Middle East Studies ISSN 2109-9618
Middle East Studies Online Journal. Volume: 2. Issue: 5. دراسات الشرق األوسط العذد المجلذ الثاني.الخامس Editor-in-Chief : Hichem Karoui
2011
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HTTP://WWW.MIDDLE-EAST-STUDIES.NET
Issue N°5- Volume 2 – (2011)
Editor-in-Chief Hichem Karoui
Have contributed to this issue the following authors:
Position Paper: Aysha Taryam: Cupcake And Abaya Nation
Research Papers: Arno Tausch: On The Global Political And Economic
Environment Of The Current Al-Jazeera Revolution Andrey V. Korotayev and Julia V. Zinkina: Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis Moshe Behar : One-State, Two-States, Bi-National State: Mandated Imaginations In A Regional Void Rawaa Mahmoud Hussain: Iraqi Dogmatism: A Historical and Critical Approach Akbar Valadbigi and Shahab Ghobadi: The Era of Globalisation and Ethnical Developments in the Middle East
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Perspectives Burhan Ghalioun سوريا على طريق:ثورة الكرامة والحرية برهان غليون
[Syria on the road to Dignity and Freedom Revolution] Faten Karoui-Bouchoucha: Tunisie … Réflexions sur une révolution Issam A.W. Mohamed: Economic Perspective of Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Technology Transfer and Rural Water Use in Darfur Hassan El Mossadak: Vers une nouvelle théorie
d’engagement : action communicationnelle et choix rationnel Philippe Jourdon: Hommage à Kurt Rothschild… Sur les traces d’une théorie économique pour demain !
Book Reviews Jacob Greenberg (reviewer): Making Islam Democratic:
Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn Ibrahim Abrash : Arab Epistemologic Approach of Political Sociology إبراهيم أبراش- علم اإلجتماع السياسي في مقاربة ابستمولوجية عربية
A Last Word: David Swanson: Is Israel’s Right Wing in Eric Cantor’s
District?
Books Received: - Konrad Pedziwiatr: The New Muslim Elites in European Cities: Religion and Active Social Citizenship Amongst Young Organized Muslims in Brussels and London
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-Hichem Karoui, Arno Tausch: Les Musulmans… Un cauchemar ou une force pour l’Europe?
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- Arno Tausch with Chr. Bischof & K. Mueller: “Muslim calvinism�, internal security and the Lisbon process in Europe
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A Position Paper Cupcake And Abaya Nation Aysha Taryam
Abstract: The author, who happens to be a female business-leader, calls the Emirati women to seek other businesses than the traditional Abaya and cupcake shops... Key-words: United Arab Emirates, Arab women, business-ladies, emancipation, modernity...
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mirati women have always been leaders in the pursuit of selfactualisation. With the birth of the Emirates they saw their dreams manifesting into realities at the hands of our father and the founder of our beloved country the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. It is because of his extraordinary efforts in encouraging women’s education throughout the Emirates that we are here today. In the 1970s Emirati women sought knowledge with an insatiable thirst and had the courage to venture into worlds previously unknown to them. Nevertheless they ploughed their way through male dominated arenas and proved their abilities admirably. From being mothers in their homes they became teachers in our schools, filling positions that prior to their
Aysha Taryam, whose political commentaries and philosophical essays have set the world of readers talking, is the first Middle Eastern female Editor-in-Chief of an English language daily broadsheet newspaper – The Gulf Today. Aysha, a scion of the family that owns the Gulf media house Dar Al Khaleej, is endowed with a rare literary wherewithal to conceive and discuss issues of socio-economic significance.
involvement saw only hired teachers from across the Middle East. Our pioneering Emirati women of the 70s were role models then and remain ones today. By the 1980s, Emirati women constituted 6.2 per cent of the UAE’s workforce. Today this figure has risen to well above 50 per cent proving beyond any doubt that their long sought-after dream of financial independence had been achieved. Today, in a bold yet welcomed step many Emirati women have decided to leave their jobs and seek private business ventures instead. Soon after, we began to see local businesses entirely owned and run by Emirati women. At first these business ventures came in the form of abaya stores. The abaya is the Emirati woman’s national dress and therefore understandably it became her first outlet for fashion expression. It was indeed refreshing to see Emirati women designing their own national dress for who better to translate the experience of wearing abayas into fashion than the women that live in them on a daily basis. This move transformed a staple of UAE society into the ultimate fashion accessory, pushing its prices upwards from a few hundred dirhams in the 1990s well into the thousands today. This proved that abaya stores are great business models and profitable ventures. Soon every women stopped wanting to buy abayas and started making them. The country became littered with abaya stores and, in an odd twist on the theories of supply and demand, the more stores there were and the higher the prices got, the more people demanded them. Once the national black cape market had been saturated our Emirati woman moved on to something a little bit sweeter, dessert making. In a decision reminiscent of the 1950s American woman’s pie baking ventures the cupcake craze was born in the UAE. Some opened up cupcake stores, others baked them from home and delivered them to designated locations. This also proved to be a venture too sweet to fail and with that the skies of the Emirates filled with the smell of freshly baked cupcakes. While there is absolutely nothing wrong with replicating business models that have proved successful, it seems that Emirati women have backed themselves into an icing slathered corner. If you ever had an opportunity to walk around university fairs that showcase students’ business models you might get the impression that ideas have stagnated and become sandwiched between food and fashion.
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What happens to the remaining business sectors? Have they become barely visible through the rows of abayas and the ensuing sugar rush? Young Emirati women should realise that there lies great potential and room for profits in different business areas offering them not only ease of entry but also an opportunity to be female pioneers. Innovation is a word we live by in the UAE. Always seeking new heights, always pushing forward, we must not lose this passion for excellence. Daring to be different has its risks but brings with it change and variety. Emirati women have proven that they are worthy competitors in the work place and must now aim to prove that in all private business sector too.
Arabic Version
عمل المرأة اإلماراتية وشغف التميز عائشة عبداهلل تريم ، وعندما أبصر احتاد اإلمارات العربية النور. كانت ادلرأة اإلماراتية ومازالت رائدة يف السعي لتحقيق ذاهتا فتحت ادلرأة عينيها لًتى أحالمها قد حتولت إىل حقيقة على يدي والدنا ومؤسس دولتنا احلبيبة الشيخ فلوال جهوده اجلبارة يف أضلاء البالد كافة يف دفع ادلرأة. رمحو اهلل وطيب ثراه،زايد بن سلطان آل هنيان .وتشجيعها على التزود بالعلم دلا وصلنا إىل ما ضلن عليو اليوم بدأت ادلرأة اإلماراتية سعيها لتحصيل العلم وادلعرفة خبطوات حثيثة،ويف السبعينات من القرن ادلاضي ، ورغم ذلك. وقد كانت ُشجاعة مبا فيو الكفاية لدخول رلاالت غريبة وجديدة عليها،وبظمأ شديد وأثبتت جدارة،مشت ادلرأة اإلماراتية خبطوات واثقة لتشق طريقها يف قطاعات ىيمن الرجل عليها .وقدرات تدعو إىل الفخر واالعجاب
Courtesy: Aysha Tariam and the Gulf Today. This paper has been published first by the Gulf Today, April 17, 2011. < http://gulftoday.ae/portal/84d4d161-111c-42d4a1b7-1758691f0a3a.aspx >
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وخرجت ادلرأة األم من بيتها لتصبح معلمة وتشغل مناصب كانت حكراً على الرجال ،وأصبحت يف ميدان العمل تنافس ادلعلمني الوافدين الذين كانوا يتدفقون من كل بلدان الشرق األوسط للعمل يف اإلمارات .لقد كانت امرأة السبعينات الرائدة ،قدوة لبنات جيلها ومازالت حىت اليوم منوذجاً حيتذى بو . ويف الثمانينات ،بلغت نسبة النساء 2،2يف ادلئة من القوة العاملة يف اإلمارات .واستمرت ىذه النسبة يف ارتفاع حىت غدت يف يومنا ىذا أكثر من 00يف ادلئة .ويف ىذا دليل قاطع على أن ادلرأة اإلماراتية قد وصلت إىل ما كانت تصبو إليو وحققت أحالمها يف االستقالل مادياً. ومل تكتف ادلرأة الطموحة مبا وصلت إليو ،بل واصلت مسريهتا االقتصادية ادلستقلة ،ويف خطوة جريئة قوبلت بالًتحيب الشديد ،قررت نساء كثريات التخلي عن الوظيفة والسعي وراء ادلشاريع التجارية اخلاصة ،وسرعان ما بدأت مشاريع متلكها وتديرىا النساء تظهر على الساحة التجارية احمللية. ويف بادئ األمر ،اقتصرت تلك ادلشروعات التجارية على متاجر للعباءات ،أي على زي ادلرأة اإلماراتية الوطين .وقد كان من الطبيعي أن تكون العباءة النافذة األوىل اليت تطل منها ادلرأة على عامل األزياء. وشلا يدخل البهجة واحلبور إىل القلب ،أن نرى ادلرأة اإلماراتية تصمم زيها الوطين بنفسها ،فمن أقدر على ترمجة جتربة ارتداء العباءة إىل أزياء من امرأة تلبسها كل يوم؟ لقد حولت خطوة ادلرأة ىذه مادة أساسية يف اجملتمع اإلمارايت إىل أزياء ارتفعت أسعارىا من بضعة دراىم يف التسعينات إىل ما يربو على آالف الدراىم اليوم ،ما يثبت أن متاجر العباءات مناذج جتارية عظيمة ومشروعات تعود بالربح الوفري. ويف زمن قياسي ،هتافتت النساء على شراء وتصنيع العباءة اإلماراتية ،فغصت البالد مبتاجر العباءات، وخالفاً لنظريات العرض والطلب ،ازداد عدد ادلتاجر ،فارتفعت أسعار العباءات وزاد الطلب عليها. وعندما غرق السوق بالعباءة الوطنية السوداء ،انتقلت ادلرأة اإلماراتية إىل شيء أكثر حالوة ،أال وىو صنع احللوى .وقررت يف ما يذ ّكر مبشروعات طهو الفطائر وصنع ادلربيات اليت اشتهرت هبا ادلرأة األمريكية يف اخلمسينات ،أن تصنع الكعك الصغري أو كعك القوالب ليتحول يف اإلمارات إىل ظاىرة تشبو اجلنون .وقامت بعض اإلماراتيات بفتح زلال لبيع ىذا الكعك ،أما البعض اآلخر فقد قمن خببزه يف البيت وارسالو إىل زلالت سلصصة.
