of the Passage as territorial waters of Canada. Since 2008, Canada requires prior notification (registration) for all vessels flying foreign flags that are sailing the Northwest Passage. However, it remains unclear how Canada will enforce its requirements (or penalties for those who failed to register), having in mind its relatively modest surveillance and patrolling capabilities.

In this shuﬄe of the contested national pride, defence-driven advancements (security concerns), geopolitical ambitions and geoeconomic greed, Canada’s position is getting weaker as the Northwest Passage becomes a more attractive international shipping route as a result of the ice-melting. In this matter, neither the International customary law not the UNCLOS, nor the domestic enforcement capabilities are on the Canadian side. Concerning the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Canada as a party to the UNCLOS, can lodge its continental shelf extension claims until the year 2013. Canada aims at the extension of the continental shelf on its North/North-East Coast as well as extension in the central and western portion of the Arctic (an area of about 1.75 million km²). Currently, Canada is investing considerable funds in the geomorphology and related areal research. SPECIAL REPORTS 24

In addition to it, the tripartite expeditions together with the U.S. and Denmark are working on several Arctic assignments. One of the assignments is bringing about conflicting results that the Lomonosov Ridge is connected with/extended from Greenland and the Northern American continent, and not as the Russian side vocally claims that the Ridge is an extension of the Eurasian continent. Further claims of Canada are at the Alpha Ridge next to the Ellesmere Island, at the Beaufort Sea, and over the Mackenzie River Delta, where allegedly riverine sediments are pouring into the Arctic seabed well to the far north. Canada has a standing dispute over the Hans Island (located in the Nares Strait between the Ellesmere Island and Greenland) with Denmark. Acting pragmatically, the two Arctic states have reached an agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf (in force since 1974, with the amendments of 1994). This accord clarifies fishing zones and defines territorial borders between the two over a length of 1,450 nM. However, the Hans Island is excluded from the agreement as still of unsolved status. (Potts & Schofield, 2008, p.160)

Denmark (Greenland and Faroe Islands) Although a look at the geographic map would never imply that a tiny country located nearly in the middle of Europe would be a circumpolar state, Denmark owes it to its colonial past. The Kingdom of a famous Shakespeare’s quotation was once upon a time a great European and naval power with land possessions deep in the south and far north/northwest-wards overseas. If any landmass were contested to play an equivalent role to the Antarctica of the North, it would surely be the geomorphologic ‘fugitive‘, the island of Greenland (the world’s largest and the least populated island). Thus, Denmark through its (increasingly formal) overseas possessions of Greenland and Faroe Islands is entitled to the Arctic claims. Both territories were granted the so-called home rule, with the reservation on the foreign policy and defence, which Copenhagen keeps under its prerogatives.

Towards the Danish Commonwealth Denmark is the only EU member state of the Arctic Five, but it is additionally curios that its overseas territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not. Both overseas territories are predominantly inhabited by indigenous peoples, and while Greenland is a large territory (2,166,086 km²) with a tiny and disproportionately situated population (57,600 residents, or 0.025 inhabitants per km², with 88% of Inuit or mixed Inuit-Danish origin), the Faroe Islands are a considerably small territory (18 major islands totalling 1,399 km²) and evenly populated (48,000 inhabitants, roughly 92% Faroese). Although neither territory is officially part of the EU, the Faroe Islanders may choose between the Danish or Faroe citizenship while the Greenlanders are all Danish nationals. Gradual moves towards the full independence (induced primarily from the Danish side) are gaining momentum: On Greenland’s consultative referendum conducted in November 2008, as many as 75.5% of Greenlanders voted for an extended autonomous status granting those more powers to control the justice and home affairs as well as subjecting them to the international law. Furthermore, the Danish subsidies are now linked proportionally to the revenues Greenland earns, which besides fishery is mainly through the exploitation of natural resources. Two sides also agreed that at any event of Greenland’s independence the entire invested money would be paid back to Denmark mostly from the forthcoming revenues originating in exploitation of minerals. (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009)

For the time being, Greenland remains financially dependent on Denmark, and even if the clear econimic prospects due to rapid ice-melting are wide open, the Greenland infrastructure would need a steady capital inflow to turn this economic opportunity into a commerical probability. The needed economic emancipation and administrative capacitation of the Faroe Islands is of better standing than on Greenland, and therefore the Faroese indipendence (if it ever comes) would be earlier than the Greenlandic one. Finally, common to the indigineous peoples in all the Five Arctic states, the Danish indigenous are also suffering severe social integration problems (change from the traditional, isolated, fishery-related life to the modernized and urban life), reflected in the high rates in alcoholism, suicide, homicide and other forms of violence, etc. As already mentioned, Greenland’s future will very much depend on its economic emancipation. Huge deposits of resources which are allegedly dozing under the island’s massive ice sheets or at its seabed offshore need further investigation and expensive preparation for viable exploitation. Even rich and stable Denmark cannot do it alone. Therefore, there are already several oil and mining companies at the spot (e.g. the Scottish oil company Cairn Energy together with the Malaysian Petronas planning to invest € 310 million in the exploration off Greenland’s coast). It is estimated that there are oil deposits ranging from 16 billion to 47 billion barrels offshore, as well as minerals like gold, zinc and lead onshore. Furthermore, the substantial investments are made in the exploration of the seabed and Greenland’s continental shelf as to file a credible and scientifically proven claim with the CLCS rule, as the Danish submission is due in 2014. SPECIAL REPORTS 26

Like the rest of the Arctic Five, Denmark is strengthening and renewing its Northern military capabilities. Its defence plan for 20102014 is calling for a formation of a special Arctic (joint) force which should be patrolling beyond the parameters of a single state territory. As one of the NATO founding members, Denmark was steadily and actively contributing to this collective security system. Beyond the mainland, Greenland is hosting the most northern bases of NATO for decades, which at the peaks of the Cold War were crucial for the surveillance and deterrence of the Soviets. The current increased patrolling and armament of the Arctic by each of the Five is not an encouraging signal that gives comfort and security assurances to either of them.

Norway The Kingdom of Norway (385.252 km² out of which – like in case of Canada – around 40% is situated within the Arctic Circle, with total of 4,8 million inhabitants) is the smallest country of the Five, having also the smallest Arctic share among them. However, the homeland of the legendary Viking seafarers – Norway is the most advanced of all the Five, when it comes to lodging the claims before the CLCS. Already by 2006, the Norwegian government has filed its clams on the Arctic borders. The claimed area amounts to over 248,000 km² (which, if proven and confirmed, would be a territorial gain equal to 2/3 of the present state territory) including the areas of the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea, the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea as well as the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean. (Seidler, 2009, pp. 199-213) In March 2009 the CLCS positively responded to the part of Norwegian Arctic claims, which makes Norway the very first of the Arctic Five to obtain recommendations. The government is preparing national legislation to domesticate the CLCS deliberations (promulgating the legally binding text on the renewed/extended border limits through its constituency). However, there are several Arctic areas with overlapping claims and confronting claimants where the final settlement is pending. (Van Pay, 2009)

The smallest by size – the biggest by expertise Beyond the national pride or geopolitical aspirations (which no state is deprived of), the prime Norwegian drive in the deep Arctic is to secure and maintain its current prosperity which is heavily based on oil. The oil industry presents the main pillar of the nation’s economy. However, Norway’s current oil fields are drawing to a close, faster than those of any other oil producing country. Latest estimations are predicting that the known Norwegian reserves will be exhausted until 2030. For the oil-driven economy, the alarm bells to find alternatives are ringing. Reformulating its economic policy in response to this pressing issue, the government aims to achieve two goals: decouple and further diversify (to support and stimulate innovations in other economic fields) as well as to divert/expand its ‘oil know-how’ (oﬀ-shore and joint-venture oil exploration in the Arctic waters). To prove that Norway is not only assertive but also shift-capable, the government allocates considerable funds in the development of state-of-the-art technology for all-season presence. Norway is modernizing and quantifying its commercial and armed capabilities, be it for the oﬀ-shore exploitation, deep sea exploration and research of environmental effects, or the patrolling and surveillance of its outmost Arctic limits (to stop pirate fishing and other intruders). Norway is one of the founding members of NATO, traditionally occupying a vital controlling and deterring function on the outmost eastern end of the block (same like Turkey on the southern flank). More importantly, Norway has unsurpassed historical experience and knowledge in polar exploration (eventually in the same league with the know-how of Denmark and Russia), which if coupled with the specific technological advancements makes this country to be the expertise leader among the Arctic Five. By compensating the modest size of territory with its huge share of historical knowledge and modern experience, Norway enjoys an undisputed parity with the rest of the Arctic Five.

Svalbard The Svalbard Islands (formally Spitsbergen) are situated to the north of the European mainland, far in the Arctic Ocean, about halfway between Norway and the geographic North Pole. The archipelago (61,000 kmÂ˛, inhabited by some 2,200 settlers, out of which 55% are Norwegian and 45% Russian citizens) consisting of nine main islands is a formal mandate given to Norway. Svalbard has rather a unique position, which is determined by the Svalbard Treaty, in force since 1925 by the so-called Svalbard Act. The Svalbard proper has been an object of sporadic interest for several littoral and non-littoral states, but neither of them was ever declaring the archipelago its own national territory prior to the treaty. Only commercial and military advancements (including a discovery of promising coal deposits), coupled with the confrontational course between the post WWI Europe and the early Bolshevik Russia, brought up the need for a comprehensive legal framework regulating the ownership of deposits and clarifying the territorial claims. SPECIAL REPORTS 28

In the Svalbard Treaty (original name: Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen), signed in Paris in 1920, the nine original signatories have recognized the formal mandate of Norway. It has been also agreed that every (bonae fidei) nation has equal rights to inhabit the islands and to exploit natural resources, including the right to fish and to hunt under the legislation of Norway. (Nordischer Ministerrat, Governor of Svalbard, 2008) As the Svalbard Treaty was not decisive on the full set of territorial/souverign rights, there are certain calls to reopen and renegotiate the terms of the Treaty. Needless to say that the archipelago is strategically important for both Russia and Norway (NATO), but any possible territorial extension (meritime zones, continental shelf ) via Svalbard is of direct concern for each of the Arcic Five, too. The archipelago is simply a far too big geoeconomic promise and geopolitical imperative to leave any state neutral.

