Middle East Studies Issue 6 Summer 2011 by Middle East Studies دراسات الشرق الأوسط

Middle East Studies issn 2109-9618

Middle East Studies Online Journal : Volume 3 -Issue6 3 ‫ المجلد‬6 ‫دراسات الشرق األوسط العدد‬ Editor-in-Chief : Hichem Karoui

2011

HTTP://WWW.MIDDLE-EAST-STUDIES.NET

Middle East Studies Online Journal Volume: 3 – Issue: 6 – Summer 2011 Editor-in-Chief : Hichem Karoui ‫دراسات الشرق األوسط‬ 3122 ‫المجلد الثالث – العدد السادس – صيف‬ ‫ هشام القروي‬:‫رئيس التحرير‬

Acknowledgements

This issue of Middle East Studies Online Journal would not have been possible without the goodwill and the dedicated work of several colleagues from the Board who gave their time to read and review the research papers and advise the authors and the Editor. I mention especially: Anna Piela, Saddek Rabah, Rachana Kaushal, Nadeem Omar Tarar, Adis Duderija, Philippe Jourdon, Amir Sheikhzadegan, Kassem Bahaji, Konrad Pedziwiatr, Dina Matar, Lena Jayyusi, Alaa el-Shamy, Susanne Olsson, Tahir Abbas, Khalid Al-Azri. Many thanks to all and to everyone who helped in the production of this issue. The Editor.

Contents Conference: Change in Syria is certain.The Regime is Teetering........... 3 Research Papers ................................................................................................ Issam A.W. Mohamed: Economics of Water Use for Commodity Production in Scarcity Arid Regions: Kutum, Darfur ................................. 9 Bedrudin Brljavac:Turkey Entering the European Union through the Balkan Doors In the Style of a Great Power? ............................................. 29 Majid Rafizadeh: The Unrecognized Social Movements: One Million Signature Campaign and the Islamist State of Iran....................................47 Afzalkhani, M., Naderi, E., Shariatmadari, A., and Seif Naraghi, M.: Developing High School Curriculum Based on Creativity................79 Pepijn van Houwelingen: “Refugeeism” and the Two-State Solution ..........................................................................................................................103 Akbar Valadbigi and Shahab Ghobadi: Rethinking social capital and civil society. Reflections from the recent uprisings of the Middle East ………………………………………………………………….......129 Daniel R. Fredrick: Lions Leading Lions. An Explication of the Speeches of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai, United Arab Emirates......................................................145 Bassam Abdullah Albassam: Political Reform in Saudi Arabia. Necessity or Luxury ?…………...…………………………………..175 Scott A. Albers and Andrew L. Albers: The Golden Mean, The Arab Spring And a 10-Step Analysis of American Economic History........ 199 Balqis Al-Karaki: A Poetic „Write!‟ vs. a Qur‟anic„Read!‟ The Prophetic Anxiety of Mahmüd Darwısh....................................................................253

Riyad Manqoush, Noraini Md. Yusof, and Ruzy Suliza Hashim: Amplifications of Religious Fundamentalism in Fiction. Al-Saqqaf‟s Qissat Irhabi vs Updike‟s Terrorist .........................................................297 Faten Karoui –Bouchoucha: Réalisme et Utopie dans la pensée politique de Spinoza……………………………………………… 319 Scott James Meyer: Transitional Human Rights. Hope For Egypt and the Region...................................................................................................... 345 Abir M.A. al-Ghandour: :‫ جدلية بدائل التوجه السياس ى التركي املعاصر‬Dialectical Alternatives to Contemporary Turkish Political Orientation: A ForwardLooking Study (Arabic).............................................................................361 Afaq Muhammad Sadiq Abu al-Rish: ‫ظاهرة الطرق الصوفية العابرة للقوميات‬ ً"ً‫"الطريقة البرهانية فى السودان نموذجا‬

Transnational Sufi phenomenon.

The Burhaaniyyah model in Sudan............................................................395

Perspectives ........................................................................................................ Abdelilah Bouasria: The Boutchichi order and the Politics of Jouissance......................................................................................................421 Sherry Sayed Gadelrab and Robert Mason: Inverting the Pyramid. The Challenges of Transition from Pharaoh to People Power in Egypt…429 Ibrahim Y. Vaid: Saudi Women and Entrepreneurship. Opportunities in Architecture and Interior Design............................................................445

Book Reviews ..................................................................................................... Majid Rafizadeh: Life as Politics. How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Asef Bayat)............................................................................461 Majid Rafizadeh: Sexual Politics of Modern Iran (Janet Afary)..........467 Last word.......................................................................................

Nabil al Sahli: Palestinians of 48 facing a storm Judaizing time and place ‫ في مواجهة عاصفة تهويد الزمان والمكان‬44 ‫ فلسطينيو‬.............................469

Change in Syria is Certain The Regime is Teetering

r Azmi Bishara, Director of the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar (the Doha Institute, ACRPS), expressed his conviction that regime change in Syria was a certainty. In this regard, Bishara said, the Syrian regime was teetering and would have to face the same fate as other Arab governments. In his opening statement which he made at the beginning of a meeting the Center organized on July 30-31, 2011 in Doha under the title of "Syria: Choices and Interests and the Possibility of Change", Bishara opined that there was no real question of regime change in Syria, but rather "the type of regime change and the way in which it would take place". Bishara underscored how a repetition of the Tunisian and Egyptian models, where the military took the side of the protesters, was unlikely, however. The Syrian authorities were already working, according to Bishara, at splitting up the Syrian people through fomenting sectarian divisions in an effort to thwart popular unrest, alongside their violent suppression of the protests.

Bishara also expressed the view that the Iraqi-Libyan scenario was equally unlikely in the Syrian case, for a number of reasons. The primary obstacle to this scenario is in the revolutionary movement itself: the Syrian people know only too well how such situations pan out, and they do not want to lend credence to the regime's charge that they are following an international conspiracy. ACRPS General Director Bishara went on to explain that this conference should not be seen as an opposition convention, but rather as a venue for prominent intellectuals and scholars to present a vision and discuss ways in which a peaceful transition might be possible. As a result, the attendees were carefully selected amongst to form a group who had demonstrated clear, deep knowledge of the situation in Syria, in order to explore the current situation there and the potential prospects from various perspectives. Bishara further expressed the view that change was necessary in the Arab reality, due to the nature of despotic regimes in the region, the political structure of the ruling elites, and the way in which the governments used military might to retain their grip on power. The Arab people, on the other hand, have simply lost the will to be subjected to that kind of rule under their repressive regimes. Bishara noted that there would have to be a difference between one Arab country and the next in the shape that these revolutions took. One of the crucial differences between Syria and other countries was that its despotic regime relied on a political ideology with a particular following and which had a legacy and its societal base. In the past, the vision presented by that party attracted a number of followers, who hoped to achieve that vision which they presented. Yet the regime in power had lost its course, and had instead chosen to build its alliances with businessmen and capitalists who were drenched in a miasma of corruption; that regime went on to use repression to silence its critics. Bishara emphasized that while there may have been some acts of self-defense during the revolution so far, it was by its nature a

peaceful movement. Such a movement, born of the Syrian people and having lasted for more than four months, and which has spread to every corner of the country, has set a new precedent for a peaceful mass uprising. The situation on the ground today was that the people were continuing their struggle while the government was steadily losing its grip on power. The recent partial liberalization and increased openness in the way in which the Syrian government treated the opposition was an indication, said Dr Bishara, of the success of the revolution. Dr Bishara went on to claim that denying these partial gains would be to deny the revolution some of its victories. Bishara then went on to address the question of the intellectuals and writers, the Syrian revolution as well as the Arab revolutions. who serve the regime. The ACRPS Director presented the view that the "regime intellectuals" had been shown to be morally bankrupt by the wave of revolutions in the Arab Spring. No longer could they justify the despotic regimes which they supported on the basis of value premises, but instead could only defend them using Machiavellian arguments about the regime's intransigence and resistance to change. Likewise, however, a number of other thinkers and intellectuals who have championed a supposedly revolutionary cause for decades have also been left shocked, confused and speechless by these revolutions, which have not taken the form they expected. Bishara invited the participants not to rush to ideological judgments with regards to the revolutions; the people, he said, had come out demanding an end to tyranny, and so the best and only way to satisfy them would be to bring about democracy. The Social Class Dynamics of the Popular Revolt The first day of the conference also saw four different sessions, with the attendance of a number of well-known intellectuals and scholars from Syria and abroad. These included Haitham Manaa, Aref Dalila, Al Tayeb Tayzini, Salam Al-Kawakibi, Burhan Ghalyun, Mohammed Makhlouf, Hassan Chalabi, Samir Taqi, Samir Awdat as well as others.

The first session was set aside to discuss the nature of social movements which were taking part in the Syrian uprising, with special attention paid to the class dynamics, as well as try to understand the socio-economic and civil dimensions which bred resentment. The participants who contributed to these discussions spoke of the socio- economic factors which set the protest movement alight, focusing on the spread of poverty and the destruction of the middle classes, as a result of a system which lavished benefits on businessmen who had clientist relations with the regime but which left all others behind. The same participants also discussed, however, how the demands of the revolution quickly developed to become political; the root causes of unrest may have been economic, but they were no longer so. Dr Haitham Manaa made clear in his contribution to the proceedings that the Syrian people remained committed to fighting all signs of sectarianism, despite the authorities' efforts to bring about a sectarian rift. As far as he was concerned, there were three red lines which the revolutionary movement would not cross: there would be no violence; there would be no sectarianism; and there would be no foreign intervention. The regime on the other hand, according to Manaa, was doing its utmost to break the will of the revolutionaries in a number of ways. The regime is accusing the protesters of violence, as well as sectarianism and it is blaming them for complicity with foreign conspiracies in its attempts to shame and silence the revolutionaries. Jamal Barout, another participant, spoke of the socio-economic situation which the Syrian regime had produced over 40 years of its rule, making the point that the distribution of wealth in Syria was lacking the kind of legitimacy which would be gained from social justice. The poverty rate in Syria had in fact, according to Barout, risen from 11.5% to 34.3% over the past decade. The Nature of the Syrian Regime and the Possibility of Change The second session of the conference was dedicated to an analysis of the popular unrest in Syria, its demands and the composition of the movement. It also examined the nature of the Syrian regime,

its economic pillars and its amenability to change. The session went on to discuss the relationship between the Baath Party, the army and the security services. The conclusion to this second session, which was chaired by Wajih Kawtharani, was that any change in Syria which kept the present regime in power would not be enough to do away with the single-party state, and thus would not achieve the aim of establishing a pluralistic democracy. The Role of the Syrian Opposition The first day's third session revolved around the opposition's role and went on to evaluate its performance in the popular movements, as well as the opposition's ability to help shape a vision of a future Syria. In the fourth and final session, the participants discussed the probability of change and the role which might be played by world powers, with the discussions focusing on the roles of the United States and France in the Syrian popular uprising; the same needed to be considered, said the participants, with regards to the roles of Turkey, Iran and the Arab states. The same session also went on to discuss the Syrian confrontation with Israel through the resistance groups in Lebanon, and what role this confrontation would play in the unfolding revolution. The Center's conference on "Syria: Choices and Interests and the Possibility of Change" concluded on Sunday, 31 July in a roundtable seesion chaired by Dr Azmi Bishara, the General Director of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Source: Doha Institute (ACRPS)

Economics of Water Use for Commodity Production in Scarcity Arid Regions: Kutum, Darfur By: Issam A.W. Mohamedď&#x20AC;Ş Abstract: This paper investigates water use in a rural village in semi-arid of Darfur region. Water use is viewed from the perspective of four production sectors: agriculture, rural industry, trade and services as well as domestic: drinking, cooking and sanitary uses. Water for these uses may be from three sources: rain water, surface water, and groundwater. This study focuses on groundwater. Results of a detailed survey indicate that groundwater use is dominated by agricultural activities including irrigated vegetables and grains, tree crops, and animal rearing. A ratio of water use to income generated is used as a measure of water intensity that can be compared across activities and commodities. Agricultural commodities, especially irrigated vegetables, grains and trees, are shown to be the most water intensive. The results provide useful background information for the development of predictive models and water conservation strategies. It presents an analysis of water use in a droughtinflicted of Darfur. That represents the preliminary findings of a research project whose objective is to assess the implications of alternative rural development scenarios for water use and water scarcity. Key-words: Sudan economy, water use, Darfur, Agriculture, developing countries

ď&#x20AC;Ş

Professor Doctor, Faculty of Commerce, Economics and Social Studies and Dean of the Nile Basin Research Center at Alneelain University.

Introduction

he global picture of Darfur region is a gloomy one as shown by civil war, massacres, heavily armed rebels and rife destitute. However, there is life, economic activities and hopes for development. Water is a limiting factor as scarce production input in the region. That is even with reports of massive untapped underground resources that lie under the surface of the region. Additionally, there are many Wadis that bring massive amounts of surface water that have the potential of supporting agriculture as a dominant economic activity 1 . The current paper attempts to shed empirical lights on a specific area. The first step toward such an assessment is by collecting detailed household surveys were conducted to determine the direct and indirect water requirements of all village activities. The goal is to help to identify scenarios for more efficient water use by determining those activities whose benefits to the local economy are greatest relative to their impacts on water resources. At the heart of our analytical approach is the assignment of all village activities to categories for which input-output relations can be measured. The village economy is thus represented as a set of interrelated industries producing a larger set of commodities. Industries are groups of firms or households that produce goods or services for intermediate or final demand. Commodities are the individual products of the industries. Each industry produces one or more commodity, and in principle the same commodity can be produced by more than one industry. Goods such as water and fire wood which are extracted directly from the environment for use in the economy are referred to as ecological commodities (Miller and Blair, 1985; Dabi, 1996). Data collected in the village chronicle the typical water use of a Wadis is the plural of Wadi or seasonal rivers that are common in the Sahel region. 1

sample of households and firms engaged in various industries. Data on water use for domestic activities such as cooking and washing were collected at the same time. On the basis of the sample, rates of domestic and industrial water use were inferred. Data on the sales and purchases of commodities within the village and trade of commodities outside the village were also recorded. These data on local economic relations serve two purposes: first, to produce measures of the economic benefits of various industries to be contrasted with their water requirements and second, to provide a basis for calculating the direct water requirements implicit in the patterns of economic transactions. The remainder provides background on the rural economy of Sudan and on the village of Kutum, where our study was conducted. We describe our field survey methods with some indicators summarizing water use and economic benefits at the industry level. Background Agriculture is the major economic activity in the rural areas of Sudan. It provides the means of livelihood (food) and employment for the ever-increasing population. Prior to the discovery of oil in commercial quantity, agriculture dominated the Sudan economy, accounting for about 60 percent of GDP and more than 75 percent of export earnings (Oshikoya, 1990). The primacy of agriculture was diminished by the oil boom in the early 1970s. However, because of the fruitless efforts by the Sudanese government to industrialize the nation, and the dwindling nature of the oil industry, the agricultural sector, which still employs over 75% of the rural population, remains the mainstay of the Sudan economy. Conditions for agricultural production are in a state of decline. Desertification has been widespread in the semi-arid zone of northern Sudan following the recurrent droughts between 1968 and 1987 (Glantz, 1987; Payne, et al, 1987; Sivakumar, 1991).

Rainfall, the major source of water, is very seasonal lasting for a period of about four months in a year (June to September) and fluctuates considerably, with annual averages ranging between 150 and 300 mm and the number of rain days between 20 and 30 per year (Woo and Tarhule, 1994). This means that the growing season is short and animal rearing adversely affected. Irrigated agriculture and animal rearing are viable only at locations where surface and groundwater sources are accessible. Without that, up to eight months of the year become an idle period for most of the rural population, although some people engage in other non farm economic activities such as rural industry, trade and services. Various studies have indicated progressive decline in rainfall in the sub region (Olaniran, 1991; Anyadike, 1993; Hess, et al, 1995). Thus, water demand for agriculture, crop production and animal husbandry, non farm activities, rural industry, trade and services, as well as domestic use is exerting tremendous pressure on the limited water resources (Kimmage, 1991). The allocation of water to these competing uses has been based entirely on traditional practice. Often, inefficient decisions are taken leading to severe shortages for some if not all the uses with inevitable adverse repercussions. There is the need for better management of water resources to enhance sustainable rural development in this semiarid environment. Large-scale dam projects aimed at improving agricultural production, promoting rural development and providing support services to urban centers have not performed up to expectations mostly due to institutional and managerial bottlenecks. This has shifted the research focus onto integrated water management (Salau, 1990; Mitchell, 1994) and the promotion of small-scale irrigation (Adams, 1986; Adams and Carter, 1987; Kimmage, 1990; Kimmage and Adams, 1992). Most studies concerned with environmental predicaments of this region have been discipline specific and conducted at a regional

scale (for example, Falkenmark, 1989; Falkenmark and Lindh, 1993). To gain a better understanding of the direct and indirect effects of this man-environment relationship and coping strategies in this vulnerable region, however, multi-disciplinary studies conducted on a local scale are also needed. The Drought and Rural Water Use Research Project is an example of such a multidisciplinary and locally focused study. It is a combined effort of Sudan and Canadians working on such diverse topics as hydrology, regional economic analysis, demography, community development, health, and indigenous knowledge systems. All of this research is focused on the village of Kutum. Characteristics of the Study Area Kutum village in Darfur State, Sudan, is the area selected for the case study. Located within the semi-arid zone of northern Sudan and have similar environmental characteristics and human activities to the rest of the Sahel region. It is prone to droughts, and experiences water scarcity, as described earlier. Agriculture and animal husbandry are the major economic activities. As in most rural areas in this region, the lack of most urban facilities such as piped water and electricity, and the limited nature of government assistance, leaves its people to the mercy of the environment. The village came to become to be known as a Caravan point for long time. The early settlers were mostly the Furs who were subsequently joined by other tribal groups. These tribal groups exhibit some spatial differentiation, with the each concentrated into one or two village wards. The settlement has been growing mostly due to immigration and more recently due to natural increase. Our survey puts the population at about three thousand people. The people depend on the limited rainfall, seasonal stream flow, and especially declining groundwater sources for their domestic and economic needs. This dwindling water availability is typical for its location in the Sahel savanna belt of the arid and semi-arid (ASA) zone of East Africa. The extensive sedimentary

Chad Formation, which is recharged by seasonal surface flow, is the main source of its groundwater. Its undulating terrain is covered mostly by Sudan savanna-type vegetation, basically patchy grasses and scrub as well as scattered acacia and baobab tree species. Human economic activities are typical of most rural areas in the ASA zone and tend to follow tribal affiliations: rain-fed agriculture for the more settled farmers; animal husbandry: herding or rearing for the Arabs some animal and vegetation gathering for food, fuel and construction; and rural industrial production of goods and services, traded mostly within the local economy. Limited irrigated agriculture is limited to a short period and locations accessible to surface and groundwater sources along the seasonal Wadis. Turner (1985) defined Wadi land as seasonally flooded or waterlogged. Most of the Wadi land is owned and cultivated by the sedentary. The village economy is a combination of subsistence and market activities with external linkages. Each household produces agricultural commodities, some of which it consumes and some of which are traded in an active local market. Most households are involved in livestock (animal) husbandry, including poultry. Only a relatively small number among the other groups rear cattle. A limited amount of agricultural produce is traded to the nearby urban centre. Many households engage in other economic activities including small scale manufacturing and handicrafts, construction-related activities, food preparation, and a variety of personal services. Methodology The results presented here are based on two surveys of households in Kutum Village. The first a survey of all households to obtain basic population and activity data and the second a sample survey to obtain more detailed economic and environmental (ecological) information. Prior to commencing survey activities, a number of

key informants including village head, tribal group heads, major farmers, and school teachers, were consulted to solicit information on the socio-cultural setting of the village, economic activities, and the nature of water supply, demand and use. This information was useful for the design of the survey instruments. The data were collected with the aid of three field assistants. The data collection was conducted in May of 2007, as no population data were available from the National Population Commission of` Sudan. All households in the village were surveyed. Questions included the name of household head, number of wives, number of children, wards and other dependants; source of water for household use, quantity withdrawn, and purpose of use; and occupation(s) of household members and activities they are engaged in. Figures from the population survey provide basic information and were also used for sampling purposes in the more detailed survey that followed. There were 424 households with a total population of 2,734 people. The economic activities of households were recorded and assigned to four sectors: agriculture, rural industry, trade, and services. Within each sector a number of industries were defined. Each industry produces one or more commodities, of which more than 100 were identified in the survey. Table 1 lists the industries and commodities, along with the number of households involved in the production of each commodity. All households were engaged in some form of raided agriculture. Somewhat less than half were engaged in various forms of animal husbandry and a rather small group of households were engaged in irrigated agriculture. Among non farm activities, large numbers of households were involved in weaving, trading, and vegetation gathering, while smaller but still significant numbers engaged in diverse industries and services. In order to gain a better understanding of the input-output relationships in the village economy especially with respect to inputs of water, a more detailed survey was conducted on a sample of village households and industries.

A multistage (stratified) sampling procedure was used to draw the sample. Industries were stratified according to the number of households participating in each. A sample of at least 20 percent of the households engaged in each industry was taken. For those industries with fewer than ten households, a 50 percent sample was taken. A total enumeration (100%) was done for those industries with less than five households. In all more than 250 interviews were conducted. To ensure representativeness within the sampled industries, the enumeration included all possible commodities produced, by distributing the sample size for each stratum proportionately over the identified commodities. For example, the irrigated agriculture industry has nine (9) households producing five commodities by different numbers of households in the following order: combined vegetables (all 9 households); tomato (6 households); Sorghum (all 9 households); and wheat (1 household). To ensure representativeness, one household producing each of the commodities was included in the sample of five, instead of taking more from those with all households and none from that with only one household. Table 1: Household Income (By Sector and Industry)

Sector Agriculture

Industory 1- Rainfed agriculture 2- Irrigated agriculture 3- Cassava (annuals) 4- Tree crops (or orchards) 5- Animal husbbandry Total Rural Industry 6- Brick Making 7- Building Constructors 8- Pottery 9- Blacksmithing 10- Wood carving 11- Ropes carving 12- Weaving 13- Milling Total Trade 14- Butchery 15- Catering / Trading 16- Fishing 17- Hunting 18- Water vendors 19- Vegetation harvesting Total Service 20- Technical & and Mechanical repairs 21- Carpentry 22- Transportation 23- Tailoring & design 24- Hairdressing / Barbing 25- Education 26- Household labor 27- Other services Total Grand Total

Income (000 Pounds) 25245.00 652.00 68.00 0.00 10373.00 36337.00 734.00 619.00 323.00 84.00 534.00 28.00 1035.00 742.00 4099.00 1494.00 312.00 632.00 147.00 35.00 12401.00 15021.00 132.00 99.00 2049.00 48.00 17.00 144.00 1785.00 9.00 4283.00 59740.00

The respondents included men who were heads of households as well as men or women who were heads of the production units. They were asked to list quantities and, where applicable, market values of inputs used in the production of each commodity Inputs included locally produced commodities, such as inputs of agricultural commodities to the milling industry or inputs of animals to butchery; inputs of ecological commodities including water, forest products, and land; and inputs of commodities imported from outside the village. The heads were also asked to divide their output of each commodity into amounts retained for their own consumption or use, sold or traded to other households and industries, and sold outside the village. These data will eventually be used to develop an input-output modeling system for the village economy. However, they are used primarily for descriptive purposes. Respondents did not generally keep records of their transactions, especially for quantities of items used in production processes and much of the information was based on imprecise memories because some of the activities took place at a season other than the one during which the data were collected. Efforts were therefore made to gather information and establish figures that are reasonable via cross checks and queries during data collection and use of standard measures from secondary sources, This gave rise to a lot of data that relate to the quantity of inputs (particularly water) used for the production of commodities and the quantity of output (sales) of these commodities to intermediate demand of other industries and final demand of the household consumption and exports. The results were recorded using physical units (kilograms and liters) and monetary values (Pounds) where applicable. Quantities of water extracted and used for commodity production and household consumption were ascertained from the survey responses and measurements. The water basically comes from ground sources, deep wells within the village and shallow wells on

the river bed and washes boreholes around the river flood plains used specifically for irrigation. There are 33 village (deep) wells and several shallow wells. Twenty one of the deep wells are located within compounds and owned by individual households as private property. The remaining twelve are public, scattered around the village and accessible to all wards. The shallow wells are dug on the bed and flood plain of Wadis which bypasses the village. Some of the shallow wells are owned by irrigation farmers and located within their farm plots. Most others on the river bed are common property and are within a walking distance between 200m and 1 km from all wards. Therefore, the problem of accessibility to water is not physical distance to the wells but reaching deep groundwater at the peak of the dry season. Consequently, labor demand for obtaining water in the various industries is not necessarily different from most other unskilled tasks performed by the workers, except for the water vendors who are sole proprietors. Water extraction and hauling are not clearly defined along gender line. Men, women and children male and female are all involved. However, adults perform more of the skilled labor while children assist with the menial jobs at home and at the production unit. In typical, households, men and children and occasionally older women go out to fetch water. To a limited extent, surface water and rainwater are used in the rainy season. The shallow wells are ruined by the flowing river in this period, but the village wells are full and meet most of the demand. Surface water is only used for washing, bathing and recreation or for watering grazing animals. Rainwater is rarely harvested because of turbidity resulting from the thatched and mud roofs over most of the buildings. For better measurements, measurements of the deep and shallow wells were taken to determine quantities extracted and conveyed to households and industries. Household water is meant for domestic use, drinking, cooking, and sanitary purposes, and industry for the

production of commodities, goods and services by various economic activities. The quantity of water was determined by measuring the volume of containers used for water extraction, e.g., withdrawal from wells and those used for delivery. For example, households were observed to withdraw between four (4) and 18 liters of water per day for domestic use, and up to 200 liters for other activities like construction or sale by vendors. Water consumed by animals was measured by monitoring the number of times animals are watered and the quantity consumed in the process. The average size of containers usually 4 liters used for hauling water from the wells was determined. This was multiplied by the number of times the water is poured into the animal's drinking container, a half-sized barrel or an opened gourd, and the result then divided by the number of animals that drank from it. The quantity of water extracted for irrigation was determined from the rate of pumping, the quantity of water released multiplied by the duration of irrigation using 2-3 horse power engines water pumps or the number of gourds of water delivered to the cropped area using the Shadoof method, a traditional method of delivering water from the source through channels or gutters to the cropped area. These quantities were calculated for a week and multiplied by the number of weeks the crops were irrigated. Data were collected on a daily basis from morning to late evening by monitoring the number of times individuals visit the wells. The monitoring was spread over the two seasons. Water extraction data from deep and shallow wells was collected between May 16 to 19 and June 16 to 19 to cover every day of the week in the dry period. The same process was repeated for only deep wells between July 9 to 12 and August 9 and 12 for the rainy season. This is because the shallow wells were inaccessible as indicated above. Some diurnal variations were observed. More water was extracted for use in the trade sector on Thursdays, the weekly market day in the village. For other activities, more water was extracted on the no market days because people tend to concentrate on their

routine activities. Water for domestic use was about evenly spread. Extraction was concentrated in the early mornings (6-8.00 am) and late afternoons (4-5.00 pm). Crops are usually irrigated after water has been drawn in the morning and evening, while animals are usually watered in the afternoon. Seasonal variations were also observed. During the rainy period, water extraction for construction, brick making and building and animal watering declined, and irrigation virtually ceased. Quantities extracted for the other industries and households did not show any significant change. Wells are usually recharged seasonally, during the rainy season. Groundwater draw down reaches its lowest level at the peak of the dry season (April/May to early June). This is when most of the village wells run dry. Henceforth, during the remainder of the dry or `water scarce' period, the shallow wells are the most dependable source of water. At this period, we also noticed some daily fluctuations in water levels, reflecting diurnal variations in demand. Quantities of vegetation wet and dry leaves, branches, stems, and roots, of grasses, herbs, shrubs and trees as well as fruits extracted for use in industries and households were also determined. Because this was wild vegetation extracted from the bush, which is very extensive and uncontrollable, it was difficult to determine the extent of degradation. However, these values present useful information for environmental resources accounting not covered here. The area of farmlands for all agricultural activities rainfed, irrigated, annuals and tree crops was measured. Quantities for building, brick-making and pottery were determined indirectly from the quantity of commodities produced. Another indirect method was to measure ditches left after these activities were carried out.

Results

Table 2: Cultivated Farmlands Commodity (crop) Sorghum Millet Maize Beans Vegetables Okra Groundnut Pumpkin Beans Egg plant Vegetables Tomato Wheat Tree crops Total

Land Area (Feddans) Land ratio (percenatge) 9280 30.567% 5193 17.103% 4650 15.317% 5254 17.306% 82 0.269% 94 0.308% 5768 18.998% 6 0.019% 11 0.036% 2 0.007% 11 0.036% 2 0.008% 3 0.010% 5 0.016% 30360 100.00%

Information from the sample survey was summarized to determine average household inputs, outputs, and earned income for each commodity on a daily or weekly basis. The average values were then multiplied by the number of households producing each commodity. The resultant values were then multiplied by the production period (duration over which commodities are produced). Whereas certain activities such as irrigated agriculture and rain fed crops are seasonal, others such as cassava growing, tree crops and trade operate all year round. Services may be rendered seasonally or throughout the year. While certain goods from the rural industry may have even shorter durations, daily, weekly, or seasonal, depending on demand. All the data were cautiously processed before the projections and aggregations were done. The projections were made from a sample of commodity producers to represent the population of all households involved. The aggregations involved regrouping of commodities to the production units (industries) and then into the four sectors: agriculture, rural industry (manufacturing), trade, and service. We expect some amount of error to have occurred in the process, but it was necessary to allow a better description of the economy as a whole. An income measure was calculated as an indicator of the volume of activity in each industry. The total income earned from the sale of each commodity to local or external markets was estimated based on the survey. This was crosschecked against prices observed in the market. This tells only half the story, however, since much of what is produced, especially in agriculture, is

retained by the household for its own consumption or use. An imputed income is calculated by multiplying the amount retained of each commodity by an observed market price. (This represents the amount the household could have earned by selling the retained commodity - or, put differently, the amount it would have to pay to purchase that quantity.) The total income associated with each industry is taken as the sum of the earned and imputed incomes from all the commodities it produces (Table 2). Table 3 shows the income estimates. Clearly agriculture dominates the local economy, accounting for 60% of total village income. Rainfed crops alone accounts for more than 40%. Irrigated agriculture, however, accounts for less than 1%. Of the nonagricultural activities, the largest is vegetation harvesting. Another important indicator of activity levels in a rural economy is land under cultivation. Table 4 shows the distribution of cultivated land to the various rain fed, irrigated, annual, and tree crops. Clearly land use is dominated by a few rainfed crops: guinea corn, millet, maize, beans, and groundnuts. In fact, all crops requiring irrigation including tree crops take up only 0.12% of land in cultivation. These crops are very important, however, from the perspective of water use. Table 3: Ground Water use for irrigation and animal husbandry Commodity Water (litres) 1. Combined vegetables 176000 2. Tomato 96000 3. Wheat 60000 4. Tree Crops 144000 5. Sorghum 120000 6. Maize 7360 7. Beans 72000 8. Animals 18358 Total 693718,0 Average 86714,8

% 25,37% 13,84% 8,65% 20,76% 17,30% 1,06% 10,38% 2,65% 100,0%

Groundwater use is broken-down of into the four economic sectors and domestic uses. We focus on what follows on groundwater use despite the fact that smaller but still significant amounts of surface water are also used as discussed earlier. Surface water is available only during part of the year, drawn primarily from the seasonal river, and it is very difficult to measure the amount used (as, for example, when animals drink directly from the Wadi). More important, the amount of surface water used by the villagers Table 4: Groundwater-output and Groundwater-income relationships by sector Industry Groundwater: income (litres/pounds) does not Sector Agriculture 1. Rainfed agriculture 7,000 2. Irrgated agriculture 6,455 impact 3. Cassava (annuals) 2,609 significantly 4. Tree crops (orchards) 6,000 5. Animal husbandry 0,395 on its Average 4,492 Rural Industry 6. Brick Making 1,412 availability. 7. Building contruction 1,210 8. Pottery 0,046 Since 9. Blacksmithing 0,063 10. Wood carving 0,022 groundwater 11. Calabash carving 0,015 availability is 12. Weaving 0,018 13. Milling 0,150 highly Average 0,367 14. butchery 0,066 sensitive to Trade 15. Catering / Trading 0,217 the amount 16. Fishing N/A' 17. hunting 0,006 drawn out 18. Water vendors 2,000 19. Vegetatino harvesting 0,010 by villagers, Average 0,460 20. Technical & Mechanical 0,022 it is the Service 21. arpentry 0,014 water source 22. Transportation 0,017 23. tailoring & Design 0,055 that most 24. Hairdressing / Barbing 0,076 25. Education 0,199 needs to be 26. Household labor 0,010 27. Other service 1,540 conserved, Average 0,242 and therefore the focus of our analysis. However, despite the small amount of land devoted to non rain fed agriculture and the small number of households engaged, it accounts for the lion's share of groundwater use in the village. Even the domestic use of all 424 households is only one third as much as that used for irrigated crops, annuals, tree crops, and animals. Table 5 shows the breakdown of this to different types of

activities. Combined plots, in which several vegetables are generally grown together, consume the most water, followed by the irrigated grain crops. A couple of interesting things can be observed from Table 5. The first is that animals account for a surprisingly small share of groundwater use. This is because larger animals drink exclusively from surface water during the wet season and may be driven out of the village to areas where surface water is available during the rest of the year. Thus, groundwater is only a supplementary water source for most animals. The second observation is that water use is not directly proportional to land use. Cassava and tree crops use significantly less water than irrigated rice and wheat, despite the fact that the former two occupy much more land than the latter two. The variation of water intensity across crops is borne out by the use of water on a per-bag' of produce basis. Here rice and wheat are the most water intensive crops. Irrigation for combined vegetable plots involves a labor intensive method whereby water is directed to individual plants, and is therefore more water-efficient. These results create an impression that cultivation of irrigated rice and wheat is extravagant in its use of groundwater resources. It is important to balance this view. One bag equals roughly 50 Table 5: Sample sizes and Proportions Industry 1. Rainfed Agriculture 2. Irrigated agriculture 3. Irrigated / rainfed agriculture 4. Tree crops (Orchards) 5. Animal husbandry 6. Brick making 7. Building 8. Pottery 9. Blacksmithing 10. Wood carving 11. Calabash carving 12. weaving 13. Milling 14. Butchery 15. Catering / Trading 16. Fishing 17. Hunting 18. Water vendors 19. Vegetation harvisting 20. Technical / Mechanical repairs 21. Carpentry 22. Transportation 23. Tailoring & Design 24. Hairdressing / Barbring 25. Education 26. Household labor 27. Other services

Active Households

Sample size 424 9 24 2 175 12 5 20 7 25 5 85 35 14 125 16 10 7 125 4 4 36 5 8 6 60 5

85 5 5 2 35 3 3 4 4 5 3 17 7 3 25 4 5 4 25 4 4 8 3 4 3 12 5

Sample proportion 20.05% 55.56% 20.83% 100.00% 20.00% 25.00% 60.00% 20.00% 57.14% 20.00% 60.00% 20.00% 20.00% 21.43% 20.00% 25.00% 50.00% 57.14% 20.00% 100.00% 100.00% 22.22% 60.00% 50.00% 50.00% 20.00% 100.00%

kilograms, although this varies across crops. The bag is used as the basic output measure in the survey because it is a standard measure used in the village and therefore respondents could more easily estimate total bags than total kilograms. However, we have estimated a measure of income associated with the production of each crop as before, both earned and imputed incomes were included.) We recognize that exchange values may be an imperfect measure of benefits, but they at least give us a common denominator on which to base comparisons of water intensity. Figure 3.3 also shows the ratio of water to income (in liter per Pounds) of the same five irrigated crop types. Here combined plots and Millet again appear to be more water efficient than tomatoes, owing to the low market value of tomatoes. The proportional difference between the water-income ratio of either rice or wheat and combined plots is smaller than the corresponding difference for the water-output ratio. This reflects the high market prices of rice and wheat which are sold to external markets. In light of this, the amounts of groundwater the villagers are willing to devote to irrigated grains are not as surprising. A similar analysis was done for all four economic sectors for the water- income relationships for the aggregated sectors and their constituent industries. Agriculture is by far the most water intensive activity, although this conclusion may be exaggerated by the fact that only direct water use is measured here, and nonagricultural activities may have significant indirect water impacts. Irrigated crops are the most water intensive followed by annuals with animal husbandry as the least. However, the value for trees is not shown because no income is yet being generated by the industry. The water-income-relationships for individual industries in the rural industry sector are all low compared to the agricultural sector, but they show significant variation. In particular, the production of bricks and construction activities use far more water per Pounds of income than any of the other rural industries. Food preparation

industries (butchering and catering) are more water intensive than other trade industries, but still very low even when compared with brick making and construction. All service industries have extremely low water intensities, with education being the highest because it includes the weather observatory which uses large quantities of water. It is important to note that some of the results based on water-income ratios may be attributable to the fact that commodities sold locally generate less income than those sold in urban markets. Discussion and Conclusions Groundwater is a critical resource for the rural villages in the semiarid Sahel zone. Formulating conservation strategies and assessing the water impacts of alternative development scenarios requires baseline information on where available water is going and how it contributes to the local economy. The survey-based results reported here provide such information. The most important result from the survey is that irrigated cultivation of vegetables and grains accounts for more than half of all groundwater consumed in the village. In spite of this, irrigated agriculture accounts for a very small proportion of the agricultural land, is practiced by a relatively small proportion of households, and generates relatively little income in aggregate although for those households engaged the income contribution is significant. Animals also consume a significant amount of groundwater, but this amount is smaller than might have been expected given the large number of households that keep animals and the large amount of income they generate. However, animals often benefit from other sources of water from different locations especially while pasturing. These results point to the need for a more comprehensive approach to water management that addresses the costs and benefits of alternative development scenarios especially in light of

the emphasis placed on irrigation in rural Sudan (Pradhan, 1993.) In particular, those responsible for water conservation should be aware that unchecked growth in irrigation, especially of grains, could lead to rapid depletion of already precarious groundwater stocks. An important shortcoming of the analysis presented above is that it deals only with the direct water requirements of the various commodities produced in the village. This probably results in an underestimate of the total water impact of non-agricultural activities that have both direct and indirect requirements. For example, a butcher uses only limited direct water inputs for cleaning the carcass. The indirect water requirementsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; for the meat he provides, however, includes the water provided to the animal during its lifetime, plus any water used to grow fodder fed to the animal. Thus the total direct and indirect, water intensity of the commodity meat may be quite high. An approach to calculating the direct and indirect water requirements for all commodities will make it possible to estimate the impact of changes in the production of final goods for consumption in the village or for export on groundwater stocks. We suggest developing an inputoutput modeling framework based on the survey results that can produce such estimates. References Miller R. and Blair, P. (1985) Input-output Analysis: Foundations and Extensions. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey Dabi, D. (1992) Evaluation of Farming Activities on the Jos Plateau Mineland. Paper presented at the International Seminar of the Jos Plateau Environmental Resources Development Programme (JPERDP). Jos Plateau Environmental Resources Development Programme. Final Report (In press). Oshikoya, T. (1990) The Sudan Economy: A macroeconomic and Input-Output MWel. Praeger Publications, New York. Glantz, M. (1987) Drought and Hunger in Africa: Denying Famine a Future. Cambridge University Press. Payne, R., Rummel, L., and Glantz, M. (1987) Denying drought a future: Concluding remarks. in, M. Glantz (ed.) Drought and Hunger in Africa. Cambridge University Press, pp 435-443. Sivakumar, M. (1992) Empirical analysis of dry spells for agricultural

applications inEast Africa. Journal of Climate, 5, May. pp 532-539. Woo, M. and Tarhule, A. (1994) Streamflow droughts of northern Sudan rivers. Hydrological Sciences Journal, 39 (1): 19-34. Olaniran, O. (1991) Evidence of climatic change in Sudan based on annual series of rainfall of different daily amounts, 1919-1985. Climatic Change 19, pp 319-341. Anyadike, R. (1993) Seasonal and annual rainfall variations over Sudan. International Journal of Climatology, 13, 567-580. Hess, T., Stephens, W., and Maryah, U. (1995) Rainfall trends in the North Eastern Arid zone of Sudan. - Agric. & Forest Met., 74: 87-97. Kimmage, K. (1991) Small-scale irrigation initiatives: the problems of equity and sustainability. Applied Geography, l 1 : 5-20. Salau, A. (1990) Integrated Water Management. In Mitchell, B. (ed.) Integrated Water Management: International Experiences and Perspectives. Belhaven Press, London. Chapter 8, 188-202. Mitchell, B. (1994) Addressing the Hedge Problems in land and water management in the Sokoto-Rima river basin. Geoforum 25(2), 133-143. Kimmage, K. and Adams, W. (1992) Wetland agricultural production and river basin development in the Hadejia-Jama'are valley. The Geographical Journal, Adams, W. (1986) Traditional agriculture and water use in the Sokoto valley. The Geographical Journal, 152 (1): 30-43. Adams, W. and Carter, R. (1987) Small-scale irrigation in sub-Saharan Africa. Progress in Physical Geography 11, 1-27. Falkenmark, M. (1989) The massive water scarcity now threatening Africa: Why is it not being addressed? Ambio 18(2), 112-118. Falkenmark, M, & Lindh, G. 1993. Water and economic development. In Gleick, P.H. (ed.), Water in crisis: A guide to world's fresh water resources. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, pp. 80-91. Turner, B. (1985) The classification and distribution of Wadi in central northern Sudan. In Thomas, M.F. and Goudie, A. (eds) Dambos: small channelless valleys in the tropics, formation and utilization. Stuttgart: Zeitschrift Fur Geomorphologie, Supplement band 52, 222pp.

Turkey Entering the European Union through the Balkan Doors In the Style of a Great Power?

By Bedrudin Brljavacď&#x20AC;Ş Abstract: Confronting an increasing EU opposition from a number of influential member states to its membership the AKP government adopted a multilateral approach to its foreign policy making resulting in dynamic economic and diplomatic policies with the countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Balkans region. In this article we analyzed the effects and consequences of a paradigmatic shift in Turkish foreign policy in the western Balkans in relation to the country's EU membership prospects. Through its pro-active economic and diplomatic initiatives in the region Turkey has been proving itself as indispensable country for the European Union membership. Thus, if the Turkish government concentrates more on solving its internal problems and continues its pro-active

ď&#x20AC;Ş

Bedrudin Brljavac received his B.A. in Political Science and Public Administration at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. He completed the Master Programme in European Affairs (MEA) at Lund University in Sweden as the scholarship holder of the Swedish Institute. Since November 2010 he works at the Quality Office in International Burch University, Sarajevo. Meanwhile he has worked in national and international projects and has regularly written columns for national and international magazines and daily newspapers. In addition, he has had several translations from English and Turkish into Bosnian. His research interests are Transnational Relations, International Norms, Soft Power, Europeanization, EU Enlargement Policy, Human Capital, Education Policy, Democratization Theory, And Western Balkans Politics.

diplomacy in western Balkans, among other regions, it could become not only a regional but also a global power. Key words: Turkey, Foreign Policy, European Union, Western Balkans, Great power, Soft Power.

1. Turkey’s European Union Journey

urkey has been waiting the longest in the row amongst the applicant countries aspiring for the entrance to the European Union. In fact, Turkey has been an associate member of the EU since 1963. Although Turkey applied to enter the EU on 14 April 1987 it was officially recognized as a candidate for a full membership only in December 1999 at the Helsinki Summit of the European Council (Sozen, 2005: 24). Since then under the governing Justice and Development Party, or AKP, Turkey has implemented significant reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria, especially regarding democracy-building, human rights, the rule of law, stable administration and protection of minorities. However, in spite of the AKP‟s commitment to the EU accession process its final membership to the bloc has been stalled by a number of domestic and external problems. While the military and Kemalist forces are the biggest domestic challenge the issue of Cyprus continues to be a major external obstacle to full EU membership. Furthermore, a number of EU members such as Germany, France, and Austria are rather ready to grant Turkey a “privileged partnership” instead of full EU membership (Christensen, 2009: 10). Facing a strong EU opposition to its membership the AKP government adopted a multilateral approach to its foreign policy making resulting in active rapprochement towards the countries from Asia, Africa, Latin

America, and the Balkans region making it more powerful world actor. 2. The Currency of a Great Power Still, is it possible to think of Turkey as a superpower or a rising great power. Does Turkey meet these five criteria that Waltz suggested? In terms of its population, Turkey's total population in 2010 was around 73.7 million (TE, 2010). Also, the area of Turkey is 783,562 km2 (302,535 sq mi) (UN, 2007). Turkey has been among the world leaders in producing agricultural products, textiles, construction materials, motor vehicles, ships and other transportation equipment, consumer electronics and home appliances. As for its economy, Turkey has the world's 15th largest GDP and 17th largest Nominal GDP (WB, 2010). In terms of the military potential, in 2008 the Turkish Army had nearly 401,000 active personnel and it is the second largest army of NATO only after the United States (Economist, 2006). Thus, if we exclude political instability as decades-old problem in Turkey than it is possible to conclude that the country has the criteria that how Kenneth Waltz defined a great power. Also, John Feffer from the Huffington Post points out: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Turkey remains stubbornly fixed in Western culture as a backward-looking land of doner kebabs, bazaars, and guest workers. But take population out of the equation -- an admittedly big variable -- and Turkey promptly becomes a likely candidate for future superpower. It possesses the 17th top economy in the world and, according to Goldman Sachs, has a good shot at breaking into the top 10 by 2050. Its economic muscle is also well defended: after decades of NATO

assistance, the Turkish military is now a regional powerhouse” (2010). Still, how do we recognize the great power when we see the one? A great power is a state that has a capacity to influence policy-making in the international system (Bull, 2002). In fact, the main characteristics of the great powers are economic, military, diplomatic and cultural strength that make them recognizable and influential at global stage. The term “great power” a first time was used in the post-Napoleonic era to define the most important states in Europe at the time (Webster, 1931: 307). However, it has been a challenge for social scientist to define and describe the meaning and structure of a great power. The first debates on the meaning of great power used to analyze states by a realist school of thought which emphasized the importance of military strength of the state. In this light, prominent historian Taylor pointed out that “ The test of a great power is the test of strength for war” (1954: 24). The French historian Duroselle put it in this way: “a great power is one which is capable of preserving its own independence against any other singe power” (Kertesz and Fitsomons, 1959: 204). Nevertheless, at the end of World War II and Cold War the definition of great power also included economic and political state of affairs in a country. For instance, the founder of the neo-realist theory of international relations Kenneth Waltz (1979) suggests a set of five criteria to define a great power: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Population and territory, Resource endowment, Economic capability, Political stability and competence, Military strength.

3. Paradigmatic Shift in the Foreign Policy The main policy-maker of the ongoing AKP's multi-dimensional approach to foreign policy has been Ahmet Davutoglu who defined Turkey's global strategic role in his 2000 book Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik ). Davutoglu pointed out that Turkey is positioned at the center of main “geo-cultural basins”, the West, the Middle East, the Balkans and Central Asia, and thus should create dynamic and proactive foreign policy within each of these geographies. In Davutoğlu‟s own words: “Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the capability as well as the responsibility to follow an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy... To contribute actively towards conflict resolution and international peace and security in all these areas is a call of duty arising from the depths of a multidimensional history for Turkey” (2009: 12). That is, in his capital book he stresses that Turkey must rediscover its historic and geographic identities and pursue a balanced approach towards all global and regional actors. He also put an emphasis on Turkish potential of the soft power based on active diplomatic efforts, regional cooperation and economic engagement to utilize in its manifold historical and cultural relations (Baran, 2010, 117). That said, Turkey recently has focused on the strategic importance of the Balkans region in order to rediscover this strategic location as part of its foreign policy doctrine. Using its soft power potential in the context of the foreign policymaking Turkey recently has initiated significant strategic diplomatic moves at unquiet western Balkans countries. In fact, soft power is the ability to achieve your objectives through attraction and good image (Beng, 2008). As Nye points out: the central currencies of soft power are an actor's values, norms, culture, and institutions that have a potential to attract other actors to “want what you want” rather than to coerce them (2004). Thus, using its soft power capabilities Turkey

has made paradigmatic shifts in its foreign policy-making and taking new position on the world stage. Specifically, utilizing rich historical and cultural heritage from the Ottoman reign over the Balkans the Erdogan's government has recently initiated considerable diplomatic moves and strengthening its political leadership within the region. As Bulent Aras points out: “Turkey has gained the status of a soft power by experimenting with its foreign policy and demonstrating achievements on the ground” (Aras: 2009). That is, recently Turkish diplomacy has played important integrative role in the process of ethnic reconciliation and peace-building amongst the worn-torn ethnic groups at western Balkans (Eralp, 2010: 5). Furthermore, in the lack of a clear and strategic approach of the EU towards the region Turkish diplomacy headed by Davutoglu has filled a diplomatic vacuum and strengthened its position of inevitable regional leader without which it has become impossible to make necessary compromise solutions.

4. Pro-active Diplomacy in western Balkans Recently, Turkey's pro-active foreign policy making in the western Balkans secured it a position of important mediating country. Turkey has initiated a number of a diplomatic meetings between the former enemies in order to contribute to peace and regional stability. Thus, over the past two years the Turkish officials have organized several meetings between the officials from Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia culminating in the Istanbul Declaration in April 2010 (Sarajlic, 2010: 25). The main objective of the Istanbul Declaration was to boost regional cooperation and the EU membership prospects of the region. That is, the document signed by the regional leaders says, “we confirm our readiness to take all the necessary steps to secure peace, stability and prosperity in the region” (Jovanovic, 2010). Furthermore,

following several meetings between Turkish and Serbian officials in March 2010 the Serbian parliament passed a resolution apologizing for failing to prevent the Srebrenica execution of over 8000 Bosniak adult males. Gözde Kılıç Yaşin, from the Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis (TÜRKSAM), claims that the trilateral meetings are a important not only for reconciliation and better diplomatic relations between Bosnia and Serbia but also for setting a problem-solving model for heated Balkans political scene (2010). In other words, by making soft diplomatic initiatives that resulted in constructive and concrete solutions and compromises Turkey has clearly proved that it has become essential and inevitable player for the resolution of conflicts in the region. Furthermore, Turkey‟s new foreign policy in the Balkans is strengthened by dynamic and increasing economic investments. In other words, Turkey‟s volume of trade with the Balkan countries has increased from about $3 billion in 2000 to nearly $17.7 billion in 2008 (Mail International, 2011). Also, Turkish banks provided 85 percent of loans for construction of a highway through Serbia for easier Turkish transport of goods to EU member states. In 2008, Turkish Airlines bought a 49 percent stake of Bosnia's national carrier, BH Airlines (Reuters, 2010). While Balkan countries are waiting long for EU membership and face fierce competition at its single market Turkey allows a privileged access of their goods to its rapidly growing market of around 80 million consumers. Thus, Turkish recent omnipresent economic cooperation with Balkan countries is increasing its chances to become the dominant power which has an important part of influence in a region where it has strong strategic interests. Since most of the countries from the Balkans region have a very devastated economic infrastructure and unstable political ambient this Turkish brave and increasing investments can strengthen its growing leadership position in the region. As Erdoan Shipoli argues: “Turkish initiatives are present not only in the political arena, but also in economics,

society, culture and education. This is an opportunity for Turkey to take the lead in Balkan politics, the opportunity of a lifetime.” (2010). In fact, recent dynamism of Turkish economic and foreign policy at the Balkans has increased its influence at the global stage.

5. Strong Cultural Ties Additionally, relying on rich legacy of Ottoman past Turkey has traditionally kept strong cultural and historical ties with the countries from the region. That is, since the post-Ottoman period Turkey has always viewed the Balkans as its closest allies due to deep and dynamic historical and socio-cultural links with the regional states. As the official statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey says: “Basic elements of Turkey‟s policy towards the Balkans can be summarized as follows: developing relations to the highest level with the Balkan countries, with which Turkey has historic, cultural and humanitarian ties; enhancing the existing atmosphere of regional peace and stability; keeping the transportation connection of Turkey with Western and Central Europe open” (MFA of Turkey). What‟s more, on the basis of intensive historical and cultural relations with the Balkans countries and its wide knowledge of socio-political context Turkey can play the role of constructive mediator. Thus, in an interview with Today‟s Zaman, Djukic-Dejanovic emphasized special position of Turkish diplomats in the Balkans pointing out that “The Turkish foreign policy establishment was able to understand the often complicated position of Serbia and her neighbourhood much better than anybody else and has really helped us a lot” (Bozkurt: 2010). Indeed, Turkey can use its omnipresent cultural capital with regards to the Balkan countries in order to intensify its foreign policy making within the region.

Furthermore, due to the Ottoman heritage within the countries of western Balkans Turkey has traditionally had strong cultural relationships with the whole region. Recently, Turkish soap operas that have become very popular among the population in the region have been promoting Turkish culture, the customs, and its life style (Balkan Chronicle, 2010). For instance, the one Turkish product that did have a profound impact in the region is the soap opera titled “Binbir gece” or “Şehrezad,” as it is better known locally. This Turkish soap opera, which was a hit on Turkish TV a few years back, made it somewhat late to the Western Balkans, but it sure came in full swing and singlehandedly succeeded, probably more than any other recent endeavour, in promoting a new image of Turkey in the Balkans (Karcic: 2011). In addition, in 2010 the Turkish International Co-Operation and Development Agency (TIKA) provided 3.5 million euro for the reconstruction of the Mehmed Paša Sokolović Bridge in the city of Višegrad, over the Drina River in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska (EMG, 2010). Also, there are two Turkish-funded universities in the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which students from Turkey mix with students from the region. In addition, there is a large number of primary and high schools opened by the Istanbul-based Foundation of Journalists and Writers which are better known as the Bosna Sema Education Institutions. Whats more, these Institutions educate students of Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian nationality (Todays Zaman, 2011). This is important platform for building peace among former warring nations, an intercultural rapprochement and mutual cooperation.

6. Balkans as a Playground for “Great Powers” Balkans is positioned at an important strategic geography making a link between Europe and Asia. Throughout the history Balkan has

always played significant geo-strategic role as the crossroad between East and West. This territory has attracted regional and global powers to realize their interests and to expand them to other regions (Zeljkovic, 2010; 2). Especially in the aftermath of dissolution of Yugoslavia the Balkans region has become the playground for strategic accomplishment of diverse interests of several actors. The US has dominated the policy-making processes in the post-communist Balkans countries the last two decades. For example, it made critical efforts to stop the war in Bosnia signing the peace agreement in Dayton in December 1995 and the US also was the major proponent of the independence of Kosovo. Although the EU has played a passive role in the Yugoslav conflicts it developed more strategic approach towards the region in the end of 1990s through the integration policy (Sadakata, 2006: 40). Also, Russia is the next power that seeks to enlarge its sphere of influence in the region through political and financial means primarily in Serbia and Serb-dominated Bosnian entity, Republika Srpska. Lastly, during the ongoing Erdogan government Turkey has intensified its political, economic and social policy-making across the Balkans region focusing mostly on Bosnia. Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x;s ambitions in the Balkans have forced the EU to pay more attention to political processes in the region, where Russia and the United States are also vying for influence (Alic, 2010). In particular, the European Union member states have been disturbed by increasingly pro-active and highly visible role of Turkey in the Western Balkan countries' political and economic policy-making. Since the European Union has been one of the most active, if not the most visible one, actor at the region recent dynamic and active Turkish foreign policy has become serious threat and warning to the bloc's policy-makers. In other words, Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x;s diplomatic and financial deployment in the Balkans has provoked a prompt response from the EU, which hopes to remain the main authority in the region. And

Brussels indeed has a lot of catching up to do, largely because over the past four years it has lost much of its credibility (Alic, 2010). It does not have a luxury of repeating the scenario from the 1990s when the European Union member states looked rather paralyzed and ineffective in front of the Yugoslavian conflicts taking place at their doorsteps. If the European Union is going to become important world actor both politically and economically then it is of utmost importance to tackle the problems in its closest neighbourhood (Kaya, 2009: 121). Thus, the logical question would be: Will the European Union succeed in reforming one of the most complex regions in Europe, or will it fail and lose the credibility it needs to become a great power? (Perco: 2011). On the other side, a recently launched pro-active Turkish foreign initiatives in the region is slowly but steadily demonstrating rising Turkish power. 7. Turkey as a Regional Power Therefore, the unstable region of western Balkans has become a place where the power and diplomatic capability of rising and great powers is demonstrated and measured. That is, among other things, in this turbulent region great powers demonstrate their power while rising or to-be-great-powers are pursing policies that are aimed at carrying them into the status of great power. For instance, the USA proved and further strengthened its greatness and status of global superpower when it brought the Bosnian crisis to the end in 1995. Also, today the European Union's image of the rising power is being tested in the case of western Balkans and especially in Bosnia (Juncos, 2005) On the other side, Turkey as a rising power tends to prove its position of regional power and even rising power at a global level joining the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) team. So far, Turkey has demonstrated considerable diplomatic policy-making in the region and it is proving its potential of becoming great power in foreseeable

future. In addition, through pro-active economic and diplomatic initiatives in the region it is proving itself as indispensable country for the European Union membership (Barysch, 2010: 9). As John Feffer argues, “Today, the E.U. and Turkey compete for influence in the region, and much hangs on Turkey's prospects for joining the 27member European organization” (2010). Its dynamic foreign policy in the western Balkans is bringing Turkey slowly but steadily into the Brussels although a number of EU member states are still against its status of full member of the bloc. However, if Turkey continues with its pro-active foreign policy in the Balkans region the EU will come in the situation when it will have to admit Turkish membership.

8. Turkey’s Internal Problems However, before Turkey decides to play more reconciliatory role in resolving its regional problems it is of crucial importance for its government to firstly deal with its internal political, judicial and social problems. For instance, the so-called Kurdish problem is one of the biggest problem for Turkish government to deal with since many Kurdish citizens claim that they are being under repression by the government (Barkey and Fuller, 1998). Then for years Turkish society has been living under great fear of terrorist attacks coming from militarist Kurdish organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers„ Party) which is struggling for a kind of more semi-autonomous Kurd-populated South-Eastern region of the country. And probably the most important, the problem of secularism has stayed alive since the foundation of modern republic in the year 1923. In relation to this problem recently Turkey has confronted with a collusive network commonly referred to as “Ergenekon,” which is related to the antigovernment attacks and coup plots against the state composed mainly by the members of the ultra-nationalist secret services, military coup

plotters and right-wing activists. In fact, since it was first launched in June 2007 the Ergenekon case has become one of the largest and most controversial judicial investigation in recent country's history (Jenkins, 2009: 9). All being said, Turkey should pay more attention to solving its domestic problems in order to become stronger and more credible player at both regional and global stage (Barysch, 2010: 8). In other words, if Turkish government tends to demonstrate more active foreign policy then it must build its political and economic order strong to act as a model country.

9. Concluding Remarks As the EU-related reform process in Turkey recently has faced serious challenges coming from a number of influential EU leaders the AKP government headed by its Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu has made a paradigmatic shift in the foreign policy adopting a multi-dimensional approach that means a dynamic and proactive diplomacy in the West, the Middle East, the Balkans and Central Asia. Following such paradigmatic shift Turkey has recently become more active in the western Balkans intensifying its economic, diplomatic, and cultural policies. Through its increasing diplomatic efforts in the region, besides its activeness in other regions in the world, Turkey tends to prove its potential of being a super power or a great power. In addition, Turkish government has viewed a Balkan crisis as a diplomatic opportunity and thus strengthened its image of a rising power. Turkey proved itself as a mediating country after it organized a number of a diplomatic meetings between the former enemies in order to contribute to peace and regional stability. Moreover, its businessmen significantly increased economic investments in the region increasing a volume of trade with the Balkan countries from about $3 billion in 2000 to nearly $17.7 billion in 2008.

Also, relying on rich legacy of Ottoman past the country has traditionally kept strong cultural ties with the region. As a result, through such a pro-active economic and diplomatic initiatives in the region Turkey has been proving itself as indispensable country for the European Union membership. Indeed, if Turkey concentrates more on solving its internal problems and helps resolving the “Balkan deadlock” it could become not only a regional but also a global power.

Literature:

Alic, Anes, (2010), “Vying For Influence In The Balkans”, Radio Free Europe (RFE), Commentary, June, 2, 2010. 2. Aras, Bulent, (2009), “Turkey's soft power”, Guardian, 14 April 2009. 3. Balkan Chronicle, (2010), “Turkish Soap Operas Take Balkans by Storm”, Editor, 31 December 2010. 4. Baran, Zejno, (2010),”Torn Country: Turkey between Secularism and Islamism”, (Hoover Institute Press 2010). 5. Barkey, Henri & Fuller, Graham, (1998), “Turkey‟s Kurdish Question”, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 6. Barysch, Katinka, (2010), “Can Turkey combine EU accession and regional leadership?”, Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief. 7. Beng, Phar Kim, (2008), “Turkey‟s potential as a soft power: a call for conceptual clarity”, Insight Turkey (Ankara), 10 (2008) 2, S. 21-40. 8. Bozkurt, Abdullah, (2010) “Growing ties with Turkey more important than EU, Serbian Parliament speaker says”, Todayszaman, interview with the President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, Dr. Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic, 23 December 2010. 9. Bull, Hedley, (2002), The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Palgrave. 10. Christensen, Mette Buskjer, (2009), “Mobilizing local networks for a better informed dialogue on Turkey‟s accession to the EU”, Policy Brief-1, EU-Turkey relations and the functioning of the EU, available at http://accesstr.ces.metu.edu.tr/dosya/christensen.pdf. 1.

11. Davutoglu, Ahmet, (2009), “Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010", Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 8, no. 3 (2009), pp. 11-17. 12. Economist, (2006), “Who is losing Turkey?”, The Economist, 26 October, 2006. 13. EMG, (2010), “TIKA finances Drina bridge renovation in Bosnia”, Ekonom:east Media Group, 26 April, 2010. 14. Eralp, Doga Ulas, (2010), “Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Future Reflecting on the Past”, SETA, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, August, 2010 , Brief No: 46. 15. Feffer, John, (2010), “Stealth Superpower: How Turkey is Chasing China to Become the Next Big Thing”, Huffington Post, 14 June 2010. 16. Jenkins, Gareth, (2009), “Between Fact And Fantasy: Turkey‟s Ergenekon Investigation”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, available at http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/0908Ergen ekon.pdf. 17. Jovanovic, Igor, (2010), “New Beginnings in the Balkans?”, ISN, International Relations and Security Network, 21 May 2010. 18. Juncos, Ana, E., (2005), “The EU‟s post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU?”, in Southeast European Politics, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 88 – 108. 19. Karcic, Harun, (2011), “The “Seherzad Effect” in the western Balkans”, Todayszaman, 06 January 2011. 20. Kaya, Taylan Ozgur, (2009), “Identifying the EU‟s Foreign and Security Policy Roles”, Uluslararasi Hukuk ve Politika, Cilt 5, No: 17, p. 107-131, 2009. 21. Kertesz and Fitsomons (eds) – Diplomacy in a Changing World, University of Notre Dame Press (1959). 22. Kilic, Gözde Yaşin, (2010), “Bosna-Hersek‟te AB-Batı Balkanlar Zirvesi”, Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis (TÜRKSAM), Balkanlar, 31 Mayis, 2010, available at http://www.turksam.org/tr/a2054.html. 23. Mail International, (2011), “Turkey uses economic clout to gain Balkan foothold”, 14 March 2011. 24. Nye, Joseph S. 2004. Soft Power: TheMeans To Success InWorld

Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Chp 1. ER. 25. Perco, Ajdin, (2011), “The Western Balkans: The Ultimate Test for the European Union”, E-International Relations, February 7, 2011. 26. Reuters, (2010), “Turkish Airlines to buy Bosnian carrier - Report”, 30 December, 2010. 27. Sadakata, Mamoru, (2006), “The Balkans between the EU and NATO: Focusing on the Former Yugoslavia”, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2006. 28. Sarajlic, Eldar, (2010), “The return of the Consuls: Islamic networks and foreign policy perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Paper presented at the conference “After the Wahabi mirage: Islam, politics, and international networks in the Balkans”, European Studies Center, University of Oxford, December 2010. 29. Shipoli, Erdogan, (2010), “The Turkish Balkan Initiative”, Todayszaman, 26 May, 2010. 30. Sozen, Ahmet, (2005), “Turkey - EU Enlargement at a Crossroads: Turkey‟s Democratisation in Light of its EU Candidate Status”, Eastern Mediterranean University (Famagusta, North Cyprus), Paper prepared for presentation at the 2004 Conference Enlargement and the Future of the European Union: Parallel Paths or Crossroads?, in Warsaw, Poland, 1-3 July, 2004. 31. Taylor, Alan JP (1954). The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848– 1918. Oxford: Clarendon. 32. TE, (2010), “Turkey Population”, Trading Economics, available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/turkey/population. 33. Todayszaman, (2011), “Serbian torture base now houses Turkish school”, 06 January 2011. 34. UN, (2007), “UN Demographic Yearbook, April, 16, 2007. 35. Waltz, Kenneth, (1979), Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). 36. WB, (2010), “World Development Indicators Database – Gross Domestic Product in 2009 (Nominal), World Bank, 27 September, 2010. 37. Webster, Charles K, Sir (ed), British Diplomacy 1813–1815: Selected Documents Dealing with the Reconciliation of Europe, G Bell (1931), p307. 38. Zeljkovic, Nikola, (2010), “Clash of interests on Balkans between USA, Russia, Turkey and the EU”, 2010 Moscow Conference on

Geopolitics Connecting Geography to Politics: 21st Century Issues and Agendas, IAPSS â&#x20AC;&#x201C; International Association for Political Science Students.

The Unrecognized Social Movements

One Million Signature Campaign and the Islamist State of Iran Majid Rafizadeh Abstract: For decades, ordinary people have been refusing to exit from the social and political stage controlled by repressive states and they have been generating and discovering new spaces within which they can voice their dissent and strive to enhance their lives. Nevertheless, through the prism of prevailing social movement theories, which were primarily developed in politically open western societies, many scholars have concluded that there is no such thing as a youth or women’s movement in the Middle East because the characteristics of Middle Eastern women or youth activities do not comply with the principle “ framework.” Social movements in most Middle Eastern and Muslim societies may be unconventional but they definitely exist. Contrary to the prevailing discourse, activism and agency in Middle Eastern societies merely take on a different form but have yet to be recognized because they do not fit Western conceptual imaginations and prevailing categories. This paper seeks to raise a number of methodological and theoretical questions 

Majid Rafizadeh is an Iranian-Syrian scholar of International Studies and Foreign Policy with emphasis on the Middle East. He obtained a Diploma of Empirical Science and a Bachelors degree in Translation and Interpretation (Arabic, Persian and English) in Esfahan, Iran. Later he completed a graduate program of Education and Teaching. He came to the United States on a Fulbright Scholarship and taught as a teaching associate in the Religious Studies Department at the University of California, Santa Barbara. As an intern, he worked at the United Nations and International Committee for the Red Cross. Currently, he is a research assistant at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, intern at National Council on US-Arab Relations, and columnist for Harvard International Review. He is native speaker of Arabic and Persian, and his other languages are Hebrew, English, French and Dari.

regarding ways to view social movements, agency, and change in the Middle East. In order to examine the unique socio-religious and socio-political character of the current movements in Muslim societies, I will conduct a case study about the peaceful “One Million Signatures” campaign which was carried out by a group of women in Iran. The women collected one million signatures in support of changing laws which discriminate against women in Iran. The study reveals that women’s movements for gender equality under the modern autocratic and patriarchal regimes take on a unique character: they are largely horizontal in form. In other words, Iranian reform movements are not headed by formal leadership, as is usually the case in politically open societies in the West. Key-words: Iran, Islamism, Democratic movements, Middle East uprisings, civil society…

Objective

he objectives of this study are to observe the socio-political character of the unrecognized social movements and civil society. I focus on the agencies and the resulting change in the Muslim Middle East; the societies in which religion seems to occupy a prominent position. Furthermore, studying the configuration of these sociopolitical transformations by collectives, individuals and internal forces are essential to understand the nature of the civil society and social movements in the Middle East. Therefore, I will focus on the diverse resistance strategies not recognized by Western social movement theories, in which the ordinary people- men and women, the globalized youth and the subaltern- struggle to influence the strategies for change in their societies.

Significance of the Study By advocating a bottom-up approach and exploring the top-down mechanisms, this research will stress on the character of social movements and civil society under the Iranian regime. It will further explore the extent to which community participation and grassroots movements have impacted wider society. Moreover, this study will attempt to represent the misrepresented and examine the involvement of ordinary people that resulted in the reform of some state policies toward women. Methodology It was essential to choose a methodology that would enable me to talk and listen to activists as well as to participate in the activities of the agents of change. As Silverman discusses in Doing Qualitative Research (2005), some researchers argue that qualitative methodology will result in more detailed data because the research will provide an understanding of peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x;s interactions. Others argue that a qualitative approach will provide a deeper understanding of social phenomena. A qualitative research approach will give me the possibility of understanding the interactions and activities of ordinary people participating in the campaign. In order to truly understand the way ordinary women and men challenge the patriarchal framework I must utilize a qualitative approach. This study aims to, in part, understand the ideological motives and techniques that campaigners employed to achieve their demands. This research employs multiple methods for data collection including text analysis, participant observation and interviewing. In order to reach a meaningful understanding of the character of this campaign as well as the excesses, contradictions and interaction between the Iranian state and the civil society, this study will examine the writings

of contemporary Iranian scholars, interview female activists (both in Iran and in exile) involved in this campaign. The voices of the “real women and men” who are agents of changes in the civil society and social movements are significant in this study. These methods were selected in relation to the research questions as well as the reality of the “One Million Signature Campaign.” As Silverman argues, “methodological triangulation can be used if the researcher wants to use different methods and sources to coordinate each other” (Ibid 2005, 121). Furthermore, the reason I applied different methods in this study was to optimize access to the way participants talk about their activities regarding democracy and gender equality in actions and written texts. This is to ensure the validity and reliability of data. Introduction Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East ranging from those of Iran, Syria, Morocco, and Egypt to the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, continue to suppress demands for democracy and the rule of law. For decades, ordinary people have been refusing to exit from the social and political stage controlled by repressive state regimes and they have been generating and discovering new spaces within which they can voice their dissent and strive to enhance their lives. There is no doubt that reform of these authoritarian regimes will face major challenges, the difficulties of which cannot be understated. Through the prism of the prevailing social movement theories that have been largely developed in politically open Western societies, many scholars have concluded that there is no such thing as a youth or women‟s movement in the Middle East. This conclusion stems from the view that Middle Eastern women and youth struggles do not

comply with the characteristics of the principle “framework.”1 This begs the question, to what extent can predominant social movement theories account for the complexities of the socio-political, socioreligious particularities of “social movements” in the Middle East? Given the fact that these social movement theories draw on a purely Western experience, how far they can help us understand collective resistance in politically closed societies?2 It is problematic to make a comparison which takes “one of the elements of comparison as the “norm” without questioning the “original configuration.”3 These “models” hold specific historical genealogies and it is debatable if they can effectively explain the intricate dynamics and texture of the revolutions and upheavals currently taking place in the Middle East. The social movements, which emerged in Western Europe and North America after 1750, often developed into highly structured and largely homogenous entities. What came to be recognized as a “social movement” constituted three fundamental elements in the eyes of the West. First, the movement had an organized and sustained demand for the authorities. Second, it contained a repertoire of performances such as street marches, public meetings, associations, and media statements. Third, through various political measures, the movement had “public representations of the cause‟s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitments”4

Bayat Asef, Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle east, Stanford University Press, 2010 2 Bayat Asef, “ Islamism and Social Movement Theory”, Third World Quarterly 26, no. 6 ( July 2000), pp.891-908. 3 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 8-9 4 Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 ( Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2004), p. 7. 1

Current social movement theories which draw on purely Western experiences may not be able to account for the complexities of socioreligious movements in contemporary Muslim societies due to the distinct, autocratic nature of regimes in the Middle East. Recently, distinct forms of activism and organization have emerged in the Middle East which have not received adequate attention because they do not fit the prevailing classifications and conceptual imaginations of the West. Because social movements in the majority of Middle Eastern and Muslim societies are characterized by unconventional forms of activism and agency, they have not been recognized as movements, per se. Under authoritarian rule which continues to suppress demands for rule of law, democracy and the recognition of opposition parties, popular resistance movement in the Middle East have taken on a unique socio-religious character. In order to examine the unique socio-religious and socio-political character of the current movements taking place in Iran, I will conduct a case study about the peaceful “One Million Signatures” campaign which was carried out by a group of women in Iran. The campaigns mission was to collect one million signatures for a petition which protested of a body of laws that discriminate against women for submission to the Iranian government. The essential questions would be the following: What is the character of the “One Million Signatures” campaign? How have the activists been mobilizing under these authoritarian regimes when civil society and political participation is extremely restricted? Have these women been successful in adjusting their authoritarian regimes? Interactions and Contradictions: The One Million Signature Campaign and the Islamist State Women‟s movements for gender equality under autocratic patriarch regimes take on a different character than those that operate under politically open societies. Establishing independent

organizations and publications, mobilizing ordinary women, obtaining resources and funding, lobbying, managing public protests and creating links with international communities became restricted activities for women under the Iranian authoritarian regime. On June, 2006, when security forces violently attacked a peaceful women‟s right demonstration, a small cluster of Iranian feminists in Tehran formed the Campaign of Equality and embarked on the grassroots One Million Signature Campaign to establish equal rights for women by doing away with discriminatory and misogynous laws.5 The campaign‟s mission was to collect one million signatures for a petition which protested a body of laws that discriminate against women. The petition would be submitted to the Iranian government. It also aimed to provide education about legal issue to the public, especially women. Additionally, the campaign aimed to raise public awareness, promote collaboration between groups demanding equality between men and women, as well as to document experiences. First, they launched their campaign by using Western social movement techniques such as putting on seminars and conferences, promoting dialogue, identifying supporters, collecting signatures, and organizing street theatre performances with the intent of raising the profile of the campaign. They wrote and distributed brochures, talked to people face to face in the streets and asked people to protest against the discriminatory laws in any peaceful way they were able to. Their campaign incorporated a hierarchal structure with leadership at the top. The One Million Signature campaign initiated its activities with a few committees in Tehran. Soon after the campaigns initiation, 5

Tahmasebi, S. “What is the One Million Campaign?” ( 2008)

the committees‟ membership grew. After an increase in the number of committees operating in Tehran, the campaign succeeded in extending their networks to activists in other parts of Iran. By March 2007, nearly 400 trained young women carrying petitions visited homes, restaurants, doctor‟s offices, parks, buses, trains and elsewhere asking for the signatures of ordinary women and men. Each person, whether they signed or not, received a brochure explaining the legal inequalities facing women in plain language and with examples.6 The campaign, after two years of networking developed an organized network that was covering more than 20 cities from 13 different provinces. The One Million Signature campaign did not only spread inside Iran, but also gained popularity and support from Iranian citizens abroad. In 2008, the campaign had created networks with Iranians in many countries in the Middle East, Europe and America. As Shirin Ebadi said at the time of the campaign, “Even if we wanted to stop the campaign, we are not able to anymore” (Javaheri 2007a, 10). However, given the socio-political and socio-religious framework of the Iranian regime, the campaign could not pursue its activities by utilizing predominantly Western social movement techniques and strategies. The One Million Signatures campaign was attacked by the government.7 The activists of this campaign were subjected to constant government harassment, repression, and detention. Many were jailed, received prison sentences, beaten not only by the morality police but also by their male guardians. Many have been freed on Casey, Maura J. 2007. “ Challenging the Mullahs, One Signature at a Time.” The New York Times, February 7. Retrieved February 7, 2007 (www.nytimes.com/2007/02/07/opinion/07observer.html). 7 Noushin Khorasani, “Iranian Women’s One Million Signatures campaign”, Women's Learning Partnership for Rights ,2010 6

probation or high bail but their activism has been suppressed. 8 Many of the campaigner stated that the government even threatened them with execution for apostacy (mortad).9 By institutionalizing Islam, the Islamic Republic of Iran altered the power relations and social fabric of the state. Political Shiite Islam became the dominant ideology of Iran and excluded and marginalized any women and men who did not fit into the state‟s dominant framework and ideology. This marginalization was the result of the application of the three modes of power described by Michel Foucault.10 In order to solidify their power, the Islamist government employs various apparatuses of control which are informed by Foucault‟s three fundamental modes of power: disciplinary power, biopower and sovereign power. Disciplinary power is a form of surveillance and control over the individuals‟ behavior and comportments.11 It is dispersed and constantly operating throughout the day in order to produce and diffuse an array of social practices. It is even present during basic daily interactions. This kind of power functions from below, by imposing homogeneity on each individual‟s thoughts and conduct.12 It seeks to make people docile in order to manage them more easily. Furthermore, it attempts to individualize each citizen so as to make it possible to detect differences among members of the society as

“ One Million Signature Campaign”, ca.org/English/Docs/campaign_summary.pdf 8

http://changeforequality-

Gilda Seddighi, “ The Structure for Gender Equaity Within an Iranian Islamic Framework”, May, 2009, p. 56 10 Foucault, Michel. [1976] (1998). The History of Sexuality Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge. London: Penguin, see also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979). 11 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979). 12 Gordon Neve, Israeli Occupation, University of California Press, 2008. 9

regards specialties, personal abilities or abnormal activities.13 On the other hand, biopower is defined as the control of the population as opposed to the individual. This form of control is imposed through institutions which manage and regulate social interaction, the economy, medical care and welfare while simultaneously, normalizing a body of knowledge and configuring and circumscribing the political sphere.14 Disciplinary modes of power emphasize the individual while biopower administers the individual insofar as he or she is a member of a larger group. However, it integrates and modifies the disciplinary power on a different scale, through an array of distinct instruments. These two modes of powers operated concurrently and might overlap.15 The Islamist regimesâ&#x20AC;&#x; objective of employing various forms of control was to regulate the population through the process of incorporation into the Islamist state. For instance, in order to normalize specific types of knowledge, the new Islamist state removed all the female judges from courts. The state encouraged polygamy, reproduction, temporary marriages and motherhood.16 The testimony of a woman in court became worth half that of a man, a woman would inherit half of the share of her brothers and a woman would need her husbandâ&#x20AC;&#x;s permission to leave the country or to work. Another prominent example of this mode of power was control over the female body- "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the

Gordon Neve, On Power and Visibility: An Arendtian Corrective of Foucault, Human Studies 25, no. 2 (2002): 125-45 14 Foucault, Michel. [1976] (1998). The History of Sexuality Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge. London: Penguin 15 Gordon Neve, Israeli Occupation, University of California Press, 2008. 16 Afary Janet, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 13

control of populations."17 As Foucault states, “By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, …”18 The Islamist regime regulated public bodily functions of women. The new social order expanded to include policies that regulated dress, including compulsory wear of the “Hijab” or the preferred “Chador.” Janet Afary points out that the Chador and Hijab became symbols of the ideological and political hegemony of the Islamist state. Women who worked for the state were required to wear the black Chador; other women were required to wear the Hijab. The state also prescribed the “Mantoo,” a long and very loose overcoat, a large scarf (usually coming in dark colors like black, gray, and navy) that covers the hair and neck, and loose pants. Women who wore makeup, showed strands of their hair or showed a modern aesthetic of the body were considered to be in violation of the law. Several sports were banned because they exposed the body. Female vigilantes would monitor the dress of other women and were given the authority to drag anyone who was not following the required dress code to the “Amre Be-l Maroof wa-l Nahi an-l Monkar” office of the Center for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice where the arrested women might be lashed or jailed.19 Forty thousand female teachers were dismissed or resigned because of these restrictions.20 In order to manage and administer the population, biopower also utilizes statistical, scientific methods and apparatuses of Foucault, Michel (1998) The History of Sexuality Vol.1: The Will to Knowledge. London: Penguin. p. 140. 18 Michel Foucault:Security,Territory,Population, Palgrave Macmillan; Tra edition, p.1 (2007). 17

19 20

Afary Janet, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2009. Ibid., p:279.

surveillance, in order to for instance, intervene in birth rates, the distribution of labor with regard to age, gender, unemployment age and so on.21 The Islamic state attempted to control the population by allocating or preventing specific jobs from specific genders. For instance, women were prohibited from serving as judges.22 In other places, such as buses where women sat in the back and men in front, the segregation was more absolute. Mixed schools and beaches were also banned. Another form of biopower was control over citizenship. According to Article 976 of Iran's Civil Code, citizenship was granted to children whose fathers were Iranian. If the mother is an Iranian citizen and the father is not, the children are not granted Iranian citizenship. In other words, women cannot pass their citizenship on to anyone.23 Normalization of the population through biopower was another means of controlling women. Special bodies of knowledge such as religious knowledge-the Quran, Khomeiniâ&#x20AC;&#x;s writings, and Shariâ&#x20AC;&#x;a law- dominated other bodies of knowledge like the Social Sciences, Humanities, as well as Modern and International Law. Other changes included the replacement of secular judges with clerics and the removal of all female judges.24 The Islamist state put more emphasis on Shiite holidays rather than traditional holidays such as the Nowruz Holiday (Persian New Year). Many books were removed from universities and libraries while the academic curriculum was altered. In addition, a gender hierarchy was imposed. The state encouraged polygamy, reproduction, temporary marriages,

Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended ( New York; Penguin Books, 2003), 242-47 21

Afary Janet, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2009: 279 22

THE CIVIL CODE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Fred B. Rothman & Company (December 1994) 24 Afary Janet, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2009 23

and motherhood.25 The testimony of a woman in court became worth half that of a man, a woman would inherit half of the share of her brothers and a woman would need her husbandâ&#x20AC;&#x;s permission to leave the country or to work. Under the new regime, the citizens found themselves under the constant gaze of the Islamist state. The state strongly encouraged participation in Friday prayers, mourning during the month of Muharram, and fasting during the month of Ramadan. Issues that before were considered personal such as ablution, fasting, and daily prayers, suddenly became legal requirements which were sometimes enforced.26 The morality police and Basij were given the right to spy on the general population in order to enforce the new regulations. If people refused to follow the new laws, they were jailed, beaten, tortured executed. Forty thousand female teachers were dismissed or resigned because of these restrictions.27 Alcohol was punishable by public whippings. The Islamic state imposed and prescribed specific hairstyles and dress codes for men as well. The third form of control was through sovereign power: imposing a legal system and rule of law to legitimize the exercise of the previous forms of power, then enforcing or suspending it by the use of military. Unlike the first mode of power, sovereign power is topdown. It can also be enforced via judicial or executive institutions. It is utilized when a member of society breaches Islamic Law or suspension of the regimesâ&#x20AC;&#x; law.28 Deployment of sovereign power Afary Janet, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2009 Afary Janet, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press, 2009 27 Ibid., p:279 25 26

Carl Schmit, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). See also Michel Foucault, Power/Knoweledge, ed., Colin Gordon ( New York: Vintage, 1980) 28

was emphasized more than the other two types of powers following the revolution. After the Islamic party took control, they set up a new hierarchical order. This can be identified as an example of the application of this type of power. They introduced Jurisprudent Leadership (Vilayat-e Faqih) which gave absolute and divine power to the Supreme Leader (Vali), whose legitimacy lies in his supposedly unmatched knowledge of Islam and his piety. Article 56 of the constitution states that [Divine Right of Sovereignty]: “Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it is He Who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive man of this divine right, nor subordinate it to the vested interests of a particular individual or group. The people are to exercise this divine right in the manner specified in the following articles. Article 57 [Separation of Powers]: The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute religious Leader and the Leadership of the Ummah, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of this Constitution. These powers are independent of each other.”29 This means that the Supreme Leader has the power to enact any law, eliminate or suspend any existing law, or make any changes in the judicial, legislative or executive laws when he feels that it is necessary to defend Islam and/or the Islamic state. This gives the sovereign power the most powerful means to suppress any protest or opposition group which is viewed as anti-Islamist. Moreover, this power became more instrumental when every article in the constitution became subject to Article 4 that states, “All civil, penal Iranian constitution, info/government/constitution.html 29

http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-

financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the wise persons of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter.” This law gave the Islamist state the sovereign power and institutional mechanisms to implement and ensure compliance with Islam, as defined by the ruling clerics. Since the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken power, Iran‟s state judiciary institutions have effectively paralyzed any women rights reform movements by shutting down hundreds of so-called “antiIslamist” publications.30 According to a United Nations report, since 2002, eighteen newspapers have been banned by a court that claimed that they are against Islamic principles.31 These actions were legitimized by the government because of the enforcement of Article 24 which states, “Publications and the press have freedom of expression, except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public. The details of this exception will be specified by law.” Another example included the restriction of the widespread use of blogging and the Internet by the youth who claimed that print media would no longer allow freedom of speech. The Persian language became the fourth most frequently used language for sustaining on-line journals.32 Blogging provided a space for people to bypass strict state censorship in order to write freely. When the government noticed this threat to their power, in 2004 the head of judiciary announced a new law expressly restricting “cyber crimes.” 33 According to the law, “Anyone propagating Fridman Ari and Maxine Kaye, Human Rights in Iran, American Jewish Committee, 2007 31 Ibid. 32 Alavi Nasrin, We Are Iran, Soft Skull Press, 2005: 2 33 Ibid. 30

against the regime, acting against national security, disturbing the public mind and insulting religious sanctities through computer systems or telecommunications would be punished.”34 This law, like Article 4 of the constitution, subjects various types of new technology usage to punishment, if they are detrimental to Islam and the regime. Through this law, the regime is able to control and curtail freedom of speech in cyberspace. In 2004, several internet journalist and bloggers were arrested and imprisoned. They were the first bloggers in the world to be imprisoned for the content of their blogs.35 The government took direct action to crack down on the bloggers after accusing them of engaging in sexual activity or committing adultery via the internet. Additionally, the media was no longer allowed to show anything that contradicts so-called Islamic principles. Many television networks such as the Tehran Bureau of Al Jazeera were shut down.36 The One Million Signature Campaign issued "The Statement of Campaign" arguing that the misogynous laws imposed by sovereign power have created a discriminatory atmosphere women in Iran and it demanded the elimination or reform of following Islamist state laws:37

the the for the

●The marriage law states that the age of marriage for girls is 13 and for boys it is 15, and every girl needs a “father‟s consent” where the father gives permission to the marriage (See also the Articles Ibid,. p: 4 Ibid., p: 5 36 Fridman Ari and Maxine Kaye, Human Rights in Iran, American Jewish Committee, 2007 37 “ One Million Signature Campaign”, http://changeforequalityca.org/English/Docs/campaign_summary.pdf 34 35

1041, 1043, 1044 and 1060 of the Civil Code). According to Article 1041 of the Civil Code, girls younger than 13 years old and boys younger than 15 years old can get married with father‟s consent and court‟s permission. ● Citizenship: According to the law of Iran, the citizenship of a woman does not transfer to her child; having an Iranian mother does not make the child an Iranian citizen (See also the Bill 3 of Article 976 and 986 of the Civil Code). ● Divorce: This law states that divorce is the right of a man, and a man can divorce his wife whenever he pleases. If the wife initiates a divorce, she must prove that the husband is guilty of misconduct (See also the Articles 1113, 1129 and 1130 of the Civil Code). ● Age of criminal responsibility: According to this law, the age of criminal responsibility for girls is 8 years and nine months, and for boys 14 years and 6 months. Thus, if a 9-year-old girl committed a crime, she will be treated as an adult. The only exception is that in cases of execution, when the child will be jailed or kept in a juvenile institution until she/he reaches the age of 18 (the Article 49 of the Islamic Penal Codes). ● Blood Money (diyeh): Blood money is the amount of money a murderer or one who has inflicted serious bodily harm pays the victim or their family. According to Iranian law, a woman‟s life is considered to be worth half that of a man (See also the Articles 294, 300 and 301 of the Islamic Penal Codes). ● Inheritance: According to civil law, sons inherit two times as much in inheritance as daughters, after the death of the father and mother. If a man who has a wife and children dies, the wife inherits

one eighth of her husband‟s wealth. However, if they do not have any children, the wife inherits one fourth of her husband's wealth (See also the Articles 899,900,907,906, 909, 946 of the Civil Code and the Articles 630 and 220 of the Islamic Penal Codes). ● Partners’ Number: The laws give men the right to have 4 permanently married (Aqdi) wives and an infinite number of temporarily married (Siqehi) wives. (See also the Articles 1048, 1049, 900 and 901 of the Civil Code). ● Witness Rights: This law bears that in some cases of crime, women can not testify, such as homosexuality, prostitution and sodomy. In other cases, two female witnesses are equal to one male witness. (See also the Article 495 of the Civil Code and the Articles 74, 76, 119, 128, and 137 of the Islamic Penal Codes). Despite constant government harassment, repression and detention, the One Million Signature campaign continued to pursue its work to fight for gender equality in Iran. However, under the socio-religious and socio-political framework of the Iranian Islamist state and the society, the campaign was forced to adopt different methods of resistance.

The Unique Socio-religious Character of the Campaign The social movements that emerged in Western Europe and North America after 1750, largely developed into highly structured and largely homogenous entities. What came to be known as a “social movement,” constituted three fundamental elements. First, they had an organized and sustained claim on the authorities. Second, they hold a repertoire of performances such as street marches, public meetings, associations, and media statements.

Third, through various political actions, they had “public representations of the cause‟s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitments.”38 Social movements in most Middle Eastern and Muslim societies are characterized by particular, unconventional forms of activism and agency which have not been recognized because they do not fit into the Western conceptual imagination and do not fit into prevailing sociological categories.39 Under the authoritarian regimes that continue to suppress demands for rule of law, democracy and lifting restrictions on opposition parties, such as those in Syria and Iran, people‟s resistance movement have taken a unique socio-religious character. The resistance produced in such states can be characterized by what Asef Bayat calls “quiet encroachment.” Bayat defines “quiet encroachment” as “the silent, protracted, but pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or the public, in order to survive and improve their lives.”40 It is viewed as the collective action of non-collective actors. It does not bear leadership, ideology or structured organization. These movements “embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations.” The power of this type of resistance rests on the “power of big

Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 ( Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2004), p.

Bayat Asef, Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle east, Stanford University Press, 2010, p.3. 40 Bayat Asef, Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle east, Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 7. 39

numbers.”41 In Middle Eastern and Muslim societies, three main characteristics of the ordinary people‟s resistance to the current social order are: first, a tendency to be action-oriented and non-vocal. Their demands are made on an individual basis as opposed to through ideologically driven, audible and in unified groups. Second, in this kind of resistance, people, despite government sanctions, implement their demands directly rather than being organized and mobilized under leaders to put pressure on authorities. Third, the resistance takes place during the ordinary practices of everyday life rather than through getting involved in extraordinary deeds of mobilization such as attending meetings, lobbying, petitioning and so on.42 The resistances, which can be viewed during ordinary activities of day-to-day life, challenge the sovereignty of the state and bring about sociopolitical change to religion and government. The reaction of each individual to the various modes of power has created the collective resistance of non-collective actors. This is the logical collective reaction of individuals within a group when they are confronted by the same threat. Every individual, in spite of all odds, discovers new spaces within which he or she can make herself realized, heard, felt and seen. 43 Millions of individuals who strive to improve their lives in a lifelong collective effort, created this protracted mobilization, which is not characterized by elements of structured organization, ideology and centered leadership. Those who resist include women striving to play sports, attend college, do “men‟s work,” work in public or choose their own partners as well as young people Ibid., p: 20 Bayat Asef, Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle East, Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 19. 43 Ibid., p: 19-20 41 42

struggling to wear what they like and listen to the music they wish. Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x;s movements for gender equality under autocratic patriarchic regimes take on a different form than those that are active under politically open societies. Establishing independent organizations and publications, mobilizing ordinary women, obtaining resources and funding, lobbying, managing public protests and creating links with international communities became restricted for women who have gender claims under the authoritarian regimes. Because of such constraints on the movement, the campaigners decided to employ different strategies that intimately involve the mundane practices of everyday life. As the government tried to limit the campaignersâ&#x20AC;&#x; resources and facilities, the campaign attempted to find new methods and resources to go beyond such limitations. Campaigners tried to find new spaces for collecting signatures when demonstrations, public meetings, the streets and metros were no longer safe and many were arrested and jailed. The new spaces for collective action became taxis, shopping centers, parks, universities and hairdressers. Jail became a new space for the collective action. In articles written by former prisoners, jail was described as a new space for having access to the women who were most marginalized (Javaheri, 2007a). Many of the campaigning activists decided to pursue their activities by not being members of organized networks. They worked by themselves, not having daily or weekly communication with other members of organized networks. Under the new character, there could be many different interpretations of what resistance and gender equality entails. As one of the founders of the campaign Khorasani, claims, the focus of the campaign is on demands, not ideology (Ibid, 2007a).

The hierarchical structure and leadership of the One Million Signatures Campaign was also dismantled. Collective action became based on voluntary work. People from all types of political, social, and ideological backgrounds could join. This led to a new dynamic and structure within which people with diverse backgrounds and beliefs could join the campaign. The campaign did not have any official space within which to work which resulted in the creation of new spaces, especially public spaces (Ibid 2007, 76). Most of the seminars, meetings and activities were moved from taking place in official spaces to parks, streets, cafes, restaurants, hairdressing salons, libraries, etc. Occasionally, private spaces such as houses were used for workshops, seminars, and meetings. Other strategies included using the internet as a space and tool for communication. Campaigners found creative ways to use the internet for attracting followers and gaining the support of the international community. For instance, they established special mailing lists to inform their members especially after they were forced to change their web address as a response to government censorship. They also used the internet to reach out to international supporters who signed petitions and donated to the campaign in solidarity with the plight of Iranian women. The One Million Signatures Campaign gained substantial support from inside and outside Iran. Many members who were involved in this campaign stated that they found the campaign on the internet. The increase in the number of the campaignâ&#x20AC;&#x;s websites and weblogs indicates the importance of the internet as a tool for resistance. For instance, in the beginning, the campaign had one website. After the crackdown of the state, the campaign established three websites with every city and country having their own weblog. Therefore, the internet, specifically weblogs and email, became a new space for communication. Due to the socio-religious configurations of the Iranian regime and Iranian society, resistance through everyday actions has altered the

discourse on gender equality in Iran. Therefore, the One Million Signatures Campaignâ&#x20AC;&#x;s struggle against hegemonic masculinity and the construction of self should be understood by the collective action of non-organized, collective actors for the goal of reconstructing subjectivity in the personal (micro) and political (macro) level. As Khorasani states, the women and feminists who struggle for gender equality (2007, 99) no longer focus on ideology, but rather on resistance through the daily activities of women in Iran. For Khorasani, the One Million Signatures Campaign is a prominent example of such conceptualizations. They have chosen to utilize this approach because of the socio-religious and socio-political condition within which they live. She adds: Indeed I mean that our minds and views should not be shaped in the vacuum or by the external sources; on the contrary, our thoughts are shaped by a collection of social and everyday conditions. If our condition leads us to use a specific theory or strategy, we should use them for the purpose of change of the limitations of the same society we live in (Ibid, 101). She also emphasizes, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Yes, this generation is seeking justice and equality, it is seeking new and exciting strategies. This generation wants to test feminine imagination, which originates from everyday life to a civil fightâ&#x20AC;? (Ibid, p. 114). This illustrates the fact that the social and political context of Iran has resulted in the present form of resistance. This also means that the current situation leads activists to act in a specific way in order to change the current situation. Since ideological feminist perspectives like Islamic and secular feminism could not progress the condition of women in the Iranian context, (where women from all perspectives have been marginalized in the Iranian power structure and negotiating within the system was made

impossible), Iranian feminists have resorted to pragmatic feminism. The campaign, a prime example of situational feminism, has attempted to create new possibilities within daily and legal scenarios. In order to understand the action of situational feminism, it is crucial to contextualize the action.44 On one of the One Milllion Signature campaign‟s website “Change for Equality,” it is stated that “One Million Signatures Campaign is a decentralized movement, and all Iranian and foreign egalitarians, both men and women, can participate as actors in the movement. The most important part of the actors‟ work is collecting signatures through face-to-face dialogue with people on women‟s issues in relation to discriminatory legislation” (“Change for Equality”, 2008b). The One Million Signatures Campaigners shifted from gathering signatures publicly to collecting signatures primarily from their own family and relatives. However, sometimes members gather signatures in the streets, in parks, on buses, and in metros. They attempt to collect signatures individually rather than through organized networks. Many of the campaigners have acknowledged that the campaign has experienced various structural adjustments since its initial launching. For example, one campaigner named Mahtab stated that “the campaign does not have any specific structure. Earlier we worked in committees, and each committee had its responsibilities. Later, committees changed to sub- groups, thus forming smaller groups. In smaller groups people formed closer friendships, and we became more like friendships circles. The structure emerged by itself.” Khorasani, agrees with campaigners stating, “How can we expect a civil movement to have a stable and permanent strategy, when we live in a country where every month and every week a new case will come up, Gilda Seddighi, “ The Structure for Gender Equaity Within an Iranian Islamic Framework”, May, 2009, p. 74 44

and the tension it creates causes its citizens to feel unstable and confused” (Khorasani, 2007, p. 117). These transformations indicated that over the last three years, the campaign has adopted a unique structure under the Islamist regime. They have attempted to operate without a leader or leadership. They emphasize a horizontal structure of relationships. They practice their demands and challenge the state through day-today activities. They adopted this approach after realizing that the campaign would have a longer life-span by not adopting an organized network or formal leadership. In this sense, the horizontal structure of the campaigns collective nature was a structure that was created in response to the existing social order imposed by the Iranian state and repressive socio-religious norms. Conclusion Certain distinct forms of organizations and activism have emerged in the Middle East that have not received adequate attention, because they don‟t fit into the prevailing Western classifications and conceptual imaginations. Through the prism of prevailing social movement theories, which were primarily developed in a politically open western societies, many scholars have concluded that there is no such thing as a youth or women‟s movement in the Middle East because the characteristics of the Middle Eastern women or youth activities did not comply with the principle “ framework.” Given the fact that these social movement theories draw on a purely Western experience, to what extent can these frameworks help us understand the collective resistance that takes place in politically closed societies? Upon examining the character of the “One Million Signature” campaign, the study revealed the problematic nature of making a comparison which takes “one of the elements of comparison as a “norm” without questioning the “original configuration.” These “models” hold specific historical genealogies and it is debatable if

they can effectively explain the intricate dynamics and texture of resistance, upheavals, and nationwide revolutions in the Middle East. Although grassroots and social movements are not recognized by predominant Western Social Movement theories, Middle Eastern resistance movements take on a unique socio-religious and sociopolitical character. What came to be known as “social movements” in the West constituted three fundamental elements. First, they had an organized and sustained claim on the authorities. Second, they hold a repertoire of performances such as street marches, public meetings, associations, and media statements. Third, through various political actions, they had public representations of the cause‟s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitments. The current social movement theories, which draw on the Western experience, may not also be able to account for the complexities of socio-religious movements in contemporary Muslim societies because of the autocratic and distinct character of the Middle Eastern societies and regimes. The One Million Signature campaign launched their activities by using Western social resistance techniques such as holding seminars and conferences, promoting dialogue, identifying supporters, collecting signatures, and organizing street theatre performances with the intent of raising the profile of the campaign. They wrote and distributed brochures, talked to people face to face in the streets and asked people to protest against the discriminatory laws in any peaceful way they were able to. Their campaign had a hierarchal structure, leader, and leadership. However, due to constant state sanctioned harassment and constraints on the movement, the campaign took a unique form under the Islamist regime. Campaigners found new spaces for collecting signatures when street demonstrations and public meetings were no longer safe and many were arrested and jailed. For the movement‟s survival the movement

was forced to take on a more horizontal structure. Activists began to exert their demands and challenge the state through their day-to-day activities and without an organized network or formal leadership. The current social movements in Muslim and Middle Eastern societies seem to have the tendency to be action-oriented and nonvocal. Their demands are made on an individual basis as opposed to through ideologically driven, audible and in unified groups. Second, in this kind of resistance individuals, despite government sanctions, practice their claims directly rather than being organized and mobilized under leaders to put pressure on authorities. Third, the resistance takes place during ordinary practices of daily life rather than through getting involved in extraordinary deeds of mobilization such as attending meetings, lobbying, petitioning and so on.

