European Parliament Elections: 2014 Coverage

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT A Global Affairs Magazine

ELECTIONS | 2014 COVERAGE

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

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CONTENTS

06 / Victory in Europe?

By Theo Moore 10 / Tough Decisions Ahead: The Future of Europe

By Chrisella Herzog 12 / Impact of a New German

Government on the European Union

By Lucia Meyer

14 / French Nationalism and Euroscepticism Sign of Greater Discontent in EU Elections

By Tristan Lemonnier 16 / An EU Digital Single

Market by 2015?

By James Lovegrove 18 / The EU’s Democratic Deficit and the Case for Pan-European Candidate Lists

By Theofanis Kakamias 20 / Six Months Until European Elections, What Do We Know?

By Tim McPhie 04

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22 / Digital Politicking Comes

to Europe

By Matt Bostrom 24 / Can the EU’s Political Parties Get Out the Vote?

By Philippe Mase-Sencier 26 / EU Elections: A Thorny Equation

for Newly-Appointed French Government

By Carlos Luca de Tena

28 / European Parliament Candidates Must Choose Energy and Climate to Be Chosen Themselves

By Julie Kjestrup 30 / Europe’s Global Elections: A View From Washington

By Dr. Joshua W. Walker

32 / Facing Inward: A UK

Perspective on the EU Election

By Keir Ferguson

2014 COVERAGE

MASTHEAD Special E-Book Edition of Diplomatic Courier Publisher: Medauras Global Editor-in-chief Ana C. Rold Managing Editor Chrisella Herzog Senior Editor Paul Nash Creative Director Christian Gilliham Technology Officer Kyle Herzog Senior Photographer Sebastian Rich Editorial Assistants Chiara Romano Bosch Pauline Gebczak

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Contributors, Cont.

C. Naseer Ahmad Matt Bostrom Charles Crawford Keir Ferguson Justin Goldman Whitney Grespin Theofanis Kakamias Julie Kjestrup Tristan Lemonnier James Lovegrove Philippe Mase-Sencier Tim McPhie Lucia Meyer Oscar Montealegre Theo Moore Paul Nadeau Paul Nash Richard Rousseau Carlos Luca de Tena Joshua W. Walker Kenneth Weisbrode

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EDITOR’S NOTE The Future of the EU: The 2014 European Parliament Elections

By Chrisella Herzog

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espite an existential crisis, the European Union, with 500 million citizens and an economy producing over US$16.6 trillion, remains a major player in shaping the future course of global politics and economy—what happens in Brussels ripples outward.

This has been a year of change for the European Union, as Euroskepticism has risen, fueled by questions of whether Brussels is up for—or even has a right to—directing the future of the EU members. In May 2014, this was reflected in the results of the continent-wide European Parliament elections. The changes taking place in Brussels, stemming from the change in dialogue from the populations of the 28 Member States, will set the course of the European Union for the next five years, and will affect global progress in issues ranging from climate change to negotiations with Iran to worldwide economic recovery.

The European Parliament sees a demographic change, with 751 new MEPs elected; in November, a new European Commission will take power, with one commissioner from each of the 28 countries. In December, the European Council, an intergovernmental chamber uniting the 28 Heads of State, will choose a new President of the European Commission by the beginning of December.

This election was notable not only for the changes it would bring to the politics of the EU, but also for the expansion of democracy that it brought to Europeans as citizens of the European Union. These 2014 elections marked the first time that European citizens were voting indirectly for the President of the European Commission, as the European Parliament must approve the President. However, this will take a good bit of coalition-building and negotiating, as Theo Moore discusses in his opening article of this special edition, because the question of who “won” the elections is not as cut and dry as it may seem.

But then, what election ever is? To an outsider, the issues surrounding the European Parliament elections may be clouded by the variety of parties seeking to have their voice heard or by the clash of 28 Member States’ cultures over the different approaches to solving the problems the European Union faces. Since September 2013, the Diplomatic Courier has sought to clarify these issues and problems through coverage that incorporates viewpoints from Brussels, Greece, and Washington, DC. Even though the voting booths are now closed for the next five years, there is no doubt that the questions and ideas discussed in this special edition will resonate throughout Brussels for some time.

As always, thank you for joining us in this exploration of the forces that shape our world. We always welcome your thoughts on Twitter, at @DiploCourier. ■

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VICTORY IN EUROPE?

By Theo Moore

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he newly elected European Parliament will help set the political tone in Europe for the next five years.

The new MEPs will have a major impact on the next College of Commissioners and will also have a say on critical issues, from a free-trade deal with the United States, to the energy supply across the continent, as well as on questions of institutional reform and the governance of the single European currency.

There are many excellent summaries of seats won and lost, but perhaps more intriguing is the difficulty in saying who really “won” the European Elections held across 28 Member States between 22nd and 25th May. Proclaiming the centreright European People’s Party (EPP) as the winner because they have the most MEPs in the new Parliament masks the fact that they lost some 62 seats compared to 2009, whilst the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the Liberals & Democrats (ALDE) both lost only around 10 MEPs each.

Certainly Marine Le Pen (Front National, France) and Nigel Farage (UK Independence Party, UK) both feel like winners, coming first nationally with 26 percent and 27 percent of the vote respectively. Nonetheless, whilst these and other Eurosceptic or “fringe” gains (Austria 27 percent, Denmark 26.6 percent, Hungry 14.68 percent, and Greece 26.6 percent) are the most immediately significant and striking result of this election, they are not an actual victory in terms of parliamentary arithmetic.

Perhaps one way to call victory relates to the new President of the European Commission, successor to José Manuel Barosso. One innovation of the 2014 elections was the nomination by major political parties of a ‘Spitzenkandidat’ or ‘top candidate’ for the President’s role. The party that gets their nominee into that slot could claim real victory, as it will be a hugely powerful position. The European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents has said the EPP’s Spitzenkandidat, Jean-Claude Juncker (a former prime minister of Luxembourg), has a clear mandate to start negotiations for the role. Given the lack of clear majority in the European Parliament, however, Juncker may not have enough support; the German MEP Martin Schulz, the PES Spitzenkandidat (who served as President of the European Parliament from 2012), is actively working to form a coalition behind his own candidacy.

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This said, the sole prerogative to appoint the President actually sits with the European Council, which is merely obliged to “consider” the results of Parliamentary elections rather than acquiesce to any given Spitzenkandidat. The Member State governments that make up the Council are ambivalent, at best, regarding Parliament’s claims to appointing the new head of the Commission. They may well put forward their own candidate, and the only real influence MEPs will have then is to approve or reject the nominee, and subsequently do the same with the College of Commissioners.

Dominating the legislative process might be another way to identify a winner but that, too, is not cut and dried. In the (entirely predictable) absence of a political group with an absolute majority, the ability to engineer partnerships and coalitions will be crucial. A “grand coalition” between EPP and PES might see the light of day, although the Socialists have stated that they are willing to cooperate only if the EPP signs up to certain policy priorities. Instead, the two largest parties might feel more comfortable with traditional allies. The PES can probably count on the Greens and the far-left, giving them a group of around 285 MEPs. Meanwhile, the EPP may be able to co-opt the European Conservatives & Reformers (ECR) to create a block of around 260 MEPs (this is by no means a certainty, however, as some ECR MEPs are pressing to align with UKIP). The consequence of these moves might be to make ALDE the Parliament’s powerbrokers: their 60+ MEPs would put any of the two coalitions in front, although still neither would have an absolute majority. Despite the rise of the ‘fringe’, therefore, really all of the major parties can make some kind of claim to “victory”.

The final possible analysis of who came out on top is to look at the Member States themselves. This election will radically change the balance of power within the major political groups. The clearest illustration of this is that France’s largest delegation of MEPs now comes from the far-right, weakening that Member State’s influence in mainstream political groups, notably in the EPP where France will be dwarfed by the German delegation (and where the UK will absent since its Conservative MEPs sit in the ECR). Indeed Germany should be very well-placed in most of the big party groups, as not only does this Member State have the most MEPs but its mainstream parties were not as badly mauled by the electorate as elsewhere.

