Cyprus: Perfectly Blue Waters Hiding Politically Explosive Gas

by alexcia chambers

Cyprus perfectly blue waters hiding politically explosive gas A Special Book Edition by

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CYPRUS Perfectly Blue Waters Hiding Politically Explosive Gas

by Alexcia chambers

Ana C. Rold Editor 3

Š 2006-2015 Diplomatic Courier and Medauras Global.

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Editor: Ana C. Rold All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions.

First Published 2015.

Published in the United States

by Diplomatic Courier and Medauras Global LLC 1660 L Street, NW, Suite 501 Washington, DC, 20036 www.medauras.com www.diplomaticourier.com Cyprus: Perfectly Blue Waters Hiding Politically Explosive Gas / Alexcia Chambers Legal: No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, except brief excerpts for the purpose of review, without written consent from the publisher. Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of information in this publication, however, Medauras Global and the Diplomatic Courier magazine make no warranties, express or implied in regards to the information, and disclaim all liability for any loss, damages, errors, or omissions.

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diplomatic courier medauras global Washington, DC 5

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CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 09 1. THe moments that shaped Cyprus’ future

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2. Cyprus the ally, 25 the energy hub, and the regional mediator 3. negotiating for 31 a stronger future 4. fueling a resolution 45 5. washington smells 55 gas but sees gold 6. two party talks 67 with three parties 7. global connections: 75 the divisions of cyprus and korea appendix 87 Historical Timeline 88 Gallery 94

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INTRODUCTION

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xactly seven years ago, in March 2008, in an article titled “Greek and Turkish Leaders Have Just Revived the Peace Process” I reported on the meeting between the newly then elected Cypriot President Demetris Christofias and the Turkish leader Mehmet Ali Talat. That was four years after the failed Annan Plan in 2004. Many of the commentators and others interested in this otherwise forgotten conflict had given up on a solution that would unify the island. This meeting, however, reinvigorated the negotiating parties and the international community. The experts concluded that the timing was great and that the political will was there.

At the time, the BBC reported that when asked by a reported whether he would be drinking Greek or Turkish coffee during the discussions, Christofias replied: “Cypriot coffee, we will both be having Cypriot coffee.”

Alas, it was not to be. The meeting changed the mood on the island only temporarily. And Cyprus went back to business as usual. The conflict between the Republic of Cyprus in the South and the so-called Turkish Republic of Cyprus in the North—recognized only by Turkey—has the dubious distinction of being the UN’s longest peacekeeping mission.

And although there has been no large-scale violence since 1974, it remains an island in turmoil.

The negotiations have centered around truly intractable issues, such as control of territories, the return of refugees, and the presence of the Turkish army and Turkish settlers in the north of the island.

We embarked on this story with Alexcia Chambers when she joined Diplomatic Courier as a correspondent last summer. When she decided to do a story on the discovery of hydrocarbons in Cyprus, I realized we had not discussed Cyprus in a while, mainly because no real news on the advancement of the peace process had come out of the island in recent years. But this discovery seemed pivotal.

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A decade ago, as a student of peace and conflict resolution I saw the island as the key to solving other bigger conflicts.

I believed that if Cyprus could do it—if it could overcome its tragic past—then others could follow the example. But I lost optimism when the Annan Plan failed. While my hopes were revived in 2008 with Christofias in power, they were soon crashed again when those talks did not lead anywhere new. I believed if the European Union accession did not do the trick then nothing would. An entire generation of Cypriots had learned to live separately and last time I was in Cyprus (2006) I didn’t meet many young people that could point definitively to what the issues were or ones that did not believe the conflict was “ancient history”.

Now Cyprus has newfound wealth to look forward to.

An estimated 50 to 60 trillion cubic feet of gas and 1.7 billion barrels of crude oil have been found off Cyprus’ southeastern coast. At a time of renewed discord with Russia and unreliable allies in the Middle East, the European Union consumers may find in Cyprus a viable and sustainable alternative energy source. If political will cannot bring the parties to resolve their issues, gas may do the trick. If shared prosperity does not bring about some resolution, what else can?

Chambers gives a thorough refresher on the Cyprus conflict, the history, the issues, and what could fuel a resolution. For those who have followed the issues, they will find a refreshing take on what matters now to move the negotiations forward. For those newly acquainted with the conflict and the divided island, they will find this book to be a fascinating primer.

As for the editors of Diplomatic Courier, we felt there may never be a better time to speculate on a positive outcome for Cyprus’ conflict.

Ana C. Rold, Editor Washington, DC March 2015 11

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THE MOMENTS THAT SHAPED CYPRUS’ FUTURE

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he years 1963 and 1974 mark the moments that made Cyprus what it is today—a geostrategic goldmine stalled by unruly neighbors and years of international apathy. Now Cyprus finds itself in a position of strength; a position that can only be capitalized on with the resolution of the island’s past.

Positioned between Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Libya, the island of Cyprus is located in a region of tremendous international players. As many Aegean and Ionian Islands gained independence after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus hoped to follow suit, removing itself from the clasp of the British crown.1 Despite pleas to the crown itself and later to the United Nations General Assembly, Cyprus would not be free. Great Britain had no intention of relinquishing an island of such geostrategic importance.

Soon after WWI and continuing for decades, riots, campaigns, and unofficial referendums for independence became widespread, but Great Britain held on tight. The grip finally loosened in 1960 with the end of the British colonial rule on August 16th, accompanied by the signing of the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment. This independence came with the exclusion of the Akrotiri Base Area and the Dhekelia Base Area, two sovereign military bases that Great Britain maintains to this day.2 With the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey, Greece, and Great Britain became the guarantor states of the Republic of Cyprus, taking on the responsibility of maintaining Cyprus’ independence, territorial integrity, and security. As outlined in the treaty, this is done by prohibiting any activity that promoted either the union of Cyprus with another state or the partition of the island in any way (Articles I & II); by respecting the agreement put forth regarding Britain’s sovereign base areas (Article III); and by consulting the other guarantor states in the case of a breach in the provisions of the Treaty, reserving the right to act unilaterally to reestablish the standard state of affairs if needed (Article IV).3

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This responsibility to protect applies to the whole island, but within the island there are two different communities under consideration: Cypriots of Greek descent and Cypriots of Turkish descent. For the most part, relations between the two Cypriot communities were harmonious, with strong cultural similarities bringing the groups together. While it is true that political tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots had been growing over the years, it was not until the end of 1963 that the division between the two communities truly began.

The 1960 Cypriot constitution was largely based on ethnicity, a principally ineffective model. Instances arose where Turkish Cypriots used their constitutional power of veto to block a number of Greek Cypriot proposals, including budgeting changes, the abolition of separate Turkish-Cypriot municipal councils, and the integration of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot troops.4 This constant contention on both sides made government ineffectual. In 1963, Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III proposed constitutional amendments that Greek Cypriots argued would facilitate a better functioning state. These amendments included removing the veto powers of the Greek Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot Vice President, establishing an order of succession, and abolishing separate community voting for the enactment of laws.5 However the Turkish Cypriots saw these proposed changes as a way to reduce their involvement in the government and in decision-making processes, serving the needs of the Greek Cypriots alone.

As a result, inter-communal violence erupted in December of 1963, and the Turkish Cypriot ministers withdrew from government.6 While Turkish Cypriots explained that this withdrawal was a necessary safety precaution, Greek Cypriots saw this withdrawal as the unwillingness of Turkish Cypriots to work in partnership. United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 sent a UN Peacekeeping Force to taper the aggression, but it had little impact.7 Ultimately, the Greek Cypriots that remained in the House of Representatives passed the proposed amendments. The outburst of violence and the subsequent arrival of the UN Peacekeep17

ing Force signaled the beginning of long and tumultuous coexistence between the two Cypriot communities and the Guarantor States.

In the midst of violence, Turkey, one of Cyprus’ guarantor states, threatened to invade the island under the auspices of Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. As a result, the United States entered the scene in June 1964. In his letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, President Lyndon Johnson recommended that Inonu consult with the United States before any action is taken on the island. He added that intervening in Cyprus could result in the partition of the island—a result prohibited by the Treaty of Guarantee—and could even lead to the direct involvement of the Soviet Union. Johnson made it clear that by taking action without the consent of its NATO allies, Turkey could find itself alone in an overwhelming situation.8 Ultimately Turkey decided not to intervene, leaving the Cypriots to resolve the issue without interference. While tensions persisted, the island remained intact. By 1968, both communities led separate political lives, inter-communal violence had settled, and Cyprus had found relative peace.

On July 15th, 1974 a Greek-ordered coup overthrew Archbishop Makarios and installed Nikos Sampson as the new President of the Republic of Cyprus.9 One proposed motive for this coup was the intention of the Greek military junta to achieve a union between Greece and Cyprus, also known as enosis. Where many Cypriots saw chaos, Turkey saw an opportunity. Greece was under the reign of a military junta, Nixon was on trial, and Britain wanted to extend her presence in the eastern Mediterranean, leaving Turkish aggression unchecked.10 On July 20th, Turkey unilaterally invaded Cyprus.11 Purportedly to restore constitutional order and protect the Turkish Cypriot minority on the island under the Treaty of Guarantee, the first Turkish troops landed on the north coast at Kyrenia.

This day in history will become known in the Republic of Cyprus as the day Turkey illegally invaded and occupied Cyprus, and in the northern occupied area as the 1974 18

Peace Operation. Turkish Cypriots contend that the coup in Cyprus could only have been dealt with through military intervention, as Turkey had done on that July 20th. But as a matter of international law and norms, the action taken

by Turkey was in violation of the UN Charter, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, and the NATO Treaty.12 That same day, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 353, demanding the “immediate end to foreign military intervention” and the withdrawal of “foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements,”urging the commencement of negotiations between Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain.13” The fighting continued, but on July 23rd the Greek-installed puppet president Nikos Sampson was removed and replaced with Glafkos Clerides, putting an end to the coup regime.14 A general ceasefire was declared, however this ceasefire was not observed in many parts of the island. At this point, Turkish forces had advanced as far south as Nicosia International Airport (See map). Unable to put an end to the violence, Turkey and the other guarantor powers began the first Geneva talks on July 25th. Then inexplicably, on August 14th, 22 days after constitutional order had been restored on the island, Turkey flouted the UN ceasefire and began the second stage of its operation, “Atilla-II.”15 The port city of Famagusta fell and the Turkish army advanced far beyond its previously observed UN ceasefire lines.16 Turkish troops took more than 37% of sovereign Cypriot land, cost more than 3,000 Cypriot lives, and injured thousands of others, while nearly 1,500 people were reported missing.17 Turkey’s advance finally stopped at what is now known as the Green Line, a buffer zone monitored by the United Nations.18 The international response to the 1974 invasion was to condemn the Turkish actions, to pass a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, and to impose sanctions on Turkey. This was followed by a U.S. Congressional decision in July 1975 to suspend all military aid to Turkey pending a solution. Turkey, although suffering from the embargo, responded by rescinding all defense cooperation agree19

ments with the U.S.19 Instead of holding firm, the United States quietly lifted the embargo in September 1978 without having made any progress on the Cyprus issue.20 This is a trend that would continue through the decades.

In May 1983, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Cyprus.21 Disregarding international rulings, the Turkish Cypriot leadership unilaterally declared the establishment of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” on November 15, 1983.22 Within days, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 541, making it clear that the international community would not recognize the new state.23 The only nation to recognize the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” was Turkey.

Twenty-one years later, in an effort to find a solution, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan put forth what is known as the “Annan Plan,” which went up for referendum in both communities in 2004. While the Annan Plan seemed like the first viable solution to the problem, Euripides Evriviades, former Cypriot Ambassador to the United States and current Cypriot Ambassador to Great Britain, contends that it put the Republic of Cyprus in a “foreign policy straight jacket.”24 As presented, the Annan Plan stipulated that the new Cypriot government would be comprised of four Greek Cypriot members and two Turkish Cypriot members. All six delegates would have veto power, and in order to settle disagreements should anyone invoke that veto, a Supreme Court of nine members (three British, three Turkish, three Greek) would be used. This meant the majority and minority groups would carry equal weight in government, and the majority, the Greek Cypriots, would have had equal weight in the government, and foreign nationals would have been given the deciding vote.25 Additionally, the Annan Plan required that taken Cypriot property had to be bought back individually by the original owners. In other words, victims had to pay out of pocket to recover the homes that were stolen from them during the invasion. For Greek Cypriots, perhaps the largest gap in the Annan plan was that it did not require the removal of all 43,000 Turkish troops reinforcing the occupation of the island.26 20

After Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan with 76% of the vote, some interpreted this as evidence of Greek Cypriot unwillingness to cooperate or to find an equitable solution to the problem.27 However Christopher Price, a former member of parliament in the United Kingdom, argued that the Annan plan was nothing but a scheme, “calculated to smooth the path of Turkey towards EU membership—the deadline for negotiation on which had been set for the end of 2004—and to demonize the Greek Cypriots as scapegoats if a political solution did not materialize.”28 Nonetheless, it is possible that the result of the referendum was simply a matter of distrust. There are Greek Cypriots that believe if a solution is found, the de-facto power to govern will not be shared with Turkish Cypriots, but with Turkey. “The great majority of people voted ‘no’ not so much because of the provisions of the plan, but because they do not trust Turkey. We learned not to trust Turkey through our history and through Turkish action,” said Nikos Christodoulides, Spokesman of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. “We used to live with the Turkish Cypriots; we don’t have a problem with them. Our fear— our problem—is that Turkey is unstable. … [The Greek Cypriots] are asking, ‘who is going to guarantee that Turkey will implement the solution?’” 29 With the rejection of the Annan Plan and the failed rounds of negotiations that followed, there was little hope that the Cyprus issue would find a solution. But in 2011 the discovery of hydrocarbons in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone brought new life to the issue.30 Armed with the proper incentives to move forward, the two Cypriot communities came together again in 2014 for another round of settlement talks.31 The historical accounts of the Cyprus issue are heavily contested between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The diverging histories have been the source of many tensions and sustained divisions throughout the last four decades. But the international community as a whole maintains one, definitive opinion: July 2014 marked the 40th anniversary for the commemoration of the illegal invasion and ongoing occupation of Cyprus, where thousands of lives were lost.