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ومرة أخرى ،أثبتت ادلرأة اإلماراتية أن النجاح سيكون حتماً حليف مشروعها احللو .ومع الوقت، فاحت يف جو اإلمارات رائحة الكعك الطازج ادلسكوب يف قوالب صغرية. وبالرغم من أن تكرار النماذج التجارية الناجحة ال عيب فيو البتة ،لكنو من الواضح أن ادلرأة اإلماراتية قد حشرت نفسها يف زاوية مطلية بسكر احللوى .فإذا ما قدر ألحدكم أن يتجول يف معارض اجلامعات حيث تقام مشروعات الطالب التجارية الصغرية فالبد أن يتكون لديو انطباع بأن الركود قد أصاب الفكر اليت أصبحت زلصورة بني الطعام واألزياء. ترى ما الذي حدث للقطاعات التجارية األخرى؟ ىل اختفت خلف صفوف العباءات واجتياح السكر؟ على اإلماراتيات الشابات أن يدركن أن القدرة ىائلة يف فرص الربح يف اجملاالت التجارية ادلختلفة اليت ال متهد ذلن الطريق لولوج عامل األعمال فحسب ،بل تعطيهن الفرصة كي يصبحن رائدات يف ىذا اجملال أيضاً .اإلبداع كلمة نعيشها يف إماراتنا ،وضلن نسعى دائماً للوصول إىل أعلى ادلستويات، وصلد يف ىذا السعي باستمرار ،وينبغي أال نفقد شغف التميز .وإذا كان للجرأة واجملازفة سلاطرىا ،فهي البد جتلب معها التغيري والتنوع .ولقد أثبتت ادلرأة اإلماراتية أهنا منافسة جديرة يف مكان عملها ،وعليها اآلن ،أن تسعى لتثبت ذلك يف القطاع التجاري اخلاص أيضاً. دار اخلليج 11نيسان/أبريل 2011
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Research Paper On the global political and economic environment of the current Al Jazeera revolution Arno Tausch Abstract: The current revolutionary movement in large parts of the Muslim, especially the Arab world, which the present author is inclined to view as the Al Jazeera revolution (ElNawawy and Iskander, 2002; Miles, 2005; Rushing and Elder, 2007; Seib, 2008) must be also viewed in the larger framework of the movements, trends and cycles of the global and the European economy, and the trends and cycles of global conflict in the world system. Are international conditions likely to support a generalized breakthrough towards democracy and human rights, especially in the Arab countries, or is the global economy and the European economy, the most important developed neighbouring region for the Arab countries, characterized by globalization, instability, and conflict? Among the existing theoretical approaches, which are of relevance in this context, the contribution by the Austrian political economist Josef Steindl (1912 – 1993) should be especially mentioned as a policy alternative to the current and dominant, but waning Brussels/Paris neo-liberal consensus of the European Commission and the OECD, which still dominates the political economy of rich Europe in the neighbourhood of the revolting Arab world. Steindl (1952) empirically well established a relationship between economic stagnation and the growth of oligopoly in advanced capitalist countries. With Steindl, a secular tendency to stagnation in mature capitalist economies, brought about by monopolization, is to be expected, arrested by • the rising share of the public sector; • technical innovations and new products;
Arno Tausch is in his academic function Adjunct Professor (Universitaetsdozent) of Political Science at Innsbruck University, Department of Political Science, A-6020 Innsbruck University, Universitaetsstraße 15, 2nd Floor/West, A-6020 Innsbruck; Austria. Currently, he is also Visiting Professor of Economics, Corvinus University, Budapest, and Lecturer of International Development, Vienna University. He authored or co-authored books and articles for major international publishers and journals, among them 15 books in English, 2 in French, 7 books in German, and over 200 printed or electronic scholarly and current affairs publications in 7 languages in 29 countries around the globe. E-mail: arno.tausch@yahoo.de
• international cooperation in economic policies; • cooperation between business and trade unions; and • a favourable political and economic climate. in the post-war boom years, which raised effective demand. Since the early 1980s, income distribution has changed in favour of classes with high savings propensities; i.e. in most industrial countries, the share of wages and salaries in national income has been declining, while non-wage income, in particular property incomes have risen sharply, and income inequality between the rich and the poor has increased considerably. Especially in the countries of the EU, the burden of taxation has shifted from profits to wages - a process which reduced the expansionary effects of the public sector. Steindl’s European ‘policy of stagnation’ will continue for some time, since governments are preoccupied with inflation and the public debt (Steindl, 1979, p. 9). The waning political and economic landscape, which began to take shape already in the late 1970s and 1980s, was characterized by • a macroeconomic policy being oriented primarily towards price stability and budget consolidation • a declining international cooperation regarding economic policy (breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the establishment of a flexible exchange rate system in the early 1970s) • increasing environmental and energy problems • a political trend against full employment (already foreseen by Kalecki, 1943). Steindl very strongly believed in the ‘political aspects of full employment’, and argued that the entrepreneurs were losing interest in full employment because of the increasing power of trade unions and employees as a consequence of full employment. This policy set-up was called by Steindl as the ‘return of the Bourbons’. In view of the current crisis in Greece, Ireland and in other Southern European countries (‘PIIGS’), Steindl remarked prophetically that it has to be avoided that debtor countries are forced into a painful policy of restrictions, causing low growth and high rates of unemployment, of which all countries would have to suffer. In the empirical and cross-national as well as time-series part of our essay, we show the relevance of this pessimistic analysis of the international environment for the current Al Jazeera revolution. The Al Jazeera revolution and its emerging leadership has the unique historical opportunity to follow another political economic path, the path of employment and demand, which will characterize the new economic cycle in the post-2008 years, centred around the Indian Ocean area. Every major revolution needs an appropriate international environment. Will the international environment for the Al Jazeera revolution be as peaceful as the one, which supported the victory of the ‘velvet revolution’ in Eastern Europe, 1989? An international revival of the K-cycle (Kondratiev-cycle) debate (i.e. severe economic crises all 50 years) by NATO’s Advanced Studies Institute exactly raises the question of the relevance of long cycles of war and international conflict far beyond the narrower borders of the political debates among limited leftwing circles (Devezas, 2006). In this second, empirical part of our essay, we show the relevance of these concepts, using econometric techniques of auto-correlation and cross-correlation of world industrial production growth, war intensity and defence pacts over many decades and centuries in the tradition of Goldstein, 1988, as well as country time series data for 117 nations since 1980, which all show that rising globalization and rising instability went hand in hand.
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Our analysis also re-iterates empirical results, recently published by the Russian scholars Korotayev and Tsirel (2010) and has shown in addition the following things: 1) 2) 3)
liberal and ‘Marxist’ analyses of all ‘denominations’ are right in emphasizing the severe cyclical fluctuations of the capitalist system on a global scale there is a world political and world strategic swing of societal system, which accompanies the economic ups and downs and three there is a striking similarity in the logic of the globalized period of the second half of the 19th Century with our age.
Globalization and monopolies lead towards stagnation. Josef Steindl emphasized this since the early 1950s. Some other great political economists of the instability of the international order, like Rosa Luxemburg and Otto Bauer, foresaw the dark clouds of major inner-capitalist wars on the horizon, and in the light of our analysis, we are not too far away from such dark times, if the logic of ‘madness’ called contemporary globalization, is not corrected.
JEL classification: B24 - History of Economic Thought since 1925: Socialist; Marxist; Sraffian B25 - History of Economic Thought since 1925: Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian B31 - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - Individuals E32 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: Business Fluctuations; Cycles E37 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications E11 - General Aggregative Models: Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary E12 - General Aggregative Models: Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian H56 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: National Security and War P16 - Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
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Introduction Every revolution deserves a name. The revolution in East Central Europe of 1989, in many ways similar to the current upheaval in the Arab (and beyond that also in other parts of the Muslim world) in its tidal wave character, engulfing country after country during that world historically decisive year of 1989, was called the ‘velvet revolution’1, while the current revolution should be called the Al Jazeera revolution in view of the enormous, and still growing importance of the TV Channel for the current, evolving events (for earlier assessments of the importance of Al Jazeera see also El-Nawawy and Iskander, 2002; Miles, 2005; Rushing and Elder, 2007; while undoubtedly Seib, 2008 was the first to speak about an Al Jazeera effect). What has the fate of the current and moving Al Jazeera revolution in the Arab world, in a way repeating the democratic transition cycles of the mid 1970s in Southern Europe, 1989/90 in Eastern Europe, and the era of the victory of democracy over dictatorships in the wake of the last major long depression in the world economy, starting in the 1970s, in countries as far apart as the Philippines and Latin America, to do with the writings of an Austrian Jew and political economist, Josef Steindl, who – to the best of my knowledge – never even visited the Arab world and whose work concentrates on the political economy of the global capitalist system as such, and not its semi-periphery and periphery? As it is well-known (Vernengo, 2006), another great Austrian political economist, Joseph Alois Schumpeter already foresaw in his writings, published in 1908, 1912, 1939, 1950 that capitalist development takes the form of ‘creative destruction’. The writings of Schumpeter (in particular 1908, 1912, 1939), and later world system and dependency analyses were always aware of the emergence of crises, cyclical imbalances, regional shifts, and the rise and decline of entire regions and even continents in the process of capitalist development (Vernengo, 2006). Schumpeter also strongly believed in Kondratiev waves (for empirical studies on Kondratiev waves, see Devezas 2006; furthermore Bornschier 1996; Goldstein 1988; Tausch 2007, 2008). Successful innovation is a source of temporary market power, eroding the profits and position of old firms, yet ultimately losing to the pressure of the new inventions, championed
This expression is originally from the Czech language: ‘sametová revoluce’, referring to the events on November 17, 1989, in Prague, when riot police suppressed a peaceful student demonstration in Prague. See Wheaton and Zavan, 1992. 1
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by the competitors (for a formal model of Schumpeterian growth economics, see Aghion/Howitt 1992). Several world systems approaches have taken up the basic idea of the Schumpeterian competition and stipulated that even the international system itself since the 1450s is characterized by hegemonies, international system de-concentration, the de-legitimation of the international order, and recurrent global wars over the hegemony in the system (see Devezas 2006; furthermore Arrighi 1995; Goldstein 1988; Tausch 2007; on the general questions of cycles see also Bakir and Campbell, 2006; O’Hara, 2003). That currently economic growth dramatically shifts away from the North Atlantic arena and the states very closely linked to them to other regions of the world economy, most notably the ‘Dar al Islam’ (house of Islam), China, India and some rising middle powers in Latin America seems to indicate that such a major fundamental shift is taking place with the force of a real tsunami. The tsunami waves of global economics are associated with the tsunami waves of global regime transitions. To understand (r)evolutionary upheavals of our times, we have to understand the (r)evolutionary developments of the global economy. The Steindl legacy This essay will now feature first of all on the global relevance of the political economy of Josef Steindl (1912 – 1993). Steindl, like so many others, had to leave Austria at the time of the Shoah, and returned from British exile after the Second World War. His path-breaking analyses are especially noteworthy in the context of overall research on instability, monopolization, and economic cycles of the global economic system. In terms of economic policies, he was among the first to confront, head-on current European Union orthodoxies. At a time of the severe crisis of the Euro-zone, it is worthwhile to look more systematically into the relevance of his political economy. In a radical perspective, we see the current malaise, stagnation, and ‘Burbonic’ political economy of Europe even as the other side of the same coin – world economic change, whose other side is the search for a new political economy of a rising world economic centre – the Arab world – and the breakup of its earlier structures of dominance and power. The crisis-prone and cyclical nature of global capitalism has been featured already by many theories in the tradition of political economy (for a recent survey, see Brailean, 2009; furthermore: Arrighi, 1995;
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Attinà, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; Bauer, 1936; Bobróvnikov, 2004; Bornschier, 1996; Devezas and Corredine, 2001; Escudier, 1993; Galalp, 1989; Goldstein, 1988; Jessop, 1990, Jessop and Sum, 2006; Jourdon, 2008; Kalecki, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1979, 1996, Kalecki and Feiwel, 1972; Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010; Louçã, 1997, 1999, Louçã and Reijnders, 1999; Luxemburg, 1964; Mandel, 1995; O’Hara, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b; Schumpeter, 1912, 1939; Tausch, 2007a, 2007b, Tausch and Ghymers, 2006). Josef Steindl’s work nowadays begins to enjoy a renaissance (see also: Lavoie, 1996), especially championed vigorously by the Austrian Institute for Economic Research in Vienna, as a policy alternative to the current and dominant Brussels/Paris neo-liberal consensus of the European Commission and the OECD. In Steindl (1946), the author already analyzed the process of increasing concentration of capital and the oligopoly of the market. In Steindl (1952) he established a relationship between economic stagnation and the growth of oligopoly in advanced capitalist countries. In the words of Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen: ‘In competitive industries profit margins are highly elastic, and excess capacity is eliminated in the long run by squeezing out surplus capital. In monopolistic industries, on the other hand, price cuts are not practicable. In these industries, demand does not determine prices, but the degree of capacity utilization - also in the long run. The typical producer in the competitive type of industry has low profit margins and rather small chances to survive. In monopolistic industries, on the contrary, producers have substantial profit margins and a high chance of survival. Therefore, it would require a large price cut to eliminate competitors. Hence, oligopolistic or monopolistic firms avoid cut-throat price competition.’ (Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, 2006) Steindl expected a secular tendency to stagnation in mature capitalist economies, brought about by monopolization, and – as Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen remark with justification -, the prosperity of the post-war era was a ‘big surprise’ to Steindl, who published his analysis of US capitalism in 1952. In the introduction to the re-publication of his book on ‘Maturity and Stagnation’, Steindl explained the extraordinary development of the postwar period in the West by the following factors: • the rising share of the public sector; • technical innovations and new products; • international cooperation in economic policies; • cooperation between business and trade unions; and • a favourable political and economic climate.
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The postwar boom increased public expenditures, which raised effective demand. These outlays were largely financed by profit taxes. In accordance with Kaleckiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s arguments, the expansionary effect of public expenditures is even higher, Steindl assumes, if taxes are financed by profits and not mass consumption. Technical innovations stimulated investment. Information and communication technologies, automation and aircraft industries gave a strong impetus. The innovations, due to high military spending even disseminated to the private sector. In postwar Europe, private investment was further stimulated by the catchingup process with the USA, a process initialled by the Marshall plan. According to Steindl, the speed of European post-war recovery was greatly enhanced by additional labour supply from agriculture and, later on, from abroad. The change in the secular trend of income distribution since the end of the Second World War in the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most advanced economies, observed by Steindl, has to be especially noted: since the early 1980s, income distribution has changed in favour of classes with high savings propensities; i.e. in most industrial countries the share of wages and salaries in national income has been declining, while non-wage income, in particular property incomes, have risen sharply, and income inequality between the rich and the poor has increased considerably (Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, 2006). In Graph 1 we try to visualize some of the main points of Steindlâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s theory by using data from 22 western democracies. Unemployment remained high throughout the period, inequality rose sharply, as did globalization, and economic growth strongly fluctuated.