AREAS OF CLAIMS

ar too often in history the territorial disputes triggered the open and tragic conflicts or kept the rhetoric on confrontational course, or at least hindered any closer cooperation among states and their societies at large. Still, sometimes the territorial disputes bring or even hold states together. Both scenarios are highly probable between the two disputed states. But, what happens when the interaction is between five parties?

The first thing that the five unconstrained subjects would do in any (human) interaction (especially, if they have something lucrative to share or/and divide) is to agree to deny access to the 6th, or 7th party. This would remain an underlying common denominator, which invisibly holds them together. Once these 5 are secured from an external intrusion, the second thing to do would be an attempt of 4 joining together as to eliminate the 5th one, aimed at reducing the number of participants and optimizing the shares of forthcoming spoils. 4 are selecting 1 on either a basis of opportunity (weakest) or on a basis of fear (strongest). At this stage, the action of the second weakest (or second most likely to be the attacked next) is critical: Either he is (for right or wrong) assured by other 3 that he is not the next to be eliminated, or the 5th convinces the 4th that he will be the second for elimination. The very outcome heavily depends on two things: (i) the sense of judgment of the 4th (access to information and analysis of it), and (ii) the ability of both the first 3 and of the 5th to convince the 4th.

SPECIAL REPORTS 30

If the argument is won by the first 3, it is most likely that the 5th will be eliminated, and constrains will soon arise among the remaining ones. After short euphoria that every victory holds, the remaining 4 will react double-fold: each of them will contemplate further maximization of spoils (by reducing number of players) but will also trap themselves into residual (but not openly communicated) fears that each of them might be the next one. In the course of subsequent development (phase with more contemplation and less action), a lot of energy will be spent on suspiciously observing dynamics of others and demands for clear assurances from each and every one of them that no hostility will be conducted, while publicly (and seemingly confident) oﬀering pacific assurances to others. Once these 5 have eliminated one from their own ranks, the appetites of those remaining are up, but their mutual trust is down. The prospect of the possible (final) gain will be a powerful centripetal force to assert, but an equally strong (negative) charge will be a centrifugal force to refrain and defend oneself. The only way out of this deadlock for the remaining 4, is a formation of two blocks each having 2 members. Only that move tranquilizes residual fears for each of the 4, oﬀering a clear perspective at the same time to all of them to turn the possibility into probability.

The block of 2 is formed on either the basis of availability (willing) or on a mixed basis of fear-opportunity (strongest). Everybody wants to win, but is afraid that his action brings defeat. Being inside the block, undeniably gives more security, but reduces flexibility (internally and externally). Sooner or later, intentionally or not, such block-formation takes parties onto the inevitable confrontational course. Four facing one is a victory as 2 facing 2 results in victory, the considerable diﬀerence here is a prize paid for a victory. The two victorious (the last ones remaining of the 5) are sharing the spoils alone, but are too weak to fight each other to the end, or to prevent the 6th parties from intrusion. Let us go back for the moment and elaborate on the second possible scenario when the 5 are still together. If the 5th wins the argument with the 4th, we will witness the formation of an implicit or explicit block of 3 vs. 2. As a basic principle of physics teaches, the stronger magnetic field will more likely attract the nearby particle than the weaker magnetic field. Ergo, if 4 select 1 on basis of fear, it is more probable that the 5th will win the argument with the 4th. The ‘3 vs. 2’ scenario has two possible outcomes: less likely (but not impossible) is that 2 win over 3. In this case, the winning duo is overly exhausted and too weak to face each other in a final countdown (rather unintentionally, they remain the co-sharing winners by force of event). If the more likely scenario occurs, by which 3 win over 2, the winners would face the so-called triangle dynamics. The triangular equidistance, even if possible, cannot be maintained in the longer run (e.g. that spot A, B and C are facing each other from the same, equidistant proximity). The party which by his actions or actions of the other two allows the sharpening of its angel below the threshold of 60°, is most likely the next victim of the remaining duo (as the simple geometry equation implies: when point C distances itself from the other two, point A and B inevitably get closer to each other).

Whatever scenario takes place, the still-standing two have won it all, but are unable to maintain and secure their spoils on a longer run. In the course of eliminations, the remaining two have overextended themselves to the limits of either implosion or extreme external exposure (appetites of externals are arising) or both. The large community remembers them hostile but lately turning weak. Finally, the external action against the 2 will be just a matter of time; as such a move will be firmly justifiable from practical and from moral ground. This is how the dynamics of five plays its end game. If the previous lines seemed like wasting of time on a trivial and ill-managed interpretation of mathematics, here comes the geopolitics back. Above elaborated ‘game of five’ is exactly what happened with the Five European powers during the formation of the so-called Eastern Diplomatic Question, WWI, dissolution of Ottoman Empire (and division of its spoils mainly between the two Versailles victors, Britain and France), and their elimination from the club of big powers after WWII (by one peripheral and one external superpower). The ‘perfect balancer’, Britain well knew the logics and outcome of the ‘game of five’, and therefore formulated long before its policy of 3+2 aimed at securing its ‘splendid isolation’ from a single prevailing country or block of countries to face alone over the La Mache. Still, mistakes were inevitable; the UK faced its horrors (of standing alone against the single ruler of the continental part of Europe) twice: with Napoleon, and with Hitler. Nominally victorious, post-WWII Britain and France suffered erosion of their empires as well as external hostilities (be it from superpowers or from the decolonization movement). The triangle dynamics is also a powerful reminder that the Soviets skilfully played on differences between De Gaulle’s France and the U.S. (over the NATO role and its central command in Europe), as the U.S itself masterly played on differences between China and the Soviets in 1970s. SPECIAL REPORTS 32

After all, it was Britain that heavily advocated the extension of Roosevelt’s four policemen concept finally winning the argument and getting France in the privileged P–5 club of the UN Security Council. Losing the first of 5 is the beginning of process of erosion which inevitable brings grave consequences to each of the remaining 4. The ability to verticalize its own historical experience and institutionalize the collective memories is simply a demonstration of the state’s maturity. Naturally, there are always wins and losses, but the biggest defeat is when the certain power feels the most content (omnipotent). And now, let us turn back to our Arctic Five, their dynamics and memories. Although highly speculative, the inner dynamics of the Five could be a formation of two informal (de facto) blocks, each composed of two. Finally, both blocks (by a token of the British 3+2 formula) are trying to gain the 3rd – the decisive one – on its side, and at the same time preventing the other block from achieving the same.

Map 2: Lomonosov Ridge and Russian Claim, Source: Global Law, 2007

If so, the story would then follow that due to geographic proximity and shared territorial disputes, a logical but informal block would be Russia-Norway vs. Canada and the U.S., with Denmark in between. Seen from the Danish perspective, neither of the two blocks is a part of the EU, neither fully shares the same linguistic or cultural background (even though there is a strong bond on the side of Canada-US); in each block there is at least one NATO member. So, the Danish choice would fall on the block with whose (at least one) member Denmark has an unsolved territorial dispute. Besides the fascinating speculation on geopolitics, let us now take a closer look at the unsolved territorial claims.Thus, the Arctic is a theatre of four major areas with contradicting and overlapping claims.

Each of the disputed areas is holding large resource deposits (be it marine biota, hydrocarbons, other minerals and precious metals, on lands or seabed oďŹ&#x20AC;shore), and also has extensive geopolitical meaning to the parties (including the control of possible transport routes). Generally, the Five have preliminary agreed on the demarcation lines by establishing more than half of the potential EEZ. However, the remaining area including the geographic North Pole is still under dispute and no agreement has been reached so far. Besides the considerable territorial gain, having the Pole within its national borders is the intangible value and prestige symbol in itself. On the other side, the Antarctic theatre has witnessed some claims back to pre-system times, but the claimants themselves have agreed to put it on hold by the letter of the Treaty and the entire ATS system. However, there are some voices (still not decisive) that the old claims should be revisited and the pact eventually renegotiated. The following pages are a brief overview on the disputed areas.

Lomonosov Ridge The Lomonosov Ridge is a 1,800 kilometres long seabed mountain chain stretching from the New Siberian Islands across the Arctic Ocean and the North Pole to the Ellesmere Island (Canada) and Greenland – see the map bellow. As many as three of the Arctic Five are claimants on the Ridge, each (Canada, Denmark and Russia) claiming that the Ridge is an extension of their respective continental shelf. Russia argues that the Ridge is simply a prolongation of the Eurasian continent, and that this fact gives them a right to exploit the seabed beyond the 200 nM limit (set for the EEZ). Already in 2001, Moscow handed in its submission to the CLCS including the claim on the Ridge. Reacting to this submission, Canada and Denmark objected by stating that the Ridge is rather an extension of their respective continental shelves. Neither approving nor disapproving the claim in 2002 the CLCS gave Russia more time for a re-submission as to better document its claim. Documenting claims with the well elaborated and scientifically credible evidence for any of the three parties is quite a challenge, as the Ridge itself is beneath thick Polar ice on a seabed of unbearably violent ocean. As previously mentioned, Canada and Denmark agreed on a joint programme regarding the exploration and mapping of the seabed. One of the main aims is to gather suﬃcient geological data as to determine which continent’s land mass prolongs onto the Ridge. Coupling their human and financial resources in the joint-bipartite venture was the only option for Canada and Denmark, but also their hope that the findings will be beneficial (and will in the end pay back the enormous costs). SPECIAL REPORTS 34

On the other end, the Russian decades long patrolling beneath the Arctic ice would imply that the Soviet submarine fleets have made detailed and precise mapping of the Pole’s seabed, its main ridges and seabed picks. So, it seems likely that the Russians have the best data, the only question is whether this submitted to the CLCS is the fair share of data. As Map 2 clearly indicates, whoever wins the argument with the CLCS will get a ‘lion’s share’ of the Lomonosov Ridge-based 150 nM extension of continental shelf both geopolitically and geo-economically. Although scientists argue that the main resource deposits are oﬀ the cost (excluding the marine biota) and not near the Pole, the evidences are not as conclusive as the fact that nearly all future transportation routes would cross over the Ridge. Notably, if a single party gets the Ridge, that same party pretty much controls the Northern Pole and its aﬀairs. Maybe that is the reason why not only Canada and Denmark but also the U.S. and Norway would like to see the Ridge co-shared and divided between the three claimant parties.