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Developing High School Curriculum Based on Creativity Authors: Afzalkhani, M. Naderi, E. Shariatmadari, A. Seif Naraghi, M.

Abstract: The present study aims at investigating the structure of high school curriculum in Iran regarding the degree of creativity within it. Its main purpose is to design a model of guidance for high school curriculum developers to enable them to strengthen the creativity elements of the curriculum. This research is based on a survey with the population being all of the university teachers and curriculum development experts that are 104 individuals altogether. As the total number of population was not too large, the whole population was selected as the sample for the study. The instrument for gathering the data was a questionnaire devised by the researchers. The reliability and validity of the instrument were also tested prior to data collection. The analysis of the data was done using the SPSS software. The findings of this research reveal that the creativity aspects of the curriculum are towards poor and low. It also showed that the degree of creativity from the 

Ph.D Student. Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University Tehran, Iran. Email: afzalkhani_mr@yahoo.com  Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University Tehran, Iran.  Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.  Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

point of view individuals, group and organizations are towards low. The spiritual aspects of creativity show an upward trend. The cultural heritage on the other hand showed middle to low trend. Therefore, with the aim of promoting creativity in the high schoolsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; curriculum and considering different aspects of creativity and emphasis on various important factors influencing decisions making in this area and taking into account previous research in the field a model for strengthening and reinforcing creativity in the curriculum has been offered. Key words: Pattern of creativity in the curriculum, high school, creativity

Introduction Including creativity in the high school curriculum is of special importance. Among the reasons for this is that high school curriculum is expected to provide conditions for qualitative reform in study and preparation for productive jobs, improvement, and development of knowledge and technology in the society. In addition, it should also be able to convincingly answer the different needs and questions of students in various fields. Zamani and Liaghatdar (2003) carried out a research on innovations and new guidelines in which they compared Iranâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s educational approaches with some other countries. The results showed that the approaches that are used in Iran are traditional and cannot satisfy the needs and problems of present society. Discipline structure, content and methodology of discipline are among the main elements of curriculum. In discipline structure, what is important is not the gathering of the information and facts, but it is the exact thinking method about the information. Many people have enough information in a discipline but do not know the method of thinking to apply to it. Regarding discipline content there are two issues: first, what should be included in an educational course? Second, what level of complexity is

appropriate for the contents nowadays, due to the advances in science and technology and due to some of the cognitive approaches? Unfortunately schools mostly focus on transformation of scientific information and facts and they are moving away from education thinking and creative individuals (Shabani, 2008, p. 1). Ruholahi (1993) carried out a research with the aim of investigating the relationship between high school educations and students’ creativity. In this study the high school students were compared to their peer group who had left full time education earlier on. Generally, the results showed that education offered in high school did not aim at developing the students’ creative ability and elements of innovativeness and flexibility. In contrast, the education has developed uncreative characteristics, dependence on others, shyness and surrounding to the ideas of others (ibid.). Renzulli and Reis (1997:20) offered a pattern for “enrichment of students programs” and emphasized the development of creativity in the schools. They considered the role of teachers to be very important as counselors and role models and believed that the interest and motivation of teachers for their work influenced students’ quality of learning. In their model the following goals were included: Reinforcing and promoting the creativity in gifted students, improving the educational quality, expansion and the enrichment of organized educational curriculum, and encouraging cooperation instead of competition between the teachers and those who cooperate in the enrichment program. Renzulli and Reis reported that the pattern for “enrichment of students programs” is self– concept and improve the learning abilities in students. Renzulli has revised and reformed this pattern many times. In his revision (1997) he stated that: all of the students should be provided with the possibility of experiencing learning in such a way that they can choose a pathway that matches their individual abilities, interests, and learning methods. If we do not develop methods for achieving

these goals, the educational system will decline with the view of “the same education fitting all” (ibid.). Niu (2007) investigated the environmental and individual influences of 357 high school students, through measuring their creativity by the story completion test, measuring divergent thinking (cycling exercises and completion of pictures) and selfestimation of divergent thinking. In this study, that was based on the model of cognitive approach and eclectic one (investigation of individual elements such as intelligence, personality, motivation, thinking and knowledge patterns, and environmental elements like schools and family atmosphere) shows that both the environmental and individual elements influence students’ creativity. This study generally indicated that the environmental factors and related issues have an inevitable role in the formation of creativity. Some theorists such as Guilford (1967), Debono (1992), Sternberg (1993), Amabile (1987), Runcco and Albert (1990), and Menge (2001) while emphasizing on the individual aspects of creativity have also referred to its educational dimensions. A review of these studies reveals that the individual aspect of creativity is affected by education; specifically the ability to be self initiative is emphasized. Sternberg (1993) conducted a study titled “the effect of creativity training on students’ performances” on 110 students; he concluded that the extent of the effect of the training of creativity is related to the cognitive and personality characteristics of the students. Make, Sonmi, and Muammar (2009) investigate the effects of discovery curriculum on the students of primary school. The results showed that active learning, curriculum selections by the students, availability of different resources, discovery, selfassessment, finding the problem and problem solving which are the elements of discovery curriculum significantly led to the promotion of creativity in the students.

Rojas, Drummaond (2006), in an experimental investigated the effects of using novel teaching methods like cooperative learning, teaching of critical thinking, and exploratory talk on students. The results indicated a significant increase in the studentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; creativity test. Denise (2000) argued in order to call a production creative, some standards are needed. Creativity does not happen in isolation and solitude just the same way as it can not exist outside of the humanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s mind, so creativity should actually occur in the interaction of individuals with their cultural community. There are also some studies which show that group elements are among the most important and pervasive elements that influence the creativity of students. Yetton and Bottger (1983), Amabile (1998), Amabile (1988), Gilson (2001), Singh (1992), Konz et al. (1988) are among those who believe that group elements play a crucial role in the creativity. Bidokhti (2004) carried out a research on organizational creativity. The result of this study indicated that there was a significant and negative relationship between mechanical organization structure and organizational creativity and its six dimensions (failure tolerance, ambiguity tolerance, encouraging new ideas, accepting change, tolerance of conflict, and low external control). It showed that extensive implementation of mechanical structure in high schools would result in the decrease of creativity. The results also showed that there is a significant difference between the schools with mechanical structure and those that have organic structure with regard to the extent of creativity. The creativity scores were higher in organizations with organic structure in relation to the organizations with mechanic structure. Oldham and Cummings (1997), Farmer et al. (2003), Mcfadzean (1998), Martins and Terblanche (2003), Isaksen and Lauer (2001), King and Anderson (1995), Drazin et al. (1999), Shalley and Gilson (2004), and Taleb Bidokhti and Anvari (2005) believed that the

organizational elements play a definite role in creativity. Providing creative and flexible structure is among the methods that reinforces creativity in organizations, especially the educational organizations. It is done in this way that formal regulations, circulars and rules should not be dominant and the context should be provided for public cooperation and training the creativity and innovative soul in the individuals. And also the provided structure should be flexible, motivational, tolerant of new ideas and thoughts, cooperative, and dynamic (Taleb Bidokhti and Anvari, 2005). In relation to creativity one may ask whether creative education can improve the mind and personality. In which elements does this creativity occur? As it was explained in the literature, the answer to this question is positive and some limited studies in the Iranian context also confirm this. A study by Pirkhaefi (2009) showed that creative education leads to the promotion of the mental consciousness, flexibility and mental creativity in students. In another study by Pirkhaefi (2006) entitled â&#x20AC;&#x153;the investigation of effects of creative education on meta-cognitive elements of creative thinking of teachersâ&#x20AC;? showed that creative thinking can help to increase the meta-cognitive elements. Method The method chosen for this research is that of a survey with the subjects of the research being all the university teachers and experts in the field of curriculum development and the reviewers and curriculum developers for high school who are totaling 104 individuals. Due to the limited number of the population all of subjects were chosen as the sample of the study. The instrument for the data collection was a questionnaire devised by the researchers. Based on the literature a questionnaire was devised that included the following elements: individual

characteristics related to curriculum (social human, subjectorientation, development of cognitive processes, qualificationcenteredness, student-centeredness, transmission of cultural inheritance, spiritualism, and humanism) and also the curriculum approaches based on curriculum patterns and theories, and the creativity elements (individual, group, and organizational). It is worth mentioning that in preparing the questionnaire, the items were designed in such a way that it measures the application of innovative approaches and orientations, and the creativity elements in the curriculum through a five Likert-scale options of very high, high, middle, low, and very low. Of all the returned questionnaires only 92 were complete. Through the gathered data and their analysis, the degree of high school curriculum tendency toward creativity was revealed. A practical pattern for curriculum which contextualizes creativity was then offered by using both the results of this research and the library references related to criticisms and analyses of different curriculum and creativity patterns. The reliability and validity of instruments: the content validity was used for the validity of the questionnaire. Since the questionnaire was designed based on the well-known theories and models of curriculum, the individual, group and organizational creativity and its items were directly adopted from these theories one can, therefore, deduct that it has a good content validity. In this process the views of curriculum experts were also imposed. For the reliability of the questionnaire, the Cronbach Alpha was used. The reliability for different sub-scales of the questionnaire, including approach and orientation to curriculum, individual elements of creativity, and the organizational elements of creativity were 90%, 84%, 89%, and 85% respectively. To describe the variables descriptive statistics including percentage, frequency, the mean and standard deviation were used. For the analysis of the data, in the first part of the questionnaire, the tests of mean equality, Levene, F, and Duncan were applied.

One-sample t-test was used for the second part of the questionnaire.

Results a. Demographic characteristics of professionals and curriculum experts Of the 92 professionals and experts of the subjects of this research 55 (60%) were men and 37 (40%) were women. Their years of service were as follows: No of participants

Percentage

Lengths of service (years)

2.17

less than 5

9.79

5 to 10

10.86

11 to 15

11.96

16 to 20

21 years and more

40.22

Did not specify

The analysis of the data regarding the application of different approaches in designing and developing high school curriculum revealed the following results: The amount of reported F was equal to 16.17 with the significance level less than 0.001 and it shows that the mean of approaches have significant difference with each other. In order to understand about the ranks for approaches the table of Duncan test is offered. This test is based on the dual comparison of the means for approaches.

Table1: The Duncan table for the application of the approaches to individual characteristics from creativity components in high school curriculum N Approaches Development cognitive processes

Subset for alpha=0.05 1 2 3 2.5435

2.5435

2.6848

Student-centeredness Social human Humanism Transmission of cultural inheritance Qualificationcenteredness

3.0217

3.0761

3.3587

3.6522

Subject-centeredness .374

.703

1.000

Spiritualism Sig.

In this table, first the approaches are ranked based on their means and then they are divided into groups based on the amount of significance and difference. In this case group 1, which is related to the approaches with low means, includes development of cognitive processes, studentcenteredness, social human, and humanism. The mean for these approaches was between 2.54 to 2.68. This mean is less than the average mean (group 3) which indicates that these approaches are applied almost in the low levels.

The second group (or second rank) includes the approaches of transmission of cultural inheritance, and qualification-centeredness with the means of 3.02 and 3.07 which indicates that these approaches have been applied in middle levels. The third group (or third rank) only includes subject-centeredness with the mean of 3.35 which shows that this approach has been applied more than the middle level. The fourth group (or fourth rank) only includes spiritualism with the mean of 3.65 which shows that this approach has been applied in the high levels. So, in order to answer the first question one can be say that: Spiritualism has been applied in high levels, subject-centeredness in more than middle, transmission of cultural inheritance and qualification-centeredness in middle and the development of cognitive processes, students-centeredness, social human, and human in low levels. b) How is the presence of creativity in the high school curriculum in the new system? The amount of reported F was equal to 14.1 with the significance level less than 0.001 which shows that the mean for orientations have significant difference with each other. In order to determine the ranks for orientations the table of Duncan test is offered.

Table 2: The Duncan table for the application of the orientations to individual characteristics from creativity components in high school curriculum

Orientations

Student-centeredness

Subset for alpha=0.05 1 2

2.3696

2.3804

2.4022

2.5435

Social human

2.6739

Subject-centeredness

Development processes Humanism, centeredness

Transmission inheritance

cognitive

Qualification-

cultural

2.6739 2.8804

3.44577 .064

.159

1.000

Spiritualism Sig.

In general, the table shows that: spiritualism has been present more than other orientations (3.44) and it is in level higher than middle, after that there are transmission of cultural inheritance and subject-centeredness (with means of 2.88 and 2.67) that shows their presence is lower than middle. Finally, there are social human (with mean of 2.45), humanism(with mean of 2.4), development of cognitive processes (with mean of 2.38) and students-centeredness (with mean of 2.36).

Table 3: The amount of application of creativity components in high school curriculum Indices Creativity components

Mean

Sig.

2.47

0.74

6.82

>0.05

Personality characteristics

2.25

0.73

9.87

>0.05

Group characteristics

2.34

0.74

7.77

>0.05

Organizational characteristics

2.29

0.69

9.9

>0.05

Capability

Discussion and Conclusion The calculated F with the significance level lower than 0.001 reveals that the application of different views in the high school curriculum are as follows: spiritualism and subject-centeredness are toward middle and high, transmission of cultural inheritance and qualification-centeredness are toward middle, and development of cognitive processes, students-centeredness, social human, and humanism are toward low. The principles of high school curriculum should emphasize the elements such as cognitive development from the category of developing cognitive process, process-centeredness, and problem solving from meta-cognitive development, experiencecenteredness and students-centeredness from cognitive and procedural views, and social development from social function and

cooperation, and achieving self-fulfillment. This study shows that development of cognitive processes and student-centeredness that play a very important role in the development of creative thinking are used at very low levels. These results are in line with the claim by Shabani (2008) that todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s schools have distanced themselves from developing thinking and creative students and also with results of the study by Zamani and Liaghatdar (2003) that compares the Iranian educational approaches with some other countries. It should be mentioned that this issue is also evident in the orientations toward curriculum. In other words, the existence of the orientations toward development of cognitive processes and student-centeredness is very low in the high school curriculum. The value of â&#x20AC;&#x153;tâ&#x20AC;? which was equal to 6.82 with the significance level of more than 0.05 shows that the high school curriculum has paid little attention to the capability aspects (knowledge, technical skill, intelligence) of reinforcement of creativity. Niu (2007), Mike et al. (2009), Williams (1970), Renzuli (1997), and Amabile (1988) believe that individual elements play a very significant role in the creativity of students and the environmental effects related to that plays an inevitable role in the formation of creativity. They believe that cognitive domain includes knowledge, reasoning skills, technical skills, and special talents, and from their points of view the success in this domain is related to good curriculum, experience and ability of the learner's access to various resources, discovery, self-assessment, finding the problem and problem solving would significantly lead to the promotion of creativity in students. Curriculum development experts, teachers, and learners should pay enough attention to these points. Guilford (1967), Debono (1980), Sternberg (1993), Amabile (1987), Meng (2001), have focused on the individual as well as curriculum dimensions of creativity. The review of these studies shows that creativity from the individual dimension (ability and personal characteristics) are influenced and improved through

education, especially the initiative improves very significantly through this process. The value of “t” which was equal to 9.87 with the significance level of more than 0.05 shows that in the high school curriculum the reinforcement of creativity through the dimension of personal characteristics was applied at low levels. These results are in agreement with the results of the study by Ruhollahi (1993) with the aim of investigating the relationship between high school education and the creativity of students. The results of this study showed that the high school education was not aimed at developing the creativity, originality and flexibility elements. In contrary the education developed uncreative characteristics, dependence on others, shyness, and surrender to the ideas of others. But, personal characteristics play a particular role in the development of creativity as it is mentioned by Brolin (1992), Nelson and Quick (1994), Harris (1998), Sutton (2001), Dacey and lennon (2000), James et al. (1992), Gardner (1993), Machinnon (1962), Sternberg and Amabile (1988), Isaksen et al. (2001), Niu (2007) . The results for group elements with the value of t that was equal to 7.77 with the significance level of more than 0.05 indicates that high school curriculum develops creativity through the group dimensions at almost low levels. But some would argue like Denise (2000) that in order to call a product as creative some standards are necessary. Creativity is not developed through isolation of individuals, as it cannot stop existing in the mind of individuals. Actually, the creativity should be developed through the interactions of individuals with his/her cultural community. Yetton and Bottger (1983), Amabile (1998), Gilson (2001), Senge (1992), Koontz et al. (1988) would also believe that group elements have essential role in the development of creativity. The result for organizational elements with the value of “t” that was equal to 9.9 with the significance level of more than 0.05 indicates that high school curriculum develops creativity through

organizational elements at low levels. Bidokhti (2004) conducted a study with the aim of determining the organizational structure (mechanic or organic) of high school curriculum and comparing the extent of organizational creativity in each of these two structures. Generally, the results of this study showed that there is negative significant relationship between organic structure and organizational creativity and its six dimensions (accepting the failure, ambiguity tolerance, encouraging new ideas, accepting change, conflict tolerance, and external control). This shows that extensive implementation of mechanic structure in the high school would lead to the decrease of creativity. Oldham and Cummings (1997), Farmer et al. (2003), Mcfadzean (1998), Martin and Terblanche (2003), Isaken et al. (2001), King and Anderson (1995), Drazin et al. (1999), Shally and Gilson (2004), and Taleb Bidokhti and Anvari (2004) believed that organizational elements play an essential role in the development of creativity. Some of the methods for addressing creativity in organizations, especially the educational organizations, are serving to decrease the domination of formal regulations, circulars, and rules and the context that is provided for public cooperation and the development of creativity and innovation in individuals and a flexible, motivational, cooperative, dynamic structure be provided which accepts the new ideas and thoughts. A Model for Creative Curriculum development (based on the results of the study) The aim of the model The aim of the presented model is to offer a practical guide for high school curriculum developers for designing and developing a creativity-based curriculum. The students and teachers get the most from implementation of such curriculum and this type of curriculum can positively affect the whole educational and also social systems.

Theoretical Bases of the model In the present study it is attempted to include the collections of important components and elements that contextualize creativity in the curriculum, these are all the results of valuable experiences of theorists in the field of creativity and curriculum. This pattern is based on the evolutional process of the knowledge on creativity and curriculum development that were founded on valuable theories of creativity and curriculum development about curriculum that contextualizes creativity. The aim of this model is to design a curriculum which contextualizes creativity through the elements that influence creativity. The necessity of a model Although there are various general patterns for curriculum, there has been no serious attempt for developing and designing a curriculum that contextualizes creativity in Iran. Offering such a model as a suitable solution has the following advantages: 

guiding the experts and critics of high school curriculum development for different subject area;



justifying the importance of designing and developing curriculum based on creativity elements;



focusing on the significant role of elements which address creativity in the classroom;



satisfying the various needs of students more and in appropriate ways;



attempting to improve and balance the existing curriculum;



active cooperation of students in different stages of curriculum development and attending to the needs and interests of students;

ď&#x201A;ˇ

addressing the needs of the society in particular that of the workforce;

ď&#x201A;ˇ

integrating the creativity elements into the curriculum along with the updated specialized knowledge that leads to an updated curriculum.

Explaining the model The model for creativity-based curriculum includes three main stages of production of the curriculum, implementation, and its evaluation. This section attempts to describe the steps towards the productions of the creativity based curriculum for the high schools. (Figure 1)

Figure1. The model of creativity based curriculum for high school

Based on the above mentioned stages and steps, the process of curriculum development can be explained as follows: 

needs analysis (focusing on the needs of students and society and the new specialized knowledge);



setting the educational goals;



selecting the appropriate content (focusing on the principles and criteria for content selection and the creativity elements (individual and group);



selecting the organizational methods;



selecting the methods for presenting the content, the teaching methods which are applied should reinforce teaching methods that address creativity (maintain paradigm, following the paradigm, and breaking the paradigm) in addition to their agreement with content.



arranging time for presentation of the content (starting point, duration, and the place);



selecting the appropriate assessment methods (diagnostic, formative, summative, evaluation through student-centered self-assessment with a process-oriented view).

Enough attention should be paid to the following points all through the process of applying the curriculum development pattern by the high school curriculum developers: 

paying attention to views and orientations of curriculum (development of cognitive processes/ process-orientation and problem solving/ developing meta-cognition, experience and student-centeredness from the domain of cognitive and procedural views, and social development

from the domain of social function and social cooperation) before, and also during the curriculum development; 

internal relationship between the elements of curriculum. The elements are needs analysis, goals, content selection, the methods for organizing the content, the methods for presenting the content, time and location of offering the content, assessment;



being sensitive to the natural complexity and significance of each elements of curriculum and creativity components;



focusing on systematic approaches in curriculum development and addressing all of the influential elements of creativity on the educational system;



consistency and unity all through the process of curriculum development, so that all of the elements of curriculum have internal relationships with each others, and also affect each other and are affected by each other. Based on the process of assessment with the mentioned stages, at each stage of assessment and each decision making we should have a look at the previous stage to see if there is a need for reformation or change in the previous stage and also the present stage, then they should be included in the curriculum. Also, it is suggested that the proposed pattern should be first piloted so that the shortages and advantages are clarified and then it should be implemented after the improvement and revision.

References: Amabile‚ Teresa. (1998). How to Kill Creativity. Harvard Business Review Sept– Oct: 77-87. Amabile‚ T. M. (1988). A model of creativity and innovation in organizations. In: Staw, B.M. and Denise, S. (2000). Teacher and student perception of creativity in the classroom environment. pp:143. -Brolin, C, (1992) "Creativity and critical thinking. Tools for preparedness for the future in Krut, 53, pages 64:71 Drazin, R., Glynn, M.A., and Karanjian, R. K. (1999). Multilevel theorizing about creativity in organizations: A sense making perspective. Academy of Management Review, 24: 286-307. Dacey, J.& Lennon, K, (2000) Understanding creativity: the interplay of biological, psychological and social factors, Creative Education Foundation, Buffalo, NY Debono, E. (1995). Serious Creativity, (translated by Basiri, Gh. and Ghafaripur, M., 2003) Tehran: Ayizh (in Persian). Farmer et al., (2003)."Employee creativity in Taiwan". Academy of Management Journal, Gardner, H. (1993). Greasing minds. New York: Basic Books. Guilford, P. (1967). Creative abilities in the arts. Psychological Review, 64:110-118. Harris, R. (1988). ”Introduction to creative thinking”. Available at: http://www.virtual salt.com www.Virtual. Isaksen, G. S., Lauer, K. J., Ekvalla, G. & Britz, A. (2001). Perceptions of the best & worst climates for creativity evidence for the SOQ. Creativity Research Journal, 13(2):171-174. James‚ K., Chen, J. & Goldberg‚ C. (1992). Organizational conflict and individual creativity. Journal of Applied Social Psychology‚ 22:‚ 545-566. Koontz, H. et al. (1988). Management. New York: Mc Grow-Hill. p: 228. King & Anderson‚N. (1995). Innovation and Change in Organizations. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 96-102.

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“Refugeeism” and the Two-State Solution By : Pepijn van Houwelingen.

Abstract: The Palestinian refugee issue has been a pressing political and humanitarian problem for over sixty years, yet recent frameworks – in particular the two-state paradigm since Oslo – have marginalized the refugees and their claim to a right of return. This article argues that the binary logic of Oslo has been too narrow to fully take the refugee problem into account, and that a broader multilateral approach is required to deal with this regional problem. Moreover, little to no voice has been given to refugees by the PA/PLO leadership, which represents a flaw in current approaches to finding a lasting solution. Peace Process, Palestinian Authority, Oslo accords, Israeli-Palestinian conflict... Key-words:

Introduction

n the absence of a negotiated solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the “final status issues” remain unresolved: Israel‟s borders have not been settled (nor have, ipso facto, those of the envisaged Palestinian state), the status of Jerusalem remains disputed (in Israel‟s view, it is its “undivided capital”), and Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories 

PhD Candidate and UG Tutor - Royal Holloway, University of London. Coeditor and book reviews editor - Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies. www.criticalglobalisation.com

103

continue to expand. Given their obvious and immediate urgency, these matters have been prioritized in political forums and the media. There is, however, another final status question which has received much less attention: the Palestinian refugee problem.1 There are currently over 4.5 million officially registered Palestinian refugees, with almost 30 percent living in the 58 UN-run camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza.2 Particularly in these camps, where refugees and their descendants have resided for over sixty years, living conditions are altogether abominable, and the UN reports severe structural, ongoing problems with regards to sewerage, infrastructure and healthcare. This stands in direct relation to the fact that refugee camps are characterized by a high degree of (militant) political activity and often tension. Palestinian refugees have en masse insisted on a right of return (haq al-awda) to their former homes, the majority of which are located in what is now the State of Israel, others in Gaza and the West Bank.3 Yet for Israel, the notion of large numbers of Arabs returning to its territory cannot be reconciled with the Zionist foundations of the state, and the right of return has been rejected in no uncertain terms. The Arab host states, on their part, have largely refused to allow refugees to integrate into their societies, arguing that this For the causes of the Palestinian refugee exodus see Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Nur Masalha, The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem (London: Pluto Press, 2003) and Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006). 2 The responsible UN agency is UNRWA. All numbers on refugee populations used in this article draw on UNRWA statistics, available online at http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/file/statistics/UNRWA_in_figuresJune_2010 _English.pdf (accessed May 1, 2011). 3 Though the legality of the right of return is not the topic of this article, it must be noted that its consistency with international law has been convincingly argued by a number of scholars. See in particular Susan Akram, “Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications for a Just Solution,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 3 (2002), pp. 36-51. For more on the property lost by Palestinian refugees see Walid Khalidi (ed.), All that Remains (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992) and Michael R. Fischbach, Records of Dispossession (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 1

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would undermine the right of return and make the Arabs responsible for a situation caused by Israel. Refugees have thus been stuck in a state of limbo for over sixty years. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this ambiguity is the so-called “protection gap”: the fact that UNRWA‟s mandate does not cover protection of refugees and that those in UNRWA‟s area of operations cannot appeal to the more powerful UN High Commissioner for Refugees.4 In a recent publication, Michael Bernstam, a fellow at Stanford University‟s Hoover Institution, draws attention to the refugee problem and the UNRWA camps, which he describes as „a breeding ground for international terrorism‟, „a permanent refugee welfare state‟ and, apparently quoting Joseph Stalin, a „parasitic lumpenproletariat‟.5 As he puts it: „the perennial refugeeism of the UNRWA welfare-warfare state always results in paramilitary formations, perpetual warfare, and terrorism‟. Bernstam insists that the only way to resolve the refugee issue and the wider IsraeliPalestinian conflict is to dissolve UNRWA and to focus on resettlement, integration and naturalization of refugees. This, he believes, is „the Palestinians‟ sole hope of finding a viable future‟. Bernstam‟s characterization of refugees waiting listlessly for handouts rests on a nefarious misrepresentation of the situation, but it is one that resonates with arguments that have been dominant within Israeli political spheres over the last decades. In this light, and given the present difficulties experienced in the peace process, it is worthwhile to revisit the refugee issue. The refugee problem appears as unique amongst the final status issues owing to its regional nature, making an inclusive multilateral approach required for its resolution. This article therefore aims to See Akram, Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status and Michael Kagan, “Is there really a Protection Gap? UNRWA‟s Role vis-à-vis Palestinian Refugees,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28, no. 2-3 (2009), pp. 511-30. 5 Available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-palestinianproletariat (accessed 19April, 2011). 4

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place the refugee issue in a wider regional context. The analysis offered here focuses in particular on the dynamics of the Oslo framework and its impact on the right of return. This will also illustrate how – whilst it must be stressed that Israel bears sole responsibility for the existence of Palestinian refugees – the Arab host countries have in some respects contributed to the perpetuation of their travail. The structure of this article is as follows: the first section considers how Israel and the Palestinian leadership view the refugee issue. This discussion pays special attention to the two-state paradigm and its implications for the refugee problem. Subsequently we examine the principles that have directed Arab policy on the refugees, followed by a brief investigation of the position of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Here we also dwell on the factors that have driven these states‟ particular policies and what their stance is towards potential resolutions. In the final section we draw some conclusions with regards to the comprehensive picture painted here in order to understand better the complex dynamics between the refugees, Arab states‟ policies and the two-state logic. The Right of Return and the Two-State Solution The two-state solution is currently widely accepted as the best way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, though there have been calls for a single democratic state in light of Israeli settlement expansion and the “Bantustanization” of Palestine.6 In the view of this author the latter argument seems increasingly valid, indeed, but given the persistence of the vision of two states its implications for the refugee problem merit consideration. And as we will see in this section, the logic of the two-state solution has profoundly affected the political disposition of Palestinian For example, Ali Abunimah, One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the IsraeliPalestinian Impasse (New York: Metropolitan, 2006). 6

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refugees, particularly the attitudes of the Palestinian leadership with regards to the right of return. At the basis of the two-state solution lies the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish state. Thus, within the Oslo framework Israel has firmly rejected the right of return, a policy underpinned by the notion that „[i]f Israel were to allow [the refugees] to return to her territory, this would be an act of suicide on her part, and no state can be expected to destroy itself.‟7 It is clear that Palestinian refugees are seen as a threat to the “Jewishness” and thus the essential nature of Israel.8 In the various talks that have taken place between Israel and its neighbours since the Oslo Accords (where the refugee issue was notably marginalized), Israeli negotiators have showed the greatest willingness to discuss the refugees at the informal though high level talks at Taba in January 2001, where it was reported that the parties came closer than ever to a resolution. It was in Taba that Israel submitted its “non-paper” to the Palestinians, which contained the following important points: 4. […] the emergent State of Israel became embroiled in the war and bloodshed of 1948-49, that led to victims and suffering on both sides, including the displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian civilian population who became refugees. These refugees spent decades without dignity, citizenship and property ever since. 5. Consequently, the solution to the refugee issue must address the needs and aspirations of the refugees, while accounting for the realities since the 1948-49 war. Thus, the wish to return shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the existence of the State of Israel as the Ruth Lapidoth, “Do Palestinian Refugees have a Right to Return to Israel?,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/ Do+Palestinian+Refugees+Have+a+Right+to+Return+to.htm (accessed June 19, 2010). 8 This ethnic/religious focus is illustrative of larger, fundamental problems in the Israeli system, indicating that the compatibility of the country‟s Zionist foundations with democracy is strongly questionable. See Baruch Kimmerling, “Religion, Nationalism and Democracy in Israel,” Constellations 6, no. 3 (1999), pp. 339-63 and Oren Yiftachel, “‟Ethnocracy‟: The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine,” Constellations 6, no. 3 (1999), pp. 364-90. 7

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homeland for Jewish people, and the establishment of the State of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people. 9

At heart these articles are in line with the Israeli position since the Oslo accords, with explicit emphasis on Israel‟s Jewish nature and reference to the two-state solution. The proposal at Taba, however, did not explicitly reject the right of return, and Israel showed more willingness to admit at least partial responsibility for the refugee problem than it had previously been prepared to do. Even though the option of full repatriation of refugees is implicitly rejected, as it is not considered to be in accordance with “the realities since the 1948-49 war” and Israel‟s existence as a “Jewish State,” UNGA Resolution 194 (which calls for the return of refugees) is mentioned in articles 6, 7 and 8 of the non-paper as the basis for just settlement of the refugee issue. Altogether the Israeli Taba proposal suggests a combination of limited return to Israel, unrestricted return to “the State of Palestine,” rehabilitation within host countries and relocation to third countries – coordinated and funded internationally – to resolve the refugee problem. This clearly falls short of full implementation of the right of return, but it does mark a departure of sorts from the traditional Israeli rejectionist line, which denied responsibility for the problem and always linked it to Jews who emigrated from Arab countries to Israel. If this was a small but potentially constructive shift, more instructive than the actual proposal is what happened in Israel after the Taba talks fell through. An alarmed majority of Knesset members adopted a law that was described in its explanatory notes as created to „prevent the government from making a decision without the Knesset‟s approval, or by a sporadic ordinary majority, on the return of refugees to the territory of the State of Israel‟ For the full statement see “Private Response on Palestinian Refugees,” Le Monde Diplomatique, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/procheorient/israelrefugees-en (accessed 21 January, 2011). 9

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(“Ensuring Rejection of the Right of Return Law–2001”).10 It is useful to quote this law in full: 1.

2. 3.

In this law– “territory of the State of Israel”–the territory located within the sovereign jurisdiction of the State of Israel. “refugee”–a person who left the borders of Israel at the time of war and is not a national of the State of Israel, including the persons displaced in 1967 and refugees of 1948 and members of his family. Refugees shall not be returned to the territory of the State of Israel except with the approval of a majority of members of Knesset. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2, the Minister of the Interior, with the consent of the Minister of Defence and the approval of the Knesset‟s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, may enact rules for the granting of approval, for humanitarian reasons only, to refugees to enter the territory of the State of Israel for the purpose of residing there. The government of Israel will not make any commitment and will not enter into agreement that is inconsistent with the provisions of this law. This law shall not apply to a person to whom the Law of Return–1950, applies.11

An additional comment to the bill by MK Yisrael Katz (Likud) held that „the right of return, a state of all its citizens – are expressions synonymous to the wish to destroy Israel.‟12 After Taba it thus became impossible for Israeli negotiators to discuss the right of return, indicating that the Israeli non-paper at Taba marked only a small, temporary change to an otherwise consistent policy of rejection. This conclusion is reinforced by Israel‟s response to the 2003 Roadmap for Peace – „declared references must be made to Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state and to the waiver of any right of return for Palestinian refugees to the State of Israel‟ – and the more recent comment from Netanyahu that Palestinians „must abandon their demand to settle the descendants Cited in Nimer Sultany (ed.), Citizens Without Citizenship (Haifa: The Arab Center for Applied Social Research, 2003), p. 19. 11 Cited from Sultany, pp. 19-20. 12 Sultany, p. 20. 10

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of Palestinian refugees in Israel and gradually “eat away” at the State of Israel after a peace agreement is signed.‟13 What has strengthened Israel‟s disposition is the fact that it has enjoyed the full support of its main ally, the United States, with regards to the rejection of the Palestinian right of return. A letter from US President George Bush to Ariel Sharon re-emphasized the so-called “Clinton parameters” by stating that the US „is strongly committed to Israel‟s well-being and security as a Jewish state.‟ Bush further explicitly said that the „agreed, just, fair and realistic solution‟ will need to be found through a two-state solution and the settlement of Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state rather than in Israel.14 Barack Obama‟s presidency does not seem to have changed these basic tenets of American policy. In a speech during his election campaign (on 18 December 2007) he stated that „the Palestinians would have to reinterpret the notion of right of return in a way that would preserve Israel as a Jewish state. It might involve compensation and other concessions from the Israelis but ultimately Israel is not going to give up its state.‟ 15 Obama has not said or done anything since that indicates a departure from this view. Given the US/Israeli rejection of the right of return and their insistence that in a two-state solution refugees will have to move to a Palestinian state or be resettled elsewhere, notions deeply See “Israel's Response to the Road map,” Knesset, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap_response_eng.htm (accessed 22 June 2010) and “Netanyahu: Palestinian Refugees Must Never Return to their Homes,” Maan News, http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=211885 (accessed 14 July 2010). 14 See “Ariel Sharon and George W. Bush's Letters in Full,” Haaretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/ariel-sharon-and-george-w-bush-s-letters-infull-1.277418 (accessed 4 June 2010). 15 Cited from “Obama: Israel must remain a Jewish State,” Institute of Public Affairs of the Orthodox Union, http://www.ou.org/public_affairs/weblog_single/34342 (accessed 4 June 2010). 13

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unpopular with refugees, we must ask what the response of the Palestinian leadership has been. Here the effects of the acceptance of the two-state logic are clear: whilst the PLO continues to view itself as the representative of all Palestinians, its partial transformation into the Palestinian Authority (PA) has meant that formal ties with refugees outside the West Bank and Gaza were largely relinquished. This is illustrated most clearly by the fact that after Oslo the PLO has diverted its refugee aid almost entirely to Gaza and the West Bank.16 The original PLO charter of July 1968 did not mention Palestinian refugees. This was not necessary, since article 15 of the charter called for „the elimination of Zionism in Palestine.‟17 This position could evidently not be maintained after the Oslo Accords. Taking the Taba negotiations as a reference point again, the Palestinian demands can be summarized thus: 2. Israel recognizes its moral and legal responsibility for the forced displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian civilian population during the 1948 war and for preventing the refugees from returning to their homes in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194. 3. Israel shall bear responsibility for the resolution of the refugee problem. 5a. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), all refugees who wish to return to their homes in Israel and live at peace with their neighbours have the right to do so […] 18 See Wadie Said “The Palestinians in Lebanon: The rights of the Victims of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 30, no. 2 (1999), pp. 315-59. The transfer of control of certain areas in the Occupied Territories to the Palestinian Authority (PA) has had direct consequences for the almost 1.9 million refugees who reside there (in Gaza and the West Bank together there are 27 refugee camps). The PA regards refugees in its area of jurisdiction as „foreign residents‟ rather than full citizens, even though they enjoy a similar legal standing. The status and rights of the refugees are regulated by PA civil law via the Ministry of Refugee Affairs. 17 Leida S. Kadi, Basic Political documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement (Beirut: Palestine Research Centre, 1969), p. 139. 18 Available at “The Taba Proposals and the Palestine Refugee Problem,” MidEast Web, http://www.mideastweb.org/taba.htm (accessed 22 April 2010). 16

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The notion that all refugees who wish to return have this right is known as the “absolute right of return,” and this has always been the official Palestinian position. However, there are strong indications that the current Palestinian leadership views the right of return primarily as an abstract, impracticable right (thus emphasizing point 2 rather than 3 and 5), an interpretation that is certainly different from that of the refugees. In informal documents, such as the 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen Document or the 2003 Geneva Accord, Palestinian leaders have shown willingness to negotiate the right of return. To take the example of the BeilinAbu Mazen Document, it clearly states that the Palestinian side „recognizes that the prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence, as well as the realities that have been created on the ground since 1948, have rendered the implementation of [the right of return] impracticable.‟19 This appears to be a more honest formulation of the Palestinian position since Oslo than the ambiguous rhetoric typically employed. Now PA president Abu Mazen, for example, has stated that „no one can force Israel to integrate millions of Palestinian refugees, but on the other hand, no one can force millions of refugees to surrender their rights.‟ 20 More recently, in an interview with Akiva Eldar for Haaretz, PA prime minister Salam Fayyad responded to a question about the refugees with the statement that „Palestinians would have the right to reside within the State of Palestine.‟21 This attracted indignant responses from refugees and observers who argued that the right of return is an inalienable individual right. Altogether it is clear that full or large-scale return of refugees is impossible within the current political constellation. Interviews “The Beilin-Abu Mazen Document,” The Reut Institute, http://reutinstitute. org/data/uploads/ExternaDocuments/20050328%20-%20The%20BeilinAbu%20Mazen%20Document.pdf (accessed 28 April 2010), p. 8. 20 “Abbas Reveals that he has Discussed Final Status Issues with Olmert,” Maan News Agency, 28 July 2007. 21 Akiva Eldar, “Palestinian PM to Haaretz: We will have a State Next Year,” Haaretz, 2 April 2010. 19

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conducted for this article indicate that there is a widely felt sentiment amongst refugees that by binding itself to the West Bank and Gaza the PLO/PA has “abandoned” refugee rights. There are thus strong suspicions that denial of the right of return will eventually de jure be the upshot of an agreement with Israel, should that ever materialize, as it is at the present time de facto already the case. And if the notion of return to a Palestinian state is accepted as it has been stipulated in recent proposals, which in theory would at least make an end to the refugees‟ statelessness, it is doubtful whether it would be possible for such resettlement to be truly “unlimited” in the already densely populated West Bank and Gaza, despite talk of “land swaps.”22 Moreover, as was made unmistakably clear by all refugees that I spoke to, it is believed that no one can “give away” the right of return. Refugee communities both in and outside the Palestinian Territories have felt excluded from the political process and this has led to a significant amount of resentment and disenchantment with the “peace process” (as well as, on the other hand, an upsurge in popular mobilization for the right of return). The implications of the tensions thus engendered were summed up by one refugee in Dheisheh camp, near Bethlehem, who told me that „if the Palestinian leaders make a deal that does not solve the refugee problem in line with the rights of the refugees, we will continue the Palestinian struggle.‟ Refugees and the Arab Host States Given the persistent stalemate with regards to the right of return, the Arab host states play an important role in the refugee issue. It is evident that neither Israel nor the Palestinian leadership can decide for these countries whether they will naturalize Palestinian refugees, so a solution to the refugee problem can only come about with the cooperation of the Arab states. Initially, the magnitude of the Palestinian exodus imposed some rather See Rex Brynen and Roula El-Rifai (eds.), Palestinian Refugees: Challenges of Repatriation and Development (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 22

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unexpected problems on them: Jordan reported that the refugees were a severe drain on „almost nonexistent resources,‟ Lebanon described the refugees as an „unbearable burden‟ and Syria had „practically abandoned its relief expenditures as unsupportable budgetary drain.‟23 At first the situation was regarded as only temporary, but a solution did not materialize, and in February 1951 a joint memorandum was sent to the major powers: Arab countries are unable to take on full responsibility for the quest for international peace as long as the refugee problem exists, and they have done their best in order to solve this problem. In addition, it is beyond their capacity to provide a fundamental solution for this tragedy. Therefore, the international community must take on this burden, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.24

There is not, and has never been, a unified Arab policy for the refugees, although declarations such as the above have repeatedly been made through the Arab League. In general terms, Arab policy has been guided by two broad principles, which at times have proven to be contradictory. The first of these two is solidarity with the Palestinians and the Palestinian cause. In this vein the Arab League adopted in 1965 the “Casablanca Protocol” defining the rights of Palestinian refugees in Arab states. However, the protocol was never fully implemented by those who adopted it, and reservations were expressed from the outset (e.g. by Lebanon). In 1991, after the first Gulf War, the Arab League adopted Resolution 5093, officially revoking the Casablanca Protocol. The second principle that has driven Arab policy is emphasis on preserving the Palestinian identity of the refugees. Host countries have thus refused to allow Palestinians to (fully) integrate into their societies or to assume nationality (with the exception of Jordan). Donald Neff, “U.S. Policy and the Palestinian Refugees,” Journal of Palestine Studies 18, no. 1 (1988), pp. 96-111. Cited from pp. 101-102. 24 Cited in Mohammad K. Al-Aza'r, Arab Protection for Palestinian Refugees (Bethlehem: BADIL, 2004), p. 5. 23

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The official status of Palestinian refugees in Arab host countries is often unclear, as refugees are regularly subjected to bureaucratic fluctuations and shifts in the political climate. Moreover, there is in many instances a notable gap between principle and practice: One of the main obstacles to establishing civil rights of the Palestinian refugees in host Arab states is the absence of clear and well-defined legislation regulating their status. Palestinian affairs are governed by ministerial decrees or administrative orders, which allow differing interpretations and abuses of power and can easily be reversed in response to changing political conditions. 25

Further complicating matters is the fact that relations between the Arab states and the PLO have often influenced the position of Palestinian refugees. After the PLO left Lebanon in 1982, for example, the situation in the camps there reverted back to the prePLO situation, which meant that the provision of several basic rights (such as healthcare) was severely curtailed.26 Some countries have hardly made a distinction between official relations with the PLO and treatment of the refugees, thus, at times, using them as means to punish the Palestinian leadership. The position of Palestinian refugees in Arab states has furthermore become increasingly untenable since the start of the Oslo Peace process; more restrictions have been imposed upon them and their situation has become ever more insecure.27 The most significant multilateral talks thus far have taken place in the framework of the Madrid-Oslo process (since 1992) in the form of a technical working group on refugees. However, Abbas Shiblak, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries.â&#x20AC;? Journal of Palestine Studies 25, no. 3 (1996), pp. 36-45. Cited from p. 39. 26 The 1969 Cairo Agreement gave the PLO special military and political privileges in Lebanon, which led to certain improvements in the living conditions and rights of Palestinian refugees. See Dorothee Klaus, Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon - Where to Belong? (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2003). 27 See also Human Rights Watch, Stateless Again: Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Citizenship (New York: HRW, 2010). 25

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Lebanon and Syria quickly withdrew from the talks in protest to Israeli inflexibility, and after eight plenary sessions the Arab League called for a boycott of multilateral talks as a response to Israeli excavations underneath the Al-Aqsa mosque in 1996-97. Low-level activity continued until September 2000 and came to a halt due to the outbreak of the second Intifada. Unsurprisingly against this backdrop, the working group‟s achievements were altogether modest and related chiefly to issues like humanitarian affairs and research.28 The most recent collective Arab statement on the refugee issue can be found in the “Arab peace Initiative,” originally published on 28 March 2002 in Beirut and reaffirmed in 2007 in Riyadh. The initiative calls for a “just solution” to the refugee issue, but it also emphasizes that the Arab countries assure „the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.‟29 This clause, included at the insistence of Lebanon, leaves resolution of the refugee issue open to the preferences of the host states. For this reason it is useful to consider each of them individually.

Lebanon According to UNRWA, as of 30 June 2010 there were more than 427,000 registered refugees in Lebanon with just over 53 percent in the 12 official camps in the country. In addition there are an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 refugees who are registered with the Lebanese authorities but not with UNRWA, as well as an unknown number of entirely unregistered individuals (“non-ID” refugees). Refugee affairs are dealt with by the Department of Affairs of the Palestinian Refugees (DAPR), an office within the Ministry of Interior. Refugees do not have property rights, and See Rex Brynen, “Addressing the Palestinian Refugee Issue: A Brief Overview,” Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet, http://prrn.mcgill.ca/research/papers/brynen-070514.pdf (accessed 23 June 2010). 29 Cited in Joshua Teitelbaum, The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2009), p. 16. 28

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Lebanese law places strict limitations on their opportunities for employment.30 Before the signing of the Cairo agreement in „69 Palestinians were officially regarded as a “special kind of foreigners.” This term is no longer used, but it does indicate the current legal standing of refugees: the permanence of their presence has warranted exemption from a number of rules affecting foreigners, but altogether their situation is unclear and subject to bureaucratic whim.31 Altogether it can be said that the refugees in Lebanon are worst off compared to the other host countries; particularly those in the camps have suffered intensely during the country‟s various armed confrontations.32 As a 2007 Amnesty International report notes: Most Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have had little choice but to live in overcrowded and deteriorating camps and informal gatherings that lack basic infrastructure. The amount of land allocated to official refugee camps has barely changed since 1948, despite a fourfold increase in the registered refugee population. The residents have been forbidden by law from bringing building materials into some camps, preventing the repair, expansion or improvement of homes. Those who have defied the law have faced fines and imprisonment as well as demolition of the new structures. In camps where additional rooms or floors have been added to existing buildings, the alleyways have become even narrower and darker, the majority of homes receive no In 2005 this law was reviewed and Palestinians are now allowed to work in a wider range of professions than before. Syndicated professional jobs such as medicine and law are still prohibited for Palestinians, though. More recently there has been discussion on granting a wider range of rights to refugees, such as the right to education and healthcare, but at the time of writing there has been no change to Lebanese law. Supporters of Palestinian rights most notably include Hezbollah and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. 31 See Souheil Al-Natour, “The Legal Status of Palestinians in Lebanon,” Journal of Refugee Studies 10, no. 3 (1997), pp. 360-77 and Said, The Palestinians in Lebanon. 32 This was recognised by Israel in article 8.a of its proposal at Taba, stating that „priority [will be] accorded to those Palestinian refugees currently resident in Lebanon. The State of Israel notes its moral commitment to the swift resolution of the plight of the refugee population of the Sabra and Shatila camps.‟ 30

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direct sunlight and, despite the best efforts of the inhabitants, the pervasive smells of rubbish and sewage are at times overwhelming. 33

Palestinian refugees have since 1948 constituted an important factor in Lebanese politics. After Palestinian militiamen were expelled from Jordan during Black September (1970), large numbers of fighters regrouped themselves in Lebanon. The PLO maintained what some called a “state within a state” in southern Lebanon until Israel forced its leadership out in 1982-83. As a relatively small country, Lebanon has always aimed to maintain a somewhat neutral stance towards the conflicts in the region, and its political ambitions have hardly transgressed the Lebanese borders. Yet the country has been deeply involved in some of the most intense and violent conflicts in the region. Some argue that this has primarily been due to the Palestinians: In pre-war Lebanon, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon provoked deep communal divisions, intense political debate, and ideological controversy. From the late 1960s, no issue did more to militarize the country, mobilize communities, political parties and leaders, and split public opinion than the PLO military presence. And when the war broke out in the mid-1970s, what prolonged it and turned it into a fullfledged regional conflict was the direct involvement of the PLO.34

Lebanon has unequivocally rejected the principle of tawteen (permanent settlement of refugees). A provision introduced in the preamble of the amended Lebanese constitution of 21 September 1990 holds that „there shall be no settlement […] of non-Lebanese in Lebanon.‟ No faction opposed this provision, which made settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon constitutionally impossible. This rigid stance has been most convincingly explained as a result of the delicate balance of power between the various “Exiled and Suffering: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,” Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE18/010/2007 (accessed 19 March 2010). 34 Farid El-Khazen, “Permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: A Recipe for Conflict,” Journal of Refugee Studies 10, no. 3 (1997), pp. 275-93. Cited from p. 275. 33

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religious communities in Lebanon. If Palestinian refugees, the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims, would become Lebanese citizens – or if they would attain similar rights (constituting de facto settlement) – the need for extensive constitutional reform would become virtually impossible to ignore. Thus, as Rosemary Sayigh notes: „opposition to tawteen is a glue that helps hold the political system together.‟35 The upshot of the Lebanese point of view has been that initiatives to improve the situation of refugees have been treated with suspicion, leaving Palestinians in poverty and legal limbo. As recent debates over extending Palestinian rights have shown, the “Palestinian presence” remains a topic of contention in Lebanon. Refugees are seen as a cause of instability – „troublemakers‟ as one Palestinian told me – and their political aspirations and involvement have been widely perceived as harmful to Lebanon‟s stability and its national interests. Syria Presently there are more than 477,000 registered refugees, nine official refugee camps and three unofficial camps in Syria (about 27 percent of registered Palestinian refugees in the country live in the UNRWA camps). Most Palestinians in Syria are 1948 refugees, the majority of whom reside in Damascus and its suburbs. They are supervised by the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR), which dates back to 1949. Its main function is to „organize, relieve, and secure different needs for refugees, in addition to allocating suitable jobs for them.‟36 Equal treatment of Palestinians and Syrian citizens in various spheres is stipulated by law no. 260 of 1956, which states that Palestinians in Syria are „equal to Syrians in everything related to employment, residence, trade, military service, education and health without jeopardizing Rosemary Sayigh, “Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Implantation, Transfer or Return?,” Middle East Policy 8, no. 1 (2001), pp. 94-105. Cited from p. 100. 36 Al-Aza‟r, p. 22. 35

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their national identity and citizenship.‟37 This principle was also confirmed to me by various Palestinian refugees from Syria. As one of them put it: „Palestinians in Syria are equal to Syrians, which is why we were able to develop ourselves and the Palestinian cause.‟ Even though Syria seldom makes explicit foreign policy statements, the country‟s attitude towards the refugee issue appears to consist of the following three principles: 1) the problem should be solved as a whole (instead of broken into bilateral agreements); 2) a solution must be based on the right of return; 3) the PA/PLO alone cannot make a decision on the refugees, all Arab countries must be involved in negotiations. Shortly after the Zionist expulsion of Palestinians from their land, the Syrian government made a number of offers to Israel, such as one in 1949 to take in between 250,000 and 300,000 Palestinian refugees in return for readjustment of the international border.38 The early Syrian proposals were met with little enthusiasm from the Israeli side, and Israel was unwilling to make a peace deal that would entail substantial concessions.39 To quote Moshe Sharett (Israel‟s second prime minister): „In negotiations with Syria, any promise or hint of possible promise on our part of a change in the border between Palestine and Syria and along the lakes should be avoided. On the contrary, it should be clear to the other side that under no circumstances can such a change be contemplated. On the other hand, the Syrian delegation should be encouraged to think about a large-scale absorption of refugees.‟40 Hamad S. Al-Mawed, “The Palestinian Refugees in Syria - Their Past, Present and Future,” Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet, http://prrn.mcgill.ca/research/papers/al-mawed.pdf (accessed 14 May 2010), p. 60. 38 See Robert G. Rabil, Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel & Lebanon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener, 2003). 39 See Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 79. 40 Cited in Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, pp. 81-82. 37

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The Israeli policy of “no concessions” continued after the Israelis gained control over the Golan Heights in „67, where settlement construction was swiftly initiated. These settlements are now a principal obstacle to peace between Israel and Syria. As Zertal and Eldar write: „It was Rabin‟s fears about the settlers‟ reactions that guided his conduct and led him to prefer the Oslo channel to the option of talks with Syria … [A]ny peace agreement with Syria would entail the immediate dismantling of settlements in the Golan Heights [but] with the PLO […] it was possible to get an extension of several years‟41 In response to the occupation of the Golan Syria rejected UNGA resolution 242 (which calls for Israeli withdrawal), stating that withdrawal must be a preamble to negotiations rather than a result thereof. The country holds a similar position towards the refugee issue. In March 2010 during a visit to Libya, president Assad stated that the right of return is an inalienable moral and legal individual right and emphasized Syria‟s ongoing support for it. A solution to the refugee issue, he said, lies in the right of return, as he argued that „there are no conditions, but the rights. There is a difference between conditions and rights and we are talking about the rights. The rights are subject to no compromise, no surrender and no discussion. The rights are the basics of Mideast peace.‟42 One of the factors that has driven the Syrian unwillingness to negotiate both Golan and the refugee issue, namely the possibility of opposition within Syria, was highlighted by Hafez al-Assad shortly after the Oslo accords in 1993: „If I were to sign an agreement similar to that signed by Arafat, I would have faced great problems. You all know that there are Arab leaders who paid with Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War over Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007 (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 138. 42 Bashar Al-Assad, “Press Statements in Libya,” http://www.presidentassad.net/SPEECHES/AL_ASSAD_SPEECHES_2010/ Bas har_Al_Assad_Statements_Libya_March_28_2010.htm (accessed 20 April 2010). 41

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their lives as the price for such separate behavior.‟43 However, Syria has not explicitly rejected a two-state solution and has indicated that it is willing to support the Palestinians in their decision and make peace with Israel, but it is clear that this scenario would require significant Israeli concessions that do not seem forthcoming at the present time. In summary, it is evident that in sharp contrast to the Lebanese situation, Palestinian refugees in Syria have enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom. The Syrian attitude towards the Palestinian refugees has been relatively stable; law 260 was adopted in 1956 yet subsequent regimes have continued to pursue the policy stipulated in it. Furthermore, whereas Lebanon has had little interest in politically supporting the Palestinian cause and was more concerned with its own domestic politics, Syria‟s political disposition has facilitated a policy that was favourable to Palestinians in the country – depsite the notably hostile relations between Syria and the PLO as well as Hafez Al-Assad‟s antagonistic relationship with Arafat.44 UNRWA notes on its website that it „benefits from operating in a stable political environment and Palestine refugees have the same rights and privileges as Syrian citizens, except citizenship.‟ However, it must also be mentioned that this does not mean that refugees in Syria have been bereft of problems with matters such as sewerage, infrastructure and poverty. This is illustrated by the situation in Neirab, Syria‟s largest official camp: The poor construction of the barracks results in scorching temperatures in summer and freezing conditions in winter. Water leakage and rodent infestation remain a problem for the refugees. The quality of life is also affected by the lack of privacy. The camp's streets “Hafez al-Assad, Who Turned Syria into a Power in the Middle East, Dies at 69,” The New York Times, http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/asadd3.htm (accessed 20 April 2010). 44 See Aburish K. Said, From Defender to Dictator (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1998). 43

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are the only place for children to play and even they are often no wider than the span of a child's arms.45

Jordan Currently there just over two million registered refugees in Jordan (almost a third of the country‟s total population), with ten official refugee camps housing a total of 17.3 percent of the refugees. Dealing with administrative and security-related affairs is the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA), which collaborates with UNRWA concerning relief and social services. Yet it is UNRWA that runs basic education, health care, relief and social services. Owing to citizenship laws adopted in February 1954, when Jordan controlled the West Bank, Palestinians who came to the Hashemite Kingdom from the West Bank before 1988 enjoy full citizenship. However, the decision to distribute Jordanian passports was taken unilaterally by the Jordanian authorities, leaving Palestinians no choice but to accept. Therefore UNRWA regards all Palestinians in Jordan who were unable to return to historical Palestine after ‟48 or ‟67 as refugees, whether or not they hold a Jordanian passport. Owing to the PLO‟s increasing popularity and the Arab states‟ rejection of King Hussein‟s plan for a federation between the West Bank and Jordan (making an end to “the Jordanian option”), the latter relinquished its claim to the West Bank in 1988.46 One of the effects of this decision was a change in the status of Palestinians who had held Jordanian passports in the West Bank. Instead of a full passport they were given five or two-year temporary passports that do not give access to government services (this has made their status similar to that of the approximately 120,000 ‟67 refugees from Gaza in Jordan). Despite the legal equality of “East Bank See “Neirab Refugee Camp,” UNRWA, http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=153 (accessed 22 June 2010). 46 See Joseph Nevo and Ilan Pappé, Jordan in the Middle East 1948–1988: The Making of a Pivotal State (Essex: Frank Cass, 1994). 45

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Jordanians” and Palestinian refugees, the latter – especially in the camps – have faced discrimination in matters such as education and employment, and they do not have equal opportunities to access to e.g. healthcare and other basic government services.47 In 1994 Jordan and Israel signed the “Treaty of Peace,” which holds that the refugee issue should be resolved in accordance with international law and through bilateral negotiations or otherwise. The treaty also assures Jordan a role in final status negotiations on the refugees. The country has in principle supported the right of return but there has been some ambiguity. In 2007, for example, King Abdullah II was quoted in the Israeli press as saying that compensation could be an alternative to return, but this was later described as a “distortion” by Jordan.48 However, given the large number of Palestinians in Jordan, the country‟s desire to be seen as a “moderate” and its ties with Israel it is unlikely that mass mobilisation of Palestinians is seen as a favourable option by the Jordanians. A relatively stable policy of the status quo is therefore expected from Jordan, ostensibly supportive of the right of return but with little concrete action to back this up.

Conclusion Having taken note of the various positions of the relevant actors, it is possible to draw a number of conclusions with regards to what is required for a solution to the refugee problem. We are now also well-placed to assess charges of “refugeeism” and understand the notion‟s political causes. The refugees, whose displacement was caused by the implementation of the Zionist plan for a Jewish state, have been deprived of their dignity for over sixty years. Israel Al-Aza‟r, p. 18. “Jordan Denies Remarks Ascribed to Abdullah on Right of Return,” Haaretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/jordan-denies-remarks-ascribed-to-abdullahon-right-of-return-1.218701 (accessed 10 July 2010). 47 48

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has refused to allow them to return to their former homes, arguing that this would “destroy” the state. This rejectionist line has been followed consistently since 1948, with only momentary seemingly progressive change at Taba, and with the election into office of individuals such as Binyamin Netanyahu and Avigdor Lieberman there is frankly no hope of change. On the Palestinian side, prior to the Oslo agreements the right of return was seen as an integral part of the struggle to recover the land of Palestine. When the twostate paradigm was finally agreed upon in Oslo, the refugees were kept for future “final status” negotiations. It is clear, though, that a logical outcome of a framework that bases itself upon the notion of a Jewish and a Palestinian state is the further political marginalization of the refugee problem. What is more, the Palestinian leadership has indicated on various occasions that it regards the right of return impracticable, which has contributed to the prevailing scepticism of Palestinians with regards to the PLO and the PA. Refugees believe that their rights cannot be “given away,” which compels the conclusion that their inclusion in negotiations on the right of return is absolutely imperative. The failure of the PLO and of external actors to recognize the political agency of refugees is one of the gravest enduring mistakes in current approaches to the problem. Furthermore, given that Palestinian claims for return contain both collective and individual elements, only a solution that acknowledges both and directly involves refugees in all host states (as well as the governments of those states) could be of a lasting nature. Such a solution could in principle be implemented in a two-state framework, but Israeli actions since Oslo seem to have foreclosed this option with a creeping annexation and Apartheid policy. In light of the deep involvement of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in the refugee issue, it is impossible for the Israelis and Palestinians to decide on a solution without the support of these countries. Whilst the Lebanese position is clear and unlikely to change, which must be taken as a given and dealt with accordingly, there is a lot to win for Israel if it could engage with Syria on the refugees. Israeli

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intransigence and a clear unwillingness to consider any concessions, however, have made rapprochement impossible. As in all aspects of its domestic and foreign policies, there is a considerable degree of hubris in the Israeli attitude towards Syria. It is also important to stress the fact that support from the refugees is needed lest a deal between Israel and the PA/PLO merely ends up being a veiled form of further forced displacement of Palestinians. The two-state option as it is currently pursued, however, has neglected both the Arab states and the refugees themselves. This is a direct result of the uncompromising Israeli position and the decision of the Palestinian leadership to adopt a more “realistic” approach. In this situation it is simply impossible to come to a lasting solution, and only a change in the Israeli attitude seems likely to enable genuine progress. The true sources of “refugeeism,” it seems, can be found in the power politics of the Middle East, rather than UNRWA or prevalent attitudes amongst refugees. In a more immediate sense, the Palestinian refugee issue represents an intense humanitarian catastrophe. The refugee camps are marked by squalor and poverty, and there are currently no proper mechanisms for legal protection of refugees. Sponsored by international donors such as the EU, UNRWA has done as much as it can to deal with the humanitarian aspects of the problem, but more attention should be given by international actors to the political dimensions of the situation. This would involve engaging with host states, who have in many regards pursued a “hands off” policy of sorts. Especially here lies a role for external actors to work to improve the legal and political disposition of Palestinian refugees. Whether or not the two-state solution will ever fully materialize remains to be seen, but the extremely unfavourable conditions under which a majority of Palestinian refugees have had to live should not be ignored. Ultimately, only an inclusive, democratic and multilateral political approach seems capable of creating a just and lasting resolution. Unfortunately current

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frameworks fall well short of this ideal, and the future of the Palestinian refugees remains as uncertain as ever.

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Rethinking social capital and civil society Reflections from the recent uprisings of the Middle East

Akbar Valadbigi Shahab Ghobadi

Abstract: The ongoing unrests in the Middle East have opened up new debates on the relationship between social capital and civil society. But what actually are they, and what applications do they have for the region of the Middle East? The relationship between social capital and civil society in this region is much debated, but scarcely conceived. This paper is intended to explore the practical and theoretical significances of these concepts at the heart of the recent uprising in the Middle East and North Africa and suggests some recommendations that can be of potential application in strengthening civil society which can bring effective changes in the political life of the Middle East. This paper also strives to analyze the current state of social capital and civil society in this region. It suggests that although the Middle Eastern nations have always been subject to severe violence and harshness, civil society organizations and the stock of social capital can be seen as rising. It is argued that a society with higher rates of social capital is more likely to benefit from more stable democracy and politics that are typical of a modern civil society. Keywords: Social capital, civil society, the Middle East, democracy, uprising 

Islamic Azad University, Sanandaj Branch, Kurdistan, Iran E-mail: karvan74@gmail.com  Islamic Azad University, Sanandaj Branch, Kurdistan, Iran E-mail: arashavin@gmail.com

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1. Introduction:

he â&#x20AC;&#x153;recent widespread publics embrace of the discourse of "civil society" and "social capital", as Foley and Edwards put it (1997), '' is part of a search for new paradigms with which to confront the problems of contemporary societies.â&#x20AC;? (Walters, 2002) Social capital deals with the situation of civic engagement and social trust in liberal democracies. Its impetus is that successful and healthy democracies and economies are those enjoying dense webs of community participation. With respect to the integration of social capital with political life, the most influential voice is that of Robert Putnam. Putnam's conception of social capital is regarded as contributing to a revival of intellectual interest in the theme of civil society (Walters, 2002). It has been widely argued that civil society and social capital are on the rise in the Middle East and that prospects for change toward stable democracies look promising. In recent years, considerable scholarship has been devoted to exploring the relationship between civil society and social capital. A number of experts have pointed to the prevalence of civil society in regions such as South America or Eastern Europe as one of the main reasons for their greater levels of social capital as compared to the Middle East or Africa, where civil society has so far been scarce (Kamrava, 2007). With regard to the Middle East, some argue that the region's social capital deficit is due to the fact that civil society either does not exist in most Middle Eastern countries, or, where it does exist, it is too embryonic and fragile to be of considerable consequences. Then, it is important to explore the exact nature of the relationship between civil society and social capital, and to see what consequences, if at all, arise from civil society's predicament in the Middle East in so far as the prospects for social capital in the region are concerned (Kamrava, 2007).

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The large amount of literature on social capital shows that, while the concept is multidimensional and its features vary by context, social capital is an invaluable asset to enhance civil society. Thus, many civic activists seek to enhance it. Evidence from different communities suggests societies and groups, who are rich in their stock of social capital, benefit from more effective governance and more stable democracies. In the broader sense of the term, social capital is defined by the World Bank as ' the norms and networks that enable collective action'. Social capital is a vital yet underappreciated asset, which refers to a class of assets that inhere in social relations, such as social bonding and bridging (Chase and Christensen, 2009). 2. What is civil society and how is it contextualized in the Middle East? As is well known, the notion of civil society has been in existence at least from the eighteenth century and exists in a wide variety of political vocabularies, including the liberal, the Hegelian, and the Marxist, without there having been any generally held consensus about how to define it and what it may really mean (Owen, 2004). Hobbes, Locke and Hegel distinguished between the state and civil society that is organized society over which the state rules. This concept is the framework through which those without political authority live their lives- economic relationships, family and kinship structures and religious institutions. However, it was not until the breakdown of the Soviet systems in the Eastern Europe that the term ''civil society'' became a common discussion among the public. It is an analytic concept because civil society does not exist independently of political authority, nor vice versa, and, it is generally argued that neither could long continue without the other; it is why no very clear boundary can be drawn between the two.

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The neglect of civil society in recent decades has two main reasons. One is the fact that the state itself has been discussed less often and has been replaced by ' political system'. Second, the growing trend towards using sociological models in political discourse has inclined to efface the barriers between political activity and social activity; both are treated as manifestations of underlying ideological, cultural, or even economic patterns (Robertson, 2004). ''The expression ''civil society'', Abootalebi (1998) argues, '' is used today to illustrate how clubs, organizations and groups act as a buffer between state power and the citizen's life. In the Middle East, state financial and coercive power remains strong and far superior to resources available to its social, economic and political oppositions. Nowadays, however, the civil society debate on the Middle East has focused more on changes in formal governance procedures rather than substantive changes in state-society relations''. Civil society is a contested concept in the Middle East, and there have often been three major approaches to civil society in this region. The first approach resembles Western images of ArabIslamic society and believes that Islamic belief systems and patriarchal tribal organization obstruct values such as tolerance, civic values, and personal freedom. The rise of Islamic revivalist movements, however, is understood as Muslim resistance to modernity. The second approach is related to the notion of corporatism, which was borrowed from analyses of Latin America. Corporatist tendencies are processes in which the state dominates any kind of economic and civic participation: centralization, oneparty rule, pervasive state security establishments which express their independence from the dominant state structures. And the third approach equates civil society with Western-style formal NGOs in the private and voluntary sector. In the policy circles concerned with democratic transition, therefore, it is agreed upon that these NGOs foster political liberalization and democratization

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from the grass-roots level. NGOs' independence from the regimes and their oppositions to them are the defining characteristics of the Middle Eastern civil society(Sater, 2007). According to Norton (1995) as cited in Sater(2007), "there is no link between civil society and democracy: societies do not take two tablets of civil society at bedtime and wake up the next morning undergoing democracy. He argues against the view that civil society is 'deficient, corrupt, aggressive, and hostile', claiming that these are general views of Middle Eastern civil society". 3. Characteristics of social capital and its implications for the recent uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East region: The notion of social capital has been around for decades. Social capital has come to mean many things to many scholars, so much so that researchers are always asking what social capital is not. Social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a sense network of reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital (Smith, M. K. (2001, 2007). Robert Putnam is a figure well-known for his strives in measuring social capital by considering groups' participation in civil society. In measuring participation in voluntary organizations in democratic societies such as the United States, however, Putnam argues that such social associations and the degree of participation indicate the extent of social capital in a society. These associations and participation promote and enhance collective norms and trust, which are central to the production and maintenance of the collective well-being (Lin, 2004). “There is a considerably body of evidence,” Halpern writes, “showing that high social capital is associated with more effective

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and less corrupt government.â&#x20AC;? Further he argues that:'' communities with high social capital foster more civic citizens who are easier to govern, a ready supply of co-operative political leaders, and a fertile soil in which effective government institutions can grow'' (2008). There has recently been an explosion of interest in the concept of social capital and its impact on society. Social capital is related to community spirit and cohesion, and while having various definitions, the major features of social capital are citizenship, trust and shared values, community involvement, volunteering, social networks, and civic and political participation. Nowadays social capital has become a highly visible feature of policy debates, and has been seminal in the recent uprisings of North Africa and the Middle East region. Once connectivity between the masses and ruling parties decreased in the Middle East, then, the stock of social capital in this region, too, becomes shrinking. However, Haezewindt (2003) argues that the term social capital has given researchers, planners, and decision-makers a new common language. Research on the multitude of beneficial social and economic consequences created by high levels of positive social capital has encouraged policy makers to consider how social capital can be created and maintained to benefit people and their communities. In the recent uprisings of North Africa, the Egyptian protestors, among others, learnt how to socially connect through Facebook, having learnt the techniques of social organization and use of mobile communication technology from a bunch of Serbs who managed to overturn Milosevic in the late 1990s. The mobile phone, Facebook, and Twitter have transformed the mode of communication between friends, family, and colleagues, especially among the young. The Internet is the new wonder of social communication, but as people in Egypt and the Middle East discovered, a power for social mobilization (Sheng, 2011).

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4. A review over the state of civil society in the Middle East: from the past to the present With the discourse on civil society still evolving and facing innumerable governmental and unofficial obstacles, it is not clear how the region's elites define civil society. However, despite decades of conflict and violence, there are various civil society organizations in the Middle East that have crossed the cultural, national, religious and ethnic divides. However, any review over the status of civil society in this region is subject to different problems, as the status of civil society organizations in the Middle East has various characteristics. What follows, therefore, takes us straight to the heart of the status of civil society in the Middle East which will most deeply concern us in the rest of the paper. In the 1990s, there was a rising hope for political reform in the Middle East, and especially the Arab world. Developments in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, and Yemen suggested that the grip of authoritarianism was loosening. The factors that contributed to this burgeoning hope included the growth of civil society, the changing global scene, and especially the end of the Cold War bright prospects for the emergence of a global media of communication and proliferating discourses on human rights. If there is a moment in the history when values associated with civil society, such as civility and tolerance, are important, it is the present. Arguably the ongoing protest and their subsequent results can be regarded as an opportunity to establish an exemplar stable democracy. However, if the work of politics in the Middle East after these protests settled is left to the forces of order and advocates of violence, then, the harvest of the ongoing conflicts will be the bitter fruit of repression and injustice. The Middle East is usually seen as a region where democratization has not yet occurred. However, democratization has been on the agenda since the 1990s, and civil society has been considered as the forerunner of Middle East democracy. (Michael Schulz)

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In the greater part of this region, however, weak and fragmented industrialization and modernization and the failure to establish a sustained democracy based on a coherent and strong civil society created a ''chronic developmental crisis'' in the last decades of the twentieth century. The creation of democracy and social capital is not possible but difficult without a strong civil society with related forces and institutes among which one can refer to working, middle and business classes. A fragmented civil society will result in the amalgamation of social and political powers within the embrace of political elites. In a number of the Middle Eastern countries, this process impeded the self-organization of domestic modern social forces and a selfregulating civil society (Amineh, 2007). Gallner, who has been a famous supporter of ''civil society'', argues that in both the Marxist and Muslim Worlds the state was too strong and civil society too weak. He suggests that civil society provides institutions and associations strong enough to balance the state and to prevent the monopolization of power and tyranny (McCrone, 2002). 5. Investigating social capital and its contributions to civil society in the Middle East: There has been very little effort to study the societies of this region for their own sake to draw the general insights necessary for building more effective social institutions that satisfy the increasing needs of their growing population. The development of social studies in the Middle Eastern countries was hampered by the resistance of political authoritarianism. The rise of secular ideological states in these societies where the ruling elites derived their policies from certain ideological approachesArab nationalism and Arab socialism, among others- laid less emphasis on the significance of the social studies for the construction of a modern society where ideology became the

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leading principle of state action, the necessity and need for verifiable knowledge of human social relationships upon which to base policies were hardly ever, and in many cases never understood. Consequently, the civil society of the Middle Eastern societies never developed social institutes that were both modern and autonomous to empower its public (Moaddel, 2007). As Walters (2002) argues, the conceptual territory of social capital is quite different. It is not concerned upon the idea of a system. It lacks this rather symmetrical architecture. Although it speaks of norms of civility and social responsibility, it is not concerned about the social unity or integrity of the polity. Social capital theory, then, assumes a world in which governance is no longer the monopoly of the political structure. Instead, governance is dispersed, carried out across a multitude of sites- in civic associations, partnerships, and communities. However, social capital presupposes a more active political and social citizens and groups that assume responsibilities for dealing with social problems. 6. Is civil society the cause or effect of social capital? Both the development and level of social capital in a society may be unrelated to its system of social policies. This claim rests on an idea that the social, political and economic trajectories of social capital and civil society can live their separate lives. A rich stock of social capital, therefore, is necessary for the creation of the universal civil society. In other words, when the Middle Eastern societies are richly endowed with social capital, they can build their encompassing civil society. A society with a high level of social capital and an active voluntary sector is more likely to produce the kind of politics that are typical of the universal civil society. On the other side, civil society as such is a source of social capital. This implies that either the outcome of this type of civil society generates enhanced generalized trust and makes it more likely that people will be more engaged in voluntary associations, or it could be something in 'how

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to do it' which increases social capital. The latter suggests that it is not the outcome of the various policies but the specific process of implementation in civil society that is vital to creating social capital (Valadbigi, 2010). Social capital is sometimes linked to norms of civility and is believed to be â&#x20AC;&#x201C; along a neo-Tocquevillean line of thoughtessential for the flourishing of civil society and in turn, of stable democracy. (Weber, 2009) The recent turmoil that appeared across several Middle Eastern countries confirmed the importance of voluntary civic activism for the existence and quality of democracy. ''An abundant stock of social capital, Fukuyama (2001) asserts, '' is presumably what produces a dense civil society, which in turn has been almost universally seen as a necessary condition for modern liberal democracy'. Low levels of social capital lead to a number of political dysfunctions, which have been extensively documented. Fukuyama further suggests that low levels of social capital have been linked to inefficient local government in southern Italy, as well as to the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s pervasive corruption. (Fukuyama, 2001) Not only is social capital a source of naturally organized groups, but also it is essential for any formal organization to work properly. 7. Traveling towards stable democracies in the Middle East: avenues and obstacles The democratic wave sweeping North Africa and the Middle East region has opened a new agenda for discussing the role of civic movements in transition toward stable democracies. In order to evaluate civil society in the Middle East one should identify the social forces which are embedded in civil society. However, it is argued that democracy and democratic culture have been difficult to establish in this part of the world. The hybrid nature of Arab societies is clearly reflected on the civic institutions. Understanding the implications of the diversity of associational patterns would give us a clue to the social movements

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that could facilitate the travel toward table democracies. Here, the civic institutions whose activities focus on a more tolerant and vibrant democratic society should be encouraged. However, plenty of those who hamper democracy can be found in organizations based on religious activism or on ethnicity and kinship (e.g. in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria). The civil society as marginalized and suppressed explains the fact that some groups lean to violence as an ideological expression of political demands. There are, then, many factors that contribute to this modern reality in the Middle East; the undeniably traumatic experience of colonialism, among others, dismantles the traditional institutions of civil society. On the other hand, the emergence of centralized, despotic and often corrupt governments, and the nationalization of the institutions of religious learning undermine the mediating role of civil society in transition to sustained democracies in this region (Hassan, 2010). In the face of these obstacles the Middle East faces in its travel toward establishing stable democracies, there have recently been some prospects for a true democratization process across this region. The increased awareness within the relatively small civil society in this region, Schulz (2010) believes, has contributed to regional networking, fostering new cooperation, and creating more vivid debate around democratic issues. Globalization itself increases the awareness and networking between external actors and the Middle East. This, in turn, strengthens the chances to establish and consolidate a vivid and democratic regional debate across the region. Civil society not only acts within in each country in this region, but also it has also increasingly developed transnational networks, thereby constituting a forerunner in regionalization and democratization in the regional context. 8. Conclusions: This article has suggested that the recent uprisings of North Africa and the Middle East have opened new debates for discussing the

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relationship between social capital and civil society in this part of the world. We have seen how the stock of social capital is closely associated with the rise and development of civil society in the Middle East. We observed that those societies which are endowed with higher levels of social capital, then, are remarkably enjoying more stable democracies and better lifestyles. Broadly speaking, political institutions are more often assessed in terms of their performance. Once they are in dense webs of associations, they function better. The article argued that while there is a hostile climate towards civil society in the Middle East and social capital's stock has been at lower levels in comparison to developed societies, these days a kind of civil society has raised which is still in its embryonic, fragile stage. It was also argued that tendencies toward civil society has been around from the 1990s in this region; however due to numerous aggressive factors, a successful, stable democratic culture has not been established in the Middle East. As well as reviewing the past and present state of civil society in the Middle East, this paper has investigated the mutual contributions between social capital and civil society. Social capital tries to contribute to the development of civil society and transition to stable democracies in the region. However, it faces innumerable obstacles from the sides of both official and unofficial authorities. It was uncovered that a universal civil society can be a source of social capital, as such kind of society has a people who are more inclined to take part in voluntary activities and this, in turn, can increase the level of trust- the most important component of social capital- among them. The current literature on the relationship between social capital and civil society, however, has not made justice to the two, as further research on these areas can provide the policymakers with better understanding of how to engage their peoples in handling the affairs of their societies.

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9. Recommendations: By far, this article has strived to investigate the interactions between social capital and civil society and their mutual contributions to each other in the context of the Middle East. Although civil society has found some appropriate opportunities to rise, and the stock of social capital has enjoyed more or less developments, it is not enough for a region which these days has been the focus of the international political and economic organizations. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, we suggest the following recommendations which seem to be of potential interest and application both for the authorities and the public of this region. 



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The removal of patrimonial relationships between the state and society in the Persian Gulf States can enhance prospects for modern civil societies, and as a result more stable democracies; Establishing an indigenous organized labor in this region can make the formation of more stable democracies more likely; Empowering the well-organized groups to practice pressure on the ruling elites to open the political space will contribute to the emergence of modern civil society in the Middle East; The activities of civil society should complement the functions of the state and other shareholders towards strengthening the stock of social capital; The elites of the Middle East should exhibit their commitment and emphasize on the role of civil society in restoring and reconstructing hope and confidence in the conflict-ridden communities of the region; and States can prevent a serious negative impact on social capital by not undertaking activities that are better left to the private sector or civil society. (Fukuyama, 2001)

Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to Dr. Karoui and the anonymous reviewers whose valuable comments on this paper helped us a lot to revise it to upgrade its standard. Shahab, in his part, would like to pay tribute to Professor Dr. Hanane Darhour who has faith in him and has accompanied him through ups and downs of his studies. And last, but not least, Songs of love and gratitude to our "Avin", again and always. About the authors: Akbar Valadbigi is a doctoral candidate in Sociology of Development at the Department of Sociology, the Yerevan State University (YSU) and lecturer at the Islamic Azad University of Sanandaj, Kurdistan, Iran. He is a member to several committees of the International Sociological Association (ISA). He is now working on his doctoral dissertation that is about social capital and trust. His research interests include social capital, poverty, ethnicities, and globalization. He has published numerous articles on the socio-cultural and political affairs of the Middle East. He has also been invited to numerous international conferences to present his works. His latest publication, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Perspectiveâ&#x20AC;? gives a sociocultural insight into the regional and international developments of the region.

Shahab Ghobadi holds a B.A. in English language and literature. His current research interests are centered on globalization, ethnicities, and social capital in the context of the Middle East. Shahab is currently affiliated to Sanandaj Islamic Azad University as an independent researcher. He is also a member to the International Sociological Association (ISA). He is going to continue his education in the Middle East studies.

References: Abootalebi, Ali.R. (1998). ' Civil society, democracy, and the Middle East', Middle East Review of International Affairs Vo. l 2, No. 3: 46-59. Chase, Robert and Rikke Nording Christensen. (2009). ' Building social capital', in Gert Tinggaard Svendsen and Gunnar Lind Haase Swendsen (eds) Handbook

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of social capital: the troika of sociology, political science, and economics. London: Edward Elgar Publishing. Fukuyama, Francis. (1996). Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity. New York: Free Press. Fukuyama, Francis. (2001). ' Social capital, civil society and development', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No 1: 7-20. Haezewindt, Paul. (2003).' Social trends: the role of social capital', No:33. Halpern, David. (2008). Social capital. London: Polity Press. Hassan, Hamid A.(2010)' Civil society and democratization of the Arab World', in Heidi Moksnes and Mia Melin(eds) Power to the people?(con-)Tested civil society in search of democracy. Sweden: Uppsala Center for Sustainable Development. Kamrava, Mehran. (2007) ' The Middle East's democracy deficit in comparative perspective', in M. Parvizi Amineh(ed.) The greater Middle East in global politics: social perspectives on the changing geography of the world politics. Leiden: Brill. Krokowska, Katarzyna. (2009). ' Cooperation among adversaries: regionalism in the Middle East', M.A. Thesis. Lin, Nan. (2004). Social capital: a theory of social structure and action. London: Cambridge University Press. McCrone, David. (2002). The sociology of nationalism: tomorrow's ancestors. London: Routledge. Moaddel, Mansoor. (2007). Values and perceptions of the Islamic and Middle Eastern publics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ostrom, Elinor and T.K. Ahn. (2009)' The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action', in Gert Tinggaard Svendsen and Gunnar Lind Haase Swendsen (eds) Handbook of social capital: the troika of sociology, political science, and economics. London: Edward Elgar Publishing. Owen, Roger. (2004). State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East. London: Routledge. Parvizi Amineh, Mehdi. (2007). ' Theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of the greater Middle East', in M. Parvizi Amineh(ed.) The greater Middle East in global politics: social perspectives on the changing geography of the world politics. Leiden: Brill.

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Robertson, David. (2004). The Routledge dictionary of politics. London: Routledge. Sater, James N.(2007) Civil society and political change in Morocco. London: Routledge. Schulz, Michael.(2006). 'The role of Middle East society in democratization: Introduction', in Heidi Moksnes and Mia Melin(eds) Power to the people?(con-)Tested civil society in search of democracy. Sweden: Uppsala Center for Sustainable Development. Sheng, Andrew.(2001). 'Social capital and the Middle East', Think Asian. Smith, M. K. (2001, 2007) 'Robert Putnam', the encyclopaedia of informal education, www.infed.org/thinkers/putnam.htm. Last update: October 14, 2009. Valadbigi, Akbar. (2010). Perspective (a collection of articles). Arbil: Aras Press. Walters, William. (2002). 'Social capital and political sociology: re-imagining politics?' Sociology 36(2): 377-397. Weber, Ralph. (2009). ' Religio-philosophical roots', in Gert Tinggaard Svendsen and Gunnar Lind Haase Swendsen (eds) Handbook of social capital: the troika of sociology, political science, and economics. London: Edward Elgar Publishing.

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Lions Leading Lions An Explication of the Speeches of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai, United Arab Emirates

By: Daniel R. Fredrick ABSTRACT: His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, ruler of Dubai, United Arab Emirates is one of the most lauded Arab-Muslim leaders in the Arabian Gulf. Sheikh Mohammed, as well as his country, stands in stark contrast to many other leaders and countries in the Middle East which have recently seen violent civil protests and unsympathetic rejection of long-time leaders. This essay explicates the speeches and other works of Sheikh Mohammed to shed light on what makes him so exemplary and what makes the UAE so great a paradigm for the Middle East in general. Sheikh Maktoum’s rhetoric reveals four underlying features which make the UAE, Dubai in particular, a global paradigm: (1) a citizen-centered Arab-Muslim ruler (2) a highly educated population (3) a traditional but tolerant, united Middle East and (4) an optimistic worldview. KEY-WORDS: Discursive analysis, Discourse strategies, Dubai, UAE, Arab politics, Middle East education…

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Dr. Daniel R. Fredrick is an assistant professor at the American University of Sharjah where he has been teaching courses in writing and speaking since August 2008. Before moving to the UAE, he began university teaching in 1996 and since has taught in California, Texas, Florida, and even Bulgaria. He has written articles for professional publications and has presented papers at national and international conferences on topics related to rhetoric. He currently lives in Sharjah with his wife and son who was born in Sharjah in 2009.

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IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY he seven-star hotel Burj al Arab and the Palm Islands in the Arabian gulf; the Burj Khalifa (the world‟s tallest free-standing building) and the Dubai Cares campaign—these are some of the more famous projects of Dubai‟s ruler, His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. Although Sheikh Maktoum is the leader of one of the most innovative, fascinating, and exemplary countries of the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates, his speeches have yet to receive thorough attention from scholars, especially those in the field of rhetoric. No doubt, if Dubai and Sheikh Mohammed are not well-known to the academic world, they are well-known to the business world, such as General Motors, General Electric, Boeing, and Microsoft, which all have international offices in Dubai; and no doubt this major city in the Arabian gulf and its renowned leader are well-known to the international media which rush to report on Dubai whenever a new, architectural feat gets under way. What is the latest enthrallment? The Time Dubai building--constructed with solar-powered, revolving floors, a feature allowing 360-degree views of Dubai‟s glittering skyline and the marbled waves of the Arabian waters. In sharp contrast to those in business and the media, those in the field of rhetoric have not paid much attention to the voices of Arab leaders, particularly Sheikh Maktoum, who, because of his sterling ethos, global ideology, and vision for a new Arab paideia (Arab excellence), is a worthy and pressing study for those not only in rhetoric, but also those in international studies, politics, philosophy, art and architecture, and contemporary affairs. Perhaps one reason for the lack of rhetorical study of Sheikh Maktoum is that his glitzy city is often stereotyped as a place limited to international business and luxury shopping—topics which would

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summon few academics. And because of these two features (highpowered businesses and billion dollar malls), Dubai could easily come across as a place where money and luxurious frivolities dominate the culture at the expense of human rights and other important social issues. Yet nothing could be more erroneous. A critical study of Sheikh Maktoum‟s speeches reveal that the UAE, in addition to its corporate and commercial appeal, is already fast becoming the world‟s premier model for superior education, quality of life, and global tolerance and charity. Sheikh Maktoum‟s speeches necessitate rhetorical analysis due to pragmatic reasons alone: e.g. „How does a leader improve his society?‟ „What is the ideology that works, and can it work for others?‟ These questions are among the most important for any society. And so, the purpose of this essay is to explicate this new paideia of one of the world‟s most important modern, MuslimArab leaders and to explain Sheikh Maktoum‟s particular kind of Arabic rhetoric as he outlines and pursues his ro’ya, vision. As a derivative of this essay, it is my hope that the speeches and writings of Arabic leaders since WWII should begin to receive greater attention from western scholars, for this topic is greatly understudied, a surprising reality given the multicultural leanings of most scholars in the past thirty years and given how many current events are directly connected to the Middle East. THE CENTRALITY OF ALLAH Our mission in this life is to work to Allah's satisfaction… --His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Speech at the 32nd Unification Day, May 5, 2008 No greater motif pulses through Arabic rhetoric than the laudation for, thanksgivings to, and perpetual acknowledgement of Allah; and this is so in the writings of Sheikh Maktoum. Although

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appeals to the Divine are not uncommon in many genres of speech throughout history such as the American Presidential Inaugural Address, or much earlier still, the Homeric invocations of the divine Muses, the degree of intensity and the timing of the appeals vary greatly between western rhetors and Arab leaders such as Maktoum. To elaborate, in the Iliad, the Divine comes in the form of the Muse who gives verse to the poet. In this sense, the divinities are not spirits guarding the poet from ill-fortune, but artistic spirits capable of triggering the creative animus of the poet—a sort of physical possession—in order to help the mortal „get the song right‟; the appeals to the divine, then, for Homer, are not always „modern‟ wherein the earthly adherent prays for forgiveness, mercy, and accouterments of the good life, but more of a request to the God of the arts to grant aesthetic proficiency to the earthly artist. After all, the Homeric bard does not invoke Zeus directly but rather his daughters Aeode and Mneme, the Muses of Song and Memory. In more recent times, if we focus briefly on American Presidential Inaugural Addresses, we see that political leaders in the new world have a very different relationship to the Divine than did the ancient bards but more similar in faith to modern Muslims. Rather than calling on the Divine for the right words, American leaders have typically called on God for mercy and to offer thanksgiving. Similar to Arab leaders, early American Presidents did call upon God, but this explicit acknowledgement has abated continually since the founding of America. For example, the last three presidents, Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and William Clinton address God only in their conclusions, and even there only in the culminating statements, each using the common, sign-off “God Bless America.” These modern presidents end their speeches conventionally, quite unlike America‟s founding Fathers whose parting words show much richer and exuberant appeals to the Creator, appeals which Muslim leaders such as Maktoum still offer. Indeed, to early American presidents God was,

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as is Allah today in the Muslim world, an unabashed force in their vision and practice of politics. To the first American presidents, God is a supreme being who does more than dole out blessings. Instead of merely ending with the three-word formula, “God Bless America,” notice the way Thomas Jefferson, in his second inauguration, a striking passage of faith, shows faithful submission to God in all aspects of life and politics: I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land and planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life; who has covered our infancy with His providence and our riper years with His wisdom and power, and to whose goodness I ask you to join in supplications with me that He will so enlighten the minds of your servants, guide their councils, and prosper their measures that whatsoever they do shall result in your good, and shall secure to you the peace, friendship, and approbation of all nations. Such a passage makes the contemporary presidential sign off “God Bless America” seem apathetic at best. What‟s important to note is that we do see evidence of appeals to God in western (i.e. ancient Greek and modern American) rhetoric, but what makes Maktoum‟s rhetoric so unique is that appeals to Allah permeate every aspect of his speeches; prayer to Allah frames the speeches in conventional devices (greetings and farewells) but also plays an even more interesting role as the key proof in Maktoum‟s assertions. To elaborate, Maktoum‟s exordia acknowledge Allah in the first utterances and often accentuate features of Allah‟s divine nature: most often that Allah is merciful and compassionate. For the believer, the Almighty has an inexhaustible list of traits entitled to human appreciation, indeed ninety-nine names (Hitti 128), so why does Maktoum regularly point out Ar-Rahman and Ar-Rahim, Mercy and Compassion when acknowledging Allah? These are common but

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meaningful Arabic phrases, allowing Maktoum to center and frame his ethos firmly inside the Islamic tradition, for, Muslims believe, “[Allah‟s] attributes of love [sifat] are overshadowed by those of might and majesty (sur. 59: 23-4) (Hitti 129). To speak the same language is the first sign of a shared identity, and Arabs predominantly unify under Islam. Although the international community may see Maktoum mostly as a great innovator and leader, judging by all the achievements of Dubai, his Muslim ethos is his core identity; this Muslim ethos, evidenced by Maktoum‟s adherence to the Islamic faith and tradition, shows through in his traditional supplications to Allah in the majority of his exordia. Thus, Maktoum‟s speeches are unique in that there are always two audiences, the heavenly Allah and the earthly audience. Indeed, Allah‟s eminent position in Maktoum‟s speeches —especially as a source of argumentative proof—deserves special attention. ALLAH AND THE ROLE OF PROGRESS IN MAKTOUM’S PAIDEIA Like blood in the human body, Allah is the fundamental substance in Maktoum‟s speeches, not only as the supreme being who deserves praise and worship, but also as the God who is actively involved in the daily progress, successes, and shortcomings of the world. Throughout his speeches, Maktoum reasons that Allah is the key operating force, which, in diurnal human affairs, can guide and bless, or, as well, administer consequences and obstacles to edify his people or to encourage better behavior from them. To reiterate, Maktoum‟s key points for supporting all of his positions and activities are the following: (1) that Allah is not only the guiding force in all areas of life but also the director of outcomes, and (2) that a Muslim‟s submissive behavior and attitude toward Allah is a necessary factor for any kind of success. Maktoum‟s assertions underscore to Muslims that Allah is responsible for both disciplining as well as for rewarding the faithful

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when they work toward improving the quality of life in every sphere, from education to business to religion. That Allah is the author and enabler of success is stressed in Maktoum‟s address to the Young Arab Leaders Forum on Saturday, December 3, 2005: “Allah Almighty does not let the efforts of hard workers go to waste.” Indeed, this interplay between hard work and rewards from Allah is one of the steady harmonies in Maktoum‟s assertions and an idea that governs his expression of Arabic paideia. But this notion of progress invites some controversy. Could it be possible that some resolute traditionalists may want to reject progress, feeling there to be a dichotomy between progress and tradition and believing that the more a culture assimilates the products, ideas, and new fashions brought by free trade and globalization, the further that culture moves away from the roots of its past, and, consequently, all the more reason why those fibrous roots may fray? In other words, when Burger King is across the street from the mosque, is this progress? And if so, has progress gone too far? Has the Islamic world assimilated too much or the wrong kinds of progress, especially in the Gulf nations? This is a question Christians as well should ask, for example, when they visit holy sites in Europe, such as the Cathedral in Milan, only to ascend to the roof and look out upon the flashing neon signs of fast-food empires-- McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, and Burger King; this hideous juxtaposition of the sacred and the profane makes many Christians feel that there is something incongruous between progress and traditional culture. Maktoum‟s position regarding this controversy is that progress and prosperity, in their varied forms, are gifts derived from Allah, blessings that are bestowed to reward advancement in knowledge and learning. These manifestations are the fruits of Allah; and so, the fruits of progress and prosperity—even when they come in the form of lumpen products (such as Big Macs) or impressively scientific and aesthetic ones, (such as blue prints for the Burj Khalifa)—are not false

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gifts; one ought not commit the genetic fallacy, the rejection of a gift because of its origin; or otherwise, anything invented by or made in the west would be haram—Microsoft software, MRI exams, GPS, polio vaccinations, or even Gore-Tex; it is hard to imagine anyone rejecting a polio vaccine because of where it was invented, but some hardliners assign symbolic value to some western exports, yet oddly not to others. Indeed, what Maktoum realizes is that appropriating the west is part of the Arabic tradition. All one need to recall is the role of Aristotle‟s Organon which, during the rule of the Abbasids, “took place side by side with Arabic grammar as the basis of humanistic studies in Islam” (Hitti 315); or Muhammad Ali of Egypt‟s embracing of western schools and business practices to “awaken” the Muslim world to progress in modern times (Hitti 745). Maktoum emphatically injects this idea into his messages, saying that “continuous learning”—the very source that leads to prosperity and progress—“will not make us forget our traditions, customs, and our Arab and Islamic values” (Arab Gulf University in Bahrain, April 30, 2008). The great prosperity of the UAE is inextricably tied up with progress and vice versa. Although Dubai does not rely solely on oil for its revenue, oil is a good example to explain the inter-relationship which Maktoum sees between prosperity and progress. Oil is useless without oil drills and refineries. Although the Chinese were the first to drill for oil and refine it for lamp oils, many nations along with the Arab world were advancing laterally with the Chinese in terms of being able to refine oil for use; what this means for Maktoum‟s position is that technological progress is a universal feature of advanced societies and the Arab world has always been a world of progress; and without question, today the Muslim world is peerless when it comes to observing tradition; indeed, Muslims have the great ability to excel at both preserving tradition and keeping up with progress. In the Muslim world, tradition has always been riding alongside progress.

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For this reason, Maktoum is sure to unite prosperity with progress not merely because it is a sound economic policy but also because prosperity and progress are two synchronized forces, (mares galloping in apposition), of the traditional Arab world, and from these forces, Allah bestows his gifts upon his people. What we can see clearly from Maktoum‟s speech to the Arab Strategy Forum is a deep belief against the notion that progress threatens tradition: “Looking for a conspiracy or a wicked plan behind every new thing is to…resist reform and postpone change...Hence the way in which we interact with this new world effects our ability to solve our current problems...” (Arab Strategy Forum, Monday December 13, 2004). And what we learn explicitly from Maktoum‟s latest work, My Vision: Challenges in the Race for Excellence, is that an economically retarded society is disastrous for any country (15). Why is there an undying conflict between progress and tradition? The problem lies in the fact that progress and tradition are typically defined by kinetic metaphors: progress is associated with forward movement in time whereas tradition is associated with immobility— with a past always pushed further away by time and ignorance. And so, because the kinetic metaphors are so deeply embedded in the way we talk about progress and tradition, it often seems that tradition lags behind progress. In short, to paraphrase Maktoum, to even have the chance to prosper, one must see tradition and education as recursive acts rather than linear ones; for sure, to keep up with the changes in technology alone, we must incessantly reacquaint ourselves with new developments. But more important than encouraging current university students to pursue life-long learning, Maktoum reassures Muslim students that the understanding of and the skillful use of history as well as new technology and ideas of progress do not run counter to tradition nor do they force one to disengage with Islamic values.

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On this point, Maktoum‟s new Arab paideia challenges the notion that tradition moves linearly through historical time as a man who continually ages, a man who, because of the feebleness that comes with age, grows weaker and seemingly less relevant as time goes by and who is typically unable to assimilate with the new generation; Maktoum‟s goals for a pragmatic as well as glorious infrastructure throughout Dubai, the UAE, and the Arab world, challenge those who oppose progress and unintentionally may be refusing the generous fruits and gifts from Allah. „How could social advancement and prosperity destroy the Arab tradition,‟ Maktoum implicitly asks, „When the Arab world was often a forerunner and leader of progress in the civilized world?‟ Allah in the past has generously blessed the Arab world—with great gains in finance via trade with China, with great libraries (Alexandria), with bountiful goods (Istanbul‟s Grand Bazaar), and with black gold, oil. The blessings today merely have new packaging and new features, but they are still heavenly gifts recurring. Maktoum, in short, is reminding Muslims that, in light of history, progress and prosperity belonged to the Arab world. Progress and prosperity are part of the defining traditions of the Arab world. Universal trading, Maktoum insists, was the main reason for Arab success (My Vision 24).