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Graph 1: Rising monopolization/globalization, rising inequality, stagnation and unemployment in the West (22 leading western democracies)
Notes: Unweighted means for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. The numerical values in our Graph are simple differences between the EU-15 performance and that of the USA and the other Western democracies under investigation. In order to visualize our time series in a single graph and on a single easily comprehensible left hand scale, we had to multiply the University of Texas Inequality (Theil Indices of the inequality of wages by sectors) data time series by a factor of 250 and to divide the ETH globalization flow data by a factor of 10, to produce scales, which range from 0 to 12. Statistical sources: see appendix
According to Steindl, the burden of taxation has shifted from profits to wages - a process which reduced the expansionary effects of the public sector (Steindl, 1979, p. 5). Assuming that tax revenues are immediately spent, higher profit taxes are paid out of increasing profits (before taxation) due to higher capital utilization, while an increase in wage taxation reduces consumption. The following aspects of Steindlâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s analysis especially caught the attention of the empirical researchers from the Austrian Institute of Economic Research
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(Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, 2006): what Steindl calls a ‘policy of stagnation’ will continue, since governments are preoccupied with inflation and the public debt (Steindl, 1979, p. 9). Thus the Steindl paper on ‘Stagnation Theory and Stagnation Policy’ (Steindl, 1979, especially p. 13) must be regarded, together with Boccara’s and Rothschild’s (1944-2004) papers, as one of the first key documents against the current Euromonetarist stagnation policy, which – according to this Kaleckian viewpoint – is the cause of stagnation, unemployment and rising inequality in Europe. The new political and economic landscape, which began to take shape in the late 1970s and 1980s, was characterized by • macroeconomic policy being oriented primarily towards price stability and budget consolidation • declining international cooperation regarding economic policy (breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the establishment of a flexible exchange rate system in the early 1970s) • increasing environmental and energy problems • a political trend against full employment (with Kalecki’s (1943) Steindl believed in the ‘political aspects of full employment’, and argued that the entrepreneurs were losing interest in full employment because of the increasing power of trade unions and employees as a consequence of full employment. This new set-up was called by Steindl as the ‘return of the Bourbons’. The Bourbon’s return resulted in a restrictive bias in economic policy, particularly in the EU. For Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, one of the main consequences for our analysis of the European Union today is the following: ‘Steindl identified a persistent and lasting mood against growth and very clearly spoke about a deliberate ‘policy of stagnation’. This characterization seems to be even more appropriate for the current development. In the EU a macroeconomic policy framework has been established that has a restrictive bias—it may even be characterized as ‘policy of stagnation’—although it promised stability and growth. In the current macroeconomic policy framework of the EU, institutions to guarantee price stability and sound public finance are extensively developed. However, institutions responsible for aggregate demand and full employment are missing.’ (Guger/Marterbauer/Waltterskirchen, 2006) According to Steindl, there are currently three main pillars of economic policy in the EU: (1) a ‘free’ market economy is seen as being stable and improving welfare. Deregulation and establishing free movement of goods, services,
15
capital and labour, and structural reforms especially on product and capital markets are seen as the main element of improving real variables such as economic growth and employment in the long run (2) macroeconomic policies are oriented towards ensuring growth and stability by providing stable frameworks. This is seen to be guaranteed by the combination of ‘price stability and sound public finance’. For achieving these ends two institutional arrangements have been formed: the European Central Bank, which is primarily oriented on price stability and the Pact for Stability and Growth, which aims at budgetary positions ‘close to balance or in the surplus’ in the medium term. (3) The unemployment problem, seen from a neoclassical perspective, mainly being determined by ‘structural factors’. In the medium and long term, unemployment will be unaffected by aggregate demand or productive capacities, but the NAIRU [non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment] can be reduced by a flexible labour market. EU employment policies are oriented towards increasing the adaptability of the workforce and the flexibility of the labour markets. In view of the current crisis in Greece, Ireland and in other Southern European countries (‘PIIGS’), Steindl remarked prophetically that it has to be avoided that debtor countries are forced into a painful policy of restrictions, causing low growth and high rates of unemployment, of which all countries would have to suffer. He further pointed out (Steindl, 1988) that the record of the EU model of economic policy has been disappointing. Growth rates of GDP are low and unemployment is high in relation to long-run averages and to the USA. Economic policy in the EU seems to have an inherent anti-growth and pro-unemployment bias. Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen thus reach the conclusion: ‘What we experienced in recent years was a European economic policy focused on preventing inflation and budget deficits. With the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ Steindl’s apprehensions were realized: Europe’s economic policy got a bias towards stagnation policy from the outset. The Lissabon process—oriented towards economic growth—has not altered this bias so far.’ (Guger/Marterbauer/Walterskirchen, 2006).
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Research Design In the following, we will show from standard time series data in the tradition of Goldstein and Attinà that, as Rothschild, Steindl, and also the French political economist Paul Boccara correctly predicted, globalization indeed leads to the erosion of economic growth. Nothing could better highlight the erosion of the Keynesian, NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliance supported post-World-War-II order than the quadruple process of globalization, erosion of economic growth, defence pacts, and the increase of world political superpower tensions. In addition, we also show that the globalized years in world history, 1870-1913 and 19752009, show striking parallels in their economic growth cycle pattern, and that – on top of all, the patterns of warfare – as measured by annual major power battle fatalities – show again a striking parallel of the post1945 patterns with earlier, indented W-pattern shaped warfare cycles. Instead of learning from the past, the world repeats in a nutshell the grave errors of the second half of the 19th Century. Most published research articles on the subject of the capitalist world economy and development performance are based on simple or pooled cross-national data analysis, and as yet do not use time series analysis, based on yearly data. First of all, statistical research methods and developments have developed, and the availability of relevant statistical programmes, available for the global research community, has proliferated during the last decades. As to the econometric analyses used, we simply draw the attention of our readers to standard applications and introductions (basic texts Ito, 1993; Meko 2009; as well as Nagakawa, 2006; Warner, 1998; Wei, 2006; for critical views on earlier research from the standpoint of econometric time series analysis Silverberg, 2005, 2007; furthermore: Devezas, 2006; and Tausch/Ghymers, 2006). The following data series are especially relevant for our research question and directly relate to the research questions of the dependency/world systems paradigm. Apart from the economic standard data on economic growth (IMF) and unemployment (OECD) we used the KOF Index of Globalization, provided by a team of the ETH-Zurich in Switzerland, which to our knowledge is the best single available time series about different aspects of globalization since the 1970s through to 2007. We concentrated here on the ETH economic globalization time series, to get at least yearly data, which would be comparable to our independent variables. Economic globalization is composed in this index by:
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Capital Account Restrictions Foreign Direct Investment, flows (percent of GDP) Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) Hidden Import Barriers Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) Mean Tariff Rate Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) Trade (percent of GDP)
Our analysis also relies on the data series by the University of Texas Inequality Project on Inequality. UTIP is a research group at the University of Texas, concerned with measuring and explaining movements of inequality in wages and earnings and patterns of industrial change around the world. It starts from the assumption that one can establish a reasonably reliable relationship between these measures and the broader concepts of inequality, such as income inequality. UTIP relies on the of Theil's T statistic to compute inequality indexes from industrial, regional and sectoral data. UTIP also used yearly pay inequality as an instrument to estimate measures of household income inequality, for a large panel of countries from 1963 through 1999. So the following time series data were used:
Economic growth: IMF economic growth data (real GDP per annum) and growth predictions, data download April 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php
Globalization: ETH Zurich globalization time series data, data download January 2010, http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/rawdata/globalization_2 010_short.xls The Zurich data, used in this study, refer to the ETH economic globalization time series, which covers ‘actual flows”, combining trade (percent of GDP), foreign Direct Investment (flows, percent of GDP); foreign direct investment (stocks, percent of GDP); portfolio investment (percent of GDP); and income payments to foreign nationals (percent of GDP). The ETH Zurich globalization data are weighted according to the following key:
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Indices and Variables A.
Weight s Economic Globalization [37%] i) Actual Flows (50%) Trade (percent of GDP) (19%) Foreign Direct Investment, flows (percent (20%) of GDP) Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent (24%) of GDP) Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) (17%) Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (20%) (percent of GDP) ii) Restrictions (50%) Hidden Import Barriers (22%) Mean Tariff Rate (28%) Taxes on International Trade (percent of (27%) current revenue) Capital Account Restrictions (22%)
Inequality: Theil Index of Inequality, based on payment in 21 industrial sectors; calculated from UNIDO sources in University of Texas Inequality Project (data download January 2010), http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html
Unemployment: unemployment as % of the civilian labour force: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx
The most recent contribution on the subject, written recently by two Russian K-cycle researchers, merits our special attention in the debate. Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010 present results of spectral analysis that has detected the presence of Kondratieff waves (their period equals approximately 52–53 years) in the world GDP dynamics for the 1870– 2007 period. To estimate the statistical significance of the detected cycles the authors used a new methodology. In addition, the reduced spectral analysis has indicated a rather high significance of Juglar cycles (with a period of 7-9 years), as well as the one of Kitchin cycles (with a period of 3–4 years). Thus, their spectral analysis has also supported the hypothesis of the presence of Juglar and Kitchin cycles in the world GDP dynamics. Korotayev and Tsirel suggest that the Kuznets swing should be regarded as the third harmonic of the Kondratieff wave rather than as a separate independent cycle. The research, presented by Korotayev and Tsirel suggests two interpretations of the current global economic crisis: on the
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one hand, the spectral analysis suggests rather optimistically that the current world economic crisis might mark not the beginning of the downswing phase of the 5th Kondratieff wave, but it may be interpreted as a temporary depression between two peaks of the upswing (whereas the next peak might even exceed the previous one). On the other hand, Korotayev and Tsirel suggest that there is some evidence supporting another interpretation based on the assumption that the current world financial-economic crisis marks the beginning of the downswing phase of the 5th Kondratieff wave. Korotayev and Tsirel also explore the world GDP dynamics before 1870 and find that it does not appear possible to detect Kondratieff waves in the world GDP dynamics for the pre-1870 period, though for this period they appear to be detected for the GDP dynamics of the West. Korotayev and Tsirel argue that in the pre-1870 epoch the Modern World System was not sufficiently integrated, and the World System core was not sufficiently strong yet – that is why according to them the rhythm of the Western core’s development was not quite felt on the world level. Only in the subsequent era the World System reached such a level of integration and its core acquired such strength that it appears possible to trace Kondratieff waves in the World GDP dynamics. Our own research results
Especially the ‚globalized‘ cycles after 1862 and 1958 bear an interesting resemblance. In accordance with standard econometric practice on the subject, documented inter alia in Devezas, 2006, we performed an analysis of autocorrelations about these time series, to answer the old question, whether these K-cycles exist at the end of the day. Our analysis with the untransformed and complete data series also suggests that in the light of the analysis of autocorrelations, there are not only 10 year cycles and cycles of about 35 to 40 years duration, but also 55 or 60 year cycles and even 90 year cycles, which all are significant in the strict statistical sense of this standard econometric test for time series.
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Graph 2: Analysis of autocorrelations (ACF) of world industrial production growth, 1741-2009
ACF analysis world production growth, 1741-2009
1,0 Borders of significance
0,5
ACF 0,0
-0,5
-1,0 1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101111121131141
Lag-Number
One of the most striking aspects of this kind of analysis is the fact that the two phases of ultraliberal globalization â&#x20AC;&#x201C; post 1862 and post 1958 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; are so similar in tendency. We first show this by an overlapping graph of the two cycles and the 5th order polynomial regression with the untransformed original data:
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Graph 3: World industrial production growth during two globalization periods
We also performed a ‘sliding correlation’ analysis, based on a projected 50 year time-series trend-line from 1830 and from 1934 onwards. The similarity in the indented W-shaped trend is – in our view – breathtaking, and we must be fast approaching the evil abyss at the end of the 19th Century, which, we all know, led to World War I, don’t we?
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Graph 4: a 50 year trend line correlation comparison of the trajectory of the societal models since 1830/1934
The empirical analysis of patterns of the evolving international system for quite some time now also is familiar with the closer inspection of wars and war intensities since 1495. In Tausch/Ghymers, 2006, the original data about military battle fatalities from major powers in the world system (todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s 5 members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) end by 1975. In Tausch/Ghymers, 2006, these data were expanded with PRIO, Oslo data for the period until 2002. The startling discovery to make is that each global political cycle from 1495 ends in a period of sustained, three decade long bloodshed between central players of the international system. The 5th order polynomial statistical analysis of the original, untransformed data of battle fatalities from major power wars yields the following, indented W â&#x20AC;&#x201C; shaped pattern of escalating global conflicts along the time-line since the last major global war:
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Graph 5: the war cycles in the world system, 1495-2002
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However, polynomial regression analysis in times of easily available advanced standard econometric time series analysis is never sufficient. In the literature, especially in Devezas, 2006, we find several references, which doubt the cyclical nature of international relations. The analysis of autocorrelation suggests the following result:
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Graph 6: Analysis of autocorrelations of battle fatalities from major power wars, 1495-2002
ACF analysis battle fatalities from major power wars 1495-2002 1,0
Borders of significance
0,5
ACF 0,0
-0,5
-1,0 1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91101111121131141
Lag-Number
Also, the fluctuations of the international system, measured by defence pact index, proposed by AttinĂ , 2005 demonstrate the remarkable fluctuations of the international system. The index, as it is well-known, measures the percentage of the national states in the international system in comparison to the total number of states in the system, which at a given time, belongs to military alliances. The height of defence pact density is reached at around 1835 and 1955, and after these years, the defence pact system disintegrates and builds up anew in a renewed cycle of international war.