The coming months and years will doubtless give us a clearer picture of who really won this election, if anyone. It may be easier to point out who lost or did not even feel part of the game. “Many are called but few are chosen” has resonance not only for the would-be MEPs that failed to be elected between 22nd and 25th May; it also reflects on some 228 million EU voters who did not make it to polling booths across the country. The 43.11 percent turnout was in fact slightly up on the percentage who voted in 2009, marking the first time the popular vote did not decline since elections began in 1979. However, that said, 2009’s turnout was only slightly lower at 43.00 percent. It seems clear that these elections simply did not rouse that much interest amongst Europeans, which is as clear an ”absence of true victory” as we might wish to find.

The 2014 European elections clearly have changed some things, nonetheless. We will certainly see Brussels politics entering a phase of coalition and disruption, retrenchment and reform. This will almost certainly lead to a concentration of effective Parliamentary power with the mainstream political groups and may lead to more “moderate” European policy-making in the face of pressure from the “fringe”. At the same time, however, Member State governments will be wrestling with domestic political agendas that have been changed by the surge of Euroscepticism. How this will affect the attitude of the European Council and the Commission will be as important as the Parliament’s own response to the 2014 European Elections. ■ 10

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TOUGH DECISIONS AHEAD The Future of Europe

By Chrisella Herzog September 2013

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n April 2013, it became clear that Slovenia was nearing the cliff of fiscal collapse and was working to avoid becoming the fifth Eurozone nation to need a bailout.

Initial analysis and statements from EU financial leaders suggest that Slovenia is not suffering from the same severity of troubles as Cyprus, the last troubled Eurozone nation to make headlines. However, the handling of the Cyprus crisis is still very fresh on everyone’s mind—seemingly manageable financial problems escalate when the national government responds too slowly or hesitantly, and EU authorities step in to impose unpopular and possibly counterproductive measures. There are questions over the future of the Euro, talk about Germany’s leadership through the crisis, calls for reform of the banking system, and protests against austerity measures and intervention by the “Troika.”

It is not the first time we have heard this story, and time will only tell if it will be the last.

The response to the financial crises in both the U.S. and the EU have been repeatedly described as “technocratic,” driven by “ostensibly scientific techniques [that] would manage risks and predict rare events.” The European Union, united by a common currency but divided by fiscal policies decided on a country-by-country basis has struggled to find an economic—let alone political—solution for its structural weaknesses. In the process it has, in the words of Frankfurt professor Jürgen Habermas, resorted to constructing a “technocracy without democratic roots,” trapping the European Union between fiscal accountability and democratic legitimacy, unsure of what form it truly wants to take. In a speech in late April at the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium, he called for a revival of Europe’s otherwise doomed constitutional efforts, as current policy has become torn between, on one hand, “the economic policies required to preserve the euro and, on the other, the political steps to closer integration.”

Clearly, the European Union is in the early stages of a new transformation, and one in which member states must decide what the future of a united Europe will be. A fiscal union, with the ECB as a lender of last resort, seems to be the preference of EU authorities, pushed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel; however, this option leaves the voices of the people out of the equation, and has contributed to a rise of nationalist and anti-EU sentiment. A fiscal union will require further political integration to be successful.

The challenge of the Euro crisis has been described as Germany’s most challenging political test since reintegration after the collapse of the Soviet Union. If the Euro fails, Germany will be blamed; if it makes it through the crisis successfully, Germany will be credited. But Angela Merkel is becoming a lonely advocate of austerity—the French Socialist party has accused Merkel of “selfish intransigence” for insisting on austerity policies in return for financial assistance, and some EU citizens, particularly in Eastern Europe, are beginning to turn against what some perceive as German imperialism.

Habermas called on Germany to move away from policies to stabilize the budgets of shaky Eurozone economies through austerity, to a policy of “solidarity”—common liability and mutual debt, along with more democratic inclusion of smaller countries in the decision-making process.

The revolt against austerity brewing in the Eurozone will target not only German leadership, but also the role of the European Central Bank, which has been working

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since September 2012 to bring more fiscal uniformity and stability to the Eurozone by becoming a lender of last resort to local banks on the verge of collapsing under bad debt.

The ECB must take a stand in banking reform, moving away from a “too big to fail” mentality and forcing banks across the Eurozone to put some “skin in the game.” Nassim Taleb and George Martin, in the SAIS Review, wrote, “[N]obody should be in a position to have the upside without sharing the downside, particularly when others may be harmed. While this principle seems simple, we have moved away from it in the finance world, particularly when it comes to financial organizations that have been deemed ‘too big to fail.’” The captain must go down with the ship; bankers must reap the consequences of bad decisions.

Such reforms—increased political inclusion and constitutionalism in the European Union, as well as reforms of the financial sector—are vital to returning stability to the Eurozone and preventing the spread of protests and a virulent rise in nationalism across the EU. From the Golden Dawn in Greece to the latest anti-austerity protests in Slovenia, a combination of high youth unemployment and cuts to social benefits are setting the stage for a growing backlash. Said Damijan Sencar, a 51-year-old electrical engineer, to Reuters during protests through Ljubljana, “I am here because I believe we have to get rid of anyone who has held high political office during the last 20 years. I fear that things will get even worse in Slovenia if the Troika comes, but I hope that can still be avoided.”

This is not the mindset of a citizen who feels included in democratic or decision-making processes affecting his life.

The latest story in the Eurozone crisis is perhaps not just a retelling once more of an old news story, but instead is the latest slice in a tragedy of the Euro of death by a thousand cuts. The Euro was built on shaky ground to begin with, but it could still be possible to turn things around. However, it will require a difficult rethinking, from all across the region, over what kind of future should be built for Europe. ■

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Impact of a New German Government on the European Union

By Lucia Meyer October 2013

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he 2013 election of a new German parliament attracted considerable attention throughout the European Union. Some even considered it to be a landmark decision that changed German EU politics, especially with regard to financial crisis management. At the same time, the election’s outcome creates a level of uncertainty and leaves some open questions when it comes to the immediate future of German EU politics and the upcoming election of the European Parliament in 2014.

The victory of Chancellor Merkel and her party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with the Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), is unquestioned. With a result close to an absolute majority, Ms. Merkel is stronger than ever before. German middle class voters clearly mandated the current chancellor to form a new government—which traditionally requires a coalition with other political parties in Germany. Losing her minority partner from the previous coalition, the market-liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), created a situation that forces Chancellor Merkel to negotiate with opposition parties, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party. Currently, a Grand Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD looks very likely, since the Green Party declared that major obstacles in energy and environmental policy could not be removed throughout the negotiation process.

Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that 49 percent of the Germans voted for left of center positions as represented by the Social Democrats, the Green Party and the leftwing party DIE LINKE. This reflects the divide of German society, a result of a growing prosperity gap among social classes—some of it caused by the Euro crisis—but also by a so called “neo-liberal” development for which the Liberal Party took the blame in the election poll. While conservative voters prefer the austerity policy of Merkel and are in favor of state debt reduction and reform in southern EU member states, nearly half of the German population prefers improved social standards in Germany and favor less strict austerity policies in Europe.

What could a Grand Coalition mean for the German EU-Politics?

Common positions of SPD and CDU regarding EU-politics seem to be in the field of the financial transaction tax/Tobin tax, a stricter regulation of financial markets and support for reform projects as well as economic growth incentives for Euro crisis countries.

The SPD is said to have changed its mind regarding Eurobonds and is in line with Merkel’s negative position on Eurobonds. With the SPD as a partner, the CDU will have to mitigate its austerity policy and will have to focus more on economic stimulus programs.

With regard to the 2014 European Parliament election, the German elections’ outcome may predict a pattern of German voters’ preference, and in particular the Liberal Party will have to fight against their erosion of importance in the political landscape. This may result in further loss of influence for market-liberal voices in the European Parliament, too. Meanwhile, conservative forces and Social-Democrats will probably be able to benefit from the new governmental constellation. After their defeat in the German election, it remains to be seen how the Green Party will campaign for the EU Parliament election to re-attract German voters.