Hans Island Mendeleev Ridge Another sight, slightly less impressive by its range, heights and size, but equally important for the claimants is the Mendeleev Ridge. It is located in the Eastern Siberian Sea area of the Siberian Shelf, stretching further to the central portion of the Ocean. The Ridge itself is attached to the Alpha Ridge of the Amerasian Basin. The Mendeleev Ridge is a vital claim for the Russians since this Ridge gives Moscow direct access to the North Pole. Any success in the claim over the Lomonosov Ridge (as continuation of the Eurasian continent) would necessitate winning in a similar argument on the Mendeleev Ridge first.

Map 3: Hans Island, Source: Global Law, 2007

The Hans Island is an uninhabited islet between Greenland and Canada’s far Northeast (in the middle of the Kennedy channel on the Nares Strait), sized only 1.3 km² (map nr.3). The tiny islet has been the centre of a bitter territorial dispute between Canada and Denmark. Besides repeatedly claiming it (after an unsuccessful attempt in 1980s for a joint administration), both countries have demonstrated symbolical and real presence (provocations) on the islet; from both displaying the respective national flag, up to the Canadian Defence Minister visiting the islet in a military escort (2005), the move to which Denmark afterwards replied by dispatching its ice-breaker to patrol just oﬀshore the island. Other two nearby disputes (in the Lincoln Sea to the north of the Ellesmere Island and Greenland) were resolved by the bilateral agreement reached between Canada and Denmark on delimitation of the continental shelf. However, the Hans Island was not subject of this agreement, and remains oﬀ the table, unresolved. Canada centres its territorial claim on the so-called Sector principle and Denmark fears that in case of success, the Hans Island could set a precedent on the applicability of this principal elsewhere in the Arctic (contradictory to the Delimitation agreement). Denmark’s contra-claim is based on customary law with the argument that the island is a traditional hunting ground of Western Greenland’s Inuit people. (Byers, Breaking the ice, 2009)

Located in tight straits of the Kennedy channel and controlled by both, it is an irrelevant territorial gain for either side. Why is it then that the islet is so hotly debated and bitterly claimed by both sides? Well, the Russian author Girshovich oﬀers an explanation. It could be that the Hans Island is (morphologically speaking) only a surfacing tip of the Lomonosov Ridge. If so, then the party who has the islet may claim a share of the Ridge, and eventually count its extension of the continental shelf from that point seawards for additional 150 nM. Perhaps, this indeed explains how such a little islet may trigger such a big and lasting dispute.

Barents Sea – Loop Hole Now, from the American continent let us go back to Europe: Russo-Norwegian land border totals to only 193 kilometres in length, but since never properly demarcated or defined, it created significant overlapping territorial claims that reached all the sea-way long up to the Arctic marine theatre. For over 30 years, the main and most disputed case is in the Barents Sea. The area of dispute (shown on the map nr. 4) has a size of 176,000 square kilometres, going beyond the EEZ parameters of 200 nM for both Norway and Russia. Reconfirmed geological evidences that in the exploitable and relatively warm (oil-platforms friendly) Barents Sea, there are considerable deposits of hydrocarbons, which bring additional tension on the dispute between both oil-driven economies. The bilateral talks on the partition of this zone had already started by 1970s without any considerable progress. SPECIAL REPORTS 36

Map 5: Disputed Area in the Barents Sea Source: UNEP/GRID-ARENAL, 2007

The only success was a temporary agreement on fishing rights in the Loop Hole (declaring the so-called ‘Gray Zone’ accord of 1978, which grants both nations to explore the marine biota within the Loop Hole, but also within the portions of both Russian and Norwegian EZZ) limited on extend since it requires annual renewal. Frustrated over the deadlock in the bilateral talks both sides have already handed in applications to the CLCS (including the Loop Hole issue). However, it is clearly beyond the Commission’s mandate to decide on the demarcation line. It should be the actual parties finding the consensus and communicating the outcome to the CLCS. The old Norwegian proposal was to divide the disputed area by the so-called median line (to identify the closest points of both countries’ baseline and draw a dividing line exactly in the middle of them, e.g. Svalbard on the Norwegian side and e.g. outmost tip of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land’s archipelago on the Russian side).The Russian proposal, of course more favourable for the originator, was to draw a dividing line at the meridian from the Varanger Fjord to the North Pole.

Map 6: Territorial Dispute in the Beaufort Sea

Russia primarily based its demarcation proposal on the fact that any acceptance of the Norwegian proposal would mean an implicit recognition of full territorial sovereignty of Norway over Svalbard (which is incompatible with the Svalbard Treaty). However, despite all previous odds, it seems that late Russo-Norwegian talks are scoring a breakthrough. The negotiations are now based on the following terms: Russia agrees upon Norwegian jurisdiction in the Svalbard fish protection area, if Norway accepts to divide the disputed area in the Barents Sea further to the west (accepting Russia’s demarcation parameters). In these quid-pro-quo negotiations, Norwegians and Russians have allegedly agreed how to divide 80% of the area, and the discussions over remaining 20% (with promising Fedinski-structure deposits beneath) are soon to be closed.

Beaufort Sea Equivalent to the dispute over the Barents Sea of the northern tip of Europe is the Beaufort Sea dispute on America’s continent (part of the Arctic Ocean, the Sea itself is of nearly a half million km²). The U.S. and Canada are disputing on a portion of 21,436 square kilometres north of Alaska and the Yukon (map nr. 6), which – to the trouble of both – is probably rich in hydrocarbon resources. The northern land demarcation line between Canada and the U.S. is established along the 141st degree of longitude west, which leads Canada to argue that the same demarcation line should rather be followed on sea. The U.S. disputes it by claiming that the sea border should be established by drawing a line under the 90° angle relative to the cost line (diagonal to the cost line). If winning the argument, the U.S. would receive a wedge-shaped area of the Beaufort Sea (marked on the map nr.6).

Antarctic Country Claims

Both parties are tempted by the reach deposits (marine biota and minerals), but also by the fact that the dispute has to be resolved in direct negotiations (since the U.S. as non-party to the UNCLOS is hindered from the IIIparty/LOSC, neutral arbitrational platform). An alternative to the partition would be, of course, to declare a joint development regime (for fishing and exploitation of hydrocarbons) over the disputed area. A similar, alternative approach has been in place between e.g. Iceland and Norway on the sea portion near the Norwegian Island of Jan Mayen. (Norway and Russia might be finally putting an end to their own dispute over the Barents Sea/ Loop Hole in the same fashion). So far, there has been no clear indication of the negotiations going to that direction: Canada justifies its stiﬀ position by expressing the environmental concerns (questioning whether the U.S. would put in place and enforce suitable living marine environmental protection). The U.S. is indeed very active in oil exploitation in the western Beaufort Sea (including several extensive searches for the oil deposits in the disputed belt itself ). Extensive overfishing in the belt has recently resulted in the U.S.’ selfdeclared fishing moratorium in the zone, which Canada repeatedly called for in the entire theatre of the Beaufort Sea. At any rate, it is not (always) clear whether declaring the protected marine zone in certain sections of the Arctic Ocean and introducing stricter environmental regulations beyond the territorial waters is an expression of the environmental concerns or compensation for the lack of exploitation and patrolling capabilities of a particular state. SPECIAL REPORTS 38

A way before the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) came into force several polar exploring states have been putting claims on particular parts of the Antarctica. Late 19th and early 20th century have witnessed numerous expeditions by many nations, with the first stationery research personal dating back already to the 1930s. This eventually led seven parties among many other interested ones exploratory states to claim particular portions (see: the pie-shaped sectors, map nr.7) of the southern continent. Common to all seven is a close proximity to the Pole by its main or overseas territory. When the Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1959, the territorial claims of the interested parties on land and ice shelves south of 60°S were put on hold, as article 4 clearly stipulates: “...treaty does not recognize, dispute, nor establish territorial sovereignty claims; no new claims shall be asserted while the treaty is in force”. Clearly, the Antarctic Treaty neither denies nor recognizes existing territorial claims. However, article 10 underlines: “...treaty states will discourage activities by any country in the Antarctica that are contrary to the treaty”, and the subsequent, article 11 calls upon the peaceful settlement of any dispute, ultimately recognizing the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Recognizing the Antarctica as demilitarized continent open to all mankind for pacific research and scientific exploration, the Treaty system (ATS) denies the right to lodge any new territorial claim. Despite this notion, both the Russian Federation and the U.S. (in a fashion of non-claimants) have already reserved their rights to make a (future) territorial claim (the latter declaring interest on the Marie Byrd Land).

Map 7: Antarctic Territorial Claims Source: University of Texas 1986

Promising deposits of natural resources as well as better technological capability to access, explore and exploit the same, have caused several countries to reconsider their demands which may lead to synchronized pressures for amending the ATS/Treaty system. Even though the treaty prevents nations from economic activities on land and oﬀshore beyond the parameter south 60°S, Britain, for example, handed in its extension of the continental shelf-claim (east and south of the Falklands/Malvinas). Trying to relativize the impact, the Foreign Oﬃce spokesman in 2007 stated that “...it would be a claim in name only we wouldn't act because doing any mineral exploitation contravenes the treaty."

It is worth mentioning that the tiny archipelago (the Falklands, South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands) which is the British entrance to the Antarctica, witnessed a brief but brutal armed conflict of rather large scale between Britain and Argentina in 1982 (the so-called Falklands War) The moratorium on mining (and other extensive economic activities) in the Antarctica will be reviewed only in 2048, as the Madrid Protocol (in force since 1998) prohibits the exploitation of natural resources for 50 years. However, some 30 years before the expiration of the legal regime, interested (and capable) parties are quietly but passionately positioning themselves for a future land and resources grab.

OTHER PARTIES AT STAKE

n addition to the five littoral circumpolar states, other parties – be it states, international FORAs and blocks of states, or the indigenous peoples’ associations – have explicit or implicit interest in the Arctic. Even geographically distant countries like China or Japan have expressed their interest in the Arctic aﬀairs. These interests of distant states are primarily driven by the increasing demands for energy as well as the need for cheaper and faster alternative transportation routes. In the following subchapters, the major entities involved in the matter will be discussed.