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Graph 7: the degree of organization of the states of the world system in defence pacts - % of states belonging to a defence pact
Attina's defense pact index
70,0 Attina's defense pact index
60,0 50,0 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0
1995
1983
1971
1959
1947
1935
1923
1911
1899
1887
1875
1863
1851
1839
1827
1815
0,0
We compare the results from spectral analysis and analysis of autocorrelation. The analysis of autocorrelation would suggest an 80-year and 135-year cycle.
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Graph 8: autocorrelation analysis of the defence pact index, 18151999
ACF analysis – Defense Pact Index, 1815-1999 1,0
I Borders of significance
0,5
ACF 0,0
-0,5
-1,0 1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101111121131141
Lag-Number
Equally astonishing are the results from the comparison of the world political cycle 1862 ff and 1958 ff, emerging from Graph 9. It is to be feared that the globalized world political order of the period after 1958 ends in the same catastrophe of global wars as the ‘old’ globalized world political order, which emerged during the heyday of liberal globalization before World War I.
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Graph 9: how the global war cycles are similar to one another: 1862 ff. and 1958 ff.
In Graph 10, we perform a cross-correlation time series analysis of the effects of globalization on economic growth in the world system since 1741. For reasons of simplicity, we defined in our time series the period between 1870 and 1913 and the period after 1975 to the present as the globalized years (dummy variable 1), and the other years were defined as being relatively free from globalization (dummy variable 0). With a timelag of around 12 to 15 years, globalization leads to the slowdown of economic growth in the world-system and to the erosion of world military alliances. At the same time, war intensity in the international system increases, as a consequence of globalization, by a time-lag of about 40 years:
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Graph 10: cross-correlation time series analysis - globalization on growth in the world system, 1741-2009
CCF Analysis globalization on growth
1,0
Borders of significance
0,5
CCF 0,0
-0,5
-1,0 -30-27-24-21-18-15-12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
Lag-Number
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Graph 11: cross-correlation time series analysis - globalization on defence pacts in the world system, 1815-2009
CCF Analysis Globalization and Defence Pacts
1,0
Borders of significance
0,5
CCF 0,0
-0,5
-1,0 -60-55-50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Lag-Number
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Graph 12: cross-correlation time series analysis - globalization on war in the world system, 1495-2009
CCF Analysis Globalization and war
1,0 Borders of significance
0,5
CCF 0,0
-0,5
-1,0 -60-55-50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Lag-Number Reasons for this conflict-prone process at the level of the world capitalist system are manifold. As the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;criticalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; political economy of the international system demonstrates, the basic underlying reason for this has to be sought in the growing internal and international social contradictions, which globalization brings about. Our rigorous data analysis of the last four decades highlights the following main trends:
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Our time series investigation from 1970 to 2003 covers 92.47% of humanity living in 117 countries and territories of the world.
Indeed, rising economic globalization is the defining element of the development trajectory of humanity in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s until the beginning of the new Millenium – from Spain with the most rapid globalization process to Burkina Faso. 90.57% of humanity, living in 108 countries of the 117 countries with complete data were affected by that process
Only in 9 countries [Algeria, Malawi, Fiji, Gabon, Oman, Swaziland, Barbados, Bahamas, Iran] we were confronted with a negative time series correlation between the time axis and economic globalization, measured by the KOF-Index. These countries amount to just 1.90% of the world population
The brave new world of rising economic globalization is a world of rising inequalities. 75.92% of the global population lived in countries, where there was a rising linear trend towards inequality over time. For 54.05% of humanity, this trend was especially strong, and the time series correlation coefficient of the time axis with inequality was 0.500 or above. Ranked by the magnitude of this phenomenon, we find 60 nations, from Lesotho, Portugal and Lithuania at the top right through to El Salvador, Austria and the United States of America. Among the EU-27 countries, there are 13 nations, corresponding to this very strong trend towards rising inequality over time: Portugal, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Romania, United Kingdom, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Austria.
79.61% of humanity also experienced the dire fact that according to the available time series, globalization in their countries was positively correlated with higher inequality.
For 48.97% of humanity, living in 55 countries, this trend was especially strong. The time series correlation was 0.500 or above. 13 of the 27 EU countries are among them and their experience gives a testimony about the Latin Americanization of the European continent: Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Portugal, Poland, Bulgaria, Ireland, Germany, Lithuania, United Kingdom, Slovenia, Austria, and Slovakia.
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ď&#x201A;¨
Only 35 countries experienced some positive promises of globalization, i.e. a negative time series correlation between globalization and inequality. The inhabitants of these countries are a fortunate global minority, and comprise 12.86% of the global population. Only 7 EU-27 are among them, namely Latvia, Netherlands, Spain, Cyprus, Sweden, Finland, and France. Interestingly enough, in globalization critical France, this effect was strongest, and in Latvia, the effect was weakest. Other best practice highly developed economies with a very notable trend of globalization leading to less inequality over time are South Korea and Singapore
Our time series analysis evaluated the data from 117 countries with complete data: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, The, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, RB, Zambia, Zimbabwe
If the relationship between globalization and inequality is a clear numerically positive trade-off, the time series correlation must be high. A time series correlation coefficient to the magnitude of <.50 indicates the 55 countries of the world economy, most devastated by globalization (in order of descending magnitude of devastation): Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Angola, Poland, China, Ecuador, Australia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Islamic Rep., Bulgaria, New Zealand, Ukraine, Ireland, Germany, Mongolia, Zambia, Turkey, Mexico, Lesotho, Croatia, Lithuania, Honduras, Brazil, Cote d'Ivoire, Russian Federation, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, RB, Egypt, Arab Rep., Pakistan, United Kingdom, Canada, Chile, Slovenia, Uruguay, Nigeria, Syrian Arab Republic, Philippines, Colombia, Austria, Togo, Slovak Republic, Japan, Senegal, Guatemala, El Salvador, Kuwait, Cameroon, Panama, Peru, Papua New Guinea,
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Our data analysis now shows the 61 states of the world that must be regarded as the chief victims of globalization (time series correlation globalization with inequality >.25; globalization with time >.25, and rising inequality over time (r >.00)). Table 1: The 61 chief victim states of current globalization country Albania Angola Argentina Australia Austria Azerbaijan Belgium Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Cameroon Canada Chile China Colombia Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. El Salvador Germany Guatemala Honduras Hungary Ireland Israel Jamaica
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r, globalization with inequality
r, globalization with time
r, inequality with time
0.455 0.947 0.286 0.894 0.662 0.892 0.285 0.477 0.821 0.880 0.578 0.729 0.723 0.913 0.673 0.808 0.835 0.966 0.479 0.912 0.754 0.589 0.866 0.606 0.828 0.966 0.870 0.403 0.446
0.604 0.981 0.935 0.967 0.969 0.926 0.970 0.842 0.762 0.770 0.631 0.878 0.983 0.923 0.933 0.746 0.686 0.973 0.945 0.952 0.911 0.709 0.941 0.937 0.896 0.835 0.967 0.759 0.931
0.341 0.868 0.462 0.831 0.557 0.949 0.399 0.677 0.678 0.840 0.928 0.834 0.733 0.935 0.600 0.843 0.658 0.949 0.372 0.822 0.863 0.566 0.776 0.645 0.662 0.796 0.737 0.825 0.697
Japan Kuwait Lesotho Lithuania Mexico Mongolia New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Senegal Slovak Republic Slovenia Sri Lanka Syrian Arab Republic Togo Trinidad and Tobago Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom United States Uruguay Venezuela, RB Zambia
0.649 0.587 0.845 0.835 0.851 0.864 0.872 0.700 0.321 0.754 0.573 0.503 0.508 0.686 0.938 0.950 0.986 0.790 0.624 0.652 0.712 0.281 0.694 0.661 0.784 0.854 0.871 0.751 0.420 0.712 0.757 0.855
0.955 0.404 0.932 0.957 0.928 0.891 0.964 0.954 0.964 0.923 0.797 0.327 0.931 0.981 0.882 0.954 0.777 0.984 0.701 0.828 0.958 0.958 0.870 0.400 0.864 0.950 0.958 0.938 0.961 0.941 0.891 0.800
0.785 0.637 0.977 0.955 0.831 0.302 0.808 0.442 0.377 0.774 0.763 0.615 0.609 0.705 0.723 0.973 0.922 0.832 0.744 0.846 0.856 0.057 0.725 0.574 0.837 0.847 0.891 0.859 0.513 0.851 0.576 0.909
The following 29 countries experienced no rising inequality over time, and also, their time series correlation coefficient between globalization and inequality was negative. Further research will have to establish, why these lucky 29 countries could escape from the general deterioration of the social conditions, expressing themselves in rising inequality rates.
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Table 2: the 29 lucky ones who escaped: no major inequality increasing effect of globalization, no increasing inequality over time country Korea, Rep. Cyprus Singapore Benin Ethiopia Finland Kenya France Iceland Rwanda Sweden Congo, Rep. Indonesia Nepal Thailand Mozambique Mauritius Spain Tunisia Netherlands Haiti Malaysia Moldova Jordan Uganda Latvia Costa Rica Zimbabwe Kyrgyz Republic
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r, globalization r, globalization with inequality with time -0.791 -0.532 -0.938 -0.795 -0.394 -0.668 -0.657 -0.723 -0.653 -0.707 -0.587 -0.875 -0.522 -0.689 -0.516 -0.453 -0.591 -0.342 -0.394 -0.340 -0.228 -0.306 -0.317 -0.154 -0.023 -0.174 -0.018 -0.208 -0.264
0.966 0.722 0.886 0.954 0.833 0.964 0.720 0.980 0.916 0.713 0.977 0.821 0.897 0.885 0.952 0.941 0.908 0.986 0.952 0.981 0.842 0.974 0.702 0.851 0.788 0.927 0.933 0.847 0.738
r, inequality with time -0.888 -0.834 -0.833 -0.816 -0.788 -0.779 -0.742 -0.727 -0.720 -0.680 -0.674 -0.649 -0.644 -0.563 -0.511 -0.475 -0.472 -0.438 -0.368 -0.314 -0.277 -0.239 -0.238 -0.181 -0.168 -0.072 -0.072 -0.068 -0.034
Conclusions We hope to have shown in this article with sufficient clarity that the current revolution in the Arab countries and in other parts of the Muslim world, just as the revolution in East Central Europe of 1989, has a tidal wave character, engulfing country after country, which cannot be explained but with the theoretical tools of long economic cycle research. The current Al Jazeera revolution (see also El-Nawawy and Iskander, 2002; Miles, 2005; Rushing and Elder, 2007; and Seib, 2008), heralds, just like the democratic transition cycles of the mid 1970s in Southern Europe, and 1989/90 in Eastern Europe, the beginning of a new societal contract in this world economically ascending region, which will go hand in hand with global economic shifts in favour of the Indian Ocean area, and the decline of the Atlantic arena in the process of capitalist development. European stagnation and growing crisis, the return of a ‘Burbonic’ pattern of neo-liberal governance and stagnation, and political developments away from democracy in countries like France and Germany (in favour of a tightening the belt political economic, panEuropean regime) is but the other side of the same coin – the rising ‘house of the Indian Ocean’ and the decline of Euro-Atlantic arena. That currently economic growth dramatically shifts away from the North Atlantic arena and the states very closely linked to them to other regions of the world economy, most notably the ‘Dar al Islam’ (house of Islam), China, India and some rising middle powers in Latin America seems to indicate that such a major fundamental shift is currently already taking place with the force of a real tsunami. The tsunami waves of global economics are associated with the tsunami waves of global regime transitions. To understand (r)evolutionary upheavals of our times, we have to understand the (r)evolutionary developments of the global economy. In this article, we have shown the path-breaking importance of the analyses, put forward by the Austrian political economist Josef Steindl. The Steindl/Kalecki approach in political economy would hold that the contradictions of global capitalism increase over time, if markets are left for themselves. Seen in such a way, nothing will remain the same after the financial crash of 2008. The stupidity of the patterns of economic un-governance, ruling the West after the advent of neo-liberalism in the 1970s, achieved in a few weeks, what the terrorist fantasies and operations of Osama Ben Laden and all the other Islamists around the globe could not achieve after the end of the first, Soviet Afghanistan war: global economic power is shifting towards the East; and the Arab world, especially, regains its world economic centrality, together with political changes, which make
38
such a new ‘societal contract’ of global social and economic ascent possible. Our own analysis, using advanced statistical techniques, has shown in addition the following things: 4) liberal and ‘Marxist’ analyses of all ‘denominations’ are right in emphasizing the severe cyclical fluctuations of the capitalist system on a global scale 5) there is a world political and world strategic swing of societal system, which accompanies the economic ups and downs 6) and three – and this is the most breathtaking aspect of it all there is a striking similarity in the logic of the globalized period of the second half of the 19th Century with our age The ultimate success or failure of the Al Jazeera revolution will also depend on the fact, whether or not, on a global scale, the fatal tendency towards inner-capitalist rivalry (this time between the US and Europe on the one hand, and rising neo-capitalist China on the other hand) can be halted. Globalization and monopolies, to be sure, and Steindl was right in emphasizing this from the late 1940s onwards – lead towards stagnation. Some great political economists of the instability of the international order, like Rosa Luxemburg and Otto Bauer, foresaw the dark clouds of major inner-capitalist wars on the horizon, and in the light of our analysis, we are not too far away already from such dark times, if the logic of madness called contemporary globalization is not corrected. A democratic anti-neoliberal evolution in China, away from the rigid one-party rule, would greatly enhance the chances of the successful democratic Al Jazeera revolution, just as a re-modelling of the European political economy following the strategy proposed by Josef Steindl.