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NOTES 1. Robert McDonald, The problem of Cyprus. No. 234-239. “The International Institute for Strategic Studies,” 1989. See also: Lawrence Martin, “Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne” The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, 1994 2. “Sovereign Base Areas,” United Kingdom http://www.sbaadministration. org/index.php 3. “No. 5475 Treaty of Guarantee,” Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (16 august 1960) http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_ of_guarantee.pdf. Reinforcing the need for stability, the Treaty of Alliance codified the common desire of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them “No. 5712: Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus,” United Nations Peacemakers, (16 august 1960) 4. “Key Points in Cyprus’s History since Independence.” Mediterranean Quarterly 25, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 65-76.

5. Yusuf Aksar. “The European Court of Human Rights and the Cyprus Problem,” Journal of Ankara University Faculty of Law, 50, no. 3 (2001): 141-174. http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/38/289/2631.pdf 6. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou. “Cyprus at the Crossroads, 1959-63.” European History Quarterly 35, no. 4 (October 2005): 523-540.

7. “The Cyprus Question: Resolution 186” United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (4 March 1964) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=S/RES/186(1964). This peacekeeping force remains in Cyprus to this day.

8. “Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey,” U.S. Department of State, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/ xvi/4758.htm 9. “Makarios III.” Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6Th Edition (December 2013): 1.

10. William Mallinson. “US Interests, British Acquiescence and the Invasion of Cyprus.” British Journal Of Politics & International Relations 9, no. 3 (August 2007): 494-508. See also Gene Rossides, Kissinger & Cyprus: A Study in Lawlessness (Washington, DC: American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 2014) 11. Gene Rossides, Kissinger & Cyprus: A Study in Lawlessness (Washington, DC: American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 2014). The illegality of the invasion is supported by: “Resolution 550.” Famagusta Municipality, http://www. famagusta.org.cy/images/users/1/resolutions.pdf 12. Nick Larigakis, “Response to Turkish Cypriot’s opinion piece” The Hill (23 July 2014) 13. “Resolution 353” United Nations Security Council (20 July 1974) http:// www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/1974.shtml 14. “Cyprus Timeline.” International Debates 3, no. 3 (March 2005): 69-96 15. Gary Bono, “The Cyprus Problem: A Commemoration of the July 15th Turkish Invasion” Political Affairs (5 July 2011) http://www.politicalaffairs.net/ the-cyprus-problem-a-commemoration-of-the-july-15th-turkish-invasion/ 16. Winston Ross. “The Ghost Town that Wouldn’t Die” Newsweek Global, 162, no. 8 (February 21, 2014): 62-70.

17. “Missing Persons,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus (October 2006) http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus03_en/cyprus03_en?OpenDocument 18. “The Buffer Zone” United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus http:// www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1592 22

19. Ron Ayes, “Turkish Foreign Relations” libcom.org (17 Aug 2013) https:// libcom.org/library/turkish-foreign-relations 20. Ayes, “Turkish Foreign Relations” 21. “Resolution 253: Question of Cyprus” UN General Assembly (16 May 1983) http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r253.htm 22. “The European Union and the Cyprus Question,” Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index. php?module=page&cid=33 23. “Resolution 541 (1983)” UN Security Council (18 November 1983) http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/541(1983). Soon after, the Security Council passed another resolution condemning the “purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership...”. The text can be found at “Resolution 550 (1984)” UN Security Council (11 May 1984) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ RES/550(1984) 24. Euripides Evriviades, Former Ambassador and Political Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, interview with Alexcia Chambers, (26 June 2013) 25. Andreas Auer, Mark Bossuvt, Peter Burns, et al. “A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the light of International and European Law,” Agora Dialogue (2005) http://agora-dialogue.com/a-principled-basis-for-a-just-and-lasting-cyprussettlement-in-the-light-of-international-and-european-law/ 26. “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,” United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (2004) http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent. cfm?a_id=1637 27. Vincent Morelli “Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive,” Congressional Research Service (26 July 2011) http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/170508.pdf> 28. Christopher Price, “Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence,” UK Parliament (22 February 2005) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/ cmfaff/113/113we11.htm 29. Nikos Christodoulides, interviewed by Alexcia Chambers, July 16, 2014, transcript.

30. David Wethe and Stelios Orphanides, “Noble Announces Natural-Gas Discovery Off Coast of Cyprus,” Bloomberg News (29 December 2011) http:// www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-29/noble-announces-natural-gasdiscovery-off-coast-of-cyprus.html 31. “Joint Declaration: final version as agreed between the two leaders,” Cyprus Mail, February 11 2014 http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/11/joint-declaration-final-version-as-agreed-between-the-two-leaders/

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Cyprus the Ally, the Energy Hub, and the Regional Mediator

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yprus could be the key to stabilizing the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Occupying a valuable position for maritime trade, Cyprus connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Pacific Ocean.1 With such centrality, there is no question that this EU member state serves as the perfect vantage point for its allies.

Cyprus has long served as a British listening post, monitoring electronic communication and sharing intelligence with allies such as the United States and the EU.2 The Troodos mountain range is ideal for aerial surveillance from the Atlantic Ocean to the northwest of India, keeping watch over areas in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf.3 However Cyprus’ proximity to Turkey’s southern shores—just 65 kilometers away—makes Turkey particularly wary of the potential threat Cyprus could pose to its ports.4 Turkey’s ultimate fear, however, is if a single power were to take control of Cyprus and the Aegean islands. In such a case, Turkey would find itself surrounded. Thus it is possible that Turkish interest in Cyprus may not be driven by the small Turkish-Cypriot community there, but by the bearing this island has on Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics.5 Although international efforts to find a resolution have lagged for the last 40 years, the recent discovery of hydrocarbons in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has dramatically accelerated negotiations between the two Cypriot communities. Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone has already been recognized by Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon, making Cyprus an ideal candidate to facilitate other EEZ negotiations in the region. However, the island’s division represents a significant impediment to realizing its potential as a mediator, a gas hub, and an active member of international organizations.

Once reunited, effectively combating asymmetrical threats and fostering much needed partnerships in a hostile region are easily within Cyprus’ reach. In times of crisis, Cyprus has consistently proven to be a stable, predictable, 26

and reliable ally. In Syria, for example, Cyprus has played a key role in the joint mission of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to eliminate Assad’s chemical weapons.6 Likewise, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Cyprus provided its allies with port access and over-flight and landing rights.7 With a solution to the issue, the international community could leverage the resources of the entire island, making Cyprus an altogether stronger ally.

Furthermore, the Cypriot people have newfound wealth and economic growth to look forward to. An estimated 50 to 60 trillion cubic feet of gas and 1.7 billion barrels of crude oil have been found in the waters off Cyprus’ southeastern coast.8 In addition to providing a domestic source of energy and revenue for Cyprus, these hydrocarbons could serve as a viable energy alternative for European consumers.

Energy security has become imperative over the past year, as Russia has repeatedly shown that it is not afraid to use its energy exports as political leverage. Vice President Biden underscored this sentiment, saying, “we need to ensure Russia can no longer continue to use its resources as a weapon against anyone in the region.”9 In fact, the European Union’s indecisive response to Russia’s misbehavior may largely be due to Europe’s overdependence on Russian energy imports.10 Similarly, Turkey desperately needs energy imports from alternate sources, as nearly threefourths of Turkey’s natural-gas imports come from Russia and the Middle East.11 While Eastern Mediterranean gas alone is not enough to replace Russia as Europe’s chief supplier, the EU represents a large portion of the Russian economy, making it enough for Moscow to take notice.

Beyond the energy potential this discovery offers, the country’s offshore claims could also provide a catalyst for change for a number of regional challenges.12 Amos Hochstein, U.S. Deputy Undersecretary for Energy Diplomacy, recently said, “hydrocarbon reservoirs are not bound by political borders, therefore it is important that the countries in the region work together to use these 27

transboundary resources in a cooperative manner instead of fueling confrontations.”13 The resources found in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone will be exploited, but the extent to which it will affect the region is largely dependent on whether or not the Cyprus issue can be settled. Turkey’s involvement in a possible pipeline—or even in the plans for a Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) terminal—would mean maximum utility of the resources.

But this involvement would require that Turkey make concessions and adhere to international law.

By encouraging Turkey to fulfill its international commitments, global security could be strengthened.

In this way, a solution to the Cyprus conflict could spur greater collaboration between NATO, where Turkey holds membership, and the EU, where Cyprus holds membership. Despite the fact that the two organizations share 22 member states, the respective statuses of Turkey and Cyprus prevent official bilateral cooperation between the two groups. Moreover, the complex relationship between the EU and Turkey has hindered progress toward a solution.14 Turkey has been able to capitalize on the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the instability of the Middle East to gain the support of key European players seeking a western buffer. Turkey has also been able to block Cyprus’ accession into other organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA).15 But removing animosity through the resolution of this dispute would mean increased security for Turkey and for the international community as a whole. Cyprus’ accession into NATO, for example, would extend the Alliance further east.

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NOTES 1. James Leigh and Predrag Vukovic, “Geopolitics of Cyprus” The Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, December 22, 2011. http:// www.gloria-center.org/2011/12/a-geopolitics-of-cyprus/. Cyprus connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandab Strait. From there, it leads to the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, and to the Pacific Ocean through the Strait of Malacca.

2. Charles Grant, Intimate Relations: Can Britain Play a Leading Role in European Defence and Keep Its Special Link to US Intelligence? Centre for European Reform, Working Paper, April 2000, http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/ default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/cerwp4-2805.pdf; Duncan Campbell, “Inside Echelon: The History, Structure and Function of the Global Surveillance System,” Telepolis, July 25, 2000, http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/6/6929/1.html.

3. Gordon Adams, “Tactical Radar Systems,” June 2001, http://www.noding. com/la8ak/e98.htm.

4. Sait Yilmaz, Power Politics and Cyprus, Beykent University, 2009, http://www.beykent.edu.tr/WebProjects/Uploads/saityilmaz2-kasim09.pdf 5. Francis Henn, “Cyprus: The Geo-strategic Dimension,” Contemporary Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2007), p. 289.

6. “Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN Joint Mission” United Nations http://opcw.unmissions.org/ 7. “Allies in the Fight Against Terror” Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&cid=1002 8. Christopher Coats, “What Does The U.S. See In Cypriot Natural Gas?” Forbes, July 16, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/christophercoats/2014/07/16/what-does-the-u-s-see-in-cypriot-natural-gas/ 9. “Biden Offers Help To Reunify Cyprus, Lauds Energy Potential,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 29, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/us-bidenpressure-russia-ukraine/25393852.html 10. Robbie Gramer “Cyprus: The New Key to European Energy Security?”

The National Interest, March 25, 2014 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ cyprus-the-new-key-european-energy-security-10109 11. Robbie Gramer, March 25, 2014 12. Coats, July 16, 2014 13. Coats, July 16, 2014 14. Fouskas, “Reflections on the Cyprus Issue and Turkish Invasions of 1974”, pp. 108, 114-16.

15. Seth Cropsey, “Mediterranean Gas Find: A Chance for U.S. to Break with Turkey.” PJ Media, August 20, 2013. http://www.hudson.org/research/9704mediterranean-gas-find-a-chance-for-u-s-to-break-with-turkey

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NEGOTIATING FOR A STRONGER FUTURE

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ince the inter-communal violence at the end of 1963, there have been several ineffectual rounds of peace talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. But through the years, the issue has grown far beyond a question of territorial sovereignty.

Since Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the issue has grown far beyond a question of territorial sovereignty.

The occupation has brought into question the property of the displaced, the illegal importation of settlers from the Turkish mainland, security guarantees, and the future of governance on the island. Forty years of occupation has created an entirely different Cyprus, and concessions are required from both communities to move forward.

After a two-year suspension on settlement negotiations, talks resumed on February 11, 2014 with a historic Joint Declaration by the leaders of both Cypriot communities.1 Months of negotiations between the two sides ultimately produced an outline for the overall framework and guiding principles of the negotiations.2 According to the Joint Declaration, any agreement reached will create a new, united Cyprus, structured as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality for both constituent states—based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and high level agreements.3 There will be a single citizenship under federal law, complemented by a domestic citizenship to either the Greek-Cypriot constituent state or the TurkishCypriot constituent state.4 While the basic parameters of a resolution have already been set, the current round of negotiations are meant to discuss the unresolved “core issues” of the Cyprus question. The February 11th Declaration clearly states, “The negotiations are based on the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” Although the Joint Declaration shows unprecedented commitment to the resolution of the Cyprus problem, President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, was quick to point out that the “Joint Declaration does not constitute a solution.”5 Anastasiades is participating in the negotiations as the 32

leader of the Greek-Cypriot community, and Dervis Eroglu, Dervis Eroglu, Turkish Cypriot leader, is representing the Turkish Cypriot camp.