Iceland, Finland and Sweden In the previous chapters, the author extensively elaborated on the five Arctic, littoral and circumpolar states. In additional to these five there are three other polar states – Iceland, Finland and Sweden. Neither of the three is a littoral nor a circumpolar state. Iceland itself is an Arctic island state (size 103.000 km², with 330.000 inhabitants); while the other two are so-to-say land-locked countries from the Arctic side (arches of the Norwegian and Russian territories are between the northern tips of Finland and Sweden on one side and with the Arctic on the other). However, both Finland and Sweden are typical costal states. Their sea access is limited to the Baltic theater, and only by their northern land parts both countries are stretching well into the polar cycle (25% of Finish and 15% of Swedish territory).

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While Iceland is predominantly populated by the Icelanders (mix of Celtic and Nordic settlers), the northern portions of Finland and Sweden (Norway too) – generally known as the Lapland region – are home of the indigenous Sami (Lapp) people. Sami are the traditional hunters-gatherers prone to their nomadic life in tundra and (sub-) permafrost. Although all three countries as well as the indigenous peoples of both Finland and Sweden do have their say in diﬀerent forums (e.g. Arctic council, Nordic Group, etc.), the Five littoral states are rather dismissive when it comes to any event relevant to the Arctic Ocean theatre. The very setting and the deliberations of the Ilulissat summit both are the best illustration of this. Limited in access to any relevant decisionmaking FORA, Finnish and Swedish governments may only voice their environmental concerns (since the nomadic Sami are very dependent on reindeers whose habitat heavily depends on the climatic oscillations).

The position of Iceland is somewhat better since this northern country is of a direct sea access to the wide Arctic theatre. If the Arctic Five are dismissive towards Iceland its geography is very beneficial – the island is strategically located on the very edge of the polar circle between the North American and the Eurasian continent. Traditionally, Icelandic economy was centred on living marine resources (fishery) and tourism. In the last decade, the financial service sector was booming bringing unprecedented wealth and prosperity to this tiny nation. Nevertheless, the recent financial crisis severely hit the country bringing it to the verge of bankruptcy. With the end of the oﬀshore services euphoria, Iceland’s sobriety is marked by looking towards less speculative, yet more stable and long-range economic prospects. One of them is the consideration to join the European Union (with the precondition to firstly close the bitter negotiations over the fishery – an issue, so sensitive to Iceland) – as it is the candidate strongly supported by the EU Nordic block (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). The other opportunity – promising in the sense of diversifying its economy – is coming with the prospects of a navigable Arctic Ocean (new shipping and transportation opportunities). It appears that the transhipment route between the North Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean straight over the Central Arctic Ocean (the so-called Arctic Bridge) might be in reach earlier than expected due to climate change. If so, Iceland’s strategic position will dramatically improve (permit its volcanic and overall seismic activity) and will turn the island into an economic hub – a power base for transportation-related services, bringing along a whole new range of economic activities.

As to compensate its relative geographic and economic size, Iceland is one of the champions of the Nordic and circumpolar cooperation. It advocates joint research programs and economic undertakings. One of these initiatives concerning resource management has turned into a bilateral cooperation agreement in 2008. Norway and Iceland are in an extensive joint search for oil and gas on the continental shelf between the western Norwegian island of Jan Mayen and Iceland.

Arctic Council The Arctic Council is a forum with a permanent secretariat and a chairmanship biannually rotating among the eight Arctic states. Its founding members are states (the so-called Arctic 8) and groupings of indigenous peoples (3+3), which make it a unique International FORA â&#x20AC;&#x201C; simultaneously an intergovernmental and inter-societal. As a consultative forum with a certain monitoring mechanism, the Arctic Council was established in 1996 by the Eight Arctic States and three associations of indigenous peoples, with the three additional associations joining later SPECIAL REPORTS 42

Based on the expressed interest and irrespective of the geographic proximity, there are several observer countries (all together nine, with confirmed or ad-hoc status) as well as the observer organizations (e.g. the Nordic Council, the EU, several UN bodies, etc.). The Councilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s functional and substantive work is carried out in six working groups as well as through the four programs and action plans. Mandated with the monitoring and assessment tools, the Council mainly deals with aspects of sustainable development, biodiversity (protection and preservation of the local flora and fauna including the marine environment), human dimension (the so-called Arctic Human Development Report) as well as the preparation of emergency action plans.The findings of the working groups are well-documented studies on the eďŹ&#x20AC;ect of climate change in the Arctic, the assessment on the natural resources (mainly the hydrocarbons), biodiversity and shipping issues.

OSCE, NATO, EU and the Nordic Council At a first glance these four entities have nothing in common. Still, all of them do share certain interest in the Arctic matters. Each would be able to extend the mandate as having the institutional capacity, but as the consensus based entities are restrained by one or the other of the Arctic Five. Let us firstly revert to two securityâ&#x20AC;&#x201C; based organizations among the four.

Although some of the issues are burning and pressing for the Arctic states, like demarcation of the sea borders/delimitation, shipping or fisheries, it is clear that no legally binding power is or will be given to the Council as its member states do not want to see it as the powerful instrument. The Council itself will remain a consultative mechanism, a credible knowledge database centre, still without legal personality. Besides the sporadic political declarations (as the main outcome of the biannual ministerial summits) and relatively more frequent recommendations, no legally binding instrument is entitled to the Council. Interestingly enough, the US and Russia did not even want the security related matters to be part of the Councilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s discussions. So, apart from the human or marine biota-related issues, no security is on the agenda of this Arctic forum or at any of its working groups and programs.

The Helsinki/Budapest-born OSCE is the only organization besides the UN system to which all the Arctic Five plus three polar states are members. The OSCE is perfectly suited to address nearly all of the Arctic related concerns: It has the politico-military cooperation, economic-environmental and human dimension as well as the confidence-building well-established machinery. However, as a consensus-based organization the OSCE is not mandated to deal with the Arctic matters. Besides few sporadic discussions, the polar issues were never brought to the attention of any basket and any meeting of the OSCE. The very same dismissive stance of the Arctic Five is evident within the NATO ranks. This security alliance gathers four of the Five, and even through the Partnership-for-Peace machinery it has Russia around its many Brussels tables. Still, besides the sporadic talks about the military bases on Greenland, the NATO Secretariat has never had the Arctic related issues on the agenda of its meetings. Interestingly enough, the four have never even contemplated in playing Russia out (by the token of formula 4 against 1) through the institution of NATO, as this would enable other NATO members to institutionally voice their say in the Arctic matters. So, it is safe to say that NATO is here to stay for all military security matters, but primarily as the North Atlantic (not the Arctic) Treaty Organization.

The European Union, a 27–members strong block, has three of the Arctic Eight within its ranks. Additionally, another two of the Arctic Eight, Norway and Iceland are having tight links to the EU. Although formally outside the EU system, both Norway and Iceland are deeply integrated into the EU markets through the (EFTA-EU) mechanism of the European Economic Area (EEA). Hereby, the complex EU structures diﬀerently reflect upon the Arctic issue. The decision makers vary from the powerful (but strictly consensus based and MS controlled) EU Council, that has never discussed Arctic matters, up to another (co-)decision maker (democratic, directly elected, and notconsensus based) the EU Parliament, which was calling upon the creation of the ATS-like international treaty for the Arctic. The EU executive branch (more consensus based and MS-dominated), the Council repeatedly communicated that the Arctic territorial disputes should be resolved throughout direct bilateral and multilateral talks of parties concerned under the established legal frameworks like the UNCLOS. SPECIAL REPORTS 44

Initiated by several communications of the late Prodi and the Barroso Commissions (“the EU and the Arctic region”), the so-called ‘EU position in the High North’ basically remains the non-instrumented concern over the Arctic environmental degradation and climate change, (security of rights of ) fishery, and position of indigenous peoples. Implicitly, the Commission reaﬃrms the full authority of the Arctic Council, although the pressure is evident in the matters related to the free waterways (the international waters status for the Northern corridor), and alternatives to the external energy dependence (on Russia). Following several of its MS, the EU is observer organization to the Arctic Council. Likewise the above mentioned FORAs, the Nordic Council (composed of the two of the Arctic Five and all three of the remaining three polar states), is deprived from any relevant participation in the work of Arctic Five. However, the Nordic Council remains an important platform for the economic, social and labour intraNordic cooperation.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

arth caps are caught in limbo between the environmental hazard triggered by global warming, rising economic opportunity (including the promising opening of transportation routes for the shipping of general cargo), contested geopolitical aspirations â&#x20AC;&#x201C; all in absence of precise and long-range legal regime. While the climate change warns and cautions, the legal regime constrains and obliges, the economic opportunities (funded or assumed) open and invite. No wonder that the later gives the most of dynamics to the Arctic and to the Antarctica. Deglaciation of the ice caps invites the projections on the (seemingly existing and easily accessible) vast amounts of resources concealed under ice and water, all to the interests of governments, corporations and organizations. The Arctic and Antarctica are the last remaining spots of the planet to be divided. The precise demarcations of EEZ and claims for the extension of the continental shelf are the operative tools to achieve this. Elsewhere on the planet, the resources deposits (including very much hydrocarbons and marine biota) are consumed under the accelerated speed and will be exhausted to the point of irreversible depletion far faster than anticipated. In near future, the possession of natural resources (including the control over fresh water reserves) will add even more power to states than it does today. SPECIAL REPORTS 46

Map 8: Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, Source: UNEP/GRID-ARENAL, 2007

Clearly, the economic infrastructure in the North is growing, be it related to fishery, energy resources, shipping or tourism. Economic opportunities in the Antarctica are still behind, as about 98% of the southern continent is covered by a perennial ice sheet and 2% are unfruitful rock. The harsh climate additionally discourages sustained economic activities: the Southern Pole is the coldest, windiest and driest continent. Compared with the Arctic, circumvented by the leading industrialized nations, the Antarctica is detached even from few gravitating states (Chile, Argentina, South Africa, New Zeeland and Australia) and any local or transcontinental commercial activity and shipping routes. However, both poles have experienced an increase in tourism. Luxury cruise ships or even ice breakers bring tourists frequently to the area (e.g. under relatively aﬀordable prize, one can book a trip on the Russian nuclear ice breaker ’50 Years of Victory’ from the harbour of Murmansk to the North Pole which includes an exotic polar picnic).