A Grand Coalition will also be a favorable constellation for Martin Schulz, President

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of the European Parliament. Seen to be the favorite of the Party of European Socialists (PES), he will have a good chance to secure German backing as candidate for the President of the European Commission in 2014, should Mrs Merkel’s European People’s Party not retain their leadership in the European elections.

Still, the two parties remain discordant on many points. Mandatory minimum wages and income tax raises for high income groups are at the core of the SPD’s catalogue, as well as EU-wide social standards and more rights for the European Parliament. On the other hand, the CDU expressed concerns over a too-centralistic Europe. The accession of Turkey to the EU is another topic of conflict with a strong conservative resistance. Also, the topic of a European Banking Union seems not yet to be resolved between the future coalition parties.

More financial help for Greece, the future of Cyprus, accession talks with Turkey, next steps of the European Banking Union, and accession talks with Serbia will be on the European agenda in the last quarter of 2013. Although it is integral to the negotiations to play with a timeframe that postpones the forming of a new German government until Christmas, all political parties know the urgency to take an aligned position regarding European topics. But, the Social Democrats promised a member vote to their party members and this may, in fact, delay the entire process.

Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission, expects the new Grand Coalition to even strengthen Germany’s overall EU-friendly policy. A milder version of austerity policy and a stronger focus on the European labor market is expected. Energy policy will remain a key priority for Germany, and they will influence the European position in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations in order to protect German industry positions. Demonstration of successful partnerships with European member states and good relations with the European institutions remain critical topics for any German government. More understanding and better acceptance for European affairs and politics among the German population is of utmost importance to attach people emotionally to Europe. The immediate success of almost 5 percent of voters for a newly founded EU skeptical party (AfD) in the 2013 poll speaks for itself. The Grand Coalition will have to show the German population that there is benefit in both a common currency and in the EU to ensure that the skepticism of being the “German cash cow for Europe” is not deepened. ■

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French Nationalism and Euroscepticism Sign of Greater Discontent

By Tristan Lemonnier November 2013

O

nly eight weeks will separate the municipal elections (March 23rd and 30th) and the European elections (May 25th) next spring in France—two key milestones that could accelerate the path towards a redefined political landscape.

As President Hollande’s popularity plummets in recent polls and the defiance towards traditional parties continues to grow, many pundits consider that the 2014 EU elections in France will once again be a “referendum” on the government’s popularity and a reflection of the current trend towards the radicalisation of French politics. The next European elections in France are likely to be once more plagued by abstention, and the shift from a bipartisan to a tri-partisan political landscape further accelerated.

A GROWING TREND TOWARDS ABSTENTION The 2014 EU elections are likely to struggle to generate interest from French voters and could very well be marked by a record-breaking abstention rate, as participation has consistently decreased in France since 1979. The last three EU elections in France have been marked by an abstention rate of more than 50 percent and, after an all-time low in 2009 (when 59.37 percent of voters did not cast a ballot), 2014 is unlikely to buck this downward trend. The lack of interest from French voters in the EU elections has often been explained in France by the failure of the major political parties to place European issues at the top of the agenda and to link the benefits of EU policies to the daily life of French citizens.

While the key issues and parameters of the campaign are slowly emerging, six months ahead of the 2014 elections, the debate remains focused on whether these elections will be the climax of voters’ discontent towards the current French administration and if they will trigger the government reshuffle that many observers already predict. The debate is once again likely to focus on national political issues rather than on major EU policy priorities such as an EU banking union, tax harmonisation, a stronger European defence, or the economic governance of the euro zone.

In that context, as long as the European elections are seen by voters—and used by French political parties—as a vote of confidence on the current direction taken by the national government, abstention will likely continue to rise. This is even more probable this year as the European elections will immediately follow the municipal elections that are already considered a major test for President Hollande and his government. Confirming that EU mandates tend to be seen as “second tier” by French politicians and in order to avoid political retaliations, Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault recently advised members of the government not to lead any list for the European elections.

AN ACCELERATION IN THE RAPID RISE OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL FRONT PARTY A recent poll conducted by the Institut Français d’Opinion Publique (IFOP) on October

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9th placed the National Front (far right wing party) as the front runner for the 2014 EU elections with 24 percent of voting intentions. It is the first time that the National Front has ever topped a pre-election poll ahead of traditional parties such as the UMP (conservative right wing party) and PS (President Hollande’s socialist party), trailing respectively at 22 percent and 19 percent.

Marine Le Pen’s National Front party momentum started in the 2012 presidential elections where she obtained 18 percent of the vote and its rise has further accelerated throughout 2013. On September 7th a poll conducted by the CSA institute revealed that 36 percent of French voters now consider Marine Le Pen as the primary opposition figure to President Hollande. She is placed far ahead of traditional party leaders such as Jean-François Copé, the leader of the UMP, who came second with 23 percent. Although the National Front has long been attracting protest votes, it has enlarged its base since 2012 by gathering more votes from disappointed former supporters of the PS and UMP parties thanks to a populist platform which has appealed to many voters in times of economic downturn.

This trend was confirmed on October 13th with the landslide victory of the National Front candidate in a by-election for one of the General Counselors in the Var department (southeast of France). Although a relatively minor public office in a region traditionally favorable to the National Front’s platform, such a decisive victory by an unknown candidate confirmed the growing influence of the party and its position as one of the major forces in the French political landscape. This rise is likely to continue with the EU elections as protests over the government’s policies continue to develop and because France’s proportional representation voting system traditionally favors smaller parties.

Since François Hollande’s election, the National Front’s platform has been focused on curbing immigration and exiting the euro zone, claiming to protect French people against the “European Soviet Union”. In the context of record unemployment and a struggling economy, this populist approach is generating a lot of interest among a population that continues to perceive the European Union as a source of problems and constraints rather than a positive force improving their daily life. This growing euroscepticism has also been fuelled by the anti-European stance taken by many candidates from the mainstream French parties during the last elections, criticising the austerity measures imposed on several European countries or questioning the existence of the Schengen area. According to a poll conducted by Gallup in May 2013, if a referendum on membership of the EU were to be held, one third of French voters would vote to leave, while 43 percent would vote to remain in it.

The year 2014 will mark a crossroad in European politics. The rise of nationalism and euroscepticism is not merely a French particularity; a similar phenomenon can be observed in many European countries. As many observers point out, there will be growing success for nationalist and populist parties in the next European elections unless governments throughout Europe, as well as the EU institutions, manage to shift the debate from politics to policies. ■

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An EU Digital Single Market by 2015?

By James Lovegrove November 2013

“T

oday, one main question: How to restore Europe’s online leadership.

Lives have gone digital—so the single market must go truly digital too”. President Herman Van Rompuy’s summit opening in October is unlikely to rival other European Council defining catch-phrases (such as the Iron Lady’s “I want my money back”) but could have far more significant impact in Europe and beyond.

October’s Digital Summit in Brussels brought together representatives of the 28 Member States and a plethora of political families to agree on completing a Single European Digital Market by 2015, which aims to increase GDP by 5 percent and create 3.8 million new jobs.

Will President Van Rompuy’s opening words to the first “Digital” European Council materialise within such a short timeframe, and in a highly volatile economic and political environment? Will it resonate with a disillusioned European electorate? There are, as expected, two schools of thought emerging from the Brussels beltway. Let’s start with the pessimistic school.

Short-term national interests continue to plague the single market. In practically every key sector there are examples of incomplete markets from national support to energy champions, to barriers being created in financial services or technology. Lessons learned from the failed Lisbon Strategy of March 2000, which sought to establish Europe, within ten years, as the “leading knowledge economy”, have not been properly applied.