Negotiations proceeded from February to September until talks were suspended in early October 2014 when a Turkish seismic exploration vessel entered Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This encroachment into Cyprus’ EEZ prompted President Anastasiades to suspend the reunification talks. Since then, Anastasiades has said that the Republic of Cyprus will not return to the negotiating table until international lawfulness is restored.6 However, Turkey maintains that it has a right to the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. The Third Maritime Law of 1982 supersedes those before it to give the islands of the Aegean rights to continental shelves and EEZs. However as Turkey is not a signatory to the Third Maritime Law—largely because of the Aegean islands— Turkey argues that it cannot be held accountable to such international law. But even so, Eroglu explained that the Turkish Cypriot government had given Turkey the authority to do seismic surveys in the region on their behalf, as Turkish Cypriots have equal rights to hydrocarbons currently being explored by the Greek Cypriots. Further, a written statement from a Turkish National Security Council (MGK) meeting on October 30th asserts that Turkey will continue to protect its rights and interests in the Aegean. Although the suspension is still ongoing as of April 2015, many are left wondering where the suspended negotiations had left off.

Until negotiations were suspended in October, both leaders had met every month since February, and the two negotiators—Greek Cypriot negotiator Andreas Mavroyiannis and Turkish Cypriot negotiator Kudret Ozersay—met weekly to further the conversation. Because discussions were closed, it is difficult to confirm what has happened at the negotiating table. Both communities have publically affirmed their commitment to reaching a settlement, how33

ever it seems that the negotiating process had been rocky.

Sitting in on the negotiations was spokesman for the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, who provided a rough outline of the negotiations. Starting with the “first ‘screening’ phase, each side presented its proposals.” In September, the parties were in “the second phase of in-depth negotiations,”10 where both sides had presented detailed proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus problem. These submissions were meant to facilitate more concrete discussion, not to signal agreement on their content.11 After submission, Anastasiades suggested that each side prepare a list of all the points of similarity and difference in these proposals, but Eroglu rejected this recommendation in an attempt to maintain the convergences achieved in past rounds of negotiations.12 Christodoulides contends that the Turkish Cypriots were using the past convergences of the 2008-2012 negotiations to avoid discussing some of the core issues, as some aspects of the former agreement that Eroglu was rushing to protect contradict his stated interests in the current negotiations.

The Greek Cypriot side argues that it is important that the current round of negotiations—upon resumption—should produce new, “Anastasiades-Eroglu” convergences.13 When, or if, the two communities have the opportunity to thoroughly discuss the proposals submitted, a third phase of “give and take” will commence. UN Envoy Espen Barth Eide is adamant that the two leaders are dedicated to bridging the gaps between the positions that were submitted to work towards a concrete solution.14 However, the negotiations were still in the second phase before they were suspended, and discussing the core issues—territory, property, illegal settlers, governance, economy, and securities and guarantees—proved difficult.

During the second stage of the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, Turkey seized 37% of sovereign Cypriot land. “Everyone has accepted that the Turkish Cypriots, that Turkey, has to 34

return the occupied territory to the Greek Cypriot constituent state,” said Christodoulides. So negotiators are now tasked with defining the areas in which the territorial readjustment will take place—a task not easily met. Both sides say that the concessions they are willing to make depend on the concessions of the other. Furthermore territorial readjustments and the property issue are intimately connected, making the discussion all the more complicated. The lines that will mark the boundaries of a future Greek Cypriot constituent state dictates how many displaced persons will fall under Greek Cypriot leadership. This directly impacts negotiations regarding property and the right to return.

Christodoulides explains that if both sides can come to an agreement on these two issues, territory and property, “it will be much easier for the other issues to be solved.”

UN findings estimate that after the 1974 invasion, about 30% of the Cypriot population was displaced: 160,000 Greek Cypriots from the north to the south, and 55,000 Turkish Cypriots from the south to the north.15 Today, the Greek Cypriot people are still deprived of the right to return to their homes and properties. The precedent set by the European Court of Human Rights is to “recognize displaced Greek Cypriots as the legal owners of the properties left behind and to hold Turkey responsible for violating Cypriots’ right to property. These violations extend to the ‘arbitrary denial of access to property’ by the Turkish military for the past 40 years.”16 Although work has been done on these issues outside of this settlement process, a roadblock was placed on the current negotiation of these two topics. Before suspension, Eroglu submitted a five-point roadmap outlining a trajectory of the negotiations that would follow up any potential settlement with a prompt referendum.17 If the Greek Cypriots agreed to the proposed roadmap, Turkish Cypriot negotiator Kudret Ozersay said he would be ready to discuss territorial readjustments and the property issue.18 However Anastasiades rejected Eroglu’s proposal, explaining that negotiations should be driven by the need 35

for a just and fair resolution instead of by deadlines.19 The outcome of this impasse has yet to be determined.

Another critical issue to the negotiations is illegal settlers. According to Article 8 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, “the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory” is a war crime. Today, there are about 160,000 illegal settlers in the occupied area of Cyprus, outnumbering the original Turkish Cypriot population of 116,000 people. In fact, since 1974, it is estimated that the ethnically Turkish Cypriot population has nearly halved.20 It is the position of the Greek Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “Turkey has implemented a systematic policy of colonization of the occupied part of Cyprus,” a policy prohibited by the Geneva Convention.21 Seeing as this has carried on for 40 years, the occupied area has taken on a completely new identity. Thousands of foreigners have made a life in the area, and this reality is something that both sides must now deal with. The issue has become even more complicated with intermarrying between Cypriots and mainland Turks and the birth of new generations on Cyprus. While some cases are cut and dry, others are far more complex. Now we are left to question, Who constitutes a Turkish Cypriot? Will the children of Cypriots be permitted to stay, but their mainland spouses be asked to leave? Leadership must consider that there are now people who are the product of intermarrying and immigration that have now lived on Cyprus for more than 40 years without ever knowing any other land.

The issues of governance and power-sharing are similarly elusive. While the February 11th declaration did outline the way the new state would be structured, there are disagreements regarding the presidency of a united Cyprus.

Eroglu is determined to have a rotating presidency, while the Greek Cypriots advocate for a permanently Greek Cyp36

riot president and Turkish Cypriot vice president.23 Former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, was willing to consider a rotating presidency if the Turkish Cypriots consented to cross voting—allowing all Cypriots to elect candidates of both constituencies by absolute majority. But Eroglu rejects the proposal for cross voting because he fears this would mean that the Greek Cypriot majority would effectively choose the candidate that would represent the Turkish Cypriots.24 What is certain, however, is the Turkish Cypriot interest in gaining access to trade. The Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union in 2004. Since then, it has fulfilled all of the obligations and enjoyed all the benefits that membership brings. The occupied area of Cyprus is excluded from this, however, because of its standing as an illegitimate state. Now, Greek Cypriots are asking for the EU’s involvement in the negotiation process. Because the same obligations will apply if a solution is found and the island is reunited, it is in the interest of all parties to have a Cypriot state that is both functional and “in line with the acquis communautaire [or laws],” said, Ambassador of Italy to Cyprus Guido Cerboni.25 Although the Turkish Cypriot side is currently uninterested in including the EU in the negotiations, it is particularly keen to gain access to the benefits of membership even before the suspension is lifted from the occupied area. “In light of the EU’s support of the negotiation process, we expect the European Commission to accelerate and increase the financial and technical support extended to the Turkish Cypriots in order to enable its harmonization with the acquis, which is suspended in North Cyprus,” said Ozdil Nami, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the occupied area.26 The Turkish Cypriots will not receive monetary support from the EU until a resolution is agreed upon, but both sides submitted proposals at the negotiating table for the future of Cyprus’ economy and trade relations.

The question of what to do with Cyprus’ guarantor states while maximizing security was also on the table. Turkish 37

Cypriot negotiator Ozersay has said that the current state of affairs in the world shows that the UN Security Council is no longer an effective body, therefore the Turkish Cypriots will not heed any decision made by the Council regarding the guarantee system.27 Instead, he suggests that the guarantors and the Cypriot leaders meet to specifically discuss the issue of guarantees. But Greek Cypriots contend that Turkey itself—as a guarantor power—is the fundamental issue. Even if the two Cypriot communities agree to a solution, Cyprus will be dealing with the same Turkish political system in the future. Christodoulides explains that throughout this whole process, Greek Cypriots have been chiefly concerned with whether or not Turkey would implement a final solution. “Greek Cypriots don’t want Turkey to continue to have guarantee rights because they say that Turkey might invade again, like it did in 1974. The issue is Turkey, a country with serious democratic deficiencies.” This sentiment plays a large role in Cyprus’ support for Turkey’s accession into the EU. Through the application process, Turkey will build democratic institutions and will be held strictly accountable to something more impactful than international law.

“History has unfortunately taught us not to trust Turkey,” Christodoulides said, and “that’s why we propose these confidence-building measures in Famagusta.”

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 902 of 1994, a great deal of importance has been placed on confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Cyprus. Following the February 11th Declaration, both parties have committed to implement programs that catalyze cooperation between the communities in preparation for a united Cyprus.28 One of the CBMs that came very close to fruition is the restoration of Famagusta, a port city in the occupied area.

Anastasiades’ proposal—backed by U.S. President Barak Obama and Vice President Joe Biden—was to assess the city’s infrastructure with the help of American experts, and to determine whether buildings are safe enough for their owners to return and rebuild. 29 However the project collapsed when Turkish Cypriots made a number of 38

demands Greek Cypriots considered unacceptable, one of which being that the plan’s execution would be left to the Americans and Turkish Cypriots alone, barring Greek Cypriot experts from entering Famagusta.30 It should be noted that the Turkish Cypriots may also be opposed to the opening of Famagusta because it would mean relinquishing leverage at the negotiating table in regards to territorial adjustments. The Greek Cypriot counter to this argument is that the only area in consideration is the fenced area of Famagusta, a relatively small portion of land.

Eroglu is frustrated with the Greek Cypriot side because he says the only CBM they wish to speak of is Famagusta. For that reason, Eroglu proposed a new CBM: the demining of the island.31 Cypriot newspaper Cyprus Mail claims that the first stage of this proposal involves having the UN demine the four known minefields in the buffer zone. The second stage requires that both sides demine the fields in their respective areas. Cyprus Mail also explains that the Greek Cypriot side was disappointed in this proposal because they were hoping for something more substantial from the Turkish Cypriot side by way of CBMs. As to the definitive progress made in the negotiations before they were suspended in October, there have been contradictory messages from the two sides. The Turkish Cypriots claimed that negotiations were moving in to the give-and-take stage, while the Greek Cypriots are adamant that very little had been agreed upon.32 Even though the February 11th Joint Declaration holds that neither side will default to laying blame, recent disagreements have tested the patience of both parties. Still, there have been two tangible, positive outcomes of the settlement talks.

One proof of progress was the first-ever joint visit to the laboratory of the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP)

by Anastasiades and Eroglu. The objective of the CMP is to recover, identify, and return the remains of more than 2,000 Cypriots who went missing after the invasion.

After the excavations began in 2006, the remains of 396 39

Greek Cypriots and 125 Turkish Cypriots have returned home to their families. 33 Despite the historic nature of this visit, there is still a long way to go for the CMP. Cyprus Mail reports that Anastasiades and a member of the CMP asked Eroglu to make a joint statement about the importance of facilitating the committee’s work, but he refused.34 The second indication of progress came with the crossvisits of the two negotiators to Athens and Ankara. Mavroyiannis’ visit to the capital city was the first direct contact Cyprus has had with Turkey in the last 40 years. Called “the key to this operation” by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, the importance of Turkey in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem cannot be overstated.35 As a guarantor state and the party responsible for the division of the island, Turkey will have to play a significant role in solving the problem it helped create.

40

NOTES 1. Ozdil Nami, “Resumption of the Negotiation Process in 2014,” Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/ cyprus-negotiation-process/cyprus-negotiations/resumption-of-the-negotiation-process/. Please note that the use of this source is solely to provide information on both parties involved in the negotiations and does not in any way recognize the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” 2. “Speech by Government Spokesman Nikos Christodoulides at the 30th Annual Cyprus and Hellenic Leadership Conference - July 15, 2014,” Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Washington, DC, July 17, 2014. http://www. cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=article&id=4886 3. Nikos Christodoulides, interviewed by Alexcia Chambers, July 16, 2014, transcript.

4. “Joint Declaration: final version as agreed between the two leaders,” Cyprus Mail, February 11, 2014 http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/11/joint-declaration-final-version-as-agreed-between-the-two-leaders/ 5. “President Anastasiades Defends Joint Statement To Cypriots,” Cyprus News Report, February 13, 2014. http://www.cyprusnewsreport. com/?q=node/7512 6. “Trio tells Turkey to back off from EEZ,” Cyprus Mail, October 30, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/10/30/trio-tells-turkey-to-back-off-from-eez/ 7. “Political Expert: International Law on Turkey’s Side in Cyprus Energy Row,” Daily Sabah, November 4, 2014. http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/11/04/political-expert-international-law-on-turkeys-side-in-cyprusenergy-row 8. Sevil Erkus, “UN advising on formula for equal share of Cyprus resources,” Hürriyet Daily News, October 31, 2014.