THE QUADRIPARTITE NEW ARAB PAIDEIA The United Arab Emirates is the country of the future. --His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Speech at the Inaugural Global Agenda in Dubai, November 7, 2008 The support for Maktoum‟s key assertion—that progress is a sign of a healthy and vibrant Muslim world—relies on an intra-cultural relationship between the Arab-Muslim rulers and their citizens in

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order for the UAE and the Arab world to reach its economic and social goals. This intra-cultural relationship must have the following four features which govern Maktoum‟s new Arab paideia: I. A citizen-centered Arab-Muslim ruler II. A highly educated generation (the “lions”) which transfers knowledge and power to the next generation (“lions leading lions”) III. A traditionally-grounded, globally-tolerant, internationally united Islamic/Arabic world IV. Optimism for making the difficult, the unlikely, or the impossible possible This quadripartite intra-cultural paradigm, when all of its goals are realized, would be impressive enough on its own. However, its most impressive feature, as Maktoum believes, is its innate power to be selfreplicating. In other words, the UAE, which currently has gone way beyond the beginning stage of Maktoum‟s vision, can now function as a model not only for other Arab countries but also for non-Arab countries. To clarify, after the four intra-cultural features are mostly attained and stabilized, Maktoum‟s paideia transitions to, or results in, an inter-cultural project wherein non-Arab cultures (even those in the West) are able to further their own progress by using the UAE as its chief social, economic, and educational paradigm. Putting this last point another way, Maktoum believes that the knowledge, power and success of the UAE will be able to transfer from one UAE generation to the next, then assist the entire Arab world to raise its status and standard of living, and, ultimately, to inspire interested non-Arab countries to pursue Maktoum‟s vision for an ideal state—one marked by economic prosperity, quality education and global tolerance and world peace. All of these parts of Maktoum‟s innovative vision will be illuminated with further explication.

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I: A Citizen-Centered Arab-Muslim Ruler Zayed Was Arabism. --His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Tribute to Sheikh Zayed, November 2, 2005 From the ideas and behaviors of his late father, His Highness Sheikh Rashed bin Saeed al Maktoum; and from the ideas and behaviors of his late mentor, His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, Ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of the UAE (1971 to 2004), Maktoum directly received inspiration for two of the first intracultural features—that the Arab ruler must be citizen-centered and that an educated generation extends progress to the next by increasing its knowledge and mental powers. Sheikh Zayed, according to Maktoum, is, as an instrument of Allah, responsible for the successes in the UAE primarily because Zayed was the apotheosis of the citizencentered Arab ruler. Zayed was well-loved throughout the Arab world. Indeed, Zayed‟s humanitarian concerns extended far beyond the borders of the UAE. Maktoum, in his December 13, 2004 speech at the Arab Strategy Forum, teaches that Zayed‟s “heart and mind were inhabited by Arabism” and that Zayed “react[ed] to Arab events as if they happened in his own house.” Focusing on Zayed‟s international ethos, Maktoum situates Zayed in the framework of not only the quintessential, citizen-centered leader but also in the framework of the Arab-centered leader, one who then believed that the unification of the emirates could possibly augur the unification of the entire Arab world. Zayed‟s rule was marked by love and admiration from citizens all over the UAE and the Arab world, and his deep personal compassion toward his fellow Arabs found its way into public policy. To illustrate, every year during Ramadan, Zayed was known for having great mercy on those incarcerated, letting the repentant spend the month-long holiday with their families. Here, Zayed‟s generosity was

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no small gesture. Some prisoners committed crimes that had cost the UAE over a quarter of a million dollars. Zayed‟s ethos was full of good will toward all, and his munificence made that ethos even more impressive. During his rule, to the delight of many Muslims worldwide, Zayed would often fund the building of mosques for lessfortunate Muslims outside of the UAE (“Zayed Pardons”). In his own words, Zayed reflected, “I was always contemplating as to how to serve my countrymen and bring them happiness well before I assumed power and even before oil was discovered. My people were then destitute of services and amenities which others were enjoying (Wakalat).” To enjoy services and amenities, would mean, of course, to accept modernization, the very source which bestows amenities. When Zayed talks about modernization, he is no doubt talking about everything from quality health care to central air conditioning etc., an amenity which, until modernization, no one in history enjoyed, not even the rich or the royal. And so Zayed urges the UAE—not to avoid modernization—but to “catch up with the procession of progress and civilization (Wakalat).” What we have in Sheikh Zayed is the archetypal ruler whose ethos is the model for all future leaders who shall sustain Maktoum‟s new Arab paideia because Zayed achieved success “by good rule, sharing advice, sincerity, dedication to work and service of his country and nation and concentration on development in every field, and openness to human civilization in all its components (Arab Strategy Forum).” In Zayed, Maktoum finds the epitome of the citizen-centered leader for all future leaders to emulate. One more point on Zayed is critical for understanding Maktoum‟s vision. Zayed‟s life and achievements in the UAE are incontrovertible proofs that Allah blesses progress, and, inversely, Zayed‟s success strengthened his relationship with Allah. As Maktoum expresses, “[Zayed] is one of those rare leaders who were not spoiled by leadership, fortune, achievement and prestige. In fact, these things

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strengthened his belief in Allah and inspired him to follow in the footsteps of Prophet Mohammed….” (Tribute to Sheikh Zayed, Wednesday November 2, 2005). What we see in Sheikh Zayed is the blueprint for the right kind of ethos that Maktoum believes is the first part of the intra-cultural register, a blueprint on which Maktoum has established his own ethos. And thus, these three Sheikhs are archetypes of the new Arab paideia: the first two, Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashed Maktoum, pass along wisdom and progress to the the next generation, Sheikh Maktoum; this intra-cultural transition is shown in Maktoum‟s concern not only for his home country, the UAE, but for the entire Arab world. This brotherly concern runs throughout Maktoum‟s writings, but is most poignant in My Vision. Maktoum begins this passionate and personal work by telling us about his response to a journalist during Ramadan. One question was specifically about Al Qadr, the night of power, a commemoration of the night in which Allah revealed the Quran to the prophet Mohamed. Muslims believe that on this night Allah sends out droves of angels to carry out prayers (Surat Al-Qadr 97:1-5). No doubt the reader can anticipate the journalist‟s question: What would Sheikh Maktoum pray for? Maktoum tells us that his first reaction was to have Allah raise the UAE to the highest level of excellence in all matters ranging from morality to business to social success. But then—thinking about what Sheikh Zayed would do—he held back, recalling a saying from the Hadith, that one must love his brother as he loves himself, feeling that he should use his prayer for the benefit of all Arab nations. But this egalitarian wish too makes Maktoum pause. If the Arab world shares in the success, then the UAE—his home, his people, his heart—will lose the opportunity to be preeminent (My Vision 1). Maktoum, though a visionary and optimist, is also a realist. He knows that there must always be leaders, and the UAE is already one of the leading Arab nations. But Maktoum‟s hope is that the Arab world will prosper, and prosperity

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must start with brotherhood between leaders and citizens. Maktoum himself shows the height of Islamic brotherly love in this moving line from his Tribute to Sheikh Zayed: “By Allah, if death would accept a ransom, I would sacrifice my life for Zayed. If years of life could be offered, I would grant him the years of my youth and the sweetest days of my life.” The parallel clauses create symmetry and grace, and the final balanced doublet (the years of my youth and the sweetest days of my life) rounds out the expression. The harmony and balance at the syntactical level are not only aurally pleasing but also artistically symbolize the harmony and balance that Zayed has brought to the UAE and that Maktoum carries on.

II: A Highly Educated Generation which Transfers Knowledge and Power To the Next Generation, or “Lions Leading Lions” I prefer to call Dubai Catalyst Inc. --His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum from Our Ambitions for the Middle East, January 12, 2008 Sheikh Maktoum‟s new Arab paideia, like all great visions, is designed to endure long after the work of the visionary‟s own generation. The UAE‟s goals can assuredly be achieved if Maktoum‟s generation can pass on its knowledge and power to the next generation. We saw in the last section that Sheikh Zayed‟s great contribution to Maktoum‟s new Arab paideia was offering his exemplary life and achievements as a paradigm for Arab leaders. Maktoum has appropriated the key traits of Zayed for sure, but his own life and achievements illuminate further the traits of the educated leader. Several of Maktoum‟s features, if emulated by future leaders and citizens, will help bring about the realization of Maktoum‟s vision.

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One of the crowning signs of an educated citizenry is an extraordinary ability to communicate effectively. Maktoum believes in the centrality of rhetoric (effective and ethical speaking and writing) and is a consummate rhetor whether he is speaking of business matters or poetizing Arabic life and values. What is central to this essay, however, is not an in-depth discussion of Maktoum‟s oratorical style but how Maktoum lucidly articulates his vision and why this vision will succeed. Although the new Arab paideia cannot be implemented without sound business sense, Maktoum does not speak in the style of the bureaucrat but in the style of the master teacher, using distinctive metaphors, rhetorical devices which Aristotle notes are the chief mark of literary and pedagogical genius because of the metaphor‟s ability to aid comprehension through pleasure. Maktoum‟s leonine metaphor, for example, in his speech to the Free University of Berlin on February 7, 2008, explicates in every respect the spirit of the new Arab paideia. In this metaphor, Maktoum challenges the famous European proverb attributed to Alexander the Great—that it is better for a lion to lead sheep than a sheep to lead lions. Maktoum recalls his reaction to this ancient European view of leadership: “I said to myself, „What a bad example…the teacher should teach his followers to be lions so he can…teach them what he knows and show them the way to be lions.‟” Lions leading lions—this is the hallmark of Maktoum‟s new, Arab paideia, one which forces Maktoum to overturn the Alexandrian dichotomy of ruler (lion)/subject (sheep) for a new, Emirati version which avoids constructing people as passive, expendable subjects (as Alexander would see them) in favor of seeing them as an active, educated, vibrant societal force (as Maktoum sees them). Indeed, Maktoum‟s leonine metaphor works not only because it depicts his co-enterprise with his people and the first-class social goals he has for them, but it also works because it refutes those who think that being unresponsive when it comes to improving oneself and one‟s country is a viable option.

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Maktoum tell us that when the gazelle wakes up, it must take action to outrun the fastest lion to save its life, and the lion itself must outrun the fastest gazelle to have its meal. Interestingly, we should note that there is a greater need for the weaker, more passive animal to take action, for its failure is a matter of life and death, not simply a matter of caloric intake. The powerless animal gains power through the run, that is, through its action. Maktoum is unwavering on this point: “In the UAE and Dubai, I don‟t care if you are a gazelle or a lion, when you wake up, you better start running.” Maktoum‟s philosophy—that a great Arab society needs intellectually robust citizens—is lucidly expressed in his use of the leonine metaphor, and his own ethos is heightened from it as well, for it shows his goodwill toward his people, seeing them as powerful forces who control the chase and are a part of a great Arab team, rather than victims whose only purpose in life is to stay one step ahead of greater forces that seek to destroy them as the lion destroys the gazelle; in short, we learn from Maktoum‟s unique and effective use of rhetoric, that in the new Arab paideia, citizens, like Maktoum himself, should not only be educated in the affairs of business but should also possess these philosophic qualities and rhetorical abilities: a studious awareness of the world in general, a profound, poetic sensibility, pragmatic eloquence, a heart and mind appreciative of and stimulated by the humanities, and a keen ability to employ an art of effective and ethical rhetoric. Although abilities in rhetoric are central to the new Arab paideia, Maktoum‟s message also reveals that citizens should have great socio-observation, or critical thinking skills, for these skills allow a leader or citizen to evaluate whether the society is heading in the right direction. The next section addresses this important point.

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III: A Traditionally-Grounded, Globally-Tolerant, Internationally United Islamic/Arabic World Sheikh Maktoumâ&#x20AC;&#x;s vision is grand and noble; grand, because it aspires to raise social conditions throughout the Emirates and the Arab world to levels yet unseen in history; noble, because his mission is citizen-centered and based on the deserved outcomes of hard work. It is grand and noble because it is not the vision of a self-aggrandizing autocrat but the vision of a traditionally-grounded and tolerant Muslim leader who sees his rule as a way to maintain peace and to reach for ever-rising standards of living for the UAE and Emirates immediately, the Arab world as soon as possible, and all the world through improved relations between the west and the Middle East. Through the eyes of western media, the Middle East is perceived as everything the UAE is not: a haven for Jihadist terrorists, a region intolerant of outside influences, and a place in which women are treated inequitably as part of the cultural mores. Maktoum is aware of the criticism about the Arab world, and while the UAE is one of the favorite destinations of both western and Arab tourists and offers one of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x;s safest places to live and raise children, it is still a small oasis in the middle of a larger Middle Eastern region comprised of countries either at war or strongly implicated in terrorism (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan) or racked with controversy over human rights or strife-ridden, international politics (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen). In short, despite its appeal, the UAE is still situated within an unstable part of the world. Maktoum faces this reality and seeks to remedy it by revealing a number of heuristics for dealing with the negative perceptions surrounding the Middle East and by promoting tolerance not as some en vogue ideology of western liberal progressivism, but as one of the tenets of Islam. Indeed, Maktoum advertises to the world that Arabs have a long history of living up to high moral standards, especially respect toward others, generous

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hospitality to all, especially foreigners, respect and concern for everyone, especially women, and great tolerance for and appreciation of diversity, especially in one social setting. We must elaborate on Maktoum‟s position on terrorism. Maktoum addresses terrorism with apt consideration, giving it not too much attention nor brushing it aside for that matter, for attention is what terrorism craves, and brushing it aside would seem to trivialize it. In the 2007 World Economic Forum in Dalian, Maktoum demands that Arab countries must improve international relations by taking on „responsibilities in spreading forgiveness and acceptance between different nations, cultures, people and ethnic groups.” Although he is a visionary, Maktoum is rare as a visionary in that he is always grounded in reality. As he says, international boundaries are „elastic‟ today and “there is no alternative to working together.” Because of this elasticity between borders, Maktoum feels that war is an illogical if not a useless endeavor; indeed, he is right when he says, “wars have lost their ability to put a final end to issues.” This view steals back the notion of jihad from terrorists, interpreting it to mean an inner spiritual struggle rather than an outward form of war against infidels, enemies who may one day convert to Islam, a classic if not prudent interpretation, for every murder of an infidel is the destruction of a potential convert, a potential spiritual brother. What is most remarkable in Maktoum‟s argument is that Muslims have the obligation to be pro-active in denouncing terrorism that grows from inside the Arab world. That is, the burden is put on the Muslim to initiate improvement in diverse cultural relations and not merely wait for the west to take the leading role in reconstructing the controversial image of the Middle East as perceived within the international theatre. To this end, in one of the most memorable passages, he reminds Muslims of the epistemological problem with terrorism. Notice the way Maktoum shows how the ideology of the terrorist can creep into society and threaten the progress of Islamic civilization:

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The Stubborn ones belong to a different world than ours; they try unsuccessfully to stop progress, and they think wrongly that they can stop the process of history. Likewise, there are those who advocate the clash of civilizations; they are terrorists and fundamentalists in thought and deed, and they build walls—material, geographic or spiritual—between people and cultures to gain materially or politically. -- World Economic Forum in Dalian, 2007 Above we see that Maktoum appeals to the individual Muslim and his or her role in the greater international theatre, emphasizing that “human competency is measured by our ability to work successfully together, and search for appropriate solutions according to the „win for all‟ equation.” But individual responsibility is only one part of the solution. Maktoum also realizes that the entire Arab media must be restructured to restore the real visage of Arabism. For example, in his address to the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research in 2005, Maktoum argues that, in the early days of its inception, the Arab media played the role of helping “to steer the ship, control[ling] its speed and bring[ing] it safely back to port on schedule, whether on calm or rough seas.” However, soon after this pioneering effort, the very ship the media was piloting became a vessel of totalitarianism wherein the media “instead of exposing mistakes….cover[ed] them up.” As a result, the role of the Arab media “suffered when [it] was plagued by totalitarian thought and rule,” and this adverse political residue still stains the Arab media today. But technology has changed the rules and challenged the powers of totalitarianism. With global information torrenting through the internet, it is no longer impossible for totalitarian regimes to prohibit access to other countries and consequently to other news sources. “It is no longer possible,” Maktoum tells us, “to sell illusions.” So what exactly must the media

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do? It must “encourage intellectual freedom, protect intellectuals, accept other opinions and sponsor hard work, initiatives and excellence.” All of these remedies for improving the Emirati as well as Arab international ethos and showcasing the tolerance of the UAE culminate in what Maktoum calls Majlis, an Arab version of democratic administration. In the UAE, the Sheikhs operate in the spirit of true Arab brotherhood, avoiding the pitfalls and disrepute that come with absolute rule, by having “the leader and wise men gather together [to] discuss everything” (Free University of Berlin). Before Majlis was instated in the UAE, the seven Emirates had varying laws which interrupted relations such as in the financial sector. But Maktoum‟s father and Zayed, formed a union and all the Emirates were eventually persuaded to unify in 1971, and since then, it is Majlis that helps the UAE to advance its goals. Majlis works, Maktoum tells us in the November 19, 2007 Federal National Council, because leaders engage in Shura, or consultation with other members of the country, which amounts to a united, “active role in the growth and development of the nation.” The concepts Majlis and Shura are congruous with Maktoum‟s belief that lions should be leading lions; and this concept could not be more fitting than at the Federal National Council, an assembly which shares in the Shura. The ultimate goal of Majlis and Shura, for sure, is to achieve widespread cooperation in the gulf as well as the gamut of the Arab world. In the same speech, Maktoum expresses the theme of this third section: Our foreign policy will continue to have . . . a commitment to the principles of international law. We will continue to be a good neighbour and we will refrain from intervening in others‟ affairs. We will continue to establish bilateral relations based on

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balanced interests and mutual respect, to resolve disputes peacefully and to support pan-Arab work. But fixing the image of the Middle East is no easy task; neither is designing and building one of the greatest cities and countries in the world. Problems arise and divisions abound. So what is Maktoum‟s method for dealing with adversity when it aims to halt progress? He uses both intellect and attitude. It is his philosophy of optimism that we must turn to next.

IV: Optimism for Making the Difficult, the Unlikely, Or the Impossible Possible. The one who begins his day saying, ‘Today is beautiful, and I have to create something…I am the best.’ He is the one who can achieve many things. --His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Speech at the Women’s Leadership Seminar in Dubai, January 6, 2009 The global recession that hit the world in 2009 left Dubai, like all affluent countries, open to great criticism. Dubai‟s financial situation in December of that year, when it received assistance from Abu Dhabi, left it vulnerable to unrelenting waves of journalistic attacks and op-ed jeers. In the minds of some, Dubai was a mighty giant deserving to fail. After all, was it not the height of hubris to plough the seas or bring snow to the desert? But those who expect to see Dubai come crashing down should study more about the history of Dubai and the resolve and philosophy of Maktoum. Maktoum‟s speeches are filled with tales of Dubai overcoming opposition, upsets, and crises. It is during the times of deep crises and bitter setbacks that Maktoum believes the real lions, the true leaders, will come forth just as leaders came forth during past challenges. Problems, as Maktoum

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tells us, helped develop the leadership skills in himself and in his own Bani Yas tribe (Free University of Berlin). And what makes it all possible, demands Maktoum, is the possession of an unwavering optimism. Maktoum believes that optimism is a necessary trait both for the business leader and the Muslim, for negativity does not glorify Allah: “I tell the people around me that this universe contains both the positive and the negative, and that Allah created the universe and He gives you what you ask for. If you focus on the negative, Allah will give it to you, and if you believe in Allah and ask Him for happiness and success, He will grant them to you” (Arabian Gulf University, Wednesday, April 30, 2008). The „focus‟ Maktoum is referring to not only is contemplative but also communicative. Indeed, one‟s very use of language is central to Maktoum‟s theory of optimism. As he says to students in the speech at Arabian Gulf University, “I was talking about this project [the Palm Islands] when someone told me I was making a mistake by trying to succeed where the UN and UNICEF have failed. I looked at him and said, “If you talk this way, you have already failed, so you shouldn‟t be on the team that will handle this task.” I have noted earlier Maktoum‟s gift for language and this view, that positive words can help design positive thoughts, aligns him with the great rhetorical tradition which seeks, as one of its major goals, to explain the relationship between thought and expression. The right word can change a mental outlook which could in turn determine the success or failure of a project. This is why Maktoum lectures in the same speech the following point: “As you move from theory to practical experience you will face what some call difficulties. I call them challenges (emphasis mine), because when you see something as a challenge it means you can handle it, and if you look for the positive you will find it.” Positive thinking combined with the use of positive language, believes Maktoum, manipulates the brain‟s response. In a similar example, to the audience at the Federal National Council on November 19, 2007, Maktoum calls problems

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„side-effects.‟ This use of positive language is supported by Maktoum‟s interesting metaphor in the speech tot he Arabian Gulf University. “When water meets resistance in the form of a stick, it changes direction and still manages to reach its destination—the sea.” In this metaphor, water represents the UAE in general and Dubai specifically. Just as water rushes ever onward toward its goal, so too Dubai and the UAE stream toward their endeavors. A stick (any „side-effect‟ or „difficulty‟ which obstructs progress), may force the water to take an alternate path or even cause a slight delay, but it does not have the ability to prevent the water from achieving its goal. The metaphor can be extended to highlight Maktoum‟s view of the global financial crisis. In this context, the stick would no doubt be a massive felling of trees in the river, and yet, even on this scale, the water would still work its way through the cracks; the water would slow down, but would still have the inertia to push onward. In summary, Maktoum strongly suggests that „sticks in the water‟ are necessary because they are part of reality. In one sense, the „stick‟ is the catalyst for the solution because it provides an opportunity for creative solutions, and to help bring forth leaders (Free University of Berlin). Of course, this philosophy of optimism must be co-equal with the drive for hard work and sacrifice. As Maktoum inspires the UAE on the 36th National Day, he also admonishes those who lean toward negativity and passivity: “those who neglect the new will remain at the back of the line…Every new day brings with it new tasks, new problems, and new challenges. It brings new inventions and innovations in science and knowledge.” With such resolve and stoicism against crises, no wonder Maktoum argues to the students at the Arabian Gulf University that if there is no challenge, then he is „bored.‟ And no wonder, in his speech at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Investment Conference on November 9, 2009, Maktoum, rather than panic, finds that the “economic slowdown [notice the avoidance of the term „crisis‟] has given us time to pause, contemplate and study the

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things around us….” Here we see that Maktoum uses the power of rhetorical language and philosophical perspective to respond to one of the greatest threats against the UAE‟s goals since its inception.

DUBAI AS GLOBAL PARADIGM My chief concern is young leaders and investment in humanity. --His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Speech at the Women’s Leadership Seminar in Dubai, January 6, 2009 In the World Economic Forum in Dalian on September 6, 2007, Maktoum reminds his audience that 1990 marked a year of great hope for the global community. The fall of communism inspired “great expectations at the birth of a new world order, where different cultures co-exist, and its different forces cooperate to achieve peace, security and development.” Twenty years have passed, and although Maktoum concedes that some progress has been made, the “big picture is filled with dark corners that reflect our grave challenges.” In other words, there are still many needs unmet for the world to achieve prosperity and peace, or at least to attain livable means and tolerance among cultures. Maktoum brings to the world‟s attention that these great expectations can still be achieved and the dark corners illuminated, by believing that the UAE should be a leader in helping to bring about these important global improvements. But why Maktoum and why the UAE? In the Free University of Berlin speech, Maktoum states that the UAE is “number one in the world” for getting high school students into college, “especially girls.” The UAE‟s transfer rate is around an astounding 94%. Compare that to the USA which is a dismal, if not embarrassing, 68.6 percent (College Enrollment). In a region criticized for marginalizing the rights and roles of women in society, the UAE

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leads the pace in raising the status of women, outrunning all liberal and progressive nations. Indeed, in his speech at the Women’s Leadership Seminar in Dubai on January 6, 2009 Maktoum gives an encomium to women, enumerating the many female Arab leaders who changed society for the better, from Khadija bint Khuwaylid, to Queen Zaoubia of Tadmor who fought so fiercely against the Roman army that “when she was captured, the Roman leaders shackled her with gold chains instead of iron chains, to honour her.” These impressive examples make Maktoum pause mid encomium to say, “the mother who rocks her child‟s cradle with her right hand, can sway the world with her left…women are the soul of society; I mean that they are everything.” So, why the UAE? Because it is a proven success, and it delivers on its goals and promises. It invests in human capital and works tirelessly to improve standards of living. Moreover, the UAE should be a leader because of the speed of its accomplishments. On the UAE‟s 36th National Day celebration, Maktoum reminds the world about the UAE‟s swift success and high potential to be the paradigmatic country for the world. These were the years when Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid began a new era. They worked tirelessly to improve the country…They paved the way for the nation to shift from humble growth to its current status as an example for modern times (emphasis mine). The progress that the UAE made in just 36 years would have taken other countries centuries. Indeed, this idea that the UAE should be a model for the world is not mere table talk. In his speech at the Dubai Government Excellence Program Awards Ceremony on April 19, 2005, Maktoum is already aware that countries in the region perceive and accept the UAE as a model, “using [the UAE‟s] ideas and copying [its] projects.” And the UAE is moving headlong to this goal, a goal which will manifest itself into “an Arab world [not just the UAE] enjoying prosperity and stability” from

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the hard work and unified efforts driven and inspired by the UAE. What exactly are the specific goals? To provide millions of new jobs, infrastructure, education for all in order to “eradicate illiteracy,” and achieve “competitive higher education.” This notion is explicitly stated in Maktoum‟s address to the Federal National Council on November 19, 2007 when he urges the FNC to support the goals of the government “that will make the UAE into a model for a modern, developed, open civil society.” Because Maktoum is a pragmatic visionary, he has set a timeline in which the UAE can feasibly attain its goals and establish itself as the paradigm for the Arab world and other countries: 2021, a year which will mark the fiftieth celebration of the UAE as a country (Arab Strategy Forum). Perhaps the most important sign, which augurs Maktoum and the UAE‟s success by the year 2021, is the UAE‟s investment in human capital. In his speech at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Investment Conference on November 9, 2009 Maktoum explains that the UAE‟s investment in human capital, which is part of the economic diversity of Dubai, is not only helping to alleviate the effects of the global crisis on Dubai‟s economy but also showcases Dubai as a model for the Arab world which “prioritizes…human resources and places people at the top of [the] agenda.” Indeed, Dubai has “planted the roots of a knowledge economy” along with its multifaceted business economies. It is for sure this belief in human dynamism that powers the engine of Maktoum‟s new Arab paideia. The great value of human cooperation is seen in the first part of this paideia, where the citizen is at the center of the Arab-Muslim ruler‟s concern; the immense worth of the human mind is seen in the second part, where the technical and rhetorical education of the citizen is of the utmost priority; the inevitable relationships between all people is seen in the third part, where a citizen must think beyond his own borders and establish bonds where there is bias and tolerance where there is intolerance; and the wondrous supremacy of the human mind is seen in the fourth part, where optimism rides buoyantly on deep,

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cynical waters. And thus, with this grand, noble, and indeed pragmatic paideia in mind, it must be of no surprise to those interested in studying the works of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum to hear him reveal such a deep understanding of the importance of human capital, a passage which best ends this explication, for his words echo the great thoughts of those moments in history, when ordinary men and monarchs, pursuing the same, humanistic objectives—equality, prosperity, peace and joy—worked together, in might and mind, sweat and spirit, to beget more fulfilling lives for all, in societies that flourished in goods as well as goodness. At the Dubai Government Excellence Programme Awards ceremony, he says: Man isn’t a number, a piece of paper in a file or an automaton operated by remote control or by orders. Man is emotions, feelings, memory and a brain that thinks analyses and makes comparisons. If you don’t take all this into account when you deal with people, then they will give back much less than you expect and they won’t work with enthusiasm or be able to care whether you succeed or fail. The year 2021 is roughly a decade away. If all countries charge forth investing in human capital and drawing from Maktoum‟s vision, the world will indeed be a better place.

Works Cited al Maktoum, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid. My Vision - Challenges in the Race for Excellence. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2006. -----. “Mohammed addresses the FNC (Federal National Council). 19 November 2007. Keynote Speech. -----. “Mohammed addresses the World Economic Forum in Dalian.” 6 September 2007. Dalian, China. Keynote Speech. -----. “Mohammed addresses Young Arab Leaders Forum.” 4 December 2005. Keynote

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speech. -----. “Mohammed opens Global Agenda in Dubai.” 7 November 2008. Keynote Speech. -----. “Mohammed's speech at Bank of America Merrill Lynch investment conference.” 9 November 2009. Keynote Speech. -----. “Mohammed's speech at the Dubai Government Excellence Programme Awards ceremony.” 19 April 2005. Keynote Speech. -----. “Mohammed's speech at the ECSSR (Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research) conference.” 9 January 2005. Keynote Speech. -----. “Mohammed's speech at the Free University of Berlin.” 7 February 2008. Keynote Speech. -----. "Mohammed's statement on the 32nd Unification Day." 5 May 2008. Keynote speech. -----. “Mohammed's statement on the 36th National Day.” 1 December 2007. Keynote Speech. -----. “Mohammed's tribute to Sheikh Zayed.” 2 November 2005. Keynote Speech. -----. “Our Ambitions for the Middle East.” Wall Street Journal [New York] 2 January 2008. Retrieved from < http://www.sheikhmohammed.co.ae>. -----. “Sheikh Mohammed addresses the Arab Strategy Forum.” 13 December 2004. Keynote Speech. -----. “Sheikh Mohammed's speech at Arabian Gulf University.” 30 April 2008. Bahrain. Keynote Speech. -----. “Sheikh Mohammed‟s speech at the Women‟s Leadership Seminar in Dubai.” 6 January 2009. Keynote Speech. “College Enrollment and Work Activity of 2009 High School Graduates.” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Feb. 2010. <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/hsgec.nr0.htm>. Hitti, Philip K. The History of the Arabs: from the Earliest Times to the Present. St. Martin‟s Press. New York, 1967. Jefferson, Thomas. “Jefferson's Second Inaugural Address: The Colonial Williamsburg Official History Site.” Colonial Williamsburg Official History Site. N.p., n.d.

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Web. 18 Oct. 2009. http://www.history.org/ almanack/life/politics/tjinaug2.cfm. "Surat Al-Qadr." Quran.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 Nov. 2009. <http://quran.com/>. Wakalat Anba'a al-Emarat. "Accession Day 2002 / Zayed-Achievements." wam.org.ae. Wakalat Anba'a al-Emarat, 2 Aug. 2002. Web. 12 Dec. 2009. http://wam.org.ae/servlet/Satellite?c=WamEreport&cid=1066128944. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Zayed Pardons 307 Prisoners.â&#x20AC;? www.gulfnews.com. N.p., 29 Nov. 2002. Web. 10 Jan. 2010. <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/zayed-pardons-307prisoners-1.404558>.

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Political Reform in Saudi Arabia Necessity or Luxury? By: Bassam Abdullah Albassam

Abstract: Since its founding in 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has never had a written constitution or any form of public participation in the policy process and governmental decision-making process. Since 1992, the rulers have been under increasing pressure to formulate a written constitution and to increase public participation in the policy process. As a response, Saudi rulers have enacted many laws, which they claimed were a new ‎constitution for the country. This paper ‎argues that the reforms introduced in Saudi Arabia are empty reforms that put the country’s political stability in jeopardy. In contrast, increasing public participation in the policy process will ensure political stability and legitimize rulers’ authority. Thus, without political reform that guarantees citizen participation in the policy and governmental decision-making processes, the country’s political future will continue to be controlled by a small group of people (the royal family) who often disagree amongst themselves about what is best for the country. Key Words: Saudi Arabia, the Saudi royal family, political and administrative reforms, citizen participation

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Ph.D. Candidate (ABD).Public Administration Program. Florida Atlantic University. Boca Raton, FL, USA. Email:balbassa@fau.edu

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Introduction

ince the foundation of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the country has had ‎no written constitution. Instead, it is ruled by a monarchy of tribal rulers, in which the ‎head of the state holds absolute power. Consequently, there are no ‎elections to choose the head of the state or any public officials; the sons of the ruling family hold these positions and the oldest son rules the country. Thus, there is no public participation in the policy process or in the governmental decision-making process.‎ In addition, the public has no voice in running the government or monitoring public officials‘ work. From 1992 to 2010, Saudi kings Fahd (1992-1995) and Abdullah (1995-present) announced a variety of laws as part of a political reform in Saudi Arabia. These laws pertained to ‎ruling the country and judiciary reforms. The Saudi kings claimed that these changes ‎would increase public participation in governance and in the policy process. In addition, they claimed that these laws would separate the powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. Additionally, the kings argued that these reforms would increase the transparency of ‎government work (Abir, 1993; Alrashid, 2007; ICG, 2004; Metz, 1992). However, there have been debates among scholars and local and international civil society organizations over the effectiveness and meaning of these reforms. There is also some debate regarding whether these reforms are just a response to internal and external pressure, or a real effort to reform the political system in Saudi Arabia (Aba-Namay, 1993; Alrashid, 2007; Al-Rasheed, 1996). This paper argues that there is a need for political and administrative reforms to protect the country from instability and endow it with a long-term strategy that organizes the political system

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in Saudi Arabia, for many reasons. Having a clear and written constitution that is supported by the public will provide the country with a stable government and a systematic method of top-level governance. Another reason for the necessity to adopt real and effective political reforms is the fact that the current rulers are elderly and no procedure has been made clear to the public regarding the method of transferring power between the royal family generations. This paper will discuss administrative and political reforms that have been introduced by Saudi kings since 1992, as well as the reasons behind introducing these reforms. Also, the author will evaluate these reforms‘ successes or failures in achieving the purposes for which they were introduced, such as public participation in running the ‎state, transparency of the government work, and separation of the executive ‎and legislative branches of government. This paper will start by addressing the current political system in Saudi Arabia. Then, different reforms that have been introduced by kings since 1992 will be discussed. Analysis of political and administrative reforms in Saudi Arabia will be presented. The author will conclude this paper with recommendations regarding the future of the political system in Saudi Arabia. The Political System in Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia is a monarchy based on Islamic law. The king is the ruler of the state and the ‎commander-in-chief of the military. Additionally, the king is at the apex of the legal system and acts as the final court of appeal ‎and can issue pardons. The king appoints a crown prince who has to be a member of the royal family

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to ‎help him with his duties. The crown prince is second in line to the throne (Al-Rasheed, 2009; Metz, 1992). The king governs with ‎the help of the Council of Ministers, or cabinet. The cabinet has 29 government ministers ‎who are appointed by the king (Champion, 2005; Metz, 1992; Vassiliev, 1998). Approximately one-third of all such cabinets are comprised of members of the royal family. Key ministers of interior, foreign affairs, and defense are run by members of the ruling family as well. The Council of Ministers is the ‎supreme ‎executive and legislative power where all activities and functions are consolidated. The ‎Council of Ministers ‎makes domestic and foreign policy, financial, economic, educational, ‎and defense decisions; controls public affairs; and supervises implementation‎‫ ‏‬of all government affairs (Aba-Namay, 1993; Metz, 1992) ‎‫‏‬. Saudi Arabia is divided into 13 provinces, each with a governor and deputy governor also appointed by the king. All of the current governors are members of the royal family. Each province has its own council, also appointed by the king, which advises the governor (Al-Rasheed, 2009, Heinrichs, 2002; Metz, 1992).‎ Thus, the central government of Saudi Arabia is responsible for issuing and adopting regulations, while provincial ‎governments can only ‎enforce these regulations and laws. Absence of constitution and public participation Since the foundation of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the country has ‎had no written constitution. There are several reasons for the absence of a written constitution in the Saudi political ‎system. In Saudi Arabia, the Quran (the holy book of Islam) and the Sunnah (the ‎Prophet Mohammad‘s actions and speeches) are

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considered the sources of law; therefore, the founders of the ‎modern state have used the Quran and Sunnah as the country‘s constitution (Ali, 2011; Alrashid, 2007; Al-Rasheed, 1996; Aba-Namay, 1993). ‎ In addition, the Saudi royal family does not want to limit its absolute power with a written constitution. They want ‎to be the final authority, even though Islamic ‎law, which they claim to ‎follow, supports public participation and consultation in running the government (Al-Rasheed, 1996). According to the Islamic system, the public has the power to ‎choose its rulers and there is no absolute power but God (Ali, 2001), which is not present in the political system in Saudi Arabia. In ‎addition, many of the actions and ‎speeches of the Prophet Mohammad supported the role of ‎the public in running the government and ‎electing rulers (Ibn Kathir, 2000). Furthermore, because the Saudi people are generally conservative, their religious figures can influence public opinion; thus, the rulers have an informal agreement with the religious leaders. This agreement guarantees authority and power to the royal family and prestige and religious influences to religious figures (Aba-Namay, 1993; Al-Rasheed, 1996). According to Aba-Namay, ―for the last halfcentury, the Kingdom has been held together informally through an ‎alliance between the royal family and the traditional religious leaders‖ (p. 295). Thus, the royal family maintains that adopting the Quran as the source of law and guaranteeing the support of religious figures in a conservative society negates the need for a written constitution or for the public to have a more substantial role in shaping the country‘s political system. Also, the rulers have been using the country‘s wealth (predominantly oil revenues) and the combination of resources and the relatively small population of Saudi Arabia to create a high standard of living, which gives the public a sense of complacency,

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making them less likely to complain about their lack of political participation. Thus, the rulers buy people‘s silence (diverting people‘s attention from demanding political participation) by providing people with high standards of living (Whitaker, 2009). Until 1992, there were no strong voices opposing the current system of government or pressure for political and administrative reforms. So, what makes 1992 a critical date in the Saudi political system? Or in other words, what changed then to make citizens want to enforce the rulers in Saudi Arabia to introduce political and administrative reforms in 1992 and the following years? Reasons behind the Reforms If the royal family has no intention of letting people participate in the political and governmental decision-making process, why did they introduce or adopt political reforms in the first place? There are many analyses regarding the reasons behind Saudi rulers introducing the 1992 and 1995-2010 reforms. In the following section, reasons and events that have compelled the rulers of Saudi Arabia to introduce reforms will be discussed.

Reform movement In 1990, some professors, religious leaders, politicians‎‫‏‬, members of the ‎royal family, and public figures published a petition asking the king at that time (King Fahd) to reform the political system in Saudi Arabia. The petition asked, among other points, for increased public participation in running the ‎‫‏‬government and to fight corruption. This movement came about as a result of Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait, which led to the second Gulf War. This war had two major consequences for Saudi Arabia. First, it revealed a high level of government corruption, especially in the military when the Saudi

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military failed to defend the country front from Iraqi forces, leading the Saudi Arabian government to ask foreign forces such as the U.S. and U.K. to protect the country. Many Saudi people felt this corruption was a result of the absence of a public role in monitoring the government‘s work (Dekmejian, 2003; Metz, 1992). Second, this war led the Saudi Arabian people to question the political future of Saudi Arabia and how the absence of a clear and written constitution would impact the political future of the country in case something happened to the ruler (the king) (Alrashid, 2007; AlRasheed, 1996; Aba-Namay, 1993). The petition was unofficially distributed throughout the kingdom ‎and published in some Arab and Western newspapers (e.g., ‎Independent, 25 May 1991, p. 12).‎‫‏ ‏‬ ‫‏‬According to Al-Rasheed: ‎ The secular petition of December 1990 was signed by 43 public figures, ‎prominent businessmen, writers, and journalists. Careful not to be perceived as ‎opposing the regime, or deviating considerably from the Islamic tenets of the ‎state, the signatories stressed the need for the formation of a consultative council, ‎the implementation of the Law of the Provinces, an investigation of the judicial ‎system, the enforcement of people's equality before the law, freedom of the ‎media, the clarification of the role of the Association for the Propagation of ‎Virtue and the Deterrence of Vice, and the amelioration of the status of women in ‎the country. (p. 362) According to these reformers‘ views, there was a need for a constitution or a formal statement to address the relationship between the rulers and the citizenry and to organize governing processes. Also, they argued that the ‎lack of a constitution and public participation in the policy process increased government corruption and would have

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negative consequences on the country‘s political, administrative, and economic systems. Aba-Namay summarized the main concepts and characteristics of the petition: ―A written constitution, which clarifies and details the ‎function of the government, is appropriate. It will prevent government from going beyond the ‎limits prescribed by the written law and regulate the working of the government to overcome its ‎deficiencies‖ (p. 302). Some members of the royal family supported reforms, ‎especially those from the second generation, like Prince Alwaleed Bin Tallal, who was educated in the U.S. and the U.K. ‎They believed that reforms would ensure the stability of the political system in Saudi Arabia (Fitzgerald, 2009). According to Aba-Namay, ―this view finds backers within sections of ‎the royal family, who are conscious of their country‘s wealth and vulnerability to outside power‖ (p. 303). Support for reforms from some members of the royal family showed that there was a conflict among royal family members regarding political reforms. This evidence of conflict within the royal family is unusual, as such disputes are usually kept out of the public eye (Al-Rasheed, 2009; Lange & Reed, 2007).

External pressures External pressures influenced late reforms (2001-2010) by King Abdullah more than early reform (1991-1995) by King Fahd. After ‎the terrorist attack on the U.S. in 2001, the Saudi government found itself under international pressure and ‎criticism, since 15 of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2004 argued that ―the country‘s rulers, its religious beliefs, social ‎customs, and educational curricula became targets of endless hostile commentary‖ (p. 8). ‎In addition, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing war on terrorism, such as ‎the invasion of Iraq and the war in Afghanistan, have placed

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additional pressure on the Saudi government to start reforming its political system to prevent accusations ‎from the international community that it is producing terrorists (Teitelbaum, 2005). ‎

The rulers’ health conditions According to International Crisis Group (ICG), ―the ruler‘s advanced age and the prospect of succession present another important ‎constraint on reform‖ (p. 5). The current king, King Abdullah, and all of the senior princes ‎are in their 70s and 80s, which makes organizing the transition of power between generations in the royal family imperative. Steinberg discussed the danger of the rulers‘ advanced age factor on courtier‘s future: The challenge now is to find other ways to ‎implement the necessary measures. If the family fails to decide on the transition between ‎generations in the dynasty, in the worst case scenario it will have to select a new king from ‎within its ranks every two or three years, with all the consequences this could entail for political ‎continuity and stability in the country. (as cited in Wurm, 2008, p. 9)

Other factors High unemployment and ‎rapid population growth add more pressure for reforms. In 2008, the unemployment rate in Saudi ‎Arabia was around 12 percent and its growth rate was 2.3 percent. The proportion of younger people in the ‎society continually increases. Forty-five percent of the population is less than 14 years old, and 73 percent was under 29 in 2007 (CDSI, 2008). These demographic facts have created a major challenge for ‎the government in creating new jobs and meeting the needs of the new generation, which includes demands for increased participation in the policy process and in running the government (Aba-Namay, 1993; Albassam, 2011).

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The lack of a written constitution and the absence of public participation have produced political uncertainty and a fragile system that is subject to disintegration at the first major political upheaval. Because the country‘s political stability is in the hands of one family, any conflicts between the royal family members could have serious consequences for the country‘s political stability (Al-Rasheed, 2009; Lange & Reed, 2007). Background of Reforms Two main sets of reforms ‎in Saudi Arabia were introduced by King Fahd (1992) and by King Abdullah (1995-2010).‎ These reforms were introduced with three promises: 1) increase public participation in the policy process, 2) these reforms count as a written constitution to organize the political system in Saudi Arabia, and 3) fighting corruption. Thus, these reforms, as introduced by the rulers, demonstrated that the rulers recognized the shortcomings of the existing system and intended to fill gaps in the old system. According to Al-Rasheed, ―the reforms were, therefore, interpreted as a ‎step towards the restoration of the old political order‖ (p. 365).

King Fahd’s reforms On March 2, 1992, King Fahd introduced three major political reforms: the Basic Law of Government, the Law of the Consultative Council, and the Law of the ‎Province. These were meant to compose the first constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Basic Law, which reaffirms the monarchy ‎as the form of government in Saudi Arabia, contains nine chapters. Chapter Two, for example, states that the country is a monarchy in which rule ‎passes to the male descendants of the founder, King Abdul-Aziz bin-Saud. ‎Other chapters ‎deal with the state‘s legislative, judicial, executive, and

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regulatory authorities. Although, the 1992 reform claim that the judiciary remains independent, appointment and dismissal of judges is by royal decree by the king only, which influence the independency of the judicial system (Aba-Namay, 1993; Al-Rasheed, 1996; Dekmejian, 2003; Wurm, 2008). Aba-Namay commented on the 1992 political reform by King Fahd, ―in this respect it contains, for example, a somewhat cautious step toward a ‎greater participation in governmental politics, through the restructuring of governmental power ‎and the establishment of the Consultative Council‖ (p. 303). The second of King Fahd‘s statutes, the Law of the Consultative Council (Majlis Ash Shura), establishes ‎a 60-member assembly and the head of the Consultative Council, all of whom are appointed by the ‎king. The council was expanded to 150 members by 2008. The ‎assembly is a policy advisor to the king without any power to hold either the king or the government accountable for their actions. In addition, the Consultative Council does not have any legislative power (Al-Rasheed, 1996; Metz, 1992).‎ Essentially, the Consultative Council is a think tank that studies only subjects assigned by the king, with no power or authority in the policy process or legislative process. Additionally, the public does not elect members or play any other role in this council. The third statute, the Law of the Provinces, defines the rights and duties of the provincial governors. The Law of the Provinces divides the kingdom‘s ‎13 provinces into governorates. This statute is meant to limit corruption, establish ‎tighter governmental control over financial matters in the provinces, and decentralize some of the central ‎government‘s duties (Aba-Namay, 1993; Al-Rasheed, 1996; Metz, 1992)‎.‎

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All of King Fahd‘s reforms concentrated the power in the hands of the king and royal family members. In addition, the king appointed governors, judges, bureaucrats, and consulate members (Aba-Namay, 1993; Al-Rasheed, 1996). According to Al-Rasheed (1996), in spite of the rulers‘ claims when the reforms were introduced, these reforms were designed to concentrate the political power in the hands of the royal family without any attempt to increase people‘s participation in the political and governmental decisionmaking process. Thus, from the 1992 reforms, the public still had no voice in the policy process, running the government, or holding the rulers or the government accountable for their work.

King Abdullah’s reforms In January of 1996, King Fahd became too ill to continue running the ‎government. So although Abdullah was not ‎declared king until August of 2005, he took charge of the government‘s daily operations since 1996 (ICG, 2004; Wurm, 2008). In 1996, Saudi Arabia saw the ‎beginning of the largest political and administrative reforms in its history; however, most of King Abdullah‘s reforms were economic rather than political. King Abdullah‘s reforms shared the same promised with early reforms (King Fahd 1992 reforms), which were more public participation in the policy and governmental decision-making process and fighting corruption (Alrashid, 2007; Champion, 2005; Whitaker, 2009; Wurm, 2008). ‎Economic reforms In 1999, the ‎telecommunication and the electricity sectors in Saudi Arabia were restructured, the stock market was opened to ‎foreign ‎investors through open-ended mutual funds, and reforms of the tax and customs ‎administration ‎continued. In 2000, the new investment law allowed ‎foreign investors ‎to own businesses, including in the oil and ‎energy distribution ‎sectors (Albassam, 2011; SAGIA,

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2008). According to Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) (2008), the purpose of the investment law was to open the Saudi market – which had previously been monopolized by the government – to the private sector, especially in power generation, ‎telecommunication, natural gas exploration, and petrochemicals industries. These reforms were intended to ‎reduce the kingdom‘s ‎dependence on oil exports and to reduce the high unemployment rate among its citizens. ‎In addition, as part of the government efforts to attract foreign investment and ‎diversify the ‎economy, Saudi Arabia joined the World Trade Organization in December 2005 after many years of ‎negotiations (WTO, 2009).

Administrative reforms Many administrative reforms have been enacted since 1996; a new judicial system was ‎presented in 2007, and a transparency and corruption law was passed in 2007. However, only a few of the reforms have been really implemented as result of government corruption and bureaucracy (Albassam, 2011; Alrashid, 2007; AlRasheed, 2009). ‎ One of the major administrative reforms was the creation of the Ministerial Committee of Administrative Organization in 1999. The committee evaluates ‎the administrative structure and performance of government agencies and institutions and ensures their financial efficiency. The king appoints its members, most of whom are ‎professors, government employees, and experts. The committee has an advisory role but no executive or enforcement role over the government‘s work (MEP, 2009).‎

Political reforms Encouraging public participation in policymaking is another major reform. In October ‎2003, the king announced that elections

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would be held for half of the municipal board (local ‎council) seats, and the government would appoint the other half. However, it is limited. In February of 2005, the first ‎election process in the history of the kingdom took place (Al-Sulami, 2008; ICG, 2004; Wurm, 2008). ‎―Although the elections may have had some strange features, they should still be valued as the ‎first step towards liberalization; it may look small from the outside, but it has an enormous ‎magnitude from the Saudi perspective‖ (Wurm, 2008, p. 18). The elected councils have a ‎narrow mandate that deals mainly with the provision of services. Crucial areas of public ‎policy and financial issues, such as the budget, national security, and foreign affairs remain beyond ‎their authority. In addition, women were not allowed to participate in the election. This form of public participation, which was regarded by many political analysts as a major step toward more public participation in the policy process and decision-making process, did not last long. As a sign of the government‘s lack of seriousness in establishing a democratic process in the country, King Abdullah announced that the election, which was scheduled for 2009, would be on hold indefinitely, claiming that improvements needed to be applied to make the election process more efficient (Slackman, 2009; Whitaker, 2009). Analysis of the Reforms The rulers who introduced the reforms in 1992 and 1996-2010 claimed that ‎the reforms would guarantee more public participation, more transparency, ‎and greater separation of powers (Aba-Namay, 1993; Alrashid, 2007, 1995; Nehme, 1995; Wurm, 2008). According to Al-‎Rasheed, the three statutes introduced in 1990 ‎―were meant to reestablish the basis for government and regulate political ‎participation

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through the establishment of a consultative council and regional government‖ (p. 363). In the following section, the reforms will be evaluated to determine whether the government has met its goals and kept its promises.

Transparency and corruption According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) issued by the Transparency International (TI), in 2008 Saudi Arabia scored 3.5 out of 5, where 5 is highly corrupted and 1 less corrupted, this score indicates a serious corruption problem. The CPI is a scale that Transparency International (TI) uses to measure the extent of corruption in a country as well as the government‘s effort to fight corruption (Transparency International, 2008). ―Unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia is also among approximately half of the world‘s countries that cannot be treated on Transparency International‘s corruption perceptions index because reliable data is not available‖ (Eigen, 1998, p. 179). Thus, the 1992-2010 reforms did not fix the corruption problem, which means that the reforms did not meet their goals. The problem with ‎political and administrative reforms in Saudi Arabia is that some people are above the law. The royal family members and business and religious elites cannot be held accountable for their misuse of authority or corruption. Therefore, the basic democratic principle of equality before the law does not exist (AlRasheed, 1996; ICG, 2004; Wurm, 2008). In addition, there are no clear administrative procedures to help citizens and non‎-governmental ‎agencies hold public servants accountable, where most laws are ambiguous, so tracing violations can be difficult. As Champion noted, ―However Saudi politics and ‎society may be perceived, the one thing they are not is transparent‖ (p. 179).

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Another reason for corruption in Saudi Arabia is the rulers‘ interpretation of Islamic law, which they try to enforce with the aid of religious figures. According to this interpretation, the king is at the apex of the legal system, so he acts as the final court of appeal ‎and can issue pardons (Metz, 1992). This interpretation gives the rulers absolute power over the law; however, under Islamic law a ruler should be held accountable for his actions (Ali, 2001; Ibn Kathir, 2000). Additionally, royal family members dominate all high-ranking positions in the government without the qualifications to do so, which has an impact on people‘s loyalty and raised the government corruption level since royal family members are above the law (AlRasheed, 2009; Lange & Reed, 2007). Another reason for the shortcomings of political and administrative reforms is the fact that the government agencies in charge of controlling and monitoring the government‘s work are essentially powerless and therefore inefficient. All agencies responsible for controlling and monitoring the government agencies‘ administrative and financial ‎activities, such as the General Auditing Bureau (GAB), have a consultative role rather than any executive power to hold the government agencies accountable for their actions, so there is no real authority for controlling and monitoring the agencies‘ work (Albassam, 2011; Al-Rasheed, 1996; GAB, 2009; Wurm, 2008).‎

Separation of powers Separation of powers is another one of the reform promises; however, the 1992 law guaranteed the king absolute power in running the government (Metz, 1992). Thus, there is no separation of powers in Saudi Arabia‘s political system. The king has power over all branches of the government and no one has the authority to question

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him. Therefore, there are no checks and balances in the political system of Saudi Arabia (Nehme, 1995). Thus, it is clear that in practice the political and administrative reforms that were introduced in 1992-2010 are no different from the old system where there was no written constitution and no mechanism for public participation in the political and governmental decisionmaking process in Saudi Arabia. Although the rulers promised that these reforms would fill the gaps in the old system, the evidence shows that these reforms (new systems) give the rulers as much power as the old (Al-Rasheed, 2009; Lange & Reed, 2007; Nehme, 1995). Reasons for Failure While the 1992 and 1995-2010 reforms fail to achieve what was supposed to be achieved, there is no doubt that the reforms of 1992-2010 opened a new era in the political system in Saudi Arabia since the rulers realized the shortcomings of the old system and the need for a new one (Al-Rashid, 1996).‎ In contrast, many reasons can be mentioned to explain why these reforms are ―empty reforms‖ (Nehme, 1995, p. 155). In addition, many actions such as putting a hold on the municipal election by King Abdullah in 2004, have given the impression that these reforms are just a propaganda tool for the rulers to glorify their image as reformers for the benefit of the international community, without any intention of enacting real change. According to Wurm, the reforms that were introduced by King Abdullah, ―allowed as little change as ‎was required to meet the ‎minimum demands both from within the country and from the outside‖ (p. 25). One of the main reasons for the failure of the reforms to achieve their purported goals is a lack of trust between the public and the government. According to ICG, ―the regime‘s mixed signals –

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allowing greater debate, taking cautious steps toward change, cracking down on reformers – have led to a host of interpretations concerning longer-term intentions‖ (p. 23). Accordingly, the indefinite postponement of the next scheduled election, for example, gave the citizens of Saudi Arabia another reason to doubt the real intention of the reforms (Slackman, 2009; Whitaker, 2009). Another reason for the failure is the fact that many powerful members of the royal family, such as the Minister of the Interior and second deputy of the king, Prince Nayef, were against the reforms, arguing they were ―developments‖ rather than reforms. This terminology is a strong sign that the rulers did not intend to make real political reforms and it shows that there is no intention to alter the existing system to increase public participation in the policy process. As Wurm (2004) noted regarding Nayef‘s stands against political reforms: Minister of Interior Nayef was clearly more negative about these ‎reform aspirations. His motto is ‗no to change, yes to development‘… Change ‎means changing something that already exists. Whatever exists in the Kingdom is already well‎established; however, there is a scope for development— development that does not clash with ‎the principles of the nation (p. 7). Another reason for the failure of the reforms is the political ignorance of the public. For 60 years – since the declaration of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia by King Abdulaziz, the father of the current kings in 1932 – the people of Saudi Arabia did not practice any form of democracy. The absolute ‎and entrenched power of the ruling family has had a major impact on popular attitudes ‎toward democratic participation (Al-Rasheed, 2009; ICG, 2004; Lange & Reed, 2007;

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Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). According to Nehme, ―when dealing ‎with ‎political development in the Arab Gulf, one should be awake to the claim that there ‎exist ‎strong ‎anticolonialist forces, powerful ruling elites and weak states, especially in Saudi Arabia‖‎‎ (p. 155). Thus, any effective reform needs to start by educating people on the advantages of raising public participation in the political and governmental decision-making process, such as 1) decreasing corruption by increasing accountability among public officials and rulers, 2) and the positive impact of public participation in insuring the stability of the country‘s political system in the long run. Conclusion and Recommendations There is no doubt that the political system in Saudi Arabia is one of the most stable in the ‎world. Since the ‎foundation of the kingdom in 1932, there has been no major political instability; therefore, ‎moderate and continuous reforms are the best way to implement effective political, administrative, and economic ‎change. However, for this stability to continue, many political and administrative reforms need to be adopted by the rulers, such as increased public participation in the public policy process and adopting a written constitution that organizes the transition of power in the royal family. These reforms will ensure government stability and reduce corruption. In particular, Smith (2007) suggested that: Economic and political development is believed to be dependent upon four sets of constitutional reforms designed to strengthen the accountability of political leaders to the people, ensure respect for human rights strengthen the rule of law and guarantee the decentralization of political authority (p. 16).

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Another reason for the necessity of political reforms is the fact that most of the senior members of the royal family in Saudi Arabia who rule the country are in their 70s and 80s, and the mechanism for transition of authority has not been made clear to the public. In addition, many Saudi citizens are unhappy with the high level of government corruption and the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of government-operated public programs. Public participation will benefit both rulers and citizens in Saudi Arabia. It will benefit the rulers by ensuring a stable government in the long term and raising people‘s confidence in the government. Government work will also be more efficient and effective as a result of increasing ―checks and balances‖ from the public (Albassam, 2011; Mattozzi & Merlo, 2007). Also, public participation will add more legitimacy to the rulers‘ authority and guard against instability that might result from conflicts among the royal family (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004). The rulers of Saudi Arabia need to apply values that ensure more public participation in the policy process or risk further jeopardizing the stability and development of the country. In order to improve the political system in the long term, the rulers must sacrifice some of their power to the public in the interest of creating a more balanced system. Recent unrest and revolutions in the Middle East have raised serious alarm that should be taken into account by decision-makers in Saudi Arabia. In the end, the question is whether the royal family in Saudi Arabia wishes to stabilize the country over the long term by applying political reforms to increase public participation in the policy process and provide for a written constitution, or keep the current system where the country‘s future will be held in the hands of a small group

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of people who often disagree, and which will only increase public unhappiness as well.

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The Golden Mean, The Arab Spring And a 10-Step Analysis of American Economic History By Scott A. Albers and Andrew L. Albers Abstract: The Long-Wave theories of Nikolai Kondratiev and others claim to find mathematic waves in economic and other social data which are at present in dispute. Currently the theory is considered outside the scope of mainstream economics under several rationales. Despite the lack of mainstream acceptance, we make a strong case for the existence of long waves in the Real GNP of the United States with a 56 year cycle. Our analysis bypasses many of the issues cited by Long-Wave theory critics and in fact clarifies the mathematical structure of the theory, of Okun’s Law and of “The Great Moderation.” JEL classification: B41, B5, C01, C02, C50, C63, E00, E01, E10, E19, E30, N00, N01, N11, Z10, Z13

Keywords: Real GNP, Golden Mean, Fibonacci Series, Arab Spring, Phi, Long Wave, Long Cycle, Kondratiev Wave, Economic Forecasting, Economic Model, Global Financial Crisis, Constitutional 

Scott Albers is a criminal defense attorney practicing law in Northwest Montana, U.S.A. (1994 –present), and previously Missouri (1986 - 1994). He obtained a Juris Doctorate degree in 1986 at the University of Missouri School of Law in Columbia and maintains a long-term interest in international law and macroeconomics. He may be contacted at scott_albers@msn.com.  Andrew Albers is a 2010 graduate at the Montana State University of Bozeman, U.S.A., with a Bachelor of Science degree in the teaching of mathematics and minors in computer science and the teaching of history. He presently is employed as a mathematics instructor for the Northern Cheyenne Tribe in Southeast Montana.

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Law, American Economic History, Revolution, Consolidation, GNP Spiral, Okun‟s Law, “The Great Moderation”

he cyclical model which we propose for U. S. Real GNP, 1869-present, is as follows. It will be referred to herein as “the GNP Spiral.”

In Steps 1 through 8 of this paper we show that when a 56year cycle is taken as the basis for the circuit above, “the Golden Mean” – an ancient and well-known mathematic constant – is found in the un-averaged data for United States Real GNP, 1869-2009, to an accuracy of 3.4 parts in 10,000. Under certain assumptions this proximity to the Golden Mean increases even to 5.3 parts in 100,000. In Step 9 we correlate this cycle to legal changes in the Federal Constitution, demonstrating the importance of this analysis beyond the realm of economics.

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In Step 10 we speculate possible correlations of this analysis as taken at a global scale towards an interpretation of the recent meltdown of the world‟s economy and current events in the Middle East. This model may be supportive of long-wave theories, including those of Nikolai Kondratiev. We present these here briefly, and return to them at the close of this paper. The Problem In his 1925 work The Major Economic Cycles Nikolai Kondratiev postulated a long-term wave running throughout the economic histories of various western countries of approximately 50 to 60 years. (Kondratiev, 1925) Joseph Schumpeter‟s 1939 work Business Cycles acknowledged Kondratiev‟s significance to economics. (Schumpeter, 1939) Nevertheless the importance of these cycles has faced a variety of complaints. (see e.g. Rothbard, 1984) The academic search for evidence of “long waves” running through the economic history of various nation-states is long standing (Goldstein, 1988) and a central topic of heterodox economics. Indeed a 52-53 year cycle has been described in very extensive detail underlying the global meltdown (Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010) and incorporated into the study of the current revolutionary movements in the Middle East. (Tausch, 2011) Our approach is quite different from the long-wave analysis of these authors1 whose works are replete with data from different Kondratiev‟s work originated in the dangerous political context of prior socialist discoveries (Van Gelderen (1913), DeWolff (1924) and Kautsky (1917)) and communist theories (e.g. Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin) as to the evils of capitalism and the nature of its inevitable demise. (Goldstein, 1988:30-31) Kondratiev‟s suggestion that democratic capitalism might avoid such demise brought to him the censure of Stalin and death in a Siberian prison camp. Orthodox economics, on the other hand, maintains an enormous breadth of opinion as to whether considerations of political policy must, or must not, be a part of doctrinal discipline. This paper concludes that there is much in Kondratiev‟s 1

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countries and time periods as presented under a variety of mathematic assumptions.2 In this paper we shall deal only with the United States, only with data published by the United States government, and only with the mathematical elegance of such a cycle. In this paper we will suggest that indeed a 56-year cycle may be involved in the “Arab Spring” in a fashion heretofore unexplored.3 A Proposed Solution: A Brief Introduction To “The Golden Mean” The Golden Mean, sometimes referred to as “the Golden Ratio” or “the Golden Section,” was defined in 300 b.c. by Euclid of Alexandria, as follows:

work which is directly applicable to the economic history of the United States, but does so without reference to Marx, et al. 2 Orthodox economics rejects “long waves” as a fallacy and concentrates rather on econometric measurements of other variables, i.e. the stochastic vs. deterministic effects governing the creation of real GNP itself. (See e.g. Nelson and Plosser, 1982) The distinction has been important for mainstream economics. (See e.g. Cochrane, 1988: “The distinction between a random walk … and a trendstationary series … is extreme. Long-range forecasts of a random walk move one for one with shocks at each date, while long-range forecasts of a trend-stationary series do not change at all. There are two related ways to think about a series that lies between these two extremes.”) The ultimate significance of this inquiry however may be questionable. (Sowell, 1992: “The fact that postwar GNP series cannot distinguish between a time trend and a unit root model has important implications for theoretical models of the economy. Attention should be given to models where both the policy and theoretical implications of interest are not sensitive to the model of the trend. Ideally we would like a model which implies the same results if the trend is modeled as either a time trend or a unit root. Until such models are developed, further attention should be given to new statistical techniques which focus on discovering the long-run behavior of time series.”) 3 The model presented herein is not the outcome of research of Kondratieff Waves nor of mainstream economics, but rather of philosophy, specifically that of Parmenides and Zeno of Elea, circa 550 b.c. (See, e.g., Rucker, 1983:84-88.)

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A straight line is said to have been cut in extreme and mean ratio when, as the whole line is to the greater segment, so is the greater to the lesser.

If line segment AC is to AB in the same proportion as line segment AB is to BC, then line segment AC has been divided into its extreme and mean ratios at point B. If line segment AB is set equal to 1, and if line segment AC is in a Golden Ratio relationship with AB, then AC will equal approximately 1.6180339887… (see e.g. Livio, 2002:3-4), a numeric constant generally referred to by the Greek letter phi in lower case . Algebraically, this may be expressed as:

As discovered by Johannes Kepler in 1611, if the Fibonacci series is taken as a set of ratios, these ratios oscillate around the constant 1.6180… as follows (Livio, 2002:101):

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

1/1 2/1 3/2 5/3 8/5 13/8 21/13 34/21 55/34 89/55 144/89 233/144 377/233 610/377 987/610

Geometrically, the proportion of 1: following construction.

1.000000 2.000000 1.500000 1.666666 1.600000 1.625000 1.615385 1.619048 1.617647 1.618182 1.617978 1.618056 1.618026 1.618037 1.618033

ď Ş may be created by the

A spiral may be obtained from this construction as follows. This spiral and its relationship to the economy of the United States will be the focus of this paper.

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When this model is complete this spiral pattern of U. S. Real GNP will demonstrate a proximity to phi of 5.3 parts in 100,000 using un-averaged data taken directly from official sources of the United States Government, i.e. slightly closer than the 10th Fibonacci fraction 89/55. This model is presented in the following ten steps. Model As we consider the Gross National Product of the United States over time, our sources are limited. The United States Department of Commerce has published one set of numbers based upon 1958 prices running between 1869 through 1970. The St. Louis Federal Reserve has published a different sequence of numbers based upon 2005 prices extending between 1947 through to the present day. If two sets of data propose to measure over time exactly the same thing, then the underlying unity of the thing measured should remain in tact despite any number of possible series which might be used to convey the object under discussion. For example if one set of observations describes a series as: “5, 10, 15, 25, 35, 55, 65, 85, 95, etc.”, and a second set of observations describes exactly the same series as: “3, 6, 9, 15, 21, 33, 39, 51, 57, etc.”, we could make these series equivalent by multiplying the first series by 3/5, or multiplying the second series by 5/3. Or we could divide the first series by 5, and divide the second by 3, and discover that both series simply state using different numbers the pattern of the first 9 prime numbers, i.e. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19 etc. If we have but fragmentary parts of these

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series, we might use these “splicing multiples” of 3/5 or 5/3 to use one series to fill in the blanks of the entire series. In this way we may approach an understanding of the underlying nature of the thing described by our observations. Splicing multiples are quite necessary when considering two different series each of which proposes to calculate U.S. Real GNP over different periods of time. To “splice” or to “graft” these two sets together is necessary if an extended series running from 1869 to the present day is to be obtained. There does not exist at the present time such a series published by the United States Government. Consequently our first step in the analysis is to construct such a series as the foundation of this approach. 4 1. Appendix 1. Make a list of figures for U. S. Real GNP, in constant terms, beginning in 1869. Figures for U. S. Real GNP 1869-1970 may be found the book Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1, published by the United States Department of Commerce. Series F 1-5 presents "Gross National Product" for the United States between the years 1869-1970 according to 1958 prices. The years 1869-1878, and 1879-1888 are given with decade averages of 23.1 billion and 42.4 billion dollars respectively. Figures for U. S. Real GNP 1947-present are collected by the St. Louis Federal Reserve.5 The best multiple which might be used to splice these two series together is the average of the last ten years of overlap, i.e. 1961 – 1970. This multiple is 5.962552.

See e.g. Cochrane, 1988:902. “The presence of a splice in 1947 also does not drive the result. Every long series of GNP data contains at least one splice. The wide surveys used to construct later data are simply not available for earlier periods, so some projection using a restricted set of industries is unavoidable.” 5 These figures are available at: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GNPC96 4

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Appendix 1 considers three possible multiples with which to splice these two series of U.S. Real GNP figures together. The first possible splicing multiple is 5.881696, the average of all 23 multiples between 1947-1970 given in Appendix 1 column 6. These are the years during which these two separate series overlap. This number is problematic in that there is a clear drift from 1947 through 1970 toward higher multiples. Figures from 1947-1960 range from 5.646318 (1953) to 5.977644 (1958) and average at 5.8239423. Figures from 1961-1970 range a bit higher, i.e. from 5.907649 (1962) to 6.071220 (1965). A second possible splicing multiple is 5.962552, the average of the final ten years of overlap, i.e. between 1961-1970. This multiple is the one used to splice these series in this paper as it is nearer in time to the eventual cutoff between the series and includes only multiples found in the later and more recent multiples. A third possible splicing multiple is 6.0, which simply rounds to the nearest whole number the previous splicing multiple. This number is problematic because only two of the 23 multiples to consider â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 1961 at 6.033387 and 1965 at 6.071220 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; are at 6.0 or above. The data given in Appendix 1 figures an extended series for U.S. Real GNP in constant terms between 1868 through 2009 for each of these multiples. (See Appendix 1, Columns 8, 9 and 10) However for the purposes of this paper only the mid-range splicing multiple, 5.962552, will be used for calculations. 2. Appendix 2. Create ratios of U. S. Real GNP by taking as the numerator one yearâ&#x20AC;&#x;s real GNP and dividing it by the figure of an earlier year. (For example, 2009/2008 (one year spread); 2009/2007 (two year spread); etc.) In the effort to estimate the proximity of any given set of ratios to phi, four terms will be used. These are:

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The “Mid-Range.” The mid-range is the mid-point lying between the high and low ratios in the sample, i.e. the average of the highest and lowest numbers in the set: “(H + L) / 2”. The “Average” or “Arithmetic Mean.” The sample mean is the sum of all the observations divided by the number of observations: The “Median.” The median is that number for which half the data is larger than it, and half the data is smaller. It is also called the 50th percentile. If the data has an odd number of members, the median will be the number in the center of these members; if an even number of members, the median will be the mid-point between the two numbers closest to the center. The “Median Average.” The Median Average is the mid-point between the Median and the Average (Arithmetic Mean). It is figured as: “(Median + Average) / 2” and is the approximation used throughout this paper as the best figure to evaluate a set of ratios‟ proximity to phi. 3. Appendix 3. Determine which set of these ratios is most closely associated with “The Golden Mean,” 1.6180… by: a) indicating the spread between years which generates the ratio (presented below in the “# of years” first column), b) setting forth the Median Average for all ratios generated for any given spread of years (second column below), c) figuring the “absolute difference” and the “percentage difference” of these different Median Averages from phi (3rd and 4th columns below), and finally d) stating these differences as absolute values (5th and 6th columns below).

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This data is summarized in the bar graph to the right of this data. This graph demonstrates that Median Average ratios generated by a 14-year spread between years are closest to phi.

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4. Appendix 4. Examine the price indexes for the United States between 1800 and 1994. These are stated below (1) in 7-year running averages (red line, top graph, semi-logarithmic scale), and (2) the change between years in the seven-year average as divided by the average itself (blue line, bottom graph). The lower graph permits us to see the increasingly large inflationary price index values of later years (post-1966) as placed in a more consistent relationship with the preceding values of the series.

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Note in the above that the 56 year period (14 x 4 = 56) between peaks at 1861 through 1917 suggests the possibility that similar periods of time might connect other peak points of inflation. If a 14-year span (blue rectangles above) is drawn around the years 1805, 1861, 1917 and 1973 (each of which is separated by periods of 56 years), virtually all inflationary peaks are contained in a single model. Minimal inflation has occurred since 1993 and will not affect this analysis in any way. 5. Appendix 5. Place all change/average inflation (lower graph above) along a 56-year circuit shown below. In the following diagram 9 o‟clock represents the midpoint of the cumulative average of all inflation along a 56 year cycle as contained within the blue rectangles above. (This is marked as “Year One” in Appendix 5.) 3 o‟clock represents the midpoint of the cumulative average of all inflation rates 28 years later. (Line 29 in Appendix 5) The circumference of each circle represents a positive increase in the cumulative change/average figure of 1/2 percent (for example, a change/average cumulative amount of 1805 + 1861 + 1917 + 1973 lying directly at 9 o‟clock). Points found within the interior of the smallest circumference represent negative figures by a comparable amount. The blue square below represents the four 14-year segments of time set forth in Step 4. The blue rectangles (previously given) are represented by the vertical left line segment (below). Taken together 4 x 14 periods of time create the 56 year circuit of time of this model. Note that the Great Depression of 1929-1940 is part of the deep indentation between axis 8 and 22, i.e. at the top horizontal of the blue square and interior to the smallest radii.

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6. Combine this 56-year circuit with our figures for U. S. Real GNP. If we take 7-year running averages of the U. S. Real GNP (Steps One and Two), we can see that 14 sets of ratios, all lying in crosses at 90 degrees or 180 degrees from one another, are presented. In order to explore this more thoroughly, let us take the real GNP figures averaged for seven year periods running between 18691987 (See Appendix 1, Column 12) over this 56-year circuit, and create the spiral below. The center of the spiral, beginning at axis 9 = 1869, represents the real Gross National Product for that year of 23.10 billion dollars in 1958 prices. The Gross National Product â&#x20AC;&#x201C; as stated in seven-year running averages â&#x20AC;&#x201C; for subsequent years in real terms are given along each axis respectively, with each circle of circumference representing ten billion dollars of real GNP in 1958 prices.

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If we divide the set of points along the spiral by “crosses” of 90 degrees each, we envision the relationship between points of the spiral in a mathematic relationship with each other, whereby the productive activity of the United States may be measured over the long-term.6 For example, let us look at the figures in Appendix 1, Column 12. Referring to the appropriate date, the year 1959 (axis 43, 6 o‟clock) has a larger Gross National Product than does the year 1945 (axis 29, 3 o‟clock), 14 years previous. This relationship between years 90 degrees apart from one another is proportional to the productivity of these years (numbers given are unrounded) or: 1959 (axis 43) = 1945 (axis 29) =

476.6000 = 328.2286

1.4520

The approach here is similar in intent to that of econophysics. See e.g. McCauley, 2009:9. “Econophysics, simply stated, means following the example of physics in observing and modeling markets.” 6

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The entire series of numbers following this pattern of vertical and horizontal axes (axes 1, 15, 29, and 43, 9 o‟clock, 12 o‟clock, 3 o‟clock and 6 o‟clock, respectively) would be as follows: 1889= 49.2143 1903= 90.4857 1917= 136.8429 1931= 169.6143 1875= 25.8571 1889= 49.2143 1903= 90.4857 1917= 136.8429 ratio: 1.9033 1.8386 1.5123 1.2394 ______________________________________________________ 1945= 328.2286 1959= 476.6000 1973=808.6766 1987=1,284.0653 1931= 169.6143 1945= 328.2286 1959=476.64 1973= 808.6766 ratio: 1.9351 1.4520 1.6967 1.5878 ______________________________________________________ 2001=1,943.5784 1987=1,224.0653 ratio:

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1.5066

Note that each year begins as a numerator of a fraction and then becomes the denominator of the subsequent fraction. The average ratio for the period 1869-2001 along this cross is 1.6302.

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We might consider as well the diagonals of the square which has been proposed.

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These ratios for the period 1868-1987 are: 1896 = 63.9714 1910 = 118.7286 1924 = 166.6429 1938 = 208.4143 1882 = 42.4000 1896 = 63.9714 1910 = 118.7286 1924 = 166.6429 ratio: 1.5087 1.8559 1.4035 1.2506 ______________________________________________________ 1952 = 387.9571 1966 = 645.0571 1980 = 997.9522 1994=1512.9302 1938 = 208.4143 1952 = 387.9571 1966 = 645.0571 1980=997.9522 ratio: 1.8614 1.6626 1.5470 1.5160 ____________________________________________________ The average of these ratios of diagonals is 1.5786. Taking the average ratio of the horizontal/vertical axes (1.6302), combined with the average of the diagonal axes (1.5786), yields the average of these two figures as 1.6044, or: 1.5786 + 1.6302 = 1.6044 2 This number is merely 0.0136 less than the constant phi = 1.618033988... This number indicates that the average of our horizontal/vertical cross, as coupled with the diagonal cross, represent a number which is less than one percent less (.0040) than phi. 1.6044 = 0.9915 1.6180 This discovery leads us to the following step in our analysis.

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7. Appendix 6. Place the 14-year ratios of un-averaged U. S. Real GNP (Steps One and Two) for all available figures for GNP, 1869 to the present, into rows and columns as follows. We have added the amount 23.10 for the year 1868 in order to make the table complete, although the Historical Abstract of the United States does not include this year‟s amount. The un-averaged figures for the diagonal cross above is found in Row 1, and the horizontal / vertical cross above is found in Row 8. 7

It should be mentioned that a 14-year span may have support and importance beyond the technique used herein. See Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010:10. “As is easily seen in Fig. 2A in both spectra one can detect distinctly the Kondratieff cycle (its period equals approximately 52-53 years), however, the cycle with a period of 13-15 years is detected even more distinctly.” 7

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The “circle” analysis above takes the ratio of each row and averages it once, i.e. the 14 ratios given in the “Average Ratio of Rows” column to the right of the data as divided by 14. This is consistent with the definition of a circle i.e. that set of points lying in a plane equidistant from a single point. A “square” analysis creates a similar average of rows, but counts the diagonal cross (first row) twice and then divides by 15, rather than 14. This is consistent with the notion of a square, i.e. a quadrilateral figure of line segments AB, BC, CD, DA in which all sides are both equal in length and at right angles from each other. Because each letter represents both the end of one line of fractions (ratios given by years in a 14-year spread) and the beginning of the next, the diagonal cross must be counted twice to consider the line segment fully.

Reviewing Appendix Six it appears that the Real GNP of the United States does indeed have a profound and dramatic connection to phi, “The Golden Mean.”

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The summarized results are as follows: Splicing Multiple

Proximity to 1.61803399 Absolute Percentage

5.881696 Median Average (Circle) 1.620932 Median Average (Square) 1.620483

+ 0.0028980 + 0.0024490

+ 0.179% + 0.151%

5.962552 Median Average (Circle) 1.618590 Median Average (Square) 1.618120

+ 0.0005560 + 0.0000860

+ 0.034% + 0.0053%

6.00 Median Average (Circle) 1.617527 Median Average (Square) 1.617370

- 0.0005069 - 0.0006639

- 0.031% - 0.041%

Taking the two splicing multiples above which do not include multiples prior to 1961 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 5.962552 and 6.0 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; each Median Average figured is greater than the Golden Mean by no more than 3.4 parts per ten thousand (+0.034%) and less than the Golden Mean by no more than 4.1 parts per ten thousand (- 0.041%). Using our second mid-range multiple (5.962552) we obtain a Median Average under a circle analysis of slightly more than the Golden Mean by 3.4 parts per 10,000 (+0.034%) and under a square analysis at very slightly more than the Golden Mean by merely 5.3 parts per 100,000 (+0.0053%). This is done with un-averaged data from the United States Government which is altered only by splicing one series for U. S. Real GNP to the next. It would appear with great strength that the Golden Mean has a definite and perhaps central place in the economic development of the United States as derived directly from the numeric data available for U. S. Real GNP.

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8. Appendix 7. Evaluate how proximity to the Golden Mean is increased through this analysis. It may be instructive to consider the impact of the Golden Mean throughout an entire 56-year cycle. The movement around the spiral is indicated by color-coding each of the four 14-year segments along the spiral: red = right vertical, pink= lower horizontal, purple = left vertical, orange = upper horizontal.

The chart above presents the ratios of the former spread sheets as these occur in their time series. The first year is the ratio given for 1882 (upper-right corner of the GNP Spiral and first ratio of the spread sheet, row 1, column 1) and proceeds across the Cycle Dynamics chart with the green line to 1937. The cycle then repeats and the first year of the x-axis is now 1938 (again taken from the upper right corner of the GNP Spiral and row 1, column 5 of the

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spread sheet); it proceeds across the Cycle Dynamics chart with the blue line to 1993. The cycle then begins again and the first year along the x-axis is now 1994 (again upper right corner of the GNP Spiral and the first row, 9th and final column of the spreadsheet); this proceeds across the Cycle Dynamics chart with the red line along a partial circuit, ending at 2007. In Step 3 we found that a 14-year spread of years led to ratios which best approximated the Golden Mean. The Median Average of all ratios so generated brought us to an absolute proximity to phi of 0.01613438 and a percentage proximity to phi of 0.9971593%. Comparing these to the spread sheet given in Step 7 we have come significantly closer to the Golden Mean. Splicing Multiple 5.962552

Proximity to 1.61803399 Absolute Percentage

Previous (Step 3, all ratios, 14-year spread) 1.60189961

- 0.01613438 0.9971593%

Median Average (Circle) 1.618590 Median Average (Square)1.618120

+ 0.0005560 + 0.0000860

+ 0.034% + 0.0053%

Simply by placing these numbers in a 14-row spread sheet, we have an increased proximity to phi of 30 fold, and even 200 fold. From this mass of numbers the central ratio of the Golden Mean emerges. How does this take place? To answer this question let us expand upon the spread sheet in Appendix 6 and investigate the averages which emerge in Appendix 7.

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In step 3 we had but a single median and a single average for all ratios generated by a 14-year spread. This resulted in the Median Average given by Appendix 2 of 1.60189961 for the entire set. Taking the dynamics presented in the rows and columns as a graph, we have:

For both rows and columns when a high is reached it is immediately balanced by a low as determined from the approximate midpoint of the Golden Mean. In addition, as time has passed the American economy has steadily narrowed its focus to precisely this same single point.8 We

The last two columns of the Column Dynamic graphic represent a time period stretching from the end of Column 7 (1979) to end of Column 9 (2007). During this period of time the economic volatility of previous years markedly narrowed. Although hailed at the time as “The Great Moderation” and a sign of progress in economic understanding (e.g. Bernanke, 2004), post-Global Financial Crisis this view has come under attack. (e.g. Chomsky, 2011) The same graphic demonstrates that a marked narrowing of volatility began two columns prior to 1979, i.e. beginning with the end of Column 5 (1951), named here “The Greater Moderation” by way of comparison.

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may notice that the Median Average of the Columns is itself 1.618200. This number is greater than the Golden Mean by 9.8 parts in 100,000. Splicing Multiple 5.962552 Rows: Median Average (Circle) 1.618590 Median Average (Square)1.618120 Columns 1.618200

Proximity to 1.61803399 Absolute Percentage + 0.000556 + 0.034% + 0.000086 + 0.0053% + 0.000167 + 0.0098%

The above makes clear that the Golden Mean does not appear as a haphazard finding in a mass of data. Rather it is a consistent point, one which is central to the structure of the American economy. The collective power of these separate 14 sets of tensions propels a proximity to the Golden Mean which is greater than the simple average of the data itself. The process of this â&#x20AC;&#x153;balancingâ&#x20AC;? might be viewed by listing all ratios presented in row 1:

This wave-like process may be seen as frames in an animation, first from 1-7, then 8-14.

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The sense here is of waves of water striving to obtain a set equilibrium. This suggests that a wave of relationships exist within the data wherein each row balances towards phi, not unlike water

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disturbed by waves eventually stabilizes at a fixed level.9 As this combined set of Median Averages “works” upon the data, the result is an increased proximity to phi overall. 10 We may now expand this model toward the consideration of recent and current events. To figure the annual increase implied by the GNP Spiral, we may use the formula for simple interest compounded annually… FV = PV (1+r)t … ; state a present value (PV) of $1,000,000; a time period (t) of 14 years; and the future value (FV) as given below in proportion to the varying numbers derived in the GNP Spiral. These assumptions give us the following interest rates. Future Value Interest rate x= Circle Analysis: $1,618,590 interest rate is: 3.4995226 x= Columns: $1,618,200 interest rate is: 3.4977411 x= 89/55: $1,618,181 interest rate is: 3.4976543 x= Square Analysis: $1,618,120 interest rate is: 3.4973756 x= Golden Mean: $1,618,033 interest rate is: 3.4969781 These “interest rates” are the annual “rates of growth” necessary to obtain the various proportions of the GNP Spiral over time. 10 The above “rates of growth” may be contrasted with one of the central empirical regularities of mainstream economics, i.e. Okun‟s Law. This rule proposes a roughly 3:1 ratio between increases in real GNP and decreases in the rate of unemployment in the economy of the United States. A trend line may be devised for quarterly data between the second quarter of 1948 and the second quarter of 2007 which gives the slope of this relationship as y = .23094 + -0.066036x A “steady state” rate of economic growth may be figured for the xintercept, i.e. that rate of growth which occurs when there is no change in the rate of employment. (y = 0). Using the above equation and trend line, this x-intercept is 3.4971853. (Knotek, 2007, with additional correspondence by the author). When this “steady state” rate of growth under Okun‟s Law is placed among the “rates of growth” calculated by the GNP Spiral, the x-intercept generates a future value in proximity to the Golden Mean of 2.7/100,000 parts, closer than all other values. Comparison to Promixity Okun‟s x-intercept Analysis: Future Value to Phi Rate: at 3.4971853 Circle: $1,618,590 1.00034424 3.4995226 1.000668337 Columns:$1,618,200 1.00010321 3.4977411 1.000158927 89/55: $1,618,181 1.00009146 3.4976543 1.000134108 Square: $1,618,120 1.00005376 3.4973756 1.000054415 x-axis: $1,618,078 1.00002781 3.4971853 1 Phi: $1,618,033 1 3.4969781 0.999940752 9

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9. The significance of this 56-year cycle may be extended beyond the realm of economics if we correlate the dates of political events with their respective axes in this circuit. For example if we place on the various axes of the 56-year circuit the dates of the Amendments to the United States Constitution we have the following distribution of significant changes to the legal foundation of the United States. It is immediately apparent that a far greater number of amendments have been adopted toward the left hand side of the circuit than have been adopted during the right hand side.

Let us first discount the Bill of Rights as falling on the exact dividing line between the left and right sides of this circuit (enacted December 15, 1791). If we consider only the remaining amendments we may note that in addition to a numeric difference, a qualitative difference also exists between the right-hand and left-hand sides of the circuit. Falling within a ten-year span before and after "Year 1" (9 oâ&#x20AC;&#x;clock) are amendments:

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(1) to give former slaves the franchise (Am. 15, axis 10=1870), (2) to require "due process of law" and “equal protection” for citizens by States of the United States (Am 14, axis 8=1868), (3) to abolish slavery (Am. 13, axis 5=1865), (4) to permit women the franchise (Am. 19, axis 4=1920), (5) to prohibit the consumption of liquor (Am. 18, axis 3=1919), (6) to re-structure the election of Presidents and Vice-Presidents (Am. 12, axis 56= 1804), (7) to permit 18 year old citizens the franchise (Am. 26, axis 54=1971), (8) to permit the imposition of income taxes (Am. 16, axis 53=1913), (9) to require the direct election of senators (Am. 17, axis 53= 1913), and (10) to eliminate poll taxes as a requirement to voting (Am. 24, axis 48=1964). Only two constitutional amendments fall within a ten year span of "Year 29," i.e. 3 o‟clock. Amendment 22 restricts a president from serving more than 2 terms in office (axis 31=1951) and enshrines in law a tradition begun by George Washington 154 years earlier when in 1797 he refused to run for a third term in office. Amendment 27 prohibits laws affecting Congressional salary from taking effect until the beginning of the next session of Congress. This amendment was proposed September 25, 1789 and enacted 203 years later in May 1992. We might also consider the two remaining Amendments on the right hand side of the cycle. Both enacted in 1933, Amendment 20 determined the dates of term commencements for Congress and the President and Amendment 21 repealed the federal prohibition on consumption of alcohol. Amendment 20 was a purely administrative amendment and Amendment 21 returned the country to a wellestablished social norm.

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It is of course possible to take any data set and superimpose upon it a spiral of any sort. The list of Amendments to the Federal Constitution is useful in this analysis because: (1) each Amendment carries with it a specific date of adoption, thereby making placement in the cycle non-controversial, (2) each Amendment engages the entire United States by virtue of the centrality of the Federal Constitution and the difficulties posed in their adoption, (3) each Amendment declares in the clearest possible terms what is intended, albeit this interpretation remains subject of further interpretation by the courts, and (4) each Amendment remains an influence upon continued American development. In many cases these Amendments are intended to direct the process of the economic future of the American people away from evils previously experienced (slavery, disenfranchisement of African-Americans, women and persons of draft age, resistance to federal taxation of income, addiction to alcohol, unjust use of governmental powers, etc.) It should be borne in mind that, while the use of other data sets may contest the significance of this cycle, at this point we attempt simply to understand this model, explore the origin of the Golden Mean within the American economy and consider the sort of â&#x20AC;&#x153;balancingâ&#x20AC;? which permits it. The numerous amendments on the left-hand side of the circuit above should be contrasted with one of the most fundamental documents of American economic history occurring on the right-hand side of the circuit, the Declaration of Independence of 1776. This document makes clear that the colonists did not perceive themselves as setting forth upon some new and novel declaration of rights. Rather they viewed themselves as collectively determined to continue to enjoy rights which they already possessed.

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Regarding George III the colonists declared in their first five grievances: He has refused his assent to laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.

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He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. The remainder of the Declaration of Independence describes in ever expanding detail the list of wrongs done by the king to his colonists. Each of these royal acts or omissions justified – at least in the minds of the signatory colonists – an immediate separation of the colonies from the crown in protection of long-held rights, customs and privileges. The correlation between Amendments to the Federal Constitution and the 56-year circuit envisioned by this model provides support for the proposition that the circuit itself is an important part of the underlying social fabric of the United States and its political economy. The Amendments are not scattered uniformly around the spiral but rather are grouped almost entirely on the left-hand side. These Amendments generally alter American political life in quite dramatic ways. Amendments to the right of the cycle are very few and generally intended to honor and fix firmly past traditions and social mores. The discovery of this “bi-polarity” of American political life suggests the possibility that that the four 14-year segments of time which have been used as the foundation of this circuit may themselves have importance. If this is granted we may now expand this model into an understanding of the underlying nature of the political economy of the United States over time.

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10. We now speculate as to the nature of the right-left division underlying the GNP Spiral. This will conclude the final step of our analysis of American Economic History. For the purposes of this paper regarding American economic history, let us define a “Belief-system” as the constellation of ideas surrounding any principle of governance: a monarchy, the bourgeoisie, slavery, the relationship of labor to capital, etc. Second, let us define the term “Revolution” as a period of time when significant portions of a time-honored belief-systems are destroyed and when new and largely untried belief systems are inaugurated. Third, let us define in contradistinction to “Revolution” the term “Consolidation” as an opposing historical period in which honor or reverence are given to relatively recent belief-systems in a manner calculated to preserve and prolong them. It would appear that the left half of the circuit is “revolutionary” in character, while the right half is “consolidating” in character in the context of historic American belief systems. In light of the numerous constitutional amendments adopted on the left-hand side of the circuit, and the virtual lack thereof on the right-hand side, let us label each of the segments of American History as follows:

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Note in the above that as each period of consolidation has come to its close, the United States has very predictably experienced a complete meltdown of the economy. This occurred most recently in

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September through December of 2008, the last months of the terms of George W. Bush. Prior events of similar magnitude are: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The collapse of the colonial economy, circa 1781, The Panic of 1837, The Panic of 1893 and The Marshall Plan of 1948 and the events of 1949.

Two unusual characteristics of the recent global meltdown should be pointed out. These are (1) the difficulty of â&#x20AC;&#x153;datingâ&#x20AC;? the recent crisis, and (2) the delay of the expected time of crisis. Let us consider these important points briefly.

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Each of the previous dates of “meltdown” clearly corresponded with events between axes 33 and 34. A description of these crises may be given simply by citing textbooks of American History. Colonial meltdown of 1781 “In 1764 Parliament had outlawed paper money in the colonies altogether. Independence ended this restriction, and both the Continental Congress and the states printed large amounts of money during the Revolution, with inflationary results. To cite some examples, the Continental dollar became utterly worthless by 1781, and Virginia eventually called in its paper money at 1,000 to 1.”11 Panic of 1837 “In 1836 the second United States Bank automatically came to the end of its checkered career and the country under the inspiration of the new democracy entered an epoch of “wild cat” finance. The very next year (May, 1837), a terrible business depression fell like a blight upon the land, bringing as usual more suffering to farmers and mechanics than to the “rich and wellborn”; but this calamity was likewise attributed by the masses to the machinations of the money power rather than to the conduct of their hero, President Jackson. Nothing would induce them to retrace their steps. For three decades a union of the South and West prevented a restoration of the centralized banking system. Not until the planting John A Garraty, The American Nation, A History of the United States, HarperAmerican Heritage Textbook, p. 144. 11

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statesmen withdrew from Congress and the storm of the Civil War swept minor gusts before it were the ravages wrought by Jackson repaired by the directors of affairs in Washington.”12 Panic of 1893 “The (Cleveland) Administration was not three months old when a series of bank failure and industrial collapses inaugurated the panic of (February) 1893. The treasury‟s gold reserve was depleted by an excess of imports and by liquidation of American securities in London after a panic there. Gold was subject to a steady drain by the monthly purchase of useless silver required by the Silver Purchase Act of 1890, and by the redemption of greenbacks which by law which were promptly reissued and formed an “endless chain for conveying gold to Europe.”13 Reviewing the same axes for the years 1948-1949, we have, in addition to the creation of the Marshall Plan to rebuild post-war Europe (April 1948), the following: 1949 In 1949 a business recession occurred and prices declined slightly. (p. 819) … Further alarmed by the news, released in September 1949, that the Russians had produced an atomic bomb, Congress appropriated $1.5 billion to arm NATO and in 1951 General Eisenhower was recalled to active duty and placed in Charles A. Beard, Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, New Edition, Macmillan Company, New York., p. 570-571. 13 Garraty, p. 795. 12

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command of all NATO forces. (p. 785) … This (civil war in China) resulted in the total defeat of the nationalists; by the end of 1949 Mao ruled all China and Chiang‟s shattered armies had fled to sanctuary on the island of Formosa, now called Taiwan. This loss of over half a billion souls to communism caused an outburst of indignation in the United States and deeply divided the American people. Critics claimed that Truman had not backed the nationalists strongly enough and that he had stupidly underestimated both Mao‟s power and his dedication to the cause of world revolution. (p. 786)14 The recent Global Financial Crisis began when, in September 2004, the FBI reported that it had uncovered widespread fraud in the home mortgage market (axis 32). The date of this FBI report precedes the axes of the above mentioned crises, i.e. 1781, 1837, 1893 and 1948-1949, by a matter of months. However, and unlike previous crises, action to correct these frauds was not undertaken and the final implosion was delayed for four years, i.e. to September 2008, two months before the election of Barack Obama. Public reaction, not unlike previous moments along axis 33, has been extremely suspicious about the timing and origin of this worldwide panic. 15 Garraty, p. 786. See e.g. House Bill 3995, presented by Representative Kaptur, November

14 15

3, 2009: “(4) Fraud also played a decisive role in the Savings and Loan crisis (of the late 1980s and early 1990s). The FBI and Justice Department made prosecuting those elite frauds among its highest priorities. This took a massive commitment of FBI resources, but it produced the most successful prosecution of an epidemic of elite fraud in history--over 1,000 `priority' felony convictions of senior insiders, according to Professor William K. Black in his book `The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One'.

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To conclude our speculation as to the nature of this circuit brings us to a discussion of the current events of today. We are, today, at the dividing line between green and orange in the graph below.

(5) However, the FBI, because of its crippling personnel limitations, has been unable to assign sufficient FBI agents assigned to investigate the current global financial crisis. The FBI identified the mortgage fraud `epidemic' in congressional testimony in September 2004. It had so few white-collar crime specialists available, however, that it was able to assign only 120 special agents to mortgage fraud cases-less than one-eighth the agents it found essential to respond adequately to the huge, but far smaller, Savings and Loan crisis. (6) Given the magnitude of the financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting losses and billions of taxpayer dollars spent to keep the financial system from collapsing, the FBI should have no less than 1,000 agents to address corporate, securities, and mortgage fraud located across the country, and, in addition, more forensic experts and Federal prosecutors to uncover the crimes committed and bring the perpetrators to justice.â&#x20AC;?

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The green portion of the above represents the beginning of an evolving revolutionary trend starting in 2008. This green section correlates to an impressive extent with the current difficulties faced by the United States in the Middle East. Note that as of May 26, 2011 the United States has attempted to deal with a number of revolutionary changes throughout the Arab world over the past 4 months. These have included but are not limited to: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, Morocco and Algeria. These events have become known popularly as “The Arab Spring.” Chronologically, these were preceded by the 2009 Revolution in Iran. The fact that these events are taking place at the very beginning of the “Evolving Revolution” segment of American economic history may presage much greater events to come. A strong correlation between the onset of inflation and the axes of this period has been described by this model. The graph above demonstrates the historic inflationary rise which typically accompanies this period of American economic history. The amount of orange given in the above development towards revolution represents inflation, the strength of which emerges most dramatically along the left-pointing axis at nine o‟clock. These years represent very difficult times in the history of the United States – the coming of the war with Britain in 1812 during which the White House, the Capitol, the Library of Congress and the Treasury were burned to the ground (1814); the American Civil War beginning in 1861 ending in the assassination of President Lincoln in 1865; the First World War beginning for the United States in 1917; and the OPEC Embargo of 1973. This axis brings revolutionary times of great uncertainty, a forced re-reading of America‟s place in world history.

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A Brief Comparison of the GNP Spiral to Existing Long-Wave Research Renewed interest in the Kondratiev Wave, or Long Wave, has followed the recent global financial crisis. It is possible that the scholarship which has been generated by the Long Wave theory over the past century may be important to consider in evaluating this model and its presentation of American economic history.

Moreover the discovery of the Golden Mean at the intersection of price and productivity in the United States in a strict 56-year cycle permits us to evaluate from a more neutral and objective point of view a great deal of research on Kondratiev Waves, at least as it pertains to the American economy. We may superimpose Kondratievâ&#x20AC;&#x;s thesis upon the foregoing model of American economic history. It is important to emphasize the word American because Kondratiev was not concerned exclusively with the economy of the United States, nor do present long-wave theorists necessarily limit their interests to a single country.

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Using the dates for periods of upswing and downswing as given by Kondratiev himself, the following correlations may be made. (Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010:2)

There is a distinct similarity between the classic Kondratiev thesis and the GNP Spiral, at least in so far as the turning point from “Evolving Revolution” to “Revolution” (bottom left corner) is consistently found in the midst of an established “upswing” as noticed by Kondratiev, and the turning point from “Evolving Consolidation” to “Consolidation” (upper right corner) is consistently found in the midst of a well-established “downswing,” again as noticed by Kondratiev. On this basis alone it would appear that Kondratiev‟s thesis suggests a dramatic dichotomy running from Northwest to Southeast, as presented earlier (orange line above).