39
Appendix 1: Economic Growth in the World System, 2009 – 2010 and after Based on:
IMF prediction growth rate in 2009 (issued April 2009) IMF prediction growth rate in 2010 (issued April 2009) residual measure: crisis recovery 2010 vis a vis 2009 (based on IMF prognosis, April 2009) resilience of economic growth during the crisis (regression residuals: growth 90-2005->growth 2009, based on IMF prognosis, April 2009)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx Predicted economic growth 2010
econ. growth 2010
IMF forecasts July 2009 4,1 bis 16,4 2,9 bis 4,1 1,6 bis 2,9 0,4 bis 1,6 -3 bis 0,4
Bis is shorthand for ‘ranging from …. to’
40
(37) (39) (29) (35) (39)
Predicted economic growth 2010
econ. growth 2010
IMF forecasts July 2009 4,1 bis 16,4 2,9 bis 4,1 1,6 bis 2,9 0,4 bis 1,6 -3 bis 0,4
(37) (39) (29) (35) (39)
Bis is shorthand for ‘ranging from …. To’
41
The resilience of predicted economic growth 2009 vis a vis earlier growth
DYN GDP pc 1990/2005/2009
Residuals DYN 1990-2005 --> DYN 2009 3,5 1,5 -0,7 -3,2 -11,3
Bis is shorthand for ‘ranging from …. To’
42
to to to to to
9,2 3,5 1,5 -0,7 -3,2
(29) (36) (33) (34) (33)
The resilience of predicted economic growth 2009 vis a vis earlier growth
DYN GDP pc 1990/2005/2009
Residuals DYN 1990-2005 --> DYN 2009 3,5 1,5 -0,7 -3,2 -11,3
to to to to to
9,2 3,5 1,5 -0,7 -3,2
(29) (36) (33) (34) (33)
Bis is shorthand for ‘ranging from …. To’
43
Statistical sources: Economic growth: IMF growth data and growth predictions, data download April 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php Globalization: ETH Zurich globalization time series data, data download January 2010, http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/rawdata/globalization_2010_short.xls Inequality: Theil Index of Inequality, based on payment in 21 industrial sectors; calculated from UNIDO sources in University of Texas Inequality Project (data download January 2010), http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html Unemployment: unemployment http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx
as
%
of
the
civilian
labour
force:
War data: The war data 1495 – 1945 (1975) were reported in Goldstein, 1988, the data 1946 – 2002 are based on the war data base as reported by PRIO Oslo: http://www.prio.no/page/CSCW_research_detail/Programme_detail_CSCW/9649/456 56.htm, recalculated for the aims of a comparison of ‘great power battle fatalities from all wars”. Great Powers: the members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. World Industrial production growth, 1741-2009: Calculations based on the data provided by Goldstein (1740 – 1974; based on Goldstein, 1988) and UNIDO data, provided by Dr. Tetsuo Yamada, UNIDO statistical department (1975 – 2004). After 2004, we used data from the United States Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, openly available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ Data availability: http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2383
44
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Research Paper Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis Andrey V. Korotayev, Julia V. Zinkina Abstract: It is not surprising that Mubarak’s administration “overlooked” the social
explosion. Indeed, statistical data righteously claimed that the country was developing very successfully. Economic growth rates were high (even in the crisis years). Poverty and inequality levels were among the lowest in the Third World. Global food prices were rising, but the government was taking serious measures to mitigate their effect on the poorest layers of the population. Unemployment level (in per cent) was less than in many developed countries of the world and, moreover, was declining, and so were population growth rates. What would be the grounds to expect a full-scale social explosion? Of course, the administration had a sort of reliable information on the presence of certain groups of dissident “bloggers”, but how could one expect that they would be able to inspire to go to the Tahrir any great masses of people? It was even more difficult to figure out that Mubarak’s regime would be painfully struck by its own modernization successes of the 1980s, which led to the sharp decline of crude death rate and especially of infant and child mortality in 1975–1990. Without these successes many young Egyptians vehemently demanding Mubarak’s resignation (or even death) would have been destined to die in early childhood and simply would not have survived to come out to the Tahrir Square. Key-words: Egypt, Arab world, Arab uprisings, revolutions, social change, regime change...
Russian State University for the Humanities. Russian Academy of Sciences.
0 Introduction
H
ighlighting the events of Egyptian Revolution 2011, various mass-media tried to explain what had caused the riots. Most explanations followed the same pattern, blaming economic stagnation, poverty, inequality, corruption and unemployment. A typical explanation is that ―Egyptians have the same complaints that drove Tunisians onto the streets: surging food prices, poverty, unemployment and authoritarian rule that smothers public protests quickly and often brutally‖ (see Al-Arabiya 25.01.2011, al-Lawati 14.02.2011, Stangler, Litan 12.02.2011, AFP 25.01.2011, etc.). Such unanimity incited us to investigate to what extent those accusations reflected the Egyptian reality. So we decided to take each of the abovementioned ―revolution causes‖ and to look into the actual dynamics of the relevant socioeconomic indicators in the years preceding the Egyptian revolution.
1. Economic stagnation? Let us first consider the dynamics of the most general economic performance indicator, namely GDP, in Mubarak’s epoch (Fig. 1):
450 400 350 300 250 200
150 100 1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Fig. 1. GDP production dynamics in Egypt
(blns of 2005 dollars, PPP), 1980–2010
Source: World Bank 2011 for 1980-2009.Value for 2010 calculated on the basis of data from Boubacar et al. 2010.
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Evidently, during Mubarakâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s reign (1981â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2011) the Egyptian economy was developing rather dynamically. The growth by 4.5 times during 30 years was one of the best results among the Third World countries at the time (see, e.g., Korotayev 2009). Economic growth rates accelerated particularly visibly after July 2004 when the new government managed to attract a group of talented economists who worked out an effective program of economic reforms. These reforms provided for a substantial acceleration of the Egyptian economic growth (Boubacar et al. 2010). Regarding Fig. 1, a particular attention should be given to the fact that during the world financial-economic crisis the Egyptian GDP did not fall, but continued growing at a rather high rate. Annual economic growth rates slowed down somewhat, from 7.2% to 4.6% (though many countries would dream of achieving 4.5% rate of economic growth even in crisisless years!). Nevertheless, Egyptian government did succeed in preventing any economic collapse. In 2010 Egyptian economic growth rates increased again. It should be noted here that population growth rates were decreasing quite stably in Egypt during the past few years (Fig. 2):
1,92 1,9 1,88 1,86 1,84 1,82 1,8 1,78
2003
2005
2007
2009
Fig. 2. Relative population growth rates in Egypt, % per year, 2003-2009 Source: World Bank 2011.
It is easy to deduce that the slowdown in demographic growth further contributed to the acceleration in GDP per capita growth, and this is supported by the empirical evidence (Fig. 3):
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5500 5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Fig. 3. GDP per capita production dynamics (constant 2005 dollars, PPP), Egypt, 1980–2010. Source: World Bank 2011 for 1980–2009. The value for 2010 has been calculated on the basis of data from Boubacar et al. 2010.
Thus, accusations of Mubarak with ―thirty years in power … during which the ruling party failed to achieve any substantial development, on the contrary, led the country to a period of uncertainty and economic stagnation … and diminishing income‖ (al-Lawati 14.02.2011; see also Stangler, Litan 12.02.2011, etc.) do not appear to be just. The contrary will be much closer to reality, i.e. before Mubarak’s regime collapse Egypt was one of the most dynamically developing countries of the Third World. Notably, new Egyptian government that came to power as a result of the revolution promised that it ―would not retreat from economic reform or change the basic economic philosophy it has followed since it adopted a liberal reform programme in 2004‖ (Pitchford 22.02.2011), thus admitting that the economic policy of Mubarak’s administration was essentially correct.
2. Corruption?
As regards the corruption level, in the respective map by Transparency International (2010) Egypt looks as follows (Fig. 4):
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Fig. 4. Corruption Perceptions Index in the world, 2010 Source: Transparency International 2010: 2â&#x20AC;&#x201C;3.
In this map the lighter the color, the lower its perceived corruption level (accordingly, the darker the higher). Clearly, the situation with Egyptian corruption is not brilliant. In comparison with most OECD countries corruption level in Egypt seems to be very high. However, the same can be attributed to almost all the Third (as well as Second) World countries, against the background of which corruption level in Egypt does not seem so high. On the whole, Egypt rates 80th in the world according to corruption level (Transparency International 2010: 8â&#x20AC;&#x201C;14). In other words, there are dozens of much more corrupted countries (see Fig. 5):
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9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Singapore Sweden Switzerland Germany Japan UK USA France Estonia Slovenia Malaysia Tunisia Italy Cuba Bulgaria China Greece India Egypt Argentina Kazakhstan Algeria Indonesia Vietnam Belarus Syria Bangladesh Ukraine Iran Libya Yemen Russia Tajikistan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Guinea Uzbekistan Sudan Iraq
0
Fig. 5. Corruption Index in 2010 in some countries of the world 1
So, according to Transparency International, the level of corruption in Egypt in 2010 was quite comparable with that in Italy, Greece, China, and India; meanwhile, it was lower than in Argentina, Indonesia, Viet Nam and most post-Soviet countries (including Russia). On the whole, it is obvious that if the Egyptian level of corruption was a sufficient cause for sociopolitical uprisings, revolutions should be currently blazing in most countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.
3. Unemployment?
The dynamics of unemployment in Egypt in the past 20 years looked as follows (Fig. 6):
The index is based on Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2010: 8â&#x20AC;&#x201C;14.) and is obtained by extracting the basic index out of 10. 1
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12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Fig. 6. Unemployment level in Egypt, %, 1990â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2010 Sources: World Bank 2011. CAPMAS 2010: 31 (data for the second quarter of 2009); Abd al-Rahman 2010: 4 (data for the third quarter of 2010).
Thus, in the past 20 years Egyptian unemployment was fluctuating at a rather high level (8â&#x20AC;&#x201C;12%). However, after the launch of economic reforms in the mid-2000s it started to decrease in a rather stable manner. Predictably, there was some increase (though not so pronounced as in most other countries) in unemployment level as a result of the global financial-economic crisis, but in 2010 unemployment went down again. Just before the revolution the unemployment level in Egypt in comparison with other countries of the world looked as follows (see Fig. 7):
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35 30 25 20 15 10 5
Kuwait (2008) Singapore (2010) Norway (2010) China (2010) Austria (2010) Japan (2010) Germany (2010) Russia (2010) Slovenia (2010) Canada (2011) UK (2010) Italy (2010) Finland (2010) Sweden (2010) Belgium (2010) Egypt (2010) USA (2011) Poland (2010) EU (2010) Bulgaria (2010) France (2010) Algeria (2009) Portugal (2010) Hungary (2010) Greece (2010) Columbia (2010) Jordan (2010) Libya (2005) Tunisia (2009) Lithuania (2010) Albania (2010) Ireland (2010) Latvia (2011) Slovakia (2010) Iraq (2009) Croatia (2010) Estonia (2010) Spain (2010) South Africa (2010) Honduras (2007)
0
Fig. 7. Unemployment level in some countries, %, 20102
As we see, unemployment level in pre-revolutionary Egypt could not be called ―extremely low‖, but against the global background Egypt compared rather well. Its unemployment level was less than in the USA, the EU, France, Poland, Turkey, Ireland, almost twice lower than in Latvia and Spain, etc.