A laundry list of national obstacles remain, despite the recognition that Europe’s digital potential “is currently held back by a patchy pan-European policy framework”. Ironically, such patchy pan-European examples are used by Eurosceptic parties to demonstrate that Europe is not working but they conveniently overlook the non or incorrect “implementation” at national or local levels. In such a context, there are some in Brussels who ask if the Digital Summit has only succeeded in producing more empty statements, and that we shouldn’t believe in the commitments made.

Moreover, on the 21st of October, the European Parliament’s lead drafting committee at last adopted its Report on the Data Protection Regulation—which has met with disappointment across the board. According to the European Small Business Alliance it harms their members, and likewise for the larger tech companies—represented by Digital Europe—it is said that the parliament’s current proposal will “tie up businesses in Europe in red tape and legal uncertainty, stifle the growing trend of data analytics, and drive innovation and jobs away from Europe”. This flagship piece of legislation for Europe’s digital future still has several hurdles to overcome, and hence the Digital Council modified its ambitions and called for adoption by 2015, rather than before the European elections of May 2014 which was the initial “deadline”.

As for the more optimistic school of thought, there are those that think that dedicating a European Council Summit to “digital” is surely symbolic, and that this sector will be truly embraced. There seems to be a political acceptance of the enabling role of the ICT sector

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to revolutionise efficiency and competitiveness and (finally) create a leading “knowledge economy”. For example, switching to cloud computing could not only reduce costs and pollution but could create, according to the International Data Corporation (IDC), a 250 euro billion business by 2020. McKinsey has also made the economic case for a digital revolution, stating that deploying Big Data software could save governments 150-300 billion euro annually, via better use of public money and improved tax receipts.

Those working in the industry also believe that, despite the political show of force around NSA spying, there is a degree of realism and pragmatism behind the scenes.

This reduces the likelihood of rash political hay-making such as abandoning free trade negotiations with the United States. In response to UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s criticism of fellow EU leaders’ “la-di-da, airy-fairy” perspectives on spying, Chancellor Angela Merkel kept a surprisingly low profile, and left the key sound bites to others.

Europe’s leaders continue to seek consensus and progress. ■

MAY 2014

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The EU’s Democratic Deficit and the Case for Pan-European Candidate Lists

By Theofanis Kakarnias November 2013

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ith the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Parliament was granted significant law-making powers, making it the EU’s co-legislator along with the Council of Ministers for almost all areas of EU competence. Whereas the European Commission remains the EU’s agenda setter and the Council has to give its consent on all pieces of binding legislation, the European Parliament now has the ability to amend, accept, reject, or at least advise on legislative initiatives ranging from energy policy and information technology to international trade agreements and the EU’s budget. The significance of the European Parliament has undoubtedly been increased in legislative terms, but whether the drafters of the Lisbon treaty have successfully reduced the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU it is still unclear. Now with European elections approaching, a high voter turnout rate would be a good indicator to assess this.

European citizens now have the opportunity to directly elect the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who will decide on a great amount of the EU legislation impacting them. But despite this significant empowerment, participation rates in the European elections are still expected to remain at dramatically low levels of less than 50 percent, especially after taking into consideration the disappointing 20.74 percent voter turnout in Croatia’s first European Parliament election last April. Indeed, outside Brussels, the elections are hardly covered by the press, while national, regional, and even local elections taking place at the same time are already triggering public interest. Even when mention is made of the European Parliament elections, it is usually framed around national agendas rather than the issues of pan-European interest that MEPs will work on.

In an attempt to bring the European debate to life, many groups continue to propose a new approach to the elections, whereby citizens would elect their MEPs from both national and pan-European voting lists. This is seen in some quarters as a creative way to promote a European identity among citizens. Whether this proposal, however, could have a significant impact on the democratic deficit is uncertain. Some fear that its implementation would further frustrate the electorate who already perceive the EU as a complex and distant political system. Others argue that with MEPs being often unknown in their own countries, trying to raise awareness of and support for foreign nationals is an unnecessary or undesirable extra burden.

The question remains a hypothetical one at least for 2014, as the proposals have not yet been adopted within Parliament or by the Member States in the Council. The strongest advocate of pan-European elections remains the Union of European Federalists, who this week adopted their Manifesto for 2014, which again outlines their support for this tool in the future, as well as calling for broad Treaty reform in 2015. British Liberal MEP Andrew Duff has been proposing to elect 25 MEPs from one pan-European constituency since 2008, but last year the European Parliament failed to adopt the proposals due to

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opposition from the current largest political groups, the centre-right European People’s Party and the centre-left Socialists and Democrats.

Many have debated in past weeks about how hard the federalist message should be pushed to European voters, especially in response to the growing popularity of Eurosceptic groups on the back of often contradictory messages about repatriating powers.

Even within the ALDE family, the current liberal-centrist political group of the European Parliament, prominent members are criticising their colleagues for not being in tune with voters.

In 1751, Voltaire described Europe as a “kind of a great republic divided into several states…but all corresponding with one another. They all have the same religious foundations, even if divided into several confessions. They all have the same principle of public law and politics…” This notion of Europe remains broadly intact nowadays; a continent that can be seen as both divided and united at the same time. Personally speaking, I believe that openly supporting European principles and values and making them more visible, especially in times of an unprecedented economic and social crisis, could improve democratic legitimacy. The introduction of a pan-European list of candidates in future European Parliament elections could be one of the measures that would improve the EU’s political system and add a true European dimension to the elections. ■

MAY 2014

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Six Months Until European Parliament Elections, What Do We Know?

By Tim McPhie November 2013

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here are just six months to go until the European Parliament elections. Imagine the buzz that you would hear six months before a U.S. presidential election, and indeed consider a typical national election anywhere across Europe.

You would know the parties and candidates; you would see daily gossip in the press on policies and personalities; and you would read regular polling updates. European elections are a little different.

Don’t get me wrong—it is a growing topic of conversation and a few names, faces, and ideas are already shaping the media narrative, with articles hitting the mainstream press in publications such as Reuters, Der Spiegel, and El Pais. However, considering the importance of the European Parliament, it is amazing that many citizens will not know until the last minute whose names they will see on the ballot. So, as Brussels observers start to piece together the jigsaw puzzle, what do we know, and what do we not know at this point?

We know that the current President of the European Parliament, German Socialist Martin Schulz, wants to be the next president of the European Commission, and we know he is likely to get the backing of the vast majority of the centre-left political family, after they appointed him as their ‘candidate designate’. However, we don’t know who will be the ‘incumbent’ centre-right’s nominee for Commission president. José Manuel Barroso is nearly certain to step down, if Brussels political rumors are to be believed. But we will not know whom the party will nominate to succeed him until a congress in Dublin in March, should they retain their Parliamentary majority. They have committed to propose a candidate with ‘executive’ experience—probably meaning a current or past head of state. Fredrik Reinfeldt of Sweden will likely leave office around the time a new Commission is formed, and outgoing Luxembourg PM Jean-Claude Juncker is widely respected and seen as an ardent Europhile. Enda Kenny, the current Irish PM, seems to be the current media favourite, but he has been non-committal to date.

The other centrist party, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, is also working on its manifesto and will kick off its candidate nomination process with a congress this week in London. The Green Party’s candidate will come from a shortlist of four—José Bové, Monica Frassoni, Ska Keller, and Rebecca Harms—who are enjoying a rather friendly primary campaign that looks likely to serve the eventual winner well by raising the whole group’s profile in a social-media focused campaign.

The far-left and far-right are also gearing up for their respective but very different versions of a ‘populist’ campaign. The French National Front, led by Marine Le Pen, is topping national polls, but its rebranding still sits uneasily with many people, especially since it has formed an electoral alliance with nationalist parties including the anti-Islamic Dutch Party of Freedom led by Geert Wilders. The UK Independence Party declined an invitation to join them, though, and they will not be inviting extremist groups such as the

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Greek Golden Dawn. On the other end of the spectrum, the Greek far-left is likely to play a prominent role, with its charismatic leader Alex Tsipras expected to lead the European Left family as their candidate for the Commission Presidency. The membership-driven Pirate Party is also working on a common manifesto, hoping to build on their success in the last Parliament elections. But none of these groups are likely to be able to present a serious contender for the Commission Presidency.