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A somewhat similar plan is given by at least one recent scholar. (Jourdon, 2010)16 In this case the lower left hand corner wherein “Evolving Revolution” changes to “Revolution” is in the midst of an “upswing” and the upper right hand corner wherein “Evolving Consolidation” changes to “Consolidation” is contained within, if not central to, a “downswing.” 17

The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the anonymous referee in acquainting us with the work of M. Jourdon. 17 This accords well with Marchetti, 1988:7. “All together I think the idea of 55 year cycles in the behavior of our society is one of the most penetrating and useful in organizing social and economic facts.” 16

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The matter is not uniformly understood however and changes when we add dates provided by other scholars. (Korotayev and Tsirel, 2009:2)

Modern research on Kondratiev Waves (Korotayev, Tsirel 2010) holds that Long Wave scholars agree upon a very long period of “transition” running between the period 1914-1929 wherein we move from “upswing” to “downswing.”18 This is a “transition period” of 15 years, more than one quarter of a 56-year cycle. The upper-right corner of 1938, wherein according to this model “Evolving Consolidation” changes to “Consolidation,” remains a part of an established “downswing,” as would be consistent with the Korotayev and Tsirel cite the following sources for “„Post-Kondtratiev‟ Long Waves and Their Phases.” These include, but are not limited to,: Mandel 1980; Dickson 1983; Van Duijn 1983:155; Wallerstein 1984; Goldstein 1988:67; Modelski, Thompson 1996; Pantin, Lapkin 2006: 283-285, 315; Ayres 2006; Linstone 2006: Fig. 1; Tausch 2006:101-104; Thompson 2007: Table 5; Jourdon 2008: 1040-1043. 18

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two prior “upper-right corner” years of 1826 and 1882. At this point, however, another extended 11-year period of “transition” is given for the years 1939 through 1950. The lower left corner, 1966, wherein “Evolving Revolution” changes to “Revolution,” remains as part of an established “upswing” in the economy. This is quite consistent with Kondratiev‟s expectations for this period of the cycle. However the dates of a new downturn, this time beginning in 1974 and extending to 1984 are again contrary to what one would expect during this period. The “upswing” that is given for the dates 1991 through 2008 is completely out-of-character with what one would expect from Kondratiev‟s own thesis for this portion of the cycle. Finally it is suggested that we have now entered into a “transition period” of some unknown length. However it would be presumed that we are transitioning from the previous “upswing” running from 1991 through 2008 to a future downswing. This would be entirely contrary to what one would expect from the lower left corner of the model.19 A further ambiguity is the presence of various versions of modern long-wave theory. (Korotayev, Tsirel 2010:23) These versions are frequently at odds over how to characterize a particular period of time.20

There are several views as to how these cycles might be aligned with the classic Kondratiev cycle. (See e.g. Goldstein, 1988:176-178) We argue that – at least as regards the economy of the United States – virtually all of these views would abandon the strict periodicity required by this model, completely destroy the GNP Spiral obtained and make impossible the discovery of the Golden Mean therein. 20 The are a large number of views on Long Wave research (Goldstein, 1988) of which this paper considers but a fraction. 19

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In sum, the GNP Spiral accords rather well with the classic Kondratiev thesis and that of Jourdon, but is at odds with much of the dating given by recent scholarship on Long Waves. There may be several reasons for this. First, modern scholarship on Long Waves frequently seeks out large data bases dealing with the entire globe. Confirmation of Kondratiev Waves in this fashion risks treating the historic experiences of one group with the historic experiences of others and with all. This may lead to important insights being missed while obtaining results which are not universally accepted. Second, the history of Europe, which preceded that of the United States by centuries and which has been dominated by class struggle and conflict, can not readily be compared to the United States. In consequence the patterns of economic history between these two economic systems should not be equated. Finally, scholarship surrounding Kondratievâ&#x20AC;&#x;s work has not yet generated extensive empirical agreement. Recourse to the Golden

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Mean as a regulating structure may provide the support necessary for further study. Conclusion It remains to be seen what force or set of forces balance one another so perfectly that we are able to derive an approximation to the Golden Mean of 5.3 parts in 100,000 within the vast scope and panorama of American economic history from 1869 to the present day using such simple tools. What engine “lies under the hood” of such an interesting structure? Why the Golden Mean? And why a strict 56-year cycle? As to the significance of the GNP Spiral modeled here, one point may be of importance; the increasingly global nature of this spiral stands out. In the previous circuit the financial “meltdown” of 1948 focused principally on Europe; the political meltdowns of 1949 concerned the Communist takeover of China and the discovery that nuclear weapons were in the hands of Joseph Stalin. The most recent financial panic has encompassed the entire planet with a ferocity and totality which is truly unprecedented. If this expansion of the GNP Spiral is taken into account, current events related to the Arab Spring may be examples of this spiral “going global” and embarking on a new and unprecedented scope. Scott A. Albers and Andrew L. Albers July 21, 2011 Acknowledgments We would like to thank Linda Angeloni and an anonymous scholar for their help in editing this report. For the positions taken and the methods used herein we are alone responsible.

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References Ayres, R. U. (2006). „Did the Fifth K-Wave Begin in 1990-92? Has it been Aborted by Globalization?‟ Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security / Ed. By T. C. Devezas, Amsterdam: IOS Press, pp. 57-71. Beard, Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, New Edition, The Macmillan Company, New York.

Bernanke, B. (2004). “The Great Moderation,” Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke, Eastern Economic Association, Washington D.C., February 20, 2004. Chomsky, N. (2011). “ „The Great Moderation‟ and the International Assault on Labor,” In These Times, May 2, 2011.

Cochrane, J. H. (1988). „How Big Is The Random Walk In GNP?‟ The Journal of Political Economy, Volume 96, Issue 5. 893-920 at 894. Dickson, D. (1983). „Technology and Cycles of Boom and Bust.‟ Science 219/4587:933-936. Garraty, J. (1966). The American Nation, A History of the United States, HarperAmerican Heritage Textbook. Goldstein, J. (1988). Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. Jourdon, P. (2007). La monnaie unique europeenne et sa relation au developpement economique et social coordonee: une analysis cliometrique, Tome II, Entelequia, 2010; These, Montpellier, Universite Montpellier I, 2008. Knotek, Edward S. (2007). „How Useful Is Okun‟s Law?‟ Economic Review, Kansas City Federal Reserve, Issue Q IV, pp. 73-103. Kondratiev, N. D., The Major Economic Cycles (in Russian), Moscow, 1925; translated and published as The Long Wave Cycle by Richardson & Snyder, New York, 1984. Korotayev, A. V. and Sergey V. Tsirel, (2010). „A Spectral Analysis of World GDP Dynamics: Kondratieff Waves, Kuznets Swings, Juglar and Kitchin Cycles in Global Economic Development, and the 2008– 2009 Economic Crisis,‟ Journal of Structure and Dynamics, Social Dynamics and Complexity, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California at Irvine.

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Linstone, H. A. (2006). The Information and Molecular Ages: Will K-Waves Persist? Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security / Ed. By T. C. Devezas, Amsterdam: IOS Press. pp. 260-269. Livio, M. (2002). The Golden Ratio: The Story of the World’s Most Astonishing Number, Broadway Books, New York. Marchetti, C. (1988). „Kondratiev Revisited – After One Kondratiev Cycle,‟ International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, p. 7. Mandel, E. (1980). Long Waves of Capitalist Development. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. McCauley, J. (2009). Dynamics of Markets: The New Financial Economics, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press. Modelski, T. (1996). Leading Sectors and World Politics: The Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. Nelson, C. R. and C. I. Plosser (1982). „Trends and Random Walks in Macroeconomic Time Series: Some Evidence and Implications,‟ Journal of Monetary Economics, 10:139-162. Rothbard, M. (1984). „The Kondratieff Cycle: Real or Fabricated?‟, Investment Insights, August and September, 1984. Rucker, R. (1983). Infinity And The Mind, The Science And Philosophy Of The Infinite, Bantam Books, December 1983;84-88. Schumpeter, J. A. (1939). Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. Sowell, F. (1992). „Modeling long run behavior with the fractional ARIMA model,‟ Journal of Monetary Economics, 29:277-302. Tausch, A. (2011). „On the global political and economic environment of the current Al Jazeera Revolution,‟ Middle East Studies On-Line Journal, Issue 5, Volume 2. Tausch, A. (2006). „Global Terrorism and World Political Cycles.’ History and Mathematics: Analyzing and Modeling Global Development / Ed. by L. Grinin, V. C. de Munck, A. Korotayev. Moscow: KomKniga/URSS, pp. 99-126. Thompson, W. R. (2007). „The Kondratieff Wave as Global Social Process,‟ World System History, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, UNESCO /

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Ed. by G. Modelski, R. A. Denmark. Oxford: EOLSS Publishers. URL: http://www.eolss.net Van Duijn, J. J. (1983). The Long Wave in Economic Life. Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin. Wallerstein, I. (1984). Economic Cycles and Socialist Policies. Futures 16/6: 579585. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1, United States Department of Commerce, Series F 1-5, "Gross National Product" for the United States between the years 1869-1970 according to 1958 prices. See also the figures for Real GNP, 1947 to present, maintained by the St. Louis Federal Reserve at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GNPC96. House Bill 3995, presented by Representative Kaptur, November 3, 2009, 111th Congress, First Session.

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A Poetic ‘Write!’ vs. a Qur’anic‘Read!’ The Prophetic Anxiety of Ma˛müd Darwısh By: Balqis Al-Karaki

Abstract. This article explores a poem by the famous Palestinian poet Mahmud Darwish, and argues for his suffering from an 'anxiety of influence'—a claim made by Harold Bloom regarding the psychological struggles of poets with their precursors. The poem under question refers to a well–known, founding text in the Islamic tradition; the text of revelation where Gabriel asks Prophet Muhammad to 'read'. In Darwish's poem, the prophet is replaced by a poet, whom a transcendental figure asks to 'write'. This study examines the implications of this replacement, in view of Bloom's theory in particular, alongside some other accounts of influence and intertextuality taken from Arabic and Western critical traditions.

Keywords: Mahmud Darwish; Intertextuality; Harold Bloom



Arabic

Poetry;

Influence;

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Arts - University of Jordan, Amman 11942. Institutional email: b.alkaraki@ju.edu.jo 2010-2011 Fulbright Visiting Scholar. Philosophy Dept. Columbia University.

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―It is not the speech of a poet (little do you believe) …‖1 ( " ٍَُُِْ٘ ‫الً ٍَب رُ ْؤ‬ِٞ‫" َٗ ٍَب ُٕ َ٘ ثِقَْ٘ ِه ضَب ِع ٍش قَي‬

, 60:41)

―I am not the prophet to claim a revelation and declare that my abyss is ascension.‖2 (Darwısh) ُ ‫"ىَس‬ َّ َِِ‫ب ً ٗأُ ْعي‬ٞ ْ‫ َٗد‬ٜ‫ ألَ َّدع‬ٜ "‫صعُ٘ ُد‬ ُ ٜ‫ز‬ٝٗ‫أُ ٕب‬ َّ ‫ْذ أَّب اىْج‬

Introduction hen a poet as ―strong‖ as Ma˛müd Darwısh writes a poem which intertextualises with a text as ―strong‖ and ―holy‖ as the Qur‘ assume that there is more to this interaction than the inescapability of absorbing a – if not the –sanctioned canonical text in the Arabic tradition for any writer writing in the Arabic language. Rather, to go a step beyond this reality requires that one searches for the effects of such an inescapability, caused by the historical priority of the

rather appealing to presuppose a certain psychologico–dramatic struggle or an ―anxiety of influence‖ that distressed and tormented Darwısh while writing his poem. In the poem under question Darwīsh rewrites Prophet Mu˛ammad‘s revelation narrative while replacing the latter‘s Qur‘anic ―Read!‖ with a ―Write!‖, and in search for the motives or ―drives‖ behind such replacement, it seems tempting to try and make use of Harold Bloom‘s understanding of ―influence‖ as an intersubjective rather than a mere intertextual, language‐related problem which dismisses power struggles. In Bloom‘s humanist model of ―influence‖, the author and his predecessor become objects of oedipal, father‐son struggle. Clearly, this model is, in the end, only an analogue. But this

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analogue also exists, surprisingly, in the classical Arabic critical tradition, particularl 1239) where he promotes the impossibility of having self‐begotten ideas, and describes the inevitability of borrowing as analogous to marriage or sexual intercourse between relatives ( ),3 which in some cultures is considered incestuous. The existence of – roughly – the same metaphor in two distant historical and intellectual contexts does not necessarily validate the argument, yet it may validate the curiosity to try and read the intertext in question in the shadowlands of Oedipus, Laius, and Jocasta. Besides, why would poetic influence, as Bloom explains, be described ―for so many centuries‖ as a ―filial relationship‖? 4 And why would Darwısh himself, in a poem published recently in a posthumous collection, address a ―young poet‖ advising him: Do not ask anyone: who am I? You know your mother… As for your father… that is you!? 5

‫ ٍِ أّب؟‬:ً‫ال رسو أدذا‬ ...‫أّذ رعشف أٍُل‬ !‫ فأّذ‬...‫أٍب أث٘ك‬

This is somewhat similar to Bloom‘s notion of a poet‘s quest to ―re‐beget one‘s own self‖ which he transforms from Freud‘s idea of the child‘s wish to be the ―father of himself.‖6 This study will show that Darwısh in the intertext under question has failed to re‐beget himself; but this conclusion will occur after describing the contexts of the ‗father‘s‘ and ‗son‘s‘ texts; Darwısh‘s desires for imitation and originality underlying his supposed ―anxiety of influence‖ or his ―ordeal‖ (mi˛na latecomer poets; and finally his psychological and rhetorical courses of overcoming this anxiety. In addition to familiar Western notions of influence and intertexuality, my analysis will make use of several, less popular classical Arabic concepts and accounts of intertextuality and plagiarism.

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II.

Text of the Father, Text of the Son

II.1 The Son’s Text The text of the son, Darwısh, the latecomer poet, is one part of his poem ‗ ‘ 7 (‗The traveller said to the traveller: we will not return as …‘). The poem seems to revolve around the theme of identity; both collective and individual. It begins with a voice of a speaker, a ―resident of the Syrian coast‖, explaining how he is drawn to the desert although he is merely familiar with its words, and the rhythm which he listens to, follows, and carries ―on my way to the sky, the sky of my song.‖ 8 The question of the collective identity is implied in the speaker‘s yearning for the Arabic language of the ―ancient Bedouins‖, 9 and his quest for an individual identity as a poet – which concerns us here – is clear in his longing for the sky of his song guided by the words and rhythms of pre‐Islamic poetry. In a scene situated in his desert of Arabic words and rhythms, the two identities intersect: the reference to Muhammad‘s revelation narrative seems to affirm that Islam has become an integral part of the cultural identity of the resident of the Syrian coast, but the ‗revisions‘ or ‗corrections‘ which Darwısh suggests for this narrative imply a desparate desire for a similar powerful status as that of the figure behind the ideological and aesthetic powers of the I do not know the desert, No matter how often I visited its obsession, And in the desert the supernatural said to me: Write! Thus I said: there is another writing on the mirage So it said: Write so that the mirage will become greener And so I said: I lack absence And I said: I have not yet learned the words

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،‫ال أَعشفُ اىصذشا َء‬ ُ ‫ٍَٖب ُص‬ ،‫سد ٕبج َسٖب‬ :ٜ‫ْتُ ى‬ٞ‫ اىصذشاء قبه اى َغ‬ٜ‫ٗف‬ ! ْ‫امزُت‬ ُ ُ ‫فقُ ْي‬ ٙ‫ اىسشاة مزبثخٌ أخش‬ٚ‫ عي‬:‫ذ‬ ُ‫خض َّش اىسشاة‬ٞ‫ امزُتْ ى‬:‫فقبه‬ ُ ‫فقُ ْي‬ ُ‫بة‬ٞ‫ اىغ‬ُْٜ‫ْقُص‬ٝ :‫ذ‬ َّ ُ ‫ٗقُ ْي‬ ‫د ثَ ْع ُذ‬ ِ ‫ ىٌ أرعي ٌِ اىنيَب‬:‫ذ‬ ‫ ا ْمزُت ىزعشفٖب‬:ٜ‫فقبه ى‬ َ‫َِ أّذ‬َٝ‫ ٗأ‬، َ‫ِ مْذ‬َٝ‫ٗرعشفَ أ‬

Thus it said to me: write to know them And know where you were, where you are How you came, and whom you will be tomorrow, Put your name in my hand and write To know who I am, and leave like clouds In the expanse … Hence I wrote: he who writes his story inherits The land of speech, and possesses meaning completely!

،ً‫ ٗ ٍَِ رنُُ٘ غذا‬، َ‫ف جئذ‬ٞ‫ٗم‬ ْ‫ْ ٗامزُت‬ٛ‫َ ِذ‬ٝ ٜ‫ل ف‬ َ ََ ‫ضعِ ا ْس‬ َ ‫ ٗارٕتْ غَبٍب‬،‫ىزعشف ٍَ ِْ أّب‬ ... ٙ‫ اىَذ‬ٜ‫ف‬ ْ ‫َ ِش‬ٝ ٔ‫ز‬ٝ‫نزُتْ دنب‬ٝ ِْ ٍَ :‫فنزجذ‬ ُ ‫س‬ ُ !‫ رَبٍب‬ْٚ‫ل اىَع‬ َ َ‫أ‬ ِ ‫َ َْي‬ٝٗ ،ً‫سض اىنال‬

II.2 The Father’s Text The parental texts of this excerpt include: an Islamic narrative which may be considered as the frame‐narrative or récit‐cadre 10 which includes and interprets the first five verses of sürat Q. (96:1‐5; normally believed to be the very first verses revealed to Mu˛ammad via Gabriel),11 hence it is a mixture sürat The first text involves Angel Gabriel‘s first call to Mu˛ammad which, in the Islamic conception, is a form of wa˛y; the act of revelation by God to the prophets. Most likely, this text – as a product of revelation – has its own precursors, such as the pre‐Islamic daemons (shaya†ın) who were said to dictate poetry to competent poets (a notion which survived throughout the beginning of the Islamic period); the biblical Gabriel; and perhaps certain verses of the book of Isaiah which – the verses – strinkingly resemble our récit‐cadre where Gabriel orders Mu˛ammad to ‗read!‘: And the vision of all is become unto you as the words of a book that is sealed, which [men] deliver to one that is learned, saying, Read this, I pray thee: and he saith, I cannot; for it [is] sealed: And the book is delivered to him that is not learned, saying, Read this, I pray thee: and he saith, I am not learned. (Isaiah 29: 11‐12, King James Bible).

257

Doubtless, the makers of these texts may be both grandfathers and fathers of the son or grandson Darwısh. But before discussing the repercussions of these inter‐relationships, let us look at the first of the parental texts under question, i.e. the récit‐cadre as narrated in : commencement of the Divine form of good dreams which came like bright day light (i.e., true), and then the love of seclusion was bestowed upon him. He used to go in continuously for many days before his desire to see his family. He used to take with him the journey food for the stay and then come back to (his wife) Khadıja to take his food like‐wise again till suddenly the Truth descended upon him while he was in the cave angel came to him and asked him to read [Iqra’], the prophet replied, ―I do not know how to read‖ [ ]. The Prophet added: ―The angel caught me (forcibly) and pressed me so hard that I could not bear it anymore. He then released me and again asked me to read [iqra’] and I replied ‗I do not know how to read.‘ Thereupon he caught me again and pressed me a second time till I could not bear it anymore. He then released me and again asked me to read but again I replied ‗I do not know how to read (or what shall I read)?‘ Thereupon he caught me for the third time and pressed me, and then released me and said, ‗Read, in the name of Your Lord, who created, created man from a clot. Read! And your Lord is the most bountiful‘.‖ 12

These last words of Gabriel: ―Read, in the name of Your Lord, who created, created man from a clot. Read! And your Lord is the most bountiful‖, are the only ―Qur‘anic‖ parts of this frame‐narrative, forming three verses of sürat . Other sources of this récit‐cadre Sıra, contain the first five 13 verses: ‗Recite: In the Name of thy Lord who created, created Man of a blood‐clot. Recite: And thy Lord is the Most Generous,

258

who taught by the Pen, taught Man that he knew not‘ (Arberry’s translation).14 The second parental text is from , 7:128: ‗Said Moses to his people, ‗pray for succour to God, and be patient; surely the earth is God‘s and He bequeaths it to whom He will among His servants [‗ ‘]. The issue ultimate is to the god fearing.‘ The framework of this verse is Moses‘s encounter with the people of Pharoah, and thus its influence on Darwısh‘s ―he who writes his story inherits the land of speech, and possesses meaning completely‖, may be understood in the context of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict over land, memory and history. However I will suggest a different interpretation for this act of intertextuality, based on what I see as a struggle between Darwısh and his poetic father. This brings us to a seemingly obvious question: who, here, is Darwısh‘s threatening father, the author of both of these parental texts? II.3 Who is the Father? The originator of our récit‐cadre is normally understood to be Mu˛ammad, as the récit is allegedly a story he told his wife Khadıja. But the words he claimed to have been Gabriel‘s are Qur‘anic, and the second parental text here is also Qur‘anic. As to Mu˛ammad himself; or compiled by several authors in later centuries, the ‗truth‘ is not really important in our context. The question is who of these authors is considered by Darwısh, consciously or not, to be his Freudian father, as could be understood from his poetry itself, particulary from the excerpt under examination.

259

My suggestion is that Darwīsh‘s father is Mu˛ammad for the most part, though not without containing ‗God‘. I base this on several observations: the first concerns the fact that Darwısh in the ‗son‘s text‘ was imagining himself in the place of Mu˛ammad, speaking to a supernatural figure who tells him to ‗write‘, while Mu˛ammad‘s scene the figure had told him to ‗read‘. Therefore it may not be important whether or not Darwısh thinks that ‗Read!‘ is the word of God or not; rather, what is important is that he did not place himself in God‘s place—unless we keep in mind the fact that it is eventually Darwısh who wrote the entire poem, including the ―write‖ part, which implies that he may have considered God to be his father, since it is Him whom Mu˛ammad had attributed ‗read‘ to. Nonetheless, as he may have probably considered this attribution to be false and the whole revelation story to be made up, it remains more likely that he treated Mu˛ammad as his Freudian father. The holy voice asking Mu˛ammad to read is also Mu˛ammad‘s voice, although he chose to grant the glory to the god he created (and therefore, ultimately, to himself), which means that Mu˛ammad including the god in him may most probably be forming Darwısh‘s Freudian father. Besides, would Mu˛ammad be that strong a candidate for a mighty Freudian father had he not moulded a god from – and into – his very human being? God, as Darwısh himself wrote, is ―the luck of the prophet‖, which makes Jesus immortal because he has ―the breath of God‖ in him. 15 This suggests that even in the poems where the Islamic God seems to be Darwısh‘s rival and father, it is ultimately Mu˛ammad who is meant to be confronted. The assumption that Mu˛ammad is primarily the father here may be supported by some evidences outside the context of the poem. Among these is a 2004 interview, where Darwısh quoted Blake as having said that the imagination is a new religion, and then

260

added that ―the entire romantic movement intended to substitute the religious and prophetic inspiration with the poetic inspiration‖, and later mentioned that one among the many differences he sees between poetry and religion is that the former ―humanizes the prophets‖.16 Here he associated or even merged religious inspiration with prophetic inspiration, and used the same concept of ‗inspiration‘ for prophecy and poetry rather than using ‗revelation‘ for the former (in his poetry, however, he uses ‗wa˛y‘ (revelation) with reference to poetry). 17 Furthermore he seemed to encourage the romantic substitution of prophecy with poetry and a ‗humanization‘ of prophets. This implies that he sees certain closeness between the prophet and poet as both are subjects of inspiration, but it also indicates that he feels rather jealous of what he seems to see as a quasi–divine status of prophets (although the that he has a desire to prove the superiority of poetry over prophecy. These remarks support the assumption that the prophet is whom Darwısh considers his father and rival. Another extra‐textual (‗a Rhyme for the odes‘), which is placed in Why did you leave the horse alone? directly after the poem under examination ‗The traveller said to the traveller: we will not return as…‘: This is my language and my miracle. The wand of my magic. The gardens of my Babylon, my obelisk, my first identity, my burnished metal, and the sacred of the Arab in the desert, who worships rhymes flowing like stars on his aba, and worships what he says

.ٛ‫ عصب ِسذْ ش‬.ٜ‫ ٗ ٍُ ْع ِجضَر‬ٜ‫ٕ ِز ِٓ ىُغَز‬ ُ ‫دذائ‬ ،ٚ‫ األُٗى‬ٜ‫ز‬ٕٝ٘ٗ ،ٜ‫ ٍٗ َسيَّز‬ٜ‫ق ثبثي‬ ‫ ُو‬ٞ‫ اىصق‬ِّٜ‫ٍٗع َذ‬ ،‫ اىصذشا ِء‬ٜ‫ ف‬ِّٜ ‫ٍٗق َّذطُ اىعشث‬ ‫ ُو‬ٞ‫س‬ٝ ‫عجُ ُذ ٍب‬ٝ ،ِٔ ِ‫ َعجَب َءر‬ٚ‫ مبىْجً٘ عي‬ٜ‫ٍِ اىق٘اف‬ ‫ق٘ ُه‬ٝ ‫عجُ ُذ ٍب‬ٝ ٗ

Thus there must be prose, There must be a divine prose for the prophet to triumph... 18

،ً‫ّثش إرا‬ ٍ ٍِ ‫ال ثُ َّذ‬ ...‫ص َش اى َشسُ٘ ُه‬ ِ ‫ْز‬ٞ‫ ى‬ٍّٜ ٖ‫ال ثُ َّذ ٍِ ّ َْث ٍش إى‬

261

In this excerpt the poet‘s being and identity merge with the language and worshipped rhymes of pre‐Islamic poets and not with Q. (26:224‐227), (36:69) and (69:40) for example, insisting that the Qur‘an is not the speech of a poet and that poetry is not seemly for Mu˛ammad. The prophet‘s sayings concerning poetry fluctuate between admiration on one hand, and jealousy, contempt and rivalry on the other. 19 Darwısh seems to want to keep the sharp poetry and religion, and to revive the supposed ‗war‘ between the two. In the excerpt above he uses the word ‗triumph‘ in association with the prophet and not with God or with religion, which means that he does think of Mu˛ammad as a victorious prose–creator and victory, and this provides us with another evidence that Mu˛ammad is Darwısh‘s rival and parental figure. And although Darwısh alludes to many prophets in his poetry, with special focus on Jesus and Joseph, 20 his allusions to Mu˛ammad are the only ones that seem to contain competition, probably because he is the only nd because it is him – not Jesus for example – who represents a major authoritative figure in Arabic culture; the culture to which Darwısh belongs.

(‗The dice player‘); where Darwısh implies that poets are the ones who wrote the divine texts then ―hid behind the Olympus‖. 21 He then alludes to the ‗Iqra’‘ scene again and has ‗mirage‘ call a ‗traveller in the deserts‘ telling him to: ―Read if you could read. And write if you could write‖. 22 These examples further suggest that Mu˛ammad is Darwısh‘s father and rival in the son‘s text. The questions which arise now are: what are the causes of this rivalry?

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How did each of them perform in the battle? And who won in the end?

III.

The Prophetic Anxiety of the Poet: Two Drives and One Defeat

Graham Allen interprets Bloom‘s ideas concerning influence as introducing two motivations or ‗drives‘ from which poetry in the post‐Miltonic period stems: ―the first concerns the desire to imitate the precursor‘s poetry, from which the poet first learnt what poetry was. The second concerns the desire to be original, and defend against the knowledge that all the poet is doing is imitating rather than creating afresh.‖ 23 The following subsections discuss the causes and ramifications of Darwısh‘s desire to imitate Mu˛ammad and of his desire to be original, which lead him to a failure in begetting himself in the ‗son‘s text‘ under question. III.1 The Desire to Imitate III.1.1 Causes Some of the reasons for why Darwīsh would want to imitate while others do not. Mu˛ammad is acknowledged as ―a remarkable man‖ in Rodinson‘s words; a ―Mystic, intoxicated with the Divine‖, and someone who was ―able to become a head of state, a military commander and an ideological leader.‖24 Not only is he someone who changed the course of history, but also the course of the Arabic literary history. For Darwısh, Mu˛ammad was, without question, a poet receivers of Qur‘anic verses immediately defined it as poetry, regardless of the absence of metre (except in few instances), and accused Mu˛ammad of being a poet (Q. 37:35 and 21:5). Even in later centuries, the uncertainty seems to have remained present, as

263

can be concluded from the critics‘ use of both the terms (versification) and ˛all (rendering in prose) with reference to the 25 But Mu˛ammad wanted to be acknowledged as a prophet, and his prose as his sign and the word of God. The fact that he eventually succeeded in this endeavour is indeed worth of Darwısh‘s admiration and jealousy. Mu˛ammad had insisted on the ‗reality‘ of his phanstastic story until his words became considered for a massive number of people to be divine, literally and not metaphorically. Mu˛ammad‘s first person pronoun ‗I‘ became literally God‘s ‗I‘, and the dissolution has become so customary that rarely does anyone think of this ‗I‘ as giving direct access to Mu˛ammad. The ‗divine‘ text was Mu˛ammad‘s miracle, and was given in later centuries the status of ‗inimitability‘ ( ), including his ‗Read!‘ verses, and most of the classical Arabic theories of rhetoric and poetics emerged from a desire to verify this idea through setting the appropriate aesthetic standards. Also telling (Paragraphs and ) which was intended

Periods; echoing the Qur‘anic suwar and to prove the imitability of th by Ibn al‐Jawzı (d. 1200) for example, as being a speech with utmost feebleness (rikka) and coldness (burüda). 26 All of these remarks definitely reveal the poetic authority and the status of aesthetic ‗ideal‘ that the not only does the Qur‘an enjoy a status similar to the one Eliot claimed for Shakespeare: a poet of supreme greatness who can hardly influence; but can only be imitated, 27 but that it can only be badly imitated. Interestingly, the term

264

(lit. opposition) which was

term used for counter‐poems, an ancient Arabic art where a poet‘s admiration or high regard of a previous poem induces him to imitate it using the same metre, rhyme and sometimes the same subject, with the aim of reaching a similar or higher level of excellence. 28 This gives us insight into another – appearingly obvious – reason for Darwısh‘s desire to imitate Mu˛ammad‘s texts: he simply admires them. Why else would he (and many, many other classical and modern poets and writers) abundantly intertextualise with Qur‘anic verses especially the ones that are generally considered ‗beautiful‘? Why would they use the Qur’anic rather than the biblical sources for the narratives of Mary and Joseph? 29 The ―cultural context‖ argument does not seem sufficient, and it seems likely that Darwīsh did praise Mu˛ammad for his eloquence, even if he refuted his claim for prophecy. The motives behind imitation are sometimes understood in terms of sexual analogies. Barthes gives a quasi‐sexual description of the admiration which leads the writer to use certain ‗seductive‘ words, and claims that he uses a beautiful word ―because of the notion that I am going to do something with it.‖30 Bloom construes this desire in the analogical framework of the Freudian Oedipus complex or the ―family romance‖, in addition to Freud‘s ―sublimation‖ where a resemblance is supposed between ―sexuality and intellectual activity (including poetry)‖. 31 This way Darwısh would want to imitate what the father does to his wife, which could either be the language or the superlative status wedded devotedly to Mu˛ammad, in order to give his mother a child, ―one like himself‖, to retain her favour of tenderness, and to become the ―father‖ of himself‖.32 The desire to beget a child like himself; an influenced, envious poet, also reflects a high degree of self‐love inducing the desire to imitate. The fact that the ‗muse‘ in both Mu˛ammad‘s and

265

Darwısh‘s texts is a male spirit interestingly adds a homotexual twist to this Arabic family romance. Let us not forget that such pleasures are initially prohibited. It is prohibited to ‗steal‘ someone else‘s property or poetry, or ‗borrow‘ it by force. It is prohibited to imitate the Qur‘an because it is God‘s word and because it is assumed ―inimitable‖. It is prohibited to take the place of your father and try to possess your mother. It is certainly more prohibited to kill him. But ironically ―there is no desire without prohibition‖, as Barthes puts it,33 hence it may be the prohibition of imitating Mu˛ammad‘s texts which awakens Darwısh desire to imitate them. Another reason for imitation does not have to do with a desire to imitate as much as with a necessity to imitate. In other words imitation is not merely a matter of choice. Bloom asks: What happens if one tries to write, or to teach, or to think, or even to read without the sense of a tradition? Why, nothing at all happens, just nothing. You cannot write or teach or think or even read without imitation...34

Most classical Arabic critics have agreed that literary plagiarisms are inevitable. Ibn Rashıq (d. 1064) for example has also told us that ―speech comes from speech [ ], even if its ways [†uruq] were hidden and its lineages [ ] 35 distant‖. similar to the fact that ―the child speaks after listening to the adults‖,36 while Ibn al‐Athır used the analogy of birth and incest: The thoughts of minds do not procreate on their own, and their aim is to mate in order to beget their children, and I mate my thought with another as in mating between

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‫أفنبس اىخ٘اطش ال رسز٘ىذ‬ ُ‫زُٖب أ‬ٝ‫ ٗغب‬،‫ اّفشادٕب‬ٚ‫عي‬ ،‫ اسزْزبج أٗالدٕب‬ٜ‫ُزْبمخ ف‬ٝ ‫ ىفنش ّنبح‬ٛ‫ٗأّب أُّ ِنخ فنش‬ ُ‫ ٗال أخبف أ‬،‫األّسبة‬

kins, and I do not fear the debilitation of my child and incline 37 towards foreignness.

ٚ‫إى‬

‫ َو‬ٍٞ‫فأ‬

ٙ٘‫أض‬ .‫االغزشاة‬

The Qur‘anic text is one of the unforeign ―relatives‖ in the Arabic literary context. Like fathers and relatives, it cannot be chosen. It enjoys the status of ‗facticity, i.e. unavoidability, as Bloom would put it. 38 Darwısh may have never read the revelation story in or in al‐Sıra at all, but as the story has become part of the Arabic cultural code, and a canon in Arabic learning and education, he simply might have heard it or read or heard a version of it at school. The story, as it were, is as famous as the crucifixion of Jesus in Western culture. No doubt, the fact that any text could reach this position in recognition and ―inescapability‖ is worthy of admiration, which justifies the attempts of its imitation. Another reason behind the desire for imitation has to do with the function of prophecy. Prophets, as Arkoun explains, are among the ―grands hommes‖ who establish civilizations, but they differ in some of the tools they use and the psychological impulses they provoke, such as invoking the hope of salvation.39 In addition to giving people meaning, truth, and hope, the prophet‘s role involves fighting to establish the values of justice, goodness, knowledge and security, and to eliminate violence, ignorance and poverty.40 Darwısh was certainly aware of these prophetic functions which no poet can satisfy, as he once asserted: ―Je ne crois pas que la poésie ait un rôle évident à jouer dans la lutte nationale. Son influence n‘est pas immediate.‖41 Furthermore, in his poem ‗I see my ghost coming from afar‘ he famously wrote: ―I ask: is there a new prophet for this new time?‖ ( ).42 Hence he knows well that his poetry alone could not change fates, which involves an implicit admiration for

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the prophet and his heroic role. Such admiration may also explain Darwısh‘s desire for imitation. The final reason I found for Darwısh‘s imitation also relates to necessity rather than desire. If Darwısh wants to oppose Mu˛ammad or provide a different view from the latter‘s, he would probably need to use the latter‘s words, concepts, and ideas to ‗shake‘ or ‗destruct‘ them. Derrida has made this lucid by suggesting that any destruction would not include the signifiers: ―There is no sense in doing without the concept of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax and no lexicon– which is foreign to this history…‖43 This means that even when a poet desires originality and difference, he would still have to imitate his precursor, at least on the formalistic level of signifieds. III.1.2 Discovering the Imitation What does Darwısh exactly echo from Mu˛ammad‘s texts? It is true that there is no ―angel‖ who orders him to ―Read!‖, but there is a dialogue in the desert with al‐ghayb (the supernatural, the invisible) who asks him to ―Write!‖, and receives humble responses from the human poet. Therefore, what Darwısh imitates is the dialogue with a supernatural figure or concept, who orders a person to do something by using an imperative verb with the morphological structure (such as iqra’ and uktub), and repeats this several time while receiving humble responses from the addressee. Any other order with the same structure (such as ‗dance‘ (urquß) or ‗leave‘ (ir˛al)) would still be an imitation. However, the choice of uktub rather than any other imperative verb emphasizes the fact of imitation, not only because reading and writing belong to the same intellectual domain, but because writing can be perceived as an opposite to reading, based on the fact that the first involves

268

producing a text while the latter involves receiving one. Bloom quotes Lichtenberg: ―to do just the opposite is also a form of imitation, and the definition of imitation ought by rights to include both.‖44 Bloom adds that this implies that poetic influence ―is itself an oxymoron‖,45 which in our case will render Darwısh an imitator especially in the areas where he lucidly opposes Mu˛ammad. As for the Qur‘anic pre‐text from , the resemblance is semantic rather than structural as it simply involves an ―inherited land‖. In the Qur‘anic reference it is land which God bequeaths (yürith) upon he wills, while in Darwısh‘s text it is a land ―of speech‖ which the poet inherits (yarith) if he writes his story. The changes which Darwısh executes to the original texts emerge from the second desire relevant to influence; his desire to be original. III.2 The Desire to be Original ―And disregard every voice but mine, for I am the caller who is imitated, and the other is the echo.‖ 46 (al‐Mutanabbı)

ٙ‫صذ‬ َ ‫ َخ ُش اى‬ٟ‫ َٗا‬ُّٜ ‫أَّب اىصبئِ ُخ اى ََذ ِن‬

َِّّْٜ‫ فَئ‬ٜ‫ص٘ر‬ ٍ ٘‫ص‬ َ ‫ َش‬َٞ‫د غ‬ َ ‫َٗدَع ُم َّو‬

III.2.1 Causes Some of the causes behind the desire to be original are implied in another poem by Darwīsh: But what I will say has already been said. A passing tomorrow precedes me. I am the king of echo. I have no throne but the margins. And the path Is the way. The ancestors may have forgotten to describe Something, in which I move a memory and a sensation47

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ْ .‫و ٍب سأق٘ه‬ٞ‫ىنِ ق‬ ُ ِ‫ أّب ٍَي‬.‫ٍبض‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ غ ٌذ‬ْٜ‫سجق‬ٝ ٍ .ٙ‫اىصذ‬ ٗ .‫ إالَّ اىٖ٘اٍص‬ٜ‫ش ى‬ َ ْ‫ال عَش‬ ُ ٝ‫اىطش‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ األٗائ ُو‬َٜ ‫ ُسثََّب َّ ِس‬.ُ‫قخ‬ٝ‫ٕ٘ اىطش‬ َ‫َٗصْ ف‬ ُ ‫ أُد ِّش‬،‫ء ٍب‬ٜ‫ض‬ ‫ٔ رامشحً ٗدسّب‬ٞ‫ك ف‬

When trying to ‗separate‘ himself from his precursor, Darwīsh encounters the facts that he lives in the present; that he has come ―late in the story‖; 48 that the space left for him in tradition is as narrow as ―margins‖; that ―no proper work remains for him to perform‖; 49 and thus that he can never be absolutely original. Consequently, he suffers from fear and anxiety, or from what Ibn ordeal‖ (mi˛na) of latecomer poets, who were preceded to original meanings and eloquent wording, and therefore their poetry would be boring and dispensable if it failed to rise to the level of the predecessors‘ poetry. 50 In spite of this ―ordeal‖, Darwīsh will insist on trying to be original, for if all he could do is imitate, he would then present us with with a mere replica of Mu˛ammad‘s texts; and in such a case he would be presenting himself as a ―weak‖ poet: ―Weaker talents idealize; figures of capable imagination appropriate for themselves‖.51 Accordingly, the primary cause of the desire for originality is the ephebe‘s fear caused by his ‗lateness‘; which is a problem of ‗time‘. The fear of ‗time‘, obviously, stems from the fear of death, which is another cause underlying the desire for originality. ‗Great‘ poets for Bloom rebel more strongly than ordinary people, ―however unconsciously‖, ―against the consciousness of death‘s necessity.‖ 52 Bloom adopts Freud‘s understanding of anxiety as ―unpleasure accompanied by efferent or discharge phenomena‖, which relieve the ―increase of excitation‖ underlying anxiety.53 For Freud the primal increase of excitation is the birth trauma, a response to the first situation of danger, such as the separation from the mother where tension increases out of the fear of not gratifying the needs vital for self‐preservation; a fear that leads to death anxiety.54 Bloom observes that the poets‘ anxiety of influence is not far from this framework, as he sees that the fear of domination is universal, and that the poet–ephebe experiences anxiety ―towards

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any danger that might end him as a poet.‖55 Bloom is aware that this analogue between ―biological‖ and ―creative‖ anxiety is ―radical‖, but he seems to strengthen its validity by bringing to light the Vichian origins of poetry as emanating from our ―timeless human fear of mortality‖ and thus our desparate need for divination so as to ―foretell dangers to the self‖.56 For the poet, Bloom explains, ―these dangers come also from other poems,‖ and his death as a poet is far more threatening than his death as a man.57 The notion of poetry‘s association with putting off death for as long as possible also exists in the Arabic context, especially in the prestigious role assigned to pre‐Islamic poets in propagandistically praising their tribes and censuring others at times of war. The art of polemic poems ( ) originated in pre‐Islamic times as both prose and poetry in the contexts of war or social disputes, and it kept appearing in the Islamic era at the time of battles and wars, where poets even wrote poetry in defence of Mu˛ammad, before this art became a mere artistic competition.58 The association of poetry with war, the assumption that it can raise the enthusiasm of warriors and perhaps determine the fate of the tribe, also suggest that poetry‘s original function had to do with prolonging survival. This also explains why the Arabic muses were strong, male, virile ―daemons‖ who dictated poetry to the poets in order to put off his tribe‘s extinction for as long as possible. Yet the problematic for latecomer poets is not the same as it was for Vico‘s primitive men or for pre‐Islamic warriors. For although this poet is nevertheless afraid of death in its literal sense, he is more aware of nature‘s mysteries, of the impossibility of literal immortality, and thus could only be concerned with a metaphorical survival. The desire to be original is thus a desire for figurative immortality. But the problem for the latecomer poet is

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that his maternal muse, ―the idea of his own sublimity‖, ―has whored with many before him‖;59 ‗many‘ who are his fathers. He is trapped in this oedipal scenario, wanting to repay his mother the gift of tenderness according to Freud, by saving her from his precursors and giving her a child, one like himself. 60 He wants to repay his father all that he is indebted to him out of a longing to be independent, and all these instincts for Freud all are gratified in the wish to be the father of himself.‖61 Applied to poetic conquests this means, for Bloom, that the poet struggles to turn his lateness into earliness, and regain the authority of priority and re–beget himself to become his own ―Great Original.‖62 Ibn that the poet trapped in his mi˛na, or ordeal of lateness must make use of the wonders of his predecessors and come up with a way to hide his plagiarisms until these wonderous meanings become his own ( ); until he exclusively becomes renowned for them ( ), as if they were never precedented in the first place ( ).63 This cannot be brought into being without the incestuous relation with the mother, in turn impossible without the murder of the father, in turn a huge source of guilt according to Freud and Bloom. Interestingly, the root m‐˛‐n is used with many meanings related to violence, originality, shame, and sex.64 In addition to ‗fear‘ and its many interpretations, the desire for originality involves a desire for pleasure. For why would a poet suffer this oedipal mi˛na if he has no ‗pleasure‘ to gain from achieving power over his rival? Clearly, influence connotes power, and power produces pleasure. Foucault sees that power and pleasure are interwined in ―perpetual spirals‖; for, on one hand, there is the pleasure ―that come from exercising a power‖; and, on the other hand, there is the pleasure that ―kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it, or travesty it.‖65 This should apply to the

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ephebe and his precursor, especially in light of Freud‘s understanding of the latter‘s presence to be the ‗superego‘ which, in Foucault‘s terms, ‗watches‘, ‗spies‘, and ‗monitors‘ the ephebe. Darwısh in desiring to be original desires the prohibited pleasure of ‗scandalizing‘ and ‗resisting‘ Mu˛ammad, since prohibition creates desire as Barthes says. But in his quest for the illusion of originality, he also desires to satisfy the other impetus of pleasure, i.e. having a power similar to Mu˛ammad‘s and exercising it by monitoring and watching over other ephebes. In other words Darwīsh has a deep desire to become an influence, 66 to persuade others to read his works, 67 and eventually feel the pleasure of disrupting a power, and the pleasure of becoming one. To follow the poet‘s voyage towards having the quest of having the highest possible pleasure satisfied by becoming more influential than the precursor ever was, seems to be extremely complex and laborious. However it is luckily not without enough interesting plots of psychological drama, as will be shown in the section to follow. III.2.2. A Voyage towards Satisfaction If fear, unpleasure, and desire for power and pleasure are the main causes of a poet‘s desire for originality or anxiety of influence, one must assume the existence of side‐effects to this ordeal. To unfold these psychological reactions, Bloom suggests six ―revisionary ratios‖ that are strategies of deviating from the precursor while defending against the threat of poetic death. Again, Bloom finds Freud‘s investigations, particularly with reference to defense mechanisms, as able to provide ―the clearest analogues‖ for the ―revisionary ratios that govern intra‐poetic relations.‖68 The core ratio, or the central concept of poetic influence, is the clinamen which Bloom defines as:

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… poetic misreading or misprision proper; I take the word from Lucretius, where it means a ―swerve‖ of the atoms so as to make change possible in the universe. A poet swerves away from his precursor, by so reading his precursor‘s poem as to execute a clinamen in relation to it. This appears as a corrective movement in his own poem, which implies that the precursor poem went accurately up to a certain point, but then should have swerved, precisely in the direction that the new poem moves.69

To become a strong equal to Mu˛ammad, Darwısh must not accept an idealized version of Mu˛ammad‘s text and be silenced by it, but react against it by ‗misreading‘ it. He must swerve and find where Mu˛ammad had went wrong, which requires assuming that he did go wrong in some places, so that Mu˛ammad‘s text would be ‗neutralized‘ to the level of human rather than divine literary possibilities. In the poem under question, it is clear that Darwısh assumed it possible to persuade us that Mu˛ammad had put too much emphasis upon reading or ―Iqra’‖, and so he decided to enter the revelation scene from within to ‗revise‘ and ‗correct‘ the text to what he wants us to believe is the ‗right‘ direction. Of course in Darwısh‘s first encounter with Mu˛ammad‘s text he did not think it naïve, but quite the opposite. The extreme ‗swerve‘ in his attitude is a necessary reaction of defense, against the fear of absorbing the admirable ‗Read‘ completely and becoming a mere occasional substitute of its author. The corresponding psychic defense to clinamen is the Freudian ‗reaction‐formation‘ against the destructive impulses of the id, i.e. the impulses which produce anxiety, and the ego masters these impulses by exaggerating the contradictory attitude or tendency. 70 Darwısh‘s strategy would begin, accordingly, by a contrast, counter‐position, and re‐evaluation of the revelation narrative. 71

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This is called (inversion) or al‐qalb (reverse) in classical 72 Arabic criticism. The process of inversion and re‐evaluation involves another revisionary ratio; Bloom‘s tessera (―link‖ or ―completion and antithesis‖), which he takes from ancient mystery cults where a fragment would re‐constitute a vessel with the other fragments and hence represents a ―token of recognition‖.73 The poet finds himself inclined to ―complete‖ his precursor ―antithetically‖, assuming that the latter‘s vision would otherwise be ―truncated‖.74 The corresponding psychic defenses to tessera are turning‐against‐the‐self and reversal; the first is ―a turning of aggressive impulses inwards‖, while the second is ―fantasy in which the situation of reality is reversed so as to sustain negation or denial from any outward over‐throw.‖ 75 This implies that a protection against a psychological aggression requires executing a different sort of aggression directed against the precursor‘s text. This is obvious Darwısh‘s ‗Write‘ which contrasts ‗Read‘, but this comes after several clinamens and tesseras which he executes in relation to Mu˛ammad‘s text. The first movement appears in the fact that he rewrote the advised poets to borrow meanings from prose and use them in poetry as a means of hiding their plagiarisms. 76 But whether Darwısh was conscious or not of this clinamen, he probably would have not desired to ‗hide‘ it; for how else would the comparative, competitive function of intertextuality be possible? This clinamen, however, does not seem to elevate Darwısh‘s text, for it involves a dull imitation of Mu˛ammad‘s own swerve from pre‐Islamic poetry when he chose to present his ideas in prose and insisted that it is far from being poetry. Mu˛ammad‘s swerve carried more weight given the dominance of poetry in the literary sphere of pre‐Islamic times,

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in addition to the supposition that pre‐Islamic poetry may have had religious functions. 77 Darwısh‘s swerve to poetry may imply a desire to re‐establish the epistemological status which poetry had before Islam, especially since pre‐Islamic poetry was more inclined towards doubt than belief. Darwısh seems to see poetry in general ―Whenever the road to the sky is clarified, and the unknown unveils an ultimate goal, prose diffuses in prayers, and the song gets broken.‖78 Could this mean that he sees all prose as more oriented towards certitude than poetry? Possibly, but still, the coversion of the prose of Mu˛ammad, the claimer of access to certitude, to poetry, is not in the least sufficient for realigning the hierachical epistemological classification of religion and poetry based on the poetry‐prose distinction; simply because existentialist, skeptical ideas also exist in texts of prose (e.g. philosophy and science). Even religion, as Darwısh himself admits, shares ―La quête de l‘inconnu‖ with poetry. In other words the genre conversion does not seem to contain commendable clinamen and tessera necessary for a successful revision. Another swerve appears early in the poem, where Darwısh describes his connection to the desert as based on language and pre‐Islamic poetry (which he had obviously ‗read‘): ―I do not know the desert, but I grew as words on its sides‖. He is a resident of the Syrian coast but he is ―pulled‖ east towards the ancient Beduins where he ‗probes the pulse of the Arabic alphabet‘, and where al‐ghayb came to tell him: ‗Write!‘. Here he swerves to the antithetical extreme from his father, who claimed – even in the Qur 79 – that he was illiterate and could not read, and kept repeating to Gabriel that he does not know how to read in some versions of the revelation story. Mu˛ammad‘s relationship with the desert was one of birth and place, and Gabriel called on him in the

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cave of ‘ where he was assumingly contemplating and not reading. Appearingly Darwısh thought it a productive clinamen and a completing tessera to implicitly reveal this difference, especially as he makes ‗the supernatural‘ call on him because of his dissolution in language and poetry, unlike his illiterate precursor. It is as if he wanted to prove that he is a better candidate for the revelation of a text of literary excellence, given his efforts in reading. However this does not render Mu˛ammad‘s illiteracy claim ‗naïve‘ or ‗truncated‘ as Darwısh may have wanted; on the contrary, it even strengthens the former‘s position; for an illiterate person is supposedly more in need of transcendental, supernatural knowledge than a person who could read and write. Therefore Darwısh‘s two attempted ratios here have probably failed to be as ―revisionary‖ as he had wished. So far, the mighty father is still in absolute control. After Darwısh‘s initial identification with the desert as a mark of poetry and language, he undergoes the revisionary ratio which Bloom calls Kenosis or ―breaking‐device‖. Bloom takes the term kenosis from St. Paul, where ―it means the humbling or emptying‐out of Jesus by himself, when he accepts reduction from divine to human status.‖80 This ―humbling‖ to the point where the poet seems to be ceasing to be a poet, is aimed at discontinuity with the precursor and the latter‘s emptying‐out also, so that psychologically the ephebe can defend himself against repetition compulsions. 81 In a movement prior to Darwısh‘s encounter with ‗the supernatural‘, and after declaring that he is not a resident of the desert, he says: ―The speech has said it words, and I departed like a divorced woman I departed like her ruptured husband, I memorized nothing except the rhythm, I hear it, I follow it, and I lift it as doves, on the way to the sky, the sky of my song.‖ 82 Here Darwısh ―departs‖ and thus expiates and humbles himself to the extent of becoming similar to a ―divorced woman‖ or ―her ruptured husband‖.

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Before he meets with al‐ghayb he repeats again ―I do not know the desert‖ for the second time, this time adding, ―no matter how often I called on its obsession.‖ Is it not rather his obsession? Indeed, for obviously the thought of being unaquainted enough with the desert, and thus disqualified, keep recurring to him. Sadly, his repetition‐compulsion would not be cured easily as a ‗magical undoing‘ cannot be simply achieved by the sudden occurrence of a ‗supernatural‘. The problem is that his very act of kenonsis and emptying‐out is also an imitation of Mu˛ammad‘s humbling right before (and throughout) his encounter with the magical Gabriel. Mu˛ammad had also ―departed‖ to the cave of ‘, used to come back to his wife Khadıja for food and then return to his seclusion, until ―suddently the Truth descended upon him‖. Here he even sounds more like Darwısh‘s ―ruptured husband‖ who long awaited a magical undoing and dismissal of a repetitive fear, which in Mu˛ammad‘s case was the possible failure of prophecy. Darwısh‘s kenosis is threatened even more by the fact that Mu˛ammad insisted upon prolonging his own kenosis even after the magical undoing. As known, he kept insisting that he is only ―human‖ and nothing more, in fascinating acts of clinamen and tessera against all previous prophets who claimed a divine or semi‐divine status. He is not the ―son‖ of god, but ―merely‖ a ―mortal messenger‖ (Q.(17:93‐94)). Furthermore, Darwısh‘s emptying‐out seems mediocre compared to Mu˛ammad‘s because the latter was challenged to prove his prophecy by making a spring gush forth from the earth or making rivers gush forth or heavens fall or even bring God and the angels as a surety.83 In return he had to convince those non‐believers that he himself is mortal, but his Qur‘an is his unimitable divine miracle, unimitable by neither men nor jinn (Q. (17: 88‐89)). Doubtless, Mu˛ammad‘s kenosis resulted in the magical undoing he wished for, but Darwīsh‘s kenosis seems hardly able to defend him.

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After the last repetition of ―I do not know the desert‖, he wrote that ―In the desert, the ‗supernatural‘ said to me‖. Here Darwısh swerves again, this time by changing the signifier of the supernatural medium from ‗angel‘ to ‗ghayb‘ which means the supernatural, concealed, transcendental or invisible. For Bloom, however, the ephebe would normally execute the ratio of daemonization or Counter‐Sublime, where he reacts against the precursor‘s Sublime by daemonizing himself and thus humanizing the precursor and suggesting the latter‘s ―relative weakness‖. 84 Bloom takes the term from general Neo‐Platonic usage, ―where an intermediary being, neither divine nor human, enters into the adept to aid him,‖ and the ephebe through this being ―generalizes away‖ the uniqueness of the parent‘s work by choosing to see a larger power beyond this precursor. 85 To Darwısh‘s misfortune, this rhetorical defense cannot be effective, simply because Mu˛ammad had already invited an intermediary being, Gabriel, to daemonize his utterances, yet without affecting the impression that he remains humanized. In this way his kenosis would not be spoiled. Mu˛ammad‘s daemonization also contained an imitation, a clinamen and a tessera; for he borrowed the ‗angel‘ from biblical sources to replace the opposing medium of pre‐Islamic poets; the daemons or , and his swerve was triumphant in view of the nature of the ‗good‘ religious message he was trying to convey. In the end he was triumphant: his words considered mercilessly ―divine‖ while he is ―human‖, yet a very ―strong‖ human. Darwısh has no hope in depriving Mu˛hammad of this strength by ‗humanizing‘ him; for he had already done that and even insisted on his humanity. His words cannot be re‐humanized unless Darwısh succeeds in persuading us that his poem is daemonically or even divinely original and cannot be easily imitated by humans.

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But what can he possibly do to strike any balance in this battle and at least injure his precursor? There are simply too many obstacles. He is unable to claim access to any supernatural sources no matter how innovative his new medium may be. He could not make the same fault as did al‐Mutanabbı who have allegedly claimed prophecy with no luck. He lives in a time where the historicity of prophetic model has become more obvious,86 which means that Darwısh must either swerve to a new ‗metaphorical‘ supernatural medium, or to something else, as long as he does not claim prophecy or real access to supernatural sources. Of course he is aware that he can always wish for a similar position as those whom Orr calls ‗secular prophets‘, like poets (e.g the Romantics) or philosophers (e.g. Marx, Nietzsche) who sometimes ―pass muster as such inspired or special imparters of cultural woe or sublime expression.‖87 Thus Darwısh still has the option of becoming ―self– styled‖ modern prophet.88 Darwısh takes this chance and constructs his modern ‗style‘ by swerving from supernatural ‗figures‘ and using a conceptual expression (‗the supernatural‘) rather than an imaginable one (‗angel‘) for the intermediary being. This may be considered an act of de‐daemonization (in the sense that there is no daemonic figure) which is itself a tessera. He may have thought it clever to add a secular, philosophical twist to his text, by which he assert his difference from superstitious prophets or ‗naïve‘ believers in the reality of mythical figures. Again, his movement is not efficiently corrective: Darwısh presented nothing new to the image or scene of the revelation narrative at all, which means that imagining his conceptual ‗al‐ghayb‘ speaking to a poet in the desert would require referring to Mu˛ammad‘s scene, and so the latter would retain its priority (and, therefore, authority) in comparison to Darwısh‘s text. Besides, striking a conversation with an imaginable figure (although

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mythical) is probably far more rememberable than a conversation with a concept. For concepts often necessitate images as Aristotle once asserted, but images rarely need concepts and they will perhaps always have the advantage of priority. Darwısh by using an abstract concept derived from a precursor‘s text has not only failed to ‗turn his lateness into earliness‘, but may have even caused his text more lateness and harm. Had the conversation with a concept not been based on so obvious and powerful a scene, he might have at least gained memorability and his anti‐daemonization might have embodied a meaningful completion. Another de‐daemonization exists in the fact that Darwısh has al‐ghayb speak and converse with the poet, answering his humble questions in a somewhat ―human‖ way and even asking the poet: ―put your name in my hand.‖ With this Darwısh swerves from Mu˛ammad‘s Gabriel who merely ‗orderes‘ him to read and ‗dictates‘ the Qur‘an to him, and as this latter conduct is certainly more characteristic of any supernatural power who has access to the unknown, the powers of Darwısh and his supernatural medium will furthermore be weakened. But would Darwısh surrender after all these abusive breakdowns? No, not yet. His remaining strength comes from a successful revision, which is the simple fact that his scene itself, the whole conversation with al‐ghayb, admits to its fictionality and does not claim actuality as the Islamic text. In all probability, a writer who confesses to his human limitations and uses supernatural elements as metaphors would be taken more seriously than a conventional claimer of prophecy. Darwısh made good use of the logosphere of his age, where rationality – even if logocentric – remains more intellectually respected than unsecular orthodox beliefs.

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Another relapse is caused by Darwısh‘s choice to place the conversation with the ‗supernatural‘ in the desert, obviously alone where no one is around. In Bloom‘s ratios this is called askesis, ―a movement of self‐purgation which intends the attainment of a state of solitude.‖89 The aim of such ―curtailing‖ is the separation from others including the precursor, to make his poem undergo an askesis too and thus truncate his endowment.90 The first problem with this movement for Darwısh is that it attempts something that has already been done: Mu˛ammad had already separated from others and spent days in the cave of ‘, which may be more suitable for ―curtailing‖ than Darwısh‘s open desert. Darwısh left the Syrian coast for solitude in the desert, but this is also an imitative antithesis or tessera of Mu˛ammad‘s many journeys from the desert to Syria. These journeys may have been the cause of his learnedness which we barely know anything about, and which eventually resulted in a well‐contemplated victory. Therefore even this askesis is an ‗imitation‘, which is the very fear that askesis is trying to purgate the ephebe of its self‐destructive consequences. The second problem is that Darwısh‘s choice of the eastern desert to separate himself from his precursor is a fatal mistake given that this particular place is haunted by Mu˛ammad‘s presence, for it is where he lived, became a glorious prophet, and died. Darwısh‘s askesis or poetic sublimation would therefore be hindered. These obsessive ideas will keep recurring to him unless he converts his negative impulses to their opposites through others ratios or mechanisms of defense.91 The core of the struggle comes about when the allusion to Mu˛ammad‘s narrative becomes clear at the point of ―uktub‖, whose imperative morphological structure resembles ―iqra’‖ which was also uttered by a supernatural source. But this imitation is

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nonetheless conflictual for ―Write!‖ includes several revisionary ratios. It is a clinamen because it relies on a misunderstanding of Mu˛ammad‘s ―Read‖ or ―Recite‖, which Darwısh has obviously misinterpreted as having a fixed meaning that excludes the act of producing written work. It is also a tessera as it involves an antithetical use of Mu˛ammad‘s word and its falsification, probably in the hope of replacing the prophetic imperative ―Read‖ with the poetic imperative ―Write‖. These two ratios are the rhetorical counterparts of reaction‐formation, turning against the self, and reversal, but unfortunately these mechanisms will not be sufficiently protective, in view of the following revisionary faults. To begin with, one should note that Darwısh‘s entire conversation with ‗the supernatural‘ revolves around writing. After the first ‗Write‘, the poet answers: ―there is another writing on the mirage‖, revealing his anxiety of influence and fear of being derivative. After several humble responses from the poet, al‐ghayb tells him that by writing the poet will be able to know the words, to know where he was, where he is, how he came and whom he will be tomorrow, and above all he will know al‐ghayb itself who will then order the poet to leave ―like clouds in the expanse.‖ Here the emphasis on the epistemological function of writing is apparent, and this is a clinamen as it does not assume that Mu˛ammad‘s text contains this idea, although it lucidly does. We ―read‖ what is ―written‖, and in the Sıra version of the revelation story, Gabriel came to Mu˛ammad with a (Persian ornamented cloth) 92 containing a book. And although ―Read‖ itself does not include a command of writing (by the same person who reads) as much as ―Write‖ implicitly involves a double command of reading and writing, the revelation scene does end with the Qur‘anic verses which conclude in stressing the epistemological function of writing: ―Recite: In the Name of thy Lord who created, created Man of a

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blood‐clot. Recite: And thy Lord is the Most Generous, who taught by the Pen, taught Man that he knew not.‖ By writing, according to Mu˛ammad, we learn what we did not previously know. Darwısh chose to misread this the way it has often been misread in both classical and modern times, i.e., with reference to the might of God who teaches people through revelation what they do not know, and who taught them to write by the pen after they were illiterate.93 This dominating interpretation is merely a possible misinterpretion which chooses not to shed light on the link between writing and truth, and this is perhaps what made it tempting for Darwısh to trick his readers into thinking he has ―completed‖ the Qur‘anic text with his ―Write!‖ as a ―token of recognition‖. But he nonetheless fails: for not all readers choose the traditional misinterpretation or choose to see the Qur‘anic verses as a ―broken vessel‖. This failure is further emphasized by the fact that Mu˛ammad‘s ―Read!‖ is itself a tessera which contains an intriguing ―completion‖ of the Biblical text, where there is only a repeated order of reading and a repeated answer ―I am not learned.‖ Mu˛ammad added the ―missing‖ notion of writing and its connection to knowledge, therefore ―completing‖, antithetically, the biblical text, possibly gaining a certain priority over it, and making his vessel well‐protected against potential distortions. After all these breakdowns, Darwısh seems too exhausted to think clearly. When he writes that ―he who writes his story inherits the land of speech and possesses meaning completely‖, he implies a land of subjective meanings which the poet acquires by his own effort in writing. By this he apparently opposes, through a tessera, the Qur‘anic reference where people acquire land according to the wishes of God rather than their own. The tessera is fruitless because it is burdened by a contradiction; which is the ―superficial optimism‖94 contained in ―he who writes his story inherits the land

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of speech and possess meaning completely‖, which contradicts all the agony of subjectivity and even becomes closer to logocentric prophecy than to deconstructive poetry. And besides, could subjective knowledge help in possessing any meaning ―completely‖? Has he any strength left? Barely. What made him even weaker is that he had ‗the supernatural‘ say that by writing the poet will know ‗how you came‘. This is a clinamen since it misinterprets Mu˛ammad‘s ―Recite: In the Name of thy Lord who created, created Man of a blood‐clot.‖ Darwısh chose to read this as meaning that God has created Man who should therefore ―read‖ in His name, and so he executes a tessera by reversing his misinterpretation and suggesting the reverse (the Arabic or qalb): by writing Man can know where he came from. For Darwīsh, knowledge of creation comes, not only after reading as he understands from the Qur‘anic verses, but also after writing. But this idea is also contained in Mu˛ammad‘s ―Recite: And thy Lord is the Most Generous, who taught by the Pen, taught Man that he knew not‖, where knowledge comes after being taught by the pen. Even ―Read‖ contains this notion, for the process of reading comes after another process of writing. Naturally, we ―read‖ what is ―written‖, even if it was written by someone else. Thus it seems that Darwısh is almost completely defeated on the rhetorical level, which makes us expect that he has gone through a psychological hell. His ―write‖ has not only failed to easily free him of his anxiety, but it even pushed him into conflicts which he may have not expected. ―Writing‖ and ―speaking‖, as Freud told us, may be symbols for unconscious struggles with either the superego or with the id. Darwısh ―wrote‖ a poem where he imagined himself speaking ―orally‖ to ‗the supernatural‘ who repeatedly orders him to ―write‖, which he does in the end, and even writes about the

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advantages of ―writing‖ in inheriting lands of ―speech‖. As for Mu˛ammad, he claimed to be unable to read or write, and he imagines himself speaking ―orally‖ to Gabriel who repeatedly orders him to ―read‖ or ―recite‖ orally, and tells him of the benefits of ―writing‖. The récit‐cadre does not allude to Mu˛ammad‘s submission to the order of reading. Darwısh chose to involve himself more in the oral conversation with al‐ghayb and kept asking humble questions, swerving from Mu˛ammad‘s terrified attitude where all he could say was ―what shall I read?‖ or ―I do not know how to read.‖ Thus we are dealing with two ―written‖ texts which presumably reveal certain psychological struggles. Bloom reminds us of the Socratic and Midrashic realization that ―writing limits dialectic‖. 95 This helps us understand why both Mu˛ammad and Darwısh chose oral encounters with a transcendental figure or concept: it is because they needed the encounter to be dialectical, for all the ratios aiming at discontinuity and strength are necessarily dialectical and require a somewhat dynamic rivalry which cannot be achieved by written correspondence. They both wanted to be physically present in the scenes they created, and have their prompt, ―conscious‖ defenses recorded as statements of their strength. Bloom also reminds us of Freud‘s idea that the inhibition of writing relates to the coital symbolic meaning it has acquired, and therefore to the avoidance of a conflict with the id. 96 Speech, however, is inhibited to avoid conflict with the superego, for speech is cognitively primary to writing. 97 As for the precursors, Bloom notes that Freud knew that they are absorbed into the id and not into the superego, which is why ―Influence‐anxieties of all kinds, with all their afflictions of secondariness, therefore inhibit writing, but

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not nearly so much the oral, logocentric tradition of prophetic speech.‖98 So when Darwısh ―writes‖ a poem, he tries to ―sublimate‖ his instinctual impulses. He gets into a conflict with his id, where his precursor‘s poetry is ―introjected‖. This introjection was initially aimed at overcoming an instinct,99 which may here be the instinct of a one‐sided ephebe‘s love for the precursor. To keep on writing means freeing oneself from a prolonged introjection or a prolonged love affair in which the id acts according to the pleasure principle, so as to become original, sublime, and experience the pleasure of power. Yet in the beginning Darwısh was torn between two desires, imitation or complete absorption of the precursor on one hand, and originality or discontinuity on the other. And as the former means his poetic death, he decides to engage in an ―oral‖ conversation with a supernatural figure, and gets into a conflict with his superego. This helps him use the defense mechanism of ―projection‖ in which he attempts to reduce his anxiety by attributing his unwanted thoughts to another figure, 100 which is here al‐ghayb, his personified superego, whom he has telling him to ―write‖ and giving justification for it. So this ―write‖ is actually Darwısh‘s thought and desire for sublimation, which is why he unhesitantly submits to al‐ghayb and ―writes‖, not listening to the threat of the precursors introjected into his id. He thinks he has sublimated and ―inherited the land of speech‖, and solved the conflict with his superego by submitting to its orders. This may be true, but he is also has trapped himself into an ongoing conflict with the id, where his initial love for his father is safely stored and incorporated. To triumph in this conflict his ‗writing‘ must bring him more pleasure than his love for his precursor has ever brought him before. Unfortunately this does not happen, and his psychological conflicts do not come to an end.

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As for Mu˛ammad, he claimed not to be able to write, as though he was tricking his id into thinking he will never be in conflict with it. His story is initially oral, pulling him directly into a conflict with his superego, where he remains mostly quite and scared throughout. He undergoes a projection, and has Gabriel tell him to read or recite; i.e. that he must keep up the conflict with his superego rather than his id, as an extension of the trap created for the latter with which he remains in conflict the whole time; for was ―written‖, and Mu˛ammad even insisted that nothing among what he says should be recorded in writing except the Qur‘an. Through such an implicit, sly conflict with the extent that Darwısh does not have an option but to absorb its author into his id, imitate the orality of the encounter, and get into psychological conflicts if he were to reach sublimation as a poet. Looking at the rivals‘ reactions to their encounters with their personalized superegos, we see that Darwısh decided to swerve from Mu˛ammad by changing the reaction from fear and terror to an active participation in the scene, through giving al‐ghayb several humble comments such as ―there is another writing on the mirage‖; ―I lack absence‖; ―I have not learnt the words‖; before he submits to its orders and ―writes‖. In addition to a clinamen, this act also contains a kenosis, an emptying‐out which aims psychologically at overcoming a certain repetition‐compulsion. The obsessive images which keep recurring to Darwısh are al‐ghayb‘s repeated ―write‖, itself Darwısh‘s ―projected‖ obsession or desire for writing. His repeated answer ―so I said … so I said... and I said‖, reveals his horror of not being able to write and talking repetitiously instead. As a defense mechanism, he undergoes a kenosis in the hope of a ―magical undoing‖ through which he gains mastery over his

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obsessions. Sadly, the kenosis is not humble enough to ―undo‖ his compulsion, for compared to Mu˛ammad‘s reaction, it is even not humble at all. Mu˛ammad could not say anything more than ―I do not know how to read‖, or ―what shall I read‖, and after Gabriel released him, caught him forcibly and pressed him twice so that he could not bear him anymore (a scene well‐crafted), he kept asking the same question. When someone encounters Gabriel or a ‗supernatural‘, such a terrified, almost speechless reaction is more logical and definitely more humble. In Darwısh‘s case not only the humbling was not enough to ―undo‖ his repetition‐compulsion, but it also went the wrong way when it made him submit to the supernatural completely and follow its order of writing. This submission scandalously contradicts his initial spirit of being a subjectivist revisionist and against transcendental orders. Mu˛ammad‘s kenosis, although well‐acted, did not lead him to complete submission to Gabriel, although his reaction reveals that he has gone through the process of undoing his obsessions of ―being read‖ projected upon Gabriel. Afterall he did claim that after the first revelation he went to his wife Khadıja and asked her to ‗enwrap him‘ as implied in sürat al‐Muddaththir which begins with ‗O thou enwrapped in thy robes‘ (‗y al‐muddaththir‘) (74:1); and as appears in Islamic literatures which note that his words to Khadıja were ‗zammilünı, zammilünı‘ or ‗daththirünı‘ (enwrap me). Even such post‐revelation kenosis, rather than producing mere submission, became so powerful that any slight imitation of this repeated word ―enwrap me‖, such as 101 Darwısh‘s ―daththirını, daththirını‖ and even his ―daffi’ını‖ (warm me) in the love poem ‗Lam anta’ir a˛adan‘;102 would inevitably seem derivative.

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So far, Darwısh has used five revisionary ratios to try and overcome Mu˛ammad and clear some space for himself in the Arabic tradition. His position in the remaining Bloomian movement confirms his failure. III.3 The Failure to Beget Himself When Mu˛ammad condemned poets rather than poetry in s. In the end, the struggle would either maintain the hierarchical relation of precursor and ephebe, or would result in the ephebe begetting himself and turning the precursor into his son. The latter is the ephebe‘s aim, if he is strong, for no ―strong maker‖, as Bloom says, would desire ―the realization that he has failed to create himself.‖103 To escape this scenario, for Bloom, the late poet should culminate his revisions with one final ratio: the Apophrades or ―the return of the dead‖. The term is taken from ―the Athenian dismal or unlucky days upon which the dead returned to inhabit the houses in which they had lived.‖104 Here the poet, for Bloom, holds his poem open to the precursor‘s work again, but this time it should seem to us ―as though the later poet himself had written the precursor‘s characteristic work.‖105 The problem with this last ratio in Darwısh‘s case, is that Mu˛ammad, the strong ―dead‖ poet and prophet, would come again and ―darken‖ the vulnrerable ―living‖ Darwısh.106 Darwısh has not proved that he has any ―unique gift‖,107 by which he could distort his precursor‘s text and make it look derivative. In fact, Mu˛ammad returns ―intact‖, and his return ―impoverishes‖ the later poet, Darwısh, dooming him ―to be remembered—if at all—as having ended in poverty‖; in an ―imaginative need‖ which he could not himself ―gratify.‖108 This is because Darwısh‘s ratios were far more

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loaded with imitations than with successful revisions. His clinamens were mostly based on commonplace misinterpretations; his tesseras could not be original ―completions‖ for the antithetical meanings were mostly present in Mu˛ammad‘s texts, even explicitly at times; his daemonization was a weak imitation; his movements of kenosis were not as humble as the precursor‘s; and his askesis was not as purifying as Mu˛ammad‘s cave solitude. This makes a successful apophrades and a persuasive illusion of priority impossible. Hence Mu˛ammad maintains his strength and priority in tradition, his presence would not be voided, and he remains ―the‖ father of a son who has failed, in this poem, to beget himself after suffering from severe mi˛na or anxiety of influence.

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Notes 1

All translations of Qur‘anic verses are Arberry‘s in The Koran Interpreted (Oxford: OUP, 1998) unless otherwise indicated. 2 n Ma˛müd Darwısh (The Latest Works) (Beirut: Riad el‐Rayyes Books, 2004), pp.437‐537; see p. 454. 3 Ibn al‐Athır, al‐Mathal al‐s ’ir fı adab al‐k tib wa al‐sh ir, ed. Mu˛ammad Mu˛yı al‐Dın Abd al‐˘amıd (Beirut,: al‐Maktaba al‐ aßriyya, 1995), vol. 1, p. 143. 4 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: a Theory of Poetry (New York: OUP, 1973), p. 26. 5 From ‗Il sh La urıd tantahı (I do not want this poem to end) (Beirut: Riad el‐Rayyes Books, 2009), pp. 141‐146; see pp. 141‐142. 6 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 64. 7 In his collection (Why did you leave the horse alone?), , pp. 376‐380; see particularly p. 378. 8 Ibid., p. 376‐377. 9 Ibid., p. 377. 10 Mohammed Arkoun suggests using this term for explanatory framing narratives of Qur‘anic verses; see Arkoun, ―Lecture de la Sourate 18‖, Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 35(3‐4) (1980), pp. 418‐435; see p. 426. 11 It is also known that sürat (1) and sürat al‐Muddaththir (74) are sometimes considered to be the first to be sent down. 12 In : Arabic‐English, trans. ∑a˛ı˛ , 1, p. 22 and vol. 3 (Book of Exegesis), pp. 1593‐1594. See a slightly different al‐Sıra al‐nabawiyya (a recension of Ibn Is˛aq‘s sıra), ed. ‡ h Abd al‐Ra‘üf Sa d (Beirut, D r al‐Jıl, 1991), vol. 2, pp. 69‐75, and a translation in The Lif , trans. A. Guillaume (Oxford: OUP, 1987), pp. 105‐107. 13 al‐Sıra al‐nabawiyya, vol. 2, p. 72. 14 Arberry‘s translation of ‗iqra’‘ as ‗recite‘ may be more accurate if we take into consideration Mu˛ammad‘s illiteracy claim, yet in the Sīra version Gabriel comes to Mu˛ammad with a cloth containing a book and tells him ‗iqra’‘. As it will be shown that Darwīsh has most probably taken ‗iqra’‘ to mean ‗read‘, I shall choose this translation regardless of what ‗iqra’‘ may have meant in its original context. 15

tantahı, pp. 35‐55; see p. 42. 16 http://www.humanite.fr/2004‐04‐15_Cultures_‐Mahmoud‐Darwich‐Pour‐moi‐la ‐poesie‐est‐liee‐a‐la‐paix

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See for example Balqis al‐Karaki, ―Qur‘anic Intertextuality in the Poetry of Ma˛müd Darwısh‖, unpublished M‐Phil thesis, (Cambridge University, Faculty of Oriental Studies, 2004), pp. 68‐69. 18 In , al‐jadıda, pp. 381‐384, see p. 384. 19 See , vol. 4, p. 1936 and ∑a˛ı˛ , , vol. 4, p. 1939. 20 See al‐Karaki, ―Qur‘anic Intertextuality‖, pp. 36‐78. 21 In , pp. 47‐48. 22 Ibid., p. 50. 23 Graham Allen, Intertextuality (London, NY: Routledge, 2000), p. 134. 24 Maxime Rodinson, Muhammad: Prophet of Islam (London: Tauris Parke, 2002), Forward, p. vi. 25 For ˛all with , vol. 1, p. 95; for , p. 319. 26 Muß†af al‐Saqq et al. (eds.), Ta rıf al‐qudam ’ bi abı al‐ Al ’ (Egypt: Ma†ba at d r al‐kutub al‐mißriyya, 1944), p. 21. 27 Eliot, To Criticise the Critic and Other Writings (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 18. 28

(History of Polemic Poems in Arabic Poetry) (Cairo: Maktabat al‐nah∂a al‐mißriyya, 1946), p .6. 29 See for example al‐Karaki, Qur’anic Intertextuality, pp. 45‐62. 30 Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (London: Macmillan press, 1977), p. 129 and Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes (Paris: Seuil, 1975), p. 133. 31 Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York, Oxford: OUP, 1975), p. 101 32 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 64. 33 Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard (London, Vintage: 2002), p. 137. 34 Bloom, A Map of Misreading, p. 32. 35 Ibn Rashıq, 36

, ed. Mufıd Qam˛iyya, 2nd

Ibn al‐Athır, , vol. 1, p. 143. Ibn al‐Athır says that he borrows the idea from a prophet‘s saying where marrying a relative is not advised as it results in bearing weak children, which for Ibn al‐Athır is caused by the shyness among relatives, thus hindering the complete satisfaction of desire (ibid.). 38 Graham Allen‘s phraseology in Intertextuality, p. 138. See Bloom, The Western Canon: the books and schools of the ages (London: Macmillan, 1995).

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Mohammed Arkoun, al‐dını (The Qur‘an: From Traditional Exegesis to Religious Discourse Analysis), trans. H shim ∑ li˛ (Beirut: D r al‐‡alı a, 2001). p. 84, and M. Godelier, La Production des Grands Hommes (Paris: Fayard, 1996). 40 See Arkoun, , p. 87. 41

http://www.humanite.fr/2004‐04‐15_Cultures_‐Mahmoud‐Darwich‐Pour‐moi‐la‐ poesie‐est‐liee‐a‐la‐paix 42 From , , pp. 277‐281; see p. 279. 43 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London, New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 354‐355. 44 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 31. 45 Ibid. 46 Translation of A. J. Arberry in Poems of al‐Mutanabbı (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), p. 82. 47 annaka lam takun‘ (‗Forgotten as if you have not existed‘), from (Do not apologize for what you have done), , pp. 75‐77, see p. 76. 48 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 61. 49 Ibid., p. 148. 50 rd See 51

Bloom, Anxiety, p. 5. Ibid., p. 10. 53 Ibid., p. 57. Bloom‘s phraseology. 54 Ibid., pp. 57‐58. Bloom‘s phraseology mostly. 55 Ibid., p. 57‐58. 56 Ibid., pp. 57‐59. 57 Ibid., pp. 59, 61. 58 , p. 39. 59 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 61. 60 Ibid., pp. 63‐64. 61 Quoted in ibid., p. 64. 62 Ibid. 63 , pp. 46, 113. 64 See Ibn Man÷ür, , m‐˛‐n. 65 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 1: The Will to Knowledge, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 45. 66 Bloom, A Map of Misreading, p. 12. 67 Graham Allen‘s elaboration in Intertextuality, p. 139. 68 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 8. 69 Ibid., p. 14. 52

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Bloom, Anxiety, p. 80; and A Map of Misreading, p. 71. Mary Orr observes that these are the three primary functions of intertextuality (See Mary Orr, Intertextuality: Debates and Contexts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 7). 72 See Ibn Rashıq, , ed. th p. 282 and Ibn al‐Athır, , vol. 2, p. 359. 73 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 14. 74 Ibid., pp. 14, 66. 75 Bloom, A Map of Misreading, p. 72. 76 , pp. 113‐114. 77 See Wen‐chin Ouyang, Literary Criticism in Medieval Arabic‐Islamic Culture: the Making of a Tradition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), pp. 58‐59. 78 From , , p. 453. 79 See for example Q. (29: 48), although many scholars argued against this claim. ub?‖ in , vol. 1 (Beirut: Centre of the Studies of Arab Unity, 2006), pp. 77‐98. 80 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 14. 81 Ibid., pp. 14‐15. 82 In , pp. 376‐377. 83 See Q. (17:90‐93). 84 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 100. 85 Ibid., p. 15. 86 See Arkoun, , p. 86. 87 Orr, Intertextuality, p. 153. 88 Ibid., p. 154. 89 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 15. 90 Ibid. 91 See ibid., pp.115‐119. 92 al‐Sıra al‐nabawiyya, vol. 2, pp. 70‐71. 93 As a classical example see Fat˛ al‐b rı, p. 26. As a modern 71

(Beirut: Centre for Studies of Arab Unity, 2008), pp. 27‐28. 94 See Orr, Intertextuality, p. 154 on the superficial optimism of prophets. 95 Bloom, A Map of Misreading, p. 42. 96 Ibid., p. 49. 97 Ibid., p. 50. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid., p. 74. 100 See ibid.

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101

From Hiya ughniya, hiya ughniya, Dıw n Ma˛müd Darwısh (Beirut: D r wda, 1994), vol. 2, pp. 274‐277; see p. 276. 102 From Sarır al‐gharıba, , pp. 615‐618, see p. 617. 103 Bloom, Anxiety, p. 5. 104 Ibid., p. 15. 105 Ibid., p. 16. 106 See ibid., p. 139. 107 See ibid., p. 140 108 Ibid., p. 141. al‐

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Amplifications of Religious Fundamentalism in Fiction

Al-Saqqaf’s Qissat Irhabi vs Updike’s Terrorist Riyad Manqoush riadmanqoush@yahoo.com

Dr. Noraini Md. Yusof animy@ukm.my

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ruzy Suliza Hashim ruzy@ukm.my

School of Language Studies and Linguistics Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities National University of Malaysia Selangor, Malaysia.

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Abstract: This paper is intended to examine the amplifications of the Jewish fundamentalism in Arabic fiction, mainly in Hussein al-Saqqaf’s Qissat Irhabi (2007), and also Islamic fundamentalism in American fiction, particularly in John Updike’s Terrorist (2006). The comparison is supposed to shed light on the Judeophobic traits that prevail in the Arab culture and conversely Islamophobia that dominates America. The methodology of the analysis is an appropriation of the comparative paradigm which is framed according to our discussion of the French school and Marxist approach of comparative literature. The parameter of the comparison is Gerard Genette and Allen’s concept of amplification that refers to the process in which a text focuses on certain elements of another text to expand, detail and highlight them. Appropriating this notion, we argue that the two novels amplify the issue of religious fundamentalism in their contexts. Our analysis concludes that alSaqqaf disseminates Judeophobic traits and Updike displays Islamophobic mannerism. For instance, the former concentrates on the extremist rabbis and the Sicarii to highlight the Jewish fundamentalism and the terrorist acts that are carried out under the banner of Judaism. Conversely, Updike stresses on the character of the fanatic imam and his student to overstate Islamic fundamentalism which, as he claims, prompts young Muslims towards terrorism. Hence, the two authors shed light on two different versions of religious fundamentalism in their respective novel to assert certain ideas which mostly coincide with the cultural and ideological background of each of them. Keywords: religious fundamentalism, terrorism, comparative literature, American fiction, Arab fiction...

1 Introduction

hrough a comparative study between the Arab Hussein alSaqqaf‟s Qissat Irhabi (2007), and the American John Updike‟s Terrorist (2006), this paper is intended to examine the amplifications of Jewish fundamentalism in Arabic fiction and also Islamic fundamentalism in American fiction. This comparison is supposed to shed light on the Judeophobic traits that prevail in

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the Arab culture and conversely Islamophobia that dominates America. Since the essay reflects two different literary traditions and cultures, we will appropriate the comparative paradigm to be the methodology of our analysis of both texts. The concept of amplification will be utilised as the parameter of that comparison. In fact, this comparative methodology has carefully been selected for our analysis because the two novels are written in two different languages—Arabic and English—and expose two different views about the issue of religious fundamentalism and world terrorism.

2. Literature Review History has been the inspiration of many writers of literature. Its impact on the literary productions has provoked a number of researchers to examine certain works with the aim of exposing that influence. Since this essay is concerned with Arabic and American fiction only, we will merely investigate the scholarly writings that dealt with these two literary traditions. For instance, Saddik Gahar (2006: 5) investigates the resonance of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestinian poetry, especially during the Palestinian Intifada against the Israelis. Gohar‟s research also “critically examines social, historical and human zones of contact between contemporary native American poets and the Arab/Palestinian Intifada poets in order to illuminate issues of common interest that characterize the poetic discourse of both sides.” This comparison is justifiable because both the Red Indians in America and the Arabs in Palestine were eradicated from their lands. While the European settlers defeated the Red Indians and colonised America, the Jews did the same with the Arabs in Palestine. Gahar (2006: 5) ends his paper, which uncovered the “political and textual spaces in these two poetic traditions,” with the statement that “the attitude toward native land, identity, struggle and other motifs that penetrate the poetic narrative of Palestinian and Native American poets” is

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almost the same. This similarity foregrounds the trauma of eradication which the two nations experienced.

Just like Gohar, Dalia Said Mostafa (2009: 208) argues that the “Lebanese civil war (1975-1990)” inspired a number of Lebanese novelists. Mostafa‟s study focuses merely on two writers as quoted below:

In this study, I aim to investigate three related themes, namely trauma, memory, and identity by exploring Elias Khoury‟s two early novels Gates of the City [Abwāb al-Madīnah] and The White Faces [alWujūh al-Baydā'], which were both published in 1981, whilst drawing comparisons between them and Rabī Jābir‟s novel Rālf Rizqallah in the Mirror [Rālf Rizqallah fī al-Mir'āt], which was published in 1997 (Mostafa 2009: 208, square brackets and italics original).

Based on her analysis of these works, Mostafa (2009: 208) concludes that “Jābir‟s text shares some significant characteristics … with some themes of Gates of the City, particularly in the representation of such traumatic disorders as disorientation, nightmares, depression and severe anxiety when reflecting on the experience of the civil war”. She also claims that “Khoury and Jābir fictionalise the experiences of trauma, memory, and identity in the three novels” (Mostafa 2009: 208). In fact, this conclusion coincides with another research by Dina Amin (2010: 108) who investigate the same history in Hudā Barakāt‟s Hārith al-Miyāh (1998). Both scholars prove that the Lebanese civil war has been carved in Lebanese literature.

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Similar to the scholarly studies covered above, we will attempt in this paper to examine the employment of history in fiction but with a special emphasis on the issue of religious fundamentalism. Since the two novels selected for this essay may expose Judeophobic and Islamophobic characteristics, we need to explain these to concepts. According to John G. Robertson (2003: 108), “Judeophobia” refers to the “excessive fear of Jews or an abnormal hatred of Jews.” The term “Judeophobia” will be of significance in my analysis of the Arabic novel. In addition to that, according to Jackie Dreyer (2010), the term “Islamophobia” means “prejudice against, or an irrational fear of, Islam or Muslims” (Dreyer 2010). This concept can assist us in understanding some of the portrayals in the American novel.

3. Comparative Methodology of the Analysis

We have illustrated earlier that the comparative paradigm will be appropriated to frame our analysis of the two novels. This paradigm requires adequate knowledge of the concept “comparative literature [which] owes its origin and title to a series of French anthologies published in 1816 under title Cours de Literature Comparée” (Das 2005: 124). The French Philarète Chasles defines “comparative literature” as the study of “the influence of thought upon thought” (Chasles 1973, cited in Bassnett 1993: 12). Based on Chasles‟ statement, the French comparatists focus on the word “influence”. They mainly concentrate on the impact of one nation on another. According to Ferdinad Brunetière (1974: 181), “we are defined only by comparing ourselves to others; and we do not know ourselves when we know only ourselves.” In other words, Brunetière illustrates that the study of “influence”, which has been mentioned by Chasles previously, must be between

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different national literatures because nations cannot “know” their impact on other nations except by “comparing” themselves with the “others”.

As indicated previously, the early comparative literature was used to show the hierarchy of national literature over other foreign literatures. In her explanation of point, Susan Bassnett (1993: 21) explicates that “people used the phrase „comparative literature‟ without having clear ideas about what it was. With the advantages of retrospection, we can see that „comparative‟ was set against „national‟.” Hence, the study of influence is supposed to indicate that the French culture is influential and the other cultures are merely receivers of that influential French culture. This perception is problematic and it transmits colonial ideologies because it shows the other “nations” and cultures as embryonic.

The French comparatists insist on the linguistic element in any comparison for they assert that the comparison must be “between two languages” (Bassnett 1993: 28). According to their approach, comparing al-Saqqaf‟s Qissat Irhabi (2007), which is written in Arabic, with Updike‟s Terrorist (2006) that is written in English is accepted because the two novels come from two different cultures and are written in two different languages.

By the same token, Kristof Kozak (2003: 112) argues that the French school merely “concentrates on relations” between the different literary texts “in rather strict historical-positivist manner” for their “utmost significance is attributed to facts, factual evidences, and documents”. Since our analysis will centre on the two novels‟ treatment of religious fundamentalism, our discussions might be historical and positivist in a way that conforms to the French notion of comparative studies.

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However, the French comparatists‟ emphasis on the concept of influence runs contrary to the thoughts of the Marxist theorists who stress on the “social evolution” and the “typological analogies”. Petar Petrov (2007: 13) explicates that the French school‟s use of the term “influence” is general for they even relate the “typological similarities” between the different “national literatures” to the process of “influence”, though there are “no contacts among” these different cultures. In fact, the Marxists do not deny the impact of national literatures on one another, but they insist that there must be an “actual” and direct “contact” between them as well as “an inner need of the receiving … foreign elements” (Petrov 2007: 13). By appropriating the French and Marxist perceptions of comparative literature, we can distinguish between two types of similarities that can be shared by different national literatures. The first is related to the impact of one national literature on the other and the second is attributed to the similar “social evolutions” which the two cultures may have undergone. Linking this argument to our study, we claim that although the treatment of fundamentalism in American literature may have influenced some Arabic literary works, many American and Arab writers have employed the issue of fundamentalism in their texts because their two nations have experienced the same trauma. In other words, both underwent consequences of religious fundamentalism i.e. terrorism.

While the comparative paradigm will be utilised as a method of analysis, concept of amplification will be the focus and parameter of the comparison. We have derived the word “amplification” from the discussions of Gerard Genette (1997: 264) who utilises it to refer to the “expansion: distension of details, descriptions, multiplication of episodes and secondary characters, maximum dramatization of an adventure hardly dramatic in itself.” In other words, the “amplification” is a process in which a text

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focuses on certain elements of another text to expand, detail and highlight them. As an example of amplification, Allen (2000: 110) argues that although “Dreamworks‟ animated film Prince of Egypt” (1998) is created upon the ruins of the “the exodus of the Jewish people”, it departs from “exodus” when it emphasises on “Moses” and “the Pharaoh and his wife”. Similarly, our analysis of the novels will expose how al-Saqqaf and Updike emphasises on certain historical events and issues.

4. Amplifications of Religious Fundamentalism in Fiction

In order to make clear the distinction between the amplification of religious fundamentalism in recent Arabic and American fiction, our analysis will be divided into two sections: the first will centre on Jewish fundamentalism in al-Saqqaf‟s Qissat Irhabi and the second will focus on Islamic fundamentalism in Updike‟s Terrorist:

4.1 Jewish Fundamentalism in al-Saqqaf’s Qissat Irhabi

Al-Saqqaf excessively amplifies some events and issues which coincide with his point of view. Providing the synopsis of the text might be helpful in understanding our following discussions. Qissat Irhabi centers on a Yemeni boy, Yusof, who is kidnapped and deported with other Arab boys of his age through the desert to Israel and then by a plane to the USA. They are put in camps inhabited by heartless and fanatic Jews called the Sicarii. Yusof and his friends are brainwashed till they believe that the Sicarii represent God. Although Yusof was not ordered to participate in 9/11 attacks, he has been sent to Iraq to practise terrorism within the different Muslim doctrines. Their organisation aims to spark a

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religious and regional civil strife in Iraq for unknown reasons. One day, Yusof is given orders to explode himself in a Sunni mosque at Salat al-Maghrib. When he enters the mosque and hears the imam reciting the Quran, Yusof remembers his childhood in Yemen. He falls into tears and leaves the mosque, ignoring the explosives that are fastened under his shirt. As a result, secret agents of the Sicarii follow Yusof and shoot him in the shoulder. He manages to escape from them and hides in a deserted house. There, an Iraqi student assists him and calls his family in Yemen. The story ends when Yusof travels to Yemen by Syria using a forged passport.

Since the novel relates terrorism to a Jewish terrorist group called the Sicarii, most of its author‟s portrayals are intended to amplify this fundamentalist and terrorist group. For instance, through Yusof‟s description in the quotation below, al-Saqqaf sheds light on the radical beliefs of his fictional antagonists, the Sicarii:

We work in the Sicarii Unit which belong to the secret Masada Group. In Hebrew, the word “Sicarii” means “terrorists”. In fact, terrorism is rooted in our faith. We are good at the art of hasty fighting which we learned since our childhood. We are also capable of getting out of the dilemmas that we face. We undoubtedly believe that the real martyrdom is to kill yourself for the free Jewish homeland where there are no beggars or non-Jews (p.49, commas original).

This portrayal reinforces the theme of the novel that attributes terrorism to the Jews. For instance, the indication that the “the word Sicarii [which] means terrorists” is “Hebrew” has a

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significant meaning. In fact, most traditional texts relate intimidation to the Arabs and Muslims only, but this novel seems to resist such accusation and instead it exposes that the Jews also have their own fundamentalists and even terrorists. However, the sentence “terrorism is rooted in our faith” can be problematic because it is not clear whether Yusof alludes to Judaism in general or he merely means the “faith” of “the Sicarii Unit”, the fanatic group which he belongs to. We suggest that he means the latter because his other portrayals merely centre on the Sicarii who are portrayed as “good at the art of hasty fighting” and are “also capable of getting out of the dilemmas”. In addition to that, the same excerpt indicates that the Sicarii are brainwashed to sacrifice themselves. As Yusof explains, “we undoubtedly believe that the real martyrdom is to kill yourself for the free Jewish homeland where there are no beggars or non-Jews.” Their insistence in having a “homeland” that is merely inhabited by the Jews exposes how extremist the Sicarii are. Countries cannot be intolerant of religious or racial minorities. Having focused on these beliefs of the Sicarii, the author attempts to convince his readers that the Jewish fundamentalists can be more dangerous than the Muslim ones.

Al-Saqqaf‟s employment of the Sicarii in his fictional text is indeed an expansion of some historical documents which assert that the Sicarii are not fictional characters, but real people who lived in Jerusalem in the first century. For instance, Yusof in the story tells that:

Our movement has deeply been rooted in history since 73 A.D. when 960 people including men, children and women, committed suicide in Masada Castle which overlooked the Dead Sea. When the Romans, as ordered by the commander Titus, had

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destroyed Jerusalem, they counted the Jews in the city and then besieged Masada Castle to exterminate all the Sicarii in retaliation for their involvement in killing the Christ and also for their increasing intimidation. But in defiance of the Romans and in response to the Toratic beliefs, the Sicarii led by Elazar recorded an epic massacre to be a flame for the revolution against the non-Jews … Thus, Elazar decorated the best masterpieces of martyrdom for the Jews in general and for the Sicarii in particular. In this task, children were killed in front of their mothers. Elazar burned the ration and money and spilled the water. Then, he ordered women to kill themselves and men to kill each other. All of them were killed except a young woman with an old woman and three kids, probably to record and document this epic and inherit it to their children and grandchildren (p.4950).

This depiction of Yusof above mirrors what has been reported by some historians. In his explanation of Josephus‟ The Wars of the Jews, Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1995: 35) exposes that: “we first find the name Sicarii mentioned by Josephus in connection with events that took place between 52-62 A. D.” Although the novel relates the “roots” of the Sicarii to “73 A.D.”, it converges with BenYahuda‟s affirmation that their beginnings refer to the first century. In addition to this similarity, Ben-Yehuda (1995: 35) argues that “while the Sicarii were involved in quite a few indiscriminate terror activities, they did not shy away from committing acts of discriminate political assassinations.” The word “terror” in this document adds force to al-Saqqaf‟s attribution of “terrorism” to the Sicarii in the excerpt above. When the Romans conquered Jerusalem, the Sicarii did not surrender but hid and

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utilised different terrorist actions to eradicate any sympathisers with the Romans, even though these sympathisers were Jews (BenYehuda 1995: 35). This claim coincides with Peterson & Hamblin (2001) who argue that “from the perspective of the history of religions, the Sicarii provide a classic example of the unfortunate tendency for some religious movements to become radicalized, violently rejecting the legal, political and social consensus of the wider society.” Thus, the Sicarii were classified as terrorists when “they began to use murder, kidnapping and terrorism to support their cause … hide short daggers under their cloaks, mingle with crowds at the great festivals, murder their victims, and then disappear into the crowd during the ensuing panic” (Peterson & Hamblin 2001). These actions led other Western historians such as Randall Law (2009: 27) to share with the novelist the notion that the Sicarii are not national resistance, but a “terrorist group”.

Back to the quotation of the novel, Yusof reveals that “960 people” of the Sicarii “including men, children and women, committed suicide in Masada Castle”. Since history proves that this incident is real, we need explore what really happened in the “Masada Castle” from historians‟ point of view. According to BenYehuda (1995: 36), when the Sicarii lost a large number of their men in Jerusalem, “the rest of [them], headed by Elazar Ben-Yair … fled to Masada.” They thought that place would be out of the Romans‟ reach because “Masada is a mountain fortress nearly one hundred kilometers southeast of Jerusalem, about a ninety-minute drive from the [current Israeli] capital [that is Tel Aviv]. This rocky mountain is located about two kilometers from the west shore of the Dead Sea” (Ben-Yehuda 1995: 32, square brackets mine). However, their expectations were wrong. The Romans‟ infuriation of the Sicarii‟s terrorist acts drove them to chase the Sicarii until Masada Fortress as Ben-Yehuda (1995: 36-7, brackets original) explains below:

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The Roman soldiers effectively used their battering rams, which were put on the ramp, to hit the wall of Masada and destroy part of it. Thus, the wall of the fortress was breached. At that point, the Sicarii in Masada hastily built another wall, this time a soft wall made from wood and earth filling. This wall could absorb the ramming energy of the machines without yielding. However, the Roman soldiers set fire to the second wall and destroyed it too. Clearly, this signaled the end for the Sicarii in Masada. Their choices were clear. They could try to escape, fight to the inevitable end, surrender, or commit collective suicide. The first choice, at this stage, may have been really hopeless. Surrender meant slavery for the women and children and painful, humiliating, shameful, and strange deaths for the men. Although there were on top of Masada 967 people (only 7 of whom survived), a safe guess is that only a few hundred were actually capable of fighting, the rest being women and children and others who apparently could not fight. Elazar Ben-Yair selected the last option, a choice that was not easy. He had to make two fiery speeches to persuade the reluctant people to agree to be killed or to kill themselves. The two speeches succeeded, and the Sicarii killed one another and themselves.