Data on Iraq are given for 2009, data on Mauritania and Afghanistan are given for 2008. Sources. Egypt: Abd al-Rahman 2010: 4 (data for 3rd quarter of 2010). Russia: Federal State Statistics Agency. Employment and Unemployment. (data for December 2010). URL: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_01/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d12/3-2.htm. Switzerland: State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. Gradual Economic Recovery – Increased Risks for 2011. Bern, 08.06.2010. URL: http://www.seco.admin.ch/aktuell/00277/01164/01980/index.html?lang=en&msgid=33511. China: Xinhua News Agency. China's unemployment down to 4.1% at end of Q3. English.xinhuanet.com 2010-10-22. URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/22/c_13570193.htm. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA: European Commission. Eurostat. Your key to European statistics. Brussels: European Commission, 2011. URL: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=teilm02 0&tableSelection=1&plugin=1 (data for September–December 2010). Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia, Columbia, Croatia, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Singapore, South Africa, Tunisia: Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. Country Comparison: unemployment rate. Washington, DC: CIA, 2011. URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html. 2
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4. Inequality?
Gini index is most frequently used for measuring the level of economic inequality. After 1991 Egypt had the following dynamics of this index (Fig. 8):
35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1991
1996
2001
Fig. 8. Economic inequality (Gini index) in Egypt, 1990–2005 Source: World Bank 2011.
Thus, inequality index in Egypt was fluctuating around 30–33 points. Let us view how this compared against the global background (Fig. 9). Obviously, economic inequality in Egypt can be regarded high only by Scandinavian standards. Compared with the rest of the world, Egyptian economic inequality was very moderate. Out of 145 countries represented in the last Human Development Report Egypt rated 120th. (Klugman 2010: 152 – 155). Thus, UNDP observed a lower rate of inequality only in 23 countries, while 119 countries had higher inequality than Egypt, including France, Ireland, Spain, and India, to say nothing of Georgia, USA, China, Russia, and Mexico.
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80 70 60 50 40 30 Denmark Japan Sweden Norway Finland Germany Belarus Bulgaria Bangladesh Slovenia Egypt France Albania Tajikistan Ireland Tanzania Spain Algeria Italy United Kingdom New Zealand India Jordan Yemen Viet Nam Iran Israel Senegal United States Georgia Tunisia Morocco China Russia Philippines Uruguay Congo Nepal Kenya Brazil South Africa Haiti Botswana Namibia
20
Fig. 9. Gini index (economic inequality level) in the world, 2000–2010 Source: Klugman 2010: 152–155.3
Low level of economic inequality inherent to Egypt is connected with a very specific character of Egyptian poverty which, by the way, is most frequently called among the causes of Egyptian revolution.
5. Poverty? Some acrimonious Egyptian poverty is most frequently mentioned among the causes of the Egyptian revolution. The common notion is that 40% of Egyptians live below $2 a day income poverty line. Remarkably, nobody mentions the Egyptian level of extreme poverty, i.e. proportion of people living below $1 a day income poverty line4. This omission is not surprising at all, as Egypt is among the best performing countries in the world according to this indicator (see Figs 10 and 11):
This UNDP issue presents the values of Gini index for the latest year available in the interval 2000–2010. 4 More exactly, on $1.25 a day (in purchasing power parity), which is the currently adopted level of extreme poverty (see, e.g., Klugman 2010: 161–163). 3
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Fig. 10. Percent of people living below $1.25 a day income poverty line, 2000–20085
In this map Egypt is marked with the same color as, say, Sweden, France, the USA, or Australia, which indicates an almost full eradication of extreme poverty in Egypt. Meanwhile, for dozens of countries the extreme poverty still remains an acute problem (see Fig. 11). Thus, according to 2005–2008 data there were 13.4% living below the extreme poverty line in Georgia, 15.9% in China, 21.5% in Tajikistan and Viet Nam, 22.6% in the Philippines, 26.2% in South Africa, 29.4% in Indonesia, 41.6% in India, 49.6% in Bangladesh, 54.9% in Haiti, 70.1% in Guinea, 83.7% in Liberia (Klugman 2010: 161–163).
5Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Percentage_population_living_on_less_than_1_dollar _day_2007-2008.png. The map data have been checked for reliability on the basis of (Klugman 2010: 161–163) and found full confirmation.
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Slovenia Estonia Egypt Morocco Tunisia Venezuela Armenia Mexico Brazil Peru Bolivia Georgia Sri Lanka China Yemen Kenya Mauritania Tajikistan Viet Nam Philippines South Africa Indonesia Senegal Timor-Leste Ethiopia India Laos Uzbekistan Bangladesh Haiti Nepal DRC Chad Nigeria Niger Guinea Mozambique Burundi Liberia
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Fig. 11. Proportion of population living below $1.25 a day income poverty line in some countries, %, data for 2000â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2008
Source: Klugman 2010: 161 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 163.
The dynamics of the extreme poverty level in Egypt after 1991 had the following shape (see Fig. 12):
4,5 4 3,5 3 2,5 2 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 Fig. 12. Share of population living below $1.25 a day income poverty line in Egypt, %, 1991-2005 Source: World Bank 2011.
Let us note that 2% (more exactly, less than 2%) is the minimum level of the extreme poverty recorded by UNDP. Thus, during his stay in power Mubarak managed to eradicate almost completely the extreme poverty in Egypt. Indeed, as we have already mentioned, on the eve of the
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Revolution as regards this indicator Egypt belonged to the group of the best performing countries of the world. The situation with more moderate poverty (the share of population living below $2 a day6 income poverty line) in Egypt is not so brilliant (see Fig. 13):
Fig. 13. Share of population living below $2 a day income poverty line, 2000â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2007 data7
As we see, Egypt is not among the most well-to-do countries in this respect, as about 20%8 of Egyptians live on less than $2 (but on more than $1.25) a day. Meanwhile, against the background of other Third World countries the situation with poverty in Egypt is not at all desperate. According to this indicator, Egypt rather belongs to the most successful Third World countries (see Fig. 14):
In purchasing power parity. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Percentage_population_living_on_less_than_$2_per_ day_2009.png. The data presented in this map have been checked for reliability on the basis of Klugman (2009: 176â&#x20AC;&#x201C;178) and found full confirmation. 8 But nothing close to 40% of the population that many media sources claimed. 6 7
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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
S.Korea Slovenia Russia Estonia Croatia Belarus Chile Bulgaria Romania Jordan Malaysia Venezuela Argentina Thailand Tunisia Morocco Kazakhstan Egypt Algeria Moldova Georgia China Sri Lanka Kenya South Africa Armenia Philippines Yemen Viet Nam Mongolia Turkmenistan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Pakistan Senegal Cambodia Haiti India Sierra Leone Uzbekistan Laos Timor-Leste Nepal Bangladesh Nigeria Niger Guinea Liberia
0
Fig. 14. Proportion of population living below $2 a day income poverty line, %, 2000â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2007
Source: Klugman 2009: 176â&#x20AC;&#x201C;178.
Indeed, on the eve of the Revolution about 20% of the Egyptian population lived on less than $2 a day compared with 36.3% in China, 42.9% in South Africa, 43.4% in Armenia, 45% in the Philippines, 48.4% in Viet Nam. In a considerable number of countries more than a half of the population live under $2 poverty line: 50.8% in Tajikistan, 60.3% in Pakistan, 72.1% in Haiti, 75.6% in India, 81.3% in Bangladesh, 87.2% in Guinea, and 94.8% in Liberia. When talking about the poverty level in Egypt it appears reasonable to scrutinize one more image (Fig. 15):
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Fig. 15. Wikipedia illustration to poverty as a major cause of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution9 This photo is called A poor Cairo neighborhood. However, in Wikipedia this photo is very small, but if you take a closer look at it in a larger scale, ―Egyptian poverty‖ appears to be a very specific thing. ―Poor neighborhood‖ abounds in satellite dishes, while the Arabic signboard at the left bottom corner shows the direction to the nearest computer and software center. This is very far from what the real abject poverty looks like. Let us review photos which we took in the slums of Nairobi, Kenya. It is far not the worst Sub-Saharan country in terms of poverty, as not a half, but ―only‖ one-fifth of Kenyans live on $1.25 a day (Klugman 2010: 161– 163). Still, these photos (see Fig. 16) (taken in 2008 and 2009 together with Darya Khaltourina) vividly illustrate the difference between the extreme poverty of the Third World (living on less than $1.25 a day) and moderate (not desperate!) Egyptian poverty.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt_Revolution_of_2011#Economic_challenges. 9
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Fig. 16. What real Third World poverty looks like: slums of Nairobi, Kenya (2008-09)
BBC and CNN news reports covering the events of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution frequently featured some Egyptians complaining that after buying all the necessary food for their families they had no money left to pay the electricity bills. News reporters felt natural sympathy for those Egyptians, and so do we. Still, it is necessary to account for the fact that the truly poor Third World people would never make such complaints as they simply do not have electricity installed in their places of living to pay for. Still, poverty problems were not irrelevant to triggering the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Why?
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A brilliant paper by Egyptian economists Gamal Siam and Hanady Mostafa Abdel Radi showed that the recent dynamics of Egyptian poverty bore a seemingly paradoxical character. At the peak of the world economic boom in 2007 and early 2008 when Egypt reached 25-yearrecord annual economic growth rates of 7.2%, the proportion of Egyptians living below $2 a day poverty line increased significantly from 17.8% to 23%. On the contrary, global financial-economic crisis of 2008–2009 was accompanied not only by economic growth rates slowdown, but also by a visible decrease in the proportion of Egyptians living on less than $2 a day – from 23% to 19.5% (Siam , Abdel Rady 2010). Paradoxical as it may seem, the answer appears to be most logical and obvious as soon as you know it (though not a single economist whom we asked managed to deduce it). Indeed, a characteristic feature (and product) of economic booms (especially the latest one) is the blowing of price bubbles. On the verge of global financial-economic crisis start there were a lot of such bubbles; Russians best remember the oil price bubble (especially its burst). However, along with the oil price bubble there were lots of others, including copper bubble, nickel bubble, phosphate bubble, etc. Basic food commodities were not an exception, as wheat, rice, maize and other food price bubbles started growing. This was a painful strike to all the poor in the world who spend a major part of their household income on buying food. Egypt strongly depends on food imports10, so poor Egyptians felt the price growth very perceptibly. The $2 a day income poverty line is calculated by the UN accounting for purchasing power parity (PPP); as a result, several millions of Egyptians found themselves below this poverty line. Global financial-economic crisis was accompanied by bubble bursts (the only major ―survivor‖ was the gold price bubble [Akayev et al. 2010]). Food price bubbles were not an exception; prices for many food commodities fell significantly during the crisis. As a result, despite some slowdown in economic growth rates the poor people of Egypt rather benefited from the crisis, and about three millions of poor Egyptian managed to come above the poverty line11.
Thus, Egypt imports about 60% of its consumed wheat, being one of the leading global importers of this crop (see, e.g., Abdel Aziz, el-Talawi 30.06.2010). 11 However, it should be noted that though the food prices fell considerably during the crisis, still they did not reach their pre-bubble level, remaining significantly higher. As a result, the proportion of Egyptians living on less than $2 a day decreased in the second half of 2008 – first half of 2009, but did not return to the level of 2007 (Siam, Abdel Rady 2010). 10
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However, global economic post-crisis recovery led to the blowing of new price bubbles in the world food market almost reaching or even exceeding the peak levels of 2008. Basing on the model by Gamal Siam and Hanady Mostafa Abdel Radi, we have to expect that the proportion of Egyptians living below the $2 a day income poverty line should have reached the 2008 level by the start of the Egyptian Revolution (see Figs 17–20): 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 Dec-04 Mar-05 Jun-05 Sep-05 Dec-05 Mar-06 Jun-06 Sep-06 Dec-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Sep-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Aug-08 Nov-08 Feb-09 May-09 Aug-09 Nov-09 Feb-10 May-10 Aug-10 Nov-10 Feb-11
0
Fig. 17. World wheat prices, $/ton, 2005-2011 Source: IMF 2011. 250 230 210 190 170 150 130 110
Fig. 18. World cooking oil prices (FAO price index, 2002–2004 = 100, deflated), 2003–2011
Source: FAO 2011a.
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2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
90
190 170 150 130 110
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
90
Fig. 19. FAO food price index (2002–2004 = 100, deflated), 2003–2011 Source: FAO 2011a.
