NATO 2023 Vilnius Summit

2023 COMMEMORATIVE EDITION

NATO 2023

THE HIGH STAKES OF THE VILNIUS SUMMIT

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SPECIAL SERIES EDITOR JEREMY FUGLEBERG

MANAGING EDITOR SHANE SZARKOWSKI

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THOMAS PLANT IAN RALBY MIROSLAW ROZANSKI ETHAN SAGER LAURA THOMAS PRESLAV TONKOV

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N ATO SU MMI T I J U LY 2023

Welcome

Shane Szarkowski Managing Editor

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he NATO Summit this year is getting a lot of attention. In years past, it was mostly a specific subset of foreign policy enthusiasts who paid attention to the summit. This one is different.

For years, if there was any public debate about the identity and future of NATO, that debate mostly revolved around whether the alliance should continue to exist at all. That’s unfortunate but you can understand. Two of the three most high-profile operations NATO has been involved in since the end of the Cold War—Kosovo and Afghanistan—were bad for NATO credibility in the popular imagination, regardless of how well or poorly the alliance performed in those operations. The question of NATO credibility was further complicated in the last decade by a trend within the West of turning inward and away from multilateralism.

Today, the threat environment in which NATO operates has evolved in a frightening way, and that’s caught the popular attention. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the obvious evolution, but it’s not the only one. China’s shift to a more threatening posture matters to NATO. And perhaps most significantly, cyber warfare has become a true asymmetric threat that, at its most threatening, endangers the foundations of our democratic institutions through disinformation and targeted attacks on key civil, private, and public infrastructure.

The shifting threat environment hasn’t taken NATO by surprise, and the alliance has been working for years to be future ready.

What was lacking previously was not the realization, but real political support for a rejuvenated alliance.

Here we are today. Suddenly NATO matters in the popular mindset, so there’s the possibility of enough combined political will to support a more vital and effective NATO to meet tomorrow’s needs.

Diplomatic Courier partnered with the Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies (CoD) for this special edition in part because they are thinking boldly about how to use this newfound political will to strengthen NATO. Perhaps the most fundamental shift in today’s threat environment is

conceptual. Can democracies show resolve and solidarity in the face of continuous, multi-faceted, and often asymmetric aggression?

Can our democratic institutions remain resilient in the face of cyberattacks not just on critical institutional infrastructure but on the very hearts and minds of the most fundamental unit of a democracy—the voter?

What can, and should, NATO be doing to secure our democracies?

The question of whether and how NATO should encourage and support democratic governance is only one of a host of pressing questions facing the alliance.

Diplomatic Courier and CoD asked our networks of experts to consider that question along with two others. These are how NATO should steer its future relations with Ukraine and/or Russia and whether/how NATO should seek to become a more proactive player globally.

In all three questions, the conceptual has become as pressing a question as more traditional questions of force structure and doctrine.

The future of NATO is about security, but it’s also about how we conceptualize security and how we go about most effectively and ethically pursuing our security goals. It’s critical that we make the right choices.

We hope this collection of articles and analyses help you think about what those right choices might look.

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Contents N ATO SU MMI T I J U LY 2023

05 I Introduction: Imagining the NATO We Deserve By: Shane C. Szarkowski

08 I In Vilnius, 2% for Defense and 100% for Democracy By: Thomas E. Garrett

12 I The High Stakes of NATO’s Vilnius Summit By: Carl Bildt

16 I NATO’s Leadership Faces Tougher Audience Outside Its Membership By: Ethan Sager and Preslav Tonkov

20 I How NATO Can Reinvent Media Literacy By: Thomas Plant

24 I Fostering a NATO Cyber Civil Society Through Prevention and Resiliency By: Christopher Jackson

28 I Accurate Timekeeping At Risk Within NATO By: Laura Thomas

30 I NATO’s Post-Ukraine War Identity Still a Question By: Thibault Muzergues

34 I Envisioning Youth as the Driver of Transatlantic Security By: Daryna Onyshko

38 I Pathways for Ukraine’s Long-Term Security By: Joshua Huminski

42 I NATO Expansion Should Mean Sharing NATO’s Experience Throughout the World By: Ian Ralby

46 I Protecting the State from the Army, Protecting the Army from Politicians By: Miroslaw Rozanski

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National Gallery of Art in Vilnius, Lithuania.

Photo by Robert Noreiko via Unsplash.

In Vilnius, 2% for Defense and 100% for Democracy

By Thomas E. Garrett 8 | D I PLOM AT I C COU RIE R

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ounded with a commitment to democratic values, NATO today finds interoperability in shared democratic governance as much as through technical compatibility in weapons systems. The parties to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty united to “… safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”

As its member states gather in July 2023 in Vilnius, the NATO alliance is firm in opposing the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine and attack on the international rules-based order. NATO is also expanding because of another critical component of its mission: unity through democratic values.

Research commissioned by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 2017 shows that more than any other system of governance, democracy delivers security. Publicly accountable governments rarely start wars, while regimes that run roughshod over their people are indifferent to other peoples’ rights.

This principle of democratic governance and its effect on security and peace is evident in the example found in the first meeting of the Community of Democracies, in Poland in 2000. Among the 106 nations gathered then that went on to adopt the 19 principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the Community’s founding document, the Warsaw Declaration, were the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Yet almost immediately, the paths taken by Moscow and Kyiv diverged sharply. Vladimir Putin tightened his chokehold over Russia through years of worsening autocracy and wars in Chechnya and Georgia. The route taken

by Ukraine, despite starts and stops in the 23 years since, sought adherence to the Warsaw Declaration and has led it to Vilnius and potentially an eventual, well-deserved NATO membership.

Shortly after I was elected Secretary General of the Community of Democra-

RESEARCH COMMISSIONED BY FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT IN 2017 SHOWS THAT MORE THAN ANY OTHER SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY DELIVERS SECURITY. cies in 2017, a foreign minister in Eastern Europe asked me if I thought democratic principles were themselves an adequate foundation for a democratic alliance. His obvious doubt was well taken at a time of growing acrimony between the U.S. and NATO allies on budgets and other issues.

Today, some 500+ days into Russia’s war, I find significantly less doubt that values such as human rights and democracy belong in security and foreign policy discussions. This point was made to me very recently, in a June 2023 discussion with a foreign minister whose country meets the NATO 2% defense spending threshold, as he cited Bucha, mass child abductions, and the catastrophic attacks on civilian infrastructure as reasons democratic nations in Europe needed to support Ukraine.

Solidarity activist Professor Bronislaw Geremek, speaking at the time as Poland’s foreign minister, said in 2000 “… that democracy is by no means a process that goes from triumph to triumph.”

This has been true for NATO member states over its seven decades of existence.

Populism and isolationism are two of the threats which has brought home the challenge of a lack of mechanism to sanction internal backsliding. It is true electoral change occurs in democratic countries, bringing course corrections in policy, and this is accurate within NATO member states.

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THE VILNIUS SUMMIT IS A CRITICAL TIME TO ADDRESS THE VULNERABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS THROUGH THE FINALIZATION OF STEPS THAT ESTABLISH THE CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE WITHIN NATO HQ.

NATO Headquarters. Photo via Adobe Stock.