9. “Turkey ‘disappointed’ over stalled Cyprus talks,” World Bulletin, November 4, 2014. http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/147722/turkey-disappointedover-stalled-cyprus-talks 10. “Proposals to be Submitted on All Issues,” Cyprus Mail, June 3, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/06/03/proposals-to-be-submitted-on-all-issues/ 11. “Talks in deep freeze for summer,” Cyprus Mail, July 25, 2014. http:// cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/25/talks-in-deep-freeze-for-summer/ 12. “Leaders agree to seek convergences,” Cyprus Mail, July 5, 2014. http:// cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/05/leaders-agree-to-seek-convergences/ 13. “Speech by Government Spokesman Nikos Christodoulides at the 30th Annual Cyprus and Hellenic Leadership Conference - July 15, 2014,” Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Washington, DC, July 17, 2014. http://www. cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=article&id=4886 14. George Psyllides, “UN envoy Eide trying to ‘bridge the gap’,” Cyprus Mail, September 17, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/09/17/un-envoy-eidetrying-to-bridge-the-gap/ 15. Ayla Gürel and Kudret Özersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus, PRIO Report 3/2006 [2006], pp. 3-4 16. Rhodri C. Williams and Ayla Gürel, The European Court of Human Rights and the Cyprus Property Issue: Charting a Way Forward, PRIO Report 1/2011, pp. 3, http://file.prio.no/publication_files/Cyprus/Paper%202011- 1%20 The%20European%20Court%20of%20Human%20Rights%20and%20the%20 Cyprus%20Property%20Issue.pdf. Article 1 of the Protocol 1 to the Con41

NOTES, Cont. vention European Convention of Human Rights stipulates that the right to property is protected. Similarly, Article 8 of the Convention protects the right to respect for the home.

17. Turkish Cypriots ready to negotiate land with ‘roadmap’ to referendum,” Today’s Zaman, June 06, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/news349786-turkish-cypriots-ready-to-negotiate-land-with-roadmap-to-referendum.html 18. Stefanos Evripidou, “Cyprus a model for resolving global issues, says Arinc,” Cyprus Mail, June 7, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/06/07/cyprusa-model-for-resolving-global-issues-says-arinc/ 19. “So Near and Yet so Far-Leaders Disagree over CBMs,” Cyprus Mail, July 25, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/08/so-near-and-yet-so-far-leadersdisagree-over-cbms/. Please note that the reasoning behind Anastadiades’ rejection was provided by unnamed diplomatic source and has not been officially verified as of August 6, 2014.

20. William Mallinson, “Cyprus: A Historical Overview,” Embassy of Cyprus in Beijing. http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_beijing.nsf/DMLcy_en/DMLcy_en?Opendocument 21. “Greek Cypriot Government ready to hand over Turkey War Crime documents,” Kibris Postasi Daily News, July 30, 2014. http://www.kpdailynews. com/index.php/cat/35/news/1525/PageName/CYPRUS_LOCAL_NEWS. This policy is in violation of Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949, for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The convention in its entirety can be found at: “Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949,” International Committee of the Red Cross. http://www.icrc.org/ihl/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482 d86146898c125641e004aa3c5 22. “European Court orders Turkey to Compensate Cyprus for 1974 Invasion,” Reuters, May 12, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/12/uscyprus-turkey-courts-idUSBREA4B0K520140512 23. “Proposals to be Submitted on All Issues,” Cyprus Mail, June 3, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/06/03/proposals-to-be-submitted-on-all-issues/ 24. “The most Blatant Mockery of Negotiations,” Cyprus Mail, July 27, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/27/the-most-blatant-mockery-of-negotiations/ 25. “EU should Play Stronger Role in Cyprus talks, says Italian Ambassador,” Cyprus Mail, July 8, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/08/eu-should-playstronger-role-in-cyprus-talks-says-italian-ambassador/ 26. Ozdil Nami, “Resumption of the Negotiation Process in 2014,” Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/ cyprus-negotiation-process/cyprus-negotiations/resumption-of-the-negotiation-process/. Please note that the use of this source is solely to provide information on both parties involved in the negotiations and does not in any way recognize the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”

27. “UN Security Council cannot guarantee safety of Turkish Cypriots: Özersay,” LGC News, July 24, 2014. http://www.lgcnews.com/un-security-councilguarantee-safety-turkish-cypriots-ozersay/ 28. “Joint Declaration: final version as agreed between the two leaders,” Cyprus Mail, February 11, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/11/joint-dec42

laration-final-version-as-agreed-between-the-two-leaders/ 29. “Varosha demands were made ‘in bad faith’,” Cyprus Mail, May 24, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/05/24/varosha-demands-were-made-in-badfaith/ 30. “Leaders to hold working meeting on June 2 (updated),” Cyprus Mail, May 20, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/05/20/leaders-to-hold-workingmeeting-on-june-2/ 31. “CBMs front and centre,” Cyprus Mail, April 4, 2014. http://cyprus-mail. com/2014/04/04/cbms-front-and-centre/ 32. Cyprus Mail, July 27, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/04/01/our-viewtalks-start-but-views-still-far-apart/ 33. “So Near and Yet so Far-Leaders Disagree over CBMs,” Cyprus Mail, July 25, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/08/so-near-and-yet-so-far-leadersdisagree-over-cbms/.

34. “Talks in deep freeze for summer,” Cyprus Mail, July 25, 2014. http:// cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/25/talks-in-deep-freeze-for-summer/ 35. http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=article&id=4886

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44

FUELING A RESOLUTION

45

C

ypriot politics as they relate to reunification have not changed much in the last 40 years, but what has changed is Cyprus’ energy supply and the tools to utilize it.1 Technological advancements to make use of energy findings have improved immensely in the last 15 years, allowing companies to easily locate hydrocarbons and to drill in difficult areas.2 In 2011, U.S. Nobel Energy found seven trillion cubic feet (TCF) of natural gas in block 12 of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).3 The 13 blocks of the Aphrodite field, as it is called, is believed to hold up to 60 TCF of natural gas. If proven, Cyprus would become the EU’s second largest energy supplier after Norway.4 In addition to Nobel energy, French company TOTAL and Japanese-Italian conglomerate ENI are also set to begin exploratory drilling in Cyprus’ EEZ.

Nobel Energy and the Republic of Cyprus have recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to begin the construction of a shipment terminal at Vassilikos—located on Cyprus’ southern coast—with the intention of making it a regional energy hub for the international market. Depending on the outcome of the Cyprus negotiations, Vassilikos may later become a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility.5 However to make an LNG terminal economically feasible, additional hydrocarbons are needed.6 Conveniently, 175 miles east of Cyprus, Israel has found a whopping 31 TCF of natural gas, twice the amount of natural gas proven to be in Cyprus’ EEZ.7 Beyond contributing to Cyprus’ national wealth, Eastern Mediterranean energy in 2014 can play the role of European coal and steel in 1957, acting as a catalyst for regional cooperation.8 With the resolution of the Cyprus issue, Turkey, too, can benefit from these findings.

Despite the absence of a resolution to the Cyprus issue seven months into the most recent round of negotiations— before talks were suspended in October—the Republic of Cyprus and the relevant energy companies are proceeding without delay.9 With the companies firmly on board, now all parties involved must consider the best way to get the gas to the market. There are many methods under consideration 46

for processing and distribution such as floating pipelines and the use of Egyptian LNG plans. But the two central options under consideration are an LNG plant on the island itself or a pipeline through Turkey. This question can only be answered with a solution to the Cyprus problem, as Turkey’s involvement in regional gas plans is contingent upon a settlement between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots.

By making Vasilikos the energy hub for the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus could create a prosperous Mediterranean Gas Corridor. Furthermore, using Vasilikos as an LNG facility could make Cyprus the first LNG exporter in the EU.10 Advancing the universal interest in having access to secure and reliable sources of energy, Cypriot Minister of Energy Yiorgos Lakkotrypis contends that a “Cyprus based LNG facility could offer European consumers the maximum flexibility at competitive prices with zero transit risk.”11 However, some question whether an LNG terminal is a viable option. With a pipeline, the infrastructure is already built, transportation insurance for tankers is not an issue, and there is no need to liquefy and then re-gasify the hydrocarbons.12 However, there is also no flexibility with a pipeline. Once it is set, there is no turning back. With an LNG terminal, importers have options and energy needs can be met from various suppliers. Although LNG prices are usually higher than pipeline prices, interested parties firmly believe that as the price of gas goes down, so will the price of infrastructure.13 International interest in financing the onshore liquefaction plant depends on the amount of gas found in Cyprus’ EEZ. Once the amount of reserves is confirmed, funding will become more readily available.14 While it is still unclear which option Cyprus will choose—a pipeline or an LNG terminal—the appropriate provisions are being made for either case. Cyprus’ hydrocarbons agency EYK and Nobel Energy have been discussing the prospect of channeling natural gas from Israel’s Leviathan reserve to Cyprus to move forward on plans to construct a liquefaction 47

terminal in Vassilikos.15 Such plans can also help alleviate the economic disparity between the two communities in Cyprus—the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots.

A recent study by Turkish and Greek Cypriot economists predicts that a resolution to the issue would generate 20 billion Euros for the island.16 However, this wealth can only be shared between the two communities after an agreement on the political situation has been reached.

Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests are intimately connected—some would say they are the same. As a neighbor and guarantor state of Cyprus, Turkey is involved in both the reunification negotiations and energy plans. Oil companies with vested interest in Cypriot hydrocarbons are on a deadline and are planning to start drilling in 2015.

For this reason, after 40 years of division, the process of reunification has accelerated. “It is obvious that if Turkey does not want to stay out of the emerging cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean region,” it must work with the Cypriots towards a solution to the issue, said Nikos Christodoulides, government spokesman of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey, like the rest of Europe, desperately needs energy imports from alternate sources, as nearly three-fourths of Turkey’s natural-gas imports come from Russia and the Middle East.17 Turkey’s energy needs are growing, and its geographic position makes the nation an ideal transit state for Cypriot hydrocarbons. Although Turkey is in the process of finalizing plans for a pipeline from Azerbaijan that will go through Turkey, Greece, Albania, and Italy to supply Europe, current plans do not provide enough gas for a sustainable energy future.18 For this reason, companies are looking into the possibility to building a pipeline from Israel to Turkey. This can be done only one of two ways: through Lebanon and Syria, or through Cyprus’ EEZ. The former is rather risky given the politics of both nations, and the latter cannot be done without an agreement with Cyprus.

The leadership of the occupied area of Cyprus worries that because the Republic of Cyprus will be able to make use of the hydrocarbons even before a resolution to the 48

Cyprus issue is reached, the Greek Cypriots may no longer be willing to work towards a solution after gas begins to flow.19 For this reason, Turkish Cypriots believe the issue of Cyprus’ division should be resolved first, and then any revenue from the hydrocarbons can be shared equally between the two communities. But it should be noted that cooperation between Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey is a beneficial scenario for all parties, now and in the future. Cyprus will be able to supply for its own energy needs and will save money by exporting through Turkey, and Turkey will be able to use the pipelines its own energy supply at a lesser cost.20 However, if a solution to the Cyprus issue is not produced, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots will be excluded from the benefits that gas will bring to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars drilling exploratory wells, and billions of dollars will be spent on reaping the benefits of the hydrocarbons. Amos J. Hochstein of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Energy explains that, “in the next several months, these companies are going to get to the point and say, ‘I can’t wait for the politics anymore’.”21 These decisions are not made in a vacuum. The energy market at large influences all of Cyprus’ energy decisions, from bloc exploration to energy extraction. The eastern Mediterranean has been booming with hydrocarbon discoveries in Cyprus and more in Israel, along with potential findings off the shores of Greece, Egypt, and Syria.22 However certain instabilities in the region have led Israel, Greece, and Cyprus to join forces to protect their offshore hydrocarbon reserves.23 Arie Mekel, the Israeli Ambassador to Greece, says Israel believes, “that these three countries, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus—if we work together and use our power like in the area of natural gas—we could become together a regional power that will be able to stand up to other regional powers.”24 Because an insufficient amount of gas has been found in Cyprus thus far, cooperating with Israel is the only way to justify the construction of Cyprus’ 49

own onshore LNG terminal.

In addition, because Cyprus’ EEZ borders those of Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt, Cyprus could be instrumental in bringing these four countries together.25 In this way, the U.S. also sees an opportunity for involvement. The American government is keen to lend its expertise in developing Cyprus’ discoveries, building appropriate economic infrastructures and ensuring that these projects are done safely.26 With these tools in place, Cyprus can promote better cooperation between EU and non-EU countries in the Mediterranean, facilitating the development of a common understanding between importing and exporting states.27 The opportunity for alternative energy for Europe is especially attractive in light of Russia’s invasion of Crimea. In fact, Europe’s overdependence on Russian energy imports is often to blame for the European Union’s indecisive response to Russia’s misconduct.28 While Eastern Mediterranean gas alone is not enough to replace Russia as Europe’s supplier, the EU represents a large portion of the Russian economy, making even a slight shift in business substantial enough for Russia to take notice. Furthermore, energy security has become an imperative over the past year as Russia has repeatedly shown that it is not afraid to use its energy exports as political leverage. Vice President Biden underscored this sentiment, saying, “we need to ensure Russia can no longer continue to use its resources as a weapon against anyone in the region.”29 In this way, Cyprus’ hydrocarbons could carry significant weight.