A number of historians, including Ben-Yehuda, suspect that the women and children were given a time to decide to commit suicide. In other words, â&#x20AC;&#x153;the Sicarii on Masada left no choice for anyone who may have been reluctantâ&#x20AC;? (Ben-Yehuda 1995: 37). This claim coincides with other historiansâ&#x20AC;&#x; version of the same event. For instance, Mitchell Bard (2005: 41) believes that even

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men were not given choices because “ten men were chosen by lot to kill the rest. Then one man was selected to kill the other nine before taking his own life. Two women and five children hid and survived.” In fact, nobody knew about this massacre except “when the Roman soldiers entered Masada, the [two] women [and the five children] heard this noise and came out of their underground cavern, and informed the Romans what had been done” (BenYehuda 1995: 38). From this historical discussion as well as alSaqqaf‟s fictional description of Masada massacre, one would notice that the novel refers to the same date and also utilises the same name of the leader “Elazar”. In addition to that, he specifies the number of deaths with “960 people” which is the same number that is reported by historians. This reinforces the “validity” of al-Saqqaf‟ portrayal and indicates that he is aware of Jewish history.

In summary, al-Saqqaf‟s previous amplification of the historical background of the Sicarii is intended to highlight the Jewish fundamentalists who terrify people under the banner of Judaism. By elucidating the Sicarii‟s collective suicide in Masada Fortress, al-Saqqaf indicates that Jewish fundamentalists are more dangerous than what is recently perceived by the West as Muslim fundamentalists.

4.2 Islamic Fundamentalism in Updike’s Terrorist

While the Arab Muslim al-Saqqaf focuses on what is perceived by Arabs and Muslims as Jewish fundamentalism, the American Jew Updike excessively refers to what is perceived by the Europeans and the Americans as Islamic fundamentalism. Before we discuss some instances from the text, we will briefly highlight the plot of the novel. The story centres on an eighteen-year old Arab-

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American boy called Ahmad. He is the only child of an IrishAmerican nurse and an Egyptian exchange student. His father left the USA after he had finished his studies, leaving Ahmad with the American mother. The absence of his father leads him to trust a Yemeni imam, Shaikh Rashid, who urges him to undertake jihad. After getting brainwashed by the imam and another ArabAmerican, named Charlie, Ahmad volunteers to become a suicide bomber in Lincoln Tunnel. However, Jack Levy—a Jewish American who works as the guidance counsellor at Central High School where Ahmad studies—realises that Ahmad is deceived by the imam. The story ends when Jack knows about Ahmad‟s mission just a few minutes before the bombing and marvellously Jack succeeds in convincing him to stop driving the truck that is planned to blow up the tunnel.

Updike‟s Terrorist amplifies the notion that the fanatic teachings of Islam and particularly of some fundamentalist imams prompt young Arabs and Muslims towards terrorism. This can be seen in the story when Hermione, who works with the Homeland Security, disseminates to her sister, Elizabeth, her fear of Islamic fundamentalism. While she talks to Elizabeth by phone, Hermione says: “there are some imams, if I‟m pronouncing it right, that distinctly bear watching. They all preach terrible things against America, but some of them go beyond that. I mean, in advocating violence against the state” (Updike 2006: 132). In addition to that, Hermione somewhere else centres on terrorism. For instance, when she calls Elizabeth another time, the narrator deviates and gives a tautology about terrorism in Iraq. He reveals that “Hermione is then so silent Beth wonders if the connection has been broken off. Terrorists are blowing up oil pipes and power plants in Iraq, nothing is utterly secure any more” (Updike 2006: 260). In fact, there is no wonder that terrorists are criminals as well as no doubt that the quotation above presents dissemination of the situation in Iraq after the US occupation in 2003, but the narrator‟s

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inclusion of Iraq in the dialogue is unnatural because the two speakers are in the USA and they use US phone-lines. This deviation perhaps occurs in the novel because Updike is using every method possible, through not only plot and characterisation, but also dialogues to highlight the Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.

Updike‟ portrayals that have been discussed previously, in which he links fundamentalism and terrorism to the fanatic teachings of some imams, indeed resist al-Saqqaf‟s theme that attributes terrorism to some fundamentalist rabbis. In a fictional world, Updike makes his point of view clear, particularly through the impact of a Yemeni imam called Shaikh Rashid over a young Arab-American Muslim named Ahmad. The novel‟s view of the imam can be seen in the dialogue below between, Ahmad‟s mother, Terry and, the guidance counsellor, Jack:

“His teacher at the mosque, this Shaikh Rashid, is kind of creepy; but Ahmad‟s aware. He reveres him but distrusts him.” “You say you‟ve met him?” “Just once or twice, picking up Ahmad or dropping him off. He was very smooth and proper with me. But I could feel hatred. To him I was a piece of meat—unclean meat.” (Updike 2006: 163).

The portrayal above indicates that the imam is dangerous which can be discerned by other characters. His evil intention is not hidden under any guises. His fanaticism leads him to expose

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“hatred” towards Terry as a non-Muslim and see her as an “unclean meat”. In fact, the notion of detestation is also used somewhere else in the story where Terry reveals to Jack that “this imam of … almost never came out to say hello. He hated shaking my hand, I could tell. He never showed the slightest interest in converting me” to Islam (Updike 2006: 88). This dialogue and also the two previous ones have been employed by Updike to expose the danger of some imams like Shaikh Rashid who view the Americans as infidels and categorise them as enemies.

As an attempt to affirm his biased standpoint of the imam, Updike exposes the negative impact of the imam‟s teachings on Ahmad. For instance, Ahmad, who adopts the imam‟s view of the Americans as infidels, becomes a pessimistic guy who hates the American way of life. This can be seen when his classmate, Joryleen, tells him: “You‟re looking way serious … You should learn to smile more …. People will like you more” (Updike 2006: 6). However, he replies: “I don‟t care about that. I don‟t want to be liked” (Updike 2006: 6). Joryleen‟s sentences and Ahmad‟s reply exposes how alienated Ahmad is. While his American classmate attempts to naturalise him to the US life and culture, he insists on not intermingling with the US people and he even does not “want to be liked” by them. His solitude and carelessness urge Joryleen to try to convince him that his perception of life is wrong as quoted below:

“You scare me when you talk like that. It sounds like you hate life.” She goes on, revealing herself as freely as if she is singing, “The way I feel it, the spirit is what comes out of the body, like flowers come out of the earth. Hating your body is like hating yourself, the bones and blood and skin and shit that make you you.” (Updike 2006: 70).

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Although Joryleen loves Ahmad and attempts to convince him that he is under influence of a fundamentalist discourse, he disappoints her when he states that “her religion is the wrong one” (Updike 2006: 13). This statement is intended to reinforce what the author has shown in the earlier dialogues that some imams give extremist teachings that lead to fanaticism.

While Jack is concerned with the imam and Ahmad, the narrators captures Jack‟s fear of terrorism is where the point of view allows the reader into Jack‟s mind:

As Jack Levy sees it, America is paved solid with fat and tar, a coast-to-coast tarbaby where we‟re all stuck. Even our vaunted freedom is nothing much to be proud of, with the Commies out of the running; it just makes it easier for terrorists to move about, renting airplanes and vans and setting up Web site. Religious fanatics and computer geeks: the combination seems strange to his oldfashioned sense of the reason-versus-faith divide. Those creeps who flew the planes into the World Trade Center had good technical education. The ringleader had a German degree in city planning; he should have redesigned New Prospect (Updike 2006: 25).

The excerpt above shows a “combination” between “religious fanatics” and “terrorists”. From the whole plot of the novel, we can deduce that by religious fanatics he alludes to the extremist imams and the word “terrorists” refers to criminals who carried

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out the 9/11 attacks. This argument is underpinned by connecting fanaticism with the “creeps who flew the planes into the World Trade Center”. The narrator‟s employment of words such as “planes” and “World Trade Center” alludes to the 9/11 incident.

In fact, it might be correct that some people may disguise in religion and utilise Words of God to achieve certain goals and also some imams might utilise their positions to propagate certain ideas. Besides, there is no doubt that the 9/11 is a terrorist and criminal attack which must be condemned by all humanity, but the use of this event is not of significance to the plot of the novel. But I argue that the position of the imam is degraded in the story because indeed the majority of the imams are different from the character of Shaikh Rashid that is presented in the narrative. In other words, there is an excessive generality in the negative representation of the imam in the text. The notion that Muslim imams are behind terrorism is excessively repeated in the quotations discussed previously to profile the imams as enemies. Although all portrayals in the novel have been fictionalised, the repetition of the same notion can be dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, it can consciously or unconsciously lead people to adopt negative attitudes not only towards terrorists but also towards Arabs and Muslims in general. Secondly, it justifies the US war on terrorism and consequently it legitimises the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

5. Conclusion

From the comparison between the two novels, we can realise that al-Saqqaf and Updike have shown an amplified description of religious fundamentalism, but their attribution of that notion is different. While al-Saqqaf disseminates Judeophobic traits in his

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treatment of fanaticism, Updike displays Islamophobic mannerism. For instance, the former concentrates on the extremist rabbis and the Sicarii to highlight the Jewish fundamentalism and the terrorist acts that are carried out under the banner of Judaism. Conversely, the latter stresses on the character of the fanatic imam and his student to overstate the Islamic fundamentalism which, as he indicates, prompts young Muslims towards terrorism. Hence, we can deduce that the two authors shed light on two different versions of the same issue to assert certain ideas which mostly coincide with cultural and ideological background of each of them. Al-Saqqaf emphasises on the Sicarii and their history to provide evidence of the danger of the Jewish fundamentalism and terrorism and also to expose the Jewish fanatics as more dangerous for world peace than the Muslim fundamentalists. In contrast, Updike inflates the danger of Islamic fundamentalism and even terrorism to legitimise the US war on terror and its biased reaction against the Arabs and Muslims.

References

Allen, G. (2000). Intertextuality. London: Routledge. Al-Saqqaf, H. 2007. Qissat irhabi [Tale of a terrorist]. Sana‟a: Bin Obadi Centre. Amin, D. (2010). Disorientation and the metropolis in Hudā Barakāt‟s Hārith al-miyāh. Journal of Arabic Literature 41(1-2): 108-120. Bard, M. G. (2005). The complete idiot’s guide to Middle East Conflict. New Penguin Group.

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Bassnett, S. 1993. Comparative literature: a critical introduction. Blackwell.

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Ben-Yehuda, N. (1995). The Masada myth: collective memory and Israel. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

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Brunetière, F. (1974). European literature. In Schultz, H. J. & Rhein, P. H. Comparative literature: the early years, pp. 153-182. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press..

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Chasles, V. (1973). Foreign Literature compared. In Schultz, H. J. & Rhein, P. H. Comparative literature: the early years, pp. 13-39. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Dreyer, J. (2010). Islamophobia in America. The UWM Post, 1 November. http://www.uwmpost.com/2010/11/01/islamophobia-in-america/ retrieved in 8 November 2010. Genette, G. (1997). Palimpsest: literature in the second degree. Newman, Doubinsky. C. (trans.). New York: University of Nebraska Press.

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Gohar, S. (2006). The Poetics of Resistance: a reading of Native American and Palestinian Intifada poetry. International Journal of ArabicEnglish Studies 7: 5-28. Kozak, K. J. (2003). Comparative literature in Slovenia. In De Zepetnek, (ed.) Comparative literature and comparative cultural studies, pp. USA: Purdue University Press.

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Law, R. (2009). Terrorism: a history. Cambridge: Polity Press. Mostafa, D. S. (2009). Literary representations of trauma, memory, and identity in the Novels of Elias Khoury and Rabī' Jābir. Journal of Arabic Literature 40(2): 208-236. Peterson, D. C. & Hamblin, W. J. (2001). Who were the Sicarii?. Meridian Magazine, 15 February. http://www.meridianmagazine. com/ideas/040607Sicarii.html, retrieved in 15 February 2010. Petrov, P. (2007). Portuguese and Bulgarian literature from a comparative viewpoint. (trans.) De Carvalho, A. R. In Cieszyńska, B. E. Iberian and Slavonic cultures: contact and comparison, pp. 11-26. Lisbon: CompaRes.

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Réalisme et Utopie dans la pensée politique de Spinoza Realism and Utopia in the political thought of Spinoza

Par : Faten Karoui –Bouchoucha Résumé : Partant de l’observation du caractère paradoxal de la pensée politique chez Spinoza, je m’interroge : Comment peut-on comprendre ce paradoxe immanent à la pensée politique spinoziste, tout en tenant compte de l'aspect systématique qui la caractérise et qui exige la cohérence de tous ses éléments constitutifs? J'aborderai dans cet article cette question en ayant comme perspective, la présentation d’une approche qui tenterait de prendre en considération la spécificité de la conception spinozienne de la politique à la lumière de ces deux caractères opposés à savoir réalisme et utopie, tout en espérant apporter un nouvel éclairage à cette conception. Mots-clés: Spinozisme et politique, réalisme, utopie, contrat social, société politique… Abstract: Starting from the observation of the paradoxical nature of Spinoza’s political thought, I raise the question: How can we understand this paradox so immanent to Spinoza's political thought, while taking into account the systematic nature that characterizes it and that requires consistency of all its components? I will discuss in this article this issue with in perspective, the presentation of an approach that attempts to take into consideration the specific view of Spinoza’s polical thought in the light of these two opposite features, namely realism and utopia, while hoping to shed new light to this design. Keywords: Spinozism contract, political society... 

and political realism, utopia, social

Professeur de philosophie et chercheuse de l‟université tunisienne. Auteur de : Spinoza et la question de la puissance. Paris, l‟Harmattan, 2010.

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a pensée politique de Spinoza nous semble caractérisée par un aspect problématique. De fait, elle se présente à nous sous deux figures paradoxales. Car Spinoza se propose d'une part, à l'encontre des théories politiques traditionnelles de ses prédécesseurs1, d'élaborer en politique une théorie applicable à la réalité: "m'appliquant à la politique, affirme t-il, je n'ai pas voulu approuver quoi que ce fut de nouveau ou d'inconnu, mais seulement établir par des raisons certaines et indubitables ce qui s'accorde le mieux avec la pratique."2 Toutefois il semble d'autre part soucieux de déterminer surtout dans le Traité politique les conditions de possibilité d'institution d'une cité parfaite constituant le cadre ou pourrait se réaliser une vraie vie humaine,3 c'est Ŕà-

Ace propos, il écrit au chapitre I du Traité politique: "Ils (les philosophes)conçoivent les hommes en effet, non tels qu'ils sont, mais tels qu'eux-mêmes voudraient qu'ils fussent: de là cette conséquence, que la plupart, au lieu d'une Ethique, ont écrit une Satire, et n'ont jamais eu en Politique de vues qui puissent être mises en pratique, la Politique, telle qu'ils la conçoivent, devant être tenue pour une Chimère, ou comme convenant soit au pays d'Utopie, soit à l'âge d'or, c'est-à-dire a un temps ou nulle institution n'était nécessaire." Spinoza, Traité Politique, Chapitre I, §1, traduction par Appuhn (Ch), Paris, G- F, 1966. 2 Spinoza semble ainsi suivre les pas de Machiavel dont il reconnaît la sagesse de son enseignement. De fait en deux endroits du Traité politique, il se réclame explicitement de ce dernier, à savoir dans le paragraphe7 du chapitre 5 et dans le paragraphe1 du chapitre 10 ,en évoquant son nom en ces expressions: "le très pénétrant Machiavel" et "le très pénétrant florentin" . Ce qui laisse à entendre que dans l'élaboration de sa conception politique, il intègre certains éléments machiavéliens. Il convient à ce propos de signaler que des interprètes célèbres de la philosophie spinozienne comme Leo Strauss et Carl Gebhardt ont particulièrement insisté sur la nécessité de prendre en compte le spectre problématique de la pensée machiavélienne pour mettre en lumière les enjeux centraux du Traité politique. Dans les années soixante et soixante-dix, Louis Althusser et Toni Negri ont également souligné l‟importance déterminante de l‟apport machiavélien dans la constitution de l‟ontologie politique du philosophe hollandais. Des travaux récents permettent désormais d‟envisager la question du rapport entre Machiavel et Spinoza dans une perspective plus ample et sous un jour totalement nouveau. Vittorio Morfino consacre deux textes à l‟étude comparative de la pensée de ces deux auteurs: (Il tempo e l‟occasione. L‟incontro Spinoza Machiavelli, Milan, LED, 2002 ; Il tempo della moltitudine. Materialismo e politica prima e dopo Spinoza, Rome, Il Manifestolibri, 2005 ) 3 Ace propos Spinoza précise qu'une vraie vie humaine est" une vie qui ne se définit point par la circulation du sang et l'accomplissement des autres fonctions 1

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dire une vie libre et joyeuse ou les hommes pourraient acquérir ensemble une nature humaine supérieure.4 Aussi nous montre t-il, la possibilité d'amener aussi bien la multitude que ceux qui gouvernent à vivre suivant les préceptes de la raison en instituant un Etat puissant dont l'Autorité absolue du souverain ne met pas en danger la liberté des sujets. Ce qui inscrit du même coup sa pensée dans une perspective de rationalité hypothétique, puisqu'elle tend à dépasser le domaine de la réalité concrète pour produire une nouvelle réalité construite suivant cette exigence éthique: amener les hommes à vivre en accord avec eux-mêmes et avec les autres, en leur apprenant à être et agir adéquatement. Et comme cette nouvelle réalité se présente à nous comme le modèle d'une cité parfaite,5 on ne peut manquer de souligner le caractère utopique6 de cette pensée qui dès lors pose communes à tous les autres animaux, mais principalement par la raison, la vertu de l'âme et la vie vraie" Spinoza ,Traité politique, V, &5. 4 A ce propos, Spinoza affirme explicitement : « Voilà donc la fin vers laquelle je tends : acquérir cette nature supérieure et tenter que d‟autres l„acquièrent avec moi ; cela fait partie de mon bonheur de donner mes soins à ce que beaucoup d‟autres comprennent comme moi de sorte que leur entendement et leur désirs s‟accordent avec mon entendement et mes désirs ».Spinoza, TRE, § 14, traduction de Caillois (R), Frances (M), et Misrahi (R), œuvres complètes, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1954. 5 - Il est à remarquer que dans certains passages du Traité politique, Spinoza paraît désigner le meilleur État, et dans d‟autres, il semble se préoccuper du meilleur régime pour tout État. Citons à titre d‟exemple ce passage dans lequel « le meilleur » est pris dans un sens absolu : Quand nous disons que l‟État le meilleur est celui où les hommes vivent dans la concorde… » TP, chapitre. §5. C‟est nous qui soulignons. 6 Le terme d' utopie possède différents sens ; afin de montrer suivant quel sens , on peut parler d'aspect "utopique" de la pensée politique spinozienne ,il convient de noter tout d'abord que le terme"utopie" est forgé par thomas More en 1516 pour désigner la société idéale qu'il décrit dans son œuvre utopia, il est traduit en français par utopie qui est composé du préfixe privatif u et du mot topos qui signifient approximativement "sans lieu ", autrement dit qui ne se trouve nulle part. Par là on peut déduire que par utopie on peut entendre, en premier lieu, un pays imaginaire ou règne un gouverneur idéal sur un peuple heureux .Il convient toutefois de souligner que le terme d'utopie peut prêter à confusion dans la mesure ou il est utilisé suivant des connotations variées. Ainsi il peut désigner à la fois ce qui relève du rêve, illusion, idéal avec comme dénominateur en commun une référence à l'irréalisme. C'est pourquoi Bronislaw Baczko dans Lumières de l'utopie préfère parler plutôt d'utopisme que d'utopie puisqu'on ne peut la réduire seulement au genre littéraire inauguré par More. Si l'on s'oriente dans cette direction de recherche , on peut par conséquent affirmer

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problème, étant donné qu'il parait incompatible avec son caractère réaliste,7 posé comme principe de base dès le premier chapitre du Traité politique. Ces deux caractères contradictoires qui s'imposent ainsi à nous fortement, nous incitent à poser cette question: Comment peut-on comprendre ce paradoxe immanent à la pensée politique spinoziste, tout en tenant compte de l'aspect systématique qui la caractérise et qui exige la cohérence de tous ses éléments constitutifs? J'aborderai donc dans cet article cette question en ayant comme perspective, la présentation d' une approche qui tenterait de prendre en considération la spécificité de la conception spinozienne de la politique à la lumière de ces deux caractères opposés à savoir réalisme et utopie , tout en espérant apporter un nouvel éclairage à cette conception. L'étude de cette question suivra ce parcours composé de trois étapes: Dans la première étape, nous chercherons tout particulièrement à mettre en évidence la spécificité du réalisme politique spinozien à la lumière des principes sur lesquels le système de pensée de Spinoza est fondé. Au cours de la seconde étape, nous tenterons d‟éclairer l'aspect utopique de cette pensée, en mettant en évidence la fin éthique qu'elle se propose d'atteindre. Et dans la troisième étape enfin , qu'on peut élargir le champ de l'utopie pour qu'il puisse englober toute forme de pensée qu'elle soi imaginaire ou hypothético-déductif dont l'intention est de construire une nouvelle réalité répondant à certaines aspirations humaines telles que la justice ,la liberté ,le bonheur .Et sur cette base le terme utopie ne doit pas entrer en résonance avec le terme chimère étant donné qu'elle n'est pas une simple invention d'images irréelles mais plutôt la production d'une autre réalité, certes opposée à la réalité effective, mais que l'on pense pouvoir réaliser ou du moins que l'on espère réaliser . 7Quoi que nous entendions exactement par réalisme en philosophie, nous devrions avoir à l'esprit une conception qui ,d'une manière ou d'une autre, souligne l'importance de ce qui doit être tenu pour indépendant de notre pensée et de notre expérience. A ce propos , Spinoza se propose de présenter une théorie réaliste en politique ,en raison du fait qu'il tient à la déduire de l'étude de la nature humaine telle qu'elle est ,pour qu'elle puisse être applicable à la réalité.

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nous essaierons d'entrevoir le rapport entre ces deux dimensions qui paraissent la caractériser en tentant de le déterminer à la lumière des enseignements que pourrait nous procurer le projet libérateur spinoziste qui est d'ordre éthique et politique. 1-La spécificité du réalisme politique spinozien Par ses références philosophiques, ses fondements et ses choix méthodologiques, ou simplement par son approche globale de la politique, on peut dire que Spinoza se situe dans la lignée de l'école de pensée que l'on appelle réaliste. De fait, on peut affirmer qu'il se rattache au courant du "réalisme machiavélien" plutôt qu'à celui de l'idéalisme, dans la mesure où il ne pense pas comme les utopistes, qu'il soit possible de transformer l'homme et la société, suivant ce que la raison impose comme modèles de perfection, mais de déduire de l'étude de la nature humaine les principes de conduite politique applicables à la réalité. C'est pourquoi pour saisir la spécificité de la pensée politique spinozienne, il convient d'abord de mieux cerner son caractère réaliste. Observons au départ que cette pensée doit son aspect réaliste aux trois éléments suivants : A-Cette pensée se présente à nous comme étant une pensée réaliste, d'abord parce qu'en dénonçant dès le premier chapitre du Traité politique, l'esprit utopique prédominant dans la philosophie politique de ses prédécesseurs, Spinoza se propose de suivre les pas de Machiavel. Assurément, on ne peut perdre de vue la puissance de l'impact de ce dernier sur la pensée politique spinozienne puisqu'on trouve surtout dans le traité politique une série de problématiques d'origine machiavélienne.8 Ce qui laisse à entendre que dans l'élaboration de sa conception On peut à ce propos souligner l'importance déterminante de l'apport machiavélien dans la constitution de la conception politique de Spinoza en mettant tout particulièrement en relief les points suivants: 1-Le rapport entre l'élection politique et la fortune. 2-L'utilité des cérémonies et des cultes dans l'usage politique de la religion. 3-La critique des miracles. 4-Le désir et les passions comme fondement du pacte social. 8

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politique, Spinoza a tendance à intégrer certains éléments d'origine machiavéliens. On peut à titre d'exemple souligner le fait qu'il se sert du modèle paradigmatique de l'histoire romaine pour souligner en même temps la singularité des événements marquant le peuple juif et l'exemplarité universelle qui en découle. Et c'est précisément de cette manière qu'il parvient à fixer les modalités "ontologiques" de l'histoire humaine lui permettant d'articuler la constitution du politique autour de l'immanence absolue des rapports de force. Remarquons à ce propos que c'est grâce à la pensée de Machiavel que Spinoza parvient à comprendre l'histoire à partir de la dynamique politique instaurée par le jeu incessant des passions humaines. C'est pourquoi certains interprètes insistent particulièrement sur la nécessité de prendre en compte l'importance du réalisme politique machiavélien dans la compréhension de la théorie politique réaliste spinozienne. A cet égard Misrahi fait observer que " Si l'on s'en tient à une première lecture, la pensée politique de Spinoza risque fort de se présenter comme un progrès du seul réalisme. Sensible à l'apport de Machiavel, Spinoza aurait transposé sur le plan de la méthode de la philosophie politique cette critique impitoyable de l'idéalisme qu'il opère d'abord sur le plan de l'ontologie, de l'anthropologie et de l'éthique."9 Certes, on peut tenter de mettre en évidence les correspondances fortes entre ces deux types de pensée, mais cela dépasse le cadre de cet article. Contentons-nous tout simplement de nous demander: en admettant que Machiavel soit en effet une référence classique du réalisme politique de Spinoza, ce dernier se contente-t-il de reproduire à sa manière le réalisme machiavélien dans l'élaboration de sa conception politique? B-Spinoza, nous semble t-il, ne se limite point à accueillir les conseils politiques machiavéliens, mais va, comme nous le montrerons par la suite, au cœur de l'idéal humain: la détermination des conditions de possibilité de l'institution d'une société libre ou les hommes pourraient jouir ensemble d'un

Misrahi (R ),La rigueur et l'utopie dans la philosophie politique de Spinoza, dans L'être et la Joie ,Ed encre marine, Paris 1997,p .443. 9

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accroissement optimum de leur puissance d'être et d'agir.10 C'est pourquoi pour comprendre le réalisme politique spinozien, on doit aller plus loin, pour chercher dans le système de pensée spinoziste lui-même les éléments fondateurs de ce réalisme politique. Ce qui justifie cette manière d'aborder la question, c'est que Spinoza lui-même ne cesse de rappeler dans ses différents écrits que les sciences présentes dans son système, notamment l'ontologie et l'anthropologie, ne sont que des moyens permettant la connaissance de la nature du réel en dévoilant les lois qui le régissent. Et c'est précisément grâce à cette connaissance que nous serons capables de le modifier. Voyons ce qu'il écrit à ce sujet dans le Traité de la réforme de l'entendement: “Il est par là dès à présent visible pour chacun que je veux diriger toutes les sciences vers une seule fin et un seul but, qui est de parvenir à cette suprême perfection(...) tout ce qui dans les sciences ne nous rapproche pas de notre but devra être rejeté comme inutile. ”11 Ce texte qui nous permet ainsi de saisir le statut que Spinoza confère aux sciences dans la réalisation de son projet éthique et politique, nous amène à déduire que: pour libérer la raison de ses illusions , et l'inciter à reconnaître ses limites, il faut la soumettre aux nécessités de la réalité humaine , et l'entrainer à produire pour l'action des modes d'expressions compatibles avec elles . C'est donc sur cette base que l'on doit essayer de comprendre comment l'ontologie et l'anthropologie mettent à notre Le bonheur véritable et la vraie béatitude consistent pour chacun dans la seule jouissance du bien, et non pas dans cette vaine gloire de jouir du bien à soi seul, les autres en demeurant exclus. En effet, celui qui s‟estime plus heureux du fait que les choses vont bien pour lui seul et non pour les autres, ou du fait qu‟il est plus fortuné ou plus heureux qu‟autrui, celui-là ignore le bonheur véritable et la vraie béatitude » Spinoza, Traité Théologico-politique, Chapitre. III, traduction de Lagrée (J) et de Moreau (P-F), Paris, PUF, 1999. 10

T R E, &5,traduction et notes par Appuhn,(CH), Paris, Garnier Flammarion, 1964 . On retrouvera cette idée vigoureusement exprimée au début du livre II de l‟Ethique :“ Je passe maintenant à l‟explication des choses qui ont dû suivre nécessairement de l‟essence de Dieu, autrement dit de l‟être éternel et infini: non pas de toutes, cependant (...); mais de celles-là seules qui peuvent nous conduire comme par la main à la connaissance de l‟Esprit humain et de sa béatitude suprême”. 11

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disposition les moyens nécessaires pour comprendre la réalité politique et pour agir sur elle. C-Montrons donc à présent comment le réalisme politique Spinozien est rendu possible grâce à l'ontologie et à l'anthropologie. Commençons par le premier point: La théorie spinoziste de l'Etre doit sa spécificité à ce principe sur lequel elle se fonde : l'Etre premier et parfait qui est la condition de toute essence et de toute existence n'est rien d'autre que la nature elle-même.12 L'essence de celle-ci est cernée par deux définitions: d'abord par la définition d'un être "qui est en soi et est conçu par soi"13 et ensuite par la définition qui le détermine en son essence comme puissance.14 On notera d'abord que cette théorie ne vaut pas pour elle-même , mais seulement comme moyen indispensable à la libération de la politique de l'emprise de la religion . En effet , en récusant à la fois la notion théologique d'un être transcendant créateur du monde et le concept aristotélicien de la puissance afin d'affirmer que Dieu est puissance, c'est-à dire une puissance infinie et non pas une volonté,15Spinoza prépare le terrain pour critiquer toute forme de régime politique absolutiste qui tire de la religion toute sa légitimité, en montrant que la puissance politique ne s'ordonne plus à la puissance divine. A ce propos, il faut souligner que Spinoza nous montre surtout dans les deux traités politiques que la constitution du pouvoir politique renvoie à l'équilibre momentané produit par la dynamique conflictuelle des forces de la multitude. Ce qui signifie que notre destin n'est plus ordonné à une providence, mais à une existence politique réglant les rapports entre les individus humains. De là on peut convenir que du moment que la politique suit les déterminations de la nature, elle Dans ses différents écrits Spinoza ne cesse de répéter cette expression :"Dieu c'est-à dire la nature" 13 Spinoza, L'Ethique, I, définition3,trad de Roland (C) Paris, Gallimard 1954. 14 Ibid., proposition34. 15 Jean-Marie Vaysse explique bien cette idée, en montrant que cette critique de la métaphysique et de son soubassement théologique vaut alors comme une critique de la Monarchie…" Totalité et finitude, P51. 12

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conduit les hommes à établir des rapports convenant à la nécessité d'établir une cité parfaite: accroitre leur puissance d'être et d'agir sous la conduite de la raison .C'est pourquoi à la cause de Dieu se substitue celle de l'homme et c'est ainsi que naissent les concepts de société civile et d'Etat démocratique reposant sur le jeu de composition et de limitation de puissances, comme sur l'amour de la liberté. Abordons maintenant le second point: Il convient ensuite de faire observer que la théorie politique spinozienne est considérée comme étant une théorie réaliste en raison du fait qu'elle se propose de réorganiser la vie des hommes suivant des principes pratiques qui sont déduits de l'étude scientifique des caractéristiques naturelles des hommes et des constantes de leurs comportements.16 Cette étude scientifique de l'affectivité qui aide à dévoiler la servitude passionnelle sous ses deux formes individuelle et commune, laisse entrevoir la forme de l'Etat convenant à la nature humaine telle qu'elle se manifeste concrètement à travers les différents comportements humains. A ce propos, il convient de souligner ici que Spinoza semble avoir saisi toute la force réelle des passions, puisqu'il leur confère un statut fondamental dans la compréhension des différents problèmes éthiques, religieux et politiques. C'est pourquoi Bodei fait observer que :"Spinoza combat sur deux fronts: contre la peur, en tant que passion hostile à la raison et contre l'espoir en tant que celui-ci constitue généralement une fuite hors du monde ".17

Jean Marie Vaysse, Totalité et subjectivité, Chapitre3, P131, Paris, Vrin, 1994. Cette orientation théorique relève manifestement d'un choix délibéré, par lequel Spinoza se place dans une perspective de pensée en rupture par rapport à toute une tradition, puisqu'il ne s'agit plus de railler ou de déplorer les affects mais d'expliquer leurs modes de fonctionnement, comme il est indiqué d'abord dans les premières phrases de la de la préface de la troisième partie de l'Ethique et ensuite à sa fin : 1-:"La plupart de ceux qui ont parlé des sentiments et des conduites humaines paraissent traiter, non des choses naturelles qui suivent les lois ordinaires de la nature, mais des choses qui seraient hors nature .Mieux, on dirait qu'il conçoivent l'homme dans la nature comme un empire dans un empire" 2-"Je traiterai donc de la nature et de la force impulsive des sentiments et de la puissance de l'esprit sur eux selon la même méthode qui m'a précédemment 16 17

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D'ou l'on comprend que pour ne plus céder aux illusions des idéalistes, ceux qui imaginent les hommes différents de ce qu'ils sont, et se proposent de construire des modèles de sociétés parfaites, il faut chercher à comprendre la nature humaine afin de montrer le réel pouvoir dont l'homme dispose pour se libérer de la servitude. Assurément , lorsqu'on suit attentivement le mouvement de la pensée politique de Spinoza , on se rend compte sur le vif que Spinoza se propose de partir de la réalité effective la plus concrète à savoir la puissance d‟être et de persévérer dans l‟être telle qu'elle s'affirme à l'état de nature18 pour justifier la nécessité d‟établir une société politique rationnellement organisée. Observons que Spinoza part de la spontanéité anarchique des désirs passionnels qui débouche sur le conflit de tous contre tous et qui constitue une menace de destruction pour tous les individus quel que soit leur degré de puissance, pour montrer la nécessité de fonder une société politique défendant les intérêts communs.19 D'ou l'on comprend que la constitution de la société politique ne renvoie pas chez lui comme chez Hobbes par exemple, à une entité transcendante (rois ou assemblée) décidant de l'instauration d'un espace politique autre par rapport à l'état de nature, mais au contraire renvoie à la dynamique conflictuelle des forces des individus humains. C'est pourquoi le réalisme politique de Spinoza trouve son origine dans les fondements naturels de l‟Etat qui ne sont pas à chercher dans les enseignements de la raison, mais dans

servi en traitant de Dieu et de l'esprit humain, et je considérerai les actions et les appétits humais de même que s'il était question de lignes, de plans, ou de corps " 18 "BODEI (R) , Géométrie des passions, traduction de RAIOLA (M ),Paris, PUF,1997. 19 Balibar fait, à juste, remarquer que Spinoza appelle "état de nature" une situation limite dans laquelle les puissances individuelles seraient pratiquement incompatibles entre elles. Dans une telle situation, la dépendance serait totale pour chaque individu, sans contribuer en rien à son indépendance: c'est l'individualité même qui serait immédiatement menacée. Un tel état "de nature" est par nature non viable, sinon impensable (sauf les catastrophes historiques où la société se dissout; ou encore _ mais on peut se demander s'il ne s'agit pas d'une métaphore _ dans des régimes absolument tyranniques, où les individus terrorisés sont ramenés en deçà de toutes "vie humaine". Balibar (E) , Spinoza et la politique, Paris, PUF,1985, Chap. 3 ,p75.

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la condition commune des hommes.20 Assurément, à maintes reprises dans le Traité politique, Spinoza insiste sur le fait que c'est à partir des contradictions immanentes à l'état de nature que l'on doit tirer les impératifs de la conservation de la vie individuelle qui rendent nécessaire le pacte social. Il suffit pour le confirmer de nous reporter à cette loi mise en relief dans l'axiome de la quatrième partie de l'Ethique: "Il n'est aucune chose singulière dans la Nature qu'il n'y en ait une autre plus forte. Mais, étant donné une chose quelconque, il y en a une autre plus puissante qui peut détruire la première". En effet, on peut aisément montrer suivant cette loi que le désir de se conserver se trouve empêché de se réaliser tant que les hommes restent sous l'emprise de leurs désirs passionnels, en se référant tout particulièrement aux deux Traités politiques où Spinoza nous montre que les individus humains, pour peu qu‟ils soient soumis aux seules lois de l‟appétit, se trouvent impliqués dans des rapports conflictuels qui les exposent à la menace permanente de la destruction, ce qui les incitent d'ailleurs par voie contractuelle à modifier leur mode de comportement les uns à l'égard des autres. 21 Or, on peut ici se demander : si le contrat social comme nous l'avons déjà montré résulte de la condition naturelle commune des hommes, la conception de la société humaine sur laquelle il débouche, ne semble-t-elle pas nous présenter un idéal de société humaine parfaite, étranger aux De fait selon Spinoza, l'homme "aussi bien dans l'état naturel que dans l'état civil agit selon les lois de sa nature et veille à ses intérêts, car dans chacun de ces deux états, c'est l'espérance ou la crainte qui le conduit à faire ou à ne pas faire ceci ou cela, et la principale différence entre les deux états est que ,dans l'état civil, tous ont les mêmes craintes, et que la sécurité a pour tous les mêmes causes, de même que la règle de vie est commune. " Traité politique, Chapitre III , &3,traduction par Appuhn (Ch), Paris ,G-F ,1966. 20

Le passage suivant le montre clairement: "Si donc la nature humaine était disposée de telle sorte que les hommes vécussent suivant les seules prescriptions de la raison, et si tout leur effort tendait à cela seulement, le droit de nature, aussi longtemps que l'on considérerait ce qui est propre au genre humain, serait déterminé par la seule puissance de la raison. Mais les hommes sont conduits plutôt par le désir aveugle que par la raison, et par suite la puissance naturelle des hommes, c'est Ŕà- dire leur droit naturel , doit être défini non par la raison mais par tout appétit qui les détermine à agir et par lequel ils se forcent de se conserver". Ibid., Chapitre II,&5. 21

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sociétés de fait ? Il n'est pas possible d'ignorer, tout ce qui dans le texte spinoziste évoque l'idéal, étant donné que tout l'effort de Spinoza tend à définir une voie permettant d'orienter la vie humaine vers la prépondérance des passions joyeuses et vers l'accroissement optimum de la puissance d'être et d'agir dans le cadre d'une société politique rationnellement organisée. C'est pourquoi il nous semble qu'en se penchant sur le terrain de la recherche de la meilleure forme d'organisation politique, Spinoza inscrit sa pensée dans une perspective utopique. Voyons donc comment s'exprime cet aspect.22 2 –L'aspect utopique de la pensée politique spinoziste L'aspect utopique23de la pensée politique spinozienne semble s'imposer fortement, chaque fois que Spinoza s'engage dans la détermination des conditions de possibilité de la réalisation d'une cité parfaite permettant au désir de persévérer dans l'être de s'exprimer pour chacun dans la reconnaissance rationnelle de l'intérêt commun. En effet, il est à noter que Spinoza ne se contente pas à l'exemple de Hobbes, de fonder rationnellement la société politique, mais cherche aussi à établir une théorie du meilleur régime à l'exemple d'Aristote .A ce propos, il signale qu'est meilleur le régime qui permet aux hommes non seulement de vivre mais de bien vivre, c'est -à dire d'accroitre au maximum leur puissance d'être et d'agir. Ce qui signifie que c'est à partir de cette finalité d'ordre éthique que se détermine la meilleure organisation politique24 comme le met en pleine lumière ce texte: 22

A titre de choix sélectif, citons les textes suivants :Traité politique , Chapitre II,&15/ Traité théologico-politique, Chapitre XVI. 23 Notons que dans l'emploi de ce concept on ne se réfère pas à la tradition philosophique suivant laquelle, est utopique ce qui relève de l'idéal, et ce qui parait par conséquent transcendant à la réalité, mais qu'on se réfère plutôt à l'idée avancée par Mumford suivant laquelle on peut entendre par utopie un programme qui veut se réaliser. Ce qui confère à ce concept dans la perspective de pensée spinoziste un caractère particulier: La vision d'une vie parfaite devient un véritable plan stratégique grâce à la politique comme on s'attachera à le montrer dans ce qui suit. 24 Il convient ici de faire observer que dans L'éthique , comme dans les deux traités politiques, Spinoza envisage la société politique comme la condition et l'unique moyen d'atteindre cette fin :"Telle est la fin à laquelle je tends acquérir

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« Quand nous disons que l‟État le meilleur est celui où les hommes passent leur vie dans la concorde nous voulons parler d‟une vie humaine définie, non point par la circulation du sang et les différentes autres fonctions du règne animal, mais surtout par la raison : Vraie valeur et vraie vie de l‟esprit ».25 Assurément, pour Spinoza le salut du peuple ne relève pas seulement de la puissance matérielle dont dispose l'Etat quelle que soit son importance pour l'existence et la survie de ce dernier, mais relève aussi d'une autre exigence : la libération des individus humains de toutes formes de servitude. C'est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle Spinoza affirme dans le Traité politique que la fin de l'Etat n'est pas de transformer les hommes raisonnables en automates: "Ce qu'on a voulu leur donner, c'est bien plutôt, la pleine latitude de s'acquitter dans une sécurité parfaite des fonctions de leur corps et de leur esprits. Après quoi, ils seront en mesure de raisonner plus librement, ils ne s'affronteront plus avec les armes de la haine, de la colère, de la ruse et ils se traiteront mutuellement sans injustice. Bref, le but de l'organisation en société, c'est la liberté".26 cette nature supérieure et faire de mon mieux pour que beaucoup l'acquièrent avec moi" Spinoza, Traité de la réforme de l'entendement,&5.Il faut donc pour comprendre la pensée politique spinoziste prendre en considération l'inspiration éthique qui l'anime, "et de fait c'est à partir des principes développés dans L'Ethique que se constituent les idées que Spinoza développe dans le Traité théologico-politique et dans le Traité politique "fait observer à juste titre Fatma Haddad, tout en mettant en évidence le fait que la comparaison des trois textes de Spinoza à savoir L'Ethique, le Traité théologico-politique et le Traité politique nous fait apercevoir l'inspiration éthique commune qui les anime" Fatma Haddad, Philosophie systématique et système de philosophie politique chez Spinoza, Troisième partie, Chapitre I P.295,Publications de l'université de Tunis,1980. 25 Spinoza, Traité politique ,Chapitre V,&5.Dans le Traité théologico-politique aussi Spinoza explique que la fin de l'Etat n'est pas seulement d'ordre politique,elle est aussi éthique: "CE n'est pas seulement parce qu'elle protège contre les ennemis que la société est très utile et même nécessaire au plus haut point, c'est aussi parce qu'elle permet de réunir un grand nombre de commodités…qui sont nécessaires à la perfection de la nature humaine et à sa béatitude "Traité Théologico-politique, Chapitre V,p.684. 26 Spinoza, Traité Théologico-politique, chapitre. XX, p.899.

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Toutefois, la question se pose de savoir comment est-il possible dans une perspective de pensée "réaliste" de déterminer la fin spécifique de l'Etat suivant une exigence d'ordre éthique? S‟agit-il pour Spinoza de fonder un réalisme moral en mettant la politique au service de l'éthique, et de présenter par conséquent une vision philosophique de la politique en rupture avec la réalité historique des hommes d‟où se tire l'enseignement de la discordance entre éthique et politique?27 Et s'il en est ainsi, ne voyons-nous pas ainsi s'imposer à nous un aspect utopique de la pensée politique spinozienne diamétralement opposé à son caractère réaliste sur lequel Spinoza insiste surtout dans le premier chapitre de son Traité politique? La prise en compte de ce paradoxe nous amène dans cette étape de notre analyse à concentrer notre réflexion sur les raisons qui ont incité Spinoza à transcender le terrain des faits pour construire rationnellement les formes d'organisation politique présentées comme modèles de cités parfaites. Cherchons d'abord ces raisons dans les textes majeurs ou l'aspect utopique de la pensée politique spinoziste semble se prononcer fortement. En passant en revue les différents textes ou Spinoza évoque la nécessité d'instituer une cité parfaite, on se rend compte que dans tous les passages où il se préoccupe de présenter son projet libérateur, de le justifier et de mettre en évidence sa fin, sa pensée s'affirme comme étant une pensée utopique, Voyons donc comment s'exprime cet aspect utopique, dans les moments décisifs de l'élaboration de ce projet. Deux moments se présentent à nous : Premier moment: les motivations Notons en premier lieu l'importance de ce passage du Traité de la réforme de l'entendement ou Spinoza dénonce d'une manière 27 A ce propos on peut souligner le fait que l'expérience historique à montré que la politique obéit à un code de règles différent et en partie incompatible avec le système normatif de la conduite morale. Ce qui signifie que l'homme politique ne conduit pas sa propre action suivant les préceptes de la morale puisqu'il peut utiliser tous les moyens pour arriver à ses fins à savoir violence et tromperie. En termes machiavéliens, il doit bien connaître pour bien gouverner l'art du lion et du renard. D'ou suit qu'une conception réaliste de la politique doit mettre en relief la discordance entre morale et politique.

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émouvante la condition existentielle dans laquelle il se trouve: " Je me voyais dans un extrême péril contraint de chercher de toutes mes forces un remède, fut-il incertain ; de même un malade atteint d'une affection mortelle, qui voit la mort imminente, s'il n'applique un remède, est contraint de le chercher , fut-il incertain, de toutes ses forces, puisque tout son espoir est dans ce remède".28 Ce texte peut nous aider à saisir les raisons existentielles qui ont incité Spinoza à chercher en tant que philosophe armé seulement de la puissance de la raison, à modifier conceptuellement la réalité. Notons qu'il s'agit d'un danger imminent qui fait planer sur la vie humaine une menace permanente de destruction ; en termes spinoziens il s'agit "d'un extrême péril ". Mais montrons d'abord quel est cet extrême péril évoqué ici par Spinoza. Lorsqu'on passe en revue les différents textes dans lesquels Spinoza prend soin de déterminer la nature de la condition humaine, on se rend compte que l'extrême péril évoque la servitude humaine sous ses divers aspects (passionnel, politique et religieux) , considérée par Spinoza comme l'obstacle à vaincre pour réaliser sa fin éthique à savoir l'acquisition de cette nature humaine supérieure. Ainsi dans l'Ethique, Spinoza nous montre que la servitude apparaît d'abord au niveau de la vie affective à travers les effets perturbants des passions. En effet, il écrit dans la Préface de la quatrième partie de l'Ethique: "L'impuissance de l'homme à gouverner et à contenir ses sentiments, je l'appelle Servitude"... Ensuite dans le Traité théologico-politique, Spinoza nous fait comprendre que la servitude apparaît au niveau de la connaissance inadéquate produite par l'imaginaire religieux comme nous le révèle ce passage de cette lettre à Henri Oldenburg : " Je compose en ce moment un traité sur la manière dont je considère l‟écriture et mes raisons de l‟entreprendre sont les suivantes: 1-Les préjugés des théologiens, je sais en effet que ce sont ces préjugés qui s'opposent surtout à ce que les hommes puissent appliquer leur esprit à la philosophie...

28 Spinoza, Traité de la réforme de l'entendement,&5.

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2/ L‟opinion qu‟a de moi le vulgaire, qui ne cesse de m‟accuser d‟athéisme, je me vois obligé de la combattre autant que je peux. 3/ La liberté de philosopher et de dire notre sentiment je désire la défendre par tous les moyens; l‟autorité excessive et le zèle indiscret des prédicants tendent à la supprimer".29 Ainsi il est clair que l‟origine du projet éthique spinozien est l‟insatisfaction éprouvée devant une vie dominée par les superstitions, où la liberté de philosopher est mise en danger, par un pouvoir politique absolu dont l‟unique fin est d‟assurer sa suprématie. Il s‟agit donc pour Spinoza de critiquer cette forme de vie illustrée par les superstitions et de formuler un plan d‟existence allant dans le sens de l‟instauration d‟un système de vie conduit par la Raison. Et c‟est bien dans ce dessein que la pensée spinozienne s'engage dans l'élaboration d'un projet de cité parfaite. Le Traité politique nous persuade que les hommes ne peuvent vivre dans la concorde et la paix tant qu'ils sont déterminés à être et à agir suivant la spontanéité anarchique de leurs désirs passionnels, comme en témoigne ce texte: "En tant que les hommes sont en proie à la colère, à l'envie, ou à quelque sentiment de haine, ils sont entrainées à l'opposé les uns des autres et contraires les uns aux autres , et d'autant plus redoutables qu'ils ont plus de pouvoir et sont plus habiles et rusés que les autres animaux".30 Ceci implique que le danger qui menace notre vie relève de deux ordres de causes: naturel, et social. Au premier plan le terme "extrême péril" nous renvoie à la prédominance de la puissance passionnelle sur la puissance rationnelle qui induit les hommes à entretenir des rapports conflictuels avec eux-mêmes et avec leurs semblables. De fait l‟homme passionné est "pareil aux flots de la mer agités par des vents contraires ", pour reprendre l'expression même de Spinoza,

29 Lettre XXX à Henri Oldenburg, octobre 1665. 30 Spinoza, Traité politique, Chapitre II, &14. 27-Spinoza, Traité de la réforme de l'entendement, &5.

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est dépourvu de la maîtrise de lui-même et se trouve par conséquent condamné à vivre d'une manière passive et triste.31 Au second plan l'extrême péril se rapporte à la condition humaine sociale, caractérisée par la superstition envahissante, l'insociabilité paralysante et la misère économique, la communauté humaine se trouve en raison de ce fait déchirée par les révoltes et les séditions populaires, d‟où l‟impossibilité de la coexistence des hommes dans la concorde et la paix.32 A partir de ces considérations, on peut établir qu'en entamant ainsi la critique la plus radicale, jusqu'alors tentée de cette condition humaine caractérisée par ces trois formes de servitude, Spinoza ne peut se contenter de subir cette condition qu'il considère dramatique et s'engage à tracer la voie conduisant les hommes vers la recherche d'un remède pour mettre fin à ce danger imminent qui menace leur vie. Mais de quel remède s'agitil? Le remède que cherche Spinoza de toutes ses forces est la formation de cette forme supérieure théorico-pratique de vie, une

31 Il convient à ce propos de signaler que les affects ne sont considérés comme source de tristesse que dans la mesure ou ils sont subis passivement c'est-à dire prennent la forme des passions; s'ils se transforment en actions ,ils accèdent à un autre statut: ils deviennent l'instrument privilégié de la libération humaine. C'est pourquoi le projet de Spinoza, tel qu'il est caractérisé dans la préface de Affectibus fait observer Macherey "est bien de montrer qu'il ya une logique des affects qui en arrière de leur désordre, voire de leur délire apparent ,détermine nécessairement leur nature, sans qu'il y ait lieu, pour rendre compte de ce que, sur le plan de leurs histoires singulières, ils comportent d'exceptionnel et d'aléatoire, de faire intervenir un principe intentionnel de libre arbitre témoignant à la fois de l'excellence et de la déchéance humaines."Macherey ( P ), Introduction à L'Ethique de Spinoza ,La troisième partie, Paris, PUF,1995,Introduction, p.23 32 A ce propos Tosel souligne le fait que pour Spinoza la vie humaine qui est menacée par les théologiens de l'époque (calvinistes) qui la contrôlent dans toutes ses dimensions, doit être protégée par une organisation ou plutôt une réorganisation de la société: « Le TTP s'ouvre sur l'urgence de sa mission; il s'accompagne de la prise de conscience vigoureuse de sa nécessité pour son propre temps. Spinoza intervient parce que le temps presse. Et c'est le temps même ou la possibilité de la philosophie, de la vie philosophique, est à la fois délivrée, et mise en danger par le " préjugé " » ; Tosel (A) Spinoza ou le crépuscule de la servitude, Ed, Aubier Montaigne, 1984, Chapitre I, p.16

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vie de connaissance vraie et d‟action adéquate.33 Or cette formation ne peut s‟opérer dans la solitude et d'une manière purement théorique , car Spinoza veut dépasser le subjectivisme moral et l'idéalisme égotiste en faisant de son salut un salut commun comme le montre clairement ce passage: "Telle est donc la fin à laquelle je tends : acquérir cette nature supérieure et faire de mon mieux pour que beaucoup l'acquièrent avec moi ; car c'est encore une partie de ma félicité de travailler à ce que beaucoup connaissent ce qui est clair pour moi de façon que leur entendement et leur désir s'accordent pleinement avec mon propre entendement et mon propre désir".34 C‟est pour accéder donc à ce but existentiel et éthique que Spinoza s'intéresse à la politique comme étant l'un des moyens nécessaires à sa réalisation :"Pour parvenir à cette fin, écrit Spinoza, il est nécessaire … de former une société telle qu'il est à désirer pour que le plus d'hommes possible arrivent au but aussi facilement et surement qu'il se pourra" . Mais dans cette perspective une difficulté de fond surgit: Pour parvenir à remédier à cet extrême péril quels sont les moyens efficaces dont l'homme politique peut faire usage ? Doivent-ils être nécessairement adéquats avec les exigences de l‟éthique spinozienne ? Et s‟ils ne le sont pas, doit-il renoncer à les utiliser quitte à se trouver dans un état d'impuissance face à cet extrême péril? Voyons comment Spinoza détermine sa position à l'égard de cette question. Tous les moyens qui sont utiles à la conservation de l'Etat et à son renforcement sont nécessairement bons, au contraire ceux qui amènent sa ruine sont nécessairement mauvais, étant donné que les notions de bons et de mauvais sont des notions relatives qui se déterminent suivant l'intérêt fondamental

33 "Pour Spinoza note à juste titre Tosel l'activité philosophique est l'activité suprême, celle qui réalise la possibilité ultime de la vie, de la vie qui se réciproque avec la connaissance"Ibd, p.15 34 Spinoza, Traité de la réforme de l'entendement, trad par Charles (A ) Ed, GF-Flammarion, Paris 1964,&5.

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de chaque individu à savoir l'effort d'être et de persévérer dans l'être.35 Cette idée peut être traduite en langage machiavélien comme suit : La fin qui est le salut de la communauté humaine justifie les moyens. De ce point de vue, l'Etat le plus puissant est celui qui, en recourant à des forces d'ordre physique, psychique, et social, parvient à créer les conditions permettant la réalisation d'une existence humaine libre et joyeuse: "Il faut bien remarquer , écrit Spinoza dans le chapitre XVII du Traité théologico-politique que la puissance de l'Etat ne se limite pas à l'exercice d'une contrainte redoutée des hommes; elle embrasse tous les moyens grâce auxquels s'obtient l'obéissance à des ordres".36 De là on peut déduire que ce qui justifie le statut fondamental que Spinoza confère à la politique dans son système de pensée c'est sa recherche de l'autorité politique la plus puissante, "celle qui règne sur les cœurs de ses sujets"37 et permettant ainsi la mise en œuvre de son projet éthique. En d'autres termes, Spinoza reconnaît que sans la puissance politique, ce projet risquerait fort de ressembler aux projets utopiques de ses prédécesseurs étant donné que la raison est incapable de s'imposer par elle-même dans le monde humain face à la puissance prédominante des passions dans tous les domaines. En effet, comme il le répète à maintes reprises dans l'Ethique les hommes sont souvent vaincus par la puissance des passions au point qu'ils voient le meilleur mais ils s'engagent dans la voie du pire. C'est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle il confère à la force un rôle nécessaire dans la réalisation des objectifs politiques en rapport avec la fin éthique vers laquelle il tend à savoir le salut commun: "L'Etat , dit-il, doit être réglé de telle sorte que tous, aussi bien ceux qui gouvernent que ceux qui sont gouvernés, fassent de bon ou de mauvais gré ce qui importe au salut commun, 35 "En ce qui concerne le bon et le mauvais, ils ne manifestent non plus rien de positif dans les choses, du moins considérées en elles Ŕmêmes, et ne sont que des modes de penser, c'est-à-dire des notions que nous formons parce que nous comparons les choses entre elles" Spinoza, L'Ethique, quatrième partie, Préface. 36

Spinoza, Traité théologico-politique, Œuvres Complètes, traduites, présentées et annotées par Caillois (Roland), Frances (Madeleine) et Misrahi (Robert) Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1954,p. 843 37 Ibid.

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c'est-à-dire que tous, de leur propre volonté ou par force ou par nécessité, soient contraints de vivre selon les préceptes de la raison".38 Deuxième moment: la visée C'est justement à ce second moment que la pensée politique de Spinoza semble s'orienter dans une voie utopique, puisqu'il s'agit d'exprimer un désir concernant la constitution d'une vie humaine libre et joyeuse comme nous permet de le confirmer surtout le passage cité plus haut du Traité de la réforme de l'entendement, ou Spinoza exprime son doute concernant la modification de la réalité en répétant à deux reprises cette expression: "fut-il incertain". Dans l'Ethique aussi , son souci de libérer l'homme de la servitude est exprimé dans la préface de la quatrième partie en terme de désir: "Puisque nous désirons former une idée de l'homme parfait qui soit comme un modèle de la nature humaine devant nos yeux". S'il en est ainsi demandons-nous donc quel est le statut de ce désir dans cette perspective? Il est à noter que dans de pareilles circonstances quant les forces extérieures aliénantes font planer sur la vie des individus humains une menace permanente de destruction , et quand le sentiment d'impuissance s'empare entièrement de ces derniers, la seule puissance dont dispose le philosophe en tant que sujet pensant soumis qu'il est aux contraintes de ces forces comme ses semblables, est celle d'imaginer la vie autrement, et de la reconstruire par la suite rationnellement. On peut par conséquent affirmer que cette pensée dite utopique découle à la fois d'un sentiment d'impuissance à l'égard de la réalité existante et d'une tendance à dépasser cette impuissance en transformant la réalité grâce à la puissance de la raison. C'est pourquoi " l'utopie" dans le contexte de pensée spinoziste n'est pas à appréhender comme une vision du monde en rupture totale avec la réalité. Assurément, il faut prendre en considération le fait que Spinoza ne se contente point de construire rationnellement une nouvelle vie, mais s'engage à chercher le pouvoir dont il faut disposer pour agir sur la réalité concrète afin de réaliser son projet éthique. Et c'est précisément ce 38 Spinoza, Traité politique, Chapitre VI,&3.

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que sa classification des régimes peut confirmer: tout régime qu'il soit monarchique, aristocratique ou démocratique est parfait si d'une part les institutions qui le constituent (politiques, juridiques, militaires, économiques)sont compatibles les unes avec les autres; et si d'autre part il parvient à concilier les exigences qu'impose l'exercice réel des libertés individuelles avec la nécessité de sauvegarder l'autorité et la puissance de l'Etat. Il faut toutefois faire observer que cette conciliation est difficile à réaliser dans les Etats de fait où, ce ne sont pas malheureusement les exigences de la raison qui y règnent, mais au contraire, les passions des dirigeants, telle que l‟ambition insatiable d‟exercer le pouvoir absolu, fût ce par la violence, l‟usurpation et l‟oppression. Spinoza ne nous révèle-il pas lui-même dès le premier chapitre du Traité politique que "ceux qui se persuadent qu‟il est possible d‟amener la multitude ou les hommes occupés des affaires publiques à vivre selon les préceptes de la Raison, rêvent de l‟âge d‟or des poètes c‟est à dire se complaisent dans la fiction"? Et s'il en est ainsi, sa quête du souverain bien dont il veut jouir avec ses semblables n'est Ŕelle pas condamnée à rester un vœu pieux, étant donné que la politique dans la réalité effective relève d'un autre ordre d'exigence que celui des exigences éthiques? 3- L'utopie "réaliste" : est-ce possible? C'est un fait incontournable que la politique obéit à un code de règles, ou à un système normatif, différent ou plutôt incompatible avec le code, ou le système normatif, de la conduite morale. Dans un chapitre célèbre du Prince, Machiavel soutient que le bon politicien doit bien connaître l'art du lion et du renard qui symbolisent la force et la ruse.39 Les leçons de l'histoire et de l'expérience commune d‟où on tire l'enseignement de la discordance entre la morale et la conduite politique suffisent à le prouver. C'est ce qui ne semble laisser d'autre choix que de

39 Machiavel, Le prince, Chap. XVIII, trad. de Gérard Colonna et Roland Frapet, éd, Hachette, Paris, 1982, p.144

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conclure à l'impossibilité de réunir à l'intérieur d'une même pensée politique dont le caractère est réaliste, éthique et politique. Pourtant Spinoza prétend présenter un projet éthique et politique "réaliste”, tout en conservant l'idée de cité parfaite ; s'agit-il pour lui de fonder une utopie "réaliste"? Lorsqu'on établit la possibilité d'appréhender la pensée politique spinoziste comme étant à la fois réaliste et utopique, cela signifie qu'on se trouve devant une contradiction insurmontable qui nous parait immanente à sa nature même. De fait, cette pensée qui s'inscrit dans deux registres éthique et politique soulève le problème de l'incompatibilité entre son point de départ et sa visée. Assurément nous avons montré d'une part qu'elle s'attache à résoudre les problèmes du réel, mais nous avons aussi souligné d'autre part qu'en tendant à reconstruire rationnellement la réalité politique, elle tend du même coup à stabiliser les composantes du système politique dans un modèle afin de le maintenir le plus longtemps possible, d‟où l'écart qu'elle établit avec la réalité concrète. Il faut toutefois se demander: l'histoire vivante des sociétés politiques ne nous montre-t-elle pas que les processus constitutifs de la réalité humaine sont des processus discontinus et imprévisibles? Et s'il en est ainsi, la pensée politique de Spinoza qui ne parvient pas à se détacher de l'idée du meilleur régime, ne s'inscrit-elle pas malgré elle dans une perspective utopique? On peut soutenir à la lumières de l'analyse des deux aspects contradictoires de cette pensée que : puisque Spinoza se propose d'examiner la nature humaine telle qu'elle est et non telle qu'elle devrait être ; précisément pour déduire de son étude les modèles de perfection qui peuvent avoir plus de chance pour se réaliser grâce à un véritable plan stratégique, il fonde ainsi une nouvelle utopie "réaliste ". Trois éléments nous permettent de le confirmer: les fondements ontologiques et anthropologiques de sa pensée, le processus de réalisation de son projet (rappelons à ce propos qu'il s'agit essentiellement pour Spinoza de résoudre le problème de la servitude humaine en élaborant une stratégie libératrice dans laquelle chaque science constitue un moment nécessaire du cheminement qui puisse mener l'homme à l'acquisition de cette nature supérieure) , et enfin le souci éthique qui anime toute cette entreprise, ainsi mis en pleine lumière dans la préface de la seconde partie de l'Ethique: "Je passe maintenant à l'explication des choses

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qui ont du suivre nécessairement de l'essence de Dieu autrement dit de l'Etre éternel et infini: non pas de toutes , cependant; mais de celles là seules qui peuvent nous conduire comme par la main à la connaissance de l'esprit humain et de sa béatitude suprême". A partir de ces considérations on peut conclure que lorsqu'on se propose pour tâche de saisir le sens du projet libérateur spinoziste, on doit tenir compte, du fait qu'il peut être considéré à la fois comme réaliste et utopique, de quatre points de vues différents: 1- Son rapport à la réalité concrète qui est son point de départ. 2- La manière suivant laquelle Spinoza élabore sa stratégie de libération de l'homme de la servitude. 3- La spécificité même du réalisme spinozien. De fait il ne s'agit en aucun cas pour Spinoza de jeter les bases d'une doctrine réaliste qui permettrait de comprendre et d'accepter les faits politiques ; il s'agit plutôt pour lui de montrer suivant quelles conditions, l'Etat devient l'effectuation de l'intention éthique dans la sphère du politique. Ainsi le modèle d'une vie humaine parfaite tel qu'il est exposé dans les différents textes de Spinoza devient grâce à la politique un véritable plan stratégique. 4- Enfin, l'action politique qui doit contribuer à l'actualisation d'un bien commun, et doit servir par conséquent à l'usage d'hommes sages et vertueux, semble exprimer clairement la tendance utopique de cette pensée qui aspire à réconcilier l'éthique et la politique.

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BIBLIOGRAPHIE I.

ŒUVRES DE SPINOZA

• Spinoza, Œuvres Complètes, traduites, présentées et annotées par Caillois (Roland), Frances (Madeleine) et Misrahi (Robert) Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1954. • Spinoza, Traité de la Réforme de l‟Entendement, Court Traité, les Principes de la philosophie de Descartes, Pensées Métaphysiques, traduction et notes par Appuhn (Charles), Paris, Garnier Flammarion , 1964. • Spinoza, Traité de la Réforme de l‟Entendement, traduction par Rousset, (Bernard), Paris, Vrin 1992. • Spinoza, l‟Éthique, traduction et notes par Caillois (Roland), Paris, Gallimard, 1954. • Spinoza, l‟Éthique, traduction et notes par Misrahi (Robert), Paris, PUF, 1990. • Spinoza Traité, théologico-politique, traduction et notes par Frances (Madeleine), Paris, Gallimard, 1954. • Spinoza, Traité théologico-politique, traduction et notes par Lagrée (Jacqueline) et Moreau (Pierre François), Paris, PUF, 1999. • Spinoza, Traité politique, traduction et notes par Appuhn (Charles), Paris, Garnier Flammarion, 1954. • Spinoza, Traité politique, traduction par Moreau (Pierre-François), Paris, Ed Réplique, 1979. II COMMENTATEURS • BALIBAR (E), Spinoza et la politique, Paris, PUF, 1985. • CHENOUFI (A), le Statut de l‟homme chez Spinoza, Tunis, Pub de l‟Université de Tunis, 1991. • DELEUZE (G), Spinoza et le problème de l‟expression, Paris, Ed de Minuit, 1968. • Spinoza, Philosophie pratique, Paris, Ed, de Minuit, 1981. • HADDAD Ŕ CHAMAKH (F), Philosophie systématique et système de philosophie politique chez Spinoza, Tunis, Pub. De l‟Université de Tunis, 1980. • LACROIX (J), Spinoza et le problème du salut, Paris, PUF, 1970. • LAGREE (J), Spinoza et le débat religieux, Paris, Presses, Université de Rennes, 2004. • LAUX (H), Imagination et Religion chez Spinoza, Paris, vrin, 1993. • LAZZERI (Ch.), Droit, Pouvoir et Liberté, Spinoza critique de Hobbes, Paris, PUF, 1998. • Puissance et Impuissance de la raison, Paris, PUF, 1999. • MACHEREY (P), • Introduction à l‟Éthique de Spinoza, la troisième partie la condition humaine, la vie affective, Paris, PUF, 1995. • Introduction à l‟Éthique de Spinoza, la quatrième partie, la condition humaine, Paris, PUF, 1997.

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• MATHERON (A), Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, Paris, Ed de Minuit, 1969. • Le Christ et le Salut des ignorants chez Spinoza, Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1971. • Anthropologie et politique au XVIIe siècle : études sur Spinoza, Paris, Vrin 1986 (reproduction d‟articles publiés entre 1972 et 1984). • MISRAHI (R), l‟Être et la Joie, perspectives synthétiques sur le spinozisme : écrits sur Spinoza publiés ou inédits revus et corrigés avec notices de transition entre (1947 Ŕ 1997), Paris, Encre marine 1997. • NEGRI (A), L‟anomalie sauvage, Puissance et Pouvoir chez Spinoza, Paris, PUF, 1982. • PREPOSIET (J), Spinoza et la Liberté des hommes, Paris, Garnier Flammarion, 1967. • POLLET (M), La philosophie politique de Spinoza, Paris, Vrin, 1976. • ROUSSET (B), L‟immanence et le salut, Regards spinozistes, Paris, Ed Kimé, 1999. • SAID (J), Morale et Éthique chez Spinoza, Tunis, Pub (1991) de l‟Université de Tunis, • TOSEL (A), Spinoza ou le Crépuscule de la servitude, Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1984. III ARTICLES • ANSALDI (S), Amour, Perfection et Puissance : Un modèle de la nature humaine ? En marge de la cinquième partie de L'Ethique, Archives de philosophie, Octobre Ŕ Décembre, 2001. • BARTUCHAT (W), Remarques sur la 1ère proposition de la 5ème partie de L'Ethique, Revue philosophique de la France et de l‟Étranger, 1994/1. • BEYSSADE (J-M), (L‟Éthique IV, Appendice chapitre 7) où peut Ŕ on se sauver tout seul ? Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1994/4. • BOSS (G), les Fondements de la politique selon Hobbes et Spinoza, Études philosophiques 1994/1 Ŕ 2. • BRYKMAN (G), Sagesse et Sécurité selon Spinoza, Études philosophiques, 1972/3. • Spinoza et la séparation entre les hommes, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1973/2. • CAILLOIS (R), Métaphysique et Politique chez Spinoza Études philosophiques, 1972/3. • DUMERY (H), les deux saluts, Esprit, 1971/1 • FRAISSE (J-C), De l‟accord en nature et de l‟amitié des sages dans la philosophie de Spinoza, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1974/1. • FRANCES (M), la liberté politique selon Spinoza, Revue philosophique de la France et de l‟Étranger, 1958/3. • HAMMACHER (K), La Raison dans la vie affective et sociale selon Descartes et Spinoza, Les études philosophiques, 1984/10. • KAPLAN (A), Le Salut par l‟obéissance et la nécessité de la révélation chez Spinoza, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1973/1.

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• LAZZERI (ch.), Les lois de l‟obéissance, sur la théorie spinoziste des transferts de droit, Études philosophiques, 1987/4. • MACHEREY (P), Éthique IV : Les propositions 70 et 71, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 1994/4. • MATHÉRON (A), Le droit du plus fort, Hobbes contre Spinoza, Revue philosophique, 1985/2. • PEZZILLO (L), Rôle et fonction des valeurs à l‟origine des sociétés, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1994/4. IV DIVERS .Aristote, La Politique, nouvelle traduction avec introduction, notes et index par J.Tricot, Paris, Vrin, 1970. • LACROIX (J-Y), Utopie, Paris, Bordas, 2004. • LÉO STRAUSS, Histoire de la philosophie politique, Paris, PUF, 1994. .Machiavel, Le prince, trad. de Gérard Colonna et Roland Frapet, éd, Hachette, Paris, 1982, p.144 .Platon, La République, Œuvres complètes, bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1959. • PINÉS (Sh) la liberté de philosophie de Maimonide à Spinoza, Paris, Desclée Brouwer, 1997. • ZARKA (Y-Ch) Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne, Paris, PUF, 1999. • STRAUSS (L) et Coroprsey (J) Histoire de la philosophie politique, Paris, PUF, 1994. • ZERNIKE (E), La pensée politique, Ed Ellipses, 2003.

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Transitional Human Rights Hope For Egypt and the Region. By Scott James Meyerď&#x20AC;Ş

Abstract: Though the Egyptian civilization is approximately 7,000 years old, it may still be considered a young nation in terms of human rights appreciation. It is a country beginning a drastic transition, and among the elements of Egyptian life starting to change is a new found hope for an enshrinement of basic human rights that have previously never been made available for the majority of the Egyptian population. It is my contention that the Egyptian peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s reaction to the consistent and flagrant human rights abuses of the Mubarak regime was the catalyst that started the revolution of 2011. I will further discuss the transitional nature of the human rights awakening in Egypt by comparing their current metamorphosis to that of the somewhat recently transitioned nations of the Czech Republic, South Africa and Tunisia. Human rights violations are oftentimes unusually severe in countries going through a time of political, economic and social transition. Improving human rights standards and practices in transitional societies should be considered important for the good of the entire region and my paper attempts to direct the discussion of how a transitional human rights regime can become positively entrenched in the psyche of the newly awakened nation and region. Egypt now stands at a precipice where it must decide for itself if it wants to become a modern nation where rights for all are protected or if it will fall in line with the often abysmal human rights expectations of other nations in the region. With the disappointing experiences of the Mubarak ď&#x20AC;Ş

A.A. Broward College, B.A. Samford University, Juris Doctrate Birmingham School of Law, LLM University of Glasgow. Scott.James.Meyer@Gmail.com.

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regime still alive in the minds of the Egyptian people, my paper argues that we can remain cautiously optimistic that in the future, human rights will be more greatly respected than in the past. I argue that with the proper attention and support from the international community the growing pains of a free Egypt will be minimal while the rewards can be colossal. Keywords: human rights, transitional human rights, revolutionary human rights, Egypt, Cairo, Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak, Wael Ghonim, international human rights law, middle eastern human rights, the Arab spring, universal declaration of human rights.

Introduction

fter nearly 19 days of mostly peaceful protest at Tahrir Square in Cairo, on February 11th, 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned from office and fled to the distant resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh. Amongst the claims made by the protesters was that the Mubarak regime had systematically denied Egyptians their human rights in numerous ways including allowing the secret police (the dreaded Mukhabarat) to kidnap, torture and murder them, denial of fair wages, muting freedom of expression and refusing to protect the environment from toxic waste or allow them to democratically elect their own leaders1. News networks across the globe heralded the revolution as â&#x20AC;&#x153;history in the making.â&#x20AC;? Egypt is a country beginning a drastic transition, and among the elements of Egyptian life starting to change is a new found hope for an enshrinement of basic human rights that have never been made available for the majority of the Egyptian population. (Anyone under 1

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30 in Egypt has known no leader but Hosni Mubarak). Though the Egyptian civilization is approximately 7,000 years old, it may still be considered a young nation in terms of human rights appreciation. It is an exciting privilege to watch the old ways fall away as the people of Egypt attempt to gain the basic human rights needed to have true freedom. Human Rights Violations in Egypt Before and During the Protests

t is my contention that the Egyptian peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s reaction to the consistent and flagrant human rights abuses of the Mubarak regime was the catalyst that started the revolution of 2011. Amnesty International sums up their grievances over the Human Rights record of President Mubarakâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s 30 year reign as leader: The most pressing human rights concerns that Amnesty International has documented are the use of emergency legislation to arrest and detain people without charge or trial; the widespread use of torture and other ill-treatment; grossly unfair trials of civilians before military and emergency courts; restrictions on the peaceful exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly; the rise in death sentences; a lack of legal provisions and other measures to protect women from domestic violence; legal and other discrimination against members of religious and ethnic minorities; arrests and prosecutions of people for their actual or alleged sexual orientation; and the maltreatment of refugees, asylumseekers and migrants, including through the use of excessive, including lethal force2.

amnestyusa.org

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These abuses continued even while under the international public eye during the recent protests. The Egyptian Health Department has admitted that so far they have identified 365 dead protesters, killed by the Mubarak regime over the nearly 19 days of protest before his resignation3. Heroes for the Cause: The Cases of Ashraf Kenzy and Wael Ghomin The heroes of the Egyptian revolution have helped the cause of human rights in that country by putting faces and names of the individuals struggling for recognition against the Mubarak regime. Throughout history, the struggle for human rights often involved iconic individuals who represent many more suffering people. Anne Frank, the burning Tibetan monks, the Chinese student protestor standing in front of the tank at Tiananmen Sqaure and others come to mind. Though less prolific and undoubtedly less tragic than these cases, the stories of those who have survived the Mubarak interrogation camps have resonated throughout the globe through television interviews, online coverage and newspaper articles. These people and their stories help to inflame the revolution for human rights not only in Egypt but in the entire region as well. Ashraf Kenzy is a dentist in Cairo. He was arrested on January 26th along with hundreds of other protesters and taken to a detention center outside Cairo. He was tortured and interrogated by members of Mubarakâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security forces. He witnessed hundreds of other prisoners being held and treated the same way. When he was finally freed from custody he spoke publicly of his ordeal, galvanizing support for the revolution. He claims that he feels he may be tortured again but refuses to be silenced by forces opposed to the revolution4. 3 4

Hubbard, 2011 cnn.com

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Google executive Wael Ghomin has become the unofficial face for the new generation of Egyptians that committed themselves to the protests of Tahrir Square. He is noted for his use of Facebook.com to serve as an online center of awareness for the Egyptian situation. He was subsequently imprisoned for 12 days by the Mubarak regime in a situation that he as described as “really tough.” He had the following to say about the work of the youth in Egypt: It was not easy. There were lots of people who died. Those are the true heroes. Those are ones we don't want to forget. They had a dream. They really wanted a better Egypt. I'm proud today because I feel like they did not die for nothing. They died, and Egypt is a free country right now... I trust 80 million Egyptians, the giant is awake now and no one is going to put him to sleep again5. Egypt’s Awkward Relationship with the United States of America Of particular importance to the international community is the fact that Egypt has allowed itself to be a staging area for renditions of suspected terrorists and has allowed the United States to torture individuals on Egyptian soil with Egyptian consent in direct contradiction to the jus cogens norms established by international law. Egypt has allowed the United States to violate the human rights of individuals in exchange for large “foreign aid” packages for many years and has in turn used that money to fund the oppressive policestate regime in their own country6. Egypt is considered a crucial and valued ally of the United States especially in regards to the “War on Terror” and the 5 6

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appeasement of Israel in the region. The United States has given Egypt 60 billion dollars over the years, and friendship with America inevitably comes with a myriad of other obligations7. As it has been said, “You can’t spell Mubarak without Barack”8. Hopefully the United States will now begin to truly trust the Egyptian people and support the human rights changes in the country. “Meet the New Boss, the Same as the Old Boss?” The New Regime and Hope for Change It would be naive to think that the government gained during the Mubarak transition will be any better than the previous government without any tangible assurances of a real commitment to human rights. The military placed itself in control for now with The Muslim Brotherhood vying for political representation in the upcoming elections9. Of course the Egyptian military itself is not above human rights critiques. Protests and demonstrations including strikes are still going on in Egypt where some critics say that so far not enough has changed10. There is a lack of confidence among some Egyptians that has led to a small exodus from the country until it can be proven that the new regime is any better than the last11. The military has dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution without communicating their goals and without giving the people a timeline for change12. While the Egyptian military may represent the best institution to enable the political transition, it should not be allowed to do so without being held accountable to the higher

Paul, 2011 Cryderman, 2011 9 Frayer, 2011 10 Zayan, 2011 11 Heilprin, 2011 12 edition.cnn.com 7 8

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standard of human rights protections demanded by the protesters in the first place. The Nature of Transitional Human Rights In human rights political uprisings, rights consciousness has emerged more from the experience of a previous lack of rights, of being the victim of past violence, rather than from the consciousness of being a bearer of human rights by virtue of being human13. This uncertainty of sources and rights entitlement breeds trepidation during the transitional phases of a new government. Human rights violations are oftentimes unusually severe in countries going through a time of political, economic and social transition. Improving human rights standards and practices in transitional societies should be a central aim of the domestic reformers and the international community14. The basic starting point is to assure that the transitional governments hold to the precepts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Though the preferences and nuances of each individual culture, region or state makes each transition different from the last, it is the UDHR that should be held up as the normative example for societies in transition. The UDHR is considered a freely floating moral norm, located above any nation whether or not it is in transition15. As transitional states mature they may face unique challenges in the form of hegemonic dominance by certain larger, more powerful and established states. Transitional states are oftentimes very much dependent on foreign economic and political aid as they seek to establish themselves on the world scene, and this dependency usually comes with a price. Influence exerted by the dominant state may cause the transitional state to adopt a method of interpretation and Humphrey and Valverde, 2008, pages 85, 86 & 88 Horowitz and Schnabel, 2004, page 3 15 Morsink, 2004, pages 30 & 46 13 14

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protection for human rights that is not their own and this confusion itself can cause the future human rights of a country to breakdown16. This influence in some examples can be a positive and beneficial experience for the transitional state as unique opportunities for trade and diplomacy can be shared with the dominant power in an attempt to better implement universalist notions of human rights protections17. Above all, it is important that the transitional nation defines itself as being protective of human rights, decides what rights are going to be protected, and then establishes the best way to protect these rights. Transitional states are often pressured and rushed by the international community to establish themselves and their identity. While it is important that transitional states not waste time or neglect the need to implement the protections that have for so long been ignored, a transitional state must take the time necessary to make the crucial choices about what values will be driving them into the future18. A transitional nation is a susceptible nation and its people should remain free to seek their own destiny in regards to human rights protections under the watchful, supportive and helpful eye of the international community and non-governmental organizations. Example: The Czech Republic Like many communist countries at the time, Czechoslovakia was not at all concerned with human rights protections for its citizens. On January 16, 1969, a student named Jan Palach poured gasoline on himself and set himself on fire in Wenceslas Square in Prague. He died later on in the hospital. Despite this and other courageous protests, the repression continued. In 1977 a group of people formed Charter 77 to protest about human rights abuses in an effort to gain visibility Siegel, 2004, page 52 & 55 Siegel, 2004, page 52 & 55 18 Souillac, 2004, page 86 16 17

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for the governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; oppression19. The regime remained unconcerned for the rights of the people and because of this and other reasons, Czechoslovakia was poised for a change. In November of 1989, Czechoslovakia became a democracy through the peaceful protests of citizens and students including huge demonstrations of almost 750,000 people at Letna Park in Prague on November the 25th and 26th20. They were protesting for many reasons including gross human rights abuses by the communist government. The transition has been dramatic and the Czech Republic now has a number of internal human rights protections and is active in insuring human rights protection abroad. The Czech government, after learning about current practice of other foreign European nations, decided to set up a department at the Czech Foreign Ministry in June of 2004 to promote human rights and democracy in transitional nations. This was intended as the first step towards an independent agency similar to the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in the United Kingdom. The department's work reflects the fact that 13 years after democracy returned to the Czech Republic, the country is now the biggest humanitarian aid donor of all post-communist countries21. Example: South Africa Perhaps the most well-known example of a country transitioning from a human rights-abusing nation making drastic changes during a regime change is South Africa. The eyes of the international community were glued to South Africa as apartheid ended and the black population was enabled to take power and reclaim their status in South African society. The apartheid of South Lambert, 2010 archiv.radio.cz 21 www.lse.ac.uk 19 20

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Africa was condemned internationally by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1761 on the 6th of November 1962. Additionally, the UN Security Council set up a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa on the 7th of August 1963 and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid came into being on July 18th, 197622. However, the ruling government of South Africa was not quick to relent. Growing protests and resistance were met by increasingly violent human rights infractions perpetrated by the apartheid government23. The apartheid regime fell in 1994 and democratic elections took place. The new South African government established the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the human rights violations that occurred under apartheid with the primary mission being reconciliation between the South African citizens. Conditional amnesty was offered as part of its strategy to uncover the truth of past crimes and human rights abuses. The success of this commission is questionable. There has been a lack of follow through on almost all aspects of policy regarding justice for victims, and many victims have criticized the commission for not achieving reconciliation through justice24. However, with the apartheid government gone and human rights protections now in place, all South Africans can consider themselves better off than before 1994. What has occurred over the years in South Africa is considered a success by many and gives hope to other transitional nations such as Egypt.

un.org Humphrey and Valverde, 2008, pages 85, 86 & 88 24 Humphrey and Valverde, 2008, Pages 85, 86 & 88 22 23

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Example: Tunisia Tunisia is an especially intriguing example because of its proximity (both in location and time) and cultural similarities to Egypt. The Tunisian protests started in late December 2010 when 26 year old Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of a local municipal office in the town of Sidi Bouzid. He would later die from his selfinflicted burns. He was protesting his recent unfair treatment at the hands of Tunisiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s labor board. Protests and gatherings quickly broke out around Tunisia and on December 27th 2010 approximately 1000 Tunisian protesters gathered at the capital town of Tunis. Human Rights violations in Tunisia both before and during the revolution were rampant. Throughout the protests and until the resignation of Tunisian president Ben Ali, there were widespread reports of the government murdering and torturing protesters, and of unprovoked arrests of journalist, artists and lawyers25. The transition in Tunisia is coming slowly but surely. The people are in the process of getting governmental recognition for their land which was illegally swiped by the ruling elite when the Ben Ali regime took power 23 years ago. They are forming smaller protest groups for specific rights that theyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;d like to see protected, for example the rights of working women. The military is helping the transition and so far things seem positive in Tunisia26. Hopefully the new regime in Egypt will be as helpful to the cause of human rights as the new regime in Tunisia has been. Egypt in Transition On February 16th, 2011 the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights said that it plans to send a 25 26

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team of UN officials to Egypt to meet with the authorities in Cairo to assess the human rights situation following the recent revolution27. The results of this investigation will be extremely interesting especially in regards to the expected future growth and protection of human rights under the new regime. Though Egypt had never been formally reprimanded by the UN in the past, partly due to the political protection afforded by aligning itself with the United States and Israel, it is to be expected that the new regime will face a heightened scrutiny in the aftermath of the recent revolution. The revolution of transitional Egypt (along with Tunisia) has been an example of what can be done when the masses of a country make themselves heard. Their courage has been contagious and already protests have spread throughout the region, with many of the established human rightsabusing governments becoming anxious to hold onto their power28. The message here is that when people know what their human rights should be, and they realize how much theyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ve been abused, revolution can spread quickly causing a transition from the old ways into a new era of human rights protection and awareness.

Conclusion The transitional journey of Egyptian human rights is thrilling. Egypt now stands at a precipice where it must decide for itself whether it wants to become a modern nation where rights for all are protected or fall in line with the often abysmal human rights expectations of other Muslim nations in the region. With the disappointing experiences of the Mubarak regime still alive in the minds of the Egyptian people, I feel that we can remain cautiously optimistic that in the future human rights will be more greatly 27 28

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respected than in the past. Much like the Czech Republic, South Africa and Tunisia, there will be daunting challenges. Hopefully the United Nations, NGOs and the international community at large will have learned from those transitional struggles and the Egyptian people will be the beneficiaries of the wisdom gained from those earlier examples. With the proper attention and support from the international community the growing pains of a free Egypt will be minimal while the rewards can be colossal.

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Ron Paul (2011). lewrockwell.com [online]. [Accessed Feb. 17th, 2011.]. Available from: <http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul720.html>. Lauren Frayer (2011). www.voanews.com [online]. [Accessed Feb. 16th, 2011]. Available from: <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Egypts-MuslimBrotherhood-to-Launch-Political-Party-116234969.html>. www.ikhwanweb.com [online]. (2011) [Accessed Feb. 17th, 2011]. Available from: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/?zPage=Systems>. Jailan Zayan (2011). www.news.yahoo.com [online]. [Accessed Feb. 17th, 2011]. Available from: <http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20110216/wl_africa_afp/egyptpoliticsunrest>. John Heilprin (2011). www.washingtonpost.com [online]. [Accessed Feb. 17th, 2011]. Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/16/AR2011021601827.html>. www.edition.cnn.com [online]. (2011) [Accessed Feb. 17th, 2011]. Available from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/02/13/egypt.revolution/index.ht ml?hpt=T1>. Michael Humphrey and Estela Valverde (2008). Human Rights Politics and Injustice: Transitional Justice in Argentina and South Africa. International Journal of Transitional Justice. 2, Pages 85, 86 & 88. Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel (Authors and eds). (2004). Human Rights and Societies in Transition: Causes, Consequences, Responses. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press. Page 3. Johannes Morsink (2004). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a norm for societies in transition. In: Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, (eds). Human Rights and Societies in Transition: Causes, Consequences, Responses., Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, Pages 30 & 46. Richard Lewis Siegel (2004). Universalism and cultural relativism: Lessons for transitional states. In: Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, (eds). Human Rights and Societies in Transition: Causes, Consequences, Responses., Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, Pages 52 & 55.