Shipping Routes With the rapid melting of the icecap, the prospects of shortened transport waterways in the ice-free summers are an attractive future economic aspect of the Arctic region. There are basically three possible routes, each of significant importance: •the Northwest Passage connecting the American Continent and Far East Asia; •the Northern Sea Route offering a shorter way from Europe to Asia along the Russian Arctic coastline; and •the Arctic Bridge connecting Canada and Russia. (For details see the map nr. 7) There is high potential for the service industry in saving distance through the opening of the shorter routes between the continents. The high risks on alternative routes still keep most traffic over the traditional and well-mapped transport routes like the Suez and Panama Canal. Nevertheless, the Arctic Bridge is already used summer months for shipping from Murmansk in Russia to the Canadian port of Churchill (service operated by the Denver-based rail company OmniTRAX). (Cooper, 2008) On the other edge, the Antarctica can’t optimize shipping due to its distant location and the fact that it doesn’t offer any transpolar route to the countries of southern hemisphere.

Northwest Passage The Northwest Passage connects the Atlantic and Pacific along the northern coast of North America through the Arctic waters from the Davis straits and Baffin Bay all the way to the Bering Sea (first time crossed by the Norwegian Roald Amundsen, 1903–06). This shipping route shortens the distance between Far East Asia and American East coast (via Panama) for around 7,000 kilometres. The summer of 2007 was the first season in modern times that the Northwest Passage was fully ice-free. The latest data for the Arctic are suggesting that the route will be crossable for the non-ice-breaker cargo ships by the summer of 2013. An opening of the Northwest Passage for regular (not only sporadic) shipping has an important impact on the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Canada. While Canada claims the Davis straits and Baffin Bay as its territorial waters, the US considers it as the high seas, or at least as the international corridor, an argument also supported by the EU. In 1985, Canada (re-)defined internal waters, an act of domestic legislation which included the Northwest Passage too. When Canada eventually acceded to the UNCLOS in 1993, an agreement with the U.S. was reached that Canada would be notified prior any US shipping over the Northwest Passage. However, this domestically imposed limitation (with the right of prior consent) is hardly enforceable, since Canada has no sufficient Arctic patrolling and deterring capabilities. Still, Canada vocally defends its decision by expressed serious environmental concerns, although beneath it is the implied economic and political interest (to control the traffic and to offer its own shipping companies by introducing the high safety standards for ships flying the foreign flags). As per definition, an international strait implies that there are no restrictions on rights of usage under any conditions to any coast, as long as international law is taken into account – a solution which is not favoured by Canada. SPECIAL REPORTS 48

Northern Sea Route This route, also known as the North East Passage, connects the Atlantic coast of Western and Northern Europe with the Pacific coast of the Northeast Asia via the Russian Arctic coastline (with Adopf Erik Nordenskiöld being the first seafarer to successfully close the whole route from the island of Novaya Zemya to the Bering Sea between 1878 and 1879). Using this route, the distance between the edges of two continents could be shortened for about 40% in comparison to the traditional, warm seas, transport routes via the Suez or Panama Canal. Late Tsarist, but especially Soviet Russia introduced forceful settling of its polar circle being driven by the geoeconomic and geopolitical needs. The impressive infrastructure, urbanisation with many harbours along the Arctic coastline and lively economic activity, had been in place already by the end of WWII. Until 1987, the Northern Sea route was practically sealed oﬀ for any foreign flag, as this was basically the only life line which connected the Soviet Baltic and Pacific fleet.

The actual usage of the passage remained mostly intra-Russian (between the Russian Arctic ports). It is rare that any commercial vessels aim to make a complete crossing, since the waters are regarded as very dangerous (some parts of the passage do not have an ocean depth to allow the traﬃc of heavy container ships) and unpredictable (limited weather warning systems and iceberg monitoring facilities). The cross-route passage for foreign flags is allowed only after a submitted payment for the guidance by the Russian ice breaker. The Russian Federation plans to invest billions in the northern port of Murmansk (with the aim to double its capacity by 2015) as well as in the further development and modernization of its Arctic coastline. Since the rapid degalaciation is turning the previously unhindered passage from distant possibility to viable probability, Russia wants to competitively answer the EU, Japanese and American transportation needs and their respective commercial considerations.

Arctic Bridge The Arctic Bridge is a seasonal route which shortcuts the connection between the American and European continent via the Arctic Ocean. The Bridge concept has been oﬀered to Russia by the Canadians in the 1990s, but the first regularized shipping started only in 2004. Currently, for around four summer months, it is used for shipping grain and fertilizers from Canada to Europe (via Canada’s principal northern port of Churchill in Hudson Bay to the Russian port of Murmansk, both well connected by railroad with the rest of respective continents). Russia is keen on further developing the concept of the Arctic bridge, and already positions the Murmansk port as transit hub for the future cross-continental shipping between the North America, Northwest Europe and Pacific Asia.

Challenges of Shipping in the Arctic Although the Arctic may oﬀer shorter transhipping distances, the time and transport costs, at present, are not automatically lowered. The navigation in the high northern latitudes requires special (or additionally equipped) vessels, long and specific trainings of the crew, extreme caution and relatively low speed (even for the ice-breakers) as the natural hazards are far higher and less predictable comparing those within the traditional warm-seas routes. At present, a major barrier to the Arctic transport is the dangerous iceberg drifting, happening unpredictably (in a far and wide range), rough winds and oceanic currents whose direction, severity and frequency is far from explored and scientifically documented. Clearly the danger for the crew, cargo and environment is very high. (Since most of the traditional cargos are not eligible for the polar climate, it is safe to assume that the Arctic shipping will be dominantly related to hydrocarbons such as crude and liquefied natural gas.

Map 9: Shipping Routes in the Arctic Source: Centre Port Canada, 2008 This would surely pose a high environmental risk in the event of accidents on the anyway destabilized balance of these fragile eco-systems.) Even if in the forthcoming summers the channelsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ice-sheets might be fully melted, it is not clear whether the old ice-sheets (heaver, denser and more compact) would expand filling the gap in temporary freed pathways and block the narrow straits. To answer it with the precision, more observation will be needed. A vast majority of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s commercial fleets neither have pilots and crew, nor are the ships adequately equipped for the Arctic challenges. So far, the polar circle has very few oceanic observation stations, surveillance and warning systems (grounded or in the geostationary satellites).

In the absence of those systems, disaster relief capability and rapid rescue capacity, and with the high environmental hazard, the Arctic shipping is, at present, mostly considered as a nogo zone for the international insurance and RE companies (since the type, severity and frequency of risks are largely undocumented and therefore incalculable). Summed up all together, it increases the costs of shipping and finally neutralizes potential gains in shortening the routes. Clearly, any continued rapid deglaciation is turning the Arctic into a lucrative shipping alternative. Yet, it is not clear how soon, how long and how broad a context. Until then, the traditional transport over the warm-seas routes is to be predominantly exercised. After all, it took seafarers centuries to master the navigation of high sea in the warm oceans.

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Natural Resources It is largely assumed that the unique morphological and climatic characteristics of both poles are turning them to be the two basins very rich in natural resources. Several recent studies conducted in the wide Northern Pole theatre are proving the earlier finding of the U.S. Geological Survey, which claimed that 25% of the world’s oil and gas reserves are lie beneath the Arctic (estimated at as much as 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas). If proven, this would add about 22% of the undiscovered global resources, out of which 84% are expected to lie oﬀshore. About 70% of the undiscovered natural gas is estimated to be centred in three provinces only, namely the West Siberian Basin, the East Barents Basins and Arctic Alaska. For further details, see the maps below. (U.S. Geological Survey, 2008) To this end, the Norwegian StatoilHydro is already extracting in the so called Snow White Field (some 145 kilometres above the Norwegian northern coast). Russia’s leading gas producer Gazprom is also undertaking developments in the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, which is already the world largest oﬀshore gas field.

In addition to the exploitation of hydrocarbons, the Arctic holds mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, copper, nickel, and chrome. (Omestad, 2008) Canada is already one of the top three diamond producers due to its rich deposits in the Polar province of Nunavut. Regions of Alaska, Polar Canada and Polar Russia are already experiencing a sort of mining rush and the sudden lively economic activity. However, the sustained exploration and exploitation as well as transport remain a big obstacle along with the nearly unbearable climatic conditions for the longer stationed craws. The resource exploitation in the Antarctic region is hindered due to the ATS system which prohibits any commercial exploitation. It is known that the Antarctic continental shelf is holding rich natural resources (surveys have proven that it has been part of the super-continent Gondwanaland that back in the Palaeozoic era consisted of South America, Africa and Australia). However, exact and detailed surveys on the holdings of minerals and other resources are still from being credibly proven. Assumedly, the Antarctica is well rich in iron ore, chrome, copper, gold, nickel and platinum as well as in gas and coal. The Arctic exhibits rich marine biota too – fishery is the traditional activity for natives. Rising ocean temperatures cause fish stocks migration to the colder northern waters, further compromising the ecological balance. In the uninhabited Antarctica, any occasional fishing is physically limited and legally controlled by the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources which sets limits to all commercial fisheries and prevents any illegal and unregulated fishing.

Map 10: Undiscovered Gas Deposits in the Arctic, Source: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 2008

Map 11: Undiscovered Oil Deposits in the Arctic, Source: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 2008

SECURITY CHALLENGE

ith a climate change seriously aﬀecting the entire planet, the line between natural occurrences and human induced catastrophes will be ever harder diﬀerentiated. An increase in the severity and frequency of these occurrences is becoming practically incalculable for the scientific and insurance community, but also for the traditionally well-informed national intelligence. Consequently, the additional stress will be imposed on the overall equilibrium of all our systems; be it the eco-system, political or socio-economic system (well-routined, established systems of how we access, extract, process, transport, distribute and consume natural resources and manufactured products). The compensation for unpredictable future losses, the humankind can only find in competing over the available safe territory and natural resources. Thus, clear connection between environment and security is evident. Further climatic deterioration may bring the contraction of available resources and habitable territories, but also dispersion (e.g. deeper into the Arctic theatre). The constancy and predictability of states’ behaviours is the essential prerequisite for any viable system of international relations.