One specific means for NATO to accomplish its task of collective security is to encourage democracy within and outside the organization. “Two percent GDP for defense and 100% for democracy” was Secretary Madeleine Albright’s message for NATO countries in a note to me following one of her always-impactful visits to Europe a few years ago. The Vilnius Summit is a critical time to address the vulnerability of organizations through the finalization of steps that establish the Centre for Democratic Resilience within NATO HQ. Based on the ever-present danger to democracy, Geremek said the best means of addressing democratic erosion was for democracies to support one another through best practices and lessons learned. The proposed Centre for Democratic Resilience, on the agenda for the Vilnius Summit, is precisely this style of voluntary, non-prescriptive support that is required.

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NATO and its military are critical in resisting the corrosive erosion of the rule of law that Europe and the world encounter today. In that same vein, it is the civilian aspect and perspective on military actions that is necessary for individuals to understand the key principles of the Warsaw Declaration to integrate them into dayto-day actions and utilize them beyond their written principles. ***** About the author: Thomas E. Garrett is Secretary General of the Community of Democracies, an intergovernmental coalition founded in 2000 by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek.

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The High Stakes of NATO’s Vilnius Summit

By Carl Bildt 12 | D I PLOM AT I C COU RIE R

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ith NATO’s mid-July summit in Vilnius fast approaching, the question on everyone’s mind is how to avoid another debacle concerning Ukraine’s prospective membership in the alliance. When NATO leaders addressed the same issue in Bucharest 15 years ago, they failed to reach a credible agreement about how to address Ukraine and Georgia’s aspirations for membership. We have all been living with the consequences.

THE QUESTION OF NATO MEMBERSHIP IS NO LONGER HIGHLY DIVISIVE IN UKRAINE. PUTIN’S WAR OF AGGRESSION HAS FULLY UNITED THE COUNTRY IN SUPPORT OF IT.

In the run-up to the 2008 summit, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili persuaded U.S. President George W. Bush that NATO membership was the best option for their countries. Bush, in turn, promised that he would deliver a NATO decision in Bucharest. It didn’t end well. French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel were hostile to the idea, arguing that Ukraine and Georgia were not ready for membership, and that one should not risk alienating Russia.

become members, it hastened to add that accession would not happen then and there. The door to future membership appeared to have been opened, both fanning the flames in Russia and inflating the hopes of those who supported the idea.

The first point was undoubtedly valid with respect to Ukraine, not least because large segments of Ukrainian society firmly opposed to NATO membership.

It had been only a decade since NATO bombs fell on Belgrade, so the question of joining the alliance was still highly divisive. Had membership been put to a referendum, it is unclear what Ukrainian voters would have decided.

Obviously, Russia, too, opposed the idea. Russian President Vladimir Putin made that clear when he joined the summit (these were different times) and delivered a speech essentially denying Ukrainian statehood. The audience was stunned, but he has stuck unwaveringly to that position for years.

In the event, NATO leaders forged a compromise that represented the worst of all possible worlds. While the alliance made clear that Georgia and Ukraine ought to

Yet neither side had any real foundation for believing what it did. NATO’s fuzzy compromise did not really pose a threat to Russia because it did not really bring Ukraine and Georgia materially closer to membership. Until Putin’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine maintained a policy of neutrality vis-àvis Russia and NATO. Nonetheless, the legacy of NATO’s Bucharest debacle has remained a burden to the alliance ever since. Now that there is a renewed push for Ukrainian membership, the issue will take center stage in Vilnius. The situation has changed profoundly since 2014. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year has rendered fears of provoking the Kremlin moot, and the question of NATO membership is no longer highly divisive in Ukraine. Putin’s war of aggression has fully united the country in support of it.

Still, the politics of the issue are no less complicated than they were 15 years ago.

Plenty of policymakers in Washington and other Western capitals are wary of bringing Ukraine into the alliance too quickly.

It remains unlikely that two-thirds of U.S. Senators are prepared to ratify NATO NATO SUMMIT 2023 | 13

membership for Ukraine in the run-up to the 2024 presidential election. The problem is not only that some Republicans oppose a “blank check” for Ukraine; it is that Joe Biden’s administration and congressional Democrats will not want to hand Donald Trump a useful issue with which to support his “America First” re-election bid.

Moreover, NATO membership for Ukraine arguably is not the most pressing issue at the moment. While the prospect of the U.S. deploying troops to the frontline battlefield of Bakhmut is a long way off, maintaining a strong, consistent flow of military and financial support to Ukraine is urgent and fully achievable as long as there is political will for it. In the months ahead, concrete support will be far more useful to Ukraine than formal commitments on paper.

Nonetheless, the trauma of Bucharest will hang over this year’s summit. Many of NATO’s Eastern European members feel strongly that now is the time to correct past mistakes and flesh out the vague, unspecified promise that was offered 15 years ago. Another Buchareststyle debacle, they warn, would haunt the alliance for years to come.

In the end, the wordsmiths will have to produce a solution that provides a clear path to Ukrainian membership even as it falls short of immediate accession. Unlike in 2008, there can no longer be any doubt that membership will come one day. Ukraine’s security is key to European stability, and that will remain the case for decades. Resisting aggression and safeguarding Europe are the reasons why NATO was created in the first place. At stake in Vilnius is not just Ukraine’s future but also that of the alliance. ***** About the author: Carl Bildt is a former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2023.

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NATO’s Leadership Faces Tougher Audience Outside Its Membership

By Ethan Sager and Preslav Tonkov

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he road to Vilnius, Lithuania, for the annual NATO summit has been a rough one. Grappling with extreme geopolitical challenges related to the war in Ukraine and the enlargement of its membership, NATO’s performance is under intense scrutiny worldwide.

Gallup’s first global measure of perceptions of the organization’s leadership in 2022 showed that across 138 countries, median global approval of NATO’s leadership stood at 34%. Slightly fewer worldwide disapproved (30%) of the alliance, but a high percentage (27%) also did not have an opinion—which speaks to NATO’s relatively limited visibility outside of its membership.

Among NATO member countries, median approval of the alliance’s leadership in

2022 stood at a robust 64%. In contrast, approval was half as high among nonmember nations, with median approval sitting at 31% among non-member states, and just as many disapproving (31%) or lacking an opinion (31%).

Sweden’s bid is hampered by NATO’s collective security principle that allows members, such as Türkiye, to veto expansion. Ankara’s opposition stems from Stockholm’s backing of Kurdish groups linked to the 2016 coup attempt. Despite having one of the lowest approval ratings of NATO’s leadership among members (20%), Türkiye maintains a flexible foreign policy, balancing relationships for its strategic benefit.

The politics of Ukraine’s bid for membership will likely follow a similar pattern with bargaining between self-interested

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RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE LAST YEAR HAS STIRRED PRO-NATO SENTIMENTS IN HISTORICALLY NEUTRAL EUROPEAN CAPITALS AND EXPANSION IS SEEN AS A MEANS TO BOLSTER THE ALLIANCE.

parties. As expressed by former SecretaryGeneral Anders Fogh Rasmussen in a conversation with Politico, the summit presents an “excellent opportunity to invite Ukraine to start the final negotiations on joining NATO.” The alignment of the U.S. with this ambition remains pivotal. The pro-membership faction, spearheaded by the United Kingdom, Poland and the Baltic states, faces the task of swaying Washington toward their accelerated timeline.