So that is where we stand for the ‘top job’, but what about those thousands of MEP candidates whose names will be on the ballot six months from now? Again it is a mixed picture. The UK’s lists for the mainstream parties have been complete for some time now, and the candidates are actively knocking on doors, engaging via social media, and promoting themselves in the local press. Across the Nordic countries there are extensive lists in place and candidates are talking to potential voters as well. The main Dutch and Maltese parties are well advanced, the French Socialists have just announced their leading candidates, and other individual parties across the Member States are making progress.

Regrettably for citizens across much of Southern Europe, they are expected to have just a month or so to get to know their candidates before the elections. One imagines that the politicians themselves in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, or Italy may regret that they have not had a chance to express their personalities earlier and lay the foundations for popular support as individuals, rather than just as a member of a party. ‘Personality politics’ is being pushed for the Commission, while in the Parliament there is a risk that many MEPs will get picked despite being ‘unknowns’.

Another fascinating element of the campaign is the increasing level of activism by interest groups—the young, the old, the animal lovers, the education champions, the children’s rights defenders—who are all presenting manifestos and seeking pledges from future MEPs to support their chosen cause. It is an interesting trade-off for candidates to consider, as backing such groups, with their large and diverse memberships, can create a lot of visibility and goodwill as voters seek a familiar name or face to support at the ballot box. After all, who does not want to vote for a caring candidate who loves puppies and promises to work towards better youth employment and training while providing for the elderly? No matter the outcome, it promises to get even more interesting in the next six months. ■

MAY 2014

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Digital Politicking Comes to Europe

By Matt Bostrom December 2013

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any of us have heard that the United States is “ahead of Europe” when it comes to digital campaigning in the political sphere. Certainly there are examples from the United States that come quickly to mind, such as Barack Obama’s 2012 and 2008 Presidential campaigns and the populist support he gained. There are others which may be lesser known, such as Ron Paul’s powerful fundraising ‘moneybomb’ in 2007, the viral impact of a hidden video of Mitt Romney seemingly writing off 47 percent of the U.S. electorate, and even further back Howard Dean’s courtship of the blogging community in the 2004 elections. Undoubtedly, grand sums of money are spent on pumping the U.S. digital politics machine, but with staggering results. The first presidential debate set a record on Twitter, with more than 10 million tweets during the 90-minute debate. But it was not just volume. Research from ORI and the George Washington University Graduate School of Political Management on the 2012 U.S. election showed that 29 percent of Americans said social media was moderately to extremely influential in their opinions of the candidates and issues, nearly two-thirds (63 percent) said the quality of information about the candidates and issues on social media was the same or better than that from traditional media, 40 percent participated in a political discussion with others in their social networks, and 28 percent displayed their political affiliation on their networks.

The big question surrounding this success in the United States seems to be–will the EU experience a similar outbreak in digital campaigning, and when will it happen? The factors that go into this are numerous, and of course, in the EU different countries will feel the impact in different ways.

At the EU level, elections experts have predicted that the “protest” vote will be strong, and nobody likes a protest like social media does. In years of online campaigning, I have always found it easier to get people to stand against something than for it. Not a pretty fact, nor a universal one, but a generally true statement. This could indicate a first role for the use of digital in this campaign–to galvanise the protest vote, or to galvanise some passion in any respect.

Additionally, turnout will be a massive issue, as expectations are low, which means a few votes here or there could drastically affect the outcome, even more so in countries that use an open party list. No place is better to quickly and efficiently rally the base than online. It will be up to the parties to find a way to harness the power of social into votes.

Certainly the former point here about driving emotion will affect the latter of getting voters to show up. There will have to be some galvanising issues, driven through effective storytelling and connection online, to effectively bring people to vote.

The point about storytelling and connection is critical. At a recent event in London about the prospects of a digital election for the EU, consultant and blogger Andy Williamson said that “social media is better for individual politicians rather than party brands.”

I do not necessarily agree with this point. Certainly it has been and it is easier for an individual to harness the power of social into votes. It need not be that way though. The reason politicians are better able to use social media than parties is because inherently politicians have a coherent story to tell. They have a life story, they have clear things they care about, they have a clear “brand.” That resonates with people online. Storytelling is

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the medium most of us connect with online. Memes, which played a key role during the 2012 U.S. campaign, are just very short, inventive, simplified stories. The reason Clint Eastwood talking to an empty chair turned into an online phenomenon in the United States is because of the ways the story was told. #Eastwooding became an instant trending topic, culminating in the President posting a picture of his chair in the West Wing with the caption “this seat’s taken.” Witty, compelling, and simple.

Equally important is relevancy and coherency. Obama understood early on that creating a personal brand was critical to his success. During the 2008 campaign, Americans would instantly cite “hope” and “change” if Obama’s name was brought up. These stories need grounding in simplicity, and they need to be clear in order to be effective.

Parties are inherently bad at telling stories. They have too many of them, and they do not agree on which ones are the most important. There is a reason novels are more often written by a single author than a group. The platform of a party needs to include a multitude of views, and the storytelling and brand are lost. They do not need to be. Of course there are examples across Europe of parties and politicians with a coherent platform and narrative, but on the whole, parties are still not inherently good at connecting through first-person storytelling.

In the European Parliamentary elections, votes are cast for national parties, but these parties then sit in supranational parliamentary groups/coalitions within the European Parliament. This makes the lack of a cohesive narrative on social media even more profound, particularly when compared to the U.S. presidential system, the structure of which helps facilitate digital campaigns.

In an age where politicians are crawling over each other to “get it” online, set up on key platforms, and find any way they can to gain an edge in social media, they often lose sight of what matters. A headcount of social platforms is not going to win an election.

Connecting with people will. A party that can do this will undoubtedly have success in moving the vote in their favour.

It will take a sea change. Parties are not set up this way. Just like companies are reimagining their role with an empowered consumer, parties are going to have to adapt if they want to ride the wave. They will need to simplify, unify, and learn how to tell stories we want to listen to.

The answer to the question of a digital EU election ultimately lies with the parties.

Obama had terabytes of data and a smart team, but more than that, he had a clear story to tell. When parties in the EU are able to become cohesive storytellers, only then will they be able to realise the power of social media. ■

MAY 2014

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Can the EU’s Political Parties Get Out the Vote?

By Philippe Maze-Sencier February 2014

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n 2014, Europe will mark the 100th anniversary of the start of the “Great War”, remembering the tens of millions of lives lost during that conflict. Also, this year more than 300 million Europeans will go to the polls to elect representatives to the European Parliament (EP)—the European Union’s (EU) only directly elected institution. Is there a link between one event and the other, you may ask? As John Feffer, co-director of ‘Foreign Policy In Focus’ recently wrote, “In place of jostling empires, there is [today] the European Union, a modern family beset by the usual bickering but nothing that a smothering bureaucracy can’t handle.” The elections this May could actually be a watershed event, with potentially immense consequences for the continent and beyond.

Institutional changes introduced since the last EP elections, as well as strong external factors—Europe’s current economic situation, disaffection for the ideal of European integration, or international tensions—will most likely result in a very different composition to the EP than in the past.

Past EP elections failed to provide the European Parliament with the popular backing and legitimacy it sought and needed for a strong legislative body. Despite the many reforms implemented since 1979 to enhance its powers and role within the EU’s institutional framework, this has not excited voters, with turn-out falling from 62 percent in 1979 to 43 percent in 2009. Contextually, more than five years of continuing crises—debt and financial crises, austerity measures, slow economic recovery, and high unemployment rates in many EU countries—as well as international turmoil in countries including Libya, Mali, Iran, Syria, and Ukraine, which have divided or side-lined Europe, have unleashed an unprecedented level of distrust and skepticism about “anything EU.” This context may well translate into either a massive rate of abstention or a tsunami of “protest votes,” returning to Strasbourg a strong bloc of nationalistic and populist Euroskeptic lawmakers, with severe ripple effects in Brussels and within individual Member States—or both.