Because of its central location and proximity to a number of energy corridors in the region, Cyprus is poised to become a contributor to regional cooperation and stability. The discovery of hydrocarbons in Cyprus’ EEZ has motivated Cyprus to work towards reunification. While the time constraint that energy companies have placed on the negotiations has hastened the peace process, Cyprus is up for the challenge. But, in the event that an agreement cannot be reached, the Republic of Cyprus still has options. These options come from cooperation with Israel and the creation 50

of an offshore LNG facility. Still, though, it is the hope of all parties involved that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots will also have the opportunity to benefit from the hydrocarbons.

“The potential for this region to become a global hub for energy is very real,” Hochstein said.30 “Energy is one of the few things that has physically changed in the region and it has to change the thinking among the parties.” It is unclear whether or not this economic incentive will push both Cypriot communities to make the compromises necessary for a solution, but if it does, the region will finally have the opportunity for peace and prosperity.

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NOTES 1. Amos J Hochstein, “Cypriot Hydrocarbons” (Presentation, 30th Annual Cyprus and Hellenic Leadership Conference, PSEKA, Washington, D.C., July 16, 2014).

2. Ibid.

3. Seth Cropsey, “Mediterranean Gas Find: A Chance for U.S. to Break with Turkey,” PJ Media, August 20, 2013. http://www.hudson.org/research/9704-mediterranean-gas-find-a-chance-for-u-s-to-break-with-turkey 4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. “Country Analysis Note: Cyprus,” U.S. Department of Energy, March 2014. http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=cy 7. Seth Cropsey, August 20, 2013. http://www.hudson.org/research/9704-mediterranean-gas-find-a-chance-for-u-s-to-break-with-turkey 8. Mohammed Al-Shafey, “Cyprus Foreign Minister: We can bring Lebanon, Israel and Egypt together,” Asharq Al-Awsat, June 10, 2014 http://www.aawsat. net/2014/06/article55333092 9. “Cyprus’ hydrocarbon plans proceed without delay, says Minister” Cyprus News Agency, July 3, 2014. http://www.cna.org.cy/webnewsEN.asp?a=55b1abf9 73bc4258a23dce50c1f2f616 10. “Remarks by the Minister of Energy, Mr. Yiorgos Lakkotrypis at the press conference of the Malta Energy Conference,” Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Interior, July 11, 2014. http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/1EBBBDDB5C6036E 2C2257D12004E1194?Opendocument 11. Yiorgos Lakkotrypis, Cyprus Minister of Energy (Press Conference, Malta Energy Conference, Malta, July 7, 2014) 12. Amos J Hochstein, July 16, 2014.

13. Ibid.

14. Angelos Anastasiou, “Next six to 12 months critical for Cyprus hydrocarbons industry,” Cyprus Mail, July 8, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/08/next-sixto-12-months-critical-for-cyprus-hydrocarbons-industry/ 15. Ibid.

16. “Cyprus reunification ‘worth 20 Billion Euros’” Hurriyet Daily News, May 30, 2014 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/cyprus-reunification-worth-20-billioneuros.aspx?pageID=238&nID=67201&NewsCatID=359 17. Robbie Gramer “Cyprus: The New Key to European Energy Security?” The National Interest, March 25, 2014 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/cyprusthe-new-key-european-energy-security-10109 18. Amos J Hochstein, July 16, 2014.

19. “Turkish Cypriot PM: Cyprus Gas must be Shared Fairly”; World Bulletin, June 30, 2014. http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/139742/turkish-cypriot-pm-cyprusgas-must-be-shared-fairly 20. Amos J Hochstein, July 16, 2014.

21. ibid.

22. ibid.

23. Seth Cropsey, “Eastern Mediterranean gas finds,” The Orange County Register, October 25, 2013, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/turkey-532973-fleetcyprus.html 24. Seth Cropsey, August 20, 2013. http://www.hudson.org/research/9704-mediterranean-gas-find-a-chance-for-u-s-to-break-with-turkey 25. Mohammed Al-Shafey, June 10, 2014 http://www.aawsat.net/2014/06/article55333092 52

26. Amos J Hochstein, July 16, 2014.

27. “Remarks by the Minister of Energy,” July 7, 2014.

28. Robbie Gramer, March 25, 2014 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ cyprus-the-new-key-european-energy-security-10109. In 2012, Norway, Russia, and North Africa supplied two-thirds of the EU’s natural gas consumption: Seth Cropsey, August 20, 2013. http://www.hudson.org/research/9704-mediterraneangas-find-a-chance-for-u-s-to-break-with-turkey 29. “Biden Offers Help To Reunify Cyprus, Lauds Energy Potential,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 29, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/us-biden-pressure-russia-ukraine/25393852.html 30. Amos J Hochstein, July 16, 2014.

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54

WASHINGTON SMELLS GAS BUT SEES GOLD

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W

ashington sees a great deal of potential in Cypriot hydrocarbons—enough to change the way the world sees the Cyprus issue.

On May 21, 2014, Vice President Joe Biden became the highest-ranking American official to visit Cyprus in 42 years1. While it may seem as if diplomatic visits like these are rather commonplace, this trip symbolized renewed American dedication to Cyprus and to the region, giving the world more confidence in the success of the latest round of Cypriot reunification negotiations.

Calling Cyprus a “key partner in a challenging region,” Biden reaffirmed the U.S.’ position that there is “only one legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus.”2 Progress towards a solution, according to Biden, can only be achieved if both Cyprus’ leadership and its citizens are dedicated to the cause.

A successful conclusion to the ongoing reunification talks could significantly advance the U.S.’ larger foreign policy goals. A unified Cyprus could make Europe less dependent on Russian oil, could advance human rights in the region, could strengthen NATO forces, and could facilitate global partnerships.3 This reinforces Vice President Biden’s declaration of Cyprus’ strategic importance.4

With regard to energy, the United States is implementing an extensive regional strategy with Cyprus at its core. Given the recent hydrocarbon discoveries in Israel and Cyprus, a solution to the Cyprus issue is more realistic now than ever before. The U.S. could use these developments to improve Turkey-Israel relations, encouraging both nations to use the newly available energy sources collaboratively.

Biden made it clear that “Cyprus is poised to become a key player…transforming the eastern Mediterranean into a global hub for natural gas.”5 In this way, the EU will have the opportunity to explore alternative energy options and relieve its dependency on unstable parties such as Russia.

In turn, this will serve the United States by improving the EU’s usefulness as an ally. With natural gas bolstering its geopolitical position, Cyprus is preparing itself to take on 56

the role of a connector and regional mediator for several highly contentions neighbors.

While energy is the primary catalyst for U.S. fervor for a solution to the Cyprus question, human rights and international law have also piqued U.S. interest. Human rights do not have borders, and the United States sees it as “fundamental to our own interests to support a just peace around the world—one in which individuals, and not just nations, are granted the fundamental rights that they deserve.”6 At the Third Committee of the General Assembly on Human Rights, Ambassador Minas Hadjimichael, Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN, said Turkey “continues to commit mass violations of human rights in Cyprus, by violently maintaining the division of people and of territory and by having displaced almost one third of the population, as well as by illegally exploiting Greek Cypriot properties.”7 All of these offenses have been confirmed, documented, and condemned by UN resolutions and decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).8 Holding governments accountable to their obligations under universal human rights norms, the United States has proposed confidence-building measures (CBMs) for improved relations between the two Cypriot communities— the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots.9 The unnatural and unacceptable division of the island is an obstacle to the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by the entire population of Cyprus, and for the first time in decades the U.S. is showing some dedication to the reversal of Cyprus’ current circumstances.10 Furthermore, by promoting a stable domestic environment on the island, Cyprus will become a more effective partner in combating global threats. In times of crisis, Cyprus has proven to be a stable, predictable, and reliable ally.

In Syria, for example, Cyprus has played a key role in the joint mission of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to eliminate Assad’s chemical weapons.11 Going back further, in 1999, Cyprus signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the 57

United States, facilitating bilateral cooperation in the fight against global terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and related violent crimes.12 The benefit of this partnership was further demonstrated in 2006 with the evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon to Cyprus during the Israel-Lebanon conflict, and then again during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq when Cyprus provided allies with port access and landing rights for many military operations.13 Cyprus’ commitment to peace and security in conjunction with its geostrategic position makes it a crucial ally to all nations. However, without a resolution to the issue, animosity will continue to fester between Greece and Turkey, two of Cyprus’ highly invested guarantor states.

To mediate the hostilities these two allies, the U.S. has used Economic Support Funds (ESF) “aimed at reunification of the island and designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on Cyprus.”14 However these efforts are counteracted by Turkey’s interest in increasing its regional influence. This has been done through Turkey’s intimate connection with the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus, supplying the financial resources to keep the pseudo nation afloat. In this way, Turkey contradicts NATO’s efforts to maintain a quiet south and southeastern arm.15 Discord within NATO or the collapse of Turkish-Greek relations could be costly for the United States. Turkey borders key Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria, controls several trade corridors in the region, and has the second-largest NATO army behind the United States. Greece plays a similarly important strategic role by securing Aegean maritime trade from the Turkish channels to the Mediterranean Sea, maintaining positive relations with several Arab countries, and connecting energy pipelines from the Middle East to Europe.

However if Turkey and Greece are unable to cooperate, NATO activities in the region will become increasingly difficult. Operating in an area riddled with war and crises, an Alliance dedicated to the security of the West can no longer accept the risk that internal strife poses.16 58

Thus, in an effort to encourage cooperation on both sides of the Cypriot negotiating table, the U.S. helped to coordinate a joint declaration between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on February 11, 2014 that publically affirmed the commitment of both communities to work towards reunification.17 While the U.S. itself is not directly involved in the negotiations, Washington has assumed the responsibility of communicating to Turkey the great importance of a solution.18 Furthermore, the United States has been particularly determined to establish Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the city of Famagusta. Alexi Galanos, Mayor of Famagusta, recently explained that if an agreement was reached for the implementation of CBMs in Famagusta, the city could serve as “a steppingstone for the reunification of Cyprus.”19 President Obama recently recommended that American experts enter the fenced off area of Famagusta to conduct studies on how to begin infrastructure work, to improve the city’s port, and to determine whether buildings are safe enough for legitimate residents to return to their properties.20 However, this proposal was met with Turkish Cypriots demands that Greek Cypriots deemed unreasonable—such as refusing to allow Greek Cypriot experts to participate—and the deal collapsed.

Any pressure that the U.S. places on Turkey for a solution to the Cyprus problem could create tension between the two allies, but the reality is that relations between Turkey and the United States have been strained for some time. As shown by minimal cooperation with today’s NATO operations, nonsecular tendencies, increasingly self-serving practices, and the encouragement of state-sponsored terrorism, Turkey’s current interests are no longer aligned with those of the United States. Turkey did not support the U.S. in Iraq, nor is it recognizing longstanding quid-pro-quo agreements involving base-sharing deals with the U.S. military today.21 In 2002, Turkey’s decision not to permit the U.S. military to use its territory for an assault on Saddam Hussein’s army marked the beginning of Turkish soft balancing against the U.S. This territorial denial magnified Turkey’s bargaining 59

influence and the significance of any concessions it would make in the future.22 A few months ago, the Kurdish town of Kobane in western Syria was on the brink of take-over by the “Islamic State” (IS). Turkish tanks were well positioned to prevent the advancement of IS, and the Turkish Parliament voted to deploy the Turkish army to fight in Iraq and Syria. However, Turkish leadership decided to stay out of the fight. Even when Turkey does choose to get involved in armed conflicts—as it did in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the Balkans—it is most often in a capacity limited to logistics and training.23 The exception to this trend, Libya, is explained by Turkey’s personal interest in encouraging the emergence of Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood to power in Tropoli. As elucidated by Jonathan Schanzer of Politico, Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood is “the group upon which Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) draws its ideological inspiration,” and with this it is also easier to understand Turkey’s recently non-secular tendencies.

Initially, it was Turkey’s neutral position in Middle Eastern affairs that had tensions raising—particularly when Turkey became the first NATO member to give diplomatic recognition to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

However, now it is Turkey’s provocations that have allies whirling. Anti-Semitic remarks made by Turkish President, then Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, calling Zionism a “crime against humanity,” were firmly condemned by the United States.24 Secretary of State John Kerry stated, “we not only disagree with [this statement], but we find it objectionable.” Still worse, in 2012, Turkey replaced Iran as Hamas’ top financial backer.25 This was all compounded

by Ankara’s announcement last September to purchase a missile defense system from a Chinese company sanctioned by the U.S. for its involvement in Iran’s proliferation efforts, a deal that was only terminated because of intense U.S. and NATO pressure.26 Consequently, Turkey feels it can no longer count on the United States for political support.27 60

The United States is in a difficult position. It must juggle a fragile but important relationship with Turkey—a fellow NATO ally—while pursuing its energy interests and respecting its commitments to human rights worldwide. But as Eric Rubin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, explained, the United States sees itself as a creative force, putting forth a figurative source of energy that others do not.28 With this in mind, the United States can still play a beneficial role in the resolution of the Cyprus issue by publically promoting negotiations, monitoring the negotiations as they progress, and engaging intransigent parties when appropriate.29 Because until an agreement is reached, the United States will be unable to strengthen partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean or reap all the benefits of the hydrocarbons found there.