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On the northern side, with an absence of specific legal framework and clear demarcation/border line, the defrosting of the Arctic may heat up the political struggle driven by the geoeconomic and geopolitical consideration. It is not far from reality that the stiﬀ dismissive stance of the Arctic Five towards any external aspirant may trigger diﬀerent confrontations, including military. Even if successfully keeping others from access to the territory, (specific) passage or natural resources, any lasting balance would need a solid inner cohesion among the Five, which historically never existed. Currently, the moves of the Arctic Five are symbolic and concrete, and both assertive (towards the Arctic) and dismissive (towards the external aspirants) at the same time. Among the symbolic ones are the over toned statements of the political rhetoric, like: the Arctic is ours and we should manifest our presence, statement made by Kremlin’s special representative for the Arctic Artur Nikolayevich Chilingarov, or the Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s statement of 2008 that Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty in the Arctic: either we use it or we lose it. (McArdle, 2008)

In the category of the symbolic ones is also the statement of Admiral James G. Stavridis, the NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe: This [Arctic issue] is something we are starting to spend more time looking at. I look at the high north and I think it could either be a zone of conflict, I hope not, a zone of competition, probably. It could also be cooperative . . . and as an alliance we should make this as co-operative as we possibly can. (NATO 2009) A seemingly reconciliatory statement on the subject came from Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, that the alliance should not overly focus on the Arctic issue, and that possible NATO–Russia confrontation could be avoided by bringing in Russia, but also other nations (non-NATO members) who expressed interest in the Arctic like China or Japan. (NATO 2009) Oﬀering the share to the states which are not a part of the Arctic Five’s de facto system, but are on the Eastern and Southern flank of Russia must be triggering many concerns within the Kremlin quarters. Containment and encirclement is the last what the Russian Federation would like to see in its quest for the polar share. Seen from the NATO perspective, it looks that the North Atlantic alliance either sees Russia too powerful and best positioned in the Arctic quest, or that the Alliance wants to deter Russia’s aspirations by sharing costs of it with the external players. More concrete and less symbolic moves are the Russian frequent patrolling on and over the Arctic seas, but also the NATO interceptors several times alerted due to the flights of Russian bombers (equipped with the long-range missiles). Since Putin’s first presidency, the Russian Federation has opened a new defence budget line devoted to modernization of the polar/sub-polar airborne and naval forces. Less dramatically but equally steady, Canada and Norway, too allocated the funds for the Arctic military and general patrolling presence.

Besides the collective security arrangement of NATO, other forms of cooperation are at place: a possible and also plausible alliance could be seen between Canada and the US, as to secure their Arctic borders but also the North America’s energy supply. The U.S. and Denmark already run the military cooperation as the U.S. has an important Air Force base in Thule, Greenland. Finally in Europe at diﬀerent FORAs, Sweden, Finland and Iceland have repeatedly expressed their willingness to increase cooperation with Norway and Denmark on the Arctic security issues. In the Antarctica, on the contrary, the deterrence is still guaranteed by the Antarctica Treaty System (ATS) will remain in force for some decades to come. Additionally, the Southern Pole is politically, geographically and climatically far from any serious and sustained geoeconomic or geopolitical proximity. Still, recent British oﬀshore activities are bringing some of the old tensions over the Falklands – the gate to the Antarctica – back into the spotlights. This frozen territorial dispute between Argentina and the UK may spill over, causing the tensions among other Southern Pole participatory states in their views when and how to access the Antarctica.

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China has already applied for the observer status in the Arctic Council, and is repeatedly pronouncing its bolder naval presence including the development of ice breakers – the plans still far from concretization, though causing the additional tension all over the warm Asian seas but to the cold north too.

CONCLUSION

immy Carter’s presidency is usually portrayed as one of the weakest in the modern American history. The Iranian revolution and the US debacle with the hostage crisis are the most quoted in the long list of miscalculations ascribed to this presidency. Still, President Carter was the first one in modern history to successfully formulate and promulgate the non-territorial claim on the world scene of geopolitics. As known, the Cold war was a mega confrontation between two superpowers and blocks organized around them. This confrontation, both ideological and territorial, was essentially doctrineted by Monroe and Brezhnev. Permanent overextension of superpowers and constant calls of Europeans for a détente has finally put the US and the Soviet Union around the negotiation table in the early 1970s – something that in Helsinki will mark the biggest Cold War victory of all. Surely, the preface of the Helsinki accord was going around the same – territorial gains: Soviets were interested in mutual recognition of borders in Europe (drawn pretty much by their own hand in Potsdam), while the U.S. were finally ready to relax the tensions in Europe by accepting it. Further on, Moscow requested the unrestricted access to the western technologies (essentially the know-how transfer as to improve their declining technological edge), while the US and its European allies contra-requested the joint military inspection in the East. SPECIAL REPORTS 58

Finally, in the wake of Helsinki closure, the newly elected Carter urged something non-military and non-territorial: Human rights as an equal and non-renegotiable basket to the comprehensive Final Act of Helsinki. Although the Soviets, and to some extent Europeans, have felt that the Three-basket accord was their grand victory, the time has shown that actually the US was the final winner. The non-territorial quest, e.g. a full respect of human rights and civic liberties, freedom of speech and media is a door-way for the free market economy which does not necessarily bring (full-fledge) democracy, but surely domesticates the capitalism of such a form that best fits the US corporate interests. This in return, eventually and ultimately increases an overall American geopolitical stake. After all, free trade is not a virtue, but an instrument (as liberalism is not a state of mind, but a well-doctrinated ideology). Collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the Cold War meant a decisive victory of the nonterritorial principle. Even the post Yeltsin Russia (after absorbing the shock of the loss of its historic empire) has turned to its strategic neighbourhood (and beyond) with the non-territoriality as its major quest. The only exception is the region of Caucasus, but the Russian acting with Ukraine and Central Asia as well as with the Baltic republics and Eastern Europe is based on non-territoriality.

Consequently, we can safely say that the future contests will be predominantly driven by non-territorial claims â&#x20AC;&#x201C; decoupling the strict territorial control from the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s prosperity. However, two big exceptions are two poles at which the territorial claims are predominantly presented â&#x20AC;&#x201C; both Arctic and Antarctica are the last remaining territories to be conquered and divided. As noted earlier in the text, the two Poles are global climate stabilizers, holding by far the richest marine biota and biggest fresh water reserves, still the regions without clear demarcation lines for the military and economic presence. Climate change and global warming will cause many uncertainties in years and decades to come. Forthcoming climatic variations and environmental deterioration will inevitable stress the habitable territories, accessible resources (including the hydrocarbons and precious metals, but not excluding the fresh water). As said, the viable, universal and comprehensive international system requires, maintains and aims at the constancy and predictability of behaviour of its subjects. Climate change, therefore, seriously challenges and compromises the collective security mechanisms, and may redesign the national security priorities of many states. Eventual loss of lands and resources within the national territories may turn into the possibility of assertion in the larger theatre of melted Arctic and Antarctica. The successful promulgation of the non-territorial quest presupposes that the object of such a quest has permanent population over clearly defined land parameter, constancy of the domestic administration which demonstrates the legal enforcement sufficient enough as to maintain the basic economic activity (including the monetary predictability), consumerist needs and elementary purchasing power of residents. Essentially, each and every of the enumerated elements are completely absent in the Arctic and Antarctica. Meaning, the territoriality is not the most likely, but is the only possible scenario for the two poles.

However, due to the fundamentally asymmetric legal setup, the two Polar Regions are facing diﬀering consequences. In the Antarctica, the participatory parties agreed to set up a firm legal framework (comprehensive security, economic and environmental arrangement) – a treaty system to protect the unique environment of the most southern continent, restricting their national interests and military activities, and finally focusing on the preservation and scientific exploration of the South Pole. Respective territorial claims were not settled but frozen, and parties to the Antarctic Treaty committed themselves to the pacific use, refraining at the same time from any kind of commercial activities. Therefore, Antarctica’s legal position (though unsolved) could be described as well-defined – the treaty system that leaves little to no space for conflicting territorial claims at least for the time being, while the treaty is still in force. The Arctic, to the contrary, is not subject to any specific legal provisions. SPECIAL REPORTS 60

The only exception is the island of Svalbard which has (though imperfect) the clearly defined, restraining (semi-ATS like) legal framework.The five littoral, circumpolar states have a desire and legal opportunity (thought the UNCLOS stipulated CLCS machinery) to lodge the territorial claims over the Arctic. That is something that none of the Five would like to see changed for a new restraining international instrument whose scope would be negotiated by large number of states beyond the polar parameter. Out of the twelve original parties to the Antarctica treaty, three are among the Arctic Five (Norway, Russia/SU and the US). Out of the Arctic Five, we can consider only three as real polar states. Irrespectively of the size, might and the degree of technological advancement, no country can close a specific polar-knowledge gap within few decades. It took Denmark, Norway and Russia several centuries to ‘master the ice’.

Although the US portraits itself as a ‘fish of high seas’ – a supreme ruler of the world oceans, it is primarily a ‘fish of warm seas’. The US suﬀers from territorial discontinuity with its Alaska proper. After all, Alaska gives relatively modest share of the Arctic theatre. The US presence in the Antarctica is less substantive and more symbolic – to confirm the prestige and to observe the activities of others. Likewise, the main Arctic concern for the US is to deter Russia – for the time being there is no indication of the bolder Arctic presence. Finally, by not ratifying the UNCLOS, the U.S. cannot lodge the claim, but also (equally, if not more importantly) cannot decide on claims of others. Canada, on its own end, is neither a typical polar state nor considerable naval power. Its, second longest, Arctic border so far is more of a burden than of an advantage for the government in Ottawa. Canada is one of the most disproportionate states: huge territory with a tiny population centred at the far south of the country – of the exposed, unexplored and literally empty central and northern territory.