The 2014 election is the first since the institutional changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty significantly enhanced the powers and attributions of the EP, making it the deciding force on the vast majority of EU legislation. More than 40 new sectors now come under the co-decision procedure between Parliament and the Council of Ministers, including agriculture, energy policy, and immigration. The EP now has the final say on the EU budget, and today, roughly 80 percent of national legislation at the Member State level derives from EU legislation. Over the next five years, some of the EP’s committees will decide Europe’s destiny, especially on sizable issues such as the International Trade Committee on the EU-U.S. free trade talks, the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee on the governance of the Euro, and the Civil Liberties Committee on immigration and freedom of movement issues. The Lisbon Treaty brought about another sea change, giving the EP the responsibility to (PDF) “elect the president of the Commission, on the basis of the candidate proposed by the European Council after taking into account the results of the EP elections”. For the first time, albeit indirectly, Europe’s citizens will be able to weigh in on the next Commission’s president.

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This is all the more likely as Europe’s main political parties seem intent on heeding the EP’s 22nd November 2012 resolution, calling on them to “nominate candidates for the presidency of the Commission and [stressing] the importance of reinforcing the political legitimacy of both Parliament and the Commission by connecting their respective elections more directly to the choice of the voters.” Europe’s Socialists have shown the way, nominating Germany’s Martin Schulz, the current president of the EP, to lead the pan-European socialist campaign. Schultz is also running as the socialist candidate for the seat of European Commission President. The Liberals and the Greens have already followed suit while the European centre-right EPP is expected to announce its candidate at its European Elections Congress in Dublin on 6-7 March.

These changes could very well personalize, polarize, and Europeanize the elections. The ongoing economic crisis, the painfully slow recovery, and the austerity policies followed by governments across the EU on “Brussels’ injunction”, have not only cast Europe and the EU at the very heart of national debates, but they have also dramatically changed the very foundations of these debates (PDF) with a “popular perception that the EU is part of the problem and not part of the solution.” Putting forward known or at least recognisable and credible candidates, with clear and concrete proposals laying out different alternatives for Europe, can only be viewed as progress, helping both raise the salience as well as the stakes of the upcoming election. But will Europe’s political parties truly rise to the challenge?

For the first time, we have an EP election where each political family will campaign behind a common, pan-European figurehead. Yet, it is far from certain that the candidates chosen by those very same parties will be up to the task of rebuilding trust in Europe.

In a biting but terribly accurate piece in the French daily Le Figaro, French Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Sylvie Goulard enumerated the skills and qualities that made for a good MEP: competency, focus and dedication to the electoral mandate, and capacity to influence policy and debates back in one’s own member state. She also included fluency in English, the lingua franca of the EU. Ultimately, she concluded that unfortunately these attributes were not necessarily the ones presiding over the choice of MEP candidates in France. Instead, viewing the number of national politicians “recycled” to the EP as either a holding position until better political times at home, an end-of-career reward, or political punishment via eviction from the national political stage. One can fear that Mrs. Goulard’s assessment also holds true beyond the borders of France.

Popular wisdom (and many polls) has it that the 2014 EP elections will see populist parties flourish against the mainstream pro-European political establishment, often perceived and hence blamed for being the root cause of the continent’s dire socio-economic situation—a “spring of discontent,” finding its translation in a large Eurosceptic minority returning to Strasbourg. If so, that would indeed be a watershed event for the EU, sending shivers through both Brussels and throughout its 28 Member States. This, in addition to the state of the economy and the institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, could incentivize both EU critics and supporters to shake off their usual “voter fatigue” and spur them to take to the ballot. Whether Europe’s political parties are able to rise to the challenge, field the right candidates and lead a campaign focused on clear and meaningful policy proposals, concretely addressing the concerns of Europe’s citizens, still remains to be seen.

A century after the start in Sarajevo of one of the world’s bloodiest conflicts, a peaceful and fairly integrated EU will vote in May to return to Strasbourg representatives from its 28 Member States. Whatever the results, this eighth EP election will be very different from all others before it, and one can only hope that Europe’s political parties will finally take it seriously, and that Europe’s citizens will take it to heart. ■ MAY 2014

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EU ELECTIONS: A Thorny Equation for Newly-Appointed French Government

By Carlos Luca de Tena April 2014

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rench President François Hollande has unveiled a new front bench team—a new “government of combat”. Manuel Valls, popular former Minister of Interior and considered a centrist, has been appointed Prime Minister, while Ségolène Royal, former French presidential candidate and President Hollande’s ex-partner, has been given a key cabinet position as Minister of Environment.

This government reshuffle comes as President Hollande seeks to regain initiative after his party’s major setback at local elections. The new team will face the challenge of recapturing voters for the European elections that will take place on May 25th. However, the magnitude of the task at hand for the EU election is too vast, as abstentionism and indifference towards EU policy grows amongst citizens in France.

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS SUBJUGATED TO DOMESTIC POLITICS As in many other European countries, French voters will use this election to express their frustration against their own national government rather than focus on EU issues.

It is still unclear to what extent President Hollande’s government will be punished by voters. Extremist parties such as extreme far-right Front National led by Marine Le Pen are likely to capitalise on abstention and vote polarisation, but it is uncertain if the main opposition party (UMP, right-wing) will benefit from this like it did at the recent local elections.

President Hollande’s task is a tough one. Not only does he need to convince French voters that the reshuffle represents the beginning of a new chapter, but he must also satisfy traditional left-wing voters while adhering to budget-slashing targets set by Brussels. The recent government reshuffle is unlikely to do so since the promotion of Minister Arnaud Montebourg, a protectionist who openly campaigns against austerity policies in Europe, seems rather incompatible with Prime Minister Valls’ announced budget and tax cuts.

The reason why domestic politics are likely to dominate the European Parliament election is because this scrutiny is not perceived by French voters as a key milestone that will allow them to influence the political course of Europe. In fact, very few voters care that this is the first election since the Lisbon Treaty that gave the European Parliament a number of important new powers. Voters neither care nor trust EU institutions, and they see this election as part of an ongoing domestic political cycle involving three consecutive ballots: local in March, European in May, and senatorial in September.

MISTRUST IN SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS RUNS DEEP Currently, only 32 percent of French citizens trust the EU institutional system. The only institutions that enjoy higher levels of confidence are local authorities, such as mu-

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nicipal and regional. One of the reasons for this mistrust and disinterest in EU institutions is the lack of importance French politicians usually give to EU elections. Elections to the European Parliament only count as a means to evaluate each party’s strength in the public opinion.

Likewise, European Affairs Ministers in France are often unknown individuals, and EU matters are usually not given the proper relevance. If key European policy issues such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations have been largely ignored by the public, it is likely because French politicians have made no serious effort to generate debates on these topics. Additionally, the party membership in France is declining and only less than three percent of the electorate has a direct say in who gets selected to run for the European Parliament, so one can understand why voters are so indifferent about EU elections.

French voters perceive these decision-making processes as drifting away from the democratic arena and into elite circles and interest groups. This democratic disorder, once labeled by sociologist Colin Crouch as “post-democracy”, is undoubtedly one of the reasons behind the worrying mistrust in EU institutions and the current abstentionist trend that is leading to vote radicalisation.

The French case is not an isolated one. A similar situation is occurring in Britain, where Eurosceptic Nigel Farage’s Independence Party (UKIP) has established itself as a strong contender, and in the Netherlands, where nationalist Geert Wilders is gaining influence and calling for the Dutch to drop the Euro in favour of the national currency.