The majority of Ukrainians (54%) approved of NATO’s leadership, underscoring the fact that many Ukrainians believe that the alliance can do more to help them stop Russia. The majority of Ukrainians (64%) also expect their country will join the organization in the next 10 years.

NATO vs the Rest Beyond Europe, the dividing lines between members who want NATO to do more and those who want it to double down on existing commitments will likely stir debate 18 | D I PLOM AT I C COURIE R

in Vilnius. Before Russia disrupted the European security architecture, the purpose of NATO was being questioned. The pivot to Asia of the de facto leader of NATO, the U.S., raised questions about the relevance of the alliance beyond its historical European core. In France, where 61% approve of NATO, President Emmanuel Macron recently expressed opposition to NATO’s proposal of creating an office in Tokyo, asserting that the transatlantic security alliance should maintain its focus on its original geographic area of concern— the North Atlantic region.

This tension will likely raise questions about the purpose of NATO in the 21st century. In the 1990s, its out-of-area operations in the Balkans were seen by China as problematic in line with Beijing’s traditional stance on sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. The contrasting views of Kosovans and Serbians who were on the opposing ends of the conflict highlight

N ATO SU MMI T I J U LY 2023

the legitimacy issues which plague NATO beyond its borders.

Bottom Line In the future, regional security may shift to the periphery of NATO’s focus, making way for a different concern: the ascendant power of China. Whoever occupies the White House in 2025 will likely set the pace of this possible strategic transition. In such a scenario, Poland, where support for NATO’s leadership is high at 81%, combined with its increasing military power can take a more prominent role in regional security.

Regardless, just as the location of this year’s summit in Vilnius is symbolic of NATO’s collective stance against Russia, next year’s summit, in Washington DC, could send a different geopolitical message entirely. *****

Survey Methods: Results for the 2022 approval ratings are based on nationally representative, probability-based samples among the adult population, aged 15 and older, in 138 countries and areas throughout 2022. Interviews took place over the telephone and in person.

For results based on the total sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error ranges from ±1.2 to ±5.6 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.

The margin of error reflects the influence of data weighting. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

About the authors: Ethan Sager is a research coordinator for Gallup.

Preslav Tonkov is a consulting associate at Gallup.

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Photo via Adobe Stock.

How NATO Can Reinvent Media Literacy

By Thomas Plant

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edia literacy has regrettably become a hollow buzzword in policy discussions, and for good reason: Governments frequently pledge media literacy to sidestep implementing internet regulations, and regardless of their content, media education resources––like videos and graphic novels—often end up being exploited for political gain.

In spite of these shortcomings, addressing the information disorder in democracies is a matter of significant concern, and media literacy, when implemented properly, holds the key to the solution. NATO, with its extensive organizational capacity and global reach, has the potential to implement proper media literacy initiatives.

But to succeed, NATO must accurately grasp the nature of the problem and design programs that incorporate strategic communications.

The challenge is better characterized as trust versus distrust rather than fact versus fiction. In fact, many people believe in subversive content or conspiracies not because of the accuracy of the content, but simply because they deviate from the consensus. This problem is increasingly affecting the NATO alliance as the rise of populist movements questions the legitimacy and motives of institutions, mainstreaming baseless political claims.

Conceptualizing the information disorder in this way highlights the shortcomings of the media literacy space. The general population lacks the necessary time, institutional support, and often the willingness to engage in this type of learning––whether from intimidation of the ever-evolving tech landscape or their opposition to institutions who try to teach fact checking.

At this rate, another fact-checking website or online module may not be worth the investment.

Instead, NATO has a unique opportunity to deploy media literacy in a way that addresses the type of conspiratorial thinking that undermines democracies. Media

MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE IN SUBVERSIVE CONTENT OR CONSPIRACIES NOT BECAUSE OF THE ACCURACY OF THE CONTENT, BUT SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY DEVIATE FROM THE CONSENSUS. literacy, in many ways, is a race to keep up with evolving challenges. Democracies require a two-pronged approach: 1) providing media literacy education to children on the latest tech, and 2) implementing targeted communications for adults who may lack sufficient media literacy capabilities.

Through these efforts, the goal would be to equip children with the skills to master media in a way that allows them to think for themselves.

The initial step involves teaching children whose worldviews have not yet calcified, and they are eager to explore and embrace the latest technological advancements. The objective here is to provide children with the necessary tools to navigate media independently and develop critical thinking abilities. By doing so, they can become adept at effectively utilizing media while retaining their individual thinking capacities.

NATO has the capability to allocate resources towards media literacy initiatives targeting youth, an area that often goes unnoticed and receives insufficient funding. Leveraging its distinct advantage as an international organization, NATO can utilize its institutional capacity to identify, finance, and guide partner institutions across various countries in implementing standardized educational programs. This coordinated approach ensures uniformity and maximizes the impact of media literacy efforts on a broader scale.

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Photo via Adobe Stock.

In fact, NATO already has a pre-existing framework for this purpose: the Building Integrity action plan. This initiative encompasses a network of partner institutions spanning NATO allies and partner countries, facilitating coordination with local organizations.

ter the deceptive efforts of those contributing to democratic backsliding within the alliance. By leveraging the expertise and resources of the Center, NATO can enhance its ability to combat misinformation and maintain the integrity of democratic institutions.

But education isn’t foolproof. Some children will struggle to learn media literacy.

And even for those who gain these skills, their education will gradually lose its impact as technology evolves.

Adopting a whole-of-society approach is indeed the right course of action. However, uncoordinated experimentation runs the risk of forfeiting the benefits of organizational learning, particularly when it involves experimentation across countries and in different languages. In this regard, NATO is well-positioned to bridge this gap and provide the necessary coordination. Leveraging its unique capabilities, NATO can facilitate knowledge sharing, foster collaboration, and ensure effective implementation of media literacy initiatives on a multinational scale.

This shift is where NATO can adopt a second prong to its media literacy strategy.

This involves implementing strategic communication targeted at older populations who may be resistant or unable to acquire new skills. To do so, NATO can resort to technologically unsophisticated means.

Direct and regular communication from charismatic individuals who represent democratic institutions can help to cut through information confusion and maintain a line of trust with aging populations.

Naturally, The NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence is best suited for this role. As an entity separate from the NATO Command Structure, it provides a platform for leaders who can engage with individuals in a more impartial manner.

These spokespeople can effectively coun22 | D IPLOM AT I C COU RIE R

***** About the author: Thomas Plant is an analyst at Valens Global and supports the organization’s work on domestic extremism. He is also an incoming Fulbright research scholar to Estonia and the co-founder of William & Mary’s DisinfoLab, the nation’s first undergraduate disinformation research lab.

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Fostering a NATO Cyber Civil Society Through Prevention and Resiliency

By Christopher Jackson

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ver the last thirty years, technology has rapidly advanced in both sophistication and proliferation. This has created a vast digital landscape where governments interact, militaries conduct operations, citizens access critical services, and where civil society collaborates.