29 27 25 23 21 19 17 1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Fig. 20. Proportion of population living below $2 a day income poverty line, Egypt, %, 1991-201012 Sources: World Bank 2011 (1991–2005); Siam, Abdel Rady 2010 (2007–2009); for 2010 we use our own estimates based on the model developed by Siam and Abdel Radi. 12
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Did this food price dynamics and the respectivew dynamics of Egyptian poverty headcount have some influence on destabilization of Egyptian sociopolitical system? Definitely, it did. Indeed, though both in spring 2008 and in January 2011 Egypt remained one of the most well-to-do Third World countries in terms of poverty, the fast growth of the world food prices (taken that Egypt highly depends on food imports) led to a fast growth in the number of Egyptians living below the internationally recognized poverty line. In both cases more than three millions of Egyptians fell below the poverty line during a short period (several months). In spring 2008 the protests against food price growth surged in Egypt. The central event was the strike of spinning and weaving factory workers in the industrial city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra which started on the 6th of April, 2008. The worker’s dissent was aimed first and foremost at the decrease of living standards caused by food price growth. Egyptian bloggers supporting the strikers launched a Facebook group called «April 6 Youth Movement». It is known that this movement played a crucial role in the Egyptian Revolution 2011. Still more important was social self-organization through Facebook which was first successfully tried in spring 2008 by this youth movement and proved its efficiency in 2011 events. Incidentally, Fig. 21 indicates that some external influence seems to have also taken place. We can see that the emblem of the Egyptian ―April 6‖ youth movement is astonishingly similar with the ones of some other youth movements which played an exceptionally important role in organizing the ―color revolutions‖, such as Serbian ―Otpor!‖ and Georgian ―Kmara!‖, which led Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Interestingly, ―Kmara‖ is translated from Georgian as ―Enough‖, the same as Egyptian ―Kifaya!‖ (predecessor of ―April 6‖ movement) is translated from Arabic.
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Fig. 21. Emblems of some youth movements: top left – Egyptian youth movement «April 6»13; top right – Serbian youth movement «Otpor!»14; bottom left – Georgian youth movement «Kmara!»15; bottom right – Russian youth movement «Oborona»16.
In late 2010 – early 2011 food prices again reached the same critical level which was observed in spring 2008, and, in our view, this certainly made a contribution to political destabilization in Egypt in January 2011. Still it is fairly obvious that food price increase is hardly to be recognized as the main cause for the Egyptian events. Indeed, it was a global rather than local phenomenon, and it struck painfully all the poor throughout the Third World, including, say, Latin America, where no wave of revolutions was triggered.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:April_6_Youth_Movement.jpg. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Otpor.png. 15 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Kmara.png. 16 Source: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Файл:Логотип_Обороны.jpg. 13 14
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We should also keep in mind that the poor in Egypt were hit by the world food prices rather weaker than in most other Third World countries, since Mubarak's administration took very serious measures to protect them through the system of subsidies. Currently, the system of food subsidies in Egypt is divided into two types. The first type is subsidizing the baladi bread. Since 1989 the government has kept the price for this type of bread at 5 piastres (1 cent!) per loaf (weighing 130 gram). This type of subsidy is universal, i.e. any inhabitant of Egypt has the right to buy 20 loaves of baladi bread every day at a low (subsidized) price in the state cooperative stores (ElFiqi 2008). The second type of subsidies is ration cards. They allow families to purchase every month a certain amount of some basic food commodities (such as sugar, cooking oil, etc.) at a subsidized price. In the period of rapid growth in world food prices, including wheat prices, Mubarak's regime made heroic (and successful!) efforts to preserve the price of baladi bread at the same level. Accordingly, even in the midst of crisis, any Egyptian could still buy 20 loaves (130 grams each) of subsidized bread a day for 1 pound (about 20 cents) â&#x20AC;&#x201C; more than 2 kg of bread! So, even for those who live on less than $2 per day starvation was out of question in such a situation. But what then caused the massive protests in the spring of 2008? Actually, at that time baladi bread subsidy system in Egypt began to work with more and more fails as the bakeries did not use much of the statesubsidized flour for making bread, but re-sold it in the black market, where a sack of flour costs 100 times more than the state price. Accordingly, the bakeries produced significantly less baladi bread, which led to huge queues and strong discontent of the poor. To soothe the strikers the Egyptian administration took several measures, in particular, public sector workers were promised wage increase by 30%. Also several important changes were made to the subsidy system. So, it was decided that the baladi bread should not be sold in bakeries, but in special shops (separation of production and retail sales in order to reduce queues). The list of products subsidized through ration cards was amended (unpopular products were removed) (AARDO 2010: 159). However, the most important change was that the government significantly increased the number of beneficiaries of subsidies (from 39.5 million to 63 million people), as the system has been expanded also to the Egyptians who were born in 1989â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2005 (AARDO 2010: 159).
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Enhanced number of ration card beneficiaries led to a substantial increase in government spending on subsidies. Thus, in 2008/09 fiscal year food subsidizing cost the government a total of LE 21.5 billion17 (of which 16 billion for baladi bread), compared with 10 billion in 2007/08 (AARDO 2010: 159). Expenditures on food subsidies accounted for 1.4% GDP in 2005 and for 1.8% in 2008 (Adams, Valstar, Wiles 2010: 1). Thus, at the beginning of a new round of world food price increase 100% of the Egyptian people were provided with cheap subsidized bread and nearly 80% had ration cards and bought sugar, butter, and rice at subsidized prices. Interestingly, at the same time, according to Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey (conducted in 2008) 40% of Egyptian women and 18% of men were overweight because of overeating (Egypt Ministry of Health 2009). Accordingly, it is hardly reasonable to state that insufficient subsidies put a significant portion of the population on the brink of starvation (for the dynamics of per capita food consumption in Egypt see Fig. 22 below). Nevertheless, though the Egyptian system of subsidies mitigated the strike blown by global food price rises to the poor (Adams, Valstar, Wiles 2010: 33), it could not outdo its effect completely. Indeed, the system does not cover all necessary food commodities. Besides, the average Egyptian family having a ration card bought at a subsidized price about 60% of its consumed sugar, 73% of oil and 40% of rice (El Nakeeb 2009). The rest of these goods the family had to buy at market prices (that are, of course, much higher than the subsidized ones).
6.Structural-demographic factors of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution Let us first regard the long-term dynamics of per capita calorie intake in Egypt (Fig. 22):
17
About $4 billion.
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3400 3200 3000 2800
2600 2400 2200 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
2000 Fig. 22. Dynamics of per capita calorie intake in Egypt, 1961–2007, kcal/capita/day Source: FAO 2011b.
It should be noted that the WHO18-recommended rate of per capita food consumption is 2300–2400 kcal per capita per day (see, e.g., Naiken 2002). Thus, in Egypt in the early 1960s malnutrition was quite real, and per capita food consumption was lower than the WHO recommended standards. By the mid-1960s Egypt came to this level but until 1974 could not exceed it. After 1973 per capita food consumption rocketed up sharply, surpassing the threshold of 3000 kcal in 1982 (one year after the death of Sadat) and never falling below this level. After that, the majority of Egyptians encountered the problem of overeating rather than malnutrition. All this should be associated with Sadat’s administration launching rather successful economic reforms in 1974 (the so-called Infitah). Thus, we can say that in the 1970s – 1980s Egypt managed to escape the so-called Malthusian trap. Recall that the Malthusian trap19 is a rather typical for pre-industrial societies situation when the growth of output (as it is accompanied by a faster demographic growth) does not lead in the long-range perspective to the increase in per capita output and the improvement of living conditions of the majority of population that The World Health Organization of the United Nations. In terms of non-linear dynamics it can also be called a low-level equilibrium attractor (see Nelson 1956). 18 19
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remains close to the bare survival level. In complex pre-industrial societies the Malthusian trap was one of the main generators of severe political upheavals (up to the state breakdowns) (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006; Korotayev, Khaltourina 2006; Turchin, Korotayev 2006; Turchin, Nefedov 2009; Turchin 2003; Turchin 2005; Artzrouni, Komlos 1985; Kögel, Prskawetz 2001; Komlos, Artzrouni 1990; Steinmann, Prskawetz, Feichtinger 1998; Wood 1998). However, we have shown that the escape from the Malthusian trap somewhat paradoxically (a social explosion comes amid long-term trends of improving material conditions of life for most people) can also be systematically (and quite naturally) accompanied by serious social and political upheavals (of which many modern revolutions serve as examples). We have called this phenomenon ―a trap at the escape from the trap‖ (Korotayev et al. 2010, 2011). The 2011 Egyptian Revolution can well be considered as an example of this phenomenon (with some rather specific features). Let us first answer a really simple question: What impact could the escape from the Malthusian trap have on life expectancy and mortality? Naturally, when undernourished people solve the problem of starvation and start eating enough, their life expectancy increases and the death rate of the population decreases. This was observed in all the known cases of the escape from the Malthusian trap, and Egypt was no exception (see Figs 23 and 24):
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66 64 62 60 58 56 54 52
50 1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Fig. 23. Life expectancy in Egypt, years, 1970-1995 Source: World Bank 2011.
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Fig. 24. Crude death rate per 1000 population, Egypt, 1970â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1995 Source: World Bank 2011.
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Thus, the Egyptian escape from the Malthusian trap was accompanied by impetuous life expectancy growth, while death rate decreased nearly twice (!) in just 20 years (1970–1990). In full accordance with the theory of demographic transition (see, e.g., Chesnais 1992; Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006) decrease of birth rates followed with a usual remarkable lag (Fig. 25):
50
Death rate Birth rate
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
5 Fig. 25. Crude birth and death rates per 1000 in Egypt, 1970–1990, logarithmic scale
Source: World Bank 2011.
Mubarak’s administration was well aware of the threat hidden in the growing gap between declining death rate and stably high birth rate, and almost since the beginning of Mubarak’s reign (1981) it started taking measures aimed at bringing down the birth rate (see, e.g., Fargues 1997: 117–118). However, only in the second half of the 1980s the government managed to develop a really efficient program of such measures. This program was performed by the Egyptian government in collaboration with USAID program aimed at wide-scale introduction and distribution of family planning (Moreland 2006). Religious leaders (from al-Azhar sheikhs to local imams) were involved in the program to
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disseminate (in their fatwahs and sermons) the idea that family planning was not adverse to al-Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an; on the contrary, it is good, as having less children makes it easier for the parents to give them a happy childhood and good education (Ali 1997). This strategy proved essentially effective, as during 5 years (1988â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1992) total fertility rate in Egypt fell from 5 to 4 children per woman. However, until the second half of the 1980s the gap between birth and death rates was increasing. As a result, population growth in Egypt in the 1970 and 1980s acquired explosion-like shape (Fig. 26) and started to decline significantly only in the late 1980s.
60 000 50 000 40 000 30 000 20 000 10 000 0 1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 Fig. 26. Population of Egypt, thousands, 1836â&#x20AC;&#x201C;199020
Naturally, such a rapid population growth is bound to create serious structural strains in any system. However, it was not the only force contributing to the emergence of structural strains. Let us view the curve of absolute growth rates of Egyptian population (see Fig. 27): 20
The sources for this diagram are described in Korotayev, Khaltourina 2006.
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1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 1975
1980
1985
1990
Fig. 27. Dynamics of absolute population growth rates, Egypt, 1975–1992 (thousands of people per year)21
As we see, the absolute population growth rates reached their maximum in 1985–1989. Extracting 1985–1989 out of 2010 we obtain 21–25, which is the age of the numerous generation of young Egyptians who came out to the Tahrir Square in Cairo in January 2011. Let us move to the next question – how could the escape from the Malthusian trap influence the infant and child mortality. Children are most vulnerable to malnutrition, so they benefit most when it is eradicated; besides, in a modernizing country escaping from the Malthusian trap the health system usually develops rapidly, contributing to the decline of infant and child mortality in a very significant way. This can be seen in all cases of the escape from the Malthusian trap, including Egypt (see Fig. 28):
21
Calculated on the basis of the World Bank (2011) data.
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300 250
Infant mortality
200
Under-5 mortality
150 100 50
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
0
Fig. 28. Infant (per 1000 live births) and child (per 1000 under-5 children) mortality in Egypt in 1970–1995
Source: World Bank 2011.