On October 7th when Turkey illegally dispatched seismic exploration vessel “Barbaros” into bloc 9 of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Cypriot President Nikos Anastasiades suspended his participation in UN negotiations to reunify the island.30 In response to this illegal encroachment on Cyprus’ southern waters, Vice President Biden reiterated the importance of Cyprus’ sovereignty and the right to develop resources in its EEZ.31 Biden also articulated the administration’s intention to assume increased diplomatic action to facilitate the resumption of talks.32 Until Turkey ceases its “provocative” and “aggressive” actions, Anastasiades says that peace talks cannot resume, and U.S. Representative Gus Bilirakis agrees.33 “It is time that we hold Turkey accountable for its actions so that meaningful negotiations may resume to reach the goal of a reunified Cyprus.”34 Because until an agreement is reached, the United States will be unable to strengthen partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean or reap all the benefits of the hydrocarbons found there.

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NOTES 1. Alkman Granitsas, “Biden Arrives in Cyprus,” The Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023037499045795761518 75880282 2. “Our View: Biden’s visit everything the government could have hoped for,” Cyprus Mail, May 23, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/05/23/our-viewbidens-visit-everything-the-government-could-have-hoped-for/ 3. Helena Smith. “US vice-president Joe Biden pushes energy cooperation in visit to Cyprus” The Guardian, May 21, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/may/22/us-vice-president-joe-biden-visits-cyprus-energy-cooperation 4. “Vice President Biden’s Remarks to Press in Cyprus” United States Department of State, May 21, 2014. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/05/20140522299564.html#axzz38tWcNV2P 5. “Statement On Vice President Joe Biden’s Visit To Cyprus” American Hellenic Institute, May 28, 2014 http://ahiworld.org/media-center/pressreleases/2014/1872-statement-on-vice-president-joe-bidens-visit-to-cyprus. html 6. Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy,” President of the United States of America, May 2010 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 7. “Cyprus Condemns Turkish Violations of Human Rights to the UN” Famagusta Gazette, July 29, 2014, http://famagusta-gazette.com/cyprus-condemns-turkish-violations-of-human-rights-to-the-un-p13371-69.htm According to the recent report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Turkey violates 14 articles of the European Convention of Human Rights.

8. “Documents on Cyprus” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e. aspx?c=48&su=57, there you can find all human rights documents pertaining to Cyprus. All UNSC resolutions by year can be found at: “Security Council Resolutions” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/ 9. “Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the question of human rights in Cyprus,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, January 22, 2014 http://ap.ohchr. org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/25/21 10. Eric Rubin, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, interviewed by Alexcia Chambers, July 15, 2014, transcript.

11. “Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN Joint Mission” United Nations, http://opcw.unmissions.org/. Additionally, Biden said that “Cyprus has been really helpful a partner, strategic partner, in a number of initiatives and most importantly, with respect to Syria, the removal of chemical weapons. That leadership, that partnership, is absolutely critical to all of us.” Apostolos Zoupaniotis, “Kerry Underlines US Support to a Bizonal, Bicommunal Federal Solution,” Greek News (Astoria, NY) May 19, 2014.

12. “Mutual Legal Assistance: Treaty Between the United States of America and Cyprus” United States Department of State, December 20, 1999, http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/125317.pdf 13. For information on the evacuation of U.S. citizens to Cyprus, see: “Statement on Vice President Joe Biden’s Visit to Cyprus” American Hel62

lenic Institute, May 28, 2014, http://ahiworld.org/media-center/pressreleases/2014/1872-statement-on-vice-president-joe-bidens-visit-to-cyprus. html. For information about Cypriot support in Afghanistan and Iraq, see: “Allies in the Fight Against Terror” Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus, http:// www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&cid=1002 14. Seth Cropsey, “Will U.S. Choose the Right Side in the Eastern Mediterranean?” RealClearWorld, July 3, 2013. http://www.hudson.org/research/9659will-u-s-choose-the-right-side-in-the-eastern-mediterranean15. Ibid.

16. “Reunification Good for NATO,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/ cyprus-settlement-pulling-nato-the-21st-century 17. “Joint Declaration: final version as agreed between the two leaders” Cyprus Mail (11 February 2014) http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/11/joint-declaration-final-version-as-agreed-between-the-two-leaders/.

18. “Biden hails Cyprus as ‘key partner’ after reunification talks,” Hurriyet News, May 23, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/biden-hails-cyprus-askey-partner-after-reunification-talks.aspx?pageID=238&nID=66852&NewsCat ID=359 19. Alexi Galanos, “The Solution to the Cyprus Problem: Famagusta, Energy, and Public Relations” (Presentation, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., June 20, 2014).

20. “Government Praises VP Biden’s Historic Visit to Cyprus,” GreekNews (Astoria, NY) May 26, 2014.

21. Soner Cagaptay and Mark Parris. “Turkey after the Iraq War: Still a U.S. Ally?” Policy Analysis. The Washington Institute. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-after-the-iraq-war-still-a-u.s.-ally> .

The source “Turkey: U.S. Can Use Bases For Iraq War.” ABC News. ABC News Network, 3 Dec. 2013. Web. 09 Dec. 2013. <http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=79780> explains that late in the Iraq war, Turkey’s foreign minister announced Turkey would allow the United States to use military bases in the country for a strike against Iraq, but only if the United Nations first approved such military action. Recognizing UN resolutions in some cases but not in others (as she fails to do in the Cyprus issue) suggests that Turkey’s commitment to its obligations as a member of the UN is important only when it is convenient.

22. Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States” International Security, vol 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp 7-45. Territorial denial is when State A may benefit from utilizing State B’s land, but the State B restricts the use of its land to balance against State A. 23. Jonathan Schanzer, “Time to Kick Turkey Out of NATO?,” Politico, October 9, 2014. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/time-to-kickturkey-out-of-nato-111734.html#ixzz3IAGpfXKm 24. “Israel condemns Zionism comments by Turkey’s PM Erdogan” BBC News, March 1, 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21628757 25. “Turkey Replaces Iran as Primary Funding Source for Hamas,” World Tribute, December 22, 2013 http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/12/22/turkeyreplaces-iran-as-primary-funding-source-for-hamas/ 26. Jonathan Schanzer, “Time to Kick Turkey Out of NATO?,” Politico, October 9, 2014. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/time-to-kickturkey-out-of-nato-111734.html#ixzz3IAGpfXKm 63

NOTES, Cont.

27. John Sitilides, “The Road Through Brussels: Cyprus on the US-Turkey Agenda,” Wilson Center. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-roadthrough-brusselscyprus-the-us-turkey-agenda 28. Eric Rubin, July 15, 2014.

29. “AHEPA and AHI Praise Vice President Joe Biden’s Historic Visit to Cyprus,” Greek News (Astoria, NY) June 2, 2014 30. “Greek Cyprus president suspends peace talks,” Hürriyet Daily, October 7, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/greek-cyprus-president-suspendspeace-talks.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72655&NewsCatID=351 31. “Biden Concerned by Tension Between Cyprus, Turkey,” Associated Press, October 31, 2014. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/bidenconcerned-tension-cyprus-turkey-26614615 .

32. Constantinos Psillides, “Biden vows to help restart Cyprus talks,” Cyprus Mail, November 1, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/11/01/biden-vows-tohelp-restart-cyprus-talks/ 33. Menelaos Hadjicostis, “Cyprus president suspends peace talks,”Associated Press, October 7, 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/864fcf2 ffd0448ff83ab6967ce5080d8/cyprus-president-suspends-peace-talks 34. Ioanna Zikakou, “US Representatives React to Turkish Invasion of Cyprus Waters,” Greek Reporter, November 4, 2014. http://usa.greekreporter. com/2014/11/04/us-representatives-react-to-turkish-invasion-of-cyprus-waters/#sthash.F8WwFFq6.dpuf

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Two Party Talks With Three Parties

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T

he division of Cyprus has never been an insulated issue. While recent developments in Cypriot natural gas findings have drawn more international attention to the island, the three guarantor states— Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain—the United Nations, and the European Union have always played a significant role in Cypriot affairs.

In gaining independence from Britain in 1960, Cyprus adopted the Treaty of Guarantee, an agreement that tasked Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain with the responsibility to protect the island and maintain its sovereignty. The implications of this treaty are immense, having been utilized as the pretext for the unilateral Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974. Signed the same day, the Treaty of Establishment gave Great Britain control of two sovereign base areas on the island—Akrotiri in the south and Dhekelia in the southeast—that the Crown maintains to this day.

Decades of British colonial rule in the face of numerous independence movements have made many Greek Cypriots resentful of the British. This resentment coupled with the skepticism towards British intentions on the island—derived from the UK’s role in the creation of the unpopular Annan Plan, the common Greek Cypriot belief that Britain has failed to pay the “rent” owed on the Bases, and recent phone-tapping allegations—has fostered a complicated relationship between Britain and Cyprus. However, relations are beginning to improve. The UK and Cyprus governments signed an agreement in January 2014 to make commercial property development more flexible on the Bases. In an area of 200 square kilometers, residents and property owners on the Bases now have opportunities beyond housing development. This long awaited agreement has been the goal of several Greek Cypriot administrations, but the Turkish Cypriot leadership considers this deal to be a hindrance to the progress of Cyprus negotiations. The progress of the negotiations are especially important to Turkey because of it’s bearing on Turkish accession into the EU.

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As the only nation to recognize the occupied area of Cyprus and the chief financer of the illegal state, Turkey plays a key role in Turkish Cypriot politics. In an effort to secure Turkey’s cooperation in the negotiation process, the European Council refused to make a solution to the Cyprus issue a precondition for Cyprus’ accession to the EU. This refusal meant that Turkey, an EU applicant, would be occupying an EU member state upon Cypriot accession on May 1, 2004.

Despite the fact that all signatories of the European Convention of Human Rights are obligated to comply with the Convention and with the decisions of its institutions, Turkey has failed to follow through on such obligations. For this and many other reasons, Turkey finds itself putting forth a very contentious application into the EU. As former President Demetris Christofias of the Republic of Cyprus stated in his 2012 address at the 67th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, “Turkey behaves as if the Republic of Cyprus does not exist on the map of the region.

This behavior, by a country seeking to become a Member State of the EU and a country who is supposedly seeking to have “zero problems with its neighbors,” cannot and should not be tolerated by the international community.”

In June 2014, the EU once more demanded that Turkey implement the Addition Protocol of 2005 to the 1963 Ankara Agreement by opening its ports to goods from Cyprus. Turkish reluctance to lift the ban on Cypriot air and sea traffic since 2006 has stalled all progress on the eight chapters regarding Cyprus that must be addressed before Turkey can move forward with the accession process.

Additionally, Turkey’s reference to the Republic of Cyprus as the “Greek Cypriot Administration in Southern Cyprus” on its online travel applications has created similar upset.

But EU concern about Turkey’s application does not end with Cyprus. High-level corruption scandals, the Gezi Park protests of December 2013, and the restriction of personal freedoms of Turkish citizens have European officials concerned about Turkey’s current path.

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The Cyprus issue does not only present a problem for Turkish-EU relations, but also for Turkish-Greek relations.

The end of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus has long been one of Greece’s top foreign policy goals, and Greek-Turkish relations cannot be normalized until a solution to the Cyprus issue is found. To facilitate progress, Greece met with the Turkish Cypriot negotiator at the request of the Government of Cyprus so that the Greek Cypriots could have direct contact with Ankara. This marked the beginning of official involvement from both Greece and Turkey at the negotiating table.

The international opinion on the Cyprus issue has been reinforced by the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Commission, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Commission of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights. The more than 150 UN resolutions that exist today regarding the Cyprus issue began in March 1964 with Security Council resolution 186, which sent a UN Peacekeeping Force to help restore peace in Cyprus in the midst of inter-communal violence. By June 1964 there were 6,500 UN troops stationed on the island. Then on July 20, 1974 when Turkey began the second phase of its invasion of Cyprus, the UN Security Council resolution 353 was adopted, demanding the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cyprus.

In 1975, Security Council resolution 367 requested that the UN Secretary-General take on the mission for peace with representatives of both Cypriot communities, and since then every Secretary-General to follow has worked to find a resolution to the Cyprus issue.

To assist with the peace process, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a special adviser to the negotiations in 2008. UN Special Envoy Alexander Downer served in this capacity for five years until stepping down in February 2014. Although meant to facilitate the process, Downer’s role in the negotiations frustrated the Greek Cypriot side. Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades wrote to Ban Ki-moon to express his “insistence that the UN must 70

finally realize their role is implementation, not interpretation or misinterpretation, of UN resolutions.” Anastasiades also referred to Downer in a television interview with Greek network Antenna TV, explaining that he has “stressed many times the need for objectivity, and if someone doesn’t have that, and has lost the trust of the two sides, or one of the sides, he has to decide in what way he can be useful, if at all.”

Six months after Downer stepped down, Ban Ki-moon appointed Espen Barth Eide, managing director of the World Economic Forum, as the new United Nations Special Representative to the Cyprus negotiations. Upon assuming the post, Eide presented both parties with ideas about how to move forward, and laid out a new format for structured negotiations. But to supplement these UN efforts, the Republic of Cyprus hopes to involve the EU in the negotiation process.