These opportunities in the new landscape have helped save lives, share important information across borders in real-time, and give people a voice where they may not have had one. Unfortunately, this new digital landscape has also been infiltrated and exploited by malicious state and nonstate actors.

NATO’s Cyber Challenges While attacks on Critical Infrastructure (CI) and military installations have always been a priority for NATO, the rise of misinformation and disinformation campaigns and tactics has brought the effects of cyber malice to the doorstep of democracy. To complicate these issues further, emerging technologies, particularly Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data, make combating these disinformation and misinformation attacks against democratic institutions more difficult for allies.

The challenges that NATO and the transatlantic community face today have shifted from that of decades past. The alliance can continue to evolve and innovate how it conducts actions, communicates, and interacts internally and with external partners in the new cyber world of today.

A major part of this evolution involves fostering a robust and aware cyber civil society across the alliance. A vibrant civil society, especially in the digital world, is one of the major barometers of a healthy democracy.

Malicious state actors such as Russia threaten this barometer, and thus the health of democracies across the alliance.

Russia’s latest aggression against Ukraine has also involved many cyber-attacks against both CI and civil society. While in Ukraine, signs of software disabling critical

THERE ARE NO TRADITIONAL FRONT LINES IN THE WORLD OF DIGITAL WARFARE. THERE ARE FEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THOSE ARE RARELY FOLLOWED BY MALICIOUS ACTORS. services such as medical care were discovered, across the alliance, Russia’s disinformation campaigns have begun in earnest. In Germany for example, there has been a sharp uptick of activity in proRussian websites, controlled media activity, and pro-Kremlin social media accounts.

All of these tactics are aimed at swaying public opinion against Ukraine. This is an explicit attack on democracy with cyber propaganda that continues to be constant and aiming to confuse.

NATO has made significant progress at strengthening its cybersecurity posture, both preventatively and in response to increased aggression from malicious state actors. Since its first cyber defense policy released in 2008, NATO has continued to improve how it prioritizes actions and engages in collaborations with allies. 2018 was a major milestone with the implementation of a strategy to integrate lessons from cyber effects into new operations by openly sharing between alliance members and allies. One of the most recent—and relevant to a cyber civil society—was the launch of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) in 2021. This program brings together technology disruptors, cybersecurity innovators, endusers, and others involved in emerging technologies. It is a major step in NATO’s extending its collaboration with those outside the immediate defense sphere.

This is imperative to improving cybersecurity through knowledge, understanding, and thus, prevention.

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Strengthening Cyber Civil Society to Protect Democracy Prevention is a major facet of why it is important to have a strong and active cyber civil society. There are no traditional front lines in the world of digital warfare.

There are few rules of engagement and those are rarely followed by malicious actors. Outside of warfare, this applies to the democratic institutions and organizations that operate within the NATO community.

NATO’s military protects its democracies from physical attack. It is the civil society of the transatlantic community that will protect its democracies from these more nebulous attacks, particularly with regard to disinformation and misinformation.

There are several areas that NATO and its allies can begin to consider to help strengthen its cyber civil society against malicious cyber interference, just as it strengthens its borders against kinetic, conventional aggression. Focusing on these areas will drive transparency and increase knowledge across the information environment, mitigate the proliferation of disinformation, support independent monitoring of actors and tactics, and encourage collaboration and responsibility on cybersecurity across the alliance.

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In the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, NATO declared its intent to intensify efforts to counter disinformation in addition to its work against malicious cyber activities. In NATO’s Two Track Model, “understanding the information environment” is one of the two main tracks that combats disinformation. The other being “engage.” The first track has helped to ensure disinformation does not disrupt military operations, particularly when it comes to troop movements. NATO could leverage this same model in the civilian sphere. “Understand and Engage” provides a powerful model for real-time cyber intelligence. Although a real-time model may not be feasible, the fundamental idea will support a growing cyber civil society.

“Understand and Engage” for Cyber Civil Society A continued investment of resources between NATO allies and industry leaders can be used for community learning sessions. These lessons can cover best practices and safety measures around digital services and disinformation. These sessions can provide “living” (almost realtime) updated materials for civil society organizations around the alliance. NATO can leverage relationships and information from DIANA, along with additional multi-

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Photo via Adobe Stock.

stakeholder efforts to support development of training for communities to identify and track disinformation.

This allows for a consistent flow of information between community allies, which ensures that no one is left in the dark.

This is especially relative to Ukraine as it begins reconstruction of its institutions.

It strengthens the links of NATO’s cyber chain, so enemies have a harder time finding a weak area to exploit. Most importantly, it is based on key tenets of a democracy by exercising the promotion of digital accountability, transparency, and collaboration through this cyber civil society lens.

In addition to prevention, understanding and engagement also help build resilience in a cyber civil society. In NATO military terms, cyber resiliency concerns the ability to reestablish critical infrastructure and services following an attack. Again, this is important for ensuring that civil society organizations are able to function and provide their services following an attack.

There is no longer a question of if you will be breached, but when. However, better understanding and more consistent engagement across allies and partners means that if an organization is targeted, allies, independent monitors, and other civil society organizations—facilitated by NATO—can ensure no

permanent damage occurs. This is important to keeping the alliance’s governance institutions and supporting organizations available to those that need them, this is necessary for keeping democracy stable and strong in cyberspace.

NATO has been a global leader in the realm of cybersecurity for nearly two decades.

While it continues to serve at the frontlines of the major conflict between Russia and Ukraine, it is also playing a major role in the war in cyberspace between Russia and other malicious actors. It can continue to serve in this capacity by extending its support to fostering a cyber civil society that spans across the alliance and to allies outside of it. This can serve as a model for others as well as support stronger connections and communication with external partners. A focus on prevention and resilience in developing materials and supporting collaboration across organizations is not only helpful for global democracy, but necessary for it in the digital landscape of today as well as what is on the horizon. ***** About the author: Christopher Jackson is a strategic cybersecurity expert who has advised CISA, international governments, Fortune 500 companies, and nonprofits.

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Accurate Timekeeping At Risk Within NATO

By Laura Thomas

Photo by Sahin Sezer Dincer via Unsplash.

A

Ukrainian soldier, Instagram influencer, stock trader— even you, as a reader of an online article—all share a common reliance on an “invisible utility” that most everyone takes for granted: time. Accurate, measurable, indispensable time.

Accurate timekeeping is at the heart of civil and military navigation systems, power grids, the financial sector, communications networks, and the everyday smartphone user’s ability to coordinate a meet-up at the local pub with friends.

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), like the Global Positioning System (GPS) in North America and Galileo in Europe, depend on highly accurate atomic clocks to maintain precise timing. These atomic clocks serve as a consistent and reliable 28 | D IPLOM AT I C COU RIE R

time reference crucial for properly operating various contemporary networks and systems. This timing service essentially is provided free via GNSS signals to commercial users, and both government and commercial users have become reliant on easy and reliable access to “time as a service.”

Time and Security Vulnerabilities Yet, GPS is a single point of failure and vulnerable to hacking, spoofing, and denial of service attacks. A disruption to timing “truth” would be catastrophic in terms of national and economic security.