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Genevie`ve Souillac, (2004). From global norms to local change: Theoretical perspectives on the promotion of human rights in societies in transition. In: Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, (eds). Human Rights and Societies in Transition: Causes, Consequences, Responses., Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, Page 86. Tim Lambert (2010). localhistories.com [online]. [Accessed Feb. 17th, 2011]. Available from: <http://www.localhistories.org/czech.html>. www.archi.radio.cz [online]. (2011) [Accessed Feb. 17th, 2011]. Available from: <http://archiv.radio.cz/history/history15.html> www.lse.ac.uk [online]. (2004) [Accessed Feb. 17th, 2011]. Available from: <http:///humanRights/events/HR_democracy_Czech_republic.aspx>. South African apartheid condemnations are available <http://www.un.org/en/events/mandeladay/apartheid.shtml> and http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cspca/cspca.html>

from: <

Michael Humphrey and Estela Valverde (2008). Human Rights Politics and Injustice: Transitional Justice in Argentina and South Africa. International Journal of Transitional Justice. 2, Pages 85, 86 & 88. Yasmine Ryan (2011). www.english.aljazeera.net [online]. [Accessed Feb. 18th, 2011]. Available from: <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/02/2011215123229922898.ht ml>. Yasmine Ryan (2011) (Article #2). www.english.aljazeera.net [online]. [Accessed Feb. 18th, 2011]. Available from: <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/02/201128456256795 29.html>. Ryan Rifal (2011). www.english.aljazeera.net [online]. [Accessed Feb. 18th, 2011]. Available from: <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827 361.html>. (General overview was referenced when writing about Tunisia)

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:‫جذلية بذائل الحىجه السياس ى التركي املعاصش‬ ‫دساسة اسخششافية‬ Dialectical Alternatives to Contemporary Turkish Political Orientation: A Forward-Looking Study

Abir M.A. al-Ghandour



‫ِبير محمذ ِاوف الغىذوس‬.‫د‬

Abstract: The core of the study is to explore features of Turkey's strategical orientation of the forthcoming which is likely to result in alternatives interactions of main Turkish political forces operating in the contemporary Turkish scene in its domestic, regional, and global environment. Concept of contemporary in this title applies in the present moment which is witnessing wave of revolutionary unprecedented in the Arab world, accompanied by an European and American role to deal with that wave. The pivotal question which this study seeks to answer for: Does this shift Turkey witnessed in its geostrategic image during the last nine years a product of government color and will disappear once power transfers to a government of another color? If we assume that Turkey current image is just the echo of her government orientation, or is the color stems from civilizational imprint and candidate to continue no matter how governments changed through Turkey's ballot polls? If we assume that the current Turkish government is an echo of its people orientation. and it pops up from it another question: whether Turkey will compare between the European alternative versus the Islamic alternative, or preferring one of them on the other, or combine them instead of sacrificing alternative for the other sake? The study concludes that Turkey adopts most likely the combined alternative: taking advantage from its Arab presence to improve its negotiation cards with the European Union and to support its relations with the United States, and if one of the most vital interests of Turkey is to join the European Union, this goal will not be achieved only through Turkish orientation towards .‫ مفش‬.‫ جامّة حلوان‬-‫ كلية التجاسة وإداسة ألاِمال‬-‫ أظتارة معاِذة بقعم الّلوم العياظية‬

- 163 -

‫‪its Arab Islamic surroundings, and engagement directly in its issues via‬‬ ‫‪practicing the role of mediator accepted and desired even in the settlement of‬‬ ‫‪disputes and differences between the Arab-Arab parties and between the non‬‬ ‫‪Arab parties.‬‬

‫ملخ ص ‪ :‬ل ببذ ببزا الذساظ ببة ببو اظاؽ بشاا مّ ببالم التوج ببر ال رك ب‬

‫ظ ب را ي‬

‫اإلاش ق ببذ‬

‫الببزم مببً اإلاببشتت أن ببتمفن ِىببر لبباِوى بببذاية القببوة ال رميببة الشيهعببة الّاملببة ب اإلاؽ ب ذ‬ ‫ال ركب اإلاّاـببش ببه تببر الذاوليببة وؤلاوليميبة والّاإلايببة‪ .‬ومل ببوم اإلاّاـببش ب ببزا الّىببوان ي ببخذ‬ ‫للخٍ ببة ارخال ببشة ال ب تؽب ب ذ موج ببة روسس ببة يي ببر مع بببووة ب اإلاح ببيي الّش ب م ببخو ة ب ببذوس‬ ‫أوسو وأمشسك للتّامة مْ لك اإلاوجة‪.‬‬ ‫والعباال اإلاحبوسم البزم تعبذه بزا الذساظبة إببه ؤلاجاببة ِىبر بو‪ :‬بة مبا تؽب ذا شميبا‬ ‫مببً حببول ببه ـببوسوسا ارييوظ ب را يجية وببول العببىواى الاعببْ ألاويببرة هتببا لببون حكومببة ببضول‬ ‫باهتقبال العبلىة إببه حكومبة مبً لبون إوبشا إرا ا رلبىا أن ـ كبو كيسة شميبا الشا ىبة مجبشد ـبذة‬ ‫لتوجبر حكومهسببا‪ .‬أم ببو لببون هببابْ مببً بفببمة حمبباسسة مشمببت تن رعببتمش م مببا تغيببرى ارخكومبباى‬ ‫ال ب لشص ببا ـببىاد ا و براُ ال رميببةا إرا ا رلببىا أن حكومببة شميببا الشا ىببة ب ـببذة لتوجببر‬ ‫ؼببّاسا‪ .‬وسىبثببا ِىببر ظبباال إوببش ملببادا‪ :‬ببة ظتلالببة شميببا بببين البببذ لين ألاوسو ب وؤلاظببوم أو‬ ‫ً‬ ‫قذ م أحذ ما ِله آلاوش أو اريمْ بينسما بذ و ًِ التضخية ببذ ة ه ظبية آلاوشا‪.‬‬ ‫و فلببق الذساظببة إبببه أن شميببا ظببوا ابحببل ِلببه ألاستببت البببذ ة اريببامْ و ببو ظببتلادة‬ ‫مب ببً واجب ببذ ا الّش ب ب ب ب حعب ببين أوساو ب ببا التلاولب ببية مب ببْ ؤلا ح ب بباد ألاوسو ب ب ودِب ببم ِوواوس ب ببا‬ ‫بالوال بباى اإلاتحب ببذة‪ .‬ب ببارا ك ببان أحب ببذ أ ببم اإلاف ببارت ارخيوسب ببة ال رميب ببة ببو هم ببمام إب ببه ؤلا حب بباد‬ ‫ألاوسو‬

‫ان زا ال بذا لبً تحقبا إال مبً وبول وجبر شميبا هحبو محيى با الّش ب ؤلاظبوم‬

‫و هف بشاه مباؼ ببشة ب وم ببا اا م ببً و ببول مماسظ ببة دوس الوظ ببيي ؤلاوليا ب اإلاقب ببول واإلاشي ببو‬ ‫ح ببل ب تعببوسة النزاِبباى واراو بباى بببين ألاو بشاا الّش يببة الّش يببة و ببين ألاو بشاا الّش يببة وييببر‬ ‫الّش ية‪.‬‬

‫‪- 163 -‬‬

‫مقذمصة‬ ‫كمً أ مية شميا ه كونسا يتال ه إن واحذ لشا ذ ً مفتللين‪ :‬الغبش أو‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫القبباسة ألاوسو يببة والؽببش ألاوظببي أو القبباسة آلاظببيوسة‪ .‬هببل حتببة مووّببا جغشا يببا‬ ‫رّذ هقىة وـة بين الّباإلاين الغش بو والؽبش ه و قبْ به الىىبا الىبوساوو أو شميبا‬ ‫الكببرة‪ :‬إظبيا الوظبىو إببه جاهبذ شميبا ارخاليبة وتؽبغة مىىقبة يتابل إببه الؽببش‬ ‫ألاوظي باإلاّحل الثقا ه وارخماسة ذ ّ ا إبه ولذ العياظة الؽش أوظىية‪.‬‬ ‫لببزلك ببان ا تماماوسببا ؤلاظب را يجية متببذ إبببه رببوإ دوايببش إوليميببة لشلب ا‬ ‫ِليسب ببا اإلاووب ببْ اريغشا ب ببه و ب ببه‪ :‬الب ببذايشة ألاوسو يب ببة والب ببذايشة الّش يب ببة ودايب ببشة إظ ب ببيا‬ ‫الوظببىو‪ .‬وتؽببكة ببزا الببذوايش مبباةاى رخشمببة شميببا ؤلاوليميببة وهلور ببا الببذوبه‬ ‫ووذساوسا الّعكشسة والعياظية و وتفاد ة ولشيبهسا ه أداة دوس أوسو و إظبومو‬ ‫ؼش أوظىو ه إن واحذ‪.‬‬ ‫ولذ زا الذساظة و اظاؽشاا مّالم التوجر ال رك‬

‫ظ را ي‬

‫اإلاش قذ‬

‫الزم مً اإلاشتت أن تمفن ِىر لاِوى بذاية القوة ال رمية الشيهعة الّاملبة‬ ‫اإلاؽ ذ ال رك اإلاّاـش ببه تر الذاولية وؤلاوليمية والّاإلاية‪ .‬ومل وم اإلاّاـش ب‬ ‫ببزا الّىببوان ي ببخذ للخٍببة ارخالببشة ال ب تؽب ذ موجببة روسسببة ييببر معبببووة ب‬ ‫اإلاحببيي الّش ب م ببخو ة بببذوس أوسو ب وأمشسك ب للتّامببة مببْ لببك اإلاوجببة‪ .‬و حتببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫اراب ببرة ال رمي ببة م ببو ِ ببً التوج ببر ال ببزم ظاع ببتقش ِلي ببر ارخال ببة ال رمي ببة مكاه ببة‬ ‫محوسسة لهغ باليعبة إلِادة يكلة اإلاّىو ال ركب‬

‫حعبذ ببة باليعببة إلِبادة‬

‫يكلب ببة ِاإلاى ببا الّش ب ب بشمتب ببر و اليعب بببة لشظ ببم مّب ببالم هٍب ببام ِب ببالا جذ ببذ هب ببابْ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫باتـالة مً داوة مىىقة الؽش ألاوظي ولهغ ملشولبا ِليسبا‪ .‬وّبم وبذ ببزل‬ ‫أوب بشاا مّيى ببة ج ببذ ا لتحشس ببك ببزا التح ببول ب ب ا ج بباا مف ببارخ ا ظب ب را يجية‬ ‫التقليذ ببة‪ .‬إال أن ظ بباال ارخل ببش اإلاّش ب ب جذليببة ببزا الول ببْ ببو ال بزم ظيرظ ببم‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الفببوسة ب نسا ببة اإلاىبباا‪ .‬و ّيببذا ِببً الذساظبباى ال ب ال ح ببرم تّقيببذاى الٍببا شة‬

‫‪- 161 -‬‬

‫العياظية و قْ‬

‫هتقايية مً أول وى ا البحث بالضِم بأن اإلاتغيبر ألاوسو ب‬

‫أو اإلاتغيببر الىببوساو أو اإلاتغيببر ؤلاوليا ب ؤلاظببوم أو متغيببر آلاـببشة التقليذ ببة بببين‬ ‫شميببا مببا بّببذ أ ببا وسغ والّببالم الغش ب ِامببة والوال بباى اإلاتحببذة واـببة أو متغيببر‬ ‫التوج ببر ارخم بباسم رخ ببض بّيى ببر مث ببة ح ببض الّذال ببة والتىمي ببة ب بو ال ببزم شظ ببم‬ ‫ـ ببوسة شمي ببا اإلاع ببتقبة وسح ببذد دوس ببا ؤلاولياب ب والّ ببالا ها ي ببك ِ ببً تؽ ببكيلر‬ ‫إلاّادلببة ظببتقشاس العيا ب داول ببا ببو يمببا ل رلببر ببزا الذساظببة ابتببذاة أوببش‬ ‫ً‬ ‫للتّام ببة الع ببى ؤلاِوم ب التغشس ببشم أمث ببر م ببً كوه ببر مؽ بباس ا ب ببأم دسج ببة للبح بث‬ ‫ظ ب ب را ي‬

‫ظاؽ ب بشا اإلاشمب ببذ‪ .‬ك ب ببة ب ببزا اإلاتغي ب براى تلاِ ب ببة‪ .‬والتوج ب ببر ال ب ببزم‬

‫ظي رسببب بّببذ أن ببضول ظببيولة اللخٍببة آلاوببشة ظببيحمة بفببمة كببة ببزا اإلاتغيبراى‬ ‫مجتمّ ببة‪ .‬و ببزا ف ببير ظ بباال الذساظ ببة ببو‪ :‬وـ ببف سوا ببذ ك ببة ل ببك اإلاتغيب براى ب ب‬ ‫الف ببوسة ظب ب را يجية القومي ببة ال رمي ببة ال ب ب اؽ ببكة آلان وال ب ب ظاع ببتوم ِل ببه‬ ‫ظوو ا اإلاعتقبة اإلاىٍوس والبّيذ‪.‬‬

‫وسمبباا لببزلك كلببر ظبباال ش ب م ببم‪ :‬مببا ب د ىاميبباى وبببرة ظببتة وببشون‬ ‫مً اراو ة ال رمية باليعبة لّووة شميا باتمة الّش ية ا لقبذ أظبشا الببّن ب‬ ‫وشاةة لك ارابرة بين مغال‬

‫ثمينسا و ين ملشه تؽويس ا دون قذ م حلية‬

‫دوي ببا ل ببا بح ببث ب دالالوس ببا و ب دسوظ ب ا اإلاّش ي ببة الواج ببذ إحيا ببا و وٌيل ببا‬ ‫راذمبة ألامتببين ال رميببة والّش يببة بببة راذمببة البؽببشسة ِبببر هلببن الضسببف والتج يببة‬ ‫ًِ لك ارابرة‪.‬‬ ‫وإلاببا كببان وجببود حببض الّذالببة والتىميببة ب ظ بذة ارخكببم ب شميببا مىببز ِببام‬ ‫‪ 2002‬وموج ببة التح ببول الث ببوسم الّش ب الشا ى ببة م ببا اإلاتغي بران اريذ ببذان ألامث ببر‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ب ببشوصا ب ب اإلاّادل ببة ارييوظب ب را يجية ال رمي ببة ببان ببزا الذساظ ببة ظ رـ ببذ مّ ببالم‬

‫‪- 163 -‬‬

‫التوج ببر ال رك ب ارييوظ ب را ي‬

‫اإلاع ببتقبل ِب ببر س س ببة اإلاتغي براى ألاو ببشة ب ل ببوة‬

‫روابت الشافية ال رمية واإلاتغيراى ألاوشة‪.‬‬ ‫والعبباال اإلاحببوسة الببزة تعببذه ببزا الذساظببة إبببه ؤلاجابببة ِىبر ببو‪ :‬ببة مببا‬ ‫تؽ ذا شميا مً حول ه ـوسوسا ارييوظ را يجية وول العىواى الاعْ ألاويرة‬ ‫هتببا لببون حكومببة ببضول باهتقببال العببلىة إبببه حكومببة مببً لببون إوببش ِلببه ا براك‬ ‫ـوسة شميا الشا ىة مجشد ـذة لتوجر حكومهسا ا أم و لون هابْ مً بفمة‬ ‫أن ك‬ ‫حمبباسسة مشمببت تن رعببتمش م مببا تغيببرى ارخكومبباى ال ببل لشص ببا ـببىاد ا و براُ‬ ‫ال رميبة ِلبه ا براك أن حكومبة شميبا الشا ىببة به ـبذة لتوجبر ؼبّاساا وسىبثببا‬ ‫ِىببر ظبباال إوببش ملببادا‪ :‬ببة ظتلالببة شميببا بببين البببذ لين ألاوسو ببو وؤلاظببومو أو‬ ‫ً‬ ‫قببذ م أحببذ ما ِلببه آلاوببش أو اريمببْ بينسمببا بببذ و ِببً التضببخية ببببذ ة ببه ظبببية‬ ‫آلاوشا‬ ‫ا‬ ‫أول‪ :‬خشيطة بذائل الحىجه السياس ى التركى‬ ‫فتلببف الببباحثون الّببش حببول العياظببة ال رميببة اريذ ببذة مىببز وـببول‬ ‫ح ببض الّذال ببة والتىمي ببة إب ببه ارخك ببم ِ ببام ‪ :2002‬ى بباغ م ببً ببشة أن شمي ببا م ببْ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫معببألة همببمام إبببه ؤلا حبباد ألاوسو ب ِلببه سأط أولوساوسببا‪ .‬وو قببا ل ببزا البشأة ببان‬ ‫التوجببر الّش ببو ال رك ببو ‘ لعببش بأه ببر وظببيلة لتقوس ببة مووببف شمي ببا إصاة ببزا ؤلا ح بباد‪.‬‬ ‫وحببال همببمام إبببه الىببادة ألاوسو ببو بببضِم بباالة ظببتكون أوسو ببا ببه البببذ ة ل رميببا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ِ ببً الّ ببالم الّش ببو ؤلاظ ببومو تن هم ببمام ظ ببيلشك وي ببودا ِل ببه حشس ببة شمي ببا ببه‬ ‫التّبير ًِ ظياظاوسا ارااسجيبة الشا ىبة جباا الّبالم الّش بو ؤلاظبومو‪ .‬و ىباغ مبً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ببشة أن مع ببألة اهم ببمام شمي ببا إب ببه ؤلا ح بباد ألاوسو ببو لهع ببت ب ببذ و أو م ببارشا اليي ببا‬ ‫للتوجببر الّش ببو ل رميببا أو التّبباون ؤلاظ ب را ي ه بببين الّببش و شميببا ورلببك تن حببض‬ ‫الّذال ببة والتىمي ببة ىٍ ببش إب ببه الّوو بباى م ببْ الّ ببالم الّش ببو ؤلاظ ببومو ِل ببه أنس ببا ل ببل‬

‫‪- 163 -‬‬

‫مفلخة شمية أميذة ه حقيا ال وسة وتّضسبض ظبتقشاس ألامحبل والىمبو وتفبادة‬ ‫والذوس ؤلاوليال‪.‬‬ ‫و ب ببه ب ببزا اريضييب ببة ظب ببوا وعب ببلي المب ببوة ِلب ببه ارايب بباس ألاوسو ب ببو وِلب ببه‬ ‫البذ ة الّش و ؤلاظومو ِله التلفية التابه‪:‬‬ ‫‪ -1‬الخياس ألاوسوبى‪:‬‬ ‫ؼكلت الشيبة ال رمية ه هممام إبه ؤلا حاد ألاوسو و أحذ أ م ألا ذاا‬ ‫للعياظ ب ببة ارااسجيب ب ببة ال رميب ب ببة مىب ب ببز ظب ب ببتهىاى القب ب ببشن الّؽب ب ببشسً حيب ب ببث حشـب ب ببت‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ارخكوم بباى ال رمي ببة ِل ببه بّ ببث وس ببة أوسو ي ببة باِتب بباس أن ل رمي ببا امت ببذادا ببه يش ببو‬ ‫البوظ ببلوس ب ببرص ببزا ال وس ببة مم ببا أن ِم ببوسهسا ببه ا ح بباد أوسو ببو ظ ببيذِم ج ببود‬ ‫الذولة ال رمية ارخذ ثة ه جعيذ و حقيا ويم ارخماسة الغش ية اإلاّاـشة (‪.)1‬‬ ‫وإرا كاه ببت وم ببة لع ببىكو ِ ببام ‪ 1999‬أو ببشى تول م ببشة و ببه بي ببان سظ ببال ب ب ب‬ ‫أوسو ي ببة شمي ببا بمج ببشد شؼ ببيح ا لوهم ببمام إب ببه ؤلا ح بباد ألاوسو ببو و ببوا ال ببش ن‬ ‫اإلاىلببا الببزة ووجببر بببر اإلاغببش الِتببباسا قببْ وبباس القبباسة ألاوسو يببة ببان رلببك لببم‬ ‫رّببً بببأة حببال مببً ألاحببوال حعببم ؤلا حبباد ألاوسو ببو أمببش ِمببوسة شميببا ح ببل وأن‬ ‫اظتو ت مّا ير كو نساجً العياظية و وتفاد ة ورلبك بعببذ اريبذل ألاوسو بو‬ ‫حول اهممام شميا للىادة ألاوسو و‪.‬‬ ‫قبب ببول ال رؼب ببيح ش ب ب م وإ مب ببام همب ببمام ش ب ب م إو ببش بعب بببذ ب ببشدد القب ببوة‬ ‫الغش ي ببة ب ببين ببأرير متغي ببر ً متق ببابلين‪ :‬محوسس ببة شمي ببا ارييوظب ب را يجية والف ببوسة‬ ‫ؤلادساميببة ل رميببا ؤلاظببومية ال ب احتمببيت داس اراو ببة وال ب رذ ب الغببش أنسببا لببم‬ ‫ببتم إِببادة يكلهسببا ِل ب ببذ أ ببا وسغ بلّببة متغي براى الببذاوة بببة بلّببة ببذووى‬ ‫ارابباس ممببا احببذإ ِلببه الببذوام حالببة مببً التببواصن الببذويا ال ببؾ م مببا ويببة ِببً‬ ‫شسببب الّلماهيببة ب وعببيل الذولببة ال رميببة اإلاّاـببشة‪ .‬وِلببه ببزا ارالليببة ظنرـببذ‬

‫‪- 166 -‬‬

‫ى ببا مّ ببالم رل ببك اري ببذل ألاوسو ب مم ببا مؽ ببلت ِى ببر وب ببرة اإلاوو ببف ألاوسو ب م ببً‬ ‫ِم ببوسة شمي ببا ب ب‬ ‫ال رك‬

‫ح بباد ألاوسو ب ب ِل ببه الّك ببغ م ببً القب ببول ألاوسو ب ب للوج ببود‬

‫حلف ؼمال ألاولس ‪.‬‬

‫أ‪ -‬الجذل ألاوسوبى حىل انضمام ثشكيا لإلثحاد ألاوسوبى‪:‬‬ ‫لم ىقىبْ اريبذل ألاوسو بو حبول أحقيبة شميبا به ِمبوسة ؤلا حباد ألاوسو بو‬ ‫مىز البذا اى ألاوبه لعذه شميا لوهممام إبه ؤلا حاد‪ .‬فول رة ارخش البباسدة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ا فزى كة مً أإلااهيا و شوعبا وإ ىاليبا موولبا إ جابيبا مبً الىلبذ ال ركبو‪ .‬لكبً بّبذ‬ ‫اهممام دول ؼش ووظي أوسو ا وجىو ؼش أوسو ا إببه ؤلا حباد ألاوسو بو تغيبرى‬ ‫مواوف زا الذول الثوإ حيث حولت اإلاواوبف ؤلا جابيبة حيبال اهمبمام شميبا‬ ‫إبه ؤلا حاد ألاوسو و إبه مووف سا ن ل زا هممام‪ .‬بهىما ٌبة اإلاووبف البر ىباوو‬ ‫ً‬ ‫– ذِمب ببر مواوب ببف ِب ببذد مب ببً الب ببذول ألاوسو يب ببة ألاوب ببشة – ماسب ببذا الهمب ببمام شميب ببا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫إظاىادا ِله ِذة حجج ه‪-:‬‬ ‫(‪)1‬‬

‫أن ظببتقشاس العيا ب ل والتىميببة وتفبباد ة ل رميببا اإلاىمببمة إبببه ؤلا حبباد‬ ‫ألاوسو و ظيحذان مً ذ ا الهيشة إبه دول ؤلا حاد‪.‬‬

‫(‪)2‬‬

‫أن وظ ب ببيْ ح ب ببذود ؤلا ح ب بباد ألاوسو ب ببو لتتب ب باوم القوو ب بباص وإ ب ب بشان والّب ب بشا‬ ‫وظ ببوسسا م ببً و ببول شمي ببا م ببً ؼ ببأهر إ ج بباد ببواصن م ببىح أوسو ببا اإلاوح ببذة‬ ‫وب ببذسة أمبب ببر ِلب ببه التب ببأرير ب ببه لب ببك اإلاىب بباوا وسقب ببوة موول ب ببا جب بباا الىلب ببور‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ألامشسكو ىاغ أ ما‪.‬‬

‫(‪)3‬‬

‫أن ال ببذوس ؤلاوليا ببل ال ببزة مك ببً أن ق ببوم ب ببر شمي ببا ببه مىىق ببة الؽ ببش‬ ‫ألاوظ ببي واـ ببة و ببه الّ ببالم ؤلاظ ببومو ِام ببة مكى ببر ؤلاظ ب ام ببه ببزلية‬ ‫ـ ببّو اى التواـ ببة ؤلاوتف ببادة والتج بباسة م ببْ الّ ببالم ؤلاظ ببومو والّش ببو‬

‫‪- 163 -‬‬

‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ألاوببش هلعببيا وحمبباسسا ل رميببا وألابّببذ ِببً أوسو ببا بلّببة سواظببذ إسثسببا‬ ‫ؤلاظتّماسة‪.‬‬ ‫(‪)4‬‬

‫أن س ببن اهمببمام شميببا إبببه ؤلا حبباد ألاوسو ببو ظببيقوة النزِببة الشاد كاليببة‬ ‫ؤلاظ ببومية لك ببً وبول ببا ظ ببيكون أ م ببة توسو ببا بؽ ببشه ال زام ببا بمّ ببا ير‬ ‫ؤلا حاد ألاوسو و وؼشوه كو نساجً‪.‬‬ ‫وال فلو أن بزا التوجبر اإلااسبذ الهمبمام شميبا رّبول ِلبه البذوس ال ركبو به‬

‫التو يببا ب ببين أوسو ببا والّ ببالم ؤلاظ ببومو وسف ببذ ب ا ج بباا جّل ببا وىى ببشة وـ ببة ب ببين‬ ‫أوسو ببا والّ ببالم ؤلاظ ببوم ول ببهغ ب ب ا ج بباا اإلالاـ ببلة ب ببين شمي ببا وِاإلا ببا ؤلاظ ببوم‬ ‫لف ببارت يي ببر أوس هس ببا‪ .‬ومّح ببل رل ببك أن ببزا التوج ببر رع ببتذ اإلاؽ ب رغ ب ببين الب ببذ لين‬ ‫محة التحلية ولهغ اإلالاـلة بينسما‪.‬‬ ‫أم ببا مواو ببف شوع ببا وأإلااهي ببا وإ ىالي ببا الشا م ببة الهم ببمام شمي ببا إب ببه ؤلا ح بباد‬ ‫ألاوسو و قذ اظاىذى إبه س ة ملاد ا ما له‪-:‬‬ ‫(‪)1‬‬

‫و ببتوا الثق ببا ه وارخم بباسة وال ببذ حل ب ببين أوسو ببا وم ببا مثل ببر شمي ببا م ببً‬ ‫أبّاد اسسفية وحماسسة راى وسة مغا شة‪ .‬بما امذ كشة أن أوسو ا ال ل‬ ‫أظعب ببت ِلب ببه ؤلا مب ببان اإلاعب ببي ه ل ب ببا وسب ببة رقا يب ببة و اسسفيب ببة وجغشا يب ببة‬ ‫ميز ا ه مواج ة شميا الّلماهية ال ل ذ ً يالبية ظكانسا باإلظوم(‪.)2‬‬

‫(‪)2‬‬

‫س ببية شمي ببا اإلا ب ببردة ببه مجب ببال حق ببو ؤلاوع ببان ومواول ب ببا م ببً ألاوليب ببة‬ ‫الكشد ببة‪ .‬سي ببم وي ببام حكوم ببة ح ببض الّذال ببة والتىمي ببة وسيهع ب ا أسدوي ببان‬ ‫بباجشاة إـبوحاى ظياظببية وتؽبشلّية للتو يببا ببين بييببة شميبا العياظببية‬ ‫ً‬ ‫وتؽ ببشلّاوسا الذظ ببتوسسة والقاهوهي ببة و يي ببة ؤلا ح بباد ألاوسو ببو و ق ببا إلاّ ببا ير‬ ‫كو نساجً‪.‬‬

‫‪- 163 -‬‬

‫أن شمي ببا ظ بباىات ببه أداة دوس ببا كوظ ببيي حم بباسة ب ببين أوسو ببا والّ ببالم‬

‫(‪)3‬‬

‫ؤلاظومو قي كلما ِادى إبه وسهسا ؤلاظومية و زا حتمال اىاون‬ ‫مْ مبذأ ِموسهسا ه ؤلا حاد ألاوسو و‪.‬‬ ‫اريذ ش بالزمش أن حض الّذالة والتىميبة اسبذ اهمبمام شميبا‬ ‫إب ب ببه ِم ب ببوسة ؤلا ح ب بباد ألاوسو ب ببو و ه ب ببذما داو ب ببة اإلاىٍوم ب ببة ألاوسو ي ب ببة‬ ‫ب ب ب ب بباإلاّحل العيا ب ب ب ب ب ل و وتف ب ب ب ببادة واظب ب ب ب ببايّا اإلاكاعب ب ب ب ببباى الّلمي ب ب ب ببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫والتكىولوجيببة للخمبباسة الغش يببة اهىووببا مببً أن ال وسببة ؤلاظببومية ل رميببا‬ ‫ال اىبباون مببْ متىلببباى هتمبباة ل حبباد ألاوسو ببو‪ .‬ممببا أن ال بزام شميببا‬ ‫بمّببا ير ؤلا حبباد ألاوسو ببو و اتظبباط مّيبباس الذ مقشاويببة لببً رّضل ببا ِببً‬ ‫محيى ببا ؤلاظ ببومو ب ببة ظيم ببمً للؽ ببّذ ال رك ببو حق ببر ببه ارخل بباً ِل ببه‬ ‫وستب ب ببر ؤلاظب ب ببومية والتّبيب ب ببر ِنسب ب ببا بىشسقب ب ببة حمب ب بباسسة مثلمب ب ببا ب ب ببو متب ب ببا‬ ‫للؽّو ألاوسو ية ولألولياى اإلاعلمة ه الذول ألاوسو ية راوسا(‪.)3‬‬ ‫وسامببذ ارخببض ِلببه أن ِمببوسة شميببا ببه ؤلا حبباد ألاوسو ببو ظببتجلذ الّذ ببذ‬ ‫مً اإلاضا ا و ه‪-:‬‬ ‫(أ) مع بباِذة شمي ببا ِل ببه هتق ببال إب ببه مف بباا ال ببذول الكب ببرة واـ ببة وأنس ببا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫متل ببك إسر ببا حم بباسسا ومقوم بباى اوتف بباد ة و ؽ ببشسة وجيوظ ب را يجية ب ببين الؽ ببش‬ ‫والغش ‪.‬‬ ‫( ) لمان واجبذ شميبا به مشمبض ألاحبذاإ العياظبية الّاإلايبة بمبا جّل با‬ ‫لمً ـىاُ القشاس ؼأنسا ؼأن الذول ألاوسو ية الكبرة‪.‬‬ ‫( ) صسبادة ببشؿ ظببتقشاس العيا ب ل والتقببذم ؤلاوتفببادة ببه شميببا وتّضسببض‬ ‫ال ب ببوصن ظ ب ب را ي‬

‫ل ح ب بباد ألاوسو ب ببو را ب ببر الظب ببيما وأن شمي ب ببا قب ببْ بج ب ببواس أيحب ببل‬

‫مىىقتين هلىيتين ه الّالم و ما اراليل الّش و و حش وضوسً‪.‬‬

‫‪- 163 -‬‬

‫(د) اإلاع ببا مة ببه بى بباة ببواصن إظ ب را ي‬

‫ب ببين أوسو ببا وإظ ببيا ك ببون شمي ببا ببه‬

‫مشمب ببض الثقب ببة يب ببر ألامب ببش الب ببزة رّحب ببل إحيب بباة إسإ ِثمب بباوو ِشسب ببا كب ببان وب ببذ جمب ببذا‬ ‫أ ا وسغ‪.‬‬ ‫( ب ب ب ب) معب ب ب بباِذة شميب ب ب ببا ِلب ب ب ببه إوامب ب ب ببة ِووب ب ب بباى جيب ب ب ببذة مب ب ب ببْ محيى ب ب ب ببا دون‬ ‫اظتقىاباى ومىح ا شـة التحول لهغ إبه دولة إوليمية م مة حعبذ ببة إببه‬ ‫دولة مبرة ِله الفّيذ الّالال(‪.)4‬‬ ‫‪ -2‬البذيل العشبى إلاسالمى‪:‬‬ ‫ب ب ببرص اإلاكاه ب ببة اإلاتمي ب ببزة ل رمي ب ببا ب ببه هى ب ببا العياظ ب بباى الّش ي ب ببة وؤلاوليمي ب ببة‬ ‫والذولي ببة ببه مىىق ببة الؽ ببش ألاوظ ببي حي ببث وج ببذ ميب براإ ووس ببة م ببً التلاِ ببة‬ ‫و فببال بببين الّببش وألا بشاغ الببز ً رعببكىون ووىببين متجبباوسسً ولؽ ب ركان ببه‬ ‫ِامله الثقا ة والتاسسخ‪.‬‬ ‫وتن اري ببواس يصب ب م مف ببارت متوا ق ببة أو متىاوم ببة ب ببين اإلاتج بباوسسً و ببزا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫اإلافببارت ولببذ ومببا ا وِووبباى بّببث ِلببه التّبباون و بببادل اإلاىببا ْ أو تعبببذ ولقببا‬ ‫ومف بباوا ل ببم ف ببة التلاِ ببة ب ببين شمي ببا والّ ببالم الّش ببو م ببً مثي ببر م ببً ارابب براى‬ ‫الفبشاِية ال ببل تّببود ببه أـببول ا إبببه ببرة ارخكببم الّثمبباوو للببووً الّش ببو وإبببه مببا‬ ‫بّببذ صوال ارخكببم الّثمبباوو و أظببهغ الذولببة ال رميببة ارخذ ثببة ِببام ‪ِ 1923‬لببه ببذ‬ ‫أ ا وسغ‪.‬‬ ‫ومْ ـّود حض الّذالة والتىمية إبه العلىة ِام ‪ 2002‬ظذه ارخض إببه قوسبة‬ ‫سواب ب ببي شمي ب ببا وهلور ب ببا بال ب ببذول الّش ي ب ببة و الّ ب ببالم ؤلاظ ب ببومو والىٍ ب ببش إب ب ببه الّ ب ببالم‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤلاظومو لهغ كوهر مفذس وىش ظيا ل ورقا ه ِله الّلماهية ال رميبة ببة كمبيو‬ ‫ً‬ ‫م مببا للؽببشكاة الغببش يين وألاولعببيين لتّضسببض اإلافببلخة القوميببة ال رميببة ألامببش الببزة‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫اوّك ب ببغ ِل ب ببه ال ب ببذوس ال رك ب ببو اللاِ ب ببة ب ببه القم ب ببا ا ؤلاوليمي ب ببة ب ببه مىىق ب ببة الؽ ب ببش‬ ‫ألاوظي(‪.)5‬‬ ‫أ‪ -‬الذوس التركى الفاعل فى القضايا إلاقليمية فى منطقة الششق ألاوسط‪ :‬ظّت‬ ‫شمي ببا ح ببت حك ببم ح ببض الّذال ببة والتىمي ببة لتك ببون الى ببشا اإلاب ببادس والع ببا ه رخ ببة‬ ‫اإلاؽببكوى والوظبباوة ِبببر ارخ ببواس والتّبباون مببْ دول ِوواوس ببا متببو شة مببْ الوال بباى‬ ‫اإلاتح ببذة واـ ببة وم ببْ الغ ببش بف ببلة ِام ببة مث ببة إ ب بشان وظ ببوسسا وحشم ببة حم بباط‬ ‫و وظ ب ببيْ ِوواوس ب ببا الثىايي ب ببة م ب ببْ دول اري ب ببواس اريغشا ب ببه الّش ب ببو و ى ب ببوسش سواب ب ببي‬ ‫اوتف بباد ة ووس ببة م ببْ الّ ببالم الّش ببو ألام ببش ال ببزة ِ ببضص مكاههس ببا ببه مىىق ببة الؽ ببش‬ ‫ألاوظي وجّة الذول الّش ية اسذ الذوس ؤلاوليا ل رميا ه اإلاىىقة(‪.)6‬‬ ‫وظ ب ببوا وع ب ببتّشك با جب بباص العياظب بباى ال ب ببل اهتهيهسب ببا شميب ببا ج ب بباا بّ ب ببن‬ ‫اإلاللاى الّش ية ه اإلاىىقة ِله الوجر التابه‪:‬‬

‫(‪ )1‬الشأن العشاقى‪:‬‬ ‫أظ مت ِذة ِوامة ه حذ ذ ؼكة الّوواى ال رمية – الّشاوية و ه‪:‬‬ ‫(أ) املطصصامل السياسصصية لاكصصشاد العصصشاقي ن م صصى مقامصصة ح ص راجصصى‪ :‬بّببذ حببتول‬ ‫ألامشسكببو للّبشا‬

‫وببوسى اإلاىىقببة الكشد ببة ببه الّبشا مٍببا ش دولببة وايمببة باللّببة‬

‫ووببذ مببيْ واوببْ ظببتقول الببزاتو الكببشدة اإلاتمثببة ببه وجببود ظببلىة مشد ببة ؼببمال‬ ‫الّشا إبه د ْ شميا إبه التّامة مْ زا الكيان الكشدة(‪.)7‬‬ ‫(ب) وضص مذينصة كشكصىن ونفطوصصا وملص ر السصران التركمصصان‪ :‬كبان أحبذ ألا ببذاا‬ ‫الشيهع ب ببة للعياظ ب ببة ارااسجي ب ببة ال رمي ب ببة ب ببه الّ ب بشا مى ب ببز ِ ب ببام ‪ 2003‬ب ببو حما ب ببة‬ ‫الع ببكان ال رمم ببان الع ببىة ببه مذ ى ببة مشك ببوغ ورل ببك إلبق بباة هل ببي مشك ببوغ و بباس‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫ألا ب ب ببذة الكشد ب ببة ح ب ببل ال قب ب ببوم ألامب ب بشاد بتب ب ببذِيم اظب ب ببتقول م الب ب ببزاتو أو ح ب ببل‬ ‫ظتقول ه اإلاعتقبة‪.‬‬

‫(ج) امللصال الحيىيصة لتركيصا فصى لصمال العصشاق‪ :‬مبً أظببا ا تمبام شميبا بؽبمال‬ ‫الّ بشا مف ببارخ ا وتف بباد ة اإلاش بى ببة ب ببىلي مشك ببوغ حي ببث مت ببذ و ببي أهابه ببذ‬ ‫هلي مشكوغ – حيحان لىقة و فذ ش الىلي الّشا ه ِببر البحبش ألاببين اإلاتوظبي‬ ‫إبببه أوسو ببا ومببزلك مفببارخ ا اإلاش بىببة بىشسببا شميببا – الّبشا البببرة حيببث ىقببة‬ ‫مٍّبم ـببادساوسا إبببه الّبشا‬

‫و لببذان ارالبيل الّش يببة ألاوببشة ِبببر وشسببا اإلاوـببة –‬

‫بغذاد (‪.)8‬‬ ‫وه ببادة ح ببض الّذال ببة والتىمي ببة بم ببشوسة اظ ببتقول الّ بشا وارخل بباً ِل ببه‬ ‫وحذة أسالير ووحذ ر العياظية واإلاعا مة ه حقيا ألامبً والعبوم به الّبشا‬ ‫و أظهغ البيية الذ مقشاوية‪ .‬مما بادس ِام ‪ 2005‬إبه ِقذ مىتذة الذول اإلاجاوسة‬ ‫للّ بشا الببزة ؼبباسغ يببر ببزا ألاويببر‪ .‬وـبباس رلببك إحببذة ألادواى اإلا مببة للعياظببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ارااسجيببة ال رميببة ب مببا فببق الؽببش ألاوظببي‪ .‬مببو ِببً القيببام بالوظبباوة بببين‬ ‫مافبياى ظبيية سيهعبة مّاسلبة و ببين مبّبورين أمبشسكيين لمببمان مؽباسمة ظببىة‬ ‫الّب بشا ببه هتفاب بباى الووىي ببة الّشاوي ببة ال ببل ِق ببذى ؼب ب ش درع ببمبر ِ ببام ‪.2005‬‬ ‫و واـ ببة ارخ ببض م ببْ ؼ ببيّة الّ ببشا ِب ببر اظ ببتقبال شمي ببا سي ببهغ ارخكوم ببة الع ببابا‬ ‫إبشا يم اريّلشة ودِوة مقتذة الفذس لضساسوسا(‪.)9‬‬ ‫و ببه ِببام ‪ِ 2009‬ببضصى شميببا ِووبباى التّبباون ؤلاظ ب را ي ه مببْ الّ بشا مببً‬ ‫و ب ببول حوس ب ببة اجتماِ ب بباى مب ب بباس ال ب ببوصساة إب ب ببه مج ب ببالغ تّ ب بباون إظب ب ب را ي ه س يّ ب ببة‬ ‫اإلاعتوة لتتوبه مىاوؽة القمبا ا ؤلاظب را يجية ببين البلبذ ً مبً وبول اجتمباِين‬ ‫ظ ببىوسين ل ببشيهغ وصساة البل ببذ ً‪ .‬مم ببا وا ق ببت ِ ببام ‪ِ 2010‬ل ببه ب ببذة حوس ببة مى بباوا‬ ‫(‪.)10‬‬

‫التجاسة ارخشة مْ الّشا إبه مىاوا جاسة حشة متّذدة ألاوشاا‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫(‪ )2‬الشأن السىسي‪:‬‬ ‫بوـول حض الّذالة والتىمية إببه العبلىة ِبام ‪ 2002‬ؼب ذى الّووباى‬ ‫بين البلذ ً هقلة هوِية و م ِتماد ِله إلية الضساساى الش يّبة اإلاعبتوة لتبذِيم‬ ‫الببشوابي وتفبباد ة والعياظببية بببين البلببذ ً وتعببوسة القمببا ا اراو يببة بينسمببا‬ ‫مثة ‪ :‬وما ا اإلاياا (وا قت شميا ِله ضوسبذ ظبوسسا بقبذس مّبين مبً ميباا نسبش دجلبة‬ ‫لببشم مىبباوا ببه ظببوسسا ِلببه مقش ببة مببً مثلببث ارخببذود بببين ظببوسسا والّبشا و شميببا‬ ‫ممببا بببذأى ببه مىاوؽببة اظب را يجياى سم مؽب رمة مببْ ظببوسسا‪ .‬و ببزلك فلببت شميببا‬ ‫ِ ببً العياظ بباى الع ببابقة ال ببل كاه ببت تع ببهسذا مى ببْ ظ ببوسسا م ببً حق ببا الؽ ببش ه ببه‬ ‫اإلايب بباا (‪ )11‬وومب ببا ا ارخب ببذود (ا لقب ببت شميب ببا وظب ببوسسا ب ببه درعب ببمبر ِب ببام ‪ِ 2004‬لب ببه‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ِ راا سظميا بارخذود بينسما ِىذما أوش ارياهبان ِوهية أهر لم تّذ بينسمبا أ بة‬ ‫وم ببا ا حذود ببة) ووؽ بباه ح ببض الّم ببال الكشدظ ببتاوو (ا ل ببا البلب ببذ ً ِل ببه مى ببْ‬ ‫ألام ب بشاد م ب ببً أظب ببهغ ميب ببان أو ؼ ب بببر مي ب ببان مع ب ببتقة ب ببه أة جب ببضة م ب ببً مشدظب ببتان‬ ‫ً‬ ‫التاسسفي ببة تن رل ببك ل ببً ك ببون ل ببر ق ببي إر بباسا ظ ببلبية ِل ببه ظ ببوسسا ب ببة و ببذ ىق ببة‬ ‫الّذوة هلفالية إبه جىو ؼش ألاهالول الكشدة)(‪.)12‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫لو ِام ‪ 2002‬ووّت ظوسسا ا لاوا للتّاون ألامحل مْ شميا ممً بادل‬ ‫اإلاّلوماى والتكىولوجيا والتذسسذ وإمكان إجشاة مىاوساى ِعكشسة مؽ رمة‪.‬‬ ‫و ه ىا ش ِام ‪ 2004‬وام بؽاس ألاظذ بضساسة إبه شميا كاهت ه ألاوبه لشيهغ‬ ‫ظ ببوسة مى ببز ِ ببام ‪ . 1946‬ألام ببش ال ببزة ببذل ِل ببه التى ببوس الع ببشلْ ال ببزة وب بشأ ِل ببه‬ ‫الّوواى الثىايية بين البلذ ً ِله أظاط ح رام اإلاتبادل والل م اإلاؽ رغ‪ .‬و لت‬ ‫ببزا الضسبباسة ويببام أسدويببان بضسبباسة ظببوسسا به درعببمبر ِببام ‪ 2004‬وويببام الببذولتين‬ ‫بببالتوويْ ِلببه ا لاويببة إلوؽبباة مىىقببة جبباسة حببشة بينسمببا ودولببت ببزا‬

‫لاويببة‬

‫حيز التىليز ِام ‪ .2007‬وكاهت وريقة ألامً القومو ال ركبو ال بل ـبذسى ِبام ‪2010‬‬ ‫وذ ولّت ظوسسا ه مش بة الذول ال ل جمّ ا ب رميا تّاون وريا(‪.)13‬‬

‫‪- 131 -‬‬

‫وتن حكومببة أسدويببان وشحببت الببذوس ال ركببو الوظببيي مببذوس ـبباوْ العببوم‬ ‫رخببة بّببن ـ بشاِاى اإلاىىقببة قببذ وظببىت بببين ظببوسسا وإظ بشايية ِببام ‪2008‬‬ ‫ووامبت بشِا ببة اإلالاولبباى ييببر اإلاباؼببشة ببين البلببذ ً للوـببول إبببه تعببوسة ظياظببية‬ ‫بفببذد اريببوالن‪ .‬وسيببم أن لببك اإلالاولبباى ال ببل ِقببذى أس ببْ جببوالى ببه اظببىىبول‬ ‫و ببول الل ببرة م ببً م ببا و – أيع ببىغ ‪ 2008‬ل ببم تع ببلش ِ ببً ا ل ببا‬

‫و ببم جمي ببذ ا‬

‫هايجة الغضو ؤلاظشاييله لغضة أواوش درعمبر ِام ‪ 2008‬انسا أوضخت بذون لببغ‬ ‫أن شميا تعذه لتحقيا مفبارخ ا به اإلاىىقبة ِبً وشسبا التبأرير ولبهغ التلاِبة به‬ ‫التىوساى والتلاِوى ؤلاوليمية‪.‬‬ ‫و ب ببه ِ ب ببام ‪ 2009‬أوؽ ب ببأى شمي ب ببا مجل ب ببغ التّ ب بباون ؤلاظ ب ب را ي ه بينس ب ببا و ب ببين‬ ‫ظببوسسا وأجببشة البلببذان مىبباوساى ِعببكشسة مؽب رمة كاهببت ألاوبببه مببً هوِ ببا بينسمببا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫بّذما كاد البلذان ذوون حش ا ِام ‪.)14(1998‬‬ ‫وإرا كاه ببت اإلاواوب ببف ال رمي ببة مب ببً الث ببوساى ال ب ببل ؼب ب ذوسا ِب ببذد م ببً الب ببذول‬ ‫الّش يب ببة أِب ببادى وب ببش و أميب ببذ مشمضسب ببة الاعب ببا الى ال ب ببل تّلب ببا بجب ببو ش العياظب ببة‬ ‫ارااسجية ال رميبة حيبال اإلاىىقبة الّش يبة ومحبذداوسا و وج اوسبا وروابهسبا وال بل أمبذ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ِليسببا أسدويببان بأنسببا ىىلببا مببً حببا الؽببّو الّش يببة ببه اوتيبباس مببً حكم ببا و قببا‬ ‫للىم ببور ال ببذ مقشاوو و ببه حي بباة أمث ببر مشام ببة وحشس بباى أمب ببر ومؽ بباسمة أوظ ببْ ببه‬ ‫ارخي بباة العياظ ببية ببان م ببا ح ببذإ ببه ظ ببوسسا مى ببز ‪ 2011/3/15‬م ببً احتجاج بباى‬ ‫ؼبّبية مىا مببة لبؽباس ألاظببذ ومبً ِىببف ملبشه مببً جاهبذ الىٍببام العببوسة إصاة‬ ‫اإلاتٍ ببا شسً ول ببْ العياظ ببة ال رمي ببة ببه م ببأص ‪ .‬إم ببا التض ببخية بالىٍ ببام ارخ ببامم ببه‬ ‫ظببوسسا مثلمببا ّلببت ببه ارخالببة اإلافببشسة ِىببذما والببذ أسدويببان مببً مببباسغ التى ببه‬ ‫و ظببتجابة إلاىالببذ ؼببّبر و ببه ارخالببة الليبيببة ِىببذما والببذ أسدويببان بمببشوسة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ى به القببزا ه ببوسا بّببذ اس كابببر جبشايم فبة إبببه حببذ ؤلابببادة اريماِيببة ورلببك ح ببل‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ال لق ب ببذ شمي ب ببا سـ ب ببيذ ا العيا ب ب ب ل ال ب ببزة اماع ب بببتر ِب ب ببر ج ب ببذ بزلت ب ببر ظياظب ب ببيا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ودبلوماظ ببيا مى ببز اه ببذالُ الث ببوساى الّش ي ببة‪ .‬أو تغلي ببذ مف ببارت شمي ببا ارخيوس ببة م ببً‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫وببول سظببم واسوببة وشسببا للىٍببام العببوسة للاببشو مببً ألاصمببة ِبببر لبيببة دِببواى‬ ‫ؤلاـو العيا ل و هلتا ِله كا ة أوبشاا اإلاّادلبة العياظبية به ظبوسسا ظبواة‬ ‫كبباهوا سمببوص مّاسلببة إظببومية أو وببوة مّاسلببة ظياظببية مببً أجببة الوـببول رخببة‬ ‫شض كا ة أوشاا ألاصمة مْ س بن أة حبذ ث ِبً التبذوة الّعبكشة به ظبوسسا‬ ‫لتذاِيا ر ألامىية والعياظية ِليسا‪.‬‬ ‫(‪ )3‬الشأن الفلسطينى‪:‬‬ ‫أٌ ببش حببض الّذالببة والتىميببة ا تمامببا أمبببر بالقمببية الللعببىييية باإلاقاسهببة‬ ‫م ببْ ألاح ب بضا ال رمي ببة العب ببابقة وأو ببز تف بباِذ ببزا‬

‫تم ببام ِب ببام ‪ 2006‬ح ببين‬

‫واـ ببلت شمي ببا م ببْ حشم ببة حم بباط بّ ببذ وص ببا ببه هتفاب بباى الاؽ ببشلّية حي ببث‬ ‫كاه ب ببت م ب ببً أوب ب ببه ال ب ببذول ال ب ببل اظ ب ببتقبلت وال ب ببذ مؽ ب ببّة سي ب ببهغ اإلاكت ب ببذ العيا ب ب ل‬ ‫للخشمة(‪.)15‬‬ ‫وو ببول ِ ببام ‪ 2007‬اهتهي ببت شمي ببا ظياظ ببة متواصه ببة إصاة اإلال ببف الّش ب ببو –‬ ‫ؤلاظبشاييله هببل مببً جاهببذ وامببت بالوظبباوة بببين العببلىة الللعببىييية وإظبشايية‬ ‫ِبببر جتمبباُ الؽ ب ير بببين الببشيهغ الللعببىيحل محمببود ِببباط والببشيهغ ؤلاظ بشاييله‬ ‫ؼ ببيمون بير ببض ب ببذِوة م ببً ال ببشيهغ ال رك ببو والع ببما لبير ببض بالتح ببذإ أم ببام البرإلا ببان‬ ‫ال ركو ليكون أول معاول إظشاييل تحذإ ه بشإلاان دولة معلمة‪.‬‬ ‫ومببً جاهببذ إوببش ظببّت شميببا للتوظببي بببين محمببود ِببباط وحشمببة حمبباط‬ ‫لاعبوسة اراو باى بينسمبا‪ .‬ووبذ وبام اإلاووبف ال ركبو جباا حشمبة حمباط ِلبه لبشوسة‬ ‫ل ببم ارخشم ببة إب ببه الّملي ببة العياظ ببية والّم ببة ِل ببه إوىاِ ببا بوو ببف إو ببو الى بباس‬ ‫وإ جب بباد تعب ببوسة ظياظ ب ببية مب ببْ مفتل ب ببف اللفب بباية الللعب ببىييية‪ .‬وو ب ببذ التقب ببو وصس ب ببش‬ ‫ارااسجي ببة أحم ببذ داود أويل ببو م ببش ين ببه ظ ببوسسا م ببْ وال ببذ مؽ ببّة وج بباةى صساس ببر‬ ‫الثاهيب ببة هايجب ببة ولب ببذ الب ببشيهغ اللشوس ب ب ل هيكب ببوال ظب بباسكوصة مب ببذ ب ببذ اإلاعب بباِذة مب ببً‬ ‫أسدويان ‪ :‬و زا رّحل أن شميا وامت بالوظاوة بين حماط واللباِلين البذوليين به‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫ووت حا ٍت ير ِله‬

‫فباالى مبْ حشمبة بتح والعبلىة الللعبىييية ومحمبود‬

‫ِبب بباط وكاهب ببت معب ببا مة شمي ببا ب ببه ب ببزا اإلاع ببألة ب ببه حليب ببز حمب بباط ِلب ببه ا فب ببار‬ ‫وىواى بشاجما ية ولمان حذوإ قاس بين اللفاية الللعىييية‪.‬‬ ‫و ب ببه ِ ب ببام ‪ 2008‬أِ ب بباد اإلاوو ب ببف الق ب ببوة رخكوم ب ببة أسدوي ب ببان م ب ببً الّ ب ببذوان‬ ‫ؤلاظشاييله ِله وىاُ يضة (درعمبر ‪ – 2008‬ىا ش ‪ )2009‬شميا مشة أوشة إبه بباسة‬ ‫اإلاؽ ب ذ ؤلاوليا ببل‪ .‬وج بباة التح ببشغ ال رك ببو ج بباا ارخ ببش ؤلاظ بشاييلية ِل ببه وى بباُ ي ببضة‬ ‫لياؼببش ِلببه الببذوس ال ركببو اللاِببة ببه العبباحة ؤلاوليميببة ومشظببالة توسو ببا ِلببه أن‬ ‫شميا مكنسا التواـة بع ولة مْ ياس اإلاماوّة ه اإلاىىقة و يعيا بّن اإلاللاى‬ ‫مْ ياس ِتذال‪.‬‬ ‫وو ببذ مث ببة اإلاوو ببف ال رك ببو ببه اهتق بباد أسدوي ببان العياظ ببة ؤلاظ بشاييلية ج بباا‬ ‫الللعب ببىيييين ب ببه وىب بباُ يب ببضة ومىالب ب بة ارخكومب ببة ؤلاظ ب بشاييلية بووب ببف الّب ببذوان‬ ‫و حقيببا ووببف إوببو الىبباس و ببتح اإلاّببابش إبببه يببضة وإسظببال اإلاعبباِذاى ؤلاوعبباهية‬ ‫والؽ ببشوُ ببه إجب بشاةاى متبادل ببة إلو ببو ظب بشا ألاظ ببشة واإلاحتج ببضسً إل ببا ة إب ببه‬ ‫اهتقب ببادا لب ببك العياظب ببة ؤلاظ ب بشاييلية ب ببه مب ببا مش دا ب ببوط ِب ببام ‪ِ 2009‬ىب ببذما رمب ببش‬ ‫ؼببيمون بير ببض بأهببر حليببذ للّثمبباهيين الببز ً احتمببىوا اليسببود ال بباس ين مببً أظببباهيا‬ ‫ومىب بباوا أو ب ببشة م ب ببً الّ ب ببالم ولب ببم م ب ببى ذو م ِل ب ببه ِكب ببغ مب ببا لّب ببة إظ ب بشايية‬ ‫بالللعىيييين ه يضة(‪.)16‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫وِى ببذما ؼ ببيت إظ بشايية ِ ببذواها إو ببش ِل ببه وى بباُ ي ببضة ببه ؼ ب ش أبشس ببة ِ ببام‬ ‫‪ 2011‬أداهببت شميببا ببزا الّببذوان ؤلاظ بشاييله الببزة أظببلش ِببً ووببوُ ضببخا ا بببين‬ ‫اإلاذهيين ووالبت بانساة الّىف ه يضة(‪.)17‬‬ ‫وإرا كاهببت الباحثببة ببشة أن وىببا حكومببة حببض الّذالببة والتىميببة حيببال‬ ‫ً‬ ‫القمية الللعىييية جاة مىتقذا لعياظة إظشايية ه الملة الغش ية ويضة لكً‬ ‫ببزا ال رّح ببل أن شمي ببا تّ ببادة إظب بشايية أو أنس ببا ِل ببه اظ ببتّذاد ال ف ببار إجب بشاةاى‬

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‫للمب ببغي ِليسب ببا أو أنسب ببا تعب ببذه إبب ببه تغييب ببر أظب ببغ الّووب ببة بينسم ب با بجّب ببة ِوواوسب ببا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫اريذ ذة مْ الّش بذ و لّوواوسا مبْ اظبشايية‪ .‬ببة مكبً القبول أن شميبا ظبّت‬ ‫إبببه حوسببة ِووهسببا باظبشايية مببً وفببم إبببه سـببيذ ل ببا ببه ِووهسببا ببباإلاحيي الّش ببو‬ ‫مببً وببول إبببذاة الشيبببة ببه مماسظببة دوس الوظببيي بببين الّببش وإظ بشايية واههسببا‬ ‫ظياظة متواصهة قوم ِله هفشاه اللّال ه ظير ألاحذاإ‪ .‬ولهغ أدل ِله رلبك‬ ‫مً اظتمشاس التّاون ال ركو – ؤلاظشاييله الّعكشة اإلاؽ رغ ح ل آلان والزة بتم‬ ‫مببً وببول ظببتين مّا ببذة ظبباسسة اإلالّببول للتّبباون اإلاؽب رغ بببين البلببذ ً ببه ومببا ا‬ ‫ألامً والتّاون الّعكشة والتّاون ألامحل به مجبال مكا حبة ؤلاس با‬

‫و به مجبال‬

‫ظببتفباساى والتّ بباون ببه مج ببال الف ببىاِاى الّع ببكشسة واإلاؽ ببشوِاى الّع ببكشسة‬ ‫اإلاؽ ب رمة بم ببا يس ببا التيع ببيا الّع ببكشة واإلاى بباوساى الّع ببكشسة اإلاؽ ب رمة و وسس ببذ‬ ‫وهقببة الع ببو حيببث حت ببة أهقببشة اإلاش ب ببة الثاهيببة باظ ببتيراد ألاظببلخة م ببً إظ بشايية‬ ‫ً‬ ‫بّ ببذ الوال بباى اإلاتح ببذة(‪ )18‬م ببو ِ ببً مؽ ببشوُ الق ببشن ال ببزة ق ب ل بم ببذ وى ببوه‬ ‫الببىلي والغبباص والك ش بباة واإلايبباا مببً ميىبباة حيحببان ال ركببو إبببه ميىبباة ِعببقون ومىببر‬ ‫إبه إ وى ومنسا إبه جىو و إظيا(‪.)19‬‬ ‫(‪ )4‬الشأن إلايشانى‪:‬‬ ‫مب ببْ ب ببوبه حب ببض الّذالب ببة والتىميب ببة العب ببلىة ِب ببام ‪ 2002‬وظب ببّير لتحعب ببين‬ ‫الّووب بباى م ببْ إ ب بشان مج ببضة مب ببً ظياظب ببا ر القايم ببة ِلب ببه حعب ببً اريب ببواس دولب ببت‬ ‫الّوو ب بباى ال رميب ب ببة – ؤلا شاهي ب ببة مشحل ب ببة مفتللب ب ببة وجذ ب ببذة اوّكعب ب ببت اوتفب ب بباد ا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫وظياظ ببيا وأمىي ببا ِل ببه البل ببذ ً‪ .‬وح ببذإ ق بباس بينسم ببا يم ببا تّل ببا بوج بباى الىٍ بش‬ ‫حببول وحببذة ال برا الّشا ببه واإلاووببف مببً حببض الّمببال الكشدظببتاوو‪ .‬تّاوهببت كلتببا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ال ببذولتين و ببول ِ ببامو ‪ 2006‬و ‪ 2007‬تّاوه ببا وريق ببا ببه ِملي بباى ِع ببكشسة مؽ ب رمة‬ ‫لذ حض الّمال الكشدظتاوو‪.‬‬

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‫واِتمب ببذى العياظب ببة ال رميب ببة إصاة إ ب بشان ِلب ببه ِب ببذة سكب ببايض‪ :‬ب ببأمين الىاوب ببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫واِتببباس إ بشان باليعبببة إبببه شميببا ممبشا ىلببز إبببه وظببي إظببيا وجىوىسببا والتيعببيا ببه‬ ‫اإلاع بباية ألامىي ببة اإلاتّلق ببة باإلاؽ ببكلة الكشد ببة واـ ببة ببه ٌ ببة وج ببود والةاى وبلي ببة‬ ‫وظياظب ببية مشد ب ببة ِبب ببر ارخب ببذود ال رميب ببة – ؤلا شاهيب ببة – الّشاويب ببة ‪ :‬ىب بباغ ألام ب بشاد‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الى بباوقون باللهي ببة الكشماهجي ببة و ببم أو ببش جغشا ي ببا ورقا ي ببا إب ببه شمي ببا م ببنسم إب ببه‬ ‫ً‬ ‫إ بشان‪ .‬أمببا ألام بشاد الى بباوقون باللهيببة العببوساهية ببم مش بىببون رقا يببا ب بباتمشاد‬ ‫ً‬ ‫آلاوشسً الىاوقين بالعوساهية ه إ شان ول م ِوواى أورا اسسفيا با شان(‪.)20‬‬ ‫وا ضت زا التّاون ال ركو – ؤلا شاوو ِام ‪ِ 2004‬ىذما ووْ البلذان ِله‬ ‫ا لببا تّبباووو أمحببل ـببىف بموجبببر حببض الّمببال الكشدظببتاوو ممىٍمببة إس ابيببة‬ ‫ممببا وؽببىت ريىببة ألامببً الّليببا ال رميببة – ؤلا شاهيببة – أظعببت ِببام ‪ – 1998‬ال ببل‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫تّتبر إواسا أمىيا للتيعيا والتّباون ببين البلبذ ً بؽبأن ِبذد مبً القمبا ا ألامىيبة‬ ‫مببً أ م ببا التّبباون ظببتفباسة لببذ حببض الّمببال الكشدظببتاوو ببه شمي با وحببض‬ ‫ارخشسة الكشدظتاوو ه إ شان والتّاوو مْ اإلاعألة الكشد ة‪.‬‬ ‫و ببه ِ ببام ‪ 2006‬و ببام أسدوي ببان بالوظ بباوة ب ببين ح ببض‬

‫وإظب بشايية ِق ببذ‬

‫الّذوان ؤلاظشاييله ِله لبىان ِام ‪ 2006‬واهتقذ سيهغ الوصساة ال ركو ظتفذام‬ ‫ؤلاظ ب بشاييله اإلالب ببشه للق ب ببوة‪ .‬مم ب ببا ِم ب ببة مب ببً أجب ببة ووب ببف إلوب ببو الى ب بباس مب ببً وب ببول‬ ‫ف بباالى ال ببل م ببت م ببْ الوال بباى اإلاتح ببذة وألام ببين الّ ببام لألم ببم اإلاتح ببذة وإ بشان‬ ‫وظوسسا ولبىان وؤلا حاد ألاوسو و‪.‬‬ ‫وتن إ ب بشان ب ببأتو ب ببه اإلاش ب ب ببة الثاهي ب ببة بّ ب ببذ سوظ ب ببيا ب ببه إم ب ببذاد شمي ب ببا بالغ ب بباص‬ ‫الىبيذه قذ ووْ البلذان ِام ‪ِ 2007‬له ا لاويتين لىقة الغاص ؤلا شاوو بواظىة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫وبي أهابهببذ يباص إ بشان – شميبا مببشوسا باليوهببان إببه أوسو ببا وتعب ية فببذ ش الببىلي‬ ‫ؤلا شاوب ب ببو بواظ ب ب ببىة وى ب ب ببوه أهابه ب ب ببذ إب ب ب ببه ميى ب ب بباة حيح ب ب ببان ِلب ب ببه البحب ب ببش ألاب ب ب ببين‬ ‫اإلاتوظي(‪ .)21‬مممون رلك أن إ شان ظتقوم بالو باة باحتياجباى شميبا اإلاعبتقبلية‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫مً الغاص والىلي ه مواج ة ظياظاى الىاوة الذوليبة به حبين ظبتكون شميبا به‬ ‫هقىة الّبوس للغاص والىلي ؤلا شاوو ه وشسقر إبه أوسو ا‪.‬‬ ‫و ببه ِببام ‪ 2008‬جبباةى الضسبباسة ال ببل وببام ىسببا الببشيهغ ؤلا شاوببو أحمببذة هجبباد‬ ‫ل رمي ببا لتك ببون أول صس بباسة ق ببوم ىس ببا هج بباد لذول ببة ِم ببو ببه حل ببف الى ببا و و تمت ببْ‬ ‫بّوواى وريقة مْ الوال اى اإلاتحذة(‪.)22‬‬ ‫أما يما تّلا بباإلاووف الشظبال ال ركبو مبً البرهبامل الىبووة ؤلا شاوبو قبذ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫أ ببذى شميببا حببة مؽببكلة البرهببامل الىببووة ؤلا شاوببو ظببلميا ووامببت بالوظبباوة بببين‬ ‫إ شان والوال اى اإلاتحذة حول بشهامج ا الىووة(‪.)23‬‬ ‫و ب ببه جىيب ببف وب ببول ؼ ب ب ش درع ب ببمبر ِ ب ببام ‪ 2010‬هاخ ب ببت شميب ببا ب ببه حشس ب ببك‬ ‫اإلالاولاى بين إ شان وإداسة أو اما حول البرهامل الىووة ؤلا شاوو بّذ وول ا لل رة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫دامت ظتة ِؽش ؼ شا (‪ .)24‬ألامش الزة رؽير إبه أهر سيم مفاوا شميا مً الىمو‬ ‫الىببووة ؤلا شاوببو ومببا وببذ ببادة إليببر مببً ولببة ببه التببواصن ؤلاولياببل انسببا لببم اسببذ‬ ‫أوشوح بباى تغيي ببر الىٍ ببام ؤلا شاو ببو ال ببل أ ببذوسا الوال بباى اإلاتح ببذة ول ببم وا ببا ِل ببه‬ ‫كشة اظتفذام اراياس الّعكشة إلاّاريبة أصمبة اإلالبف الىبووة ؤلا شاوبو ببة س مبت‬ ‫ىبيا الّقو اى وتفاد ة ألامشسكية اإلالشولة ِله و شان مّلىة أنسبا ظبتح رم‬ ‫قي الّقو اى ال ل وشس ا مجلغ ألامً الذوبه(‪.)25‬‬ ‫و ب ببه ِ ب ببام ‪ 2010‬اِتبب ببرى وريق ب ببة ألام ب ببً الق ب ببومو ال ركب ببو إ ب بشان ؼب ببشسكة ب ببه‬ ‫ارخل بباً ِل ببه أم ببً اإلاىىق ببة وسم ببضى ِل ببه ظ بببة تّضس ببض التّ بباون مّ ببا وإن كاه ببت‬ ‫الوريق ب ببة و ب ببذ ؼ ب ببذدى ِل ب ببه ل ب ببشوسة إوم ب بباُ البره ب ببامل الى ب ببووة ؤلا شاو ب ببو للمتابّ ب ببة‬ ‫ارخثهثة باِتباس أن ظذه إ بشان إببه امبتوغ ظبو هبووة و ىوسش با للفبواسسخ مبً‬ ‫و بشاص ؼ ب ا (‪ )3‬ال ببل فببة مببذا ا إبببه ‪ 1300‬ميلببوم ر و ظببتمشاس ببه إهتببا جيببة‬ ‫جذ ذ مً الفواسسخ مً وشاص ؼ ا (‪ )4‬وؼ ا (‪ )5‬يسذد ألامً القومو ال ركو(‪.)26‬‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫وسي ببم صس بباسة ال ببشيهغ ِب ببذ‬

‫ج ببول ببه ‪ 2011/2/15‬إل بشان ببه إو بباس ظ ببذه‬

‫شميببا لتّضسببض الّووبباى العياظببية و وتفبباد ة بببين البلببذ ً لكبً ببزا الّووبباى‬ ‫و ببذ ببو شى ببه ل ببوة ألاح ببذاإ ال ببل ؼب ب ذوسا كب بة م ببً البح ببشسً وظ ببوسسا للمىالب ببة‬ ‫باإلـ ببوحاى العياظ ببية‪ ٌ .‬ببش رل ببك بول ببو ببه اوس ببام شمي ببا إل ب بشان بقي ببادة حشم ببة‬ ‫حتجاجاى اإلاىالبة بالذ مقشاوية ه البحشسً بقفذ ولبذ هٍبام ارخكبم القبايم‬ ‫ِل ببه وللي ببة س ببن اإلاّاسل ببة الؽ ببيّية ببه البح ببشسً ال ببذوول ببه ح ببواس م ببْ الّا ببة‬ ‫البحشسحل إلاىاوؽة ؤلاـوحاى ال ل شسذ ا بىاة ِله ذوة شميبا للتوظبي به ألاصمبة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫البحشسيية‪ .‬وٌ ش أ ما ه حز ش شميبا مبً البذوس ؤلا شاوبو به ظبوسسا اإلااسبذ لعياظبة‬ ‫ومْ حشمة حتجاجاى‪.‬‬ ‫و شة الباحثة أن وجر شميا ـو الببذ ة الّش بو ؤلاظبومو ظبوا رعبتمش‬ ‫ورل ببك لع ببببين‪ .‬أولوم صصا أن الىٍ ببشة ؤلاظ ب را يجية اريذ ببذة لّوو ببة شمي ببا بمىىق ببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الؽببش ألاوظببي وال ببل أظاظ ب ا التوجببر جىو ببا لبىبباة ِووبباى أورببا مببْ الّببش لببم‬ ‫ببش بي بح ببض الّذال ببة والتىمي ببة مى ببز ِ ببام ‪ 2002‬ب ببة ول ببْ إس اـ بباوسا وسج ببوى‬ ‫أوصال ه مشحلة ما بّذ اههساة ارخش البباسدة هايجبة بأرشا بايباس الّثماهيبة اريذ بذة‬ ‫الببزة هببادة باِببادة تؽببكية وسببة ظياظببية ورقا يببة جذ ببذة ل رميببا و بحببل مووببف‬ ‫اهتقائو حاول أن وايم بين القيم الغش ية والقيم التاسسفية ل رميا ه إواس البحث‬ ‫ِببً رقا ببة ظياظببية جذ ببذة‪ .‬وظبباس أس كببان ِلببه ههببج لببك العياظببة بتّضسببض ِووبباى‬ ‫إظب را يجية مببْ الببذول ؤلاظببومية(‪ .)27‬مببا رّحببل أن التحببول ال ركببو هحببو الّببش ظببابا‬ ‫رخ ببض الّذال ببة والتىمي ببة و ببو م ببا جّ ببة العياظ ببة ال رمي ببة ج بباا الّ ببالم الّش ببو‬ ‫ؤلاظببومو ظياظببة دولببة وابلببة ل ظببتمشاس ح ببل لببو وببش حببض الّذالببة والتىميببة مببً‬ ‫ارخكببم‪ .‬ورانيهمصصا التوا ببا ال ركببو الببذاوله بمببا وّىيببر مببً جماِبباى اإلاجتمببْ اإلاببذوو‬ ‫وال بشأة الّ ببام ال رك ببو والق ببوة العياظ ببية ح ببول وم ببية اإلاؽ بباسمة ؤلاظ ب را يجية م ببْ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الّ ببش اظ بباىادا إب ببه أن الّوو بباى الّش ي ببة ال رمي ببة ق ببوم ِل ببه أظ ببغ رابت ببة تّك ببغ‬ ‫مفارت وحماسة الىش ين بمّضل ًِ حوالى العلىة العياظية‪.‬‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫ا‬ ‫رانيا‪ :‬مشتركات بذائل الحىجه السياس ى التركى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫رؽ رغ البذ ون ألاوسو و والّش و ؤلاظومو أن مو ما مثة جضةا مبً‬ ‫التوجر ؤلاظ را ي ه ال ركبو اريذ بذ ل هلتبا ِلبه اإلاحبيي ؤلاولياب ل رميبا به جميبْ‬ ‫جا بباى باالظ ببتلادة م ببً جيو وليتك ببا اإلاوو ببْ وإسإ الت بباسسخ و ؼ بببكة اإلاف ببارت‬ ‫اإلاتبادلة‪ .‬وإرا ما اظتّشلىا اإلاووْ اريغشا ه ل رميا ظىوحَ ما له‪:‬‬

‫‪ -1‬املشترن الناب من البعذ الجغشافي‪:‬‬ ‫أ‪ -‬تؽ ببكة اإلاىىق ببة اريغشا ي ببة ال ببل ق ببْ يس ببا شمي ببا هقى ببة ق بباوْ ل وس بباى رقا ي ببة‬ ‫متّببذدة‪ .‬تتقبباوْ يسببا الثقا ببة ألاوسو يببة مببً ج ببة الغببش‬

‫والثقا ببة الشوظببية مببً‬

‫الؽمال والثقا ة آلاظيوسة مً الؽش والثقا ة الّش ية مً اريىو ‪ .‬وسيم زا‬ ‫التّذد ه الشوا ذ الثقا ية للشافية ال رمية البّذ ؤلاظومو و ألا م‪ .‬رميبا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫كاهبت مشمبضا رخمباسة إظبومية وامبت ببىباة هٍبام ظيا ب ل مثبة بالذولبة الّثماهيبة‬ ‫ووامببت ببزا ارخمبباسة ؤلاظببومية ِلببه ِىاـببش رقا يببة متّببذدة ببه مقببذمهسا ؤلاظببوم‬ ‫والثقا ببة آلاظببيوسة لأل بشاغ وال راممبباى ارخمبباسسة للثقا بباى ألاوببشة ال ببل ام زجببت‬ ‫ه بىاة الذولة الّثماهية(‪.)28‬‬ ‫وإرا مببا اظببتمشى حكومببة حببض الّذالببة والتىميببة اريذ ببذة اللببايضة بيعبببة‬ ‫هفببف اإلاقاِببذ ببه هتفاببباى البرإلااهيببة لّببام ‪ 2011‬للمببشة الثالثببة ِلببه التببوابه مىببز‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ِببام ‪ 2002‬ببه كببشلغ الل ببم اإلاىلببتح للتوجببر ؤلاظببومو بمببا جّلببر حالببىا لبقيببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الشوا ببذ وهاٌمببا ل ببا ولببهغ ملاسوببا وال ها يببا ل ببا الىايجببة ال ببل ر ببذ ِلببه رلببك‬ ‫حفول ا ِله الذِم الغش و ووذ كون ه البواببة ال بخيحة لبذوول ا به مىتبذة‬ ‫حاد ألاوسو و‪.‬‬ ‫ب‪ -‬أنسبا بلبذ مشمبضة رو وسباى إوليميبة متّبذدة ال مكبً او زالبر به ـبلة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫واحب ببذة موحب ببذة‪ .‬مب ببا رّحب ببل أهب ببر ال مكب ببً لعب ببير شميب ببا جغشا يب ببا أو رقا يب ببا بش ى ب ببا‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫بمىىق ب ببة واح ب ببذة ووابلي ب ببة اهفشاو ب ببا ب ببه اإلاى ب بباوا اإلاج ب بباوسة ل ب ببا بع ب بببذ الوؼ ب ببايل‬ ‫ارخم ب ب بباسسة والثقا يب ب ببة‪ .‬وتّك ب ب ببغ ب ب ببزا الش س ب ب ببة التلاِ ب ب ببة اليؽ ب ب ببي ب ب ب ببين الثقا ب ب ببة‬ ‫واريغشا ي ببا وول ببْ شمي ببا ببه جغشا ي ببا أوظ ببْ‪ .‬و ببه العياظ ببة ال ببل ال جّ ببة شمي ببا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫حت ببة مووّ ببا جغشا ي ببا ظياظ ببيا ام ببا حع ببذ ب ببة تغ ببذو و ببادسة أ م ببا ِل ببه الب ببروص‬ ‫موِذ م م ه اإلاجاالى العياظية و وتفاد ة(‪.)29‬‬ ‫‪ -2‬املشترن الناب من الحىجه الثقافي لحزب العذالة والحنمية‪:‬‬ ‫‪ -1‬السياسة الخاسجية التركية الجذيذة‪:‬‬ ‫ميببز وجببر العياظببة ال ببل اهتهي ببا حببض الّذالببة والتىميببة جبباا العياظببة‬ ‫ارااسجي ببة ال رمي ببة بموو ببف جذ ببذ رع ببذه‪ :‬ل ببذوس إوليا ب أمب ببر ف ببش شمي ببا م ببً بل ببذ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫"وشا" أو " امؾ" قتفش دوس ا ه كونسا ِموا ه محباوس إببه بلبذ "مشمبض" لبر دوس‬ ‫اِة ومبادس ه كا ة القمبا ا ؤلاوليميبة والذوليبة‪ .‬وارخلباً ِلبه ِووباى إ جابيبة‬ ‫ووؽىة مْ ِذد مبير مً دول الّالم وال رميز أمثر ِله مىاوا أوشة مثة الؽش‬ ‫ألاوظي وإظيا الوظىو‪.‬‬ ‫و ب ب ببزا اإلاقاس ب ب ببة اريذ ب ب ببذة إلاكاهب ب ببة شميب ب ببا ومووّ ب ب ببا ودوس ب ب ببا ب ب ببه العب ب بباحتين‬ ‫ؤلاوليميب ببة والذولي ب ببة وال ب ببل او ب ببيمت مب ببْ ِمق ب ببا الت ب بباسس ه وارخم ب بباسة والثق ب ببا ه‬ ‫اإلاتمثببة ببه الّببالم ؤلاظببومو ومىببر الّببالم الّش ببو بّببذما ابتّببذى ِىببر مىببز انسيبباس‬ ‫الع ببلىة الّثماهي ببة ح ببذدى موم ببح العياظ ببة ارااسجي ببة ال رمي ببة اريذ ببذة ال ببل‬ ‫ـاسى ش كض ِله أظغ سيهعة ه‪:‬‬ ‫(أ) إ ب بباُ ظياظ ببة واسجي ببة ق ببوم ِل ببه أظ بباط ف ببوس جغشا ببه جذ ببذ للبل ببذان‬ ‫ً‬ ‫اإلاجاوسة ل رميا والّمة ِله جّة الفوس العلبية وألا كاس اإلاعبقة ؼه ا مً‬ ‫اإلااض ل‪ .‬العياظة ارااسجية ال رمية حيال الؽش ألاوظي بّذما كاهت قوم‬ ‫ِله مل وم ظياظة سدة ّة ـاسى قوم ِله اإلال وم ظابا ه‪.‬‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫ً‬ ‫( ) حقي ببا ظ ببتقشاس والتّ بباون ل ببهغ ل رمي ببا حع ببذ ب ببة رييرانس ببا أ م ببا ببه‬ ‫مىاوا ِمق ا ؤلاظ را ي ه و و جضة مً ظياظة القوة الىاِمة و ىباة الثقبة‬ ‫و ق ببذ م التّ بباون ِل ببه الفب بشاُ بالبح ببث ِل ببه اإلاؽب ب رغ م ببْ ألاوب بشاا ألاو ببشة‬ ‫وحة اراو اى وارخواس مْ اريميْ مً أجة حقيا العوم مً أجة اريميْ‪.‬‬ ‫( ) هتقببال مببً العياظببة اريامببذة إبببه ارخشمببة الذايمببة‪ :‬بمببا رّحببل التواـببة‬ ‫مْ كة بلذان الّالم اإلا مة ل رميا والتحبول إببه مشمبض جبز رعبا م به إسظباة‬ ‫العوم الّالال وؤلاوليال‪.‬‬ ‫(د) إِببادة حذ ببذ دوس شميببا ببه اإلاىبباوا اإلاجبباوسة و ببه العياظببة الذولي بة‪ .‬كببان‬ ‫التّشسببف الؽببائْ ح ببل تعببّيىاى القببشن الّؽببشسً أن شميببا "بلببذ جعببش" فببة‬ ‫بين وش ين‪ .‬أمبا التّشسبف اريذ بذ للبذوس ال ركبو‬

‫بو أن شميبا "بلبذ مشمبض" ببين‬

‫كة الذول اإلاحيىة ىسا بحيث وظّت ارخذود إبه مبا وساة شميبا به اراشسىبة‬ ‫اإلاّش ي ب ببة تر ب ببان ـ ب بباوذه العياظب ببة‪ .‬وصال ب ببت ب ببه الز ىي ب ببة اريذ ب ببذة ارخ ب ببذود‬ ‫ؤلاوليميببة أمببام هفبشاه ال ركببو ببه البلببذان اإلاجبباوسة واماعبببت الّووببة بببين‬ ‫ً‬ ‫اري ببواس وآلاوب ببش مّحب ببل جذ ب ببذا بّب ببذ ال ببتفلق مب ببً لب ببغوه فب ببوساى الهسذ ب ببذ‬ ‫الذاولية ه العياظة ؤلاوليمية(‪.)30‬‬ ‫( ب ب ب ب) فب ب ب ببلية اإلاؽب ب ب ببكوى مب ب ب ببْ دول اريب ب ب ببواس اريغشا ب ب ب ببه وإنسا ب ب ب ببا أو " ف ب ب ببلير‬ ‫اإلاؽ ببكوى" و هلت ببا ِل ببه ك ببة ال ببذول اإلاج بباوسة دون التفل ببه ِ ببً التح ببالف‬ ‫ؤلاظ را ي ه مْ الغش‬

‫و ه الش سة ال ل أولا ِليسا أويلو ظياظة الومؽكلة‪.‬‬

‫م ببا رّح ببل إو بشا شمي ببا م ببً ـ ببوسة الذول ببة اإلاحاو ببة باإلاؽ ببكوى وال ببذوول ببه‬ ‫ـبوسة الذولبة راى الّووبباى ارييبذة مببْ اريميبْ ألامبش الببزة مبىح العياظببة‬ ‫ارااسجية ال رمية وذسة اظتثىايية ِله اإلاىاوسة‪.‬‬

‫‪- 131 -‬‬

‫(و) التو ي ببا ب ببين ارخشس بباى العياظ ببية و ِتب بباساى ألامىي ببة‪ .‬ألام ببش ال ببزة رّح ببل‬ ‫إح ب بشاص شميب ببا ِلب ببه ـب ببّيذ ؤلاـب ببو العيا ب ب ل مب ببً دون التلب ببشسي باإلاتىلبب بباى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ألامىية و و ما جّة شميا همورجا لبلذان أوشة(‪.)31‬‬ ‫و ب ببزا العياظ ب ببة ارااسجي ب ببة اريذ ب ببذة ال ب ببل ق ب ب ل بّ ب ببذم ؤلاهف ب بشاه ب ببه‬ ‫محاوس لذ محاوس أوشة وأن كون شميا ِله معا ة واحذة مً كة جيرانسا‬ ‫والقبوة ألاوببشة وأن ىلببتح و تواـببة مببْ جميببْ ألاوبشاا مببً دون القىببْ مببْ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫اإلاواوببْ ال ببل كاهببت شمي ببا جببضةا منسببا مببً أوسو ببا إبببه إظببيا الوظببىو والقوو بباص‬ ‫ومً الؽش ألاوظي إبه سوظيا مً ؼبأنسا د بْ شميبا إببه الببذ ة البزة جمبْ‬ ‫بين ألاوس ة والتوجر الّش و ؤلاظومو ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -2‬مع صصادلت الحع صصا ى الترك صصى مص ص املحغ صصر ألامشير صصى بع صصذ وص صصىل ح صصزب العذال صصة‬ ‫والحنمية م ى الح ‪:‬‬ ‫ج بباةى ارخ ببش ألامشسكي ببة ِل ببه الّ بشا ِ ببام ‪ 2003‬لتٍ ببش م ببذة التب ببا ً ببه‬ ‫اإلافببارت بببين العياظبباى ألامشسكيببة ببه الؽببش ألاوظببي واإلافببارت ال رميبة ال ببل وببذ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ال تىببابا دومببا مببْ اإلافببارت ألامشسكيببة‪ .‬و ببو مببا ٌ ببش ببه و بشاس س ببن البرإلاببان ال ركببو‬ ‫العما للوال اى اإلاتحذة باظتفذام ألاساض ل ال رمية لؽً ِمليباى ِعبكشسة ِلبه‬ ‫الّشا‬

‫ما أدة إبه و ش الّوواى ال رمية – ألامشسكية‪.‬‬

‫ً‬ ‫الوال ب ب بباى اإلاتح ب ب ببذة ظ ب ب بباوسوسا الؽ ب ب ببكوغ ج ب ب بباا شمي ب ب ببا باِتباس ب ب ببا حليل ب ب ببا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫إظب ب را يجيا مك ببً ِتم بباد ِلي ببر ل ببذة ألاصم بباى‪ .‬ببه ح ببين سأى شمي ببا أن الّ ببذوان‬ ‫ألامشسكببو ِلببه الّ بشا ظببوا م ببش باإلافببارت ال رميببة ته ببر رعبباِذ ِل ببه ويببام حك ببم‬ ‫رات ببو م ببشدة داي ببم وإمكاه بباى وج ببود ه ببواة دول ببة مشد ببة مع ببتقلة وتع ب ية قع ببيم‬ ‫الّشا‬

‫ومعاِذة حض الّمال الكشدظتاوو ِله اظتئىاا وؽاور الّعبكشة مبً‬

‫ؼمال الّشا ‪.‬‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫ولّببة رلببك لعببش اري ببود الذبلوماظببية ال ببل وامببت ىسببا شميببا وبيببة أظببابيْ‬ ‫مببً الغببضو ألامشسكببو للّ بشا‬

‫حيببث أولقببت مبببادسة ظببوم إوليميببة ظببميت "ببباِون‬

‫اظ ببىىبول" وجمّ ببت م ببو م ببً شمي ببا ومف ببش وإ ب بشان وألاسدن والع ببّود ة وظ ببوسسا‬ ‫إلاحاول ببة مى ببْ الهي ببوم الّع ببكشة ألامشسك ببو ِل ببه الّ بشا ‪ .‬وسي ببم أن ببزا اإلاب ببادسة ل ببم‬ ‫بىات ببه و به ارخببش ألامشسكيبة ِلببه الّبشا‬

‫لكنسببا أٌ بشى مببً جاهبذ إوببش وببذسة‬

‫شمي ببا ِل ببه أن ك ببون و ببوة إوليمي ببة وياد ببة ببه مىىق ببة الؽ ببش ألاوظ ببي بم ببا رّ ببضص‬ ‫الذوس ؤلاوليال ال ركو ه اإلاىىقة‪.‬‬ ‫ووببول الل ببرة مببً ِببام ‪ 2003‬إبببه ِ ببام ‪ ٌ 2006‬ببش اوببتوا ببه الببش ة ب ببين‬ ‫البل ببذ ً بؽ ببأن بّ ببن ملل بباى العياظ ببة ارااسجي ببة مث ببة اإلال ببف الع ببوسة (س م ببت‬ ‫شمي ببا الم ببغوه لهسم ببهؾ ظ ببوسسا وِضل ببا) واإلال ببف الى ببووة ؤلا شاو ببو (سأى شمي ببا أن‬ ‫العياظبباى ألامشسكيببة جبباا إ بشان ظب ز ذ مببً ىببشا وِضلبة إ بشان وظببوا تعببا م‬ ‫ببه تّقي ببذ ِملي ببة وـ ببول شمي ببا إب ببه إم ببذاداى الىاو ببة ؤلا شاهي ببة ول ببً ببىات إال ببه‬ ‫قوس ببة اإلااؽ ببذد ً ؤلا ب بشاهيين‪ .‬ممب ببا سأى شميب ببا أن أ ب ببة محاولب ببة أمشسكيب ببة هحب ببو حب ببة‬ ‫ِع ببكشة للقم ببية الىووس ببة ؤلا شاهي ببة ل ببً ك ببون ّال ببة ول ببً تع ببا م إال ببه صِضِ ببة‬ ‫ظببتقشاس ببه مىىقببة الؽببش ألاوظ بي بمببا اىبباون مببْ اإلافببارت ال رميببة) واإلالببف‬ ‫الّش ب ب ب ببو – ؤلاظ ب ب ب بشاييله (سأى شمي ب ب ب ببا أن الب ب ب ب ببذِم ألامشسك ب ب ب ببو الثابب ب ب ب ببت للعياظب ب ب ب بباى‬ ‫ؤلاظشاييلية إهمبا رعبا م به فبّيذ دايبم للمؽبكلة الللعبىييية ألامبش البزة مبش‬ ‫باإلاف ببارت ال رمي ببة) ومل ببف ؤلاـ ببو العيا ب ل ببه اإلاىىق ببة (سأى شمي ببا أن ألاجى ببذة‬ ‫ألامشسكية ليؽش الذ مقشاوية ه مىىقة الؽش ألاوظي لبً بادة إال إببه مضسبذ مبً‬ ‫لىشا‬

‫ه اإلاىىقة)(‪.)32‬‬

‫ممببا ٌ ببش اوببتوا بينسمببا بؽببأن مفببادس الهسذ ببذ لكببة وببشا وِلببه معببتوة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ميليببة التّبباوو مببْ ومببا ا الؽببش ألاوظببي سأى إداسة بببوػ بببً أن دوال مثببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫وحم بباط مث ببة ح ببذ ا للعياظ ببة ألامشسكي ببة ببه الؽ ببش‬ ‫إ ب بشان وظ ببوسسا وح ببض‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫ألاوظبي مببا رّحبل لببشوسة ِبضل ببزا البذول ومّاداوسببا به حببين سأى شميبا لببشوسة‬ ‫التواـة مْ زا الذول واح رام مفارخ ا وِذم مّاداوسا(‪. )33‬‬ ‫لكببً الىفببف الثبباوو مببً ِببام ‪ 2006‬ؼ ب ذ ويببام الببذولتين باِببادة قيببيم‬ ‫الّووبباى الثىاييببة بينسمببا بؽببكة مببيا مببً جببوة اراو بباى وسضسببذ مببً معبباحة‬ ‫لتق بباة ح ببل ال ببارش ببزا اراو بباى ِل ببه الؽ بشامة ؤلاظ ب را يجية بينسم ببا وليٍ ببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الذوس ال ركو ؤلاوليال وادما ه النسا ة للذوس الّالال ألامشسكو ويير مىاون لبر به‬ ‫نسا ببة اإلاى بباا‪ .‬و ببم رل ببك م ببً و ببول ووي ببْ م ببو البل ببذ ً ِل ببه وريق ببة ظ ببميت "س س ببة‬ ‫مؽ رمة بين الوال اى اإلاتحذة و شميبا"‪ .‬و به بزا الوريقبة اِ ر بت الوال باى اإلاتحبذة‬ ‫بال ببذوس ال رك ببو كوظ ببيي سي ببهغ ببه مىىق ببة الؽ ببش ألاوظ ببي ِل ببه اِتب بباس أن حشس ببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫وـول شميا لكة ألاوشاا مكً أن كون مليذا ه حاالى ألاصمباى وملمبو ِلبه‬ ‫ذوة سوظيا أو الفين أو ح بل أوسو با‪ .‬ممبا رّحبل أن بزا الوريقبة سأى به الىمبور‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ال ركببو الببذ مقشاوو ؤلاظببومو اإلاّتببذل همورجببا فببلت تن كببون وببابو للتّمببيم ِلببه‬ ‫دول مىىقة الؽش ألاوظي‪.‬‬ ‫و م اوتباس زا الوريقة ِله أسك الواوبْ ِبام ‪ 2007‬حيىمبا وبذمت إداسة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫بوػ بً دِما لوجعايا ل رميا ه مواج ة حبض الّمبال الكشدظبتاوو البزة ؼبً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ِ ب ببذدا م ب ببً الهيم ب بباى الّع ب ببكشسة داو ب ببة ألاساض ب ب ل ال رمي ب ببة مىتف ب ببف ِ ب ببام ‪.2007‬‬ ‫وظ بباِذ ببزا ال ببذِم ألامشسك ببو شمي ببا ِل ببه وجي ببر ل ببش اى جوس ببة إب ببه مواو ببْ ح ببض‬ ‫الّم ببال الكشدظ ببتاوو ببه ؼ ببمال الّ بشا‬

‫وظ ب ة دو ببول الق ببواى ال رمي ببة إب ببه ِم ببا‬

‫ألاساض ل الّشاوية إلاىاسدة أهفاس ارخض (‪.)34‬‬ ‫ومىب ببز ِ ب ببام ‪ 2008‬اظ ب ببتىاِت شمي ب ببا ق ب ببذ م هلع ب ب ا م ب ببشة أو ب ببشة للوال ب بباى‬ ‫اإلاتح ب ببذة باِتباس ب ببا الؽ ب ببشسك ألامث ب ببة ال ب ببزة مك ب ببً ِتم ب بباد ِلي ب ببر ب ببه ٌ ب ببة تّق ب ببذ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ألاول بباُ ببه مىىق ببة الؽ ببش ألاوظ ببي‪ .‬ل ببزا ل ببم ك ببً يشسب ببا أن تّم ببة إداسة أو ام ببا‬ ‫الذ مقشاويب ببة ِلب ببه دِب ببم ومعب بباهذة الب ببذوس ال ركب ببو ظب ببواة كب ببان ب ببه مىىقب ببة الؽب ببش‬

‫‪- 136 -‬‬

‫ألاوظببي أم واسج ببا‪ .‬و ببه ببزا العببيا جبباة اوتيبباس شميببا لتكببون اإلاحىببة ؤلاظببومية‬ ‫ألاوبه للشيهغ ألامشسكو به مىىقبة الؽبش ألاوظبي لتحمبة سظبالة أمشسكيبة ملاد با‪:‬‬ ‫تم ببام ببى بباة مؽ بباسمة إظ ب را يجية م ببْ شمي ببا والتأ ي ببذ ألامشسك ببو لل ببذوس ال رك ببو ببه‬ ‫الفشاُ الّش و‪ -‬ؤلاظشاييله و ه الّالم ؤلاظومو‪.‬‬ ‫و ب ببشة الباحث ب ببة أن ح ب ببشؿ ح ب ببض الّذال ب ببة والتىمي ب ببة ِل ب ببه و ب ببش وج ا ب ببر‬ ‫اريذ بذة به إوباس مبً القببيم واإلافبارت ال رميبة الشيهعبة إبببه جاهبذ أميبذا ِلبه أهببر‬ ‫ح رم ارخشساى الذ يية وسىلتح ِله الّالم وسبحل ظياظا ر ِله الاعامح وارخواس‬ ‫وسلعببش ؤلاظببوم ِلببه هحببو رعبتوِذ ارايبباس الّلمبباو كببان مببً ؼببأهر ومأهببر أوسو ببا‬ ‫والغش اللز ً واإلاا تؽككا ه أهٍمة ارخكم ؤلاظومية‪.‬‬ ‫ا‬ ‫رالثا‪ :‬الحبني التركي لحىجه جام‬ ‫جاة وش حض الّذالة والتىمية لبذ ة جمْ بين ارايباس ألاوسو بو والببذ ة‬ ‫الّش ببو ؤلاظببومو ِلببه ولليببة بحببل ارخببض ِووببة جذ ببذة أمثببر مواةمببة مببْ ماض ب ل‬ ‫شمي ببا الّثمب بباوو و قاليب ببذ ا الثقا يب ببة والذ ييب ببة و ب ببزا الّووب ببة أِب ببادى الىٍ ببش ب ببه‬ ‫ارخ ببذود ألاوظ ببْ لللم بباة الّش ببو والؽ ببش أوظ ببي بم ببا ل ببزلك م ببً اوّكاظ بباى ِل ببه‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الّووة مْ إ شان وظوسسا والّشا إ جابا وإِادة الىٍش ه مل بوم الهسذ بذ الىبووة‬ ‫ؤلا شاوببو إصاة ألام ببً القببومو ال رك ببو ودِ ببم القمببية الللع ببىييية ببه الوو ببت ال ببزة‬ ‫تعببتمش يببر بالعببير با جبباا لتحببا باإل حبباد ألاوسو ببو‪ .‬و ببزا البببذ ة اريببامْ ببو‪:‬‬ ‫اريم ببْ ب ببين الب صصذيل العشب صصى إلاس صصالمى ال ببزة ال لن ببه هلت ببا ِل ببه أوسو ببا بحك ببم‬ ‫مقوماى اريغشا ية العياظية ال ظيما وأن الّاإلاين ؤلاظومو وألاوسو و مم زجان‬ ‫باريغشا ي ب ببا و الت ب بباسسخ و قواظ ب ببم مؽ ب ب رمة ل ب ببضم للت ب ببواصن العيا ب ب ل اريم ب ببْ بينس ب ببا‪.‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫والبص صصذيل ألاوسوبص صصى الب ببزة وإن ك ببان وي بباسا إظب ب را يجيا وامت ببذادا لتوج ببر شمي ببا إبب ببه‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫الغ ببش‬

‫ببو اظ ببغ للك ببشة أن أوسو ببا والّ ببالم الّش ب ب وؤلاظ ببوم رّي ببان أن رم ببة‬

‫مفيرا مؽ ركا وأن صمً الّضلة وارخلول القايمة ِله اإلالاـلة وذ اهتهل‪.‬‬ ‫وتن اراياس ؤلاظومو ال قببة كبشة اظبابّاد الغيبر حيبث أهبر بىبيّتبر ويباس‬ ‫ج ببامْ‬

‫ببان شمي ببا ل ببهغ ِليس ببا أن فت بباس ب ببين وج ببر هلت ببا ِل ببه الّ ببالم الّش ببو‬

‫ؤلاظب ببومو أو همب ببمام إبب ببه ؤلا حب بباد ألاوسو ب ببو ته ب بر ال وجب ببذ ىب بباون بب ببين ب ببز ً‬ ‫التببوج ين ولببهغ مببً المببشوسة أن كببون أحببذ ما ِلببه حعببا آلاوببش‪ .‬بببة أهببر مببً‬ ‫اإلامك ببً أن رع ببتليذ الّ ببش م ببً ِم ببوسة شمي ببا ببه ؤلا ح بباد ألاوسو ببو م ببل م ببت ببه‬ ‫الببذ اُ ِببً القمببا ا اإلاؽببشوِة للّببش مببْ ارياهببذ ألاوسو ببو و ببزلك كببون البببذ ة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الّش و ؤلاظومو ِامو مكمو ومقوسا راياس شميا ألاوسو و(‪.)35‬‬ ‫وسمكببً القببول أن ببزا البببذ ة اريببامْ هتببا للعياظببة ارااسجيببة ال رميببة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ال ب ب ببل وام ب ب ببت ِل ب ب ب ببه مقاس ب ب ب ببة جذ ب ب ب ببذة تفل ب ب ب ببه وع ب ب ب بببيا ِ ب ب ب ببً س ب ب ب ب بباه التقلي ب ب ب ببذة‬ ‫باإلظب ب را يجياى الغش ي ببة لف ببارت مىٍ ببوس تّ ببذدة أو ببز ببه ِتب بباس سواب ببي شمي ببا‬ ‫التاسسفية والثقا ية الّميقة بمىىقة الؽش ألاوظي وأن رمة مفارت ل رميا به‬ ‫الؽش ألاوظي ال تىابا بالمشوسة مْ اإلافارت الغش ية‪.‬‬ ‫ومب ببا رعب بباِذ شميب ببا ِلب ببه بحب ببل ب ببزا البب ببذ ة اريب ببامْ ِوامب ببة رورب ببة‪ :‬أولوص صصا‬ ‫فاِذ و يرة أ يذ الشأة الّام ال ركو إلاضسذ مً‬

‫تمام بمىىقة الؽش ألاوظي‬

‫واإلاىالب ب ببة بضس ب ببادة التل ب بباِوى وال ب ببشوابي م ب ببْ اإلاىىق ب ببة الّش ي ب ببة والؽ ب ببش ألاوظ ب ببي‪.‬‬ ‫وسمكببً إدسا مواو ببف ارخكوم ببة ال رمي ببة م ببً الّ ببذوان ؤلاظ بشاييله ِل ببه وى بباُ ي ببضة‬ ‫مىايجببة ل ببزا التوا ببا اإلاولببو ه بببين تغيببر ا جا بباى البشأة الّببام و حببول اإلاببذاسغ‬ ‫الىاٌمة للعياظة ارااسجية ال رمية‪.‬‬ ‫رانيها ؤلاحباه الكبير لذة ألا شاغ مً ذوو حفيلة معاس م هحو ؤلا حاد‬ ‫ألاوسو و ه ٌة الّثراى والّقباى ال ل مّ ا ارياهذ ألاوسو بو وال بل حبول دون‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫اهم ب ببمام شمي ب ببا إبب ببه ؤلا ح ب بباد مقابب ببة ضا ب ببذ ب ببشؿ التلاِ ب ببة م ب ببْ اللم ب بباة الّش ب ببو‬ ‫وؤلاظومو واإلاكاظذ اإلااد ة واإلاّىوسة مً وجر ألا شاغ هحو الؽش ‪.‬‬ ‫ورالثها ضا ذ ا تمام ارخكومة ال رمية بمجال ا ارخيوة ه الؽش ألاوظبي‬ ‫والعببذه لببذوس إوليا ب أمبببر والشيبببة ببه إسظبباة أظببغ جذ ببذة للّووبباى الّش يببة‬ ‫ال رمي ب ببة ق ب ببوم ِل ب ببه واِ ب ببذة اإلاف ب ببارت اإلاؽ ب ب رمة م ب ببْ اح ب برام اراي ب بباساى العياظ ب ببية‬ ‫و وتفاد ة والثقا ية و جتماِية لكة منسما‪.‬‬

‫خاثمصة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫كاهببت حكومببة أسدويببان ببه ألامثببر أميببذا للمعبباس ألاوسو ببو للذولببة مببً بببين‬ ‫ارخكومبباى ال رميببة ألاويببرة ممببا أن موولببر مببً ِمليببة اهمببمام شميببا إبببه ؤلا حبباد‬ ‫ألاوسو ببو جبباوص مواوببف ألاحبضا الّلماهيببة هلعب ا ال ببل س ّببت ؼببّاس ألاوس ببة لكنسببا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫لببم تعببْ إبببه جعببيذ ا بفببوسة حقيقيببة‪ .‬مببو ِببً ظياظببتر جبباا إظبشايية وال ببل‬ ‫وام ببت ِل ببه اللف ببة ب ببين ح ببالف شميب ببا م ببْ إظب بشايية م ببً ج ببة و ببين حلٍ بباى‬ ‫ارخكومببة ال رمي ببة ِلببه ظياظ ببة إظ بشايية ج بباا الللعببىيييين م ببً ج ببة أو ببشة‪ .‬ك ببة‬ ‫زا رؽير إبه أن العياظة ال رمية متّذدة ألابّاد وأنسا بلونسا ؤلاظومو ال تحشغ‬ ‫ب ببه معب بباس ِل ب ببه حع ب ببا آلاو ب ببش و جم ب ببْ ب ب ببين الشيب ب ببة ب ببه ؤلاو ب ببوُ ارخم ب بباسة و ب ببين‬ ‫اِتبب بباساى الواو ب ببْ الّمل ب ببه الّ ب ببالال وؤلاولياب ببل و ام ب ببذ ِل ب ببه أن الب ب ببذ ة ؤلاظ ب ببومو‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫جامّا ال ملاـو مْ اراياس ألاوسو و‪.‬‬ ‫و فلق الذساظة إبه أن شميا ظوا ابحل ِله ألاستت البذ ة اريامْ و بو‬ ‫ظتلادة مً واجذ ا الّش و ه حعين أوساو ا التلاولبية مبْ ؤلا حباد ألاوسو بو‬ ‫ودِم ِوواوسا بالوال اى اإلاتحذة‪ .‬ارا كان أحبذ أ بم اإلافبارت ارخيوسبة ال رميبة بو‬ ‫همببمام إبببه ؤلا حبباد ألاوسو ببو ببان ببزا ال ببذا لببً تحقببا إال مببً وببول وجببر‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫شمي ببا هح ببو محيى ببا الّش ببو ؤلاظ بومو و هف بشاه مباؼ ببشة ببه وم ببا اا م ببً و ببول‬ ‫مماسظ ب ببة دوس الوظ ب ببيي ؤلاوليا ب ببل اإلاقب ب ببول واإلاشي ب ببو‬

‫ح ب ببل ب ب تع ب ببوسة النزاِب بباى‬

‫واراو اى بين ألاوشاا الّش ية الّش ية و ين ألاوشاا الّش ية ويير الّش ية‪.‬‬ ‫و ببه ببزا ارخال ببة ل ببً تفل ببه شمي ببا ِ ببً حالل ببا ؤلاظ ب را ي ه م ببْ الغ ببش أو‬ ‫ال زام ب ببا بمعب بباس الّمب ببوسة ب ببه ؤلا حب بباد ألاوسو ب ببو ب ب ببة ظاعب ببذه جا ب ببذة تن ك ب ببون‬ ‫ِوواوسببا مببْ الّببالم الّش ببو ؤلاظببومو ِبببر لاِل ببا مببْ ِمق ببا التبباسس ه وارخمبباسة‬ ‫وظ ببيلة الظ ببتكمال ِوواوس ببا م ببْ الغ ببش وم ببْ أوسو ببا ِل ببه وج ببر اراف ببوؿ وو ببش‬ ‫ً‬ ‫هلعب ا باِتباس ببا دولببة همورجببا اظببتىاِت التو يببا بببين الببذ حل واإلاببذوو ِبببر جش ببة‬ ‫حض الّذالة والتىمية ال ل حٍيت ببذِم و أ يبذ الؽباسُ الّش بو ِلبه ولليبة ويبام‬ ‫سيهغ وصسائسا أسدويان بذوس إ جا و به تشبييْ الثبوساى الؽبّبية الّش يبة ظبواة به‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ببووغ ومفببش وليبيببا والببيمً وأويبرا ظببوسسا و ببو بببزلك لببم ببرغ ببزا اإلا مببة قببي‬ ‫لألمشسكيين وألاوسو ين مثلما ّة الّذ ذ مً ارخكام الّش ‪.‬‬ ‫و ببه ٌببة الّث براى الّذ ببذة ال ببل واج ببا الثببوساى الّش يببة واـببة اريببذل‬ ‫حبول ؼبكة الذولبة ممبا حببذإ به بووغ ومفبش ويلبببة القبليبة به البيمً وليبيببا‬ ‫بب ببذو الىم ب ببور ال ركب ببو بمب ببا قذمب ببر مب ببً اريمب ببْ بب ببين ِلماهي ب ببة الع ب ببلىة ومب ببذهيهسا‬ ‫وإظبومية اإلاجتمبْ ال ركبو ببو ألامثبر جاربيبة مبً الىمببور ؤلا شاوبو و بو مبا تشببيّر‬ ‫و ذِمببر الببذول الغش يببة إلوامببة د مقشاويببة ببه الببذول الّش يببة لببهغ ِلببه الىشسقببة‬ ‫الغش ية وإهما ِله الىشسقة ال رمية‪.‬‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫قائمة املشاج‬ ‫‪1- Zoli Ozal, "It is Along and Winding Read: The Saga of EU-Turkey Relations". In:‬‬ ‫‪Heinz Kramer (ed.) Turkey and the EU: The EU's Perspective (Washington, DC.: Johns‬‬ ‫‪Hopkins University Press, 2004), PP. 2-3.‬‬ ‫‪ -2‬أحم ب ب ب ب ببذ ظ ب ب ب ب ببّيذ هو ب ب ب ب ببة "متح ب ب ب ب ببذون ب ب ب ب ببه التى ب ب ب ب ببوُ‪:‬‬

‫ح ب ب ب ب بباد وسو ب ب ب ب ببو ب ب ب ب ب ببين الق ب ب ب ب ببذساى‬

‫والتح ب ب ب ب ب ببذ اى"‪ .‬املجل ص ص ص ص ص صصة العشبي ص ص ص ص ص صصة للعل ص ص ص ص ص صصىم السياس ص ص ص ص ص صصية (بي ب ب ب ب ب ببروى) الّ ب ب ب ب ب ببذد ‪ ( 26‬س ي ب ب ب ب ب ببْ‬ ‫‪ )2010‬ؿ ‪.151‬‬ ‫‪ -3‬محم ب ب ب ب ب ببذ ه ب ب ب ب ب ببوس ال ب ب ب ب ب ببذ ً " شمي ب ب ب ب ب ببا و ح ب ب ب ب ب بباد وسو ب ب ب ب ب ببو‪ :‬مع ب ب ب ب ب ببألة ال وس ب ب ب ب ب ببة والش اه ب ب ب ب ب بباى‬ ‫والؽ ب ب ب ب ب ب ببش ألاوظ ب ب ب ب ب ب ببي"‪ .‬ل ص ص ص ص ص ص ص ون ألاوس ص ص ص ص ص ص صصط (بي ب ب ب ب ب ب ببروى) الّب ب ب ب ب ب ببذد ‪( 116‬ـ ب ب ب ب ب ب ببيف ‪)2004‬‬ ‫ؿ ‪ 68-66‬و ب ب ب ب ب ببااد نسب ب ب ب ب ب بشا " جا ب ب ب ب ب بباى العياظ ب ب ب ب ب ببية ب ب ب ب ب ببه أوسو ب ب ب ب ب ببا ووم ب ب ب ب ب ببية اهم ب ب ب ب ب ببمام‬ ‫شميا"‪ .‬ل ون ألاوسط (بيروى) الّذد ‪( 116‬ـيف ‪ )2004‬ؿ ‪.78-77‬‬ ‫‪ -4‬محم ب ب ب ب ب ببذ ه ب ب ب ب ب ببوس ال ب ب ب ب ب ببذ ً " شمي ب ب ب ب ب ببا و ح ب ب ب ب ب بباد وسو ب ب ب ب ب ببو‪ :‬مع ب ب ب ب ب ببألة ال وس ب ب ب ب ب ببة والش اه ب ب ب ب ب بباى‬ ‫والؽش ألاوظي"‪ .‬مشج سبق ركشه ؿ ‪.68‬‬ ‫‪5- Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War‬‬ ‫‪(Seattle: Washington University Press, 2003), P.66.‬‬ ‫‪6- Huseyin Bagci, "Proactive Policy in Iraq: How long?." New Anatolian, June5, 2006,‬‬ ‫‪PP. 15-16.‬‬ ‫‪7- Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War.‬‬ ‫‪Op.cit., PP. 320-322.‬‬ ‫‪ -8‬ديناميص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصات الحطص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصىس التركص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصى‪ :‬خيص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصاسات مسص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصتراثيجية للعالقص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصات ألامشي يص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصة –‬ ‫التركي ص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصة‪( .‬بي ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ببروى‪ :‬مشم ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ببض الذساظ ب ب ب ب ب ب ب بباى ؤلاظب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب را يجية والذولي ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ببة ‪ )2009‬ؿ ‪-20‬‬ ‫‪.22‬‬ ‫‪ -9‬محمب ب ب ب ب ببذ هب ب ب ب ب ببوس الب ب ب ب ب ببذ ً " ظياظب ب ب ب ب ببة شميب ب ب ب ب ببا ؤلاوليميب ب ب ب ب ببة بب ب ب ب ب ببين ارخعاظب ب ب ب ب ببياى الذاوليب ب ب ب ب ببة‬ ‫و ِتبب ب ب ب ب ب ب بباساى ارااسجيب ب ب ب ب ب ب ببة"‪ .‬ل ص ص ص ص ص ص ص ص ون عشبيص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصة (القب ب ب ب ب ب ب ببا شة) الّب ب ب ب ب ب ب ببذد ‪ )2006( 125‬ؿ‬ ‫‪.81-80‬‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫‪10- Hiam Malka, "Turkey and the Middle East: Rebalancing Interests". In: Turkey's‬‬