Long green and blue borders as well as the lack of substantive Arctic expertise will keep the US close to Canada in their security and geoeconomic considerations, still not without frictions framework. (Even the late Canadian insistence on bilingualism is not an expression of the country’s pro-France sentiment as much as it is a desire to diﬀerentiate the two societies, both being predominantly white protestant English speaking with Anglo-Irish roots.) If the US is a ‘fish of warm seas’ than Denmark and Norway are the ‘fish of cold seas’ and Russia is a ‘polar bear’ of permafrost. Russia clearly has very strong position as it owns not only the longest Arctic coastline but it also holds a long history of Arctic presence. Traditionally, the High North has been a constant geopolitical imperative since Peter the Great’s times. Parallel and wellestablished geoeconomic drive is getting a new vigour with Putin and Medvedev’s administrations. The bold (sometimes noisy) Russian Arctic policy is another signal that the Federation is not going to disappear into the second row of global politics and economy, but will increase its (non-territorial leverage and geopolitical) projection as a major energy supplier of the world throughout the 21st century. It is hard to imagine any relevant Arctic issue to be resolved (even discussed) without an explicit Russian consent. Norway, the small state with the large pool of historical knowledge and advanced technologies is a loner in the political environment, a nation in between the EU and the Russian Federation, and the key northern flank NATO member. It takes in a friendly but firm position in international relations and Arctic matters. Close proximity coupled with unresolved Arctic territorial disputes and lucrative economic prospects of joint ventures will keep Russia and Norway out of open confrontational course.

Canada’s neighbour Greenland connects the EU to the Arctic. The largest world’s island and its tiny population will be contested with the environmental, economic and political challenges in the upcoming decades. Greenland’s road-map is gradual but decisive independence, less home grown and more Danish induced. However, at the moment Greenland is still highly dependent on Danish subsidies, including diplomatic ones. It is still Danish signature that holds the biggest NATO Arctic base on Greenland’s very soil. Clearly, no instrument comparable to the Antarctic Treaty System will be established in the Arctic even if there are several advocates demanding it. By the Ilulissat Declaration, the littoral states have unanimously reaﬃrmed the UNCLOS as the only applicable framework for the Arctic territorial matters. This declaration of the Five clearly demonstrated their dismissive stance towards the larger international community, assertiveness towards the Arctic and reconciliatory attempt among them. The sporadic calls by which one or the other of the Five invites diﬀerent FORAs (like NATO, the EU, Arctic Council, the Nordic Battle Group and the like) or particular states (like China or Japan) for the stakes at the Arctic theatre are rather the tactical moves to deter the other players within the Five than they are calls for the substantive share in decision making. Each and every of the Arctic Five will continue to keep any external party far away from substantive participation in the polar matters.

SPECIAL REPORTS 62

However, it is not a guaranty for the frictionless relations among the Five: the North Pole was the most militarized region of the world at the peaks of the Cold War (and still holds huge military arsenal), while at the same time the South Pole was (and still is) the only demilitarized continent of the planet. In the Antarctica, a sudden change of the current legal regime is very unlikely. The year 2048 might constitute a landmark, as it will depend on the parties to the treaty, whether an extension or alternation of the ATS system (with all or some of its major transversals on the economic, politico-military and environmental issues) will take a place. Further on, the Southern Pole is far from the prime centres of the world gravity: the US, the EU, Russia and Japan – all four of them are situated well on the northern hemisphere. Even the rapid newcomers like India, China and Brazil, that may largely influence world politics and economy, will remain nearly irrelevant for the Arctic (and Antarctica) matters. The Polar Regions, although inhabitable, of harsh and hostile weather conditions, and distant from any prominent centre of human activity, will certainly have major influence on a climatic and environmental, political, economic and overall security matters throughout the 21st century, and therefore require closer consideration as well as cautious and constant observation.

POST SCRIPTUM

ot long ago, dissatisfied with his interpretation of current aﬀairs I played a trick on one of my students by recalling the famous Churchill saying: “There is nothing new in the world but only history chapters you haven’t read”. My student calmly replied: “Professor, how wide and how far beyond should I go in order to grasp what the newspapers write?” My young fellow definitely had a point. Most of the media space and audience attention are given to the news related to crises. We witness a crisis every once in a while; there was an oil crisis, hostage crisis, terrorist crisis, consumer crisis, ecological crisis, Stephanie of Monaco crisis, health crisis (with the outbreaks of epidemics that are human-induced but always given animal’s names: chicken, cow, bird, swine), producers crisis, Euro-currency/Greece crisis, Volcanic ashes crisis, crisis of BP oil spilled in the Gulf of Mexico, severity and frequency of natural occurrences crisis (whereas the devastating killer-tsunamis, cyclones and hurricanes are given Christian names, like Mitch, Catharina, Ivan), and finally the lasting financial crisis. Although both, international media and its worldwide audience tend to see crises as isolated incidents, the constancy of crisis state-of-the-art has a connection, and eventually deeper meaning.

Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic

Observing the archipelago from the waterline, the only shape noticeable would be a sum of disproportionate islands which independently stand next to each other – no corridor to connect them. Only a closer look, deep beneath the water surface would give us a clear image of the seabed, which is eventually a single and compact ridge with only sporadically outgoing tips visible above the waterline. Each and every crisis (whatever it is called and how it is manifested) is primarily a crisis of thought, a crisis of ideas on the way we produce, distribute, transport, consume and plan each of them. It is undeniably a crisis of thought on how we articulate our social, economic, cultural and political life, and interact and correlate them as individuals and societies. Witnessing the recent (and still unsettled) crises, I missed one thing – an extensive and wide debate of academia and practitioners. SPECIAL REPORTS 64

This silence, I could only ascribe to either intellectualism in retreat or to the forces of the status quo which are overly strong. A neutral stance of ‘wait-and-see’ attitude in times of crises is the most frequent advice or self-assurance. Either occupying a position in which one should generate ideas (per definition the idea questions and challenges the system of status quo), but failing to do so, or having the idea but withholding it, results in the same – a deep moral crisis. Therefore, a crisis of thought and ideas will lead inevitably to its final stage – a moral crisis! Dante gives a powerful reminder: “The hottest place in Hell is reserved for those who remain neutral in times of great moral crisis”. Goethe is more reconciliatory, but equally instructive: “Freedom has to be re-made and re-earned in every generation”. Is it high time for our generation to earn for its own living?!

LIST OF REFERENCES American Association of Petroleum Geologists. (2008, October). Geology Matters in Law of the Sea. Retrieved May 13, 2010, from American Association of Petroleum Geologists: http://www.aapg.org/explorer/2008/10oct/arctic.cfm Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition. (2007). The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Retrieved April 25, 2010, from http://www.asoc.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Madrid_Protocol052107.pdf Antarctic Treaty Summit. (2009). Objectives:Antarctic Treaty Summit. Retrieved May 15, 2010, from http://www.atsummit50.aq/about_summit/objectives.php Arctic Council. (2009). Opportunities and Challenges Created by A More Accessible Arctic. 6th Ministerial Meeting (p. Arctic Council). Tromsö: Ministry for Foreign Aﬀairs of Iceland. Arctic Council. (2008). The Ilulissat Declaration. The Ilulissat Declaration, (p. Arctic Council). Ilulissat, Greenland. BarentsObserver. (2008, August 07). Canada to present Arctic claims in Oslo. Retrieved May 12, 2010, from BarentsObserver: http://www.barentsobserver.com/canada-to-present-arctic-claims-in-oslo-.450032316149.html Belton, C. (2007, October 26). Gazprom gives Statoilhydro gas field stake. Financial times . Benitah, M. (2007, November 8). Russia's Claim n the Arctic and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in UNCLOS. ASIL Insight , 11 (27). Borg, J. (2009, March 11). Opportunties and responsibilities in the Arctic Region: the EU's perspective. Borgerson, S. G. (2009, May 25). Great Game Moves North. Foreign Aﬀairs . Boswell, R. (2009, October 19). Canada. Retrieved November 18, 2009, from Pushing to the Pole before Arctic seabed deadline: http://www.canada.com/technology/Pushing+Pole+before+Arctic+seabed+deadline/1606705/story.html Bowcott, O. (2007). Argentina ready to challenge Britain's Antarctic claims. Retrieved June 09, 2010, from The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/oct/19/climatechange.fossilfuels British Foreign Spokeswoman. (2007, October 7). BBC News. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from UK looks to make Antarctica claim: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7048237.stm Byers, M. (n.d.). A thaw in relations. Who owns the Arctic? Byers, M. (2009). Breaking the ice. Ottawa Citizen . Canada to Tighten Ship Registration. (2008, August 28). Wall Street Journal , p. 12. Cohen, A., Szaszdi, L. F., & Dolbow, J. (2008, October 30). The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic. Retrieved May 10, 2010, from Heritage: http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/bg2202.cfm Commission of the European Communities. (2008). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. (2007). General Introduction . Retrieved June 01, 2010, from Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/gen-intro.htm Cooper, J. (2008, January). Canada navigating challenging waters in exploring new arctic opportunities. CMA Management , pp. 53-54.

De La Fayette, L. A. (2008). Oceans Governance in the Arctic. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 23 , pp. 531-566. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. (2010) Extended Continental Shelf Project. (2009). Extended Continental Shelf Project. Retrieved May 23, 2010, from http://continentalshelf.gov/ Foreign Aﬀairs of Denmark. (2009, October 22). Greenland Referendum. Retrieved April 27, 2010, from Ambassy of Denmark, Lisbon: http://www.amblissabon.um.dk/en/menu/InfoDenmark/GreenlandAndTheFaroeIslands/Referendum/ G-7, Finance Ministers, 2010 Iqaluit G-7, Government of Canada. Retreved June 04, 2010, from http://www.g7.gc.ca/news-nouvelles-eng.html Górski, T. (2009). A note on Submarine Ridges and Elevations with Special Reference to the Russian Fed. and the Arctic Ridges. Ocean Develooment & International Law , S. 51-60. Govenor of Svalbard. (2008, April 09). The Svalbard Treaty. Retrieved April 07, 2010, from Sysselmannen Svalbard: http://www.sysselmannen.no/hovedEnkel.aspx?m=45301 Hadow, P. (2007). UK looks to make Antarctica claim. Retrieved May 26, 2010, from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7048237.stm Harper, S. (2008, August 28). Canada To Tighten Ship Registration. Wall Street Journal . Hassol, S. J. (2004). Impacts of a Warming Arctic. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Howard, R. (2009, September 4). Cold War in the Arctic. Retrieved May 12, 2010, from Times Online: http://www.timesonline.co.u k/tol/comment/columnists/g uest_contributors/article6820907.ece International Polar Year. (2008, December). APECS panel at AGU. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from International Polar Year: http://www.ipy.org/multimedia