Should pro-EU parties such as Hollande’s Socialists fail to generate pan-European policy interest by only putting the spotlight on domestic issues, they will bolster discontent and push voters away. Should they lack the courage to speak openly about EU matters, they will give Eurosceptics and extremist parties the exposure they do not deserve to discuss European issues more prominently in the run up to the elections. Not taking this into consideration may result in yet another costly election for the French Socialists. ■

MAY 2014

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European Parliament Candidates Must Choose Energy and Climate to Be Chosen Themselves

By Julie Kjestrup May 2014

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s the countdown to the European Parliament elections gets shorter, campaign efforts step up amongst MEPs and would-be-MEPs. After voting over 20,000 times in the current parliamentary mandate, on over 35,000 amendments, the final session of the 2009 to 2014 parliamentary mandate was brought to an end on April 17th in Strasbourg. They are now fully in election mode until EU voters go to the polls to elect 751 new MEPs between May 22nd and 25th.

This year, the political transition is not expected to be ”business as usual”. The electoral contest comes at a moment of uncertainty and instability for the European Union, with the effects of the global economic crisis that commenced in 2008 still very much being felt. Over the past five years, EU leaders have strived to prevent a complete collapse of the European single currency, but they have done so at great cost to public finances and personal popularity. A return to real growth still seems some way off. Millions of people across EU Member States have lost their jobs, and public confidence in the EU is severely shaken.

Enter energy and climate change. For a while now, energy and climate has been central to the narrative of MEPs on both sides of the political aisle in terms of how to dig Europe out of its persistent slump. To some, a more ambitious EU energy and climate policy is just what the doctor ordered: it will decrease Europe’s foreign energy dependency, create jobs and make industry more efficient, thus more competitive on a global scale. To others, Europe’s insistence on energy and climate change reforms is one of the things that is hindering growth. For example, many have stated that forcing member states and industry alike to invest in renewable fuel sources and other clean energy solutions is driving up both energy prices and production costs, making it impossible for European manufacturers to compete at anything resembling a level playing field.

However, a range of recent events has propelled energy and climate from being a concern of just a few to a front page issue. From the energy side, the ongoing crisis in Crimea is the most acute. Many EU countries, including Germany, France, and Poland, are reliant on Russian gas and oil, which accounts for one third of all oil and gas imported into the EU. This has highlighted to the public how vulnerable Europe’s energy security is and has resulted in the public demanding a decrease in the EU’s dependence on imported energy. At the same time, seasonably abnormal and adverse weather in many parts of Europe has highlighted once again that climate change is an issue that must be taken seriously, not only from an environmental point of view but also from a societal and financial one as well.

The next European legislature will have the challenging task of redefining the EU climate and energy policy. How to go about this and where to put the emphasis is up for discussion, although sustainability, cost competitiveness, and security of energy supply are guaranteed buzz words. Concretely, the Commission launched a communication on

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the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework in January this year, which EU leaders agreed in March 2014 to decide on in October 2014 at the latest.

And, while MEPs and would-be-MEPs are only now getting into full swing in terms of canvassing voters, others—a long list of interest groups and coalitions, some industrybased and some publicly funded NGOs—have been on the campaign trail full-time for months. For example, Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe, Europe’s largest coalition working on climate and energy issues with over 120 member organisations, has launched a campaign that calls on all MEP candidates to commit to tackling climate change throughout their term of office should they be elected to the European Parliament.

World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Europe has taken a more sweeping approach, asking candidates to “support EU policies which ensure that Europe’s use of natural resources stays within the limits of One Planet.” In addition to that, they ask candidates to pick at least one area from a menu of options where they pledge to actively contribute to the following policy goals to reduce Europe’s ecological footprint: “Do you want to secure clean and healthy waters? Please tick here.” Is the shift to a resource-efficient economy and green jobs more on your mind? Tick here. If none of the options suit, candidates can add their own.

Finally, Renovate Europe, an alliance of trade associations and energy efficiency industry is running the STOP Energy Waste in Buildings, in which it wants MEPs to kick start the economy by pledging to work to put building renovation high on the political agenda.

Come late May, the immediate impact of these many energy and climate change pledges will be made clear. How it will colour the future direction of the EU’s energy and climate change policies, to be debated again by EU Energy Ministers and Heads of State in June remains up for debate. ■

MAY 2014

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EUROPE’S GLOBAL ELECTIONS: A View from Washington

By Dr. Joshua W. Walker May 2014

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ith the European Parliament elections just days away, the mood of the European electorate is anything but celebratory. Having spent much of the young 21st century celebrating Europe’s various achievements, the perennial questions in Brussels and Strasbourg were whether to deepen or widen the European Union. Yet only seven years after Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001, the global financial crisis erupted in the United States and spread to Europe. Today, previously unthinkable scenarios have become common discussion points in Brussels, London and many other European capitals. The question now is not whether the Eurozone will expand to other member states or candidate countries, but whether it will survive the test of time and what the consequences for the European Union will be based on the election results in May. European voters are focused on almost every issue through the prism of economic issues, including concern over a Greek exit from the Eurozone and a British exit from Europe altogether, not to mention the economic consequences of a new state in Scotland or Catalonia. While Europe has been able to avoid disaster and disintegration to date, the crisis has greatly humbled core constituencies; meanwhile others have been empowered and once peripheral players such as Ukraine and Turkey have been made directly relevant to Europe given the global consequences of their association, as seen in Crimea and elections in Turkey. Seen from Washington, European interests seem to be shrinking as British, German, French, and even Polish interests have been emphasized, at their expense over bilateral disputes such as the NSA leaks or shared objectives in trouble spots such as the Middle East or Ukraine. However, even more troubling in the run up to the European elections is the type of anti-European and otherwise dismissive sentiment that can often be heard in Ankara, Cairo, Doha, Riyadh, and even Washington being spouted by candidates toward the very institutions they seek elected office for in Brussels and Strasbourg.

Triggered by global financial crises, as well as deepened by the crisis of the Eurozone and most currently the plight of Ukraine, questions about Western leadership have only increased. Reluctance on the part of the United States to assume its traditional assertive global leadership role in crises from Libya to Syria in the face of rising involvement of Russia, Iran, and China has only exacerbated doubts about the future of the West. In an ironic twist of fate at precisely the moment in which European leadership is being questioned globally, regional actors in the Middle East such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have emerged that will determine the future direction of Egypt and the broader region; these regional actors have been both decried and welcomed as a sign of more engaged partners that could determine the future direction of European foreign policy and Europe as a global or parochial power. As the United States discusses its “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia and Europe continues to be consumed by its own existential crisis, the Middle East remains the key area for trans-Atlantic cooperation and region most affected by European foreign policy.

The so-called “Arab Spring” captured the global imagination and attention of policy makers far more than the “European Fall,” yet the consequences of the revolutions

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that shook the Middle East to its core have been far less understood than the economic slowdown in Europe. While there are many factors including the disposition of current governments in contrast to previous administrations, the greatest impediment for Europe has been its own modesty and lack of imagination and strategic vision for engaging its southern neighbors. Despite having once been a part of the same colonial, Roman, and Mediterranean empires, Europe looks at the Middle East and North Africa as if there is very little to learn from the tragic past that this year commemorates: the centennial of World War I. While Europe has successfully moved beyond the eras of World Wars through painful reconciliation and European integration, it was not able to do this on its own, and it took persistent trans-Atlantic leadership and economic engagement such as the Marshall Plan from America.

At a moment in which American leadership is being questioned and sectarian tensions continue in the Middle East, the timing has never been more opportune to refocus on the core principles and universal values that Europe has championed since the inception of the European Community. Coordination and policy on the Middle East and North Africa continues to affect vital interests far beyond Brussels and Strasbourg that ideally must be synchronized with national interests and societies at large even if there is short-term turbulence between these two. Despite record levels of communication and travel between top leaders in Europe and the Middle East, the societal and institutional connections are still in need of revitalization and strengthening.

The EU is no longer the sole driver of reform in candidate countries such as Turkey, yet it is needed as an anchor and aspiration far beyond its current borders. In fact, the idea of Europe is needed more today than ever before in Turkey and its region, especially in order to encourage the pro-Western business communities that need access to the world’s largest market to pragmatically reform their own societies and systems. These coalitions are now in disarray in almost every single country that the EU once offered partnership to in one form or another. EU mechanisms and partnerships for strengthening civil society and key domestic institutions such as the judiciary, media, military, and parliament in countries from Morocco to Turkey are critical.