‫‪Evolving Dynamics; Strategic Choices for US-Turkey Relations (Center for Strategic‬‬ ‫‪and International Studies, 2009), P. 64.‬‬ ‫‪ " -11‬شمي ب ب ب ب ب ببا‪ :‬دوس الوظب ب ب ب ب ب ببيي ب ب ب ب ب ببه الؽب ب ب ب ب ب ببش ألاوظ ب ب ب ب ب ببي"‪ .‬الحي ص ص ص ص ص صصاة (جشس ب ب ب ب ب ببذة الك روهي ب ب ب ب ب ببة)‬ ‫ؿ‪1‬‬ ‫‪Website,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey.‬‬ ‫‪12- Gajendra Singh, "A New Age for Turkey-Syria Relations" Asia Times, April 14,‬‬ ‫‪2005.‬‬ ‫‪ -13‬محم ب ب ب ب ب ببذ وواج ب ب ب ب ب ببة " اإلاثل ب ب ب ب ب ببث الّش ب ب ب ب ب ببو ؤلا شاو ب ب ب ب ب ببو ال رك ب ب ب ب ب ببو‪ :‬واو ب ب ب ب ب ببْ وإ ب ب ب ب ب ببا "‪ .‬ل ص ص ص ص ص ص ون‬ ‫ألاوسط (بيروى) الّذد ‪(119‬ـيف ‪ )2005‬ؿ ‪.167-166‬‬ ‫‪ " -14‬شميا‪ :‬دوس الوظيي ه الؽش ألاوظي"‪ .‬مشج سبق ركشه ؿ ‪.1‬‬ ‫‪15- Ibrahim Kalin, "Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geo-Politics"? Private‬‬

‫‪View, (Istanbul, 2008), PP. 10-13.‬‬ ‫شمم ب ب ب ب بباوو " شمي ب ب ب ب ببا الف ب ب ب ب بباِذة ب ب ب ب ببه الؽ ب ب ب ب ببش ألاوظ ب ب ب ب ببي"‪ .‬الىق ص ص ص ص صصد (جشس ب ب ب ب ببذة‬

‫‪ِ -16‬ب ب ب ب ب ببذ‬

‫الك روهية) الّذد ‪ 2009/1/29 1074‬ؿ ‪2-1‬‬ ‫‪Website, http://www.alwaqt.com/blogprint.php?baid=9491.‬‬

‫‪ -17‬اسخش ص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصواد فلس ص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصطينى ومص ص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصابة ‪ 4‬ف ص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصى قلص ص ص ص ص ص ص ص ص لالح ص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصحالل ع ص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصى ص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصزة‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 2011/4/10‬ؿ‪1‬‬ ‫‪Website, http://www.rtv.gov.sy/index/php?=13&id=71715.‬‬ ‫‪ " -18‬أهق ب ب ب ب ب ببشة حتب ب ب ب ب ب ببة اإلاش بب ب ب ب ب ب ببة الثاهيب ب ب ب ب ب ببة بّب ب ب ب ب ب ببذ أمشسكب ب ب ب ب ب ببا ب ب ب ب ب ب ببه اظب ب ب ب ب ب ببتيراد ألاظب ب ب ب ب ب ببلخة مب ب ب ب ب ب ببً‬ ‫إظ ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب بشايية"‪ .‬ألاه ص ص ص ص ص ص ص ص ص ص صصشام (الق ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ببا شة) ‪ 2011/4/22‬ؿ ‪ 4‬و"‪ 60‬مّا ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ببذة تّ ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب ب بباون‬ ‫ِع ب ب ب ب ب ببكشة ب ب ب ب ب ب ببين إظ ب ب ب ب ب بشايية و شمي ب ب ب ب ب ببا ‪ :‬وو ب ب ب ب ب ببذ إظ ب ب ب ب ب بشاييله ف ب ب ب ب ب ببة إب ب ب ب ب ب ببه أهق ب ب ب ب ب ببشة"‪ .‬الش ص ص ص ص ص صصشق‬ ‫ألاوسط (جشسذة الك روهية) الّذد ‪ 2010/1/19 11375‬ؿ ‪2-1‬‬ ‫‪Website, http://www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=553460&issueno=11375.‬‬

‫‪- 133 -‬‬

‫‪ -19‬محمب ب ب ب ب ب ببذ الع ب ب ب ب ب ب ببيذ ظب ب ب ب ب ب ببليم "اراي ب ب ب ب ب ب بباساى ؤلاظ ب ب ب ب ب ب ب را يجية للب ب ب ب ب ب ببووً الّش ب ب ب ب ب ب ببو وموو ب ب ب ب ب ب ببْ‬ ‫شمي ب ب ب ب ب ببا منس ب ب ب ب ب ببا"‪ .‬ب ب ب ب ب ببه‪ :‬الح ص ص ص ص ص صصىاس العشب ص ص ص ص ص صصى – الترك ص ص ص ص ص صصى ب ص ص ص ص ص ص ن املا ص ص ص ص ص ص ى والحاض ص ص ص ص ص صصش‪ :‬بح ص ص ص ص ص صصىذ‬ ‫ومناقش ص ص ص ص ص صصات الن ص ص ص ص ص صصذوة الف شي ص ص ص ص ص صصة الت ص ص ص ص ص صصى نومو ص ص ص ص ص صصا مشك ص ص ص ص ص صصز دساس ص ص ص ص ص صصات الىح ص ص ص ص ص صصذة العشبي ص ص ص ص ص صصة‬ ‫بالحعص ص ص ص ص صصاون م ص ص ص ص ص ص امل سسص ص ص ص ص صصة العشبيص ص ص ص ص صصة للذيمقشا يص ص ص ص ص صصة ومشكص ص ص ص ص صصز ثجاهص ص ص ص ص صصات السياسص ص ص ص ص صصية‬ ‫العاملية (بيروى‪ :‬مشمض دساظاى الوحذة الّش ية ‪ )2010‬ؿ ‪.108‬‬ ‫‪20- Gokhan Cetinsaya, "Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historic Roots of‬‬ ‫‪Turkish-Iranian Relations" MERIA Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3, Sept. 2003, P. 35.‬‬ ‫‪21- "US Critical of Turkey's Strategic Partnership with Iran" Turkish Daily News, April‬‬ ‫‪7, 2007, P. 1.‬‬ ‫‪22- Omer Taspinar, Turkey's Middle East Politics: Between Neo-Ottomanism and‬‬

‫‪Kamalism. Carnegie Papers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), P.‬‬ ‫‪28.‬‬ ‫‪23- Cengiz Candar, "Turkey's Constructive Role in the US-Iran Situation and its‬‬ ‫‪Domestic Impact" New Anatolian, June 5, 2006, P. 10-12.‬‬ ‫‪ " -24‬أحم ب ب ب ببذة هج ب ب ب بباد رؽ ب ب ب ببكش شمي ب ب ب ببا ِل ب ب ب ببه موول ب ب ب ببا م ب ب ب ببً بشه ب ب ب ببامل ب ب ب ب ببودا الى ب ب ب ببووة وس ب ب ب ببذِو‬ ‫إب ب ب ب ب ببه تؽ ب ب ب ب ببكية وى ب ب ب ب ببذ ظيا ب ب ب ب ب ل واوتف ب ب ب ب ببادة"‪ .‬الش ص ص ص ص صصشق ألاوس ص ص ص ص صصط (جشس ب ب ب ب ببذة الك روهي ب ب ب ب ببة)‬ ‫الّذد ‪2011/2/15 11767‬‬

‫ؿ ‪3-1‬‬

‫‪Website, http://www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=608358&issueno=11767.‬‬ ‫‪25- Stephen Larrabee, Turkey as US Security Partner (RAND Corporation, 2008), PP.‬‬ ‫‪12-14.‬‬ ‫‪ -26‬ثشكيا ثحزس من صىاسيخ ميشانية جذيذة‪ .‬ؿ ‪2-1‬‬ ‫‪Website, http://www.dd-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php?t=45719.‬‬ ‫‪27- Senem Aydin and Rusen Cakir, Political Islam in Turkey. Center for European‬‬ ‫‪Policy, No. 265, 2007, PP. 1-12.‬‬

‫‪- 131 -‬‬

28- Ali Kulebi, The Impacts of Turkey's Geopolitics and Geostrategical Position on our

Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy World Affairs Board, 2009, PP. 1-3, Website, http://www.worldaffairsboard.com. 29- Ali Kara Osman Oglu, "Turkey's Security Policy; Continunity and Change". In: Douglas T. Stuart (ed.) Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic

Alliance (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), PP. 169-170. 30- H.V. Houtum, "The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries." Geopolitics, Vol. (10), No. (4), 2005, P. 674. ‫ محمب ب ب ب ببذ ِب ب ب ب ببذ الّب ب ب ب بباوو‬:‫ ب ب ب ب ببه‬."‫ محم ب ب ب ببذ ه ب ب ب ببوس الب ب ب ب ببذ ً "العياظب ب ب ب ببة ارااسجيب ب ب ب ببة ال رمي ب ب ب ببة‬-31 ‫ مكتبب ب ب ب ب ب ببة‬:‫(محب ب ب ب ب ب ببشس) ثشكيص ص ص ص ص ص صصا ب ص ص ص ص ص ص ص ن ثحص ص ص ص ص ص صصذيات الص ص ص ص ص ص صصذاخل وسهانص ص ص ص ص ص صصات الخص ص ص ص ص ص صصاسج (القب ب ب ب ب ب ببا شة‬ )2010 ‫م ب ب ب ب ب ببذبوبه ومشم ب ب ب ب ب ببض اريضس ب ب ب ب ب ببشة للذساظ ب ب ب ب ب بباى وال ب ب ب ب ب ببذاس الّش ي ب ب ب ب ب ببة للّل ب ب ب ب ب ببوم هاؼ ب ب ب ب ب ببشون‬ .33-30 ‫ؿ‬ 32- Graham Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey As a Pivotal State in the

Muslim World. Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace (Washington DC., 2008), P. 176. 33- Rajan Menon and Endres Winbush, Is the United States Losing Turkey? (Hudson Institute, 2007), PP. 2-6. 34- Carol Migadalovitz, Turkey: Issues for US Policy (Congressional Research Service, 2002), P. 4. )‫ السياسصة الذوليصة (القبا شة‬."‫ ِووباى محعبو ة‬:‫ محمذ هوس الذ ً " شميا والّالم الّش بو‬-35 .185 ‫) ؿ‬2007 ‫ ( وليو‬169 ‫الّذد‬

- 133 -

‫ظاهرة الطرق الصىفيت العابرة لللىمياث‬ "‫"الطريلت البرهاهيت فى السىدان همىذجا‬ Transnational Sufi phenomenon The Burhaaniyyah model in Sudan 

‫آفاق محمدصادق أبىالريش‬

Afaq Muhammad Sadiq Abu al-Rish Abstract: This paper aims to study, discuss and analyze the causes, the signs and the manifestations of change within the Sufi and religious groups and the reasons for their transformation into transnational groups and the consequences, by linking them to global shifts and changes in their technological, social and political dimensions. Because of the nature of the subject the paper adopted more than a scientific discipline, joining the descriptive analytical method and the historical and comparative methods. Keyword: mysticism, Sufi, religious groups, the Islamist movement, the Muslim world, religion and modernity... ‫ تهذف هزه الىسكة الى دساظة ومىاكشة وثحلُل ؤظباب وماششات ومظاهش الحؿُحر داخل‬:‫ملخص‬ ً‫الطشق والجماغات الذًيُة وؤظباب ثحىلها لجماغات غابشة لللىمُات والىحائج اإلاترثبة غلحها ورل‬ . ‫مً خالٌ سبطها بالححىالت والحؿحرات الػاإلاُة فى ؤبػادها الحىىىلىحُة وؤلاححماغُة والعُاظُة‬ ‫ولطبُػة اإلاىضىع بغحمذت الىسكة غلى ؤهثر مً مىهج غلمي حامػة ما بحن اإلاىهج الىصفي الححلُلي‬ .‫والحاسٍخي واإلالاسن‬ 

.‫محاضش وباحث فى الػلىم العُاظُة – حامػة حىبا‬ Email: afagsadig@hotmail.com

5;7

‫كلماث مفاجيح‪ :‬ثصىف‪ ،‬طشق‪ ،‬حماغات دًيُة‪ ،‬الحشهة الاظالمُة‪ ،‬الػالم الاظالمي‪ ،‬الذًً‬ ‫والحذارة‪...‬‬

‫ملدمت ‪:‬‬ ‫حاءت ثىكػات مػظم الباحثحن في حلل الذساظات الثلافُة واإلاهحمحن بلضاًا الحىمُة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫والححذًث حىٌ ثشاحؼ بل بجهُاس الطشق الصىفُة في اإلاعحلبل بظخىادا الى حلائم‬ ‫غذًذة ؤبشصها مىحة الححذًث والحػلُم التي بهحظمد الػالم ؤلاظالمي ‪ ،‬وراهحها‬ ‫الححذي الزي حابهها مً حشوات ؤلاظالم العُاس ي والتي بغحبرت هثحرا مً ؤفياسها‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ومماسظاتها بذغا محػاسضة ؤحُاها مؼ الششَػة ؤلاظالمُة ‪ ,‬ورالثهما ؾُاب الهذف‬ ‫العُاس ي الىاضح لهزه الطشق‪.‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫غلي غىغ ثلً الحىكػات شهذت العىىات ألاخحرة ثحىال متزاًذا هحى الطشق‬ ‫الصىفُة خاصة في اإلاىاطم الحضشٍة التي واهد ثخعم بالػلماهُة‪ -‬حُث ضمد‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الطشق الصىفُة بحن مشٍذحها ؤهثر الفئات ثحذًثا وجػلُما في اإلاجحمؼ – وهزه‬ ‫الظاهشة هجذها في هثحر مً اإلاجحمػات ؤلاظالمُة فى الششق ألاوظط ‪ .‬مً حاهبها ؤبذت‬ ‫الطشق الصىفُة مشوهة غالُة وكذسات هبحرة غلى الحىُف مؼ معحجذات الػصش‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ومحؿحراثه ‪ ،‬وٍظهش هزا ألامش واضحا فى بهحلاٌ الػذًذ الطشق الصىفُة مً ؤماهجها‬ ‫الحللُذًة فى الششق ألاوظط والػالم ؤلاظالم الى مىاطم وبِئات حؿشافُة ورلافُة‬ ‫محىىغة ومخحلفة معحؿلة فضاءات الػىإلاة وبمياهُاتها الالمحذودة لحححىٌ مً مجشد‬ ‫طشق وحماغات دًُيُة ثللُذًة بلى حماغات وحشوات حذًثة غابشة لللىمُات‪.‬‬ ‫تهذف هزه الىسكة الى دساظة ومىاكشة وثحلُل ؤظباب وماششات ومظاهش الحؿُحر‬ ‫داخل الطشق والجماغات الذًيُة وؤظباب ثحىلها لجماغات غابشة لللىمُات والىحائج‬ ‫اإلاترثبة غلحها ورلً مً خالٌ سبطها بالححىالت والحؿحرات الػاإلاُة فى ؤبػادها‬ ‫الحىىىلىحُة وؤلاححماغُة والعُاظُة ‪.‬‬ ‫ثإجي ؤهمُة هزه الىسكة مً وىجها ثحػلم بذساظة وثحلُل ظاهشة الطشق الذًيُة‬ ‫ً ً‬ ‫الػابشة لللىمُات‪ ,‬وفى واكؼ ألامش بن ؤبحاذ الحصىف هفعها ماصالد حلال بىشا ًححاج‬

‫‪5;8‬‬

‫للمضٍذ مً الذساظات وألابحاذ‪ .‬ولطبُػة اإلاىضىع بغحمذت الىسكة غلى ؤهثر مً مىهج‬ ‫غلمي حامػة ما بحن اإلاىهج الىصفي الححلُلي والحاسٍخي واإلالاسن ‪.‬‬ ‫ثىلعم الىسكة الى رالذ محاوس سئِعُة غلى الىحى الحالي‪:‬‬ ‫اإلاحىس الاوٌ ‪ً :‬ىاكش الححذًات التي ثىاحه الباحثحن في مجاٌ الػلىم ؤلاححماغُة غىذ‬ ‫دساظة الطشق الصىفُة‪.‬‬ ‫اإلاحىس الثاو ‪ٌ :‬علط الضىء غلى ظاهشة ثحىٌ الطشق الصىفُة مً اإلاحلُة للػاإلاُة‬ ‫بالترهحز غلى الطشٍلة البرهاهُة مً العىدان‪.‬‬ ‫اإلاحىس الثالث ‪ً :‬ىاكش معحلبل الطشق الصىفُة فى ظل اإلاحؿحرات اإلاحلُة وؤلاكلُمُة‬ ‫والػاإلاُة‪.‬‬

‫أول‪ :‬دراساث التصىف‬

‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ًمثللل الحصللىف ثُللاسا سوحُللا غشفحله حمُللؼ ألادًللان ‪ ،‬حهللذف اظاظللا اللى بدسان الحلُللة‬ ‫اإلاطللللة ‪ ،‬محللزة هللزه الحلُلللة ؤهلله ًصللػا بدساههللا بالىظللائل الػادًللة بللل ًحطلللا ألامللش‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫حه للذا هثُف للا م للً الشٍاض للات والحم للاسًٍ الشوحُ للة والبذهُ للة حت للي ً للحمىً اإلاحص للىف م للً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الىش للف اإلاطل للم حُ للث ًح للىفش ل لله بدسان الح للا واإلاػشف للة الباطىُ للة وثالُ للا الحىح للذ م للؼ‬ ‫ال للزات ؤلالهُ للة‪ .‬ه للزا ألام للش غشف لله اإلاحصل للىفه ف للي مػظ للم الل للذًاهات‪ .‬ل للزا فه للم ٌشل للشحىن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ثجاسبهم وخبراتهم بةغحباسها بحثا محىاصال غً هللا وثشبُة للىفغ غلى ألالم بضافة بللى‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫لىغة اإلاحا وشىكا الى الحىحذ‪.‬‬ ‫غ للشف ؤلاظ للالم الحص للىف مى للز بذاً للة ثاسٍخ لله وخب للر ؤش للياال محػ للذدة ل لله ‪ ،‬حُ للث ب للذؤت‬ ‫ً‬ ‫هجزغات فشدًة ثذغى للضهذ رم ثطىست ثلً الجزغات لحصبح طشكا ممحزة غشفد بةظلم‬ ‫الطشق الصىفُة ‪.‬‬ ‫الشاهذ ؤن مصطلح صىفُة في الحاسٍخ ؤلاظالمي بهخعا صحروسثه وبهخشلاسه فلي الللشن‬ ‫الحاظللؼ ووللان بالحللالي الحإظللِغ للفىللشة اللائمللة غللى الحللا ؤلال للي والحىحللذ والشؾبللة ف لي‬ ‫الفىللاء فللي هللا‪ .‬ولىللً كبللل الفىللاء فللي الللزات ؤلالهُللة ًححللاج اإلاحصللىف اللى اإلاللشوس بمشاحللل‬

‫‪5;9‬‬

‫ث للش ٍق مػُىل للة ‪ .‬وبالحل للالي و للان مل للً اإلاالمل للح اإلامح للزة للفىل للش الصل للىفي الل للىٌ بىظشٍل للة اإلاىل للاصٌ‬ ‫واإلالامات وألاحىاٌ‪ .‬فطشٍم الحصىف ًجمؼ بحن الضهذ والحصىف في آن واحذ‪ ،‬وهى ملا‬ ‫ًحطلا ثصفُة الىفغ وتهُئتهلا لللحللاء ملؼ الحلُللة ؤلالهُلة‪ .‬وملً ٌعللً هلزا الطشٍلم‬ ‫ًم للش ب للثالذ ملام للات ؤظاظ للُة‪ :‬ؤوله للا مل للام الطال للا وراهحه للا مل للام الع للالً ورالثه للا مل لام‬ ‫اإلاشٍذ‪ .‬وال ًشثلي اإلاحصىف الى ملام الا بػذ ان ًيىن كذ مش باإلالامات العابلة له(‪.)1‬‬ ‫حلُلللة ألامللش ؤهلله جػللذدت الحػشٍفللات للحصللىف حت لى وظللط اإلاحصللىفة ؤهفعللهم‪ ،‬وسبمللا‬ ‫ٌػللىد رلللً لن وللل مللً ًشٍللذ جػشٍللف الحصللىف ًللإجي بحجشبحلله الشوحُللة ال اصللة بلله‪ ،‬بللل‬ ‫سبمللا رهللا الىاحللذ مللجهم لهثللر مللً جػشٍللف‪ ،‬لن الصللىفي ٌػترًلله حللاٌ دون ظللابله‪ .‬لللزا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ًل للإجي جػشٍل للف الحصل للىف محىىغل للا‪ .‬وفلل للا لهل للزه الاحل للىاٌ (‪ً ،)2‬حجل لله الىثحل للر غىل للذ جػشٍل للف‬ ‫الحصىف الى الجاها ألاخالقي وهزا ؤلاثجاه ظائذ حتى غىذ اإلاحصىفة ؤهفعهم وؾحرهم‬ ‫مً الباحثحن في الحصىف واإلااسخحن لهم‪ .‬وفلي هلزا ؤلاطلاس ًمثلل الحصلىف سوس ؤلاظلالم‪.‬‬ ‫مل للً حاهل للا آخل للش ‪ ،‬وغل ل لى الل للشؾم مل للً هثافل للة مل للا طل للشس مل للً جػشٍفل للات للحصل للىف ًمىل للً‬ ‫ثل ُصها في رالذ ثصيُفات سئِعُة وهي‪:‬‬ ‫‪ .1‬جػشٍفات مبيُة غلى ؤلاشحلاق اللؿىي إلاصطلح الحصىف‪.‬‬ ‫‪ .2‬جػشٍفات جػحمذ غلى الطابؼ اللُمي الفلعفي للحصىف‬ ‫‪ .3‬جػشٍفات معحلاة مً ظلىن وؤفػاٌ اإلاحصىفة‪.‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ك ل للذمد هظشٍ ل للات غذً ل للذة ح ل للىٌ الحص ل للىف‪ .‬فم ل للثال هىال ل للً م ل للً ً ل للشي ؤن ؤص ل للله م ل للً‬ ‫الحصلىف اإلاعللُ ي والؿىىصللُة ‪ ،‬بِىمللا ًللشي الللبػالا الاخللش اهلله مللً ؤلافالطىهُللة اإلاحذرللة‬ ‫او الضسدشثُة او الهىذًة ‪ ،‬وبهزا اإلاػنى فةن الحصىف وافذ غلى البِئة ؤلاظالمُة ضمً‬ ‫ما وفذ بلحها مً رلافات وثلالُذ هخُجة للفحىحلات ؤلاظلالمُة او حشهلة الىللل والترحملة‬ ‫التللي ش للهذها الػللالم ؤلاظ للالمي ‪ .‬بثجللاه آخ للش ًللشي ؤن البح للث غللً ؤظ للغ الفىللش الص للىفي‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ًج للا ؤن ًي للىن ؤظاظ للا ف للي الفى للش ؤلاظ للالمي ولل لِغ ف للي هظ للم الفى للش ألاخ للشي لن اللل لشآن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫وألاحادً للث اللذظ للُة وجػ للالُم الشظ للىٌ "ص لللم" ثحض للمً غ للذدا م للً الػىاص للش اإلاحػلل للة‬ ‫بالضه للذ والحص للىف (‪ ، )3‬ف للي ه للزا ؤلاط للاس ث للشي الىسك للة ؤن الحص للىف طاإلا للا ه للى محػل للم‬ ‫بالشػىس والىحذان وطاإلاا ؤن الىفغ البششٍة واحذة فةن الحجشبة الصىفُة ًمىلً ؤن‬

‫‪5;:‬‬

‫ثيللىن مخشللابهة ؤو مشللترهة‪ .‬وغلُلله ًيللىن وحللىد شللبه بللحن الحصللىف ؤلاظللالمي وؾحللره مللً‬ ‫ؤشياٌ الحصىف في الذًاهات والثلافات ألاخشي بالمش اإلامىً واإلالبىٌ‪.‬‬ ‫ٌش للحر ثل للاسٍخ دساظل للة الحصل للىف هُل للف ؤهل لله وبلل للىة شل لليلد هحابل للات اإلاعخشل للشكحن مفهل للىم‬ ‫الحصىف بةغحباسه حضءا خاصا مً الثلافة ؤلاظلالمُة ورللً فلي بطلاس دساظلاتهم للشلشق‬ ‫والت ل للي سؤوه ل للا حارب ل للة ‪ ،‬الش ل للاهذ ؤن ه ل للاالء اإلاعخش ل للشكحن ؤم ل للذوا الب ل للاحثحن فُم ل للا بػ ل للذ‬ ‫بمػلىمات ؾضٍشة حىٌ ؤصل الحصلىف(‪ . )4‬فلي رات الىكلد ؤدي هملى وجػلاظم الحشولات‬ ‫ؤلاظالمُة ألاصىلُة التي ؤغحبرت هفعها حامُة للذًً ؤلاظالمي الىللي ومحافظلة غلُله‪،‬‬ ‫بلللى كُامهللا بةبػللاد وغللضٌ الىثحللر مللً اإلافللاهُم الصللىفُة بةغحباسهللا خللاسج جػللالُم الللذًً‬ ‫ؤلاظالمي ‪.‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫في حلُللة ألاملش بن هلزا الجلذٌ ؤخلز مياهله ثاسٍخُلا فلي الفتلرة ؤلاظلحػماسٍة وملا بػلذها ‪،‬‬ ‫خالصة ؤلمش ؤهه ثم حصش الحصىف في بطاس ألادب الىالظُيي واإلاُحافحركُا و الحلالُذ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫البالُ للة فُم للا ؤغحب للرت ألاص للىلُة سمل لضا إلظ للحجابة اإلاجحمػ للات ؤلاظ للالمُة للحح للذًث‪ .‬وف للي‬ ‫ثلذًش الباحث ؤن هزا ألامش وان خصلما غللى دساظلات الحصلىف حُلث ؤؾفللد واهمللد‬ ‫حىاها هثحرة مً غىاصش الحصىف في خضم هزا الجذٌ‪.‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫حالُا ًمىً ثصيُف مىاهج دساظة الحصىف الى رالذ ثُاسات سئِعُة‪:‬‬ ‫‪ /1‬دراس اااث أرسق ااراق‪ :‬وثحػل للم بالبح للث غ للً ؤص للل الحص للىف وه للل ه للى م للً مص للادس‬ ‫بظللالمُة ؤم رات مصللادس ؾحللر بظللالمُة‪ ،‬همللا بحثللىا غللً ؤوحلله الشللبه وؤلاخللحالف بللحن‬ ‫الحص للىف ؤلاظ للالمي وؾح للره م للً ؤه للىاع الحص للىف ألاخ للشي ‪ .‬مص للطلح الحص للىف ث للشحم ال لى‬ ‫اللؿللات ألاوسبُللة بىاظللطة اإلاعخشللشكحن البرًطللاهُحن ‪ ،‬ؾحللر ؤهلله كبللل اللللشن الثللامً غشللش‬ ‫جػل ل للشف غ ل ل للذد م ل ل للً الشحال ل ل للة ألاوسبُ ل ل للحن غلل ل للى ال ل ل للذساوَش واش ل ل للاسوا بلل ل للحهم‪ .‬لى ل للً ٌػحب ل للر‬ ‫اإلاعخشلشكىن هلم اوٌ ملً بظلحخذم مصلطلح ‪ Sufi‬لُػبلر غلً الىحله ألادللي للحصلىف‬ ‫خاصة غىذ دساظتهم للشػش الفاسس ي‪.‬‬ ‫خالص للة الام للش ؤن اإلاعخش للشكحن ه للم م للً ص للىفىا الحص للىف همج للاٌ مح لذد ووض للػىا ف للي‬ ‫اللشن الثامً غشش مفهىمهم للحصىف‪ .‬مً حاها آخش هلحظ ؤن ؤلاداسات ؤلاظحػماسٍة‬ ‫الاوسبُة وخاصة البرًطاهُة هي اإلاصذس الزي بظحلد مىه مػظم الذساظات ألاوادًمُلة‬

‫;;‪5‬‬

‫ف للي اللل للشن الحاظل للؼ غش للش همل للا هلحل للظ ؤن ثىحه للات ؤلاداسات ؤلاظل للحػماسٍة ثجل للاه الطل للشق‬ ‫الص للىفُة ؤخ للزت مىحُ للحن‪ ،‬ؤولهم للا هظشته للا للحص للىف بةغحب للاسه الىح لله الشو للي للظ للالم‬ ‫وراهحهل للا هظشتهل للا للحىظُمل للات الصل للىفُة آهل للزان والتل للي ؤغحبل للرت فاظل للذة وخطل للشة فل للي رات‬ ‫الىكد‪،‬بر شهذت اإلالاومة والىضاٌ ضذ اإلاعحػمش والتي كادها محصىفة‪ .‬للزلً واهلد‬ ‫جععي حاهذة الححىائها(‪.)5‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫‪ /2‬اإلاا ااملار اإلاار ا ا ‪ :‬والل للزي ًل للشي ف للي الحصل للىف بوػياظل للإ لل للىمط ؤلاهحل للاج والخشل للىُالت‬ ‫ؤلاححماغُة التي ثشثبط باإلكطاع وهمط ؤلاهحاج ألاظُىي ‪ ،‬هما ًحلاجج هلزا اإلالىهج بلإن‬ ‫مفللاهُم غالكللات ؤلاهحللاج وهمللط ؤلاهحللاج والحيللىًٍ ؤلاححمللاجي هللي ؤوعللا وظللُلة إلهحللاج‬ ‫ثحلُ للل و للاف لتش للياٌ ؤلاكحص للادًة والعُاظ للُة وألاًذًىلىحُ للة للحُ للاة ؤلاححماغُ للة ف للي‬ ‫ولُتها وفي ظُاكها ؤلاححماجي اإلاحذد‪ .‬واإلاإخز غلى هزا اإلاىهج ؤهله ًختلزٌ ؤلاظلالم بصلفة‬ ‫غاملة والحصللىف غللى وحلله ال صللى اللى الػىامللل ؤلاكحصللادًة وؤلاححماغُللة اإلاحضللة‬ ‫ومً رم ًحجاهل بظهام الذًً والفىش الصىفي في الحؿُحر ؤلاححماجي(‪.)6‬‬ ‫‪ /3‬مدرس ا ا اات التح ا ا ااد ‪ :‬وٍلص ل ل للذ بالحح ل ل للذًث بدخ ل ل للاٌ ط ل ل للشق الحىظل ل للُم ؤلاكحص ل ل للادًة‬ ‫والعُاظ للُة وثلىُ للات ؤلاهح للاج والىل للل وؤلاثص للاالت اإلاع للحمذة م للً ثل للً الت للي وظف للد ف للي‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الللذوٌ ألاوسبُللة والتللي ؾحللرت حىهشٍللا البيُللة العللابلة إلاجحمللؼ ثللُللذي مللا‪ .‬وثشثىللض هظشٍللة‬ ‫الححل ل للذًث غل ل للادة غل ل ل لى مشوهل ل للة او صل ل للالبة اإلاجحمػل ل للات ؤمل ل للام ؤلابحيل ل للاسات الحىىىلىحُل ل للة‬ ‫واإلااظعُة الؿشبُلة ‪ ،‬وٍىظلش فلي الشلشق ألاوظلط بللى ألافيلاس ؤلاظلالمُة بةغحباسهلا مػىكلة‬ ‫ؤو معللاغذة للحؿُح لرات اإلاعللححذرة ‪،‬و مللً رللم ثيللىن ألافيللاس هللي البللاسة ألاظاظللُة التللي‬ ‫ثذوس حىلها الححلُالت‪.‬اإلاإخز غلى هلزا اإلالىهج هلى بختزالله اإلاعللمحن وسدهلم بللى مجحملؼ‬ ‫ؾحر مش ص ًمىً فهمه بعهىلة‪ .‬الشاهذ ؤن اإلاذافػحن غً الححذًث ًلشون ؤن فهلم‬ ‫اإلاجحمػللات ؤلاظللالمُة ًمىللً الحىصللل بلُلله غبللر دساظللة الطللشق الذًيُللة الشللػبُة مثللل‬ ‫الط للشق الص للىفُة‪ ،‬وبالح للالي ف للةن ب للشوص ؤو ؤف للىٌ الط للشق الص للىفُة ًىظ للش الُ لله وفل للا له للزا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الحصلىس بةغحباسهلا ثمثلُال للحؿحلرات ؤلاححماغُلة – ؤلاكحصلادًة فللي اإلاجحملؼ ‪ ،‬بحػبحلر آخللش‬ ‫فةن دساظة الطشق الصىفُة جعهم في فهم الحؿُحر ؤلاححماجي(‪.)7‬‬ ‫مللً اإلاللذاسط العللابلة هالحللظ ظللُادة همللط ألافيللاس اإلاعللبلة غللً الحصللىف فىمللا رهشهللا‬ ‫ملً كبللل ان مػظللم هللزه الذساظللات بغحملذت غلللى ثلللاسٍش مللىظف ؤلاداسات ؤلاظللحػماسٍة‬

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‫وهحاب للات اإلاعخش للشكحن ح للىٌ الح للذًً ف للى اإلاجحمػ للات اإلاع لللمة‪ .‬وم للً ر للم واه للد الص للىسة‬ ‫الىمطُللة بللإن ؤلاظللالم ألاصللىلى هللى ثللذًً اإلاجحمػللات الحضللشٍة‪ ،‬بِىمللا صللىفد الط للشق‬ ‫الصىفُة غلى ؤجها ممثلة للظالم الشػبى فى اإلاجحمػات اإلاحلُة الحللُذًة (‪ ،)8‬مشيلة‬ ‫بزلً هزه الصىسة الىمطُة غً الحذًً فى اإلاجحمػات ؤلاظالمُة‪.‬‬ ‫حلُلة ألامش ؤن هزه الثىائُات اإلافشطة ؤغاكد هثحرؤ فهم ؤلاظالم بصفة غامة والطشق‬ ‫الصللىفُة غلللى وحلله ال صللى همللا ؤؾفلللد فللى رات الىكللد الحؿُحللر داخللل ؤلاظللالم وفللى‬ ‫رات الىكد ثفاغالثه اإلاحلُة والػاإلاُة‪.‬‬ ‫اإلاثحر للجذٌ ؤن ثحىٌ الىخا اإلاحػلمة والطبلات الىظط ظِشيل ثحذًا للباحثحن فى‬ ‫مج للاٌ الػل للىم ؤلاححماغُ للة واإلابيُ للة دساظل لاتهم غل للى الحص للىسات الع للالفة ال للزهش‪ .‬فػل للى‬ ‫ظللبُل اإلاثللاٌ فعللشت دساظللة حذًثللة غللً " الطبلللة الىظللط والحصللىف فللى العللىدان "‬ ‫ؤظ للباب الحح للىٌ هح لى الص للىفُة ف للى اإلاى للاطم الحض للشٍة بالصم للات الت للى جػِش للها الطبل للة‬ ‫الىظ ل ل للط ممثل ل ل للة ف ل ل للى ألاصم ل ل للة ؤلاكحص ل ل للادًة ال ل ل للى حاه ل ل للا ؾُ ل ل للاب الحشٍ ل ل للات العُاظل ل للُة‬ ‫والحظُمُللة(‪ . )9‬غلللى الللشؾم مللً وحاهللة وؤهمُللة هللزا الحفعللحر بال ؤهلله ؾحللر وللاف لححلُللل‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الىثحر مً ؤظباب وهحائج الحؿُحر والححىٌ فى الطشق الصلىفُة‪ ،‬هملا ٌؿفلل ثماملا مشوهلة‬ ‫الطللشق للحىُللف مللؼ معللحجذات الػصللش للذسحللة التللى حػلتهللا حاربللة للشلشائح الحضللشٍة‬ ‫اإلاحػلم للة‪ ،‬وم للً ر للم بهحلاله للا ال للى اإلاجحمػ للات الؿشبُ للة الت للى ثج للاوصت ثل للً ألاصم للات الت للى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫جػحبرها الذساظة ظببا فى ثحىٌ الطبلة الىظط للحصىف‪.‬‬ ‫واك ل للؼ ألام ل للش ؤن ظ ل للاهشة ؤلاحُ ل للاء الص ل للىفي وبص ل للفة خاص ل للة وظ ل للط اإلاحػلم ل للحن والىخ ل للا‬ ‫الىظل ل للط الػلماهُل ل للة‪ ،‬ثبل ل للرص الحح ل ل للذي ال ل ل للزي ًىاحل ل لله الىظشٍل ل للات الىالظ ل ل للُىة للػلل ل للىم‬ ‫ؤلاححماغُة‪ ،‬والتي واهد ثشي الحصىف ظاهشة آًلة للعللى هخُجلة لػملُلات الححلذًث‬ ‫والحػلُم‪ .‬لىلً اإلالذهش ؤن هلزا ؤلاحُلاء ثلم بىاظلطة الىخلا اإلاحػلملة و الللىي الحذًثلة‬ ‫في اإلاجحمػات ؤلاظالمُة‪ .‬لزلً ثلشي الىسكلة ضلشوة ثبنلي ؤطلش هظشٍلة ومفاهُمُلة حذًلذة‬ ‫لفهلم مثلل هللزه الظلاهشة ‪ ،‬وفلي رات الىكللد ؤن هضلؼ فلي ؤلاغحبللاس غملُلات الحفاغلل بللحن‬ ‫البِئل للة اإلاحلُل للة والػ ل لالم غىل للذ دساظل للخىا للحصل للىف الن مثل للل هل للزا الحفاغل للل بل للحن اإلاحلل للي‬ ‫والػالمي ٌػني ؤن هىالً غىامل مخحلفة وهحائج مخحلفة ثجذس مالحظتها‪.‬‬

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‫فم ل للً ؤواخ ل للش الل ل للشن الػش ل للشًٍ وب ل للىاهحر اللل ل لشن الىاح ل للذ والػش ل للشًٍ ًلح ل للظ اإلاهحمل ل لىن‬ ‫بالحصىف والطشق الصلىفُة ؤن هىاللً ثحلىالت ثإخلز مجشاهلا وظلط الطلشق الصلىفُة‬ ‫الحللُذًللة فللي الع لىدان همللا فللي مجحمػ للات بظللالمُة ؤخللشي ممارلللة ‪ ،‬وان هللزا الحح للىٌ‬ ‫الًمى للً وصل للفه بإهل لله ؤصل للىلي ‪ .‬ؤبل للشص مالمل للح هل للزا الحجذًل للذ اهل لله لل للِغ لذًل لله ؤي ثىحل لله‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ظُاس ل ل ي واضل للح بل للل ؤهثل للر بػ ل لذا غل للً الذولل للة ‪ً ،‬شهل للض بالظل للاط غل ل لى ثجذًل للذ الطاكل للات‬ ‫الشوحاهُل للة وبحُائهل للا ‪ ،‬همل للا ًىمل للى بصل للىسة مخعل للاسغة وٍشثى للض بش لليل هبحل للر غل ل لى الىخل للا‬ ‫والطبل للات الىظل للط رات الحػل للُم الػل للالي واإلاهىُل للحن اإلاحت للرفُحن‪ .‬وفل للي اإلا للذن الحضل للشٍة‬ ‫َ‬ ‫والتللي واهللد حصللشٍا للػلماهُللة او للحشوللات ألاصللىلُة‪ ،‬هللزه الطللشق مىفححللة ومحىاصللة‬ ‫م للؼ الػ للالم هج للضء م للً اإلاىظىم للة اإلاذهُ للة الػاإلاُ للة (‪ .)9‬همث للاٌ غ للً ه للزا الحص للىف رو‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الحىحلله الحضللشي الػللالمي اإلاحإظللغ بشلليل ؤهثللر لُبرالُللة وؤكللل جشللذدا‪ ،‬ثللإجي الطشٍلللة‬ ‫البرهاهُة في العىدان هىمىرج للطشق الصىفُة الػابشة لللىمُات حُث ثضم ؤغضاء‬ ‫ٌ‬ ‫مً حيعُات مخحلفة ومحلُا ملً ؤهثلر الفئلات ثحلذًثإ اللى حاهلا ؤوشلطتها ؤلاححماغُلة‬ ‫وؤلاكحص ل للادًة والثلافُ ل للة ‪ً .‬مار ل للل ح ل للىن ف ل للىٌ ب ل للحن الحح ل للىالت الت ل للي ثح ل للذذ للط ل للشق‬ ‫الصللىفُة اإلاػاصللشة باإلصللالحات الذًيُللة وبالححذًللذ الحشهللة البروجعللحاهُة فللي الذًاهللة‬ ‫اإلاعُحُةوالتي ًطلم غلحها اظم ‪.)10(New Anglican‬‬

‫ثاهيا ‪ :‬التعريف بالطريلت محل الدراست‬ ‫الطريلت البرهاهيت‪:‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الطشٍل للة البرهاهُ للة الذظ للىكُة الش للارلُة جػ للذ بمح للذادا لش للهش اإلا للذاسط الش للارلُة الت للي‬ ‫وح للذت غل لى ً للذ الع للُذ ؤل للي الحع للً الش للارلي ‪ .‬ثحػ للذد الشواً للات ح للىٌ هُفُ للة بهحل للاٌ‬ ‫الطشٍلللة ال لى العللىدان ومللً رللم ظللىدهتها غل لى ًللذ الشللُخ محمللذ غثمللان غبللذو‪ ،‬فحللزهش‬ ‫احللذي الشواًللات ؤجهللا دخلللد للعللىدان غللً طشٍللم اإلاؿللشب بىاظللطة العللُذ احمللذ صسوق‬ ‫الللزي ؤخللزها مللً العللُذ ؤلللي اإلاىاهللا الش لارلي حفُللذ العللُذ ؤلللي الحعللً‪ .‬وجشللحر هللزه‬ ‫الشواًة بلى ؤن العُذ ؤلي اإلاىاها الشارلي هى الزي حمؼ بحن ؤوساد العُذًً ببشاهُم‬ ‫الذظللىقي والعللُذ ؤلللي الحعللً الشللارلي‪ .‬وبالحللالي ٌػللذ الشللُخ ؤلللي اإلاىاهللا هللى ؤوٌ مللً‬

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‫سفللؼ لللىاء الطشٍلللة اإلامضوحللة "الطشٍلللة الذظللىكُة الشللارلُة " ‪ .‬وٍللزهش ؤن العللُذ احمللذ‬ ‫صسوق كلذ وشلش الطشٍللة فلي غلذة مىلاطم فلي العلىدان واخلز غىله العلُذ ؤللي دهاهلة‪ .‬ومللً‬ ‫رللم الشللُخ بدسَللغ ود ألاسبللاب‪ ،‬ومى له بل لى الحللاج فضللل‪ ،‬وهللى حللذ الشللُخ محمللذ غثمللان‬ ‫غبللذو‪ .‬ؤمللا الطشٍللم الثللاوي الللزي اهحللللد بلله الطشٍلللة بلللى العللىدان فهللى مللً مصللش غبللر‬ ‫وادي حلفل للا‪ ،‬حُ ل للث غشفل للد هىالل للً باظل للم الطشٍل ل للة البرهامُل للة بىاظل للطة الشل للُخ غب ل للذ‬ ‫الشحمً بخًُ(‪ .)11‬وفي هزا ؤلاطاس ثزهش بػالا الشواًات الشفاهُة ؤن هىالً هضاغا ثم‬ ‫بحن الشُخ غبذ الشحمً بخًُ والشُخ محمذ غثمان غبذو حىٌ مشُخة الطشٍلة وؤن‬ ‫هللزا الجلزاع وصللل الللى محللاهم العللىدان آهللزان وفللي الجهاًللة آلللد الطشٍلللة للشللُخ محمللذ‬ ‫غثمان غبذو‪.‬‬ ‫ًبللذو مللً الصللػىبة بميللان بًجللاد مػلىمللات غلً العللحرة الزاثُللة للشللُخ محمللذ غثمللان‬ ‫غبذو غذا بػالا اإلاصادس الللُلة اإلاحححزة‪ ،‬واضػحن فلي الاغحبلاس اللذاظلة التلي غلادة ملا‬ ‫ثضللف غل لى ش للُىل الطللشق الص للىفُة‪ .‬ول للذ الشللُخ محم للذ غثم للان غبللذو بلشٍ للة مج لشاب‬ ‫بىادي حلفا بشماٌ العىدان ‪ 1902،‬ووشإ بها وثللي جػلُمه في ال لىة‪ ،‬ومً رم اهحلل‬ ‫بلى اإلاذاسط ألاولُة بجبل ؤولُلاء بللى ؤن ؤثلم العلىة الثاهُلة‪ ،‬وملً رلم ثلشن الذساظلة لجهلا‬ ‫لم ثشض ي طمىحه الذًني‪ ،‬هما دسط الفله فى ود مذوي ولػذها واصل دساظحه الذًيُلة‬ ‫في مسجذ ال شطىم الىبحر‪.‬‬ ‫غىلذما صللاس غمللشه غشللش ظلىىات ؤرن للله خاللله بلذخىٌ الطشٍللة الذظللىكُة‪ .‬وحتللى رلللً‬ ‫الحلاسٍخ لللم ًإخللز جػللالُم مػُىللة‪ ،‬بللى ؤن حللاء صائللش ؾشٍللا ؤغملى ًللاٌ بهلله ؤسظللل مللً كبللل‬ ‫العللُذ ببلشاهُم الذظللىقي لحللللحن الشللُخ محمللذ غثمللان ؤوساد وجػللالُم العللُذ الذظللىقي‬ ‫اإلااظ للغ للطشٍل للة البرهاهُ للة ‪ ،‬والحل لا ثحص للل الش للُخ محم للذ غثم للان غب للذو غل لى ؤوساد‬ ‫وهح للا الطشٍل للة م للً حذث لله الت لي حفظته للا بب للان الث للىسة اإلاهذً للة ‪ ،‬وجػ للذ ه للزه ألاوساد ه للي‬ ‫ؤوساد الطشٍلللة اإلاػشوف لة بشلليلها الحللالي‪ .‬فللي ثطللىس الحللم ومللً خللالٌ سئٍللة ثىللشست إلاللذة‬ ‫ؤسلػ للة ؤً للام طل للا م للً الش للُخ بحُ للاء الطشٍل للة الذظ للىكُة ولى للً وإلا للذة ش للهشًٍ سف للالا‬ ‫الش للُخ هل للزه اإلاهمل للة بلل للى ؤن ح للاءه ألامل للش بصل للىسة صل للُة م للً ؤلامل للام الحع ل لحن ليش للش‬ ‫الطشٍلللة الذظللىكُة‪ ،‬ومللً رللم وافللم الشللُخ مللؼ بػللالا الضللماهات ؤبشصهللا ؤن ؤثباغلله ال‬ ‫ًصحرون دساوَش وال ًححاحىن لالوسحاب مً الحُاة الػامة(‪. )12‬‬

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‫مً وادي حلفا بهحلل الشُخ بلى مذًىلة غطبلرة حُلث اظلحلش بهلا لفتلرة ملً اللضمً ومجهلا‬ ‫بذا وشش طشٍلحه حُث واهد غطبلرة آهلزان مشهلضا لحجمػلات الػلاملحن وفلي غطبلرة غملل‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ف للي بُ للؼ الجبى للة هم للا امحل للً مخب لرا ف للى ثل للً اإلاذًى للة والحل للا مص للىػا للمُ للاه الؿاصٍ للة ف للي‬ ‫بىسجعىدان‪.‬‬ ‫فللي مطلللؼ ألاسلػُىللات حللاء الشللُخ محمللذ غثمللان لل شطللىم واظللحلش بهللا‪ ،‬ومللً ال شطللىم‬ ‫بظل للحطاع ؤن ًجحل للزب بلُل لله الىثحل للر مل للً اإلاشٍل للذًً‪ ،‬و بهل للا ؤظل للغ طشٍلحل لله ال اصل للة وهل للي‬ ‫الطشٍلة البرهاهُة الذظلىكُة الشلارلُة‪ .‬ومىلز رللً الحلحن ؤصلبحد ال شطلىم هلي اإلاللش‬ ‫الشئِس ي للطشٍلة‪ ،‬ومجها اهخششت بلى مػظم ؤهحاء العىدان‪ ،‬ومً رلم ل لاسج العلىدان‪،‬‬ ‫وهما في ثلً الفترة ؤصبح سئِغ اإلاجلغ الصىفي بالعىدان‪.‬‬ ‫م للً خ لالٌ ث للشدد الش للُخ محم للذ غثم للان غب للذو غل للى مص للش والل للاهشة لضٍ للاسة مل للام الع للُذ‬ ‫الذظ للىقي وؤولُ للاء هللا الص للالححن بمص للش ‪ ،‬اظ للحطاع ؤن ًج للزب بلُ لله ؤغ للذادا هبح للرة م للً‬ ‫اإلاصللشٍحن خاصللة بػللذ الف لشاؽ الشو للي الللزي ؤغلللا هىعللة ‪ ،1967‬واهخشللشت دغىثلله فللي‬ ‫ؤوظا الشباب ‪ ،‬هلزا ألاملش شليل ثحلذًا وصلذمة للطلشق الصلىفُة الحللُذًلة بمصلش ‪،‬‬ ‫بر ؤن الطشٍلل للة لوٌ مل للشة ‪ ،‬ثشمل للض بل ل لى ؤلاظل للحلاللُة العل للىداهُة‪ .‬همل للا ٌػنل للي ؤن مشهضٍل للة‬ ‫وظ للُطشة وكذظ للُة الط للشق الص للىفُة اإلاص للشٍة ك للذ ض للػفد‪ .‬وف للي ه للزا ؤلاط للاس ًمى للً ؤن‬ ‫هفهل للم هجل للىم وثىفحل للر اإلاجلل للغ ألاغلل للى للطل للشق الصل للىفُة فل للي مصل للش للطشٍلل للة البرهاهُل للة‬ ‫وللشللُخ محمللذ غثمللان غبللذو البرهللاوي‪ ،‬بر ؤصللذس ك لشاسا فللي الػللام ‪ 1967‬بحظللش وشللا‬ ‫هزه الطشٍلة مً مصش وببطالن بدغاءات شلُخها ‪ ،‬هملا حلذد ألاصهلش الشلشٍف ؤهثلر ملً‬ ‫مل للشة ‪ 1994‬مىكف ل لله مل للً الطشٍل ل للة البرهاهُل للة‪ ،‬حُ ل للث ؤص ل للذست ؤلاداسة الػام ل للة للبح ل للىذ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫والح للإلُف بمجمل للؼ البحل للىذ ؤلاظ للالمُة بُاهل للا ؤهل للذت فُل لله وك للىع الطشٍلل للة البرهاهُل للة فل للي‬ ‫اخطاء غلذًة وجػبذًة وظلىهُة كاثلله ‪ ،‬هملا كاللد اللجىلة ؤن هحلاب (( ثبرئله الزملة ))‬ ‫وهللي ؤحللذي مالفللات الشللُخ حهللذم ألافيللاس ألاظاظللُة فللي الشلشَػة ؤلاظللالمُة وكالللد للللذ‬ ‫ثجاوصت ألاخطاء بلى حذ اغحباسها طشٍلة ؾحلر بظلالمُة‪ .‬بىلاء غللى ثللً الحللاسٍش ؤصلذست‬ ‫ً‬ ‫وصاسة الذاخلُة اإلاصشٍة كلشاسا بمصلادسة الىحلاب وحظلش وشلشه وحظلش وشلا الطشٍللة فلى‬ ‫مصش(‪.)13‬‬

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‫ً‬ ‫ثمح للز الش للُخ محم للذ غثم للان غب للذو بياسٍضم للا كىٍ للة وك للذم طشٍل للة مىظم للة مػحم للذا غل للى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤظالُا غصشٍة في ؤلاكىاع والحجىُذ ومػبرا غً سئٍة سوحُة ومجذدة(‪.)14‬‬ ‫بػذ وفاة ماظغ الطشٍلة ‪ 1983‬خلفه ببىه ألاهبر الشُخ ببشاهُم وهىا ثجذس ؤلاشاسة‬ ‫بل لى ؤن اغحمللاد الىسارللة هإظللاط لل الفللة صللاس مللً ثلالُللذ الطللشق الصللىفُة فللي الػللالم‬ ‫ؤلاظالمي فى العىدان بصفة خاصة‪.‬‬ ‫ول للذ الش للُخ ببل لشاهُم ب للىادي حلف للا ‪ 1938‬ر للم اهحل للل م للؼ وال للذه لل شط للىم‪ ،‬حُ للث ثللل ل‬ ‫ً‬ ‫جػلُمله بهللا بللى ؤن هللاٌ شللهادة اإلاحاظللبة مللً اإلاػهللذ الفنللي ( حامػللة العللىدان حالُللا) رللم‬ ‫ً‬ ‫غم للل مىظف للا ببى للً الع للىدان‪ .‬ولػ للذ وف للاة وال للذه‪ ،‬بظ للحلاٌ م للً الػم للل وثف للشؽ لش لاون‬ ‫الطشٍللة وثشبُلة اإلاشٍللذًً وبسشلادهم‪ .‬الجللذًش باللزهش ؤن الشللُخ ببلشاهُم بلللى حاهلا وىهلله‬ ‫شللُخ الطشٍلللة وللان ٌػللذ مللً سحللاٌ ألاغمللاٌ حُللث بمحلللً بػللالا اإلاخللابض واإلا لضاسع‪ .‬وم للً‬ ‫اإلاالحللظ ؤن هللزا ألامللش ؤظللهم فللي دغللم اكحصللادًات الطشٍلللة‪ ،‬همللا شللهذت الطشٍلللة فللي‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫غهذه ثىظػا هبحرا واهخششت في مػظم ؤهحاء الػالم ؤًضا‪ .‬ؤحذذ هللة هىغُة فلي ملىهج‬ ‫الطشٍللة ‪ ،‬وألاهلم ؤهله بلاسن بلإن ًيلىن للطشٍللة حىلاس ظُاسل ي‪ ،‬وهلى ملاثمش حللضب وادي‬ ‫الىُل(‪.)15‬‬ ‫ثىفي الشُخ ببشاهُم في الػام ‪2003‬م وثمد مباٌػة هجله الطبِا الشاب محمذ‬ ‫والزي دسط بةحذي الجامػات ألاإلااهُة‪ ،‬وهى الشُخ الحالي للطشٍلة البرهاهُة‪.‬‬ ‫ثالثا‪ :‬جحىل الطرق الصىفيت من اإلاحليت للعاإلايت ‪:‬ألاسباب والملتائج‪:‬‬ ‫بهخشش الحصىف فى العىىات الاخحرة بصىسة هبحرة فى اإلاجحمػات الؿشبُة خاصة فى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤوسبا وؤمشٍيا الشمالُة هماهى الحاٌ فى الػالم ؤلاظالمي ‪ ،‬غاهعا فى بػالا حىاهبه‬ ‫بحُاء الشوحاهُات هبذًل لتشياٌ ألاخشي مً الاظالم خاصة ؤلاظالم العُاس ى ‪ ،‬ما‬ ‫ًىشف فى رات الىكد غذدا مً اللضاًا اإلاحػللة بذًىامُات الحىثش بحن غملُات‬ ‫غىإلاة الادًان مً حهة واللُم الؿشبُة اإلاحلُة مً حهة ؤخشي‪ ،‬خاصة غىذ ثلً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الجماغات الصىفُة اإلاهاحشة مً ؤماهجها الاصلُة لخشيل طشكا غابشة لللىمُات‪.‬‬ ‫ًمىً ؤن وػضو ثحىٌ الطشق الصىفُة مً اإلاحلُة للػاإلاُة لػذة ؤظباب‪:‬‬

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‫‪-1‬التطىر التكملىلىجى الكبير فى وسائل ؤلاجصال والتىاصل‪ .‬فى واكؼ ألامش بن ظاهشة‬ ‫ألادًان الػابشة للحذود ولللىمُات لِعد بظاهشة حذًذة (‪ ،)16‬لىً الجذًذ هى ؤن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ما ٌػشف بصطالحا بالػىإلاة هألُة لحذفم العلؼ ‪ ،‬ال ذمات‪ ،‬الثلافة والبشش غبر‬ ‫الحذود ؤظهم فى حػل غملُة الحذفم جعحر بصىسة ؤهثر هثافة غما واهد غلُه مً‬ ‫كبل‪ .‬فى هزا ؤلاطاس ؤثُحد الفش للطشق الصىفُة لطباغة ووشش مالفاتها وثذسَعها‬ ‫للمجحمػات الؿشبُة غبر وظائل ؤلاثصاٌ الحذًثة واإلهترهد والىظائل العمػُة‬ ‫والبصشٍة ‪ ،‬ظهل هزا ألامش وشش الحػالُم الصىفُة‪ ،‬مما مػه ًمىً اللىٌ بإن الػىإلاة‬ ‫ؤظححذرد ظىكا لتدًان ومً رم ؤصبحد اإلاىحىحات الذًُيُة فى الحذاوٌ‪ ،‬وبالحالى لم‬ ‫جػذ ثحىكف غً حذودها بل ؤصبحد ألادًان ثىفصل غً رلافاتها وؤكالُمها ألاصلُة‪.‬‬ ‫فى رات العُاق ؤثاس ‪ -‬الحضىس اإلاىثف للطشق الصىفُة غلى ؤلاهترهد ‪-‬‬ ‫للمجحمػات الؿشبُة الفشصة للحػشف غلى الصىفُة وؤفياسها خاصة ما ٌػشف بػلم‬ ‫الباطً والتى صىفد – هما رهشها مً كبل ‪ -‬بال اسحة غلى جػالُم ؤلاظالم ووحهد‬ ‫بششاظة مً كبل الحشوات ألاصىلُة ‪ٌ ،‬شهذ غلى رلً ؤن هحابات ببً غشل وؤشػاس‬ ‫ً‬ ‫حالٌ الذًً الشوم جػذ مً ؤهثر الىحا مبُػا فى الؿشب ‪ .‬والى حاها رلً شهذ‬ ‫الػالم بوػلاد غذة ماثمشات دولُة حىٌ ببً غشل ‪ -‬اإلاػشف بالشُخ ألاهبر‬ ‫للمحصىفة ‪ -‬و حىٌ حُاثه وثإرحره غلى الؿشب‪ ،‬وآخشها ؤلاححفاٌ الىبحر بةبً غشل فى‬ ‫مصش فى دٌعمبر مً الػام ‪ .)17( 2009‬و اححفلد مػظم الذوٌ الؿشبُة فى ‪/30‬‬ ‫ظبحمبر مً الػام ‪ 2007‬بالػام الػالمى للشاغش واإلاىظُل الصىفى الفاسس ى حالٌ‬ ‫الذًً الشوم "‪ "International Year of Rumi‬بمىاظبة غُذ مىلذه الثماهمائة‪ .‬وهىا‬ ‫ًمىىىا ؤن همارل بحن ثإرحر الحىىىلىحُا غلى ألافياس والطشق الصىفُة بحإرحر الطباغة‬ ‫غلى حشوات ؤلاصالس الذًنى فى الؿشب ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -2‬الاجرة للغرب وباإلالابل السياحت الى ال رق والعالم ؤلاسالمى ‪ ،‬لظباب‬ ‫مخحلفة شهذ الػالم حشهة ثىلل وهجشة مً الذوٌ الىامُة خاصة الػالم ؤلاظالم‬ ‫هحى ؤوسبا والؿشب‪ ،‬ومً رم هلل اإلاهاحشون ضمً ما هللىا ألافياس الصىفُة والتى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الكد كبىال وصذي فى الؿشب‪ .‬الى حاها الهجشة ظمحد العُاحة للششق مً كبل‬ ‫الؿشبُحن بالحػشف غلى الحصىف‪ .‬غلُه ًمىً اللىٌ بإن الهجشة للؿشب والعُاحة‬

‫‪648‬‬

‫للششق فححد اإلاجاٌ للحػاسف بحن الثلافات ومحصلتها ؤن الىثحر مً الؿشبُحن‬ ‫بهخشطىا فى ظلً الحصىف‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -3‬مما ل شك فيه أن الحياة اإلااد ت الى جاهب همط الفرداهيت للمجتمعاث الغربيت‬ ‫الشؤظمالُة الحذًثة مضاف الُه ضػف الحضامً الاححماجى واللُم الشوحُة الذًيُة‬ ‫واإلاحجزسة فى الحلالُذ اإلاعُحُة كذ ؤظهم ضمً غىامل ؤخشي فى دفؼ الؿشبُحن‪،‬‬ ‫خاصة ششٍحة الشباب‪ ،‬بلى البحث غً ؤحىبة الظئلة حىهشٍة حىٌ ألاهما واللُم‬ ‫الحُاثُة للمجحمػات ؾحر الؿشبُة‪ ،‬خاصة اإلاجحمػات الششكُة وما ًمحزها مً ثلالُذ‬ ‫ومىسورات سوحاهُة ‪-‬آملُحن فى مىاصهة ومضاوحة للحشٍات ؤلاححماغُة وؤلاكحصادًة‬ ‫وؤلاشباع الشوحاو ‪ ،‬والتى وحذوها فى الحصىف‪ ،‬والتى جعحجُا لحاحة سوحاهُة فى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫غالم ٌشهذ ضُاغا ثذسٍجُا لللُم‪ ،‬خاصة الئلئً الشباب الزًً ًطالبىن بشوحاهُة‬ ‫وىهُة إلغادة الحىاصن للمجحمػات الؿشبُة اإلاادًة ‪ ،‬بذمج سوحاهُة التراذ ؤلاظالم مؼ‬ ‫التراذ اإلاادي الػلالو (‪.)18‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫‪ -4‬الليادث ال ابت والىافدون الجدد ‪ ،‬ماخشا وهىخُجة للححىالت اإلاجحمػُة التى‬ ‫مش بها الػالم ؤلاظالم ظهشت كُادات شابة فى الطشق الصىفُة غلى دسحة غالُة مً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الحػلُم اإلاذو والثلافة الحذًثة خالفا للضغامات الحلُلذًة التى واهد ثمحز الطشق‬ ‫الصىفُة فى اإلااض ى‪ .‬هزه اللُادات الشابة بفضل ما ثىفش لها مً ثلىُات ثىاصل‬ ‫وثىلل وبثصاٌ ؤظحطاغد ؤن ثىلل ؤفياسها الذًيُة خاسج حذود ثىاحذها الجؿشافى‬ ‫ومً رم بظحلطاب مشٍذًحن وؤثباع حذد مً رلافات وبِئات مخحلفة‪ ،‬هما بظحطاغد‬ ‫ؤن ثحىٌ طشكها الى طشق غابشة لللىمُات‪ .‬هزا ألامش ؤظهم فى بشوص ما ٌػشف بالىافذًً‬ ‫الجذد داخل هزه الطشق‪ ،‬ؤي ظمح بذخىٌ ؤثباع مً حيعُات ورلافات مخحلفة‪.‬‬ ‫هاالء اللادمىن مً بِئات مخحلفة وبما ًمحليىن مً حشٍات دًيُة وكذسات مالُة‬ ‫وبكحصادًة وبيُات ثىىلىحُة غلى دسحة هبحرة مً الحلذم (‪ )19‬شيلىا بضافة حذًذة‬ ‫لهزه الطشق‪ .‬ومً رم ًمىىىا الحذًث غً جؿُحرات و ثحىالت همُة وهىغُة طشؤت غلى‬ ‫الطشق الصىفُة الحللُذًة ؤرشت بشيل هبحر غلى فىشها ومماسظتها‪.‬‬ ‫‪ - 5‬السياست العاإلايت ومكافحت التطرف ؤلاسالمى ‪ ،‬صىس ؤلاظالم فى بطاس الػالكات‬ ‫الذولُة – ثحد ضؿط ؤلاسهاب ؤلاصىلى ‪ -‬هإحذ اإلاػىكات الشئِعُة لحطىس الفىش‬

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‫الذًملشاط اللبحرالى ‪ ،‬وهىىع مً اإلاػحلذات التى ثحلاطؼ مؼ الػالم الحذًث وؾحر‬ ‫اإلايسجمة مؼ الػلىم والحلالُذ ؤلاوعاهُة‪.‬‬ ‫حلُلة ألامش ؤن هزه اللضاًا ثطىست ؤهثر فى فهم الؿشبُحن فى ملابل ألاصىات‬ ‫اإلاحىاصهة التى واهد ثذغى للححلُم فى بطاس ؤهثر حُادًة‪ .‬ومىز اجهُاس ؤلاثحاد العىفُتى‬ ‫صاس ؤلاظالم مهذدا للذًملشاطُة والشؤظمالُة ‪ ،‬وهمػىق ؤظاس ى لػىإلاة كُم الحذارة‪.‬‬ ‫محصلة ما ظبم ؤن ؤلاظالم ؤصبح بحذي اللىي العُاظُة اإلاهمة ‪ -‬الزي ٌػشف‬ ‫هذًً مهاحش‪ -‬فى الؿشب وفى رات الىكد مً ؤهثر مصادس اإلاشاول فى اإلاجحمػات‬ ‫الؿشبُة حُث ثم سبط ؤلاظالم باإلسهاب ‪ .‬لػل ؤهثر اللضاًا التى واهد جشؿل صاوعي‬ ‫اللشاس فى الؿشب هى هل ٌعحطُؼ ؤلاظالم ان ًحىُف مؼ اللُم الؿشبُة الػاإلاُة خاصة‬ ‫وظط اإلاعلمحن اإلاهاحشٍحن‪.‬‬ ‫الشاهذ ؤن الذوٌ الؿشبُة لم ًىً ؤمامها ظىي خُاسٍحن للحػامل مؼ ؤلاظالم ‪:‬‬ ‫‪ - 1‬ؤلاظالم هذًً بسهال ومً رم بكصاءه‪.‬‬ ‫‪ - 2‬الحػامل مؼ ؤلاظالم هجضء مً الحػذدًة الثلافُة التى بغحمذتها ومً رم‬ ‫بدماج اإلاعلمحن فى اإلااظعات الحيىمُة واإلاجحمؼ ‪.‬‬ ‫فى ولحا الحالححن لم ًىً ألامش مً العهىلة بميان‪ ،‬وٍظهش رلً مً خالٌ جػامل‬ ‫اإلااظعات اإلاػىُة بهزا ألامش‪ ،‬وغلى سؤظها ثلً اإلاػىُة بلضاًا اإلاهاحشٍحن وبدماحهم فى‬ ‫اإلاجحمػات الؿشبُة‪ .‬لػل هزا ألامش ًبرص كضاًا ؤخشي مهمة ثحػلم بالثلافة فى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫اإلاجحمػات الؿشبُة هفعها‪ .‬فالشاهذ ان اإلاجحمػات الؿشبُة خصىصا ألاوسبُة ثمش‬ ‫بمشحلة حذًذة مً الحيىًٍ وهى مشحلة ما بػذ الذولة الىطىُة ‪Post National Era‬‬ ‫ظاغُة الى ثإظِغ هُاهات بكلُمُة " والىمىرج هىا ؤلاثحاد ألاوسل "‪ ،‬ألامش الزي دفػها‬ ‫إلاجابهة بشياالت مػلذة لػل ؤبشصها كضُة الهىٍة ألاوسبُة‪ .‬وفى هزا ؤلاطاس شيلد‬ ‫ً‬ ‫كضُة ؤلاظالم ‪-‬اإلاشادف ضمىُا للسهاب– ثحذًا بححماغُا ورلافُا هبحرا للذوٌ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫واإلاجحمػات ألاوسبُة ‪ -‬ومً رم ضاغفد مً اإلاشىالت اإلاىحىدة ظلفا غلُه‪ .‬صاست‬ ‫الخعائالت ثحمحىس حىٌ ماهُة الحذود العُاظُة والثلافُة التى ًمىً مً خاللها‬ ‫كبىٌ ؤلاظالم واإلاعلمحن ومً رم بدماحهم فى اإلاجحمػات الؿشبُة ‪ ،‬ولػل العاالحن‬ ‫الشئِعُحن هىا‪ :‬هل الهىٍة ألاوسبُة هفعها لها اللذسة غلى بظخُػاب اليل ومً رم‬

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‫ً‬ ‫ثصبح الثلافة ؤلاظالمُة حضء مجها ‪ ،‬وهُف ًمىً ثحلُلها واكػُا؟ ولػل العااٌ‬ ‫آلاخش ألاغمم ًحػلم بماهُة الششو التى جشػش الجماغات اإلاىحىدة بإجها ؤوسبُة‬ ‫ؤوؾحر ؤوسبُة ‪ ،‬وما هى الحذود الثلافُة الفاصلة بُجها ؟ فى واكؼ الامش هزه ألاظئلة‬ ‫ثيىن مششوغة فى حالة ما سؾبد الذوٌ ألاوسبُة والؿشبُة فى مشاسهة آلاخشٍحن لها فى‬ ‫هىٍتها ‪ ،‬هما ًظهش لىا بىضىس الحذاخل والحػلُذات بحن اللُم الثلافُة همفهىم‬ ‫وألاظئلة الػملُة الفىُة حىٌ الػالكة بحن الػلماهُة والذًً (‪.)20‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫هخلص مما ظبم بلى ان طبُػة الحىاحذ ؤلاظالم فى الؿشب شهذت ثحىال ‪ ،‬فمً‬ ‫مجشد غماٌ مهاحشًٍ باحثحن غً فش غمل وبكامة ماكحة ثحىٌ اإلاعلمىن هىالً‬ ‫بلى حضء مً الترهُبة اإلاجحمػُة العياهُة ‪ ،‬ومً رم ًمىً اللىٌ بإجهم ثحىلىا مً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫حالُة معلمة بلى ؤكلُة معلمة ‪ ،‬وؤصبح بذحهُا الحذًث غً بذاًة مإظعة ؤلاظالم فى‬ ‫ؤوسبا ‪.‬‬ ‫مً حاها آخش برا واهد العُاظات الشظمُة الؿشبُة جػىغ ثىثش دًىامُات ظُاظات‬ ‫ؤلاهذماج الثلافى اللعشي‪ ،‬فةن هىالً شىال آخش إلظحجابة الجماهحر واإلاجحمؼ ألاوسل‬ ‫ؤلاظتهالو ‪ -‬التى بذؤت ثإخز مجشاها وظط الؿشبُحن ‪ -‬واإلاحمثلة فى بهفحاحها غلى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الشوحاهُات الششكُة والحشوات الباطىُة اإلابيُة غلى حىمة الششق خصىصا‬ ‫الحصىف ؤلاظالمي‪ .‬وفى هزا ؤلاطاس ؤشاست بػالا الذساظات الى بهخشاس الجماغات‬ ‫الصىفُة وظط اإلاجحمػات ألاوسبُة والؿشبُة مىز الثماهِىات مً اللشن اإلااض ى (‪،)21‬‬ ‫هزا الىمىرج اللائم غلى ثبادٌ وبهحاج الثلافات الزي حزب الىثحر مً الششائح‬ ‫اإلاحػلمة والطبلات الىظط فى الؿشب بصطذم بالعُاظات الحيىمُة اإلابيُة غلى‬ ‫الذمج ‪ ،‬هزا ؤلامش ًثحر غذدا مً ألاظئلة ؤلامبحرًلُة حىٌ الػىإلاة الثلافُة‪.‬‬ ‫بػذ ؤحذاذ وثفجحرات الحادي غشش مً ظبحمبر ‪ 2001‬حاءت ؤطشوحات مخحلفة غً‬ ‫الحصىسات العابلة‪ ،‬حُث ثشي ؤن ثلً اإلاشىالت ثححاج لحىضؼ فى بطاس غالمى‬ ‫اظخىادا بلى ؤن غملُة ؤلاكصاء العُاس ى الثحل ؤًة مشيلة ‪ ،‬هما خلصد الى ؤن‬ ‫ؤلاظالم اإلاحذاوٌ فى ؤلاغالم الؿشل هى الىحه العُاس ى للظالم‪ ،‬وؤشاست بلى ؤن‬ ‫الجاها الشو ى ؤلاوعاو والػالمى مً ؤلاظالم مؿُا ومجهىٌ خاصة فى الذوٌ التى‬

‫;‪64‬‬

‫صاوػى اللشاس فحها ؾحر مىحاصون لها ‪ ،‬لزا ظهشت ؤصىات ثىادي بحػمُم الفهم‬ ‫ؤلاًجال لهزا الجاها فى الذساظات والعُاظات ال اسحُة للذوٌ الؿشبُة‪.‬‬ ‫فى ؤلاطاس بشص ؤلاهحمام ألاوادًمى والعُاس ى بالحصىف والطشق الصىفُة فػلذت‬ ‫الىثحر مً اإلااثمشات الذولُة حىٌ الحصىف فى مػظم الذوٌ الؿشبُة ‪ ،‬حُث الًخف‬ ‫ؤن الػالكات بحن ؤلاظالم العُاس ى واإلاحصىفة غلى مش الحاسٍخ محىثشة ‪ ،‬غلُه حاولد‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الذوٌ الؿشبُة ؤلاظحفادة مً الىضؼ لضشب الحُاس ألاصىلى ؤلاظالمي‪ .‬فمثال جػد‬ ‫الىالًات اإلاححذة ألامشٍىُة غلا ؤحذاذ الحادي غشش مً ظبحمبر‪ 2001‬الحشوات‬ ‫ؤلاظالمُة اإلاػحذلة والحشوات الصىفُة‪ ،‬حُث جػد مشاسَؼ حىاس ألادًان‬ ‫والحضاسات معحػُىة بالذساظات ألاوادًمُة وثلاسٍش مشاهض البحىذ حىٌ الحشوات‬ ‫ؤلاظالمُة اإلاحطشفة‪ ،‬ودغد صشاحة بلى محاسبة الػىف والحطشف الذًنى وؤلاسهاب‬ ‫اإلاحمثل فى الحشوات ؤلاظالمُة الجهادًة‪ ،‬وباإلالابل ؤلاكتراب مً ألاصىات اإلاىادًة‬ ‫بالخعامح والحػاٌش العلمى (‪ .)22‬وٍمىً اللىٌ بإن ؤلاظتراثجُحن ألامشٍىُحن الزًً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ًذفػىن غلىا بةثجاه جػضٍض الػالكة مؼ الحشوات اإلاحصىفة ًشون ولشيل متزاًذ ؤن‬ ‫الحشوات الصىفُة وبإفشغها الػاإلاُة هى مً ؤفضل الىظائل إلايافحة ؤلاسهاب بِىما‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الٌعحطُؼ الشظمُىن ألامشٍىُىن ؤن ًلشوا رلً غلىا بعبا فصل الذًً غً الذولة‬ ‫فى الذظحىس ألامشٍي ‪.‬‬

‫إهق ار وجكيف الطرق الصىفيت مع البيئت الغربيت‬ ‫الطريلت البرهاهيت همىذجا‪:‬‬ ‫بػذ ألاصمات الػىُفة التى جػشضد لها الطشٍلة البرهاهُة فى مصش فى العبػُىات مً‬ ‫اللشن اإلااض ى هىخُجة للصذام بحن الطشٍلة البرهاهُة والحيىمة اإلاصشٍة ‪ ،‬والزي‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ًمىً ؤن هفعشه بحماال بإهه ثىافغ بحن كىمُات دوٌ الػالم الثالث وؤلاظالم الػابش‬ ‫لللىمُات الزي ٌػذ مً ؤهبر مهذدات الذولة اللىمُة فحها ‪ ،‬وبالحالى ومىز مىحصف‬ ‫اللشن الػششًٍ شيلد هزه الحشوات ؤلاظالمُة الػابشة لللىمُات ؤهبر ثحذ للذولة ‪-‬‬ ‫وهىا الذولة اإلاصشٍة‪ .‬فى هزا ؤلاطاس ًمىىىا كشاءة مىكف العلطات اإلاصشٍة مً‬

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‫حشهة ؤلاخىان اإلاعلمحن اإلاصشٍة وباإلالابل مىكفها مً الطشٍلة البرهاهُة رات الجزوس‬ ‫العىداهُة ‪ ،‬التى بغحبرت في ؤفياسها ومماسظتها وؤوشحطها ؾحر ميسجمة بل ومحىاكضة‬ ‫مؼ آلُات ضبط الذولة ‪ .‬حلُلة ألامش ؤن ؤلاظالم الػابش لللىمُات بشلُه " العُاس ى‬ ‫والشوحاو " ًلؼ فى بطاس هزا الحىاكالا‪ .‬ومً رم واهد بحذي ؤظباب ثىثش الػالكات‬ ‫بحن الطشٍم البرهاهُة والحيىمة اإلاصشٍة هى صػىبة ظُطشة العلطات اإلاصشٍة غلحها‬ ‫"بما فحها اإلاجلغ ألاغلى للطشق الصىفُة فى مصش " خاصة غىذما ثيىن كُادات هزه‬ ‫الطشق مً خاسج مصش‪.‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ٌشحر اإلاىكؼ ؤلالىترووي للطشٍلة ؤن الطشٍلة ؤوشإت غذدا مً اإلاشاهض والضواًا في ؤوسوبا‬ ‫و ؤمشٍيا الشمالُة هما ٌشحر هفغ اإلاصذس بلى ؤن اإلاشهض الػلالمي لللداسة وَعلمى شليُذة‬ ‫ًلؼ بهامبىسج بإإلااهُا حُث ؤوشإها الشُخ ببشاهُم في الػام ‪ ،1992‬وَػذ بمثابة اإلاشهض‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الشئِس ي في ؤوسوبلا حُلث ثللام فلي هلزا اإلاشهلض الاححفلاالت الذًيُلة محضلمىا الحىلُلة وهملا‬ ‫ثلذم به اإلاحاضشات وثلام لُالي الزهش باهحظام(‪.)23‬‬ ‫غلللى الللشؾم مللً ؤن الجاهللا الشوحللاو والػشفللاو للطشٍلللة البرهاهُللة لللم ًحللذذ للله جؿُحللر‬ ‫هبح للر ‪ ,‬بال ان الطشٍل للة البرهاهُ للة ؤظه للشت ك للذسة غالُ للة غل للى ثىُُل لف هظامه للا ؤلاححم للاجى‬ ‫والحىىىل للىوي ومماسظ للتها وهظشٍته للا العُاظ للُة لحب للذو ؤهث للر بظ للحجابة وثىُف لا م للؼ الثلاف للة‬ ‫الؿشبُلة خاصللة لغضللائها الؿللشبُحن‪ .‬فلى هللزا ؤلاطللاس جشللحر ‪ Klinkhammer Gritt‬الللى ؤن‬ ‫الطشٍل للة البرهاهُ للة ف للى ؤإلااهُ للا والت للى ثحي للىن غض للىٍتها م للً خلفُ لات رات جػل للُم ؤو للادًمي‬ ‫محللذم والتلي بهخشطلد فلى ؤوشلطة سوحاهُلة مخحلفلة كلذ مضحلد بلحن الػىاصلش ؤلاظلالمُة‬ ‫الحللُذًة و غىاصش الحذارة التى حملتها الطبلات الىظط فى الؿشب‪ .‬وفلى رات الىكلد‬ ‫حافظىا غلى غالكة حمُملة وكىٍلة ملؼ اإلاشهلض الشئِسل ى للطشٍللة وشلُخها فلى ال شطلىم ‪،‬‬ ‫ورلً ملاسهة بالىثحر مً الطشق الصىفُة الحللُذًة ؤو فى ملابل ثلً التى ثبيد اللُم‬ ‫الؿشبُة ومً رم ؤفشؾد الحصىف مً ثشاره ؤلاظالم (‪.)24‬‬ ‫ًمىً ثل ُص ؤبشص مظاهش هزا الحىُف فى آلاج ‪:‬‬ ‫ؤ ‪ -‬بظحخذام ؤلاثصاٌ ؤلاغالم اإلابنى غلى الثلافة الؿشبُة‬ ‫ب ‪ -‬ال طاب الػالمى للطشٍلة البرهاهُة‪.‬‬ ‫ت ‪ -‬بكحصادًات الطشٍلة ‪.‬‬

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‫ذ ‪ -‬وضؼ اإلاشؤة ‪.‬‬ ‫ج ‪ -‬الحىاصن بحن ؤلاظالم والحصىف‪.‬‬

‫أ ‪ -‬إستخدام ؤلاجصال ؤلاعالمى اإلابن على الثلافت الغربيت‪:‬‬ ‫ؤهث للر ألاش للُاء مالحظ للة لحىُ للف الطشٍل للة البرهاهُ للة م للؼ البِئ للة الؿشبُ للة ه للى بظ للحخذامها‬ ‫لىظ لائل ؤلاثص للاٌ والحىاص للل اإلاحلذم للة فل لي الؿ للشب ف للى غملُ للات ؤلاسش للاد الص للىفى ووش للش‬ ‫ألاخبل للاس وحل للزب وبهخعل للاب مشٍل للذًً حل للذد للطشٍلل للة الل للى حاه ل للا بظل للحخذامها ؤلاهتره ل للد‬ ‫وىظُلة لحىاصل اإلاشٍذًحن وألاغضاء فُما بُجهم مً خالٌ ؤلاححماغات غبر الشبىة‪.‬‬ ‫محصل لللة مل للا ظل للبم ان الطشٍلل للة البرهاهُل للة ‪ ،‬ومل للً خل للالٌ بظل للحخذامها لحل للذذ وظل للائل‬ ‫ؤلاثصللاٌ الؿشبُللة‪ ،‬كللذ ثمىىللد مللً فللحح كىللىات الحىاصللل بللحن مشٍللذحها فللى مخحلللف دوٌ‬ ‫الػللالم ‪ ،‬ومللً رللم كشبللد اإلاعللافات بُللجهم وبللحن اإلاشهللض الشئِسل ي للطشٍلللة فللى ال شطللىم ‪،‬‬ ‫فللةرا وللان البػللذ الجؿشاف لي ًحُللل دون الحىاصللل الفحزًللاه لػضللىٍتها ‪ ،‬فةهلله مللً خللالٌ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤلاهترهللد مللثال ًللحمىً ألاغض لاء ببعللاطة مللً الحىاصللل مللؼ الطشٍلللة وبسظللاٌ ؤظللئلتهم‬ ‫وبظحفعللاساتهم غبللر البرًللذ ؤلالىتروو ل ‪ ،‬او حتللى الحللىاس واإلاللاثمشات غبللر ‪ Skype‬او م للا‬ ‫ٌػلشف ب ‪ Messenger‬ؤو ؤلاثصللاٌ الهللاثف غبللر الشللبىة الذولُللة للهترهللد ‪ ،‬خاصللة‬ ‫اجه للا محِع للشة لغض للائها ف للى الؿ للشب‪ ،‬مم للا ظِش لليل ؤظاظ لا مفُ للذا لحىحُ للذ الطشٍل للة غب للر‬ ‫خط للى الثلاف للة الؿشبُ للة‪ ،‬و مم للا ك للذ ًي للحج غى لله هم للىرج غ للىلمي خ للا بالطشٍل للة‪ .‬لى للً‬ ‫وباإلالاب للل الًمى للً جػم للُم ه للزا الىض للؼ غل للى الػض للىٍة اإلاحلُ للة للطشٍل للة خاص للة ثل للً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الػضىٍة ألاكل هصِبا مً الحػلُم وألاضػف بكحصادًا‪.‬‬ ‫ب ‪ -‬الخطاب العاإلاي للطريلت البرهاهيت‪:‬‬ ‫بحذي هحلائج ثحلىٌ الطشٍللة البرهاهُلة اللى طشٍللة صلىفُة غلابشة لللىمُلات هلى بهحللاٌ‬ ‫معل للحىي خطابهل للا الفىل للشي ‪،‬الل للذًنى ‪،‬ؤلاححمل للاجى والعُاس ل ل ى مل للً الترهحل للز غلل للى اإلاعل للائل‬ ‫ااإلاحلُة الى مىاكشة دًيُة وغلالهُة لللضاًا التى جشؿل الشؤي الػام الػالمى هلضاًا‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤلاسهللاب ‪ ،‬حلللىق ؤلاوعللان ‪ ،‬ش لاون البِئللة وؾحرهللا مللً اللضللاًا اإلاثللاسة غاإلاُللا‪ .‬الجللذًش‬

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‫ً‬ ‫بال للزهش ؤه لله ف للى رات ؤلاط للاس هظم للد الطشٍل للة البرهاهُ للة م للاثمشا لح للىاس ألادً للان ف للى الػ للام‬ ‫‪ 2006‬بمذًىة هامبىسج بإإلااهُا ثحد شػاس الػلُذة ‪ ،‬الحا والحىحُذ(‪.)25‬‬ ‫ث‪ :‬إكتصاد اث الطريلتالبرهاهيت‪:‬‬ ‫كللذمد الطشٍلللة البرهاهُللة مضللمىها بكحصللادًا حذًللذا إلاللا ٌػللشف بةكحصللادًات الحللذًً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ًجعللذ ثحللىال فللي اإلاىظىمللة الصللىفُة الٌشللابه بالضللشوسة همللىرج الطللشق الصللىفُة فللى‬ ‫الضهل للذ ف ل للي الل للذهُا وؤلاغ ل لشا غجهل للا‪ ،‬بل للل ٌػم ل للل بىض ل للىس غلل للى ألاخل للز بإظ ل للباب ال ل للذهُا‬ ‫وؤلاكباٌ غلحها‪ .‬ولػلها جػذ هللة هىغُة في ظاهشة الحذًً الحذًث مً حُث الشؾبلة فلي‬ ‫ً‬ ‫الحصالح مؼ الؿني والثروة ‪ ،‬وهى ثاسٍخُا ؤشبه بالحشهة البروجعحاهخُة‪ .‬مً حاها آخش‬ ‫ٌػى للغ ه للزا الىم للىج الػللُ للة الحجاسٍ للة لتغض للاء وثى للىع حيع للُاتهم هم للا ٌػى للغ ثىظ للؼ‬ ‫الطشٍلة وفػالُتها ‪.‬‬ ‫حت للى وف للاة ماظ للغ الطشٍل للة ل للم ًى للً الش للُخ ًمل للً ظ للىي مجزل لله الي للائً ب للال شطىم ‪،‬‬ ‫وواه للد ألام للىس اإلاالُ للة للمشه للض الشئِسل ل ي ب للال شطىم ث للذاس بىاظ للطة ل ل ص ً للذجي ش للُخ‬ ‫حعللً ظللُذ‪ ،‬ووللان ميلفلا بللزلً مىللز الػللام ‪ .1930‬ومىللز رلللً الحللاسٍخ وحتللى ألاسلػُىللات‬ ‫ل للم ًحإظ للغ هظ للام م للالي للطشٍل للة لن الػض للىٍة واه للد كلُل للة حُ للث و للان ًل للذس غ للذدهم‬ ‫ً‬ ‫بخمع للة وغش للشًٍ غض للىا فل للط‪ ،‬وغ للادة م للا و للاهىا ًلحل للىن بص للىسة ؾح للر مىحظم للة بمج للزٌ‬ ‫الشُخ‪ .‬وغلى الشؾم مً ؤن اكحصادًات الطشٍلة ثحعيد وثطىست مؼ الشلُخ ببلشاهُم‬ ‫– هملا رهشهلا‪ -‬فلللذ ولان ملً ألارشٍللاء حُلث بمحللً بػللالا اإلاخلابض واإلالضاسع‪ .‬بال ؤن الحطللىس‬ ‫اإلاهللم فللي هللزا الشللإن ؤهلله ثللم بوشللاء شللشهة غللابشة لللىمُللات مللً ؤبىللاء الطشٍلللة جعللمى‬ ‫(حمى ‪ )Hima ،‬بشؤط ماٌ ًللذس بإسلػمائلة ملُلىن دوالس وهلزه الشلشهة ثإظعلد غللى ًلذ‬ ‫ؤغضاء الطشٍلة مً مخحلف الجيعُات في ؤبشٍل ‪.)26(1994‬‬ ‫تهذف هزه الششهة لالظخثماس في مخحلف اإلاجاالت و اإلالش الشئِس ي للششهة بال شطىم‬ ‫ً‬ ‫هما هىالً مشاهض ؤخشي لها فى مصش‪ ،‬ومجلغ بداسة هزه الششهة ًضلم رالرلحن غضلىا‬ ‫مللً رالرللحن دولللة فللي الػللالم‪ ،‬حُللث ًحلاظللمىن كُمللة الاشللتران ‪ .‬الشل ألا ألاهثللر ؤهمُللة هللى‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤن للطشٍلة هصُبها مً سؤط ماٌ الششهة‪ ،‬هما ؤن ألاسباس ثىصع وفلا للُملة الاشلتران‪.‬‬

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‫ً‬ ‫به للزا اإلاػن للى ف للةن الطشٍل للة ثل للذم همىرح للا ٌع للححم الذساظ للة اله لله ظ للُؿحر م للً الىظ للشة‬ ‫الحللُذًة للطشق الصىفُة‪.‬‬ ‫ث ‪ -‬وضع اإلارأة ‪:‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ًظه للش ثىُ للف الطشٍل للة البرهاهُ للة م للؼ الؿ للشب ف للى بح للذي اللض للاًا التل لي جش لليل مح للىسا‬ ‫للجذٌ بحن الؿشب والػالم ؤلاظالمي‪ ،‬وهى كضُة حلىق اإلالشؤة خاصلة كضلُة البجلاب‪.‬‬ ‫م للً هاحُ للة فلع للفُة ف للةن الحصل لىف هحجشبل للة داخلُ للة سوحاهُ للة ال جػنل لى ب للالفشوق بل للحن‬ ‫الشحللل و اإلا لشؤة ‪ ،‬همللا ؤن ثللاسٍخ الحصللىف ؤلاظللالمي ًلللذم سابػللة الػذوٍللة هإحللذ ؤغظللم‬ ‫اإلاحصىفة في الحاسٍخ ؤلاظالمي‪ .‬لىً مً هاحُة غملُة فةن وضؼ اإلاشؤة في مػظلم الطلشق‬ ‫الصلىفُة فلي الػللالم ؤلاظلالمي غامللة وفلي العلىدان غللى وحله ال صللى محلذد باإلاػللاًحر‬ ‫ؤلاظ للالمُة ألاسرىصهع للُة التل لي ثض للؼ ح للذودا فاص لللة ب للحن الشح للل واإلال لشؤة ملع للمة ألادواس‬ ‫بصىسة محذدة‪.‬‬ ‫ٌش ل للحر اإلاىك ل للؼ ؤلالىتروو ل للي للطشٍل ل للة البرهاهُ ل للة بل ل للى ؤن الطشٍل ل للة البرهاهُ ل للة للشح ل للاٌ‬ ‫واليعاء‪ ،‬بلى حاها ؤن للمشؤة دوس مهم هلائذة للطشٍلة البرهاهُة وهمششذة دًيُة هملا‬ ‫ًمىللً لهللا ؤن ثللذسط وثللذغى الىللاط للللذخىٌ للطشٍلللة‪ .‬وهللزا دوس مللارش ومعللاهم وفػللاٌ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤغطللي لهللا‪ .‬وحالُللا للطشٍلللة كطللاع وعللىي مػنللي بشللاون اإلالشؤة وهللى كطللاع فػللاٌ وٍلللىم‬ ‫بإوشطة محػذدة‪.‬‬ ‫همللا ثحمحللز الطشٍلللة البرهاهُللة بمىكفهللا اإلاخعللامح مللً كضللُة البجللاب حُللث هالحللظ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫حشٍللة اليعللاء اإلاىحمُللات للطشٍلللة البرهاهُللة فللى بخحُللاس الللضي الللزي ثشثذًلله وؤحُاهللا غللذم‬ ‫ؤلالتزام بالبجاب بالصىسة التى هشاها فى الجماغات ؤلاظالمُة ألاخشي ‪ ،‬غلى الشؾم ملً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤن مىضللىع البجللاب ٌػللذ م للً ؤهثللر اللضللاًا حللذال‪ ،‬خاص للة مللً وحهللة هظللش اإلاىظم للات‬ ‫اليعىٍة في الؿشب‪.‬‬ ‫مللؼ الىظللشة اإلاحلذمللة مللً الطشٍلللة البرهاهُللة للم لشؤة بال ؤجهللا ال ثلللىم بللإداء ألارو للاس وال‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ثيللحظم فللي صللفىف اإلايشللذًً بللل ثلللذم فلللط الللذغم اإلاػىللىي للللزاهشًٍ‪ ،‬غمىمللا هالحللظ‬ ‫ؤن هىالً ؤغذادا هبحرة مً اليعاء الؿشبُات في الطشٍلة البرهاهُة‪ ،‬هما حاء فلي بحلذي‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤلاحصائُات ؤن هصف ؤغضاء الطشٍلة البرهاهُة ألاإلاان هم مً اليعاء‪ .‬غمىملا للملشؤة‬

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‫البرهاهُة فى الؿشب مىكؼ محمحز وٍظهش بىضىس مً خلالٌ مشلاسهتها فلى ؤلاسشلاد والؿىلاء‬ ‫والذوس اللُادي داخل الحىظُمات الصىفُة فى الؿشب‪.‬‬ ‫ج ‪ -‬التىازن بين ؤلاسالم والتصىف‪:‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫هثحرا ملا ًللذم الحصلىف بىصلفه حلضء خاصلا ملً الثلافلة ؤلاظلالمُة ًحللل وٍحللاطؼ فلى‬ ‫الىثحل للر مل للً ألاح ل للاًحن م ل للؼ الحػ ل للالُم ؤلاظل للالمُة ال ل للحُحة ‪ ،‬خاص ل للة غى ل للذ الجماغل للات‬ ‫العلفُة وحماغلات ؤلاظلالم العُاسل ي‪ .‬ملً حهلة ؤخلشي الىثحلر ملً الؿلشبُحن لله مىاكلف‬ ‫ٌ‬ ‫مػادً للة للظ للالم وف للى رات الىك للد ؤهث للر بهفحاح للا غل للى الحص للىف‪ ،‬وٍ لشاه هىغ لا ممح للزا م للً‬ ‫الحذًً ٌػىغ ثطىس الحصىف فى الؿشب‪ .‬مً حهة ؤخشي الحصىف فى ؤلاظالم دائملا ملا‬ ‫ٌػشف هةثجاه سو ي ًحلاطؼ مؼ الششَػة ؤلاظالمُة‪ ،‬لىً بػالا الطشق فلى الؿلشب مثلل‬ ‫‪ International Sufi order‬وهللى هللىع مللً الطللشق الصللىفُة الشوحاهُللة اإلاىخشللشة فللى‬ ‫الؿشب‪ ،‬الجشتر ؤلاظالم هإظاط للهحماء بلحها(‪.)27‬‬ ‫الطشٍل للة البرهاهُ للة ف للى الؿ للشب جػ للضص فهمل لا بظ للالمُا مهمل لا ف للى الؿ للشب وثج للزس هفع للها ف للى‬ ‫الش للشق وه للى ال ط للاب الشو للى واإلاماسظ للات الت للى ثج للزب الب للاحثحن غ للً الشوحاهُ للات ف للى‬ ‫الؿشب وخاسج الػالم ؤلاظالمي‪ ،‬لىً فلى رات الىكلد ثاهلذ بلتزامهلا بالشلشَػة ؤلاظلالمُة‬ ‫مؼ بكشاس الحلالُذ ؤلاظالمُة‪.‬‬ ‫فلي واكللؼ ألامللش ثحللاوٌ الطشٍلللة البرهاهُللة ؤن ثللىاصن بللحن الحلالُللذ ؤلاظللالمُة ؤلاسرىصهعللُة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫والحصىف‪ ،‬وهزا ما ثفحلذه فى واكؼ ألامش الىثحر مً الطشق الصىفُة فى الؿشب ‪ .‬فملثال‬ ‫فى الصفحة ؤلاهجلحزًة للمىكؼ ؤلالىتروو للطشٍلة البرهاهُة ششس بطشٍلة حاربة لؿحلر‬ ‫اإلاع لللمحن ؤو الىاف للذًحن الج للذد م للً خ للاسج اإلاجحمػ للات اإلاع لللمة وؤولئ للً الب للاحثحن غ للً‬ ‫اإلاػ ل ل للاوي الػمُلل ل للة اإلالذمل ل للة فل ل للى الل ل للذًاهات الشل ل للشكُة‪ ،‬والحج ل ل للاسب الشوحُ ل ل للة و اإلاػشف ل ل للة‬ ‫ً‬ ‫بالباطىُللة‪ ،‬ألااجه للا فللى هف للغ الىكللد جش للتر ؤلاظللالم ؤوال للهحم للاء للطشٍلللة م للؼ الحإهُ للذ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫دوما غلى سبط ؤلاظالم بالحصىف(‪.)28‬‬ ‫الطشٍلللة البرهاهُللة فللى الؿللشب‪ً :‬لللذمىن ؤهفعللهم بطشٍلللة مخحلفللة غللً الػللالم ؤلاظللالم‬ ‫وهى ل للا ٌش ل للبهىن الىثح ل للر م ل للً الط ل للشق الص ل للىفُة ف ل للى الؿ ل للشب ‪ ،‬جػ ل للشٍفهم لهفع ل للهم للػ ل للالم‬

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‫ال للاسوى حُللث ًاهللذون غلللى الحجللاسب الشوحاهُللة للللزهش والحضللشة مللً خللالٌ الصللىس‬ ‫والصىت والفُذًى‪.‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫حلُلة هزا الحصىس اإلالذم غً الطشٍلة البرهاهُة ٌػىغ بهلالب حزسٍا فى ثصىس‬ ‫الػالكة بحن الباطً" الحصىف" والظاهش"العىة " والزي غادة ما ًطشس ؤجهما ال‬ ‫ًلحلُان‪.‬‬

‫آلافاق اإلاستلبليت للطرق الصىفيت العابرة لللىمياث‬ ‫محصلة ثحىٌ الطشق الصىفُة مً الػالم ؤلاظالمي الى فضاءات الؿشب‪،‬ؤجها بهخششت‬ ‫غبر شبىة غاإلاُة مً ال طى العُاظُة وؤلاكحصادًة وؤلاثصالُة لحمحذ فى‬ ‫معاحات ثحىفش فحها اللىة والىفىر والثروة بػىغ الػالم ؤلاظالمي الزي ثحضاءٌ فُه‬ ‫معاحات الحشٍة وثحمذد فُه كبضة الذولة ‪ ،‬ماظعة إلاشحلة حذًذة فى ثطىس الطشق‬ ‫والحشوات ؤلاظالمُة إلاا ٌػشف ‪ Post Nationalism Islamic movements‬مشيلة ما‬ ‫ٌػشف بالطشق الػابشة لللىمُات ‪. Transnational Orders‬‬ ‫خالصة ألامش ان هىان غذة غىامل راثُة ومحلُة وؤخشي غاإلاُة ثحػلم بالحطىسات‬ ‫اليىهُة والعُاظة الػاإلاُة ظاهمد فى ثحىٌ الطشق الصىفُة مً ؤماهجها الحللُذًة‬ ‫فى الػالم ؤلاظالم بلى بِئات حؿشافُة مخحلفة ومحىىغة لخشيل شبيات للحىاصل‬ ‫الشوحاوي معحؿلة فضاءات الػىإلاة وبمياهُاتها الالمحذوة لحححىٌ مً مجشد حماغات‬ ‫ثللُذًة لحشوات بححماغُة غابشة لللىمُات مىفححة ومحىاصلة مؼ الػالم هجضء مً‬ ‫اإلاىظىمة اإلاذهُة الػاإلاُة محجاوصة حذودها الجؿشافُة محإرشة بالبِئات التى بهحللد‬ ‫بلحها ومارشة فحها‪.‬‬

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‫اإلاصادر ‪:‬‬ ‫‪ - 1‬شاخد وبىدوسذ‪ ،‬ثشاذ ؤلاظالم ‪ ،‬الجضء الثاو ‪ ، 2 ،‬ثشحمة حعحن‬ ‫ماوغ ‪.88 ،1988 ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 2‬ؤبى بىش محمذ بً بسحم الىالباري ‪ ،‬الحػشف غلى مزها ؤهل الحصىف ‪،‬‬ ‫جػلُم محمذ شمغ الذًً‪ ،1 ،‬داس الىحا الػلمُة ‪ ،‬بحروت ‪، 1993 ،‬‬ ‫‪.22 – 13‬‬ ‫‪ - 3‬إلاضٍذ مً اإلاػلىمات حىٌ ؤصل الحصىف ؤهظش لىَغ ماظُيُىن ومصطف‬ ‫غبذ الشاصق‪ ،‬الحصىف ‪ ،‬ثشحمة ببشاهُم خىسشُذ وآخشون ‪ ،1 ،‬مً هحا‬ ‫دائشة اإلاػاسف ؤلاظالمُة ‪،‬داس الىحاب اللبىاو ‪ ،‬بحروت ‪ ،1984 ،‬هزلً ؤهظش‬ ‫هجري وىسبان ‪ ،‬ثاسٍخ الفلعفة ؤلاظالمُة ‪ ،‬ثشحمة هصحر مشوة وآخشون ‪2 ،‬‬ ‫‪ ،‬غىٍذات لليشش والطباغة ‪ ،‬بحروت‪.1998 ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 4‬إلاضٍذ مً اإلاػلىمات غً اإلاعخششكحن وؤبحاثهم ؤهظش غبذ الشحمً بذوي ‪،‬‬ ‫مىظىغة اإلاعخششكحن ‪ ،3 ،‬داسالػلم للمالًحن ‪ ،‬بحروت لبىان‪.1993 ،‬‬ ‫‪Karl Ernest, between orientalsim and fundamentalism: - 5‬‬ ‫‪problematizing the teaching of Sufism,‬‬ ‫‪http://www.unc.edu/~cernst/pdf/wheeler.pdf.‬‬ ‫‪ - 6‬مجمىغة باحثحن‪ ،‬ؤلاظخششاق وؤلاظالم ‪ ،‬ثشحمة فالح غبذ الجباس‪،1 ،‬‬ ‫مشهض ألابحاذ والذساظات ؤلاشتراهُة فى الػالم الػشل ‪ ،‬دمشم ‪،‬‬ ‫‪.10 ،1991‬‬ ‫‪ - 7‬بدسَغ ظالم الحعً ‪ ،‬الذًً فى اإلاجحمؼ العىداو ‪ :‬همحري والطشق‬ ‫الصىفُة ‪ ،1980 -1972‬ثشحمة احمذ الصادق وآخشون ‪، 1 ،‬مشهض‬ ‫الذساظات العىداهُة ‪ ،‬اللاهشة ‪.25 ، 2002 ،‬‬ ‫‪John Voll, Sudanese Islamic fundamentalism: Urban‬‬ ‫‪-8‬‬ ‫‪cosmopolitanism‬‬ ‫‪and‬‬ ‫‪Modernity,‬‬ ‫‪.http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/JohnVoll.pdf.‬‬

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‫‪Amani Mohammed ElObid, Middle class and Sufism in Sudan: the - 9‬‬ ‫‪case of The Samaniya Order of SHAIKH ALBurai, PhD thesis,‬‬ ‫‪University of Khartoum, 2008.‬‬ ‫‪John Voll, Sudanese Islamic fundamentalism: Urban - 10‬‬ ‫‪cosmopolitanism‬‬ ‫‪and‬‬ ‫‪Modernity,‬‬ ‫‪.http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/JohnVoll.pdf.‬‬ ‫‪ - 11‬الىظُلة ببشاهُم ‪ ،‬دساظة فىُة فى دًىان الىصل للشُخ محمذ غثمان غبذو‬ ‫‪ ،‬سظالة لىُل دسحة الذهحىساة فى اللؿة الػشبُة ‪ ،‬ولُة ألاداب ‪ ،‬حامػة‬ ‫ال شطىم ‪2005 ،‬‬ ‫‪Michael Frishkopf, “changing modalities in globalization of Islamic - 12‬‬ ‫‪Saint Veneration and mysticism: Sidi Ibrhaim ElDusugi , Sheikh‬‬ ‫‪Mohammed Uthman ALBurhani and their Sufi order‬‬ ‫‪http://www.equinoxjournals.com/RST/article/view/2205.‬‬ ‫‪- 13‬غً مىكف الذولة اإلاصشٍة مً الطشٍلة البرهاهُة ؤهظش غماس غلى حعً‪،‬‬ ‫الحيشئة العُاظُة للطشق الصىفُة فى مصش فى مصش ‪ :‬رلافة الذًملشاطُة‬ ‫ومعاس الححذًث لذي ثُاس دًنى ثللُذي ‪ ،1 ،‬داس الػحن لليشش ‪ ،‬اللاهشة ‪،‬‬ ‫‪. 2009‬‬ ‫‪- 14‬ثخحلف ؤظالُا دخىٌ ألاغضاء في الطشٍلة مً طشٍلة لخشي فلذ ثيىن‬ ‫ً‬ ‫مثاال باإلاصافحة مً ثحد هم الشُخ ؤو بؿمص الُذ الُمنى في اإلااء الزي‬ ‫ًىضؼ في بهاء هبحر ورلً ًفش اهحلاٌ البرهة مً ًذ الشُخ بلى ؤًذي‬ ‫اإلاباٌػحن وٍمىً ؤن ثيىن اإلاباٌػة فشدًة ؤو حماغُة هما جشتر مػظمها ؤن‬ ‫ًحم رلً امام الشُخ وما ًمحز الطشٍلة البرهاهُة في هزا اإلاى ى هى مىهجها‬ ‫الزي ًخعم باإلاشوهة في اظخُػاب ألاغضاء الجذد بر ؤن مىهجها ٌعمح ليل‬ ‫ؤبىاء الطشٍلة بإن ٌػلمىا مً ًشٍذ الاهخشا في ظلىها لىُفُة كشاءة ألاوساد‬ ‫وثىظُم الػبادات هما جػلمىها‪ -‬وكذ ظهل هزا اإلاىهج دخىٌ الىثحرون بلى‬ ‫الطشٍلة البرهاهُة‪.‬‬

‫‪64:‬‬

‫ً‬ ‫‪- 15‬ؤظعد الطشٍلة البرهاهُة فى الػام ‪ 1999‬حىاس ظُاظُا للطشٍلة غشف‬ ‫بحضب وادي الىُل والزي ثم ثجمُذ وشاطه فى الػام ‪ ، 2003‬وٍترحم هزا‬ ‫الحىظُم العُاس ى ؤلاسثبا اللىي بحن ما هى ؤبعحمىلىوي وؤًذوٍىلىوي فى‬ ‫ؤدبُات الطشٍلة‪ ،‬فةرا سحػىا مشة ؤخشي للمػحلذات ألاظاظُة للطشٍلة‬ ‫البرهاهُة ًمىىىا ؤن هفهم مً خالله ألاظباب اليامىة وساء الحىحه والحىظُم‬ ‫العُاس ي للطشٍلة البرهاهُة في رلً الىكد ‪ ،‬فالبرهاهُة هما الػذًذ مً‬ ‫اإلاحصىفة كعمىا الضمان الي ؤسلػة فترات صمىُة ٌعىد فحها ؤحذ ألاكطاب‬ ‫ألاسلػة فىشٍا وظُاظُا ‪ ،‬وبما ؤن هزا الضمان هى صمً العُذ ببشاهُم‬ ‫الذظىقي آخش ألاكطاب وؤن صماهه هى آخش الضمان‪ ، ،‬وبما ؤن الطشٍلة‬ ‫البرهاهُة هي اإلامثل الششجي للعُذ الذظىقي ‪ً ،‬صبح ثإظِغ ثىظُم ظُاس ي‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ؤمشا مفهىما‪ ،‬فى رات الىكد جػىغ الىحذة مؼ مصش ألاسثبا اللىي‬ ‫باإلاشحػُة ألاصلُة للطشٍلة وهى طشٍلة ببشاهُم الذظىقى اإلاصشي ألاصل‪.‬‬ ‫‪Peggy Levitt, between God, ethnicity, and country: an approach to - 16‬‬ ‫‪the study of transnational religion.‬‬ ‫‪Carl Ernest, Sufism, Islam and globalization in contemporary world: - 17‬‬ ‫‪methodological reflection on the field of study,‬‬ ‫‪.http://www.unc.edu/~cernst/articles.htm‬‬ ‫‪- 18‬إلاضٍذ مً اإلاػلىمات غً الحصىف فى الؿشب ؤهظش ‪Jamal Malik and John‬‬ ‫‪Hinnells “Editors”, Sufism in the west, first edition, Routledge, New‬‬ ‫‪York, 2006‬‬ ‫‪Michael Frishkopf, “changing modalities in globalization of Islamic - 19‬‬ ‫‪Saint Veneration and mysticism: Sidi Ibrhaim ElDusugi , Sheikh‬‬ ‫‪Mohammed Uthman ALBurhani and their Sufi order‬‬ ‫‪http://www.equinoxjournals.com/RST/article/view/2205.‬‬ ‫‪http://www.transcript-verlag.de/ts302/ts302_1.pdf- 20‬‬

‫;‪64‬‬

‫ كشاءة فى هحاب اإلاعلمىن فى الؿشب بحن ثىاكضات‬، ‫مصطف غبذ الشاصق‬- 21 ‫الؿشب وثحذًات اإلاعحلبل‬ 4&http://www.almanaraljadeed.com/show.asp?newid=31999 ‫ غً غالكة ؤمشٍيا بالطشق الصىفُة اهظش‬- 22 http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Understanding_Suffism. .pdf http://burhamiya.com- 23 http://www.transcript-verlag.de/ts302/ts302_1.pdf- 24 http://www.rayat-alizz.com- 25 Musab AbdElgader, Islamic Sufism and its impact upon society and - 26 state in Sudan: the case of Burhaniya Sufi order, M.A thesis, University of Khartoum 1996, P65. Celia A. Genn, The Development of a Modern Western Sufism ,a - 27 paper in, “Sufism and the modern in Islam” edited by Martin Van Bruinessem and Julia Howell, IB.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007, P257. .http://www.rayat-alizz.com- 28

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The Boutchichi order and the Politics of

Jouissance Dr. Abdelilah Bouasria

Abstract: Many observers claim the disappearance of the private sphere on the ground that it had become more inhabited. What is in fact happening is the disappearance of public life as we came to know it (politicization of issues, dominant discourses…) in the sense that public issues are leaving their space to more personalized problems of natural/personal nature. The two most predominant trends in nowadays global matrix are bio-political regulation and Jouissance as suffering. The former trend aims at securing the individual’s “happiness” meanwhile the second one generates a wave of self-control by the individual actors in the public space. This paper explores the case of the Boutchichi Sufi order in Morocco and seeks to answer the following question: by what process does Sufi meditation produce jouissance? Key words: Sufism, politics, Morocco, jouissance, bio politics, Boutchichi, Islam



Dr. Abdelilah Bouasria is a professor of Arab Studies at ICLS in Washington DC and the author of Master and Disciple (Author house: 2007) and Mamlakat al Qaht (Nadacom: 2006) and several other articles. He received his PhD in political science from American University in Washington DC and his Masters in international relations from Sussex University in the UK, and his B.com from McGill University in Canada. He speaks six languages and is working on a book on Sufism in Morocco.