It is estimated that an outage of GPS in the U.S. alone would cost over $1 billion per day. Repeatedly, we see the ability of state and non-state actors to disrupt GPS, most vividly highlighted in Russia’s use of electronic warfare and GPS-denial across

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NATO COUNTRIES MUST JOIN TOGETHER TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE UNINTERRUPTED ACCESS TO “TIMING TRUTH” OR RISK EXTREME DISRUPTION BOTH ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND IN OUR DAILY INTERCONNECTED LIVES AND ECONOMIES. portions of Eastern Europe and Ukraine.

Time has become both Athena’s sword and an Achilles’ heel. NATO countries must join together to have the opportunity to ensure uninterrupted access to “timing truth” or risk extreme disruption both on the battlefield and in our daily interconnected lives and economies.

Securing GNSS Through Quantum Devices Fortunately, there are solutions for addressing this critical point of failure. One of the most promising is through quantum devices, which represent the next generation of computers, telecom (6G), sensors, and life science devices that take advantage of quantum physics to increase their functionality exponentially. Unlike semiconductor-based devices that are facing a projected end to Moore’s Law (2x better every two years), quantum devices represent an entirely new era in technology, driving scalability in existing data infrastructure and creating entirely new industries and market opportunities.

When most people hear the term quantum, they instantly think of quantum computing. And while quantum computing likely will transform the world in ways we cannot imagine, this is an area still in the throes of extensive research and development (R&D). However, there are quantum devices that are ready here and now for commercialization that will be critical to solving our timing fragility.

even amid GPS denial, as well as help enable continued navigation in contested environments. The importance of properly developed and deployed quantum devices to NATO’s long-term security is clear, but member states will have to work together closely to make that happen.

The uses for these clocks go far beyond the battlefield. In 2023, the world is projected to generate an enormous amount of data, reaching 100 Zettabytes (equivalent to 1,000 trillion GB). A significant portion of this data is stored in distributed databases worldwide. To maintain data synchronization, each data segment requires an accurate time stamp. As the prevalence of ChatGPT and other generative AI platforms continues to grow, the overwhelming volume of data becomes a significant challenge. Small, highly precise, and cost-effective quantum clocks make it possible to ensure critical systems reliability with ever increasing data traffic in the presence of fundamental latencies. ***** About the author: Laura Thomas is the Chief of Staff and Strategic Initiatives at quantum technology and manufacturing company, Infleqtion. She is a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer and Chief of Base who built and led sensitive programs at CIA Headquarters and abroad in multiple international assignments.

Highly precise, cost effective, and deployable optical quantum clocks would allow communications systems to still function

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NATO’s PostUkraine War Identity Still a Question

By Thibault Muzergues

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he war in Ukraine has given NATO a new dynamic, but its conclusion will only raise more questions. For now, the old allies are back together with a sense of transatlantic solidarity unseen since the aftermath of September 2001. This is no small feat when considering where the alliance was just a year and a half ago following the disastrously handled Afghanistan withdrawal. NATO, which had been described by Emmanuel Macron as “brain-dead” just four years ago, has greatly benefited from this renewed transatlantic solidarity, with its primary raison d’être re-affirmed and its boundaries unexpectedly enlarged to cover Finland and, hopefully soon, Sweden.

NATO’s sudden rejuvenation doesn’t mean we can be complacent. Alliances are not ends in themselves, and there will one day be an end to the war in Ukraine. Whatever its terms, peace will lead to a different situation from the status quo ante, and NATO will have to recalibrate its mission. While a Russian collapse or regime change would be a dramatic signal that NATO needs to reconsider its identity to remain viable, fundamental changes will be in the cards even in less dramatic scenarios.

NATO’s Shifting Internal Dynamics The North Atlantic Alliance’s raison d’être was famously described by NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay in the 1950s: “Keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.” It is clear today that NATO has succeeded at all those tasks—including keeping “the Germans down” (militarily)—but times are changing. Since the invasion of Crimea in 2014 (and even before) Americans have called on Germans (and more largely Europeans) to re-arm. Since 2022, it seems that this demand is finally being taken seriously in Berlin. If Germany is to rearm, even within NATO and to keep the Americans in, this would undoubtedly introduce new dynamics within Europe, and more largely within the transatlantic relationship.

WHILE A RUSSIAN COLLAPSE OR REGIME CHANGE WOULD BE A DRAMATIC SIGNAL THAT NATO NEEDS TO RECONSIDER ITS IDENTITY TO REMAIN VIABLE, FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES WILL BE IN THE CARDS EVEN IN LESS DRAMATIC SCENARIOS. “Keeping the Americans in and the Russians out” therefore seems to be the future mission of a NATO in which Europeans will have to take a fairer share of their defense burden. In an enlarged alliance, this will lead to new questions. With the enlargement to Finland and soon Sweden, NATO’s contours will coincide with those of the European Union (EU), at least on the eastern flank. What does a fair share of the burden mean between the U.S. and Europe? What does that mean for Europe’s (and the U.S.’) defense industry? If Europeans are to take a fairer share of the burden, they will need to develop their defense industry, but doing this will mean a tougher competition for the U.S. defense industry in Europe. After all, NATO’s article 5 is not article F-35, and while many Europeans will want to continue to use U.S. platforms, one might reasonably assume they will want to boost their own armaments industry with their public money.

The war in Ukraine and the expansion to Finland (hopefully soon to be joined by Sweden) also underscore the question of membership for Ukraine, undoubtedly on top of the agenda at the Vilnius NATO summit of July 12-13. Integration should definitely be on the table, and a Membership Accession Plan (MAP) put forward, as integrating Ukraine would be consistent with the goal of keeping Russia out of Europe. Ukraine is currently single handedly NATO SUMMIT 2023 | 31

“KEEPING THE AMERICANS IN AND THE RUSSIANS OUT” THEREFORE SEEMS TO BE THE FUTURE MISSION OF A NATO IN WHICH EUROPEANS WILL HAVE TO TAKE A FAIRER SHARE OF THEIR DEFENSE BURDEN. doing just that, with the support of NATO. Russia’s actions over the past 15 years shows the gray zones that we agreed to at and after the NATO Bucharest summit of 2008 are only inviting Russia to export instability and insecurity to Europe. Thus, NATO should not miss yet another opportunity to pursue its objective of keeping the Russians out.

NATO’s Evolving Challenges Such an expansion presents strategic and logistical challenges. The alliance would then have a long, continuous border with Russia from the North of Norway to Mariupol and the Kerch Strait. Securing such a long land border is a major security challenge.

These land challenges shouldn’t overshadow NATO’s naval challenges. Russia will still maintain a strong naval presence, including from bases in Syria. NATO will need to refocus on securing its southern flank as well, particularly given that China and Iran have both made inroads toward the Mediterranean in recent years.

Answering the question of whether it is NATO’s job to keep China out (of Europe) carries challenges of its own.If the answer is affirmative, then much more effort will have to be put on naval and political presence in the Mediterranean, which could prove worrisome for NATO members sharing land borders with Rus-

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sia. Whatever the answer, a NATO at 32 members or more will be bigger but also more exposed, and this will require some strategic choices that will not necessarily satisfy everyone.