According to the spokesman of the Republic of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, it is important that the EU becomes actively involved “in order for the solution to be in line with EU law, the so-called acquis communautaire. As a member state of the European Union, [Cyprus has] obligations towards the European Union that will continue to be in place after the solution.” However Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have not been amenable to this request. Therefore Greece had decided to take on the task of involving the EU in the negotiation process by capitalizing on the “excellent relationship” that Greek Prime Minister Samaras had with European Commission President. However, since their August 4, 2014 meeting in Athens, both leaders have been replaced through the election process. This, coupled with the recent suspension of talks in October 2014 after Turkey illegally sent exploratory vessels into Greece’s Exclusive Economic Zone, has rendered this effort moot.

Technically, there are only two parties sitting at the Cypriot negotiation table—the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. But take in to account UN sponsorship, EU pressure, and the interests of the guarantor powers, and the Cyprus issue quickly becomes a problem of global proportions.

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NOTES 1. To read about a recent mission from Akrotiri, see: “BREAKING: RAF jets “in the air” heading to Cyprus for Iraq mission,” Famagusta Gazette, August 12, 2014. http://famagusta-gazette.com/breaking-raf-jets-in-the-air-headingto-cyprus-for-iraq-mission-p24852-69.htm 2. “British bases: officials questioned for bugging,” Cyprus Mail, July 17, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/17/british-bases-officials-questionedfor-bugging/ for more information on the phone tapping allegations. “NSA helps fund British bases, say UK reports,” Cyprus Mail, August 9, 2013. http:// cyprus-mail.com/2013/08/02/nsa-helps-fund-british-bases-say-uk-reports/ for more about NSA funding. “Does the UK owe Cyprus rent for the SBAS?” Cyprus Mail, September 1, 2013. http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/09/01/doesthe-uk-owe-cyprus-rent-for-the-sbas/ for an explanation of the alleged failure to pay rent. Please note that while this belief may be unfounded, it is still the popular sentiment on the island.

3. “British bases land development agreement,” Nigel Howarth, Cyprus Property News, January 15, 2014. http://www.news.cyprus-property-buyers. com/2014/01/15/british-bases-development-agreement/id=0016659 4. “‘Historic’ bases deal to boost development,” Cyprus Mail, January 16, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/01/16/historic-bases-deal-to-boost-development/ 5. Greek Cypriot benefit: “UK a Key Partner for Cyprus,” Cyprus Mail, June 20, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/06/20/uk-a-key-partner-for-cyprus/.

Turkish Cypriot counter argument: “Greek Cyprus-Britain bases deal to damage Cyprus talks,” Today’s Zaman, February 09, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-338841-greek-cyprus-britain-bases-deal-to-damage-cyprustalks.html 6. Mallinson, William. Cyprus: A Historian Overview. (Nicosia: 2011). 34.

7. Mallinson, William. Cyprus: A Historian Overview. (Nicosia: 2011). 34.

8. Miltiadou, Miltos. The Republic of Cyprus: An Overview. (Nicosia: 2012). 21.

9. “EU calls on Turkey to end Cyprus air and sea ban,” Cyprus Mail, June 23, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/06/23/eu-calls-on-turkey-to-end-cyprusair-and-sea-ban/ 10. “Moore: Turkey needs to focus on reforms for EU progress,” Today’s Zaman, May 21, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-348391-mooreturkey-needs-to-focus-on-reforms-for-eu-progress.html 11. “The Cyprus Issue,” the Hellenic Republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014. http://www.mfa.gr/en/the-cyprus-issue/. When Cyprus was under colonial rule, Greece put forth an application for self-determination on the island’s behalf. Since then, Greece has supported Cypriot independence and later the reunification of the island.

12. http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/09/24/greece-turkey-seek-to-boost-cyprustalks/ 13. Emre Iseri, “A Comparative Assessment of the United Nations and European Union’s Roles in the Resolution of Cyprus the Conflict: The Scale of Partiality-Impartiality,” Turkish Review of Balkan Studies 9 (2004): 125-143. http://www.academia.edu/457959/The_UN_and_the_EU_on_the_Cyprus_ Conflict_Resolution.

14. “Ban pays tribute to 50 years of UNFICYP,” Cyprus Mail, March 4, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/03/04/ban-pays-tribute-to-50-years-of-unficyp/ 15. “UNFICYP Background,” United Nations.

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http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/background.shtml 16. “Downer Steps Down,” Cyprus Mail, Februrary 11, 2014. http://cyprusmail.com/2014/02/11/downer-steps-down/ 17. “‘Downer has to decide: has he been useful the past five years?’” Cyprus Mail, January 11, 2014. http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/01/11/downer-has-todecide-has-he-been-useful-the-past-five-years/ 18. ibid.

19. Nikos Christodoulides, interviewed by Alexcia Chambers, July 16, 2014, transcript.

20. Sotiria Nikolouli, Cyprus Hopes to Rope EU into Sluggish UN Talks, Greece to Appeal to Juncker, Greek Reporter, July 30, 2014. http://greece. greekreporter.com/2014/07/30/cyprus-hopes-to-rope-eu-into-sluggish-untalks-greece-to-appeal-to-juncker/#sthash.nrBUTtNO.dpuf

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Global Connections: the Divisions of Cyprus and Korea

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I

n comparative politics, the Cyprus issue is most often compared with that of Bosnia. Parallels have been drawn from their histories, and speculations have been made about the similarities of their resolutions. While Nicosia is the last divided capital, Cyprus is not the last divided nation.

With this in mind, it is interesting to consider the similarities and differences between the divisions of Cyprus and Korea?

The Korean Peninsula and the island of Cyprus have been divided for decades, the former arbitrarily and the latter by force. As WWII came to a close, the Japanese colonies fell into the hands of the Allied Powers and were split amongst the victorious nations; Korea would soon become property of Russia and the United States. Drawing new boundary lines on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. Colonel Charles Bonesteel and Colonel Dean Rusk marked a clean divide along the 38th parallel.1 Once drawn, this divide would become as mental as it was physical, only to be exacerbated by inter-Korean fighting from 1950 to 1953.2 The animosity and distrust that exists between the two Koreas today is comparable to the sentiment that was created from the division of Cyprus in 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus and forcibly divided the island along ethnic and religious lines. Although it is illegal, this new Cypriot status quo persists today. As a result of both divisions, a demilitarized zone (DMZ) dissects the Korean Peninsula and the island of Cyprus. Ironically, these DMZs represent two of the most highly militarized areas in the world.3 However different the origin of their division, both South Korea and the Republic of Cyprus seek reunification.

Cypriot attempts at peace have been ongoing for 40 years with a recent jolt in the proceedings as a result of the natural gas findings. In the absence of such natural fortune, Korean’s catalyst came in the form of adamant South Korean leadership. While reunification has been on the foreign policy agenda of many different South Korean presidents, President Park Gyeun-hye took it a step further in 2014 by establishing a committee to “prepare for Korean unification.”4 Chaired by Park herself, this 76

committee will consist of 50 members, over 30 experts, and nearly 70 advisors. It is tasked with creating a plan for Korean reunification through public-private partnerships.5 This announcement came on January 6, 2014 at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, where Park gave a keynote address reiterating the benefit that Korean reunification could bring to both communities.

Calling reunification a “jackpot” for both Koreas, Park referenced Jim Rogers’ claim that, “South Korea’s capital and technical skills, and North Korea’s labor and natural resources, [could] make Korea grow exponentially.”6 Cyprus’ path toward reunification has taken on a different shape with similar characteristics. In the Cypriot negotiations, both parties—the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots—have already been brought to the negotiating table. There are no advisors outside of Cyprus’ guarantor states, and sitting at the table are the leaders of both the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community, along with the negotiators of each side. All of the negotiations are conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, signaling tremendous international support for the cause. Furthermore, planning the future of Cyprus— as for Korea—is being done with haste. However, Cypriot progression is much further along because the natural gas found in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone has given both parties a tremendous incentive to cooperate.

Korea’s progress, on the other hand, does not have a time-sensitive catalyst. In fact, Korean reunification is weakened by a lack of specifics regarding the leadership structure for a reunified state, North Korea’s refusal to participate in the second Inter-Korean High-Level Meeting to discuss reunification, and the intent of both nations to protect their sovereignty.7 Although the current statuses of the two issues are different, the same dichotomies exist in both situations: a thriving southern half is juxtaposed with a starving and isolated north. “South Korea is a young democracy, Asia’s fourth 77

largest economy, and a technology powerhouse where more than 80% of people have Internet access. Communist North Korea is an impoverished and isolated dictatorship ruled with an iron fist by the unpredictable leader Kim Jong-un.”8 Likewise, the Republic of Cyprus is an EU member state that enjoys the benefits of international trade and recognition, whereas the north of the island is an unrecognized entity propped up by one nation alone—Turkey.

The Republic of Cyprus in the south of the island is an EU member state that enjoys the benefits of international trade and recognition, whereas the north of Cyprus is an unrecognized entity propped up by one nation alone—Turkey. Furthermore, the two communities are led by two very different kinds of actors. While illegal and unrecognized, the leadership of northern Cyprus is, for the most part, rational. North Korea on the other hand, is a repressive military dictatorship with a ruler legitimized by his cult of personality. Regularly antagonizing individuals and governments, Kim Jong-un recently threatened to “punish” the South Korean people for their involvement in the distribution of anti-Pyongyang leaflets over the DMZ.9 While it is true that animosity also exists between the Republic of Cyprus and the north, such tensions are not comparable to those promulgated by Kim Jong-un himself.

Thus the differences between the north and south of Korea and Cyprus present political, economic, social, and psychological challenges to potential reunification.10 To combat these issues, both governments have emphasized the importance of confidence building measures (CBMs).11 In Korea, these measures involve a gradual build-up of inter-Korean trust through dialogue, cooperation, and a firm commitment to promises made.12 Such trust building is not only important for the Peninsula, but also for the international community. For this reason, South Korea encourages North Korea to be a responsible member of the international community in the same way that the Republic of Cyprus hopes to encourage more cooperative behavior on Turkey’s part. But still, within these divided 78

areas, it is difficult to pique the interest of the populace after so many years.

The populaces themselves represent a key difference between the two cases. North and South Korea are filled with people who ethically identify as Korean. They share the same language and culture, only to be differentiated by recent history and political systems. Cyprus, however, is ethnically diverse. The Republic of Cyprus is home to a majority of ethnically Greek decedents, whereas the Turkish Cypriots trace their descendants to Turkey, only to be compounded by the illegal importation of Turkish settlers.

Lacking linguistic and religious commonalities, time cements the division between the Cypriot people.

In fact, limited contact between the young generations of both divided areas has fostered apathetic youth, uninterested in reunification. The checkpoints along the island’s division opened partially in 2003, allowing for travel between the government controlled area and the occupied area. Since then, not a single incident has taken place.13 While this itself is a victory, it seems that this phenomenon is largely a product of the minuscule amount of Cypriot youth crossing these checkpoints. “The younger generation does not want to visit the occupied areas mainly because they don’t have something to connect them with the occupied areas. They don’t have Turkish-Cypriot friends, so they don’t care about the Cyprus problem,” says Nikos Christodoulides, spokesman for the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Likewise, many young South Koreans feel they have little in common with their neighbors.14 In fact, a 2014 survey found that 22% of South Koreans in their twenties prefer to maintain the status quo on the Peninsula, unlike the older Korean generations who still remember the connections they once had with those in the North.15 But it is also possible that decades of failed attempts at reunification in both regions are to blame for this disinterest. Some believe that “forty years later we are just discussing, and at the end of the day we do not achieve anything,” Christodoulides explained. Therefore, 79

officials contend that CBMs in both Korea and Cyprus present an opportunity to help bridge this gap between generations and between communities.

A key difference in the CBMs used by the Koreans and the Cypriots is the economic prosperity that South Korea intends to bring to North Korea before reunification is achieved. “What we saw in Europe after World War II was that economic integration can solve political challenges,” said Domenico Lombardi, Chair of the Oxford Institute for Economic Policy and advisory board member of the Bretton Woods Committee in Washington. “That might be the lesson Korea can draw.”16 Learning from this lesson, the government of South Korea has established Vision Korea Projects, initiatives designed to improve the self-sufficiency of North Korea by expanding its infrastructure, supporting its membership of international financial institutions, and exploring investment opportunities in the North.17 The Korean Peninsula is also trying to encourage development with the Kaesong industrial park, a collection of 123 small South Korean manufacturing companies located just outside the DMZ in North Korea, where both North and South Koreans find employment.18 Having brought about 30 delegates from the G20 Finance Conference in Seoul to see these facilities, South Korea actively promotes investment into the North.

This is not the case in Cyprus. While the Republic of Cyprus engages in many cultural exchanges with the occupied area in hopes of building trust and mutual understanding between the two communities, the Greek Cypriots and the international community have no intention of bringing the north out of economic isolation until an agreement is reached. Otherwise, the Greek Cypriots fear, there will be no incentive for the Turkish Cypriots to work towards a solution and change the status quo.