421

oday‟s global politics has become a habitat for several displays of intelligence (emotional intelligence, social intelligence, spiritual intelligence…) but the two most predominant trends in nowadays global matrix are bio-political regulation and Jouissance as suffering. The former trend aims at securing the individual‟s “happiness” meanwhile the second one generates an unintended consequence: a wave of self-control (jogging, meditation, healthy food…) by the individual actors in the public space, which has become the scene of many private facets of life from sexual intimacy to reality shows. People are seen on TV shows eating, screaming, mating and defecating. Hence, many observers cry for the disappearance of the private sphere on the ground that it had become more and more shared by people. What is in fact happening, one can argue, is the disappearance of public life as we came to know it (politicization of issues, dominant discourses…). Public issues are leaving their space to more personalized problems of natural/personal nature. The most obvious sign of the reign of bio-politics is the obsession with the issue of “stress” and with it the mushrooming of personal gurus. Stress is symptomatic of our inability to handle this “too much” je ne sais quoi. Spiritual ecstasy, a sort of trance created by Sufi meditation, cannot but be regulated by the state. The recent interest, by the Moroccan regime, in Sufism and in the Boutchichi order in particular, headed by Sidi Hamza, is a form of regulation of the spiritual jouissance. The Boutchichi order is a Sufi order that grew in popularity lately in Morocco and regained visibility due to the appointment of one of its prominent members, Ahmed Taoufiq, as a minister of religious affairs. This order got its name because of an event that occurred during the time of one of its ancestors Sheikh Sidi Ali. He was invited, with other men, to a dinner in a house. Upon their arrival, the guests were presented a dish made from barley and milk, known as Dchicha. The guests did not eat as they thought they

422

would receive a better dish as was the custom then. Sheikh Sidi Ali ate his dish and all the other out of respect for the saint they came to visit. Just as he had finished eating the dishes, the host told the guests that it was a test and that Ali received the secret. Politics has found itself concerned with Jouissance as a result of people‟s attempt to control their desires. The French Psychoanalyst Lacan opposed, in his Seminar The Ethics of Psychoanalysis in the early sixties, jouissance and pleasure. For him, the subject constantly tries to transgress the prohibitions imposed on his pleasure by different kinds of limits, resulting in not more pleasure but more pain, given that there is only a certain amount of pleasure that the subject can bear. When pleasure becomes pain, Lacan speaks of jouissance as suffering. It refers, along with its verb „jouir‟, to an extreme pleasure. It is an enjoyment that has a deadly reference, reaching a quasi intolerable level of excitation, carrying in its womb the idea of transgression. One is automatically led to ask here: by what process does Sufi meditation produce jouissance? The answer lies in five magical letters: Dhikr (invocation). In fact, Sufi disciples chant repetitively some names of God to reach jouissance that they call haal. It is literally a “state” or a “condition”, and it refers to the temporary ecstasy that is induced by spiritual meditation. Dhikr is related to remembrance. Hence, the true jouissance is neither in the real act itself (invocation) nor in the expectation of the pleasures derived from it (the disciple should not meditate for the goal of tasting these pleasures) but precisely in the remembrance of the original act of invocation, which is modeled on a somehow remote (in the past) act of meditation which had generated, as oral and written texts show, a state of jouissance. We had forgotten what this original meditation was but we remember its existence. Remembering that primordial/perennial model is the goal of today‟s meditation. Repetition is a fundamental ritual in this dhikr. The shape of the praying tool, the Subha, is circular, alluding to some form of cyclicality. I argue here that by encouraging

423

Sufism, the Moroccan regime encourages one of its main tools of spiritual growth, the prayer bead (Subha), which in turn invites people to engage, albeit unconsciously, into a cyclical paradigm, because of its geometric circular shape that forces the meditating bodies to engage in a circular movement at a physical level. By integrating the Sufi order in Moroccan politics, the Moroccan government is conditioning the collective psyche into recycling its modes of action. In fact, if one had to name one attribute of Moroccan politics, it would be cyclicality: Events from old history are called upon and polished to appear in new light in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x;s politics. For example, in 1909, a tribesman attacked the sultan Abd al-Hafiz while he was going to pray in the mosque, but this attempt failed and the tribesman was killed. The mosque became hence registered as a lieu dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;attaque in the repertoire of contention of the then Moroccan suicide attackers. The mosque as a space acquires hence another function besides that of praying and playing: slaying. In fact, years later, Ibn Arafa, the sultan who was put by the French colonizer as a replacement of the exiled king Mohamed V, was assaulted- while going to the Friday prayer- by another suicidal Moroccan resistance figure (Allal Benabdellah) but the attempt failed and the assailant was killed. I argue that by encouraging Sufism, the state encourages one of its main tools of spiritual growth (Subha) which in turn invites people to engage, albeit unconsciously, into a cyclical paradigm. The overriding question here is: what will Sufism look like in the public arena and what will be its guiding principle? To answer this question, I will turn to the work of Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). For this Italian thinker, there is a function of worship that is about opposition, and religion provides ways for subordinate groups to resist domination. Gramsci is remembered best for his use of the term hegemony, stressing the importance of discursive practices that contribute to domination. Gramsci understood the supremacy of dominant social classes in capitalist societies as predicated on two

424

factors, coercion and hegemony. To lead a society, a group must win support by connecting the perceived interests of dependent groups with their own, and the ability to shape these perceptions is a resource. The Boutchichi order plays such a role because it connects the interest of the state with its own and passes it as spiritual salvation. In order to combat this social miasma, Gramsci suggests a revolution in which the dominated groups generate their own organic counter-hegemonic intellectuals who will create communal free spaces that permit people to reject all parochialisms of class, gender, and race. In order for the “low” classes, whose worldview may be highly religious, to be counter-hegemonic, religion needs to undergo some transformations, such as the shift from apolitical mysticism to a sense of social and economic justice. Al Adl wal Ihsan is such a group. In March 2009, the daily Al Masae gave voice for the first time to the Boutchichi Guru to speak on Yassine‟s early days in the Zawya. Rachid Nini is a director of the most popular daily private newspaper in Morocco, Al-Masae, who is known for his extremely populist style. Nini‟s previous attacks notwithstanding, Al Masae‟s quest for marketing jouissance called for such an interview where “Sidi Hamza” reiterated his distance from Politics in a realist sense. What is interesting is that three issues of the above mentioned newspaper present conflicting views about the Boutchichi order, two negative, and one positive. This shift is explained by the lobbying underground technique used by the Sufi order to gain the sympathy of the media. The interview with Sheikh Hamza by a beginning journalist failed to present the other side of the issue, and focused on how the Sufis in Madagh, the hometown of the Boutchichi order, repeatedly told the journalist how special he was to interview the Guru. The discourse of “you must be chosen to talk to us” is a typical utterance used by the Boutchichi movement, along with many other sects, and neutral press coverage should not be lured by such sweet talking. This instance is used exactly to show how jouissance is incorporated in the Boutchichi

425

discourse and acts as a hegemonic marketing tool to silence any potential critical stance. One might ask here: what is the link between jouissance and hegemony? In fact, the whole discourse of the Boutchichi order revolves around the fact that we are all, as human beings with shortcomings, “sick” and our doctor is the spiritual master. According to this logic, one is doomed to feel a void, emptiness, and a yearning for a “perfect man” and it is this hole that is the structure of jouissance. Much of the Boutchichi discourse uses a management cultural frame focusing on marketing and publicity, but in the meantime condemning the consumerism of material life. By shifting the management rituals to the spiritual side, the Boutchichi order is setting the foundations for what I call a market Sufism. When one joins the order, s/he remembers his previous “life” as one of sickness and always repeats the words of the Guru Sidi Hamza: “we are all sick and our hospital is the order.” Using pathos as a mode of recruitment has a double function: claiming a special cure that is found nowhere else, and discrediting all competing claims. Where does hegemony come in? I argue that the Boutchichi withdrawal from the socio-political engagement for the sake of a “pure” direct contact with the “real” (the divine) carries with it a subliminal idea that favors l’action directe over ideology in a way that leaves this push-towards the real unbridled. With the death of Sidi Hamza, the order will not be safe from a move towards spiritual terrorism, not in the sense of violent acts carried by spiritual people but more so as a hegemonic enforcing of the one spiritual Boutchichi way. One of the Sufi states of mind referred to earlier (haal) mirrors this loss of self-control: in modes of intense religious ecstasy, the body “goes dark” and abnormal electrical bursts are lodged in the temporal lobes, and the ecstatic is said to be “drunk.” This state means both that the drunkard is not responsible for his acts, but also that whatever

426

he does should be understood if not legitimized due to its divine source. I argued that by encouraging Sufism, Morocco encourages one of its main tools of spiritual growth (Subha) and I also presented the Boutchichi order as a counter-hegemonic force used by the state against Abdessalam Yassine. I also argued that as Bernard Lewis said, Sufis are peaceful but not pacifists, so the tactic of biding solely on them might wreak havoc. In the same way that Zen monks adhered wholeheartedly to the Japanese military arsenal providing the spiritual rationale for killing enemies, one should not be surprised if the Boutchichi â&#x20AC;&#x153;templarâ&#x20AC;? knightsâ&#x20AC;&#x; gunshot enemy soldiers in the Western Sahara, while crediting God and his prophet with such butcheries.

427

Inverting the Pyramid

The Challenges of Transition from Pharaoh to People Power in Egypt

Sherry Sayed Gadelrab Robert Mason

Abstract: In the short time that Tunisia has gone from an authoritarian regime to the start of a democratic change, Egypt is undergoing a similar transition, but its route to democracy is far less certain. Although Egyptian President Husni Mubarak resigned in response to seventeen days of massive street protests, there are an extensive number of variables to consider in Egypt's domestic, regional and international relations which make its path to political change far more complex than the Tunisian experience. Key-words: Arab revolution, Middle East politics, Arab-Israel conflict, democracy, Arab military...

1. Introduction: The Army in Power

espite the demonstrators‟ success in removing Mubarak from power, their movement has had a limited political impact and did not constitute a complete upheaval of the regime, but rather a change in leadership. As Mubarak charged the Council of Armed Forces with the Presidency, Egypt became, for all practical purposes, under the rule of the army. The timings 

Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter.

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and mechanisms by which Egypt moves to a democracy are now in the hands of the army generals: Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, Egypt‟s defence minister, Lieutenant-General Sami Hafiz Inan, the chief of the Armed Forces; and the chiefs of army, air force, navy and military intelligence. By being neutral and avoiding using lethal force against the protestors, the army gained widespread respect and popularity amongst them. Similarly, the Egyptians on the street respect the army as the institution that represents safety and stability, especially after weeks of chaos. Nonetheless, the army, as an inseparable part and a direct beneficiary of the old regime, could not simply be accepted as a neutral player in these events. Paradoxically, the Egyptian demonstrations brought the military back and gave it (however temporary) complete and direct political control of Egypt; a situation similar to the role of the army in the aftermath of Nassir and the Free Officers‟ Coup in 1952. The 1952 Free Officers‟ military coup overthrew Egypt's constitutional monarchy replacing it with a republican system, and brought to power a number of middle class young military officers. The free officers‟ newly established republican regime relied on a group of loyal military officers, who staffed not only political and governmental positions, but also the huge businesses that were nationalised throughout the sixties. The republican constitution, written after the coup, gave the president immense powers, which included: determining the country's foreign policies, choosing the PM and overseeing cabinet's performance. Given that all Egyptian presidents, to date, came from a military background, the powerful authority of the president worked in partnership with the interests of the army. Most of the country‟s financial resources were directed towards the military establishment, particularly during the preparation of the six days war (1967) and the Yom Kippur war (1973). After Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the Egyptian military slowly refrained from directly interfering in Egyptian politics, nonetheless, it never ceased to be a direct economic beneficiary of Sadat‟s and then Mubarak‟s political regime.

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The Egyptian military enjoys an enormous stake in the Egyptian national economy. It is massively involved in almost every national economic sector at different levels, ranging from hotel ownership to household goods. The military establishment runs many of the largest, most profitable, and tax free agricultural, industrial and commercial projects in Egypt that benefit from free conscripted labour and special prices for public land. Despite Egypt's limited economic resources (deriving mainly from Suez Canal fees, expatriate labour, and US aid), the military establishment enjoys the lion-share of these resources. Half of the US aid to Egypt, about US $1 billion dollars per annum, is spent on the army, in addition to the valuable weaponry provided by the Americans.1 Finally, the military corps enjoys a wide range of social and economic benefits including access to free and special health services, subsidies, special family care and entertainment venues. The Egyptian army now faces the task of overseeing the transitions to a civilian democracy without letting the country fall into chaos or jeopardising the army‟s political, social and economic privileges. The Council of Armed Forces has indeed begun steps towards a more democratic and transparent political system. It dissolved the Egyptian parliament whose members are believed to have won their seats through fraud. The army also organised a committee of jurists to draft amendments to the 1971 constitution. In a constitutional referendum on 20th March 2011, 77% of voters backed the constitutional reforms, which are expected to allow the country to move quickly into elections.2 The army set the 15th of September for the beginning of parliamentary elections, which are

Ali Younes, “The Nature of American-Egyptian Military Relations,” Palestine Chronicles, http://palestinechronicle.com/view_article_details.php?id=16646 (accessed 22 February 2011). 2 BBC news, “Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12801125 (accessed 22nd July 2011). 1

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expected to be followed by presidential elections and the drafting of a new constitution.3 Nonetheless, these steps could be described as cautious and reformist rather than revolutionary in nature. In fact, the army seems to be carrying out political reforms within the parameters and timetable already set by Mubarak and his former vice president Umar Sulayman. To the disappointment of the liberal political parties, the Council of Armed forces has not abolished the Egyptian constitution. Rather, the Council declared that only six articles of the Constitution would be amended; the same articles identified by Mubarak before his resignation. These articles deal with the conditions for the approval of presidential candidacy, presidential periods, as well as judicial supervision of parliamentary and presidential elections. There is no evidence so far that the constitution will witness any serious changes about presidential political authorities, or the distribution of executive, legislative and judicial powers. Although the army lifted the military curfew imposed during the revolution, the Council of Armed Forces still kept the emergency laws, promising to abolish them after the parliamentary elections. In the mean time, Mubarak, his sons, exministers and MPs have either stood trial or are expected to do so in the coming months, but many of the revolutionaries continue to demand more rigorous and speedier trials for the symbols of Mubarak‟s old regime. The army‟s tendency towards slow reforms has raised suspicions about the relationship between Mubarak and the Egyptian army. Some intellectuals and protestors even assumed that Mubarak‟s resignation was a mere façade to appease the protestors and the Council of Armed Forces who would then report to Mubarak and Umar Sulayman, the former Vice President. Others argue that the leaders of the army are themselves part of the old regime which Mustafa Ajbaili, “Egypt military unveils parliamentary election rules,” http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/21/158610.html (accessed 22nd July 2011). 3

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made them more interested in reforms rather than revolutionary changes demanded in Tahrir Square. Such speculations recently put the protestors in direct confrontations with the army and its leaders. The last couple of weeks in July 2011 witnessed protests against the military council and a demand for its replacement by a civilian presidential council. Furthermore, an attempt was made by some political groups and a number of revolutionaries to replace the Prime Minister „Issam Sharaf with the opposition figure Muhammad ElBaradei by marching towards the ministers‟ council.4 The attempt failed due to the robust military response and the failure of liberal forces to mobilise people to support the idea of civilian presidential council. In addition to the Islamist political groups who vehemently opposed the idea of a presidential council, the vast majority of Egyptians seemed to trust the army and the Council of Armed Forces, regarded by people as the only remaining standing institution in Egypt and which guarantees its stability. The army‟s slow steps towards democratic transition could, on the other hand, be attributed to the army‟s desire to maintain stability and an orderly transition of power. Because of Egypt‟s population of 80 million, and its strategic location and international alliances, the military cannot afford any further social unrest, political chaos or uncertainly caused by a constitutional gap. Two days after Mubarak‟s resignation, the army made it clear that it has limited tolerance for street protests, and that it is keen on returning the country back to normal. Although the vast majority of protestors left Tahrir square in the aftermath of Mubarak‟s resignation, a few hundred protestors have stayed on to guarantee the implementation of their demands; behaviour which the army has rejected by dispersing the remaining protestors under the threat of arrest. In its fifth televised declaration, the army stated that although it was keen on meeting the demand of Egypt‟s Egypt News, “Egypt Youth call for el-Baradei to replace Sharaf as PM” http://news.egypt.com/english/permalink/20423.html (accessed 23 of July 2011). 4

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“honourable” citizens, (a flexible and undefined term), it was no longer willing to tolerate minor protests in different parts of Egypt. This stance was attributed to the demands of employees, workers, and other Egyptians for the improvement of their economic condition. Any ongoing or escalating protests in Tahrir Square would put the protestors in direct confrontation with the army, now the de facto ruler of the country. Therefore the army could resort to suppressive measures such as the declaration of martial laws, or collective arrests. It is, however, unlikely that the Egyptian army will resort to this kind of suppression unless its ability to oversee what the military council calls “handing in the country to an elected civilian government and an elected president” is directly challenged. Regardless of whether the country will be ruled by a civilian government or not, the well-equipped and strong Egyptian army, considered the largest and second strongest army in the Middle East, is expected to continue to play a prominent role in future Egyptian politics. The army will probably keep for itself the right of interference if the government‟s decrees challenge the army‟s privileges or the country‟s strategic interests. Subsequently, the success of any future Egyptian government will rely on its capacity of protecting, if not promoting, the interests of the army. 2. From Social Movement to Politics During their protests, the Egyptian youth boasted of their independence from any political party. They insisted that their love for Egypt and their anger at the corruption, police brutality, and absence of democratic mechanisms for the transfer of power in their country were what initiated their movement. They insisted that their movement does not have any preference for any ideology, but rather represents the political and ideological diversity of Egyptian society. The protests seemed to reflect this. All the protestors carried Egyptian flags and sang national anthems. Participants came from various ideological and religious

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backgrounds. Actors protested beside members of the Muslim Brotherhood and pictures of Christians surrounding praying Muslims for protection circulated on social networking websites. The Egyptian demonstrators did not seem to have a unified leadership. A 30 year old man, Wa‟il Ghonaym, a manager at the Google branch in Dubai, has been identified as responsible for the demonstrations. On his Facebook page “We are all Khalid Sa‟id”, in reference to the police brutality and murder of Khalid Sa‟id, a 25 year old man in Alexandria, he called for massive demonstrations against the government. It became a popular page with about 800000 viewers, who read his call for a protest against the regime, and particularly against police brutality. Other groups, such as the 6th of April Movement, were also formed through social networking sites. Besides these groups, there were participants from different political opposition parties, members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic movements, as well as ordinary people with no links to any political parties or groups. The events in Tunisia seemed to encourage youth to unite their goals and go onto the street, yet they remained, until the end of demonstrations, without a representative leadership. The absence of leadership and the lack of a unifying ideological discourse for the Egyptian “revolution” might project it as a spontaneous and popular movement that disregards religious and ideological differences, yet there is still a risk. Beyond the resignation of Mubarak, the punishment of his ministers and general democratic reforms such as free parliamentary and presidential elections, the protestors do not share a single vision for Egypt‟s future. There are growing fears that the revolution will be “hijacked” by some political players such as the Muslim Brotherhood, because they are the most organised political movement.

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3. Moving Towards a Theocracy? Fears that Egypt will move into a theocracy under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood who allied with other Salafi (fundamentalist) movements were fed by the fast steps taken by the Brotherhood to dominate the political scene in Egypt, particularly after the fall of its strong competitor, the National Democratic Party (Egypt‟s ruling party under Sadat and Mubarak). Most notably, the controversial Shaykh Yusuf al-Qardawi, who had been in exile in Egypt for 30 years, was invited to give the Friday speech on the Friday of Victory, the first Friday after Mubarak‟s resignation. During his speech Muslim Brotherhood leaders and other affiliated notable Islamic scholars surrounded Qardawi. The Brotherhood‟s desire to monopolise the political scene was epitomised by the fact that Muhammad Al-Biltagui, the Muslim Brotherhood leader, pushed Wa‟il Ghunaym away from the podium in Tahrir square. 5 Although the Muslim Brotherhood is the most politically organised group in contemporary Egypt, the Egyptian protests demonstrated that they are not necessarily the most popular party on the Egyptian street at least amongst the youth. Politicians and observers agree that the Muslim Brotherhood should be allowed to be a political player on the future political scene, but they expect that the Brotherhood members‟ percentage of parliamentary seats that they could win in free elections would not exceed 20%. Therefore, many intellectuals have criticised the Brotherhood‟s attempt to exclusively monopolise the political scene in Tahrir Square, especially since this was where the Egyptian revolution started. Al-Qardawi was also accused of attempting of imitating Khomeini‟s victorious return to revolutionary Iran; an accusation denied by al-Qardawi who returned back to Qatar where he used to live. Clashes between the liberal and Islamist forces appeared Muhammad Fathi & Muhammad Sha‟aban, “Min illy tard Wa‟il Ghunaym min midan al-Tahrir” Ahram newspaper http://shabab.ahram.org.eg/Inner.aspx?ContentID=4091&typeid=3&year=201 0&month=04&day=04&issueid=6 (accessed 22nd February 2011) 5

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most obviously during the Constitutional referendum. Whereas liberals refused the amendments and demanded a new constitution, the Islamic forces strongly backed constitutional reforms which would lead to earlier elections. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Salafi movements, being well-organised, well-funded and popular amongst the poorer classes, expect to dominate the parliament with at least 70% of seats.6 The overwhelmingly vague political program of the Muslim Brotherhood is another reason for the mistrust between the Brotherhood and other political players, which includes intellectuals as well as ordinary people. Although some intellectuals speculate that the role of the Brotherhood in politics will be similar to the role of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) or Justice and Development Party in Turkey, there are major differences between the situation in Egypt and in Turkey. The AKP, although an Islamist party, had to abide by the strictly secular constitution of Turkey, protected not only by the military establishment but also by a strong caste of secular Turkish intellectuals. The early twentieth century modernisation program in Turkey took a strictly secular republican direction under the auspices of the first Turkish President, Kemal Ataturk. The current Egyptian constitution, written in 1971, includes a controversial article which states that the Shari‟a is the source of legislation; an article that is not currently in use but could be easily activated by the Brotherhood if they came to power. Thus, intellectuals insist that the Brotherhood must demonstrate that they will play “by the rules” by vowing not to implement the shari‟ah; a condition that the Brotherhood has refused to abide by so far.

Euro News, “Muslim Brotherhood Prepares for Egypt Vote” http://www.euronews.net/2011/04/30/muslim-brotherhood-prepares-foregypt-vote/ (accessed 23 July 2011). 6

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4. The Concept of People Power After its revolution, Egyptian domestic politics could reflect the commitment and high profile that Egypt has had in the international community. From Nasser in the 1960s, to BoutrosBoutros-Ghali in the 1990s, and El-Baradei in the 2000s, Egypt‟s role in multilateral forums such as the UN has been significant. Much of that profile comes from its status as a pillar of the Muslim world. One only need think of the Arab League headquarters in Cairo (albeit temporary suspended after Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel) and President Obama‟s Cairo speech to find evidence of this. At the same time, Egypt has managed to achieve relative autonomy in both its domestic and foreign policies because the U.S. has been forced to engage with it even though Mubarak‟s policies were not always closely aligned to U.S. interests. What mattered most was that Mubarak was not the Muslim Brotherhood. He was therefore a preferred choice of the U.S. during a period when one of its most important foreign policies, the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), relied so much on his assistance and support. At the centre of this support was also the former head of the intelligence services (al-Mukhabarat), „Umar Sulayman, known to have played a significant role in determining Egypt‟s foreign policies in a way that guard its national security and keep the country away from wars. Sulayman is also known for his long cooperation with the U.S particularly in its war on terror. The knock-on effect of the protests in Egypt has not affected so many states in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq war. This time Egypt has hit the Achilles heel of the Gulf States: where pressure for democratic reform, accountability and transparency have constantly been „exchanged‟ for concessions. The loss of Mubarak does not equate to an inversion of the hierarchical pyramid, indeed, in Egypt the elites still remain, but it does for the first time often since the states were founded, give citizens in the Middle East some degree of leverage over their governments. The effect in the Gulf will be a far more subtle effect of increasing short term

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gestures from governments, coupled with medium term pressure for greater pluralism and participation in the decision making process. 5. Egyptian Foreign Policy What do the changes taking place in Egypt mean for regional relations? Apart from the Arab solidarity shown by most of the Arab States to Mubarak, states such as Saudi Arabia are concerned that not only have they lost an ally, but that western and Iranian interests are at play once again in the internal politics of a fellow Arab League member. There are also concerns that the Egyptian population never had the chance to express their collective political wish before Mubarak left.7 The bloody instability this has created and the fear that violent Islamists or sectarian groups may use the opportunity to fill the political void has led to heightened regional and international tensions. Combined with the alleged Iranian nuclear programme, NATO operations in Libya, and concerns over Yemen, the outcome is putting a strain on regional as well as East â&#x20AC;&#x201C; West alliances, especially with the U.S. In response, Sunni monarchies are forming stronger relations to counter the revolutionary forces, with suggestions that Jordan and Morocco join the GCC.8 Although this is unlikely, it does illustrate the lengths to which many Gulf States have tried to bridge the gap created by the Arab Spring in order to maintain the status quo. Oil rich states have always been more immune to the policy challenges created by being situated in the Middle East, exhibiting traits of interdependence with the West and the emergent powers in Asia, rather than the more common dependent relations. There may now emerge a greater disparity between the foreign policies of the Gulf States and those states such as Egypt that are emerging into a Remarks from Prince Turki Al Faisal, Gulf Research Meeting Opening Ceremony, University of Cambridge, 6 July 2011 8 â&#x20AC;&#x153;Analysis: How Would Jordan and Morocco Change the Gulf Cooperation Council?", Al Arabiya News, 9 June 2011, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/09/152623.html 7

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more complex era of balancing domestic political pressures and opportunities for a new diplomatic discourse. The main challenges for the foreign policy elite in Egypt is to ensure that what have been important Egyptian engagements in the MEPP (the government brokered a unity deal between Hamas and Fatah in June 2011) and a partial rapprochement with Iran, do not become overly informed by revolutionary zeal from the streets. Since the military remain in charge, their agenda is likely to remain traditional and pragmatic. This is especially so when taking into account the foreign policies of important sources of aid, such as the Saudi pledge of $4 billion to Egypt.9 What is likely to transform Egypt and the region as a whole, is civilian control of the armed forces which would establish new checks and balances, and tensions within the elite. The effects of a civilian government taking over power are also likely to be immediate and diverse. These could include continued engagement with Hamas on a humanitarian basis regarding the border regime and unrivalled support for a new Palestinian state; a greater opening of Egypt‟s internal markets and new investment opportunities to benefit the population; and a more independent foreign policy that is less susceptible to external pressure. In the short term at least, Egypt‟s priorities will be to communicate to the world that it has heard the call for change and is taking steps to adapt in a way which is consistent with the values being espoused in the Arab Spring, including human rights and accountability. Egypt also has to balance its own national interests in the transitional process and communicate to its allies that not only does it reject the „Gaddafi model‟ but that it needs time to institutionalise and consolidate a new Arab model of government which best serves the needs of its people; both Christian and Muslim. Ty McCormick, “How Revolutionary is Egypt‟s Post-Revolution Foreign Policy?”, Foreign Policy, 11 July 2011, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/08/how_revolutionary_is_postrevolution_egyptian_foreign_policy (accessed 23rd July 2011) 9

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6. Egypt and Israel For thirty years President Hosni Mubarak managed to maintain the cold peace with Israel that Sadat negotiated in 1979 and paid for with his life in 1981. The extent to which this treaty was, and is, vital to the national security interests of both states can be seen in the context of three wars that had been fought between Egypt and Israel (1948, 1967 and 1973). It can also be seen in the fact that Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. aid because of it. More recently, it can be seen by the lobbying efforts that Israel has undertaken in support of Mubarak.10 It is not that Israel puts much stock in Mubarak‟s ability to solve the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Mubarak‟s intervention in the Israel – Hamas ceasefire in 2008 for example, has done little to reduce the frequent violence on Egypt‟s doorstep. However, without a relatively stable Egypt, Israel is left with very few states in its backyard where it can advance its most basic national security interests. Its nightmare scenario of a close working relationship between Hamas and an ascendant Muslim Brotherhood in domestic Egyptian politics would significantly destabilise bilateral relations. It may also facilitate the growing trend of Hamas sympathisers, proponents of “radical Islam” as a serious alternative to the few steps that have so far been negotiated on Washington‟s Road Map. This hard line alliance is currently led by Iran, includes Qatar and has a close association with Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria.11 It also involves al-Jazeera, which serves as an „informal tool‟ of its foreign policy that was particularly evident during its coverage of sensitive regional issues, such as the protests in Barack Ravid, “Israel urges World to Curb criticism of Egypt‟s Mubarak”, Haaretz.com, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-urges-worldto-curb-criticism-of-egypt-s-mubarak-1.340238 (accessed 19th February 2011) 11 Simon Henderson and Matthew Levit “Qatar Challenges Washington on Hamas” Policy Watch/Peace Watch http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3004 (accessed 18th February 2011) 10

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Egypt.12 With the possibility of Egypt joining this group, a fault line could develop that splits government opinion across the Middle East. This is why the EU has expressed its desire to make rapid headway in the MEPP and has appealed for resolution before more uncertainty hands either party cause to recoil from the direct talks. It is clear from Israel‟s actions that it has a deep anxiety over the future of its national security. Such anxiety has manifested itself in allegations that Israel could re-occupy the Sinai if the Muslim Brotherhood secured an electoral victory.13 However, what Israel and others in the international community should consider is the low priority that the Egyptian protestors placed on Egyptian – Israeli relations during their time in Tahrir Square. Despite 32 years of peace between Egypt and Israel, the vast majority of Egyptians do not regard Israel as a friendly state, if not an enemy. The failure to achieve a final peace treaty between Palestinians and Israelis and the continuity of Israeli attacks against civilian Palestinians does not exactly make Israel Egyptians‟ favourite country. Egypt‟s foreign policy towards Israel is definitely going through a transformation; however, this transformation will rely on the tendencies of the political parties which will dominate Egyptian politics after the parliamentary and presidential elections. References Al Faisal, Turki (2011). Remarks at Gulf Research Meeting Opening Ceremony, University of Cambridge, 6 July 2011

The Guardian, “US Embassy Cables: Qatar Using al-Jazeera as Bargaining Tool”. Guardian.co.uk http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cablesdocuments/235574 (accessed 18th February 2011) 13 Mohioddin Sajedi, “Israel Mulling Sinai Attack?”, Press TV http://www.presstv.ir/detail/162770.html (accessed 19th February 2011) 12

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Ajbaili, Mustafa (2011). “Egypt military unveils parliamentary election rules,” Retrieved 22 July 2011 from http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/21/158610.html Al Arabiya News (2011). “Analysis: How Would Jordan and Morocco Change the Gulf Cooperation Council?”, Retrieved 22 July 2011 from http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/09/152623.html BBC news, “Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes”. Retrieved 22 July 2011 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east12801125 Egypt News, “Egypt Youth call for el-Baradei to replace Sharaf as PM”, Retrieved 22 July 2011 from http://news.egypt.com/english/permalink/20423.html Euro News, “Muslim Brotherhood Prepares for Egypt Vote”, Retrieved 22 July 2011 from http://www.euronews.net/2011/04/30/muslim-brotherhoodprepares-for-egypt-vote/ Fathi, Muhammad & Muhammad Sha‟aban, (2010). Min illy tard Wa‟il Ghunaym min midan al-Tahrir, Ahram newspaper. Retrieved 22 February 2011 from http://shabab.ahram.org.eg/Inner.aspx?ContentID=4091&typeid=3&year=201 0&month=04&day=04&issueid=6 Financial Times (2011). Leaked Cables Reveal Faith in Suleiman, Financial Times. Retrieved 22nd February 2011 from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f3295176321b-11e0-a820-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1E2nXTvlN Henderson, Simon and Matthew Levit, (2011). Qatar Challenges Washington on Hamas, Policy Watch/Peace Watch. Retrieved 18th February 2011from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3004 McCormick, Ty (2011). “How Revolutionary is Egypt‟s Post-Revolution Foreign Policy?”, Foreign Policy, Retrieved 23 July 2011 from http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/08/how_revolutionary_is_postrevolution_egyptian_foreign_policy Ravid, Barack. (2011). “Israel urges World to Curb criticism of Egypt‟s Mubarak”. Haaretz.com. Retrieved 19th February 2011 from http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-urges-world-to-curbcriticism-of-egypt-s-mubarak-1.340238

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Sajedi, Mohioddin. (2011). “Israel Mulling Sinai Attack?” Press TV. Retrieved 19th February 2011 from http://www.presstv.ir/detail/162770.html The Guardian, (2011). “US Embassy Cables: Qatar Using al-Jazeera as Bargaining Tool”. Guardian.co.uk Retrieved 18th February 2011 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/235574 Younes, Ali (2011) “The Nature of American-Egyptian Military Relations”, Palestine Chronicles. Retrieved 22 February 2011 from http://palestinechronicle.com/view_article_details.php?id=16646

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Saudi Women and Entrepreneurship Opportunities in Architecture and Interior Design Bright Future for new Graduates By: Ibrahim Y. Vaidď&#x20AC;Ş

Abstract: Female education trends in Saudi Arabia are changing. As a result, more women are studying different types of engineering, architecture, and interior design. Private and public institutions are competing to offer degrees in these related fields to attract more students. However, women are still facing many obstacles in finding jobs in engineering, architecture, and interior design companies. The purpose of this paper is to explore the various employment opportunities for architecture and interior design graduates. As well as working for architecture or interior design companies female graduates may find opportunities through entrepreneurship. This paper also discusses different opportunities for entrepreneurs to receive training in leadership, management, team building skills, loans, and business skills.

Keywords: Saudi Women, Entrepreneurship, Business Training, Architecture, Interior Design Leadership.

ď&#x20AC;Ş

Ibrahim Vaid is an educator, vocational educational consultant, and has a design practice. He can be reached at ibrahimyvid@hotmail.com

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Introduction fter graduating from colleges, universities, and private institutes, many Saudi women apply for jobs at a specific company, not realizing that other options are available where they can use their passion for design. For example, architecture or interior design graduates usually apply to architecture or interior design companies and think that if they do not find a job in either of these companies, it means the end of their career. However, this kind of thinking is not true at all. New graduates should not set their mind on specific companies to work for. Moreover, because of the many hurdles in the Kingdom, only 15% of women are contributing to the workforce. This is a major concern for the Princess Lolowah AlFaisal. The Chairman of Asharqia Chamber, Abdul Rahman bin Rashid Al-Rashid said, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Statistics show that about 82,000 women graduates are joblessâ&#x20AC;? (Abdul Ghafour, 2010). One of the reasons that women do not have jobs is because many companies have problems in creating a separate area for women. Designing and building separate areas and modifications in the existing building are expensive for businesses (Sidiya & Al-Jaseem, 2010 p. 1). This paper is written for Saudi women who are about to graduate or have already graduated in architecture or interior design fields, showing them that they do not have to work in architecture, interior design, or design related companies. Instead they have other choices. One of the choices is to be a successful entrepreneur.

The majority of Saudi families do not like female members of their family to work in a company and mingle with men due to various factors: family pressure, the way society views women, and cultural reasons. As a result more young women are working towards establishing their own businesses. In October 2010, the third edition of the Young Business Expo was organized for women entrepreneurs at the International Exhibition Center in Jeddah. Expos are the best

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place to find new clients or customers and to promote innovative ideas and products. Overwhelmingly, the participation of vendors in the expos indicated the growing trend of self employment. More than 300 Saudi entrepreneurs displayed their products and services. Many of them carried the motto of “All roads lead to success” (Al-Jassem, 2010). Rabab Mahmoud, who has an administration degree from King Abdulaziz University, also participated in the expo to promote her company. She works with local male and female engineers and designers to create gardens (Al-Jassem, 2010). There are many stories of successful women entrepreneurs for example: Maureen O‟Connor from O‟Connor Media Design, Kimberly Fowler from YAS Fitness Centers, Susan Gregg Koger from Modcloth‟s, and Anyi Lu from ANYI LU International.

Entrepreneur The word entrepreneur is a French word and is used for a building contractor or other contractor in general. However, now it is used in the same context as it is in English. There are many definitions of entrepreneur available, however according to Arthur & Sheffrin (2003), “An entrepreneur is a person who has possession of a new enterprise, venture or idea, assumes significant accountability for the inherent risks and the outcome” (p.6). This term applies to the type of personality who is willing to take upon himself or herself a new project or enterprise and accepts full responsibility for the outcome.

It is important to teach and train young children at an early age about entrepreneurship, because many successful entrepreneurs started their careers by watching other people, especially their fathers. Two school teachers, Hayley Romano and Pamela deWaal from West Milford, NJ got an idea to start an entrepreneurship program called

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TREP$. The program was piloted in the West Milford school district by working in a team with the PTA and earned the PTA‟s Champion for Children Award for the best new program. The Prince Salman Science Oasis (PSSO) followed the footsteps of the West Milford school district and organized TREP$ for the last two years, in Riyadh; the main objective of this program is to encourage students and parents to see the creativity, innovation and energy of young children to come up with the best innovative products. To make it successful, PSSO has offered a series of workshops to prepare participants in money management, instant response techniques, communication skills, risk taking, and inventive thinking. Supervisor General of PSSO, Dr. Khalid Taher said, “I really feel TREP$ Marketplace is successful in creating awareness among school children on the basic idea of entrepreneurship. Through our workshop, we were able to remove some of the misconceptions about doing business in the minds of young children” (Khan, 2010). Colleges and universities have recognized the need for entrepreneurship; as a result, in different parts of the world, institutions are offering entrepreneurship programs within the engineering and design programs. Washington State University is one of the leading institutes in the US which has established the Harold Frank Engineering Entrepreneurship Institute in the College of Engineering and Architecture. Besides entrepreneurial training, Harold Frank Engineering Entrepreneurship Institute (HFEEI) offers many services to students including free tutoring, women‟s mentoring, and more. Also, it has established its mission statement as, “The mission of the institute is to identify junior level engineering and business students who are interested in technological entrepreneurship, and to give them the tools and experiences needed to pursue their entrepreneurial ideas” (Entrepreneurship Institute, 2010). It would be a good idea if Saudi institutions study the best practices of HFEEI

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and institutions in other parts of the world, which offer entrepreneurship programs and incorporate entrepreneurship course(s) in female engineering programs, especially in the field of architecture and interior design. The study of entrepreneurship would encourage females to work independently, productively, and be empowered, which would also decrease the unemployment rate among women. Entrepreneurship develops from different circumstances and motives that drive the decision to start a business. In some cases, a family business influences other family members to enter into a business; or also, in one way or other to connect to their work experience, age, education, and family background. Letâ&#x20AC;&#x;s see an example of how family background helped start a business in a related field. Family X owns an importing business selling floor tiles; as a result other family members of X are also in the importing business, but may not be importing the same products. However, they are importing construction related products. Why are other family members in the importing business? By being in the importing business, family members know the requirements and advantages of importing goods; as a result the business knowledge passes on to other family members. Also, the environment of the family business helps other family members gain knowledge as well. Figure # 1 show family X and other family membersâ&#x20AC;&#x; businesses. Member # 1 has paints, # 2 has wall papers, # 3 has hardware, and # 4 has a kitchen cabinet importing business.

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Family X

Family X Importing Floor Tiles

Family X-Member # 1 Importing Paints

Family X-Member # 2 Importing Wall Papers

Family X- Member # 3 Importing Door Hardware's

Family X- Member # 4 Importing Kitchen Cabinets

Figure 1: Family X and its membersâ&#x20AC;&#x; importing businesses.

Education Education is power and providing education to women is healthy for all nations and the coming generations. Investing in women and young girls, the United Nations and the World Bank understand that girls and women represent a strong possibility to learn. According to Summers, the Chief Economist of the World Bank, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Investment in girls education may well be the highest return investment available in the developing worldâ&#x20AC;? (Kaaki, 2010). Therefore, nonprofit organizations prefer to invest their money and time in training women. An Indian-based aid organization that operates in Latin America, Asia, and Africa found very encouraging results in their work with women. According to Bunker Roy, manager of an Indian-based organization: The first thing we learned is the men are often un-trainable. So now we work only with women. We picked a woman from Afghanistan, from Mauritania, from Bolivia, from Timbuktu and in six months we train her to be a barefoot engineer working on water supplies or other issues (Kaaki, 2010).

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Bangladesh has invested a lot in vocational training and girls‟ education which has resulted in a flourishing clothing industry and a vibrant export sector, which exports all over the world (Kaaki, 2010). Education is very important for a healthy community and country. It increases knowledge and confidence to understand systems. But many entrepreneurs do not meet the education norm and yet are successful. For examples, Bill Gates of Microsoft was admitted to Harvard and took foundation or core courses but never graduated. Steve Jobs of Apple became a millionaire before the age of thirty but never made it to university. In both cases, they have been using computers since their teenage years. A report was prepared by a Monitor Group for Al-Sayeda Khadijah bint Khuwailad Businesswomen Center at the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) entitled “Businesswomen in Saudi Arabia: Characteristics, Challenges and Aspirations in a Regional Context”. It surveyed 300 businesswomen in Jeddah, Riyadh and the Eastern Province and has revealed that only 58% of women business owners have university degrees (Abullah, 2010). Business Licenses In the past, no one thought that Saudi women would own businesses. However, now many women are running small, medium, large, and home based businesses. According to Power, “The phrase, „Arab entrepreneur‟ was almost an oxymoron at the height of state control over the region‟s economies, but no more” (Power, 2005). More and more women are drawn towards business, as described by Molavi, “Slowly, tentatively, almost imperceptibly to outsiders, the kingdom is redefining is relationship with the modern world” (Molavi, 2006). After a long debate, the Jeddah municipality issued Saudi women permits to start their own businesses. Currently the Jeddah

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municipality is issuing women licenses to run business in the fields of clothing, tailors, hair salons, lingerie and accessories shops (Al-Jassem, 2010). An anonymous source from Jeddah municipality said that they are in the process of expanding more opportunities for women to start businesses, including coffee houses, bag, mobile and computer maintenance, restaurants, shoe shops, jewelry, perfumes, and wedding accessories stores (Al-Jassem, 2010). Training Opportunities Training plays a very active role in entrepreneurship. There are many associations which provide training and sponsorship to women entrepreneurs, especially chambers of business. Also, there are several local and foreign training program opportunities available for women to gain leadership and business skills; this training helps entrepreneurs to be successful, knowledgeable, and develop a lot of confidence in their work. In Saudi Arabia, all of the chambers of commerce have training centers. These training centers are funded by 12% fees collected from every company by the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA). Bab Rizq Jameel (BRJ) with the support of private and public sectors creates jobs, training programs, and provides interest free loans for women especially, who work from their homes. The executive director of BRJ Abdulrahman Abdulaziz Al Fihaid said recently women were offered computer and makeup courses and a training course entitled, “How to start your small project” (“BRJ Creates Jobs”, 2010). There are many women who are involved in creating jobs and supporting women in different ways to encourage them to be independent in their work. In December 2010, a Women in Leadership Conference was held in Jeddah, and many well known speakers were invited and several awards were awarded at the conference. For example, Lina Al-Maeena received a female entrepreneur award,

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Alwaleed Bin Talal Foundation for Women‟s Empowerment, and Mashael Al-Suleiman for Leading Woman in a Family Business. The Institute for Economic Empowerment of Women (IEEW), located in Oklahoma, USA, has a program to prepare women leaders called “Peace Through Business”. In this program many women entrepreneurs from the US provide long-term business training in war-torn countries by following the axiom of “educate a women, you educate a nation”. The summer of 2011, IEEW will invite 30 women from different countries. This kind of conference would be a great opportunity for Saudi women to benefit and receive valuable training. More information can be obtained about this program, from http://www.ieew.org/. The main objective of the conference is to make women learn self-sufficiency (Neese, 2010). Four members of the Women President‟s Organization (WPO) from the US visited Dar Al-Hekma a private college in Jeddah, and conducted a training program for Saudi women entrepreneurs. Trainers have a lot of practical business experiences and own million dollar businesses (Murry, 2010). Additionally, SCORE offers free faceto-face and online business counseling, mentoring, training, and advice for small businesses. It is a resource partner with the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). Furthermore, networking and training can also be received from Saudi Arabian women entrepreneurship such as: Young Arab Women Entrepreneurs, Women‟s Forum on Social Entrepreneurship, Advancing Entrepreneurship with Women, Saudi Arabia‟s Women Entrepreneur, Women‟s Incubator & Training Center and many more organizations. Additionally, women are eligible to receive many different types of business loans. However, many women are not aware of these opportunities. According to the President of the Ashreqia Young Businesswomen‟s executive council, Leyla Ashadawi, “Women also

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don‟t know how to get financial help and where to go, so it‟s very important to provide information about chambers that can help” (Khan, 2010 p. 2).

Successful entrepreneurs credit numerous variables: luck, being at the right place at the right time and having the right business. Also, it is important to do your homework before investing time and money. Only a few people make it as entrepreneurs, but other people fail and end up losing homes and putting their marriages in jeopardy (Bolton & Tompson, 2007). The first female Saudi human resource trainer and president of Ebda‟a Exchange Company, Noura AlShabaan said, “Women should believe that multiple attempts that fail can eventually lead to success … there are four elements that need to be in each woman to be successful employees. These elements are: thinking, planning, implementation, evaluation and development” (Sidiya & Al-Jaseem, 2010 p. 3). Innovation is not easy. It requires a lot of support and encouraging results. Innovators need to try again and again until they reach success in their invention (Al-Mukhtar & Al-Jaseem, 2010). A Saudi artist Fatima Ba‟azeem who organizes many workshops to discover young Saudi talent said, “I faced many difficulties to prove my talent and turn it into a profession” (AlMukhtar & Al-Jaseem, 2010).

On the other hand, typical behavioral characteristics of successful entrepreneurs are: a strong work ethic, liking the freedom to work, firmly believing in the work, creativity and innovation, having clear goals, willingness to take the lead on new ideas, accepting responsibility something having clear goals, creating capital, putting the customer or client first, managing risk, good networking skills, and sharpness in calculating risk.

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Other Work Opportunities The question arises about what other work opportunities and suitable work environments are available for Saudi females besides working full-time in a company from 8-5, or in many cases extended hours. There are many different types of job opportunities for female graduates in architecture and interior design, but the most suitable job would be self-employment, where they can set their own flexible hours and at the same time fulfill their personal and family responsibilities. There are two types of interior design programs. First, programs that have an art base and second, programs that have an architectural base. Architecture and interior design (architectural base) degrees share many similarities in courses and the kind of work available after graduating. Saudi females have opportunities to work in private/government sectors, or to start their own businesses. They can be involved in the designing of: villas, affordable homes, residential apartments, small to large scale malls, community centers, libraries, primary/middle/secondary schools, community/technical colleges, universities, textiles, trade shows, home offices, offices, lighting, store interiors, furniture, daycares, kitchens, baths, hospitals, hotels, motels, restaurants, factories, urban planning, landscaping, sustainable/environmental friendly buildings, modular/prefabricated homes, space planning, online design services, renovating, decorating, museum, interior of museum, interior of airplanes/ships, wedding stage sets, film/theater sets, exhibition stands, ergonomic/elder livings, green design, design consulting, and so on. On the other hand, women can also work in the fields of historical preservations, drafting, AutoCAD operators, construction documents or working drawings producers, estimators,

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estimating/sales, construction materials sales, construction schedulers, construction specifications writers, construction managers, educators (at schools, community colleges, and university levels) healthcare facility managers, real estate, builders, sub-contractors, general contractors (also called prime contractor), corporate facilities managers, construction safety managers, window treatments, and more. Design Business-Start-Up Costs Design business start-up costs for self employees are not a lot and in some cases most of the necessary tools and equipments are purchased by graduates as students. Most of the time architects or interior designers visit clients. However, in some cases clients would like to meet them in an office to make sure they are doing business with a legitimate professional. As a result, there must be a physical place where clients and design professionals can meet. Renting a place to start a business is one of the options, but it costs a lot, especially since new businesses do not acquire clients overnight. According to DO Architecture Ltd owner Adrian Stewart, â&#x20AC;&#x153;the simplest and most cost efficient (free) location is to create a home office-be sure to maintain separation between work and livingâ&#x20AC;? (Stewart, 2006). The basic office requires: model making tools, and design and drafting related supplies. Office supplies such as fax, phone, computer, desk, chairs, and computer with Microsoft Office, copy machine, different types of agreement forms, business cards, brochures, and printer are standard. Similarly, for design work, a drafting table with parallel bar, blue print machine, manual sketching and drafting tools, computer with design software, plotter, and material samples are needed. Additionally, a nice website, web links to major projects and

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portfolios. Also, attending different types of events to promote your business are required to attract new clients. Design and Construction Documents Agreement It is important to have a written contract prior to starting any design work. Providing a well written contract is the responsibility of architects and interior designers. Many owners do not understand the importance of having a contract and like to make a verbally agreement which can lead to many problems. A well written contract helps both parties to stay away from troubles and misunderstanding. Having a well written contract helps both parties satisfy and expectations. According to Dean Robert Camlin and Associates, Inc. owner architect Dean Camlin, “The construction contract describes the duties of the owner, contractor, and architect during the construction process” (Camlin, 2010). Conclusion There is no doubt that Saudi women need to think of different ways to work in the design fields. Their family pressures, cultural limitations, responsibilities as a mother and wife, being in technical fields dominated by males, transportation dependency on others, and segregated areas in offices are the main reasons for them to start their own businesses, or come up with innovative business ideas where they do not have to travel a lot, depend a lot on others, and still be satisfied with what they do. Additionally they have to come up with ideas from a list of Other Work Opportunities for architecture and interior design graduates to use their education, bright skills. Furthermore, there is not much attention given to “green design” in the Kingdom. This creates a big gap in the design industry and at the same time, provides chances for Saudi women to innovate solutions.

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Acknowledgements The author thanks all of reviewers for their detailed comments especially, Saad Vaid.

References Abdullah, S. (2010, July 29). Jeddah most friendly city for women entrepreneurs: Survey. Retrieved November 25, 2010, from http://www.zawya.com/marketing.cfm?zp&p=/printstory.cfm?storyid=Z AWYA2010072 9042109&1=0421100100...&cc Abdul Ghafour, P. K. (2010, January 27). Foreign Ministry announces raft of job vacancies for women. Arab News, p. 2. Al-Jassem, D. (2010, October 19). Business permits: Owned by Saudi women, but used by expats. Arab News, p. 4. Al-Jassem, D. (2010, October 20). Young entrepreneurs showcase products at Jeddah expo. Arab News, p. 3. Al-Jassem, D., & Al-Mukhtar., D. (2010, December 8). Talk about innovation. Arab News, p. 19. Arthur, S., & Sheffrin, M. S. (2003). Economic: Principles in action. Upper Saddle, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Bolton, B., & Thompson, J. (2007). Entrepreneurs Talent, Temperament, Technique. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Ltd. BRJ creates 39,718 jobs in 11 months. (2010, December 9). Saudi Gazette, p. 8. Camlin, D. (2010, March 30). What is Included in a Construction Contract? Retrieved January 25, 2011, from http://local.yodle.com/artiicles/what-is-includedin-a-construction- contract Entrepreneurship Institute. (2010). Harold Frank Engineering Entrepreneurship Institute. Retrieved December 24, 2010, from http://www.cea.wsu.edu/entrepreneurship. Kaaki, L. (2010, November 3). Women arenâ&#x20AC;&#x;t the problem; they are the solution along with men. Arab News, p. 22. Khan, S., A. (2010, December 9-15). Young entrepreneurs blossom at TREP$. Fun Times-A Saudi Gazette Publication, pp. 5-8. Khan, F. (2010, December 9). Training, sponsorship needed for businesswomen to succeed. Saudi Gazette, p. 2.

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Molavi, A. (2006, May 17). Young and Restless- Saudi Arabia's baby boomers, born after the 1973 oil embargo, are redefining the kingdomâ&#x20AC;&#x;s relationship with the modern world. Saudi-US Relations Information Service. Retrieved December 14, 2010, from http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2006/ioi/060517molavi-restless.html. Murray, D. (November 27, 2007). Oklahoma Business Woman Teams with Saudi PhD Candidate for Glasgow ISBE Conference. Retrieved November 25, 2010, from http://www.prweb.com/printer/571662.htm. Neese, T. (2010, November 12). Educate a Woman, Educate a Nation. WomenEntrepreneur. Retrieved November 25, 2010, from http://www.womenentrepreneur.com/print/article/1931.html. Power, C. (2005, June 20). Arabia retools. Newsweek International, p. 56. Sidiya, F., & Al-Jaseem, D. (2010, December 8). Forum seeks to find answers to womenâ&#x20AC;&#x;s employment hurdles. Arab News, pp. 1 & 3. Stewart, A. (2006, August 24). 10 Steps to setting up an architecture practice. Retrieved January 29, 2011, from http://www.scottisharchitecture.com/article/views/10+Steps+to+setting +up+an+architect ure+practice

459

Life as Politics How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Asef Bayat)

Reviewed By: Majid Rafizadeh 

Paperback: 320 pages



Publisher: Stanford University Press (October 21, 2009)



Language: English



ISBN-10: 0804769249



ISBN-13: 978-0804769242 Asef Bayat is Professor of Sociology and Middle Eastern Studies and holds the Chair of Society and Culture of the Modern Middle East at Leiden University, the Netherlands. He is the author ofMaking Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, 2007) and Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran (1997).



Majid Rafizadeh is an Iranian/Syrian scholar, currently conducting research at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and columnist for Harvard International Review.

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sef Bayat, a prominent scholar of social movements, workingclass activism, the agency of the urban poor, and the politics of space and place in the Middle East has published his most recent book entitled Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Bayat is a sociologist by training whose work has consistently been theoretically informed and engaged. His work as also largely been comparative due to his thorough knowledge of both Iran and Egypt, his work has also been largely comparative. In the past Bayat served as Academic Director of the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) which was established by a consortium of Dutch universities. Currently, Bayat is Professor of Sociology and Middle Eastern studies at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Bayat's most recent book provides an overview of the

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intellectual project that he has been engaged over the past decade. As a public intellectual and scholar, Bayat examines the lives of the working poor and other subordinated groups in the Middle East, including women. He observes how these groups have been forces for social and political change in the region. As such, he offers an alternative theoretical paradigm to the one of mainstream EuroAmerican political science which claims that (male) sociopolitical elites are the only significant agents of change. Life as Politics is a collection of articles and essays originally published by Bayat in a range of academic journals and edited volumes between the years 2000 and 2009. Bayat points out that, through the prism of prevailing social movement theories formulated largely by Western social scientists, many scholars have concluded that youth and/or women’s movement do not exist in the Middle East because the characteristics of these groups do not comply with the principle “framework”. This conclusion relies, specifically, on Euro-American patterns of historical development and sociopolitical contention. Given the fact that these social movement theories draw purely upon Western experiences, Bayat questions the extent to which predominant western social movement theories can account for the complexities and particularities of the socio-political and socio-religious “social movements” of the Middle East. He emphasizes that it is problematic to make a comparison that takes one of the elements of comparison as a “norm” while not questioning the “original configuration.” Because dominant western “models” have specific historical genealogies, it is debatable if they can effectively explain the intricate dynamics of the resistance and upheavals of the Middle East. Bayat contends that predominant western social movement theories fail to pay adequate attention to the way that disenfranchised urban youth in the region, “through their quiet and unassuming daily

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struggles, refigure new life and communities for themselves and different urban realities on the ground in Middle Eastern cities […] not through formal institutional channels, from which they are largely excluded, but through direct actions in the very zones of exclusion” (p. 5). The book argues that many Westerners who promote social change in the Middle East get it wrong by failing to comprehend the particular fluidity of the region’s people, social structures, movements, and cultures. Life as Politics has contributed to the conceptualization of social movements, agency and politics in the Middle East by introducing the term “social non-movements.” According to Bayat, “social non-movements” refers to the “collective actions of noncollective actors; they embody shared large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations” (p. 14). “Social nonmovements” develop by means of the “art of presence” as well as the “courage and creativity to assert collective will in spite of all odds, to circumvent constraints, utilizing what is available and discovering new spaces within which to make oneself heard, seen, felt, and realized” (p. 26). For Bayat, these non-movements are also the product of the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary people” through which the urban poor in the Middle East seek to cope with the impact of neo-liberal economic policies, globalization, and the failure of the state to address their needs. "Quiet Encroachment" is the “… non-collective but prolonged direct actions of dispersed individuals and families to acquire the basic necessities of their lives (land for shelter, urban collective consumption or urban services, informal work, business opportunities, and public space) in a quiet and unassuming illegal fashion” ( p. 45). One example of a non-movement is the way that Iranian women have been able to encroach upon and challenge patriarchal power despite limited domains and opportunities for open political activism. Other examples include urban youth struggling to create a space for “fun”

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lifestyles and ideologies which are not approved by the state or by Islamist movements; urban poor running their own parking services; Iranian youth throwing parties behind closed doors; daily cosmopolitan co-existence between Muslims and Christians in an Egyptian suburb; Muslim women wearing the veil, or hijab, based on their individual preferences; Egyptian and Iranian youth expressing themselves by balancing God, fun and sex; and the ways in which urban public spaces have transformed into locations of struggle in many parts of the Middle East. Bayat contrasts these movements with the organized social movements of the West. According to Western sociologists, “social movements” are constituted by three fundamental elements. First, movements must have an organized and sustained claim on the authorities. Second, they must hold a repertoire of performances such as street marches, public meetings, associations, and media statements. Third, through a variety of political actions, the movements have “public representations of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitments” (p.9). On the other hand, social movements in the Middle East bear different characteristics. First, they have a tendency to be unspoken, yet actionoriented. Their demands are made on an individual basis rather than through groups that are ideologically driven, audible and unified. Second, despite government sanctions, people practice their demands directly rather than organizing and mobilizing under leaders who put pressure on authorities. Finally, the resistance takes place during everyday life rather than through extraordinary deeds of mobilization such as attending meetings, lobbying, petitioning and so on. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East is a significant book and well worth reading. It is valuable work that makes a significant contribution to scholarship on contemporary urban social life in the Middle East. It is also a crucial source for scholars and activists who seek to gain a comprehensive and deep understand of

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the ongoing struggles of people in the Middle East who struggle for a better life in the face of severe socio-economic conditions and the brutality of oppressive, dictatorial regimes.

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Sexual Politics of Modern Iran (Janet Afary) Reviewed by: Majid Rafizadeh 

Paperback: 442 pages

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (April 27, 2009)



Language: English



ISBN-10: 0521727081



ISBN-13: 978-0521727082

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exual Politics of Modern Iran by Janet Afary is an important resource for those who want to understand shifting gender roles in Iran. The book meticulously explores the relationship between power, gender, and patriarchy and explains how the Iranian political and sexual context has been shaped in the past century. Janet Afary reveals that the women‟s movement, which was a response to the Iranian system of patriarchy, is not a new phenomenon. She does this by shedding light on the evolution of sexuality in Iranian society in the past century and the women‟s struggle for equal rights under the law. The book draws on historical documents, literature, poetry, letters and oral testimony that are enriched with a number of photographs, paintings, posters, newspaper cartoons and family portraits. She applies a broader theoretical framework on relevant passages from contemporary women‟s magazines, historical documents, literature, letters and oral testimony to a wide range of texts such as pre-modern Persian poetry, harem memoirs, testimonies from her own family members and texts by female activists. Sexual Politics in Modern Iran is organized into three sections. The first part covers late Qajar history, “Pre-modern practices” until the end of the Constitutional Period. The second part emphasizes westernized modernity and the history of women under the Pahlavi Dynasty. The third part covers the history of women from the Islamic Revolution to Islamist Modernity. Afary argues that the construction of modern sexuality was a historical process (confusing) in Iran as it was in the West. 'The first part of the book, which includes chapters on „Formal marriage‟, „Slave concubinage', temporary marriage, harem wives, class, 'status-defined

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homosexuality', and 'rituals of courtship‟ can be perceived as orientalist. The impacts of modernization and the project of normalizing heterosexuality led to drastic changes in the norms of intergenerational homoeroticism. In the late 19th, romantic and sexual attachments between adolescent boys and men, and sometimes between adult male couples, appear to have been the norm. The second part focuses on imperialist politics and state interventions in redefining normative sexuality, purity, unveiling bodies, romantic love, suffrage, marriage reform, and the threat of female sexuality. The Pahlavi political and military dynasty sought to „modernize‟ gender norms. They did this by initiating the „Women‟s Awakening‟ Project which included implementing policies such as the criminalization of the veil in 1936. During this period, some important reforms were made which included giving women autonomy over marriage-choices and raising the legal minimum age of marriage. The poetry of Forough Farokhzad and Sadeq Hedayat provided some examples of the shifting conceptualization of homosexuality, heterosexuality and gender roles. The final part of Afary‟s analysis contextualizes why the political left, as well as, some women‟s movements, allied with hard-line clerics- a move which has been considered regressive in West. It emphasizes that Islamist women‟s movements were shaped as aresponse to shifting gender roles and the gradual emergence of the sexual, social and financial empowerment Iranian woman. By unraveling hundreds of years of sexual history she deconstructs stereotypes such as the passive, veiled Muslim woman who is oppressed by a “backward” political and religious regime. The last part of the book details the “The Islamic Revolution, its sexual economy, and the Left”, the “emergence of Islamic feminism”

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and “Birth control, female sexual awakening, and the gay lifestyle”. It draws on the many advantages that women and normative heterosexuality gained under the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as the stringent gender restrictions, which are a reaction to these changes. The interactions, contradictions and excesses between state policies to control the female body, and leftist or Islamic women movements to dismantle the Iran‟s patriarchal societal framework, has led to shifts in gender roles. The Islamist state maintained some of the modernization programs that were implemented under the Pahlavu regime such as birth control and health care services to limit fertility. Although this is also an example of the states control over the female body, hundreds of thousands of women used these opportunities to enhance their life, particularly in villages. Janet Afary‟s example of Marziyeh Dabbagh provides a particularly fascinating picture of these interactions and contradictions. Dabbagh was Khomeini‟s bodyguard and a top military commander. As Afary states, even as Khomeini was denouncing the ability of women to function in public: “She wore modest modern clothes, drove a car, traveled, socialized, and spent much time away from her family, all without feeling guilty, since Khomeini himself had sanctioned her activities” (259). Because of her proximity to the leadership of the Islamist state and her compliance with the wishes of Khomeini, Dabbagh could push the traditional social limits of her conservative family which allowed her to achieve some level of individualized equality. By providing a thorough analysis of Iranian culture and history, the book is accessible to all readers, even those with little knowledge of gender and politics in Iran.

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‫محاوالث لترسُخ فكشة يهىدًت "اسشائُل "‬

‫ـــــــ‬ ‫فلسطينيو ‪ 84‬في مواجهة عاصفة تهويذ الزمان واملكان‬ ‫ـــــــ‬ ‫قوانين اسرائيلية لترسيخ فكرة يهودية اسرائيل‬ ‫ــــــ‬

‫نبيل السهلي‬ ‫‪Successive Israeli governments have considered since 1948, the‬‬ ‫‪mere existence of the Arab minority in its territory a danger.‬‬ ‫‪That's why they adopted a strategy aimed at continuing terrorism‬‬ ‫‪and racial discrimination to force Palestinians to leave so that‬‬ ‫…‪Israel could empty the land of its legitimate inhabitants‬‬

‫اعخب رررث الحكىم رراث لس ررشئُقُت ا خ ا ث ررت من ررز ع ررا ‪ 8491‬مج ررشد و ررىد‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ألا قُ ررت ال شةُ ررت ررً عسي ررفا ته رشا عقاه رراج فااخته ررذ ُالف ررا اس ررتراجُجُت اس ر هذفذ‬ ‫لسخمشاس ً إلاسهاب والخمُيز ال نصشي إل ث رراس الفقسهُنُين على الش ُل و إفشاغ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ألاسض من عهقفا الششعُين ج وجث ا لزلك ا الهِش لسشائُلً و ثقه ال صراااث‬ ‫الصررفُىاُت ج الشررخيرن والفااااررا ولًدسررل ااسجكرراب ال ذًررذ مررن ا جرراصس مجررضسة‬ ‫الق ررذ و الشمق ررت و ف ررش اس ر و ثُ ررت والهنه ررىسة وةق ررذ الش ررُخ ل ررذف ال ررشب ت رراس‬ ‫عسي ر ررف ‪.‬و ب ر ررذ رلر ررك اجث ر ررذ السر ررقهاث لس ر رشائُقُت سُاسر رراث اس ر ر هذفذ ه ر ر‬ ‫اجصال ألا قُت ال شةُت مر محُهفرا ال شتر ج و اولرذ رً افر الى رذ اسردُ امه‬

‫‪964‬‬

‫و دمجفر ر ر ر ررً ا جخمر ر ر لسر ر رشائُلً و لكر ر ررن عل ر ررى هامشر ر ررهج و عمقر ر ررذ ا ؤسس ر رراث‬ ‫لسر رشائُقُت اه ررذة لهمر ر الفىٍ ررت ال شةُ ررت ج فحاول ررذ ررل ال ررذسوص و الش ررش‬ ‫ىمُرراث منفصررقت ج و فشيررذ عقرراه الاذمررت إلالضامُررت ررً الهررِش لسرشائُلً منررز‬ ‫ع ر ر ررا ‪ 8491‬ج و اول ر ررذ الخفشٍ ر ر ا ر ررين ال ر ررشب ا س ر ررقمين و ا س ر ررُحُين و ج س ر ررُ‬ ‫ا سُحُين الى طىائف شش ُت و اشةُت ج و ا سقمين الى مزاهب مخخقفت ‪.‬‬ ‫و مر ررش ال ر ررشب دات ر ررل الا ر ر ألات ر ررش ا ر ر ر فت ر رراث ار ررين ع ر ررام ‪ 8491‬و‬ ‫‪1188‬ج و جمي ر ر ررزث الفت ر ر رررة ألاول ر ر ررى (‪ )8411-8491‬و هر ر ر ررً فتر ر ر رررة الحك ر ر ر ر ال سر ر ر رركشي‬ ‫ل‬ ‫لسر رشائُلً ااسخصر ررذاس اس ر رشائُل است ر ررت وز زر ررين ااىار ررا صر ررادسة ألاساة ر ر ال شةُر ررت‬ ‫سررىات جقررك التر ح ررىد مقكُ هررا ل فررين الفقسررهُنُين رً الشررخاث ج عو مررن عهررحامها‬ ‫ا ى ررىدًن ررً اس رشائُل الحاي ررشٍن الغ ررائثين وال ررزًن ً هن ررىن ررً ررشي وم ررذن اي ررر‬ ‫جقررك الت ر طررشدوا م هررا ‪ .‬ف لررى سررجُل ا ررال ال الحصررش ً هررن ررضت مررن اهررالً شٍررت‬ ‫ص ر ررفىسٍت ر ررً ر ررات الناص ر ررشة ا ر ررال شب م ر ررن ر ررشٍ ه الت ر ر ط ر ررشدوا م ه ر ررا ع ر ررا ‪8491‬‬ ‫وٍمن ىن من ال ىدة الاها ج وٍ رذس مجمرى الحايرشٍن الغرائثين انحرى (‪ )111‬الرف‬ ‫عشت فقسهُن ‪.‬‬ ‫ل‬ ‫و جىالرذ السُاسراث لسرشائُقُت صررادسة مضٍرذا مرن ألاساةر ال شةُررت ج و‬ ‫اقغذ ا صادسة عو فا رً ذراس ‪ُ 8491‬ر جمرذ مصرادسة اسرشائُل لنحرى (‪ )18‬علرف‬ ‫ل‬ ‫دوام ررا م ررن ررشي ررانين و عشاا ررت و ايره ررا م ررن ال ررشي الفقس ررهُنُت ررً الهقُر ررل و‬ ‫ا قر ج و علررى تقفُررت رلررك امررذ ألا قُررت ال شةُررت ررً عسيررفا اااخفايررت ًررى ألاسض‬ ‫ررً ال زررين مررن ذراس ‪ 8491‬ج و سر ت لفررا سررخت شررفذات مررن ال ررشي ا رزكىسة ج و‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫عصثح هزا الُى ًىمرا وطنُرا رً ُراة الشر ب الفقسرهُن رً كافرت عمرا ن جىا رذ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫جخجس ر ررذ فُ ر رره الى ر ررذة الىطنُ ر ررت الفقس ر ررهُنُت دفاع ر ررا ع ر ررن عشوةر ر ررت ألاسض و ي ر ررذ‬ ‫مصادستها من ثل سقهاث ل خ ل لسشائُلً ‪.‬‬ ‫ل‬ ‫و جث ا صرادسة ألاساةر ال شةُرت مرن ثرل الهرِش لسرشائُلً جحرذ ر‬ ‫و يشوساث ألامن ج فئن الفقسهُنُين على الشا من اسجفا مجمىعف من (‪)898‬‬ ‫ل‬ ‫علفا عا ‪ 8491‬الرى احرى مقُرىن و عب مائرت علرف عشتر فقسرهُن ًم قرىن احرى (‪)11‬‬ ‫ررً ا ائ ررت م ررن س رركان اس رشائُل ج اُ ررذ ع ه ر ال ًمقك ررىن س رىي ز ز ررت ررً ا ائ ررت م ررن‬ ‫ألاساةر التر ع ُمررذ عقاهررا اسرشائُل ررً عررا ‪ 8491‬والتر ج ررذس انحررى ‪ 91‬ررً ا ائررت‬ ‫مر ررن مسر ررا ت فقسر ررهين الخاسٍخُر ررت الثقغر ررت ‪ُ 19114‬قر ررىمتر مشت ر ر ‪ .‬و محاولر ررت م هر ررا‬

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‫ل هىٍذ ماجث ى من اساة احىصة ألا قُت ال شةُرت داترل الار ألات رش ج و ير ذ‬ ‫السررقهاث لس رشائُقُت مخههرراث ل هىٍررذ الهقُررل و سررش التر ررض ال شت ر ررً ا نه ررت‬ ‫ا ررزكىسة ج و رل ررك عب ررر مس ررمُاث مخخقف ررت ؛ ررً ا ذم ررت م ه ررا م ررا ٌسر ر مش ررشو‬ ‫جهررىٍش منه ررت الهقُررل ج و مشررشو اجمررت داود ل ررا ‪ 1111‬ج ُ ر ًكمررن الفررذ‬ ‫مرن جقررك ا شرراسَ ا شرراس الاهرا وايرهررا الررى إلاتر ل ارالخىاصن السرركا لصررالي الاهررىد‬ ‫ً ا نه ت الشمالُت ج الت ج مذن الهقُرل ج م رل الناصرشة و تر وادي عراسة‪.‬‬ ‫وال ف ررذ اا رره ت ر ل الس ررنىاث ال قُق ررت ا اي ررُت اسخص ررذسث ا ؤسس ررت لس رشائُقُت‬ ‫سصمررت ررىااين مررن شررا ها ح ضٍررض وجشسررُخ فكررشة يهىدًررت اس رشائُل ؛ ومررن عتهررش جقررك‬ ‫ال ىااين ؛ ااىن الهنسُت و ااىن النكثرت الرزي ًح رش علرى ل قُرت ال شةُرت ا ُرات‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ر ررشي اكثررت الش ر ب الفقسررهُن ؛ف ر ع ررن ررىااين جمن ر الت رزاو اررين اف رشاد م ررن‬ ‫ل قُررت داتررل الار لت ررش مر ال ررشب الفقسررهُنُين ررً ال ررفت الغشةُررت و هررا‬ ‫اررضة ؛ ورلررك بغُررت الحررذ مررن الخىاصررل الررذًمىاشا ً؛ لكررن ألاتهررش كرران اسخصررذاس‬ ‫ااىن ا ىاطنت والىالت الزي ًفشض على ألا قُت ال شةُت لعترا من ت ل س‬ ‫ااهىدًت اسشائُل ثل الحصىل على الهنسُت لسشائُقُت ‪.‬‬ ‫وجكمررن مخ رراطش جق ررك ال ررىااين لس رشائُقُت الت ر حس رراسعذ وجي رررة ص ررذوسها‬ ‫إارران كىمررت اخنُرراهى الحالُررت اخررذاعُاتها ا سررخ ثقُت الاهيرررة علررى و ررىد ل قُررت‬ ‫ال شةُ ررت ؛ و ررذ ًك ررىن الخحر ررذي لهر ر ال ررزي سر ررُىا فه ال ررشب الفقس ررهُنُىن ر ررً‬ ‫الذاتل جقك السُاساث لسشائُقُت الشامُت الى صعضعت و ىده أ قُت ً اسيفا‬ ‫بغُررت طشدهررا ررً هاًررت ا هررا ؛ ولفررزا ًخهقررب لمررش محاولررت الكشررف عررن ا سررخىس‬ ‫مررن جقررك السُاسرراث ومخاطشهررا ؛ ااالعخمرراد علررى تهرراب فقسررهُن ًخجرراوص ع ررذة‬ ‫لا سا الحاصل ؛ ُ ٌ خبرر اسرخمشاس و رىد ل قُرت ال شةُرت رً عسيرفا سصرُذا‬ ‫دًمىاشافُا ووطنُا له داللت مثاششة على الفىٍت ال شةُت ل سض الت ا ُمذ عقاها‬ ‫اس رشائُل ؛ و ررذ ًك ررىن رل ررك ال ررشد الح ُ ر عل رى مخهه رراث وسُاس رراث ا ؤسس ررت‬ ‫لسشائُقُت الشامُت الى جشسُخ فكشة يهىدًت اسشائُل ‪.‬‬

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Role of Arab militaries in popular uprisings By James M. Dorsey

Abstract: The structure and role of the armed forces in Egypt and Tunisia made the relatively peaceful overthrow of autocratic rulers in both countries the exception in the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly the structure of the military helps explain the violence in Libya, Syria and Yemen. It foreshadows worse violence in countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia should their regimes face similar uprisings. Keywords: arab spring, uprisings, revolutions, democratic movement, civil society, military, Middle East

he videos of the Syrian military shelling some of the country’s cities and Libyan forces pounding rebel-held towns present a dramatic picture of relations between the military and civil society across the Middle East and North Africa. Also, scenes of Egyptians protesting the armed forces’ alleged efforts to derail their revolution and Bahrainis being crushed by security forces produce a picture of a popular Arab revolt 

James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. This story also ran as an RSIS Commentary.

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sweeping across two continents from the Gulf to the Atlantic coast. They threaten to put Arab security and military leaders either in the dock of the International Criminal Court in The Hague or on the target board of protesters on Cairo's Tahrir Square. The picture goes some way to explain the differences in the efforts to create a democracy in Tunisia and Egypt, the two states where the revolt has toppled autocratic leaders; the battles that are engulfing Syria, Libya and Yemen; and the crushing of the uprising in Bahrain. Finally, it creates a framework to predict how revolts will unfold in Middle Eastern nations that have so far been able to contain protests or have yet to be hit by them. Distrusting the military One key to understanding the role of the military is the fact that Arab rulers, republican and monarchic, distrust their armed forces. To shield themselves from potential threats by the military, rulers have opted for different models: totally sidelining the military; buying it off with a stake in national security and lucrative economic opportunities; focusing on key units commanded by members of the rulerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s family; creating parallel military organisations; staffing the lower and medium ranks with expatriates; or most recently creating a separate mercenary force. Ironically, the appearance of a uniformed military officer on Egyptian television in February to announce the departure of President Hosni Mubarak and subsequently to read edicts of the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s new military rulers revived memories of the military coups of the 1960s to 1980s in the region as well as elsewhere in the world. The truth, however, is quite different. The Egyptian military is said to be eager to return to its barracks, but not before it ensures that its interests are protected in and after the transition to democracy. Mubarak secured the militaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s loyalty by giving it control of national as opposed to homeland security and allowing it to build an independent relationship with its US counterparts that enabled it to create a military industrial complex as well as a commercial empire in other sectors.

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To preserve its prerogatives, the military has announced that it will, prior to elections adopt a declaration of basic principles that would govern the drafting of a constitution. The declaration would be designed to ensure that Egyptâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s next elected leader will have no choice but to keep the militaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interests in mind. Elections would enable the military to return to its barracks but retain its grip on national security, including the right to intervene in politics to protect national unity and the secular character of the state; maintain its direct, unsupervised relationship with the United States; be shielded against civilian oversight and scrutiny of its budget; and keep control of its economic empire. In effect, the military would continue to enjoy the privileged status it had under Mubarak. Tunisian, Syrian and Libyan models The Egyptian militaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s approach is in stark contrast to that of Tunisia, which rid itself of its autocratic leader a month earlier than Egypt did. There a commission is discussing the best way to limit presidential power involving a range of proposals ranging from a presidential to a parliamentary regime. The fact that President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali, in one of his first moves after coming to power, decimated the military and ensured that unlike the Egyptian armed forces it had no stake in the system he built, has meant that the Tunisian force had no reason to obstruct real change; indeed if anything, it was likely to benefit from reform that leads to a democratic system, in which it would have a legitimate role under civilian supervision. The structure of the military also provides models for responses to popular uprisings elsewhere in the Middle East. In Syria, Libya and Yemen, autocratic rulers have been able to employ brutal force in continuing attempts to crush revolts because rather than sidelining the military, they have ensured that key units are commanded by members of the ruling family. This has given those well-trained and well-armed units a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and effectively neutralised the risk of potential defections in times of crisis.

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As a result, defections from the Libyan, Syrian and Yemeni military have not significantly weakened the grip of autocratic rulers and their ability to crack down on anti-government protesters. The defections have strengthened the protesters and rebels but have not significantly altered the balance of power. The exception perhaps is Yemen where an attack by a dissident unit on the presidential compound of President Ali Abdullah Saleh seriously injured him and many of his officials. That assault however was launched only after forces loyal to Saleh attacked the unit’s headquarters. Bahraini, Saudi and Iran models A fourth model is that of Bahrain where military and security forces crushed a popular revolt. The fact that much of the rank and file consists of foreigners, mostly Pakistanis, explains the regime’s ability to employ brutal violence against the mainly Shia protesters in the island-nation of only 1.2 million people. Finally, there is the Saudi and Iranian model with a variant in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that has been tested only to a limited degree. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have built competing military forces; in Iran’s case the controversial Revolutionary Guards Corps and in Saudi Arabia the National Guard now commanded by King Abdullah’s son, that operate independent of the armed forces. The UAE this year invested over US$500 million in the creation of a mercenary force, designed to quell civil unrest in the country as well as in the region. The structure of Middle Eastern military forces suggests that the Arab revolt is likely to be met with repeated violence and bloodshed and potentially civil war in countries with competing military forces. That raises the prospect of a decade of instability and strife in a geo-strategically crucial part of the world.

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What’s Your Theology Like? - As Seen Through the Triad of Knowledge, Good Deeds and Spirituality By: Dr.Adis Duderija

t would be fair to assert that every religious tradition in human history has highly valued and continues to highly value knowledge, good deeds and spirituality (i.e. in sense of performance of some kind of religious rituals) however differently they were/are defined or put into practice. What is interesting to explore, and this is the aim of this short article, is the idea of the relative importance placed on these three pillars of religious tradition one vis-a-vis the other. This could be accomplished both comparatively (i.e. across different religions) and well as within the various strands of a particular religious tradition. It could also be examined chronologically tracing any possible patterns or shifts in patterns. An examination of this ‘prioritising’ is useful as it would give us an insight into the ‘ideal’ types of theologies prevalent among the adherents of religious traditions and perhaps be used as a method for developing typologies of theologies. What I mean by prioritising or the relative importance given to one of the pillars in relation to the other can be best illustrated with the following example. Imagine you had six hours a day to dedicate to expanding your knowledge (not necessarily religious in the narrow term of the word but inclusive of it), doing good deeds or engaging in spiritual rituals? Percentagewise how would you



Research Associate University of Melbourne.

477

ideally divide this time up? The answer to this question would, in my view, be indicative of the type of theology you subscribe to. In what follows I‘d like to briefly identify and discuss three different ‘ideal types’ of theologies prevalent in my religious tradition of Islam today through the lens of this triad of knowledge-good deeds- spirituality. Of course, there is a rich history of ideas pertaining to this problematic in Islamic history, especially in relation to the definition of faith/belief (iman). The views on this problematic can be conceived as a kind of a continuum. One side there were advocates who insisted that good deeds (including the normatively prescribed rituals) were an essential prerequisites of iman with the implication that the failure to perform them was tantamount to apostasy- a crime many considered to be punishable by death. On the other hand there were those who subscribed to the view that a tacit or a verbal expression of proclaiming the faith was considered sufficient to be part of the faith community. My intention here is not to revisit these but to describe, in broad contours, some of the contemporary theologies among Muslims and some of their implications in relation to issues such as nature of revelation and scripture, the relationship between law and ethics and others. One such theology I call progressive. Progressive theology gives priority to orthopraxis over orthodoxy. This means that it considers performance of good deeds more important than acquisition of knowledge leading to ‘correct ‘ faith/belief or that of engaging in ritual . For this type of theology the human and the human condition are central to it. The discussions pertaining to how to arrive at ‘correct belief’, those centring on nature of God and its relationship with the cosmos and the living creation are of secondary importance. Instead, the alleviation of extreme poverty, being on the side of the wretched, marginalised, stigmatised, and the downtrodden is not only considered the purpose and the primary function of religion it is also viewed as an essential prerequisite leading to orthodoxy. This

478

theology, in my understanding of it, holds that humans are considered to experience the Divine most readily and immediately through their interactions with other human beings rather than by contemplating abstractly on the Divine , observing the nature or engaging in various spiritual exercises ( i.e. ritual). Furthermore, this theological orientation , in my view, by implication favours inductive over deductive reasoning/thinking because its foundation and starting point is the world of the human condition with its incredible diversity (including the religious) and complexity which makes it very difficult to think in binary terms (e.g. having salvation –not having salvation). Furthermore, this theology, by giving primacy to good deeds and to the human and by being less concerned about knowledge leading to ‘correct’ belief is also more likely to be egalitarian eschewing any form of hierarchies , most notably those based on gender , sexual orientation, race or ethnicity. In addition, it is more likely to be open to and accommodating of the idea of religious pluralism, i.e. the premise that none of the reified religious traditions made in the crucible of history (as well as those in the present and the future) are capable of objectively and fully capturing the Divine, thus none can claim monopoly over God. This, in turn, translates into the notion that, according to this progressive theology, the idea of God is not fully graspable to the human either through his intellect, mind, reason or the ‘heart’. By definition it also implies that the sacred scriptures cannot offer us humans an unequivocal, clearly accessible and once and for all valid understanding of God through the simple process of reading/interpretation. Instead, it considers the human interpreter and her subjectivities and contingencies as most significantly determinative of the process of interpretation envisaged as a never ending dynamic process that continually evolves with reason. There is, in other words, an organic and dialectical relationship between revelation and reality. Furthermore, this theology gives precedence to reason- based ethics over law. It insists that law must be in constant service of ethics and that law ought to evolve with evolving ideas about ethics as developed by humanity- and in

479

the post-revelatory period this evolution is exclusively driven by reason/intellect. Put succinctly, this theology embraces and even thrives on pluralism, diversity and what’s fundamental to all of it, uncertainty. Based on my own observations I consider this to be a minority theological position among contemporary Muslims, especially among the clerical establishment, but, importantly, a growing one. The second type of theology can be described as purist. According to this theology, religion is all about correct belief (i.e. knowledge) and everything else is secondary to it. The central concern for the purists is how to, or put more precisely, from whom to obtain the correct knowledge in order to arrive at correct faith/belief. The nature of legitimate knowledge and its sources is, thus, very specifically defined, delineated and guarded. What follows from this is the idea that this purist theology is fixed centrally on discourses pertaining to God’s essence and nature rather than being focused on the human condition. God is primarily to be found/discovered in the sacred and other canonical scriptures rather then It being experienced through human social intercourses or by contemplating about /on nature and the cosmos. I refer to this as a scripturalist dimension of purist theology or scripturalism. As a corollary, scripturalism is closely linked to what could be termed positivist legalistic theology which views law as not only more superior to ethics but the very embodiment of it. Furthermore, ethics and reason are considered as not subject to evolution and to possess potential for positive change and growth (i.e. progress). The law, according to this view, does not have a scripturally independent objective, underpinning or rationale. This theology favours, as such, deductive over inductive thinking/reasoning. In its epistemology and methods it resembles natural sciences and eschews uncertainty. Purist theology also favours decontextualized thought and defines good deeds rather statically and literally-independent of their underlying moral trajectories. Furthermore, the ‘rights’ of God are defined often as independent of at times in opposition to and always given

480

precedence over to that of the’ rights’ of humans. The purists’ legalistic theology combined with scripturalism and strong opposition to the possibility of progress defined above also facilitates hierarchical structures, especially those based on religious creed or gender. As a result purist theology shuns religious pluralism, endorses various forms of gender inegaliterianism favouring the prevalent social and cultural customs and conditions of the time of the religious traditions formation and makes forceful theologically exclusivist claims. The scripturalist and decontextualized dimension of purists’ theology also significantly contributes to its strong hermeneutical inclination for narrowing down of legitimate or ‘authentic interpretation’s of the sacred and canonical texts. This theology, in various hues and degrees, in my view has considerable presence among contemporary Muslims. The last ideal type discussed here is what I refer to as spiritual ritualistic theology. Here self -introspection and deep meditativelike contemplation takes central stage in contrast to the social human condition (progressive) or that of the scriptures (purists). This contemplative quality takes often form in the engagement in elaborate rituals and recitation of sacred mantras/formulae either in isolation or in a communal setting. This sort of theology often employs the symbolism of the ‘heart’ as the locus of ‘true’ source of knowledge about God in contrast to that of the ‘intellect’ or ‘the sacred text’. As history testifies what is interesting about this type of theology is that it can lead or be accommodative of both progressive-like and purist-like theologies. It can function within the confines of ‘the law’ in form of positivist legal theology mentioned above –therefore be purist –like- or transcend it entirely by adopting an ethically underpinned theology of the progressives. What does the future hold for these three ideal types of theologies? Are certain types going to be more likely to capture the minds and the hearts of the people? This question, of course,

481

remains open. However with the rise of the moral consciousness, the noosphere, with its simultaneous strong focus on the human condition, deep sharing of emotion, and the embrace of diversity it seems that the progressive theology is best equipped for meeting the ‘religious-spiritual’ needs of those humans who identify themselves to be ‘people of faith’.

482