Many of those choices will fall on the U.S., the uncontested leader of an alliance whose very goal is to keep it in Europe.

It is difficult to imagine America retreating from the continent after having put much stake in supporting Ukraine during the war. But the U.S. will have to answer serious questions of its own about NATO’s evolving objectives. Should it resolve to help defend Europe from both Russia and China? Should that defense be purely military or also geo-economic (which some allies might find objectionable)? Should NATO look to extend its operations still further? And can any of these expanded objectives be sold to the Finns and Swedes who got into NATO for protection against Russia but not to seek adventures outside of Europe?

In a world where resources remain limited and challenges for the West will only multiply, all these questions will be back to the forefront of NATO’s agenda once the war ends. It is often said that even though they often are only catalysts of larger dynamics preceding them, great wars always mark a rupture in history’s long continuum, and ask new questions and challenges to alliances and nation-states. NATO will have to face these questions after the war, and it will do so more successfully if it can anticipate them today. ***** About the author: Thibault Muzergues currently serves as Regional Program Director for Europe and Euro-Med for the International Republican Institute, where he works with political parties around the continent.

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Envisioning Youth as the Driver of Transatlantic Security

By Daryna Onyshko

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s NATO members gather to discuss the future of NATO and Europe’s security architecture, they must develop concrete steps for how to achieve improved security and stability. Including Ukraine in these conversations with the aim of eventually incorporating Ukraine into NATO will be one key to success. A second area—more truly focused on the future—is fostering active cooperation with young people in all NATO countries, and their allies, to best be prepared for future challenges.

NATO’s Vilnius Summit in July is an opportunity to fully integrate Ukraine into the transatlantic community. Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO would strengthen the alliance significantly, serving as a dependable stronghold for NATO’s eastern flank and thus a permanent deterrent against Russian aggression. Ukrainian membership to NATO would also have economic benefits for Ukraine specifically and Europe more widely. The success of industries investing in Ukraine’s reconstruction is intrinsically tied to upholding and safeguarding the NATO framework, particularly in the face of formidable challenges to regional security and stability.

NATO’s Future Lies With its Young People Ukrainian NATO membership is only one aspect of securing NATO’s future. Leveraging the power of youth across the transatlantic community will be critical to improving NATO’s security and stability in the coming decades. If NATO wants to fully benefit from bringing Ukraine into the fold, it must recognize the invaluable contributions of Ukraine’s youth in shaping new security structures. By involving young people in security discussions and initiatives, NATO can tap into their diverse experiences, digital literacy, and social awareness. This fosters a sense of ownership and a long-term commitment to shared security goals. Youth’s involvement in security extends beyond military ca-

IF NATO WANTS TO FULLY BENEFIT FROM BRINGING UKRAINE INTO THE FOLD, IT MUST RECOGNIZE THE INVALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF UKRAINE’S YOUTH IN SHAPING NEW SECURITY STRUCTURES. pabilities. By nurturing relationships and understanding among young people from different NATO member states, as well as aspiring members, like Ukraine, the alliance builds trust, bridges gaps, and promotes a sense of unity.

NATO is already doing this with programs such as the Youth Summit and NATO 2030 Young Leaders, incorporating youth perspectives into high-level summits and giving young experts a sense of dedication to collective defense and regional cooperation.

Yet NATO can do more by creating new initiatives where youth act as alliance ambassadors to their respective broader publics.

The new generation in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine, is capable of partnering on equitable terms and willing to collaborate with Western states in security discussions and developing frameworks.

One example of youth working across borders toward shared democratic values is the European Democracy Youth Network (EDYN), which was formed in 2019 and today includes almost 700 members from 23 European countries in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe. They drive the pro-European Union movement in Georgia, shape youth policy in North Macedonia, advocate for dialogue instead of polarization in Albania, and risk their lives defending their freedom against Russia.

As Ukraine partners start to develop recovery and support plans at multistakeholder

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THE TIME IS NOW FOR THIS REBUILD TO LEVERAGE THE STRENGTH, INTELLIGENCE, AND DIVERSITY OF YOUTH FOR COOPERATION AND SECURITY ACROSS THE TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY. conferences—Lugano, Paris, and London—it is understandable that defense, and critical infrastructure sectors are prioritized. These are immediate concerns, but we must also recognize that Ukraine’s youth also need immediate investment and involvement in this transformation.

The time is now for this rebuild to leverage the strength, intelligence, and diversity of youth for cooperation and security across the transatlantic community.

Reconstruction means modernization and reform for key parts of Ukraine’s economic and societal institutions, to leave behind its post-Soviet legacy and move toward full-fledged democracy. Empowering our youth will accelerate this modernization.

The government is setting up the Ukrainian Youth Foundation with a specific youth program. Its priorities include: development of youth infrastructure; increasing youth participation in society and politics; supporting youth entrepreneurship; tackling war-caused trauma; integration of youth from de-occupied territories; integration of youth veterans; and the cooperation with European youth. These priorities lie within principles of the United Nations Security Council agenda on Youth, Peace, and Security, which is still rarely positioned as a serious domain, despite the first resolution being adopted almost 10 years ago.

National governments, politicians, parties, and international organizations need to invest resources and efforts into the implementation of these internationally crafted priorities and, in particular, into the 36 | D I PLOM AT I C COU RIE R

institutional development of youth-led organizations. Youth’s active involvement in decision-making processes, policy development, and technological advancements will empower them to actively contribute to Ukraine’s security and the broader NATO framework.

Ukraine’s full-fledged membership in NATO and the active involvement and empowerment of youth are essential for the future of the transatlantic community’s security and stability. Kyiv’s membership would enhance security, deter aggression, and promote stability in the region. It would also contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts and attract international investment. The engagement of youth in security discussions and initiatives strengthens the sense of ownership and commitment to shared security goals in NATO. To be capable partners, the Ukrainian youth sector needs support - investing in their development will accelerate the country’s social and economic progress, empowering them to actively contribute to the country’s security and the broader NATO framework. Embracing the strategic role of Ukraine and its vibrant youth will strengthen the transatlantic Alliance and ensures a more resilient future for the entire community. ***** About the author: Thibault Muzergues currently serves as Regional Program Director for Europe and Euro-Med for the International Republican Institute, where he works with political parties around the continent.

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Pathways for Ukraine’s Long-Term Security

By Joshua Huminski

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kraine’s counteroffensive will not mark the end of the war or even the beginning of the end. Rather it is just the next step in an extended conflict. Whilst the outcome of the (hopefully successful) offensive will create conditions for the next phase of activity, it is the translation of that success to the central strategic and political objective that matters—sustainable Ukrainian security. Indeed, the key question is not whether Ukraine should be in NATO, but what is the best way of ensuring Ukraine’s long-term security— of which membership in NATO is an option.

Ukraine’s Long-term Security Challenges When seeking to answer the larger question of Ukrainian long-term security, several framing considerations are necessary.

Russia is unlikely to end its aggression toward Ukraine even if the fighting stops. While Russia’s conventional forces will find themselves in a weakened position, Moscow will seek to rearm. It will also retain indirect means—including missile strikes, cyber-attacks, and support for insurgents—to target and influence Kyiv. Even if Russia loses catastrophically, there is no prospect for an equivalent campaign of de-Nazification or Imperial deconstruction as was necessary in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War. Banking on political change within Russia is not viable, either. Even if the Putin regime falls, there is no guarantee a successor regime would be less hostile to Ukraine.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s long-term security is not about battlefield outcomes alone, these can only condition a negotiated settlement. This negotiated settlement, regardless of however much progress Ukraine makes, will likely only suspend immediate hostilities, not end Russia’s long-term animus toward Ukraine.

Modernizing Ukrainian Security Infrastructure Given these considerations, the United States and its allies have two inter-related, courses of action. First, the U.S. and its allies must

RUSSIA IS UNLIKELY TO END ITS AGGRESSION TOWARD UKRAINE EVEN IF THE FIGHTING STOPS. WHILE RUSSIA’S CONVENTIONAL FORCES WILL FIND THEMSELVES IN A WEAKENED POSITION, MOSCOW WILL SEEK TO REARM. establish independent Ukrainian deterrence.

This would see Kyiv’s forces transform from its “franken-force” of Warsaw Pact-era and NATO-standard equipment focused on the defeat of Russia’s forces into a modern, combined arms force capable of deterring future conventional aggression, a process that is already underway.

In the author’s conversations with European defense officials in late 2022, this was an objective heavily hinted at, if never outright acknowledged. Commitments by the U.S. to provide M1A1 main battle tanks (and European partner promises of main battle tanks) and the recent decision to begin training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft reflect long-term plans for enhancing Kyiv’s ability to defend itself. These platforms and their associated infrastructure represent a commitment by the West to Ukraine’s long-term security.

Beyond Ukraine’s immediate battlefield requirements, long-term deterrence necessitates the modernization of Ukraine’s defense infrastructure to include robust integrated air defense capabilities, counter-battery artillery, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and national-level command and control. At the same time, Ukraine’s domestic security infrastructure needs to be strengthened, its systemic corruption must be addressed, and democratic governance must be strengthened to counter non-military threats from Russia. These political reforms will in many ways be more challenging and require sustained political commitment from Ukraine’s leadership.

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This approach is costly and requires continued political and economic commitment from participating NATO countries. For the United States this will result in increased domestic political and economic pressure at a time when Washington seeks to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, allied defense industrial bases are not meeting current demands, let alone the anticipated requirements of refilling spent stockpiles let alone meeting the projected needs of building a NATO-standard force. Moreover, the prospect of a Trump presidency in 2024 and the uncertainty of its policies complicate future planning and necessitate a measure of hedging.

Ukraine’s Relationship With NATO Some form of this modernization program is necessary but is insufficient alone to achieve Ukraine’s long-term security. This is the basis of the case for Ukraine’s entry into NATO. According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, all members have agreed that Ukraine will join the alliance in the future, but no date for the start of accession has been agreed. In 2008 NATO pledged that Ukraine would eventually join, but progress on a Membership Action Plan (MAP) was blocked by France and Germany.

Today Ukraine’s entry into NATO is even more problematic, with U.S. reticence due to concerns about escalation with Russia.

Kyiv’s hopes to secure a full MAP at the Vilnius Summit are likely overly ambitious, something President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has acknowledged. Without the United States’ clear support, NATO will almost certainly not move forward on Ukrainian accession. Alternative models of partnerships with NATO do exist, for example Sweden’s “Enhanced Opportunity Partner” status. This brings with it opportunities to contribute to NATO missions and Alliance objectives, while engaging in dialogues with NATO. If NATO full membership is not viable would other types of security guarantees for Kyiv suffice? Guarantees or commitments are only as strong as the parties to them versus

presumed adversaries. The 1991 Budapest Memorandum which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees ultimately proved hollow. If NATO does not want to incur Article Five obligations for Ukraine an alternative course of action could well be the long-term armament commitment in line with what is presently underway, backed by a commitment to defend Ukraine with all measures short of open hostilities by NATO partners. Here an Israel-type bilateral security agreement could see Ukraine receive guaranteed military support, intelligence cooperation, and other assistance that stops short of mutual defense agreements.

The goal of any security agreement is the future deterrence of Russian aggression.

NATO deterrence has held and will likely continue to hold. Ukrainian membership in NATO was and remains a red line for Putin’s Russia. While it is unclear what Moscow would do if that red line were crossed, it is unlikely Washington will want to find out.

Washington and its European partners are, however, building a robust playbook of how to support Ukraine and punish Russia which could well be used in the future. Indeed, this menu of responses could well serve as the basis of a non-NATO security agreement.

The U.S. and its allies must provide an answer to the critical first question—what is the best way to secure Ukraine’s long-term security?

Only after answering that question is an effective discussion about the future of Europe’s security architecture possible. ***** About the author: Joshua C. Huminski is Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, and a George Mason University National Security Institute Fellow.

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“NATO Expansion” Should Mean Sharing its Experience with the World

By Ian Ralby

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or nearly three quarters of a century, NATO has served as a bulwark to prevent f irst Soviet and now Russian aggression f rom undermining the sovereignty and stability of Europe and North America.

That long-standing adversary to the East has become more belligerent in recent years, using its military to pursue claims related to President Vladimir Putin’s def inition of what constitutes Russian territory. In 2023, protecting Europe and North America f rom Russia, as well as f rom new and emerging threats, requires meaningful engagement in Af rica, Asia, and South America. The question, therefore, is: how can a military alliance, designed to thwart a physical attack within the territory of its member states, operate effectively in regions far af ield f rom that territory with no kinetic activity at play?

Russia’s physical expansion—through invasion and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, invasion and occupation of Crimea in 2014, and invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022—only tells part of the story. Russia has also been expanding in its presence and influence around the world in ways that have nothing to do with President Putin’s efforts to reestablish the boundaries of the Russian imperium. As NATO revisits its role, it must recognize the paradox that, while Russia threatens f riends and partners on Europe’s f rontier, countering Russia successfully will require NATO engagement in parts of the world where it has not traditionally operated. But how can it do this in a meaningful way?

The answer lies in sharing. NATO has amassed considerable experience and insight since its inception in 1949. Sharing insights and experiences may need to become the new manifestation of NATO expansion. The insights could, if articulated and shared in a transferrable way, be invaluable to governments and militaries now coming to terms with Russian aggression and malign influence.

Even beyond Russia, however, other parts of the world could benef it greatly

WHILE RUSSIA THREATENS FRIENDS AND PARTNERS ON EUROPE’S FRONTIER, COUNTERING RUSSIA SUCCESSFULLY WILL REQUIRE NATO ENGAGEMENT IN PARTS OF THE WORLD WHERE IT HAS NOT TRADITIONALLY OPERATED. f rom NATO’s experience and insight on everything f rom multinational exercising, countering piracy, and identifying hybrid aggression to rethinking strategic communications and advancing cyber security. For example, NATO has inf rastructure in the Centers of Excellence, the Defense College, and the Hub, but it needs to become far more creative in recognizing its comparative and competitive edge in countering malevolent security trends around the world.

As the Gulf of Guinea continues to build operational cooperation to counter the scourge of piracy, NATO’s experiences in Operation Ocean Shield could prove valuable. Somali piracy involved attacks far out at sea, taking the vessel and the crew for ransom; while initially, Gulf of Guinea attacks were actually armed robbery at sea, inside the sovereign jurisdictions of states, and focused on theft of oil. The piracy model in Atlantic Af rica, however, has changed and now the lessons f rom the Northwest Indian Ocean are potentially highly valuable to the Gulf of Guinea states especially because the Gulf of Guinea counter-piracy approach is grounded on multinational cooperation and combined operations at sea. As a result, NATO’s operational experience as a multinational force directed at piracy would offer useful insights to the states of West and Central Af rica. NATO, thereNATO SUMMIT 2023 | 43

NATO’S GREATEST VALUE MAY BE IN SHARING WHAT IT HAS LEARNED OVER GENERATIONS, INCLUDING HELPING STATES AND REGIONS AROUND THE WORLD FACE SOME OF THE SAME CHALLENGES THAT NATO HAS ALREADY OVERCOME. fore, does not need to deploy to the Gulf of Guinea to provide meaningful assistance to it. At a time when Russia—both directly and through proxies—is working to make inroads of influence in Af rica, this is the sort of security partnership that could prove valuable in myriad ways.

Indeed, the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub is exactly the sort of institution that can foster this relationship.

Similarly, the Pacif ic Islands and the states of East and Southeast Asia are experiencing a major escalation in the f requency and intensity of hybrid aggression, lawfare, unlawfare and other “grey zone” activities. Some of those activities have actually been directly influenced or inspired by Russia’s own grey zone conduct, and now Russia is engaging much more in the Pacif ic, as well. NATO has been facing and addressing these issues for years and has established Centers of Excellence in Hybrid Aggression and Strategic Communications, among other things. Leveraging those centers to the benef it of other states facing similar challenges could have material benef it.

By being more generous with its insights, NATO can build relationships that bolster its own resilience as well as that of partners farther af ield. But some of that benef it will also come in the very process

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of preparing to share. When forced to articulate knowledge and distribute it to other parts of the world, NATO will begin to appreciate and more readily recognize its own insights. Institutions like NATO Defense College can play a critical role in this sort of knowledge capture.

While NATO expansion is often viewed as a matter of either adding new members to the alliance or engaging in kinetic activities beyond the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic states, there are a myriad of different approaches that should be considered. NATO’s greatest value may be in sharing what it has learned over generations, including helping states and regions around the world face some of the same challenges that NATO has already overcome. Ironically, this approach may also become a mechanism for NATO to gain new and critically important insights f rom others. The threats to the Alliance are now global, so NATO must readdress those threats by becoming an Alliance that is willing to engage with and learn f rom all those who value peace, security, and stability. ***** About the author: Dr. Ian Ralby is CEO of I.R. Consilium, a family f irm with global expertise in maritime and resource security, and is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Maritime Strategy.

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Protecting the State from the Army, Protecting the Army from Politicians

By Miroslaw Rozanski

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s NATO members gather to discuss the future of the alliance, the question of management versus command of national armed forces deserves further examination. Experts are debating where the line between running the Ministries of National Defense and commanding the military by politicians should be marked.

In democracies today, the mission and tasks of armed forces rarely raise questions of democratic institutional resilience.

Yet there is still no consensus over how to interpret the issue of civilian, democratic control over a nation’s armed forces.

This lack of consensus about what civilian control over the military should look like can blur the line between management and command. Indeed, today there are numerous publications which compare military command to management. There is some utility to such analogies, but these can contribute to misunderstanding of the critical differences between command and management, which at some level can become dangerous.

Management is defining what should be done while command is answering how it should be done. Blurring the lines between these discrete roles could lead to entrusting one individual with both, which in turn risks that individual’s subjective view prevailing, whereas security issues require reality checks and the application of objective measures.

Management, Command Divide Remains Critical to NATO’s Identity The importance of this discussion should not be underestimated, particularly at a time when active war is being waged on NATO’s eastern flank. Discussing the line between civilian and military control of a nation’s armed forces is as crucial today as it was thirty years ago when, after the Warsaw Pact’s collapse, the question of security guarantees for its former members arose. Getting this right is critical both to ensuring militaries run efficiently and that democratic institutions remain resilient.

TODAY’S PROFESSIONAL OFFICER CADRE IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES HAS AN INCREASED AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, INFORMED

BY MODERNIZED MILITARY EDUCATION AND INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL COLLEAGUES. When Poland and other states in Central and Eastern Europe declared their desire to join NATO three decades ago, thenU.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin responded with the concept of “Partnership for Peace” as a proposal for the Alliance to sign a defense cooperation agreement with the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. One of the six key aspects of this proposal was how civilian political institutions related to national militaries.

In 2000, Poland and the U.S. were again joined in their efforts to bring established and aspiring democracies together in a global initiative of Community of Democracies, including among its 19 principles that civilian, democratic control over the military be established and preserved. A memento f rom those who have lived through the experience of a post-Soviet military impact zone was included among the founding stones to be set in any democracy.

Today, the original fears of excessive military interference in the state’s functioning faced in the 1990’s can be put aside ad acta in most democratic states. Yet it is still important that we seek solutions that consolidate democratic institutions in the functioning of the state in keeping with NATO collective defense requireNATO SUMMIT 2023 | 47

NATO MILITARIES ARE NOT INTENDED TO CARRY OUT ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, WHETHER MANAGERIAL OR RELATED TO ELECTIONS OR POLITICAL PARTIES. NOR SHOULD NATO MILITARIES BE INVOLVED IN POLICING FUNCTIONS OR MAINTAINING DOMESTIC SECURITY DURING TIMES OF PEACE.

The experience of NATO members demonstrates this balance is best achieved through assigning civilian authorities with the responsibility of determining the missions for the army, shaping the development of the armed forces, determining the size and structure of forces, and allocate funds for national security. NATO member experiences have also illustrated how best to systematically separate military and civilian structures. Finally, NATO member state best practice has established a standard of protecting the apolitical character of national armed forces. NATO militaries are not intended to carry out any political activities, whether managerial or related to elections or political parties. Nor should NATO militaries be involved in policing functions or maintaining domestic security during times of peace.

ments. Today’s professional officer cadre in democratic countries has an increased awareness of the importance of democratic institutions, informed by modernized military education and interaction with international colleagues. This should allow for increased trust of military professionals as we seek the most effective balance between managing national ministries of defense and command of the armed forces.

It is, after all, not by accident that already in 1949, the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty solemnly confirmed in the preamble to their joint obligations determination to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Those having then in mind the creation of a military and political alliance made a powerful, unquestionable and timeless, as it was proved, link with democracy.

Central and Eastern European governments should look to the example of NATO members such as the U.S., UK, Canada, and France—where the highest command authority is not part of its government administration but rather works in full cooperation with these structures.

NATO, as a unique global military and political structure, can play a crucial role in helping design these structures through sharing a consistent experience of its prominent members in establishing full authority and responsibility of the civilian leaders over the area of national defense while striking the right balance between the political needs and the professional military command.

48 | D I PLOM AT I C CO URIE R

***** About the author: Dr. Mirosław Różański is a former General of the Polish Armed Forces, now retired.

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