The reunification of either country would have a tremendous effect on the geopolitics of their respective 80

regions, but the consequences of Korean unification might be more contentious than that of Cyprus. For a real chance at success, Korean unification needs the blessing of its neighboring countries, along with China and the United States.19 However because the reunification of the Korean peninsula would tip the balance of power in Northeast Asia—which would not serve the interests of a rising China or a normalizing Japan—this consent might not easily be attained. South Korea, China, Japan, the United States, and Russia all fundamentally agree on the importance of denuclearizing North Korea. However, Korean unification would mean that North Korea has been stabilized, thus eliminating the one issue around which consensus among the powers exists. Tensions regarding unresolved territorial disputes would erupt and China would become increasingly wary of the U.S.-South Korea military alliance long based on the North Korean threat.20 Recent efforts to globalize the alliance has already made China suspicious of this bilateral collaboration, and this suspicion would only increase with reunification because the alliance would be left wanting purpose.21 Cypriot reunification, on the other hand, has the full support of the international community. While this support may have ulterior motives—such as exploiting natural gas findings or gaining access to new markets—the consensus to work towards a unified Cyprus is still the same.

Furthermore, piecing the peninsula back together would mean that Korea would have to definitively pledge its allegiance. The strategic position of the Korean Peninsula makes it an indispensible asset to Chinese national security.

Consequently the U.S. “pivot” to Asia has pushed the Chinese to match increasing U.S. military power in the region.

In the case of reunification, Beijing will urge Seoul to make a decision: either to distance itself from Washington or align with it.22 Seoul’s choice of alignment among the competing powers could potentially destabilize the region.23 Cyprus, however, as a member of the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has already made its choice. The clarity of Cyprus’ plan to 81

remain part of the European family facilitates its reunification by limiting surprises and enabling other international actors to plan for a future with one, unified Cyprus.

On the path towards reunification, South Korea must deal with an eminent nuclear security threat, an unwilling partner, and little concrete incentive to make haste towards a resolution. Cyprus, on the other hand, has two willing parties collaborating on a solution that is pressured by the energy industry. While the contexts and statuses of these divisions are different, both situations do face similar challenges. Faltering political will, intensive international involvement, and the importance of a monetarily based catalyst are key components shared by both tragedies.

Unification would create greater prosperity for all parties, would pacify tremendous security threats in the region, and would bolster international law. However as of now, it seems that reunification is not a priority on North Korea’s political agenda, and Kim Jong-un’s unpredictability presents more of a liability than an opportunity for South Korea. In Cyprus, while there is a will from both sides of the negotiating table, fear of outside influence—specifically from Turkey—today and in the future will hinder real progress towards a final agreement. Until Korean leadership changes and Greek Cypriots are assured of Turkey’s disengagement, the status quo will prevail.

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NOTES 1. S.C., “Why is the border between the Koreas sometimes called the “38th parallel”?” The Economist, November 5, 2013. http://www.economist.com/ blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/economist-explains-1#sthash.JCqP4Umw. dpuf 2. “Editorial: Toward Unification,” The Korean Herald, August 8, 2014. http:// www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140808000358 3. Enjoli Liston, “North and South Korea: can Seoul’s plans for reunification work?” The Guardian, July 18, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ jul/18/south-north-korea-unification-seoul. There are 43,000 Turkish soldiers still on Cyprus and over 1 million troops on the Korean Peninsula (Korean and U.S.).

4. Ibid.

5. “Editorial: Toward Unification,” The Korean Herald, August 8, 2014. http:// www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140808000358 6. Aidan Foster-Carter, “Jackpot of Crackpot? Park on Reunification,” The Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/01/22/jackpot-or-crackpot-park-on-korean-reunification/ For your information, Jim Rogers is an American businessman, investor and author.

7. “Unification Spokesperson Statement” Ministry of Unification, November 2, 2014. http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1834&mode=view&pag e=&cid=41558 8. Enjoli Liston, “North and South Korea: can Seoul’s plans for reunification work?” The Guardian, July 18, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ jul/18/south-north-korea-unification-seoul.

9. “Unification Spokesperson Statement” Ministry of Unification, November 2, 2014. http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1834&mode=view&pag e=&cid=41558 10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula (Ministry of Unification, Government of South Korea) 13. Nikos Christodoulides, interviewed by Alexcia Chambers, July 16, 2014, transcript.

14. Enjoli Liston, “North and South Korea: can Seoul’s plans for reunification work?” The Guardian, July 18, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ jul/18/south-north-korea-unification-seoul.

15. Karl Friedhoff, “South Koreans Lukewarm on Park’s Reunification ‘Jackpot’,” The Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/07/south-koreans-lukewarm-on-parks-reunification-jackpot/ 16. Andrew Salmon, “Inside North Korea: Could the Kaesong complex give hope for the future?” The Telegraph, December 24, 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10535828/Inside-North-Korea-Could-the-Kaesong-complex-give-hope-for-the-future.html 17. Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula (Ministry of Unification, Government of South Korea) 18. Andrew Salmon, “Inside North Korea: Could the Kaesong complex give hope for the future?” The Telegraph, December 24, 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10535828/Inside-North-KoreaCould-the-Kaesong-complex-give-hope-for-the-future.html 84

19. Koo Jun Hoe, “Korean Unification Possible by 2050: Report,” DailyNK, June 17, 2014. http://www.dailynk.com/english/read. php?cataId=nk00100&num=11973 20. Sungtae “Jacky” Park, “If Korea Were to Unite,” The Diplomat, January 31, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/if-korea-were-to-unite/ 21. Yun Sun, “The Logic of China’s Korea Policy,” The Diplomat, June 22, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/the-logic-of-chinas-korea-policy/ 22. Sungtae “Jacky” Park, “If Korea Were to Unite,” The Diplomat, January 31, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/if-korea-were-to-unite/ 23. Ibid

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ApPENDIX

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Historical Timeline 1914 300 years of Ottoman rule ends and Cyprus is officially annexed

by Britain.

1923 Turkey surrenders all rights to Cyprus under the Treaty of Lausanne.

1925 Cyprus becomes a British crown colony.

1931 First Greek Cypriot uprising against British rule.

1950 The Church of Cyprus organizes a plebiscite for the Greek Cypriot Christian Orthodox on the issue of “enosis” (union with Greece); 96% vote in favor of enosis.

1954 Greece brings the issue of Cyprus’ self-determination to the UN General Assembly.

1955 Greek Cypriots begin an anti-colonial struggle against British rule.

The National Organization of Cypriot Combatants (EOKA) fights for enosis (unification) with Greece. British authorities arm a paramilitary police force made up of Turkish Cypriots.

1956 British deport Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles.

1957 Turkey creates an underground Turkish Cypriot organization called TMT, run by a Turkish military officer. TMT supports the partition of Cyprus by intimidating the Turkish Cypriot community and inciting inter-communal violence.

1959 Archbishop Makarios returns to Cyprus and is elected president.

Independence 1960 Cyprus gains independence and the Republic of Cyprus is created.

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The Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment also take effect.

1963 President Makarios proposes 13 constitutional amendments to improve the functioning of the state, which are rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Inter-communal violence erupts and Turkish Cypriots withdraw from government.

1964 UN Security Council adopts resolution 186, establishing a peacekeeping force and reaffirming the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

1967 April: Military takeover in Greece.

1967 November: Inter-communal fighting begins in Cyprus and Turkey threatens to invade the island. Crisis diffused after U.S. President writes a letter of caution to Turkish Prime Minister. Cypriot government adopts a series of measures to normalize the situation on the island.

1968 UN-sponsored talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities begin.

1974 July 15: Military junta of Greece leads a coup against the government of Cyprus in the name of enosis. President Makarios survives attack on the Presidential Palace and escapes.

1974 July 20: Turkey launches first stage of invasion of Cyprus. UN Security Council adopts resolution 353 demanding an end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus.

1974 July 23: Coup regime is ousted and constitutional order is restored in Cyprus. Glafcos Clerides becomes president until Makarios returns in December.

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Historical Timeline, CONT. 1974 August 14: Turkey launches second stage of military invasion of Cyprus and occupies one third of its territory.

1975 Turkish Cypriots name Rauf Denktash as president and establish an independent administration. Denktash and Clerides begin talks.

1977 Makarios dies and is succeeded by Spyros Kyprianou.

1980 UN-sponsored peace talks resume.

1983 Denktash suspends talks and unilaterally declares the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognized only by Turkey. Resolution 541/83 of the UN Security Council condemns the declaration and calls for its withdrawal.

1985 No agreements are reached during talks between Denktash and Kyprianou.

1988 Georgios Vassiliou elected Greek Cypriot president.

1989 Vassiliou-Denktash talks abandoned.

1990 Cyprus applies for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC).

1992 Talks resume and collapse again.

1993 Glafcos Clerides becomes president of the Republic of Cyprus.

1996 Increased tension between communities leads to violence along the Green Line (buffer zone).

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1997 Clerides-Denktash talks collapse.

1998 Clerides re-elected. EU lists Cyprus as potential new member.

2001 May: European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe finds Turkey guilty of human rights violations in the occupied area.

2001 November: Turkey threatens to annex the occupied area if the Republic of Cyprus joins the EU. Argues that accession, coming before any reunification settlement, would violate the 1960 treaty.

2002 January: Clerides and Denktash begin talks under the UN. 2002 November: UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presents a peace plan for a federation with two constituent parts and a rotating presidency.

2002 December: Cyprus invited to join the EU in 2004 as long as the two communities agree to the UN plan by March 2003. Without a settlement, only the international recognized Republic of Cyprus will gain membership.

2003 February: Tassos Papadopoulos becomes President of the Republic of Cyprus.

2003 March: UN deadline for agreement on reunification plan passes.

2003 April: Green line opens for crossing for the first time in 30 years.

2004 April: Annan Plan submitted for referendum in both communities.

Plan is accepted by the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by Greek Cypriots.

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Historical Timeline, CONT. EU accession 2004 May: Cyprus joins the EU as a divided island.

2004 December: Turkey agrees to extend its EU Customs Union Agreement to the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish Prime Minister says this does not constitute a formal recognition of Cyprus.

2005 April: Mehmet Ali Talat elected Turkish Cypriot leader.

2006 July: Papadopolous and Talat begin UN talks again and agree to a series of confidence-building measures.

2006 November: EU-Turkey talks on Cyprus collapse because of Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s refusal to open its ports to the Republic of Cyprus.

Turkey says the EU should end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community before Turkey opens its ports.

2007 January-March: Greek and Turkish Cypriots remove the barriers dividing the city of Nicosia, paving the way for another official crossing point.

2008 January: Cyprus adopts the euro.

New talks 2008 February: Demetris Christofias elected President of Cyprus and promises to work towards reunification.

2008 March: Christofias and Talat agree to start formal talks on reunification.

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2008 April: Symbolic Ledra Street crossing between the Turkish and Greek sectors of Nicosia reopened for first time since 1964.

2008 September: Leaders of both communities begin negotiations to end the division of the island. These talks continue though early 2010.

2010 April: Dervis Eroglu becomes leader of the occupied area.

2010 May: Reunification talks resume.

2011 September: Cyprus begins exploratory drilling for oil and gas in their Exclusive Economic Zone, with U.S. energy firm, Nobel Energy. This starts another diplomatic issue with Turkey.

2012 April: Turkey’s Turkish Petroleum Corporation begins drilling for oil and gas onshore in northern Cyprus despite protests from the Cypriot government.

2012 June: Cyprus appeals to the EU for financial assistance, as Greece’s financial crisis was heavily weighing on Cypriot banks.

2013 February: Nicos Anastasiades elected President of the Republic of Cyprus.

2013 March: Anastasiades secures 10 billion Euro ($13 billion) bank bailout from the EU and IMF. 2014 October: negotiations suspended after Turkish seismic vessel enters the Republic of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone.

Negotiations still suspended as of January 2015.

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GALLERY

UN Buffer Zone between the Entering the unrecognized Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot area. northern occupied area. The unrecognized flag of the occupied area is painted on the mountainâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s side facing the Republic of Cyprus.

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The entrance of a desecrated Greek Orthodox Church called Church of Elijah the Prophet Thesviti. It was built in 1953 and is located in the occupied village of Stylloi in the Famagusta district.

It has since been destroyed, graves looted and icons defaced.

The bombed-out city of Famagusta.

The city and its structures have remained in this state since the 1974 invasion, earning the title of â&#x20AC;&#x153;ghost town.â&#x20AC;?

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GALLERY

This Greek Orthodox Church behind barbed wire—called Agia Zoni—is located in Varosha, an area of Famagusta fenced off by the Turkish army.

Areas of Famagusta fenced off by the Turkish army that have yet to be rebuilt.

The UN buffer zone that divides the island between the occupied area and the Republic of Cyprus.

A view of the UN buffer zone between the occupied area and the Republic of Cyprus.

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Air traffic control tower from the old Nicosia International Airport, now located inside the UN buffer zone.

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GALLERY

The terminal of Nicosia International Airport, newly rebuilt at the time of the invasion. It is now located in the UN buffer zone.

Cyprus Airways Trident Sunjet passenger plane on the tarmac of Nicosia International Airport.

The planeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s engines were stripped during the 1974 invasion and used to repair another airplane for escape.

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The terminal of Nicosia International Airport, newly rebuilt at the time of the invasion. It is now located in the UN buffer zone.

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A

lexcia Chambers is a Contributing Editor for the Diplomatic Courier and a student at The College of William & Mary. She also serves as the Secretary General of &MUN III, William & Mary’s intercollegiate Model United Nations Conference. Alexcia’s international interests were shaped in part by the American Hellenic Institute’s Foreign Policy Trip to Washington DC, Cyprus, and Greece. These interests have carried over to her work with the Diplomatic Courier, leading her to author this e-book on the recent developments of the Cyprus issue.

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