Reinvigorating Europe’s relations with the Middle East continues to represent the best guarantee that countries like Turkey have for domestic transformation that will culminate in a standard of democracy that will create a guiding light in the Middle East. The transAtlantic anchor provided through NATO, for example, can inject the Turkish military with the necessary confidence to embark upon reforms. Likewise, in order to fulfill its Middle Eastern promise, Turkey’s EU process must not be allowed to expire. It is not that in the absence of an EU anchor Turkey will morph into the Islamic Republic of Iran. Turkey’s historical and contemporary experiences and specificity, as well as economic, social, and religious make-up and set-up, mean such fears are profoundly misplaced. However, like many of its neighbors—and among more than a few of its EU counterparts—the lure of populism and streaks of intolerance are strong. In fact, the danger is more that a Turkey with no EU prospects comes to resemble an increasingly authoritarian Russia.

Similarly, as its Arab and Muslim neighbors watch how Turkey is treated in its European Union bid, this process is seen as a proxy for how engaged Europe will be in its own “near abroad.” Russia has already demonstrated to the world its “commitment” to its near abroad by its actions in Crimea; so the question for Europe is, will it respond by being a critical partner for its southern neighbors or close itself off as a fortress? European voters will decide for themselves on May 22nd as the world watches. ■

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Facing Inward: A UK Perspective on the EU Election

By Keir Ferguson May 2014

T

he date of the European election in the UK on May 22nd is fast approaching.

But with less than a month before voters go to the polls, the European Parliament’s optimistic slogan for the 2014 election—“This time it’s different”—appears to ring hollow in the UK. The slogan gives a nod to the fact that voters will, for the first time, be able to select their candidates for the post of European Commission President. However, public awareness of this is running low, an illustration of the wider climate of indifference which surrounds the election. In this context, the slogan, “plus ça change” might be more apposite.

It is a measure of the level of popular disillusionment with politics and the EU in particular in the UK that the parties’ European election campaigns were launched last week with little fanfare. What limited interest there was focused on the unveiling of the UK Independence Party’s (Ukip) election advertising campaign, whose distinctly antiimmigration flavour drew criticism from many quarters and prompted Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg into calling on pro-Europeans to unite against the “anti-Europe establishment” led by the party’s leader, Nigel Farage.

And well might he do so, with few other leading politicians daring to follow his lead.

Shorn of unity or coherence, the pro-European cause is distinctly lacking a sense of purpose. In stark contrast, Ukip’s star is appreciably on the rise. Though the party has no elected Members of Parliament at Westminster, it has performed strongly at EU elections over the past decade and looks set to easily break its record set at the last EU election in 2009, when it polled 16.5 percent of the vote. Because of this, the achievements of Mr. Farage, whose party pre-election polls suggest may push the Conservative Party into third place and perhaps even leapfrog the Labour Party into first place, are likely to be the main story of the upcoming election.

THE RISE OF LITTLE ENGLANDERS It may be surprising to think that a party whose leader has publically declared his admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin, praising the Russian President’s handling of the crisis in Syria, looks set to do so well in the European election. The reasons for Ukip’s popularity can be found in its success in framing a narrative that appeals to disenchanted voters. The party is adept at speaking to their concerns, whatever they may be. Some might call this tactic populist—especially when it comes to the views Mr. Farage espouses on immigration—but it is certainly providing to be effective.

One important factor Ukip is feeding on is the widespread scale of Euroscepticism in the UK. Because of this, the upcoming election has spurred discussion not about the parties’ European policies, as one might expect, but rather the UK’s position in the EU. If the election is fought on this battleground, then the chances of Ukip being successful are tilted in its favour. Ukip is the only party campaigning on a ticket of British withdrawal

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from the UK, leaving it best placed to hoover up the votes of those who are convinced its interests are best served outside.

That Mr. Farage has a strong hand to play here was illustrated by the decisive victory that he recently scored over Mr. Clegg—the only mainstream party leader who has yet been prepared to mount a strident pro-European defence—in two recently televised debates on the UK’s membership of the EU. It is an accepted truth that it is easier to make the complex case in defence of the status quo than to make the simple demand to withdraw, but there is no doubt that Mr. Clegg’s pro-European plea singularly failed to capture the popular imagination.

Mr. Farage is also taking full advantage of a distrust of politicians in general. Despite his privileged upbringing, former career as a City banker and record of unsuccessfully running to become a Member of Parliament as many as six times, Mr. Farage has been successful in portraying Ukip as an insurgent movement that is taking on the Westminster elite thanks to his straight-talking style and cigarette-smoking and lager-drinking external profile. This is attracting the backing of wealthy landowners and working-class voters alike, taking votes away from both the Conservatives and Labour.

THE ROAD TO 2015 Whatever the election’s outcome, how well both the Conservative and Labour parties fare will be held up as evidence of whether Prime Minister David Cameron and opposition leader Ed Miliband are currently guiding their respective flocks in the right direction; to electoral success or oblivion? A bad result would make the course ahead plotted by either leader going into the next general election, due to take place on May 7, 2015, more difficult. If the Tories are pushed into third place by Ukip then the Prime Minister may be forced to lurch to the right, taking a tougher line on issues such as immigration, in order to placate disgruntled Conservative backbenchers worried about the prospect of losing their seats. Equally, a setback for Labour would be interpreted as a rejection of Mr. Miliband’s own personal brand, undermining his leadership credentials, and, by implication, chances of becoming the next Prime Minister.

However, anyone looking to draw definitive clues from this election about the likely outcome of the next general election is likely to be disappointed. The reality is that the impact of the election is likely to be short-lived. Many Conservatives will no doubt take solace from the fact that European elections have not historically had major consequences for subsequent general elections. Parties without representation in the House of Commons have averaged a joint share of 24 percent of the European election vote since 1999, but only 4 percent of the general election vote. As such, the electoral threat of Ukip may seem fear less menacing by the time next May comes along.

A CALL TO ACTION But that is not to completely starve the election of significance. Voters have not yet gone to the polls, but the election has once again served to underline the UK public’s feeling of detachment from the EU project. Sceptical about how the EU’s work translates into tangible benefits that affect their daily lives, many voters are perhaps unsurprisingly dubious about the importance of the UK’s membership of the EU. This election should therefore be heeded as a wake-up call for Europhiles in the UK. Mr. Clegg may not have prevailed in his television debates with Mr. Farage, but pro-Europeans should seize the opportunity to build on his high-profile defence of the advantages of EU membership. It is time for those in the other mainstream parties who are in favour of Britain’s EU membership to join him in making this argument, and with more vehemence, to ensure it does not fall on deaf ears. If the costs of UK withdrawal from the EU are so great in terms of trade and MAY 2014

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jobs, then Europhiles can no longer afford the luxury of navel-gazing.

If the EU does not want Britain to fall out of its grasp, then European political leaders should be jolted into action, too. The weakest point in Mr. Clegg’s argument during the televised debates came when he was asked to comment on what the EU will look like in ten years’ time. He was unable to muster a convincing response that underscored the EU’s commitment to reform and evolve from its current form, which is not held in high esteem by a large number of UK voters. It is noticeable that the pace of reform in the EU has slowed to glacial pace in the wake of the Cypriot banking crisis last year. European political leaders need to rediscover their appetite for reform, as failure to do so will severely hamper the efforts on those in the UK arguing in favour of EU membership.

Pro-Europeans in the UK will be fighting a futile rear-guard action if they are forced to make the case at a time when a cloud of doubt looms over fundamental questions, such as whether the 18 countries in the Eurozone wish to integrate further, and, if so, how those countries outside the Eurozone, will be protected in a two speed Europe.

The message that will be sent out by the success of Ukip in this European election is loud and clear. If the warning signs are ignored, then the UK public may be reduced to a position of onlookers in the next European election, particularly as the Conservatives have promised voters a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU if they win the next general election outright. Now that would be a real departure; something truly ‘different.’ ■

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