Thus, while crude death rate decreased twice during 1975–1995, infant and under-5 child mortality declined thrice during the same period. Thus, at the first phase of demographic transition (that tends to coincide with the escape from the Malthusian trap) death rate declines dramatically (Вишневский 1976, 2005; Chesnais 1992; Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006a), the greatest decline occurring in infant and under-5 mortality, while birth rates still remain high. Thus, out of 6–7 children born by a woman, 5–6 children survive up to reproductive age, not 2 or 3 as earlier. This leads not only to the demographic explosion, but also to the formation of the ―youth bulge‖, as the generation of children turns out to be much larger in number than their parents’ generation. This is exactly what happened in Egypt (see Fig. 29):
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Fig. 29. Egyptian “youth bulge”. Dynamics of the proportion of youth cohort (aged 20-24) in the Egyptian population, 1990-2010 (with forecast till 2020)22
Jack Goldstone notes that «the rapid growth of youth can undermine existing political coalitions, creating instability. Large youth cohorts are often drawn to new ideas and heterodox religions, challenging older forms of authority. In addition, because most young people have fewer responsibilities for families and careers, they are relatively easily mobilized for social or political conflicts. Youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the existence of a ―youth bulge‖ (an unusually high proportion of youths 15 to 24 relative to the total adult population) has historically been associated with times of political crisis. Most major revolutions … [including] most twentieth-century revolutions in developing countries—have occurred where exceptionally large youth bulges were present» (Goldstone 2002: 11–12). Let us now view the dynamics of the number of Egyptians aged 20–24 (see Fig. 30):
Calculated on the bases of the data from the UN Population Division Database (UN Population Division 2011). The calculations have been made by Justislav Bogevolnov. 22
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9 000 8 000 7 000 6 000 5 000 4 000 3 000 1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Fig. 30. Number of Egyptian youths aged 20-24, thousands, with forecast till 201523
In absolute numbers the growth of this cohort is really astonishing, as it almost doubled during 15 years. Namely this cohort enters the labor market in more or less developed societies (including Egypt), so even for a fast-growing economy it was virtually impossible to create millions of workplaces necessary to absorb the young labor force. As we have seen above, at the beginning of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution the unemployment level in Egypt was about 9% which was not very high according to global standards. However, the most important circumstance (caused just by the ―youth bulge‖) is that about half of all the Egyptian unemployed belonged to the 20–24 age cohort (Al-jihaz… 2010)! Total number of the unemployed on the eve of the Egyptian Revolution was about 2.5 million (Abd al-Rahman 2010: 4). Accordingly, on the eve of the Revolution Egypt had about one million of unemployed young people aged 20–24 who made up the main striking force of the Revolution. It is not surprising that Mubarak’s administration ―overlooked‖ the social explosion. Indeed, statistical data righteously claimed that the country was developing very successfully. Economic growth rates were high (even in the crisis years). Poverty and inequality levels were among the lowest in the Third World. Global food prices were rising, but the government was taking serious measures to mitigate their effect on the poorest layers of the population. Unemployment level (in per cent) was less than in many developed countries of the world and, moreover, was Calculated on the bases of the data from the UN Population Division Database (UN Population Division 2011). The calculations have been made by Justislav Bogevolnov. 23
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declining, and so were population growth rates. What would be the grounds to expect a full-scale social explosion? Of course, the administration had a sort of reliable information on the presence of certain groups of dissident ―bloggers‖, but how could one expect that they would be able to inspire to go to the Tahrir any great masses of people? It was even more difficult to figure out that Mubarak’s regime would be painfully struck by its own modernization successes of the 1980s, which led to the sharp decline of crude death rate and especially of infant and child mortality in 1975–1990. Without these successes many young Egyptians vehemently demanding Mubarak’s resignation (or even death) would have been destined to die in early childhood and simply would not have survived to come out to the Tahrir Square. The rate of unemployment in Egypt stayed almost unchanged, but the number of the young doubled. This means that the absolute number of the unemployed young people also increased at least twice (this, incidentally, indicates how risky this could sometimes be to rely on percentages rather than absolute numbers). Moreover, the investigation carried out at the end of 2010 by the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics discovered that at the eve of the Revolution more than 43% of the Egyptian unemployed had university degrees (Al-jihaz… 2010)! Thus, the impact force of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution was not only young, but also very highly educated. We suppose that this circumstance stipulated the relative ―non-bloodiness‖ of the revolution, i.e. a relatively small number of victims. Indeed, though the scale of the events was truly colossal and millions of people were involved for weeks, only 300 were killed (mostly by the security forces and criminal elements employed by the security forces, but not by the protesters). Let us remember that during the ―bread riots‖ of 1977 (when low-educated Egyptian urban youth was the main striking force) 800 people were killed just during two days (see, e.g., Hirst 1977). In this regard the 2011 Egyptian Revolution was closer to the youth uprisings of 1968 type – and ―velvet revolutions‖ – in Europe and North America of the past decades than to violent and bloody (involving dozens and hundreds thousands [if not millions] of the deathtoll) Third World civil wars. However, the Egyptian Revolution 2011 would hardly have acquired its scale if its protest base had been limited to unemployed highly-educated youth. The youths were supported by millions of Egyptians (of various age, occupation, and education level) who found themselves below the poverty line as a result of world food price growth (despite all the serious
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countermeasures undertaken by Mubarak’s administration). Namely this combination created the socially explosive material necessary for the revolution. However, these were necessary but not sufficient conditions for the Egyptian social explosion. Not only some explosive material, but also some spark was needed. So let us recollect some other factors, without which the revolution might not have happened. First of all, some protesters’ complaints were justified. Thus, the decades of the State of Emergency created the situation of uncontrolled activity of security forces which led to massive usage of tortures against those opposed to the regime. We should also keep in mind the diffusion of the Internet, which supplied Egyptian educated youths with unprecedentedly powerful means of self-organization, as well as the Arabic satellite channels and their talented journalists who translated exceptionally vivid images of people uprisings to all countries of the Arab world. We also share a widespread opinion that the Egyptian events would hardly have been possible if the revolution in Tunisia had not been so fast and bloodless, if it had not created the feeling that changes of power in Arab countries could be fast and non-violent. Thus, we would maintain that the Egyptian Revolution was not possible without certain objective pre-requisites, but still it was not unevitable. Indeed, the ―youth bulge‖ in Egypt was bound to start decreasing rapidly (annually weakening the pressure on the labor market). The program of economic reforms allowed to expect Egypt to reach the level of economic miracle growth rates (about 10% annually) just within 3 or 4 forthcoming years. All this (together with the political liberalization expected from Gamal Mubarak) was bound to dissolve the social ―explosive material‖ in the forthcoming years.
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One-State, Two-States, Bi-National State Mandated Imaginations In A Regional Void Moshe Behar Abstract: Studies of the Arab-Zionist matrix are ordinarily written from what may be termed as a territorially Palestine-centric vantage-point; this – obviously – makes sense since the conflict‟s sorrows, battles, deaths, expulsions and displacements clearly emerged there. But this approach means something else too: that regional dimensions surrounding the Palestine/Israel question are often undervalued both historically and in terms of the region‟s ongoing ethno-politics. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the ever-expanding controversy between proponents of a One-State, Bi-National-State or Two-State solution to the Palestine/Israel question (1S2S). This neglect leads the numerous participants in 1S2S exchanges to debate (and devise) solutions that rest on what I term here „mandated imaginations‟, that is, scholarly spheres that ultimately conceive of the (post-1922) Britishmandated territory of Palestine/Israel as a secluded island in both historical and contemporary terms. The problem is that this neither was, nor is, the case. The Palestine/Israel question acquired a potent regional dimension from at least the time of the Palestinian anti-colonial revolt of 1936-9 and the historic 1937 pan-Arab gathering in Bludan, convened to overturn the first Two-State solution proposed by the royal Peel Commission. It logically follows that if prevailing diagnoses of the very question itself are incorrect or partial – due to mandated imaginations, a Palestine-centric outlook and a neglect of historical and contemporary regional variables – then the corresponding socio-political prognoses (One-State, Two-States or BiNational-State) may also be flawed in all terms other than rhetorical-ideational. To substantiate these propositions, this article is three-fold. Key-words: Palestine-Israel, one-state solution, two-state solution, bi-national state, Middle East geopolitics…
Pears Lecturer in Israeli and Middle Eastern Studies. School of Languages, Linguistics and Cultures. University of Manchester, UK.
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S
tudies of the Arab-Zionist matrix are ordinarily written from what may be termed as a territorially Palestine-centric vantage-point; this – obviously – makes sense since the conflict‘s sorrows, battles, deaths, expulsions and displacements clearly emerged there. But this approach means something else too: that regional dimensions surrounding the Palestine/Israel question are often undervalued both historically and in terms of the region‘s ongoing ethno-politics.1 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the ever-expanding controversy between proponents of a One-State, Bi-National-State or Two-State solution to the Palestine/Israel question (hereinafter 1S2S). This neglect leads the numerous participants in 1S2S exchanges to debate (and devise) solutions that rest on what I term here ‗mandated imaginations‘, that is, scholarly spheres that ultimately conceive of the (post-1922) Britishmandated territory of Palestine/Israel as a secluded island in both historical and contemporary terms. The problem is that this neither was, nor is, the case. The Palestine/Israel question acquired a potent regional dimension from at least the time of the Palestinian anti-colonial revolt of 1936-9 and the historic 1937 pan-Arab gathering in Bludan, convened to overturn the first Two-State solution proposed by the royal Peel Commission. It logically follows that if prevailing diagnoses of the very question itself are incorrect or partial – due to mandated imaginations, a Palestine-centric outlook and a neglect of historical and contemporary regional variables – then the corresponding socio-political prognoses (One-State, Two-States or Bi-National-State) may also be flawed in all terms other than rhetoricalideational. To substantiate these propositions, this article is three-fold. Part I is methodological and problematizes briefly ‗Mandatory Palestine‘ as the territorial framework enclosing the post-1993 1S2S discussion. Part II is ‗historical‘ in that it addresses the 1936-67 period. It begins by suggesting that critical observations outside epic and epicentral Palestine reveal a regionally-profound socio-political butterfly-effect that has emanated from there since the late-1930s. This effect remains at best undervalued by scholars and at worst, historically and analytically In Arab politics the term ‗regionalism‘ (iqlimiyya) understandingly embodies negative connotations – denoting that narrow-statist interests are superior to Arab nationalism‘s broader/holistic interests. That is precisely what I do not mean in this article when employing ‗regional‘ and/or ‗region‘; I instead mean the (English) dictionary-definition of ‗regional‘, that is, ―of – or relating to – a large geographic region‖ (i.e. opposite of iqlimiyya). 1
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cleansed from the scholarship, as is the case with contemporary 1S2S studies. It is alternatively proposed that a non-nationalized and non-teleological reading of the sequence of events that surrounded Arab-Jews2 outside mandatory Palestine is the only one capable of unveiling the direct sociopolitical interface – and tangible, bottom-up interaction – between EuroZionism and Arab nationalism, including their monumental impacts on the region‘s national consolidations. This exercise is crucial for one reason: the (otherwise contingent) mode via which the conflict, hitherto confined to Palestine, became regionalized, impacted profoundly on the political form and societal composition and configuration of both post1949 Israel/Palestine and the Arab Middle East (hereinafter AME). As such, this contingent – if somewhat longue durée – mode of Jewish and Arab national consolidations largely renders obsolete studies of the Palestine/Israel matrix that for whatever reason neglect the regional dimension; this includes, inter alia, nearly all pre-2011 books and articles constituting the 1S2S exchange.3 Part III is more ‗contemporary‘: employing an unapologetically Marxistinformed materialist vantage-point, it thematically juxtaposes two dissimilar explanatory frameworks to the question of Palestine/Israel: (i) the ‗older‘ (ostensibly outdated) analyses as conceptualized by Marxist and non-Marxist Arabs (and Israelis) in the aftermath of the 1967 war to (ii) contemporary (e.g. post-1993) 1S2S debates and exchanges (mostly taking place in Euro-America). Based on this thematic and sequential juxtaposition between these two periods and their corresponding analyses I suggest that the prospects for materializing – as opposed to merely envisioning ideationally – a modestly-democratic solution in the (Mandatory) territory comprising Palestine/Israel are likely to remain unattainable as long as complementary changes remain unrealized in the region surrounding it. I posit that the tangible attainment of I have explained in depth elsewhere why ‗Arabized-Jews‘ is presently the least-worst signifier to denote collectively Jews across the pre-1950s Arab Middle East compared to its nearly twenty ‗competing‘ signifiers (including ‗Arab-Jews‘, ‗Middle Eastern Jews‘, ‗Jews-of-the-Arab-lands‘, ‗Sephardic-Jews‘, ‗Arabic-speaking Jews‘ and ‗Oriental-Jews‘). For simplicity sake, I ironically disregard here my own advice. See Moshe Behar, ―What‘s in a Name? Socio-Terminological Formations and the Case for ‗Arabized-Jews,‘‖ Social identities (2009) 15/6, pp. 747-771. 3 From contrasting viewpoints the studies of both Benny Morris (2009) One State, Two States (New Haven: Yale University Press) and Sharif Elmusa (2007) ‗Searching for a Solution,‘ in Jamil Hilal, (ed). Where now for Palestine? The Demise of the Two-State Solution (London: Zed), pp. 211-230 are exceptional in that Jordan‘s East Bank territory is part of their respective analyses. 2
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democratically-inclusive solutions in Palestine/Israel probably necessitates the reinvigoration of a Middle-Eastern/Arab-centric vantagepoint – informed by late 1960s Marxist materialism – rather than