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Kraska, J. (2007). The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law , pp. 257-282. Marlowe, J. (2007). Report from Antarctica: countries maneuver for potential future land grab. Retrieved May 19, 2010, from Wired: http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/04/antarcticland/ McArdle, B. (2008). Foreign Policy Digest. Retrieved April 30, 2010, from A New Cold Conflict: Arctic Claim Disputes: http://www.foreignpolicydigest.org/20080605129/Regional-Archive/Europe/Russia-Archive/anew-cold-conflict-arctic-claim-disputes.html McRae, D. M. (Director). (2008). Legal Status: Selected Issues Regarding the Arctic [Motion Picture]. NATO (Director). (2009). NATO may compete for Arctic resources [Motion Picture]. Nordischer Ministerrat. (2008). Common Concern for the Arctic. Ilulissat/Greenland. Norway. (2006). Continental Shelf Submission of Norway: Executive Summary. NZ Herald. (2005, January 7). Race is on to claim the Arctic. Retrieved May 10, 2010, from NZ Herald: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/technology/news/article.cfm?c_id=5&objectid=9005765 Ocean Futures. (2005, September). Maritime Jurisdiction and Commercial Activity. Retrieved May 15, 2010, from Ocean Futures: http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/Publikasjoner/Internett-tekster/Arkiv/2006/R-FN6%20Maritime%20Jurisdiction%20&%20Commercial%20Activity.pdf Omestad, T. (2008, October 12). The Race for the Arctic: As the ice melts, nations eye oil and gas deposits and shipping routes. U.S. News & World Report , p. 53. Potts, T., & Schofield, C. (2008). Current Legal Developments. The International Journal of Marine and and Coastal Law , S. 151-176. Prokhorov, P. How do we Divide the Barents Sea? St. Petersburg: The Baltic Research Centre. Russia: Arctic ambitions trigger neighbours' concerns. (11. August 2009). Oxford analytica Daily Brief Service , S. 1. Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research. (2009). Signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. Retrieved April 20, 2010, from http://www.scar.org/treaty/signatories.html Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. (2009). Antarctic Treaty System. Retrieved April 21, 2010, from Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty: http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm Seidler, C. (2009). Arktisches Monopoly. M端nchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Illustration of Oil Resource Probability in the Arctic

The World Factbook 2002. (2002). Antarctica. Retrieved October 25, 2009, from http://www.faqs.org/docs/factbook/fields/2028.html U.S. Geological Survey. (2008, July 23). U.S. Geological Survey. Retrieved April 12, 2010, from 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic: http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980 United Nations. (1998). The United Nations Convention: A Historical Perspective. The UN Press NY United States National Science Foundation. (1997). The United States in Antarctica. Washington: U.S. Antarctic Program External Panel. Van Pay, B. (2009). National Maritime Claims in the Arctic. Conference on Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea . Seward, Alaska. Year, I. P. (Director). (2010). EUR-OCEANS and the International Polar Year [Motion Picture]. Young, O. R. (2009). The Arctic in Play: Governance in a time of Rapid Change. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24 , pp. 423-442

Illustration of the Northwest Passage

SPECIAL REPORTS 68

ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS AMONG THE FIVE LITTORAL STATES

Canada

Russia

Denmark

Norway

USA

UNCLOS Ratification

2003

1997

2004

1996

Has not ratified; approved by President Bush and Senate Foreign Relations Committee

UNCLOS Submission

By 2013

December 2001

By 2014

2006

No submission

No oﬃcial UNCTerritorial Submission pend- Largest Arctic Submission pend- Extensions in ing; will be claim: includes ing three parts of the LOS claim Claim roughly 1.75 mil- North Pole, extenlion square kilo- sions into the Cenmetres tral Arctic Ocean, the Bering Sea, the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk UN call for more data

Arctic and northeast Atlantic: the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea; the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean; and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea. Further submissions to be made

Existing Hans Island, Lin- Lomonosov Ridge Lomonosov Ridge Svalbard EEZ (with Beaufort Sea (with Russia) Canada) disputes coln Sea (with and Mendeleev and Mendeleev Denmark) Ridge (with Ridge (with Barents Sea claim Beaufort Sea (with Canada, Denmark) Canada, Russia) (with Russia) Svalbard EEZ (with Hans Islands (with U.S.) Norway) Canada) Northwest Passage (with int’l Barents Sea (with Norway) community) Lomonosov Ridge (with Russia, Denmark)

Northwest Passage (with Canada)

Extract from UNCLOS

PART II TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 2 - Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea and of its bed and subsoil: 1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. 3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law. SECTION 2. LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA Article 3 - Breadth of the territorial sea Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention. Article 4 - Outer limit of the territorial sea The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea. Article 5 - Normal baseline Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts oﬃcially recognized by the coastal State.

SPECIAL REPORTS 70

Article 6 - Reefs In the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having fringing reefs, the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-water line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognized by the coastal State. Article 7 - Straight baselines 1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 2. Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, the straight baselines shall remain eﬀective until changed by the coastal State in accordance with this Convention. 3. The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be suﬃciently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. 4. Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them or except in instances where the drawing of baselines to and from such elevations has received general international recognition.

5. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage. 6. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut oﬀ the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. Article 8 - Internal waters 1. Except as provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State. 2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the eﬀect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters. Article 9 - Mouths of rivers If a river flows directly into the sea, the baseline shall be a straight line across the mouth of the river between points on the low-water line of its banks. Article 10 - Bays 1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State. 2. For the purposes of this Convention, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation.

3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-water mark of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the diﬀerent mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the water area of the indentation. 4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed 24 nautical miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters. 5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay exceeds 24 nautical miles, a straight baseline of 24 nautical miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible with a line of that length. 6. The foregoing provisions do not apply to socalled "historic" bays, or in any case where the system of straight baselines provided for in article 7 is applied. Article 11 - Ports For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system are regarded as forming part of the coast. Oﬀ-shore installations and artificial islands shall not be considered as permanent harbour works.

Article 12 - Roadsteads Roadsteads which are normally used for the loading, unloading and anchoring of ships, and which would otherwise be situated wholly or partly outside the outer limit of the territorial sea, are included in the territorial sea. Article 13 - Low-tide elevations 1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. 2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own. Article 14 - Combination of methods for determining baselines The coastal State may determine baselines in turn by any of the methods provided for in the foregoing articles to suit diďŹ&#x20AC;erent conditions. Article 15 - Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith. SPECIAL REPORTS 72

Article 16 - Charts and lists of geographical coordinates 1. The baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea determined in accordance with articles 7, 9 and 10, or the limits derived there from, and the lines of delimitation drawn in accordance with articles 12 and 15 shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Alternatively, a list of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted. 2. The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

SECTION 3. INNOCENT PASSAGE IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA SUBSECTION A. RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL SHIPS Article 17 - Right of innocent passage Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Article 18 - Meaning of passage 1. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: (a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at roadstead or port facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility.

2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress. Article 19 - Meaning of innocent passage 1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law. 2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; (c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State; (d) any act of propaganda aimed at aďŹ&#x20AC;ecting the defence or security of the coastal State; (e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; (f ) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; (g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; (h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; (i) any fishing activities; (j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;

(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; (l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. Article 20 - Submarines and other underwater vehicles In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. Article 21 - Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent passage 1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following: (a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traďŹ&#x192;c; (b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations; (c) the protection of cables and pipelines; (d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea; (e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State; (f ) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof; (g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys; (h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State. 2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards. 3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations.

4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea. Article 22 - Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in the territorial sea 1. The coastal State may, where necessary having regard to the safety of navigation, require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may designate or prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships. 2. In particular, tankers, nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials maybe required to confine their passage to such sea lanes. 3. In the designation of sea lanes and the prescription of traffic separation schemes under this article, the coastal State shall take into account: (a) the recommendations of the competent international organization; (b) any channels customarily used for international navigation; (c) the special characteristics of particular ships and channels; and (d) the density of traffic. 4. The coastal State shall clearly indicate such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes on charts to which due publicity shall be given. Article 23 - Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substancesForeign nuclearpowered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by international agreements. SPECIAL REPORTS 74

Article 24 - Duties of the coastal State 1. The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea except in accordance with this Convention. In particular, in the application of this Convention or of any laws or regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention, the coastal State shall not: (a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical eﬀect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage; or (b) discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State. 2. The coastal State shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea. Article 25 - Rights of protection of the coastal State 1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent. 2. In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside internal waters, the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or such a call is subject. 3. The coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security, including weapons exercises. Such suspension shall take eﬀect only after having been duly published. Article 26 - Charges which may be levied upon foreign ships 1. No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by reason only of their passage through the territorial sea.

2. Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea as payment only for specific services rendered to the ship. These charges shall be levied without discrimination. SUBSECTION B. ULES APPLICABLE TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND GOVERNMENT SHIPS OPERATED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES Article 27 - Criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship 1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, save only in the following cases: (a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; (b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or (d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State to take any steps authorized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters. 3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2, the coastal State shall, if the master so requests, notify a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State before taking any steps, and shall facilitate contact between such agent or officer and the ship's crew. In cases of

emergency this notification may be communicated while the measures are being taken. 4. In considering whether or in what manner an arrest should be made, the local authorities shall have due regard to the interests of navigation. 5. Except as provided in Part XII or with respect to violations of laws and regulations adopted in accordance with Part V, the coastal State may not take any steps on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea without entering internal waters. Article 28 - Civil jurisdiction in relation to foreign ships 1. The coastal State should not stop or divert a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea for the purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to a person on board the ship. 2. The coastal State may not levy execution against or arrest the ship for the purpose of any civil proceedings, save only in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the purpose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal State. 3. Paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the right of the coastal State, in accordance with its laws, to levy execution against or to arrest, for the purpose of any civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying in the territorial sea, or passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters.

SUBSECTION C. RULES APPLICABLE TO WARSHIPS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT SHIPSOPERATED FOR NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSES Article 29 - Definition of warships For the purposes of this Convention, "warship" means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an oďŹ&#x192;cer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.

for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law. Article 32 - Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention aďŹ&#x20AC;ects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.

SECTION 4. CONTIGUOUS ZONE Article 30 - Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately. Article 31 - Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated

SPECIAL REPORTS 76

Article 33 - Contiguous zone 1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. 2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.