Ukraine: A Surprising Year, An Uncertain Future

UKRAINE A SURPRISING YEAR, AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

MASTHEAD

CEO & PUBLISHER

ANA C. ROLD

MANAGING EDITOR

SHANE SZARKOWSKI

SPECIAL SERIES EDITOR

KELLY R. BAILEY

ART DIRECTOR

MARC GARFIELD

SPECIAL SERIES EDITOR

JEREMY FUGLEBERG

SPECIAL SERIES EDITOR

WINONA ROYLANCE

MULTIMEDIA MANAGER

WHITNEY DEVRIES

BOOK REVIEWER

JOSHUA HUMINSKI

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

ANDREW M. BEATO FUMBI CHIMA

DANTE A. DISPARTE KERSTIN EWELT

SIR IAN FORBES

LISA GABLE

GREG LEBEDEV ANITA MCBRIDE

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

ANDREA BONIME-BLANC

ETHAN BROWN

NINA CHALA

WESLEY CULP

JOSHUA HUMINSKI

OLEXANDR KOMAROV

NIKOLA MIKOVIC

KATERYNA PICHIK

RICHARD ROUSSEAU

TOMER SABAN

MARK TEMNYCKY

OLGA VOROPAI

GALINA ZAPRYANOVA

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Welcome

aid will provoke Russia to escalate the conflict. Zelensky’s government is struggling with corruption. We’re starting to notice that many non-aligned countries (especially in the Global South) don’t see this conflict in the black-and-white terms that we in the West do.

Shane Szarkowski Managing Editor

As this special series goes live, we observe the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It has been a surprising twelve months. What the majority of us thought would be a short war turned out to be something very different. Ukraine proved its strength, while Russia’s supposedly daunting war machine was exposed. There were remarkable shows of solidarity for Ukraine. NATO governments responded with robust military aid, which by now has crossed what we thought could be “red lines” for a Russian escalation. We gained an international star in Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Putin looks surprisingly vulnerable. These are pretty good surprises.

It’s not all good. Russia is proving determined and remains militarily a colossus, if an ill-maintained one. NATO’s military aid has often felt poorly coordinated and concerns remain that too much

As I write this note, Russia is pushing hard to capture Bakhmut with record levels of shelling and conflicting reports that suggest Russia is making progress despite heavy losses. This could already be the first shots of the much-anticipated “spring offensive,” but we don’t really know anything for certain.

For this commemorative special edition, we asked contributors to reflect on this sense of uncertainty. Some of our contributors looked at today’s unexpected situation and what it means. Others peered into the future to at least think about what the future could look like, and how.

We lead with four pieces that look at the situation now, leading with a Q&A with Gallup’s Galina Zapryanova, who explains how Gallup continued to collect data during the conflict and what they learned. Joshua Huminski follows up with a dual-book review of two books that take early stabs at writing the history of the war.

Drs. Nina Chala, Olga Voropai, and Kateryna Pichik explain how Ukraine’s university system remained resilient through the conflict, and how university’s role evolves in times of conflict. Then,

Kyivstar CEO Olexandr Komarov unpacks how human trafficking has surged among Ukrainian refugees and the role the private sector has to play fighting it. Six pieces look ahead. Wesley Culp looks at whether the war will spell doom for Russia’s now-fragile Collective Security Treaty Organization.Andrea Bonime-Blanc and Tomer Salban analyze Ukraine’s robust defense in the digital side of the war and pull out key lessons that will help define our cyber future. Mark Temnycky makes an argument for how Ukraine not only can, but likely will emerge the victor.

Ethan Brown warns that the kind of proxy conflict the West has turned Ukraine into is a very delicate balance between not enough support and so much support it triggers an escalation. Dr. Richard Rousseau works toward what a potential peace could look like, by examining examples from recent history. Nikola Mikovic, finally, makes some predictions about what a post-war Russia— and its changed relationships with Ukraine and the West— could look like.

As ever, we are really proud of the quality and range of voices we are able to publish in our special series. The same has been true all year on the website. Diplomatic Courier hopes this series, and these voices, can help add depth and understanding to your perspectives on this ongoing tragedy. We’re also very grateful to you for continuing to come to us for perspectives and analyses.

05 I Welcome: A Surprising Year, An Uncertain Future

By: Shane Szarkowski

08 I Voices Inside a War Zone

Interview with: Galina Zapryanova

12 I Drafting the First Histories of the Russia-Ukraine War

By: Joshua Huminski

16 I The Role of Universities in Times of War

By: Drs. Nina Chala, Olga Voropai, and Kateryna Pichik

20 I Combating Human Trafficking in Ukraine

By: Olexandr Komarov

22 I Ukraine War Proves Difficult Test for Russia’s Military Alliance

By: Wesley Culp

26 I Resilient Ukraine’s Cyber-Defenses a Model for Our Cyber Future

By: Tomer Saban & Andrea Bonime-Blanc

30

I How Ukraine Can Defeat Russia in 2023

By: Mark Temnycky

34 I When Will the West’s Ukraine Aid Cross the Line for Russia?

By: Ethan Brown

38 I What Kind of Peace in Ukraine? Lessons from Recent History

By: Richard Rousseau

40 I Imagining a Postwar Russia

By: Nikola Mikovic

Photo via Adobe Stock.

Gallup regularly surveys Ukraine as part of its World Poll. In September 2022, Gallup interviewed 1,000 adults across Ukraine to get a glimpse into what their lives were like more than six months after Russia’s invasion,and to get their thoughts on the war.

Galina Zapryanova, Gallup’s regional director for research in Eastern Europe and former Soviet states, provides insights into the research – and what Ukrainians told interviewers.

Voices Inside a War Zone

with Galina Zapryanova

Interview

Photo via Gallup

Q: Gallup surveys Ukraine every year, but 2022 was obviously different. You had to survey people about their lives in the middle of war. Was there a risk you couldn’t do the survey at all?

Zapryanova: Before the war, we planned to survey Ukraine in 2022 doing face-to-face interviews. We realized right after the invasion that this would of course no longer be possible and immediately began strategizing about how to continue our work. Canceling the survey was a last resort. We were determined to avoid this, and so was our local partner in Ukraine who does the interviewing.

We joined forces to make the World Poll happen despite the war. Sometimes the most difficult years and unprecedented circumstances for a country’s people are precisely the most important times to ensure their experiences, hopes and opinions are widely heard around the world.

Q: Tell me about some of the challenges you faced. For example, a lot of people were on the move because of the war – and some areas were even under Russian control. How did you reach them? Did you reach them? What did you have to do differently?

Zapryanova: We had to carefully review and revise our screening procedures to account for the massive displacement of people both inside and outside Ukraine. Our target survey population included adults living inside the country, so we screened out any respondents currently residing abroad.

We did reach and interview internally displaced people. For analytical purposes, we collected both their current place of residence and where they lived before the war. As expected, the majority of internal migration was occurring from the East and South regions toward the rest of the country.

All areas where Russia’s military forces seized control in 2022 were still reachable by Ukrainian mobile operators, so we were able to survey those populations as well, including the Donbas Territories un-

der Russian control since 2014, such as Crimea, were not included in the sample. All Ukrainian mobile operators ceased operations there by 2015.

Q: So, Gallup partners with a local company to do the telephone interviews. This means Ukrainians are interviewing other Ukrainians about their lives – everyone is in the middle of a war. What was that like for them? Can you talk a little bit about that?

Zapryanova: We are extremely grateful to our interviewers for their resilience. While the daily practical aspects of their workday were not significantly different yet (World Poll fielded before the frequent power outages and renewed attacks on Kyiv began), the interviews took a psychological toll on them.

Supervisors noticed during listen-ins that respondents would often share snippets of their life stories and their experiences of trauma and war. If you are an interviewer working many hours per day calling people from across the country, by the end of the day you may have heard some very difficult stories of people fleeing war, being prisoners, getting hurt or losing loved ones, being anxious about the future.

Survey interviewers are usually pre-selected on certain traits like being “good with people” and further trained to be approachable and friendly to convince people to take their surveys. This approachability makes respondents eager to talk and answer questions, but also more likely to share emotional comments about what they are going through.

In the middle of all that, there were also stories of hope and laughter. Supervisors collected and shared these stories to keep up the team’s spirits.

Q: Let’s discuss the findings. What was the general mood of the country? What did Ukrainians think about the war? Tell me about what stood out most to you.

Zapryanova: Despite the hardships or maybe because of them, we saw a remarkable

sense of unity and determination take hold among Ukrainians. Confidence in the country’s leadership, government and institutions sky-rocketed. Large majorities agreed that Ukraine should continue fighting until full victory. People were also hopeful of NATO and EU acceptance, while attitudes toward Russia plummeted to historic lows.

What I also found very interesting is that, among people who remained in Ukraine, the appetite for leaving the country decreased – fewer people expressed a desire to migrate than in 2021.

Overall, the data painted a picture of a nation gearing for a long fight but still hopeful about the future and the outcome of the

war. Our fieldwork occurred right around the time of Ukraine’s first surprising successes in recapturing Russian-occupied territory. The data reflected that victorious sentiment, I think. We are very much looking forward to seeing whether it continues to dominate the public’s mood in 2023.

Q: The plan is to go back to Ukraine and do it again in 2023. Any concerns with that? Is the situation more dangerous now? What do you expect to find this time?

Zapryanova: The main difference from 2022 right now is the widespread attacks on infrastructure and renewed bombings of Kyiv. Our primary concern is the safety of the interviewers so they should always prioritize seeking shelter when/if an attack is occurring or suspected.

In addition, we will need to adjust our procedures to the frequent power outages to maximize calling during times when electricity is working. People are trying to save as much power as possible for their daily heating, cooking and technology needs, so answering unfamiliar telephone numbers during an outage will be unlikely.

Overall we are gearing up for a potentially longer timeline of data collections. Our Ukrainian partners are already adjusting the system, however, and we are optimistic that 2023 World Poll fieldwork will proceed.

Confidence in the country’s leadership, government and institutions sky-rocketed. Large majorities agreed that Ukraine should continue fighting until full victory. People were also hopeful of NATO and EU acceptance, while attitudes toward Russia plummeted to historic lows.

Drafting the First Histories of the RussiaUkraine War

By Joshua Huminski

COURIER

Writing the first history of a conflict is an unenviable task, especially about a conflict that has not yet ended and for which the end is not even in distant view. It is a risky endeavor, but one boldly taken up by two authors who attempt to pen that first draft of history: Luke Harding in “Invasion” and Owen Matthews in his book “Overreach.” Both are smoothly and elegantly written, presenting similar compelling stories, but are sufficiently different from one another that reading both, even in quick succession, is supremely rewarding.

As the war in Ukraine enters its second year, it is important to reflect on how the war began and how much has happened since February of 2022: the offensives and retreats on the battlefields, the political machinations in capitals from Washington, D.C., to Moscow, and the devastating consequences for Ukraine’s civilian population. While certainly not the first war of the 21st century, it is the first major land war in Europe since World War II, and one that has upended so many lives and so many assumptions.

It is just as remarkable to reflect on how much further the war has yet to go. The longer the war continues and the further removed the public is from its origin, the greater the likelihood that war fatigue sets in, not just for the media, but the public at large. The West’s willingness to continue support to Ukraine is critical to the country’s survival and long-term success. That willingness is predicated on the public’s understanding of the war and its consequences, and here Harding and Matthews refresh readers’ memories, a critical service to Kyiv and the West, writ large.

Harding, for his part, offers a deeply sympathetic and moving portrait of Ukraine, its people, and the effects of the war on both. Indeed, he places the Ukrainian people at the heart of his story. His writing is informed by prolific interviews with Ukrainian politicians and soldiers, Western diplomats and officials, and average Ukrainians who as of this writing are still experiencing the horrors of Moscow’s war of aggression. It is also a remarkably well-blended book, one that balances the high politics of European capitals with the horrors of war,

from the battlefield to Ukraine’s besieged cities. His inclusion of just the right amount of Ukrainian, Russian, and military history helps contextualize the ongoing war without weighing down his narrative flow. It is an impressive effort to capture the active dynamism of this war.

Throughout “Invasion,” Harding both weaves and teases at narrative threads about the war’s conduct that will almost certainly be explored in greater detail in the future. One such example is the fascinating informational element of the war in Ukraine, best embodied by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, and Kyiv’s mastery of both traditional and social media tools. Prior to the February 2022 invasion, and certainly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the West largely ceded the information war to Moscow.

Kyiv flipped this dynamic on its head. While not the first war of the social media era, it has shown the power of narratives and stories communicated through this medium in a time of war. From the open-source community’s maturation to the emergence of the social media movement known as “North Atlantic Fellas Organization” or “NAFO” (an online community dedicated to heckling Russian diplomats, most often accompanied by a cartoon Shiba Inu avatar), alongside Zelenskyy’s own efforts, the world is witnessing the war in near-real time, albeit one understandably dominated by Ukraine’s narratives. There are, of course, limits to this narrative and information warfare, and attendant risks. Most significantly, the West is winning the war, well, against itself— seeing only what it wants to see and discounting both Russia’s information war at home, but also how the war is seen in the Global South.

two authors attempt to pen that first draft of history: Luke Harding in “Invasion” and Owen Matthews in his book “Overreach.” they are sufficiently different from one another that reading both, even in quick succession, is supremely rewarding.

Harding is a full-throated supporter of Ukraine’s cause and this colors much of his reporting and the writing of “Invasion.” He wears his heart on his sleeve. There is, of course, nothing wrong with this—Ukraine’s national survival and the rejection of spheres of influence are the right causes and demand the West’s support. Harding’s support and its visible presence does, however, tilt his book away from perhaps a true history and towards more of a polemic. Even so, this is perhaps what is needed now. Harding’s impassioned support and colorful writing reminds readers of what is at stake in the war—European security and the rule of law—but also the consequences of the war on Ukraine’s civilians.

By contrast, Matthews presents what is more immediately familiar as a conventional history of the war. Also informed by innumerable interviews—many of which are with Moscow insiders, albeit identified by pseudonyms— Matthews offers a longer-term historical narrative of Ukraine and its place in Russia’s understanding of itself, as well as the Kremlin’s machinations across the recent history of both Russia and Ukraine. Whereas Harding dives aggressively into the immediacy of the war, Matthews takes a step back offering a much wider lens through which to view and understand Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine. Matthews seats his analysis in this longer arc of history. This bridges a gap in literature, which has focused either on the immediate conflict, or the longer-term history of Russia and Ukraine (something masterfully done by Serhii Plokhy in successive works such as “The Gates of Europe” and “The Lost Kingdom”). Matthews finds a welcome middle ground showing not just what has happened, but why it happened from the perspectives of both Moscow and Kyiv.

He charts the rise of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, and his inner circle, and how they viewed the world. While Harding provides brief pen-and-ink sketches of the key players in Moscow (which has its own shortcomings), Matthews offers deeper biographical portraits about their motivations and how they fit into the Kremlin’s complex, cannibalistic, and competitive ecosystem. Matthews methodically builds the causes and drivers of the war in

Ukraine, layering on politics, history, propaganda, and more, arriving at the inevitable climax of 24 February 2022.

He also offers a personal touch to the war, opening “Overreach” with a series of personal vignettes and anecdotes from Russians, Ukrainians, and a failed British squaddie who joins the Ukrainians as a private soldier, before he turns to the meat of the history of the conflict. He returns to these portraits periodically throughout the narrative. After the war’s outbreak, Matthews’ narrative picks up pace and becomes, in many ways, a ground-level account of the war with interludes to the machinations in Moscow, Kyiv, London, Washington, and across Europe.

“Overreach” is the more balanced of the two accounts—not that Matthews is sympathetic to Russia. Not at all. Whereas Harding’s support of Ukraine is on full display, Matthews takes a more dispassionate look at the war. He explores how the world and recent history is viewed from the Kremlin. This is a necessary measure of strategic empathy that is required of proper histories—not that the views are accepted, but that they are at least acknowledged as existing in the minds of those with whom we disagree or who are adversaries.

He asks the counterfactuals of could the war have been avoided? Could the West have done anything to address Moscow’s insecurities and brought Russia more into the fold of European security? Perhaps unsurprisingly, the answer is no, not the least of which is because of the marked absence of the aforementioned strategic empathy. For all of the analysis and expertise on Russia, policymakers were unable to see things from Moscow’s perspective and, conversely, Moscow could not see things from the West’s perspective. For example, reflecting on Brussels’ engagement with Georgia and Ukraine, Matthews writes, “NATO believed that shows of military solidarity would discourage Russian aggression. But to Moscow, it was precisely such symbolic shows of military engagement that were so provocative.”

The future remains unwritten. How the war progresses in 2023 is far from certain. It is like-

ly that Ukraine will continue its offensives with increasingly advanced Western arms, retaking lost territory and putting Russia on the backfoot. Indeed, the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany recently decided to send main battle tanks to Ukraine, and there are calls for the provision of F-16 fighter jets to join Ukraine’s growing arsenal. More ambitious pundits, both Western and Ukrainian, are suggesting that Kyiv go as far as retaking Crimea.

Moscow, for its part, is likely to field a good portion of those mobilized in its recent call-up of forces. To be sure they will be deeply unhappy, underequipped, and poorly led, but there is a quality in quantity. While the Kremlin has failed to achieve its violently optimistic goals of taking Kyiv and the country in swift thrusts, it appears Moscow is aiming for a much more destructive course of action, increasing the costs of the war to Ukraine and its defenders. Putin is hoping that the continued costs of the war, the political changes in America’s Congress, and domestic political and economic pressures across Europe will weigh on Western unity and, eventually, cause it to split.

This may be an ambitious prospect. Europe has largely avoided the energy catastrophe many feared. Higher than expected winter temperatures have reduced demands while additional supplies and alternative sources have developed. Western unity remains strong, and looks to continue, but is by no means guaranteed. The West is also at risk of premature triumphalism and the adoption of the false belief that simply because Russia has not escalated on the battlefield means that it cannot or will not. Russia possesses means well beyond nuclear arms to retaliate against the West or communicate its red lines. The West would do well to continue considering these risks in its calculus as it has done so thus far.

For Ukraine, Russia’s “special military operation” has catalyzed a national identity that is stronger than could ever have been hoped for, something Harding shows vividly throughout his book. War is the greatest unifier, but its sustainability once the shooting stops remains to be seen. There is strikingly little discussion of the underlying factors and

drivers that caused many in Eastern Ukraine to be, if not more sympathetic to Moscow than Kyiv, than at least desirous of greater independence. Anna Arutunyan’s “Hybrid Warriors” is one of the few accounts to address this issue and return a measure of agency to these overlooked Ukrainians.

Matthews’ prognosis for the future of Russia is grim, showing the economic and human capital costs of Putin’s flawed interpretation of history and the consequences thereof for Ukraine. He writes, “The price of his [Putin’s] illusions was not only thousands of lost lives, but also a lost future of Russia. Most ominously of all, the misbegotten war had opened a Pandora’s box of alternative futures for Russia that were much scarier than Putin’s regime had ever been.” While most attention is, understandably, given to the conduct of the war and Ukraine’s prospects of success, due attention must also be given to Russia and what comes next. Battlefield defeats for Moscow, while welcome, do not intrinsically mean that which follows will be better—it could well be much worse, and it is something the West would do well to consider.

As others have noted, with the war approaching its one-year anniversary, both “Overreach” and “Invasion” provide a useful reminder that, as Harding writes, all of the “unthinkable things happened… things which seemed impossible in the 21st century.” While countless books on the war in Ukraine are inevitably to follow, both Harding’s and Matthews’ entries are timely and valuable, refreshing the collective memory of why so much aid and support has to flowed to Kyiv, and must continue to do so in the future—not just for the sake of Ukraine, but for the rule of law in the 21st century.

About the Author: Joshua Huminski is Diplomatic Courier’s Book Reviewer and Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress.

The Role of Universities in Times of War

By Drs. Nina Chala, Olga Voropai, and Kateryna Pichik

University of Kiev, Ukraine.

Photo by Denys Rodionenko via Unsplash.

In times of war, universities must perform more than only an educational or scientific function. They are responsible for the future of society. Universities must ensure intellectual resilience during the war and the vision for post-war recovery of human intellectual potential.

Can universities successfully respond to the risks of war to ensure safety in the current moment and Ukraine’s resilience and restoration in the future?

Ukrainian Universities Resilient Amid Russian Invasion

The School of Political Analysis of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA) categorizes Ukrainian universities today based on the impact of military actions:

1. Ruined or “occupied” universities that had to relocate and whose educational process was impossible or very complicated (mainly those in the East of Ukraine - Severodonezk, Mariupil). Some of these universities were already displaced due to the Russian invasion in 2014 and needed re-relocation.

2. Universities where the educational process was interrupted by military actions and some infrastructure may have been destroyed and damaged. Recovering these universities’ educational process was not problematic (Universities in the Center of Ukraine and Kyiv).

3. Universities located further from active military operations and perhaps did not even interrupt the educational process (mainly in the West of Ukraine - Uzhhorod, Lviv).

From February 24, 2022 until December 21, 2022, there were 18,965 air alarms in Ukraine, with an average duration of

nearly an hour (56.31 minutes). Since October 2022, Russia’s systematic shelling has been aimed at destroying the energy infrastructure in Ukraine. The actions lead to power blackouts and limited mobile and internet connection, lasting up to 3-4 days.

The loss of communication increases uncertainty and makes the educational and research process difficult or impossible to carry out. A student survey at the NaUKMA on the possibility of extending the educational process, conducted on March 18, 2022, showed that 54% of students were deprived of opportunities to study due to technical obstacles and occupation. They risked their life and health.

Ukrainian universities faced a daunting problem. Amid the chaos of war, how could they ensure a high-level education process, create value for stakeholders, ensure the continuation of their unique identities, and continue scientific work?

One of the first decisions of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (MESU) was the announcement on February 25 of a two-week vacation for all educational institutions. Although various universities found themselves in very different conditions, these two weeks allowed them to adjust to their new situation and restore educational processes. Thirty-four universities were relocated at various times as

In response to the academic refugee wave, the international educational and scientific community joined forces to help Ukrainian students. Inspired by the Ukrainian diaspora, universities–mainly in Western Europe and North America–have worked to find students and academic staff a safe place to live and study.

Russian troops advanced. Some had to be relocated twice. The relocation process was coordinated by the MESU, which determined the host institution for each relocated university. Students were allowed to join online studies at other universities.

Solidarity From the International University Community

In response to the academic refugee wave, the international educational and scientific community joined forces to help Ukrainian students. Inspired by the Ukrainian diaspora, universities–mainly in Western Europe and North America–have worked to find students and academic staff a safe place to live and study.

To this end, the “Global Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” project was implemented. The project created four “foreign NAUKMA campuses.” NAUKMA campuses are co-located with the universities of Toronto (Canada), Glasgow (Great Britain), Giessen (named after Justus Liebig, Germany), and the European University of Viadrina (Germany). The concept of NAUKMA’s foreign campus includes presentation offices, exchange programs for students and teachers, joint research groups, stable funding, and the creation of joint training courses and educational programs. They are expected to attract not only Ukrainians but also local students. More than $5 million was directly raised to finance foreign campuses abroad. In 2022, Karazin University, together with the GOROD Cultural Center (Munich, Germany), opened a study hub for students studying in Bachelor programs in Computer Science, Biology, and Culturology.

The partnership of the leading universities from the EU, U.S., and Canada developed a specially designed student evacuation mobility program for Ukrainians to ensure continuous educational and scientific work. It provided an opportunity during the spring semester of 2022 to take courses from a partner university without additional bureaucratic procedures and live in a partner university dormitory. More than 300 students were able to take advantage of this opportunity starting from March to April 2022.

Additionally, a consortium of leading Ukrainian educational institutions and international organizations launched the Ukrainian Global University (UGU) initiative. The partners aimed to provide scholarships for Ukrainian students in the world’s leading Universities. In total, 2,500 students applied and 57 were chosen for the chance to get a high-quality education safely in 21 Educational Institutions in Europe and North America.

Compared to the pre-war period, the number of NaUKMA students who took advantage of international academic mobility programs increased by more than four times.

The main goal of these relocation programs is to support the physical and emotional safety of both students and academic staff. Russia’s invasion has had a significant, adverse impact on the psychological state of education seekers. Many students were unable to continue their studies during 2022 due to difficulties that arose from the invasion–psychological, physical health, or financial. In personal communication, these students noted their desire to return to studies after the situation stabilizes. According to a survey on student mobility at NaUKMA (in January 2023), one of the reasons for leaving for an international mobility program is the opportunity to be in a safe environment because the psychological state strongly affects the education of students. Among other reasons, students mentioned the opportunity to gain an exciting learning experience and expand career prospects in the labor market of Ukraine.

It is critical that evacuations and relocations don’t cause the academic community to dissolve or scatter. Universities which prioritized people –their needs and their aspirations–have achieved the best results in maintaining a sense of community.

Yet this heightened mobility does bring risks of its own. Domestic and international stakeholders are focused on ensuring that Ukraine does not suffer a loss of knowledge and expertise due to the refugee wave. Students are also sensitive to this danger. Most NaUKMA mobility students noted their readiness to return to Ukraine after the security and infrastructure situation stabilizes. UGU clearly stated the prerequisite to return to Ukraine after study and still got 2,500 applications in just two months. “I chose to pursue a program in international economic law, as the knowledge and experience that I will get from it will help me to work on the attraction of foreign investments for the reconstruction of Ukraine,” - wrote one of the UGU scholars on their webpage. These are promising signs.

Universities’ Responsibility to Society

In times of crisis (war, pandemic), universities must find mechanisms to ensure their resilience. The most critical issues are not merely the preservation or reconstruction of the buildings, technical equipment, or financial support. Rather, the most critical issues are the need to preserve the academic community as such–both students and teachers. It is critical that evacuations and relocations don’t cause the academic community to dissolve or scatter. Universities which prioritized people–their needs and their aspirations–have achieved the best results in maintaining a sense of community.

These, then, are the roles universities should play during times of war:

• Continue the educational and scientific process. In Ukraine, this was made possible through relocation domestically, classes in bomb shelters, remote learning, and partnerships with foreign campuses.

• Foster future human potential for the country’s post-war recovery. In Ukraine’s case,this meant analyzing the labor market, determining priority areas for the development of educational pro-

gramming, and conducting tandem courses with partners.

• Intellectual diplomacy. Ukraine’s universities are working to amplify the “visibility of the Ukrainian scientific community” in the European and global landscape.

• Formation of the Ukrainian scientific agenda. This took place through holding round tables, open lectures, conferences, and joint research.

Ukrainian universities continue their scientific work and educational process because they know they hold the academic and scientific front for the future of Ukrainian society. Victory requires more than just winning on the battlefield–it also lies in the minds of future generations. It requires we embrace democratic values, freedom, innovation, and sustainable development. Future growth will be driven by people who bring skills, creativity, and knowledge. Any future recovery is impossible without high-level human capital and education. Thus, the role that Ukraine’s universities play during this war–amid dire conditions–is critical to victory.

About the Authors:

Dr. Nina Chala is a Ukrainian researcher in economics and public administration.

Dr. Olga Voropai is a Ukrainian researcher in marketing and innovations.

Dr. Kateryna Pichyk is a Ukrainian researcher in economics and marketing.

Domestic and international stakeholders are focused on ensuring that Ukraine does not suffer a loss of knowledge and expertise due to the refugee wave.

Combating Human Trafficking in Ukraine

By Olexandr Komarov

Ukraine and its neighbors are experiencing a human trafficking crisis of historic proportions on the one-year anniversary of Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. State Department found that around four million people fled Ukraine during the first five weeks of Russia’s invasion, while another 6.5 million were internally displaced. Women and children make up around 90% of those who left the country and more than half of those displaced. This surge in numbers of vulnerable people means opportunities for human traffickers. Ukrainian trafficking victims in Europe are projected to increase by a factor of nine, and estimated Ukrainian asylum claims in Europe are projected to increase from around 5,000 to about 5,000,000, according to a recent United Nations report. While global human trafficking decreased during the pandemic, the UN report also identified Russia’s attack on Ukraine as

Photo via Adobe Stock.

one of two new factors driving human trafficking activity on a global scale.

The tragedy unfolding before our eyes in Ukraine is another illustration of how war creates the conditions for human trafficking to thrive. The key question is: “What can be done to stop it?”

The World Responds

The answer is that the consequences of Russia’s attack on Ukraine were anticipated by Ukraine and the global community, which together developed frameworks and took action to address this looming crisis. In May 2022, Ukraine and the United Nations signed a Framework of Cooperation to support prevention and response for conflict related sexual violence. Sixty-Five percent of human trafficking involves women, according to UN Women Europe. The NGO community has also risen to the challenge with the involvement of AllUkrainian Coalition of Public Organizations for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and support from 57 global NGOs who raised initial awareness with an open letter at the start of Russia’s invasion and have since taken efforts to counter the consequences.

Across Europe, the European Union instituted a Common Anti-Trafficking Plan in May 2022 under the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator to strengthen public awareness and set up dedicated hotlines, take steps to reinforce prevention measures, expand law enforcement and judiciary capabilities, improve identification, support, and protection for victims, and address trafficking risks in Ukraine and Moldova as non-EU states. EUROPOL coordinated efforts with 14 EU Member states to conduct a joint online “hackathon” to investigate, monitor, and track online platforms in order to identify criminal networks seeking to exploit Ukrainian refugees.

The Organization for Cooperation and Security (OSCE) in Europe has also assumed a leadership role on human trafficking and taken actions. Its BE SAFE campaign, led by the OSCE Special Representative and Co-Coordinator for Combating Human Trafficking and done in partnership with Thomson Reuters, is provid-

ing information to identify the warning signs of traffickers to minimize risks, provide knowledge of how and where to get assistance, including crisis hotlines in 12 European countries include Ukraine.

The Private Sector Must Play its Part

There is no doubt that the private sector must be an active and involved partner in combating human trafficking. It is doing so in a number of ways. The Global Business Coalition Against Human Trafficking is a voluntary, private sector led coalition of companies, including the Coca-Cola Corporation, Google, and Marriott International, that focuses on survivor empowerment, SME capability building, and helping to navigate existing resources. Companies like Facebook, BP, Microsoft, and others have engaged in efforts in the Asia-Pacific region in coordination with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime. Finally, hundreds of U.S. companies, including American Airlines, Amtrak, CSX, Greyhound, Delta Airlines, and UPS, have joined the U.S. Transportation Against Human Trafficking program to coordinate efforts. At Kyivstar, we are strongly supporting the BE SAFE campaign and have begun a program to send SMS messages to over 2 million Ukrainian customers in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Moldova to provide alerts on trafficking and to enable better coordination on anti-trafficking efforts.

Governments, international organizations, NGO’s, the private sector, and citizens have all responded to the call for action to address human trafficking as a result of Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine. It is critical that these efforts expand and deepen in the coming months. The private sector has a necessary and important role to play, and a moral and societal obligation to act, not only in Ukraine and neighboring countries, but in other troubled parts of the world where human trafficking grows. Collective action is making a difference in combating human trafficking, but we must do more.

About the Author: Olexandr Komarov is CEO of Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest telecommunications company.

Ukraine War Proves Difficult Test for Russia’s Military Alliance

By Wesley Culp

Destroyed Russian tanker in Ukraine.

Photo by Dmitry Bukhantsov via Unsplash.

COURIER

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has proved to be a deeply costly undertaking for the Russian armed forces in terms of materiel, manpower, and prestige. Along with it, the attention and bandwidth of the Russian state has increasingly been devoted to supporting the invasion. This has had consequences, not just in the redirection of state resources from domestic projects, but also in Russia’s existing network of military projects in Eurasia. In particular, 2022 was a true annus horribilis for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance of six states in the postSoviet space.

On the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the CSTO appeared to be at a zenith in its relevance as a security institution and in its cohesiveness. After mass protests exploded across Kazakhstan in the first days of 2022, Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev officially requested the deployment of CSTO peacekeepers to his country to shore up his government’s position. Tokayev’s request was premised on the supposed presence of foreign-trained “terrorist threats” in the unrest, which the CSTO Collective Security Council (made up of member-state heads of state) seized on to approve sending Collective peacekeeping forces to the country on 6 January 2022, a day after Tokayev made his appeal for assistance.

As the first such utilization of CSTO troops, this deployment appeared to inject new life into the bloc. While the bulk of the force dispatched to Kazakhstan was made up of Russian troops, it included contingents from the other five members (Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) of the bloc. As the protests dispersed and government buildings and infrastructure that had been seized by protesters retaken, the CSTO force departed as nimbly as it had come by mid-January. To the autocratic leaders in the bloc such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko, the defining lesson of the January 2022 episode in Kazakhstan was that the CSTO had proven itself as a

valuable tool in squashing unrest perceived to be Western-fomented (as Moscow often characterizes it to be).

However, time would quickly show that Kazakhstan’s 2022 unrest was not to be the CSTO’s main trial. Despite Putin’s dubious framing of the invasion of Ukraine as a defensive action, none of Russia’s CSTO allies agreed to become active participants in the invasion, with some going as far to directly swear off the possibility of taking part, sometimes even providing limited support to Ukraine themselves. In the first weeks of the war, Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council officially ruled out sending Kyrgyzstani troops to fight in any hypothetical CSTO operation in Ukraine. Kazakhstan also conclusively dismissed the possibility of participating in a CSTO mission in Ukraine, citing its respect for territorial integrity of states as a foundational element of its foreign policy. Tokayev’s government even went so far as to send humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Tajikistan and Armenia pointedly remained silent on the issue.

While Russia never publicly requested CSTO assistance with its invasion, the Kremlin possibly intended that it could play a role in a postwar settlement after a planned-for Russian victory. In March, Putin submitted a draft law on the ratification of the CSTO protocol adopted at the

To the autocratic leaders in the bloc such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko, the defining lesson of the January 2022 episode in Kazakhstan was that the CSTO had proven itself as a valuable tool in squashing unrest perceived to be Western-fomented (as Moscow often characterizes it to be).

organization’s September 2021 Dushanbe summit that would allow the CSTO to participate in UN peacekeeping missions as an organization. The timing of this submission in the first days of the Russian invasion possibly indicates that Moscow hoped that CSTO troops under Russian guidance would help police the settlement of what Russia expected would be a short, victorious adventure. However, even after the ratification of the protocol by the Federation Council and State Duma, this possibility of CSTO involvement in a Ukrainian peace settlement has not gained any traction, and the war remains far from over.

After the negative reaction of Russia’s CSTO treaty allies to Moscow’s invasion became abundantly clear, what was left of the visage of alliance cohesion was dispelled by two separate crises that placed immense pressure on the alliance treaty’s collective security article. The first of these was actually a continuation of a series of clashes between non-CSTO Azerbaijan and Armenia along their shared border (with major flare-ups in May, July, and November 2021) following Azerbaijan’s victory in a short but sharp war which saw Armenian and Armenian-backed separatist forces pushed out of much of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Major clashes in September 2022 saw Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan officially request military aid from its CSTO allies under Article 4 of the alliance’s foundational treaty, citing Azerbaijani attacks

on its sovereign territory. However, instead of its hoped-for CSTO force, Armenia’s request was instead met with a promise that a “fact-finding” mission would be dispatched to the region. Frustration with Russia and other CSTO members’ unwillingness to come to Armenia’s aid has sparked domestic calls for Armenia to buck the alliance, and Pashinyan pointedly refused in November to sign onto a draft declaration and “joint assistance measures” proposed by the CSTO in response to Armenia’s request, and Pashinyan announced in January 2023 that CSTO exercises could not occur in the near-term future on Armenian territory.

The other major test of the CSTO’s cohesion was the short and sharp border conflict fought by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on and off throughout the year, although the most serious escalation occurred almost simultaneously with the September flare-up between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Such clashes between the two CSTO members set off alarm bells in Moscow, with Vladimir Putin personally pressuring Dushanbe and Bishkek to agree to a ceasefire. Putin would subsequently host discussions in October between Kyrgyzstani President Sadyr Japarov and Tajikistani President Enomali Rahmon in October in an attempt to reach a settlement. Shortly before the mid-October talks, Kyrgyzstan officially canceled CSTO mid-October exercises it was due to host, and pulled out of the “Frontier-2022” exercises hosted by Tajikistan shortly thereafter. Nonetheless, Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister subsequently appealed to CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas for a “small peacekeeping force” to be deployed to the disputed border region to police the ceasefire between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Similar to Armenia’s case, this was not the first time the alliance had denied a Kyrgyzstani request for assistance in a moment of crisis.

The only CSTO state to arguably deepen its faith in the alliance and its military relationship with Russia over the course of last year is Belarus. Even before the February invasion, Belarus’ “multi-vector” foreign policy had been effectively discarded

After the negative reaction of Russia’s CSTO treaty allies to Moscow’s invasion became abundantly clear, what was left of the visage of alliance cohesion was dispelled by two separate crises that placed immense pressure on the alliance treaty’s collective security article.

as a result of Minsk’s diplomatic isolation in the wake of Lukashenko’s fraudulent reelection and heavy-handed suppression of protests in 2020. Belarus allowed Russia to launch the northern axis of its invasion from its territory and more recently has been host to a growing contingent of Russian troops in recent months, which stands in contrast to Lukashenko’s previous resistance to significant amounts of Russian troops being based in Belarus. However, while Minsk has called for the CSTO states to overcome their differences in order to strengthen the bloc, its military cooperation with Russia in the context of the Ukraine invasion has been on the basis of their unique “Union State” arrangement, separate from the CSTO. The most recent buildup of Russian troops in Belarus which began in earnest in the fall of 2022 under the Union State framework of a joint “regional group of forces,” rather than a CSTO formation such as the alliance’s Collective Rapid Reaction Forces.

Although trust in the CSTO’s ability to ensure collective security among the alliance’s non-Russian members is at a historical nadir, predictions that the bloc is set to break apart are premature. On a basic level, the events of 2022 starkly clarified the limits of what the CSTO can do on a collective basis. They ultimately revealed that the only actions the bloc can be expected to take collectively in its current state are those designed to suppress uprisings in member states. Nonetheless, as Russia’s

desired utilization of the CSTO as an instrument of a planned post-war settlement in Ukraine and the appeals of memberstates for alliance support show, member states have not resigned themselves to relegating the CSTO to a regime-security mechanism. Regional security realities and certain benefits to Russian security patronage reinforce the foundational durability of the CSTO as a bloc, despite the challenges of 2022. While the limited utility of the CSTO alliance has been revealed by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the regional crises which followed it, it is unlikely that the alliance will disappear as an entity in the foreseeable future.

About the Author: Wesley Culp is a Research Assistant for Defense Strategy and Great-Power Competition at the American Enterprise Institute.

Even before the February invasion, Belarus’ “multi-vector” foreign policy had been effectively discarded as a result of Minsk’s diplomatic isolation in the wake of Lukashenko’s fraudulent reelection and heavy-handed suppression of protests in 2020.

Ukraine’s Cyber-Defenses a Model for Our Cyber Future

By Tomer Saban & Andrea Bonime-Blanc

Photo via Unsplash.

One year on, Russia’s unprecedented war on Ukraine has featured several key cyber warfare lessons the rest of the world needs to take on. The war has been unprecedented because it is the first multi-dimensional war in which the kinetic aspect of war is so deeply intertwined with various forms of tech-enabled warfare including cyber, social media, disinformation, social engineering, robotics/drones, geospatial, satellite imagery, telecoms, and more.

These multi-dimensional technologies are not only available to national militaries but also to other stakeholders through various open-source intelligence methodologies (what is widely called “OSINT”). Witness the work of investigative journalism collective, Bellingcat, who are deploying multiple technologies, social media and oldfashioned sleuthing to reconstruct Russian war crimes, among other things.

The details of the military cyber warfare aspect of this war are not clear especially to those outside the military and governmental establishment. Yet the Ukrainian example can teach us valuable lessons. With these lessons, we can be more prepared, more protective of our stakeholders and assets, and more resilient moving into the future regardless of the sector we are in–business, NGO, or government.

The unfolding Ukrainian cyber-war story is a story of preparedness and continuous improvement. Indeed, it’s a master class in value-added resilience building.

Background to Cyber War: The Ukrainian Model

Ukraine has a history of being targeted by cyber-attacks, particularly from Russia, due to the almost decade-long conflict between the two countries. To defend against these attacks, Ukraine has developed a strong cyber-security culture and infrastructure in both the public and private sectors.

In the public sector, Ukraine has established a dedicated cyber-security agency,

the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection, which is responsible for protecting government networks and critical infrastructure. The agency works closely with other government bodies and international partners to share information and coordinate response efforts.

In the private sector, many Ukrainian companies have also invested in cyber-security, particularly in the IT, telecoms, and finance industries. These companies often have their own internal security teams and work with external security companies to protect their networks.

Additionally, Ukraine has a large pool of highly skilled and educated IT professionals. Thanks to this pool, Ukraine is one of the most sought-after countries for hiring remote skilled IT people, many of whom have experience working in cyber-security. This has helped to create a robust ecosystem of cyber-security expertise in the country.

Overall, Ukraine’s investment in both public and private sector cyber-security, along with its large pool of IT professionals, has helped the country to be relatively successful in fending off cyberattacks. Yet it is important to remember that no country is completely immune to cyberattacks, and Ukraine continues to experience numerous, sometimes successful cyber-attacks. Finally, and very importantly, the Ukrainian cyber-response to Russian aggression (to-

the Ukrainian example can teach us valuable lessons. With these lessons, we can be more prepared, more protective of our stakeholders and assets, and more resilient moving into the future regardless of the sector we are in–business, NGO, or government.

gether with the great example set for years by several of the Baltic nations) has had a critical influence on the U.S., EU nations, UK, and critical strategic alliances like NATO around the concept of cyber-readiness and resilience like nothing has before.

Ukrainian Cyber-Preparedness

In addition to its developed cyber talent and infrastructure ecosystem, Ukraine has employed various tactics to improve its cybersecurity posture. One such tactic is the use of cloud technology. This allows for the decentralization and redundancy of data storage, making it more difficult for attackers to target and disrupt. Additionally, partnerships with Western companies and the use of satellite internet provided by companies like SpaceX’s Starlink have provided a more resilient and diverse network infrastructure, which can help to mitigate the impact of a cyberattack.

Ukraine has also benefited from international support in the form of IT assistance and help in detecting Russian cyber threats. A recent £6 million package of support provided by the UK is an example. These types of partnerships can provide Ukraine with access to advanced technologies and

expertise, which can help to improve its overall cyber-security capabilities.

It was also reported that AWS cyber security experts and IT professionals trained Ukrainians in cyber security and that they shared intelligence on cyber threats, such as malware from “state actors”—from Russia and elsewhere—that could affect AWS customers in Ukraine.

Ukrainian cyber security agency head Yurii Shchyhol states that in the month following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, his agency registered almost three times more cyberattacks on Ukrainian resources and infrastructure compared to the same period the previous year. Shchyhol emphasizes the importance of sufficient funding for cyber defense, both at the national level and at private companies managing critical infrastructure, as well as the need for cyber hygiene at all levels and extensive international cooperation. These are important factors in helping to protect Ukraine against cyberattacks, but as the article notes, the situation is constantly changing, and the country continues to face new and evolving threats.

Possible Cyber-Scenarios

No one knows how the cyber-war portion of the Russia-Ukraine war will continue to manifest itself. There could yet be large scale cyber-attacks not only against Ukrainian targets but possibly ones against EU and U.S. targets as well.

The following are several possibilities:

• Bi-National Escalation: Cyber-attacks between the two countries could escalate, with both sides launching increasingly sophisticated and destructive attacks against each other’s critical infrastructure and government networks.

• National Cyber Sabotage: Russia could focus on sabotaging Ukraine’s economy by targeting its financial institutions and industries such as energy and transportation.

Ukraine’s investment in both public and private sector cyber-security, along with its large pool of IT professionals, has helped the country to be relatively successful in fending off cyberattacks. Yet it is important to remember that no country is completely immune to cyberattacks, and Ukraine continues to experience numerous, sometimes successful cyber-attacks.

• International Intervention and/or Escalation: Members of the international community such as the EU or NATO could become more involved in the conflict, potentially providing aid and support to Ukraine in its cyber defense efforts, beyond whatever it may be doing today.

• Stalemate: The situation could reach a stalemate, with both sides continuing to launch cyber-attacks against each other, but neither side gaining a significant advantage.

Out of these scenarios, the most likely outcome over the coming year is a continuation of the current situation, with both sides continuing to launch cyber-attacks against each other, but neither side gaining a significant advantage. However, it is important to note that the situation is constantly changing, making it nearly impossible to predict exactly what will happen.

Building a Cyber-Ready Future

Ukraine has built its cyber resilience under fraught conditions. Thus it should not be that difficult for those of us living and working under less dire conditions to learn from their example to build better readiness, preparedness, and willpower to cyber-defend our people and assets.

This means that leaders at the organizational level–companies, NGOs, universities–and governmental levels should deploy the following actionable tactics:

• Adequate Funding and Resources: Cyber defense should be adequately funded and resourced, at the organizational and at the national level.

• Cyber Education and Hygiene: Organizations should maintain good cyber hygiene, including regular software updates, employee training, and incident response plans.

• International Private/Public Cooperation: Organizations should

establish partnerships and seek support from international entities, such as government agencies and other organizations, to share intelligence and best practices.

• Redundancy and Backup: Organizations should have multiple layers of defense and have a disaster recovery plan in place to minimize downtime and data loss.

• Continual Monitoring. Updating and Improvement: Organizations should be vigilant and monitor their systems and networks constantly to detect and respond to cyber threats.

• Third-Party Security Vigilance: Organizations should also consider the security of their third-party vendors, partners, and contractors and have a plan in place to mitigate any potential risks associated with them.

Looking at the future, the good old days of “out of sight out of mind” no longer exist— if they ever did. Being reactive instead of proactive when a cyber-attack occurs or, what is worse, asleep at the cyber-switch or cyber-hibernating have never been options. There are only two options as the Ukrainian example has so dramatically taught us: vigilance and hypervigilance. Anything short is doomed to failure.

About the Authors:

Tomer Saban is the CEO and co-founder of WireX Systems, before which he worked in the homeland security space, developing defense systems for intelligence agencies.

Dr. Andrea Bonime-Blanc is the Founder and CEO of GEC Risk Advisory, a global ESG and cyber strategist, board member, life-member of the Council on Foreign Relations, international keynote speaker and author of several books and many articles.

How Ukraine Can Defeat Russia in 2023

By Mark Temnycky

DIPLOMATIC COURIER

Photo by Rostislav Artov via Unsplash.

As the Russian invasion approaches its one-year anniversary, the war has been devastating. The Russian incursion has ravaged countless cities and villages. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians have perished, and one-fourth of Ukraine’s population has been displaced. In 2022, Ukraine’s economy shrank by 32% due to the war, and economic experts predict it will take $1 trillion to rebuild the country.

The Russians have also incurred heavy losses. To date, over 130,000 Russian soldiers have died in the war. Many more have become injured. In addition, the Russians have lost tens of billions of dollars in military equipment. Despite these losses, the needless Russian invasion continues without an apparent end.

But there is reason to believe that Ukraine will win the war. This could happen as early as 2023.

When the Russian invasion began, several countries hesitated to send aid to Ukraine. They were still determining how long the Ukrainians would last. Meanwhile, numerous Western media outlets reported Ukraine’s collapse was imminent.

The Ukrainians proved them wrong. In the initial months of the war, they successfully held the Russian invaders at bay. Then, in April 2022, the Ukrainians launched a series of counter-offensives. To date, Ukrainian armed forces have successfully pushed out the Russians in northern Ukraine, and they reclaimed thousands of square miles of their territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. This determination to defend their homeland showed the world the Ukrainians would not back down. This inspired the international community to support Ukraine’s cause by providing it with foreign aid and equipment. As a result, the international community has now sent hundreds of billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine. This has made all the difference.

Based on these successes, how can Ukraine continue this momentum in 2023? How and why will the Ukrainians win?

Momentum is on Ukraine’s Side

First, Russia is running out of weapons and ammunition. Military analysts have noted that as the war continues, the Russians varied their deployment of weapons. To these experts, it indicates a Russian shortage of modern equipment. The Russians are apparently relying on older and outdated equipment. For example, in an interview with BBC, military expert Douglas Barrie of the International Institute for Strategic Studies said that there has been an “increased use of a variety of missiles against land targets.” Sir Jeremy Fleming, head of the British intelligence agency GCHQ concurred, stating that Russian “supplies and munitions are running out.”

This would explain why Russia began buying arms from North Korea and Iran. International sanctions on these three countries have made it more difficult for Russia to replenish its stockpiles. Russia’s, North Korea’s, and Iran’s interactions with the international community is limited, meaning they will have less access to the global supply chain for equipment. Limited interactions with the international community mean Russia will not be able to receive the items needed to repair and replenish its weapons. In other words, time is running out for Russia.

Second, the international community has started to increase its weapons supply to

To date, Ukrainian armed forces have successfully pushed out the Russians in northern Ukraine, and they reclaimed thousands of square miles of their territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. This determination to defend their homeland showed the world the Ukrainians would not back down.

Ukraine. As the war has progressed, the globe has slowly supplied the Ukrainians with better equipment. Prior to the second invasion in 2022, the Ukrainians interacted frequently with NATO members in a series of exercises between 2014-2022. The Ukrainians learned from their counterparts, and they implemented significant defense reforms. These changes, in addition to Western weaponry, have played significant roles in the war. Providing the Ukrainians with modern equipment will allow them to continue their successful counter-offensives and accelerate the speed at which the Ukrainians are able to reclaim their territory.

Ukrainian tactics and logistics also contributed to their continued success. To date, the Ukrainians successfully repelled Russian attacks on Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa. The Ukrainians recently liberated Kherson, the only major metropolitan area Russia captured during the second invasion in 2022. They have also reclaimed “half of the land [captured by Russian forces] in eastern and southern Ukraine.” As Ukrainians continue to push into Russian-occupied territory, they will eventually cut off Russian supply chains between the east and south. This would significantly contribute to a Ukrainian victory.

Third, the Ukrainians will win this war because of their resilience and grit. Throughout the invasion, the Ukrainians have shown courage. They have successfully repelled an invasion by the world’s secondstrongest military force. The Ukrainians have shown continued motivation and resilience. As the war went on, they liberated

thousands of square miles of their territory from Russian forces. They have been greeted by Ukrainian citizens with open arms, and messages from their country men and women inspire them to continue defending their homeland. Finally, they have shown determination. For hundreds of years, Ukraine was ruled by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This country is familiar with Russia’s brutality, and the Ukrainians want to rid themselves of their imperialist neighbor. In other words, the Ukrainians are willing to die for their freedom. They will not back down until their country is fully liberated. This includes the Russian-occupied territories in Crimea and the Donbas, land that Russia has illegally controlled since the spring of 2014.

Momentum, Morale Against Russia

In contrast, the Russian military has performed poorly throughout the war. It took them several months to capture significant territory in Ukraine, only to lose this land to Ukrainian forces in a matter of weeks and days. Moreover, the Russians have incurred significant casualties. Over 100,000 soldiers have been killed or injured, and hundreds of officers have died. This has contributed to a significant decline in Russian morale. In an attempt to resolve this problem, the Russian government announced a partial mobilization of 300,000 conscripts. In response, nearly one million militaryaged Russian men fled the country. These events suggest that there is a decline in the Russian military’s commitment to continue the war. Should this continue, this may further accelerate an end to the war.

In short, 2023 is a pivotal year in the war, and it is extremely important that Russia does not win. If the Russians are successfully able to capture significant territory in Ukraine, and if the international community reduces its aid to Ukraine, it will send a message to other authoritarian leaders around the world. It would suggest oppressive rulers and their regimes can invade other countries without consequence, and it will make the world a more dangerous place.

The Ukrainians learned from their counterparts, and they implemented significant defense reforms. These changes, in addition to Western weaponry, have played significant roles in the war.

Therefore, not only is it important that Russia loses this war, but it is also critical that Ukraine wins it. Ukraine winning the war would inform authoritarian leaders they must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbors. Should they violate international law, these regimes will be punished to the fullest extent, and they will be isolated from the international community.

“To achieve peace tomorrow, Ukraine needs more weapons today,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said during the World Economic Forum in Davos. “NATO Allies … will continue [to support Ukraine] for as long as it takes—for Ukraine’s sake, and ours.”

Russian munition stores are depleting, Ukrainians are receiving more and better weapons from the international community, and the Ukrainians are determined to end the war. Time and momentum are on Ukraine’s side, and the Ukrainians appear to be in a good position to end, and win, the war in 2023.

About the Author: Mark Temnycky is an accredited freelance journalist covering Eastern Europe and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

When Will the West’s Ukraine Aid Cross the Line for Russia?

By Ethan Brown

Photo by Taine Noble via Unsplash.

Proxy engagement is a challenging tool in deterring bad actors and international aggression, and yet the alternatives—direct confrontation or failing to respond to aggression—are even more dangerous. What remains unknown is whether or not Ukraine, and through it, the West, can deter ongoing Russian aggression without overplaying their hand and making things even worse.

The Ukraine crisis served as a critical pivot for Western grand strategy once Russia invaded on 24 February 2022. This war and the response by the West begs questions on whether or not the liberal order can sustain these kinds of reactive, proxy confrontations without inviting escalation with strategic competitors. History recalls that limited engagement by the West in foreign conflict often devolves into wider confrontation, when end states have not been established by policy. The post-colonial Vietnam front in the Cold War and the seminal proxy conflict between Communism and the free world on the Korea peninsula serve as evidence of this failure to define end states in proxy conflicts.

Historical lessons on limited engagement and proxy conflict show they can and often do produce a singular result: war, albeit to varying degrees of severity and cost. In the case of Korea and Vietnam, these limited initial interventions devolved into full-scale war. Whether the West can avoid the same result as it shapes policy in 2023 remains the unanswered question as the conflict in Ukraine remains far from over.

How Much Support is Enough?

Russia’s unbridled aggression, revanchist policies, and the crisis on NATO’s flank demanded decisive, constructive action, albeit after the fact. The West had to respond, if for no better rationale than inaction would embolden aggression in the future. Failure to deter Russian action through consequences following incursions into Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 are evidence of this reality.

The West’s response in Ukraine was swift and sweeping indeed. Economic pressure

and financial isolation against Moscow were unparalleled in history. Billions of dollars in global aid were provided to equip and sustain Ukrainian defense forces. And NATO and the West writ large forged a deeper unity.

But the guardrails in the West—when it comes to containing the level of engagement—seem to be widening, and therein lies the potential for confrontation. Early in the conflict, President Biden stated unequivocally that weapons which could be used to target deep into Russian territory would not be sent to Ukraine. Then such weapons were sent to Ukraine in June. The initial aid packages to Ukraine between March and the summer included personal protective equipment, ammunition, and medical supplies, along with communications and sustainment equipment. More recently, NATO partners have announced they plan to send tanks, armored vehicles, and expanded munitions inventories to assist with repelling the Russian invaders who have been fighting on their back foot since before the winter.

It matters little in Russia’s strategic perspective if the West stops short of sending NATO forces into Ukraine to fight the Russian forces. What Russia sees is the whole of the West committing incredible resources to Ukraine to fight Russia on the West’s behalf. To set the conditions for this “special military operation,” Moscow employed clan-

The West’s response in Ukraine was swift and sweeping indeed. Economic pressure and financial isolation against Moscow were unparalleled in history. Billions of dollars in global aid were provided to equip and sustain Ukrainian defense forces. And NATO and the West writ large forged a deeper unity.

destine and mercenary forces to destabilize the region ahead of invasion. Conversely, the West has employed Ukraine as its proxy to fight Russia.

What End State?

This continued expansion of security aid to Ukraine is simply explained: there are no clear objectives for an end state in the Ukraine conflict, and the West has invested much in this conflict without considering the implications of the blank checks it has signed. Lacking a roadmap—with clear, realistic, achievable goals and a means to get there—there is no incentive for Ukraine to think it needs to stop at reclaiming its borders.

NATO, the United States, Europe, the West writ large has not implemented a scope on this endeavor, and the aid increases apace. The West’s support is increasing despite the territorial gains made by Ukrainian defense forces, who are of course simply fighting to retake and secure their homeland. Yet those widening guardrails on Western aid may embolden Ukraine to expand the conflict beyond a reasonable scope.

For a collective international apparatus of states wanting to avoid conflict with Russia while defeating Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, the West has omitted constraint from the process. These questions must guide the policy-making process and Western strategy going forward: what is the end state desired, what are the necessary tools to get there, and how will it achieve this in 2023 without fomenting direct confrontation with an isolated, desperate Moscow?

Rhetoric matters a great deal here, especially in an age of competition—the new buzzword for potential conflict—where disinformation remains one of Russia’s strongest tools. And even though the West truly wishes to avoid confrontation with Russia, its competitors in Moscow have consistently twisted the public narrative to make themselves appear to be the victims of Western escalation. In foreign minister Sergei Lavrov’s own words: “When Western partners deny, foaming at the mouth, that they are not at war with Russia,

they are lying. The volume of support rendered by the West shows that it has staked a great deal on its war against Russia.”

Necessary Evil

Russian public rhetoric can parlay words as well as any institution. But it knows that this is a war, and that it illegally invaded Ukraine without due provocation. Yet Moscow also sees the West’s whole-of-body engagement and sponsorship of Ukraine in this conflict as a near-direct engagement between the East and West. Just as bizarrely valid in this era of information shaping, Russia sees itself as the stable, reasonable actor that is trying to avoid escalated conflict with the West and end this “war” in Ukraine as soon as possible.

It is necessary for the West to support Ukraine’s efforts to defeat Russia, and see its own sovereignty assured. Kyiv cannot fight this war alone, and will depend on its benefactors in Washington, Brussels, and European capitals for the foreseeable future.

There is little debate on whether the liberal order should be involved in deterring authoritarian aggression. But it will be unlikely, if not impossible, to contain the scope of this conflict if the West continues to expand its support for Ukraine without consideration for the implications of boundless proxy intervention. This will remain true if the West fails to determine collectively, publicly, and clearly what the end state is for Ukraine. Failure to do so could result in a repeat of history, in which engagement inevitably expanded—and devolved—into confrontation. *****

About the Author: Ethan Brown is a Senior Fellow at the Mike Rogers Center and the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. He is an 11-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force as a Special Operations Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

Ayear has passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. While the valiant Ukrainian resistance has undoubtedly dealt a strategic blow to Putin’s imperialist ambitions, the fact remains that this conflict produces only losers. First and foremost, Ukraine and its people are paying the highest price of this war–that of the blood shed under the invader’s blows. The civilian casualties are frightening, as is the level of destruction in the cities under Russian fire. Other losers include Europe, developing countries, the global economy, the Russian people, and respect for humanitarian law, among others.

What Kind of Peace in Ukraine? Lessons from Recent History

By Richard Rousseau

Experts predict that this war will last for a long time. Yet how long can Ukraine, despite its valor, continue to repel wave after wave of invaders from a Russian army that seems to have almost inexhaustible human capital and no regard for humanitarian considerations?

Wishful thinking about regime collapse in the Kremlin isn’t a strategy for ending the war. So all that remains is negotiation to end the conflict. Such negotiations are already being advocated by third-party states that support the belligerents directly or indirectly. However, for negotiation to be a viable strategy, these third-party states must be willing to see it through to completion, be-

Photo by Jared Phillips via Unsplash.

ginning with the imposition of a cease-fire. Unfortunately, we are still a long way from there. To make matters worse, when the aggressor is a permanent member of the Security Council, the veto system paralyzes UN peacekeeping mechanisms, as it did during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Looking to History for Inspiration

Can recent history point us in the direction of a possible scenario for de-escalation, a cease-fire, and a return to lasting peace? There are several historical examples which don’t help.

Referring to the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, French President Immanuel Macron said it is important to avoid humiliating Russia overly. This concern seems irrelevant, however, as it assumes a highly unlikely Russian military defeat and economic collapse.

An agreement borrowing from the 1938 Munich Agreement in Czechoslovakia also seems unlikely to be useful. Such an agreement would recognize Russia’s current territorial gains in exchange for a guarantee of non-expansion. However, the Munich Agreement didn’t satisfy Hitler’s appetite for conquest and wider war followed. The failure of the Munich Agreement was really the start of World War II. The agreement had the capacity and backing to end the war before it truly began, but failed due to its weak and poorly managed implementation.

What about other models? The Korean Armistice, signed in 1953 between the United Nations, China, and North Korea, effectively ended hostilities but was not followed by a peace treaty. Negotiations took two years. Tensions on the Korean peninsula remain high even after seventy years.

The Paris Peace Accords, signed in January 1973 after a five-year negotiation process, formally ended hostilities between the United States and North Vietnam. It didn’t stop South Vietnamese forces from fleeing, Saigon from falling, or the Americans from leaving quickly in April 1975.

The Dayton Agreement, signed in Paris in December 1995, brought an end to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which began in 1992. It authorized the country’s division into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The extremely complex management of relations between the various entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the authority of the international High Representative makes the country unstable, and the temptation of Serbian secession remains.

What about the Minsk Agreements signed in September 2014 and February 2015 to end the conflict in the Donbas? Is it possible to imagine a Minsk III? Is there any reason to believe that with a little goodwill and a lot of political pressure, it might work this time? It’s difficult to imagine.

Would it be preferable to halt NATO expansion, including into Sweden and Finland, in exchange for Russian troop withdrawal and Ukraine’s neutral status? Is Russian intervention solely motivated by NATO expansion?

There are many unknowns and few certainties. One of those few certainties is that complex treaty provisions are negotiated over long periods of time with limited political opportunities. The coming months will be crucial. Who will triumph in the conflict between the desire for empire and the desire for Europe? Who will benefit from the time constraint? Who will be able to sustain and impose sanctions in the long run? The answers to these questions will shape Europe’s future for decades. *****

About the Author: Dr. Richard Rousseau is an international relations expert. He was formerly a professor and head of political science departments at universities in Canada, France, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates.

Imagining a Postwar Russia

By Nikola Mikovic

Photo by Sasha Matveeva via Unsplash.

One year since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his socalled special military operation in Ukraine, the Kremlin has not achieved any of its military and political goals in the Eastern European country. Judging by the current developments on the ground, especially the increased Western weapon supply to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Moscow’s defeat seems inevitable. But what will be the fate of a postwar Russia?

On 24 February 2022, Putin said Russia aims to “protect the Donbas,” “denazify and demilitarize” Ukraine, and force Kyiv to accept a neutral status, which means it would officially give up on its NATO aspirations. One year later, significant parts of the Donbas are still under Ukrainian control, and civilians on both sides of the frontline have learned to live under constant artillery fire. Despite Putin’s alleged ambitions to demilitarize Ukraine, the Eastern European nation’s armed forces continue receiving all kinds of weapons from around the globe. Moreover, on 30 September 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy submitted an “accelerated” application to join the NATO military alliance.

In other words, the opposite of what Putin announced on 24 February 2022 has happened. But what will happen if the Westernbacked Ukraine manages to eventually defeat the Russian military and establish full control over its territories occupied by Russia, including Crimea?

Looking to the Future

Authorities in a postwar Russia will almost certainly have to recognize Ukraine’s 1991 borders. Since Kyiv has already started filing cases against suspected Russian war criminals, a postwar Russia will likely have to extradite them either to Ukraine or to the Hague. Moscow will also be under pressure to compensate Ukraine for the damage caused by the full-scale Russian invasion. If Russian policy makers and strategic planners do decide to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, Kyiv and quite possibly the West will firmly insist on “denuclearization” of the Russian Federation after the war.

The Western powers, for their part, are not expected to completely lift all the sanctions they imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, at least while Putin is in charge in the Kremlin. Meanwhile, sanctions will continue to have a serious impact on the Russian economy. As a result, Moscow may not be in a position to continue buying stability in its restive regions—from the North Caucasus to the Ural Mountains—which means that separatist movements all over Russia will begin to grow.

On 7 January 2023, the Congress of Supporters of Ingushetia’s Independence was held in Istanbul. Its representatives made a statement in which they emphasized the necessity of “consolidating the Ingush society around the idea of independence, as well as striving to preserve cultural and religious identity.” Since the Ukrainian parliament recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as an independent state in October 2022, it is entirely possible that Ukraine will be the first country to recognize the independence of Ingushetia—a republic of the Russian Federation located in the North Caucasus.

Given that the Russian North Caucasus republics of Chechnya and Dagestan—where ethnic minorities make up the majority of the population—remain heavily dependent on subsidies from the federal government, an economic crisis in Russia could lead to destabilization of the regions. Presently, the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, remains loyal to Putin, but a Russian defeat in Ukraine could easily break his alliance with the Kremlin, and lead to a Third Chechen War.

The central government of a postwar Russia will undoubtedly have to find a way to improve relations with the West, since remaining under isolation will additionally jeopardize Russia’s position in the global arena.

A postwar Russian government will likely have a hard time preserving Tatarstan—a region in the east-central part of European Russia where ethnic Tatars make up 53% of the population—in Moscow’s political orbit. Tatarstan is the only region of Russia that is still led by a president, even though in October 2021 the Russian State Duma passed legislation required all regional leaders to go by the official title “glava“ (head) instead of president. The incumbent leader of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov, will be named “president” until his term of office expires in 2025. After that, the new name of the top official in Tatarstan will be “the head - Rais of the Republic of Tatarstan,” or “Rais of the Republic of Tatarstan” (“rais” is an Arabic term meaning “leader”). Such a symbolic move indicates that the process of derussification of Tatarstan has already begun.

Tatarstan has formed two battalions that are taking part in Putin’s war in Ukraine. Their names are in Tatar, rather than in Russian— ”Alga” and “Timer,” meaning “forward” and “iron”—which is not surprising given that Tatarstan authorities seem to want to improve the prominence of the Tatar language in the region. In November 2022, a picket was held in Kazan, the republic’s capital, demanding the equality of the Tatar and Russian languages. One of the posters read: “Tatars demand the return of compulsory study of the Tatar language!” A Russian defeat in Ukraine could lead not only to more demands regarding the status of the Tatar language, but also regarding the very status of the region.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the predominantly Muslim republic held a referendum in 1992 in which most residents voted in favor of becoming a “sovereign state.” Tatarstan remained a subject of the Russian Federation, where foreign policy is run by the country’s foreign ministry and president. But amid the Ukraine War in 2022, its leader, Minnikhanov, made several official visits to various nations. In December, he met with Qatari officials, as well as with Kazakhstan’s President KassymJomart Tokayev. Previously, in November, he traveled to Azerbaijan to meet with the South Caucasus country’s President Ilham Aliyev. Such visits indicate that Tatarstan attempts to

develop close ties with Muslim states, which is a path that many other leaders of Russian “ethnic republics” could follow.

The central government of a postwar Russia will undoubtedly have to find a way to improve relations with the West, since remaining under isolation will additionally jeopardize Russia’s position in the global arena. Regardless of the war with NATO-backed Ukraine, some members of Putin’s elite have managed to preserve ties with certain Western countries. For instance, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s grandson lives in Latvia, while the country’s Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova’s granddaughter lives in Spain. Also, Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s son lives in France, while a grandson of Viktor Zolotov, the Director of the National Guard of Russia, lives in England. Moreover, several Russian oligarchs have strong business links either directly with Western nations, or with countries that are politically close to the West, namely Israel and Turkey. Thus, in order to protect their own business interests, they are expected to push the Kremlin to normalize relations with the United States and the European Union.

If the US and the EU aim to eventually incorporate Russia into what former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski once described as a “cooperative larger West,” sooner or later Moscow, Washington, and Brussels will need to become partners again. However, Russia will first have to go through a radical transformation that may include “deputinization” of the country. And that will be the final result of Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.

About the Author: Nikola Mikovic is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia covering foreign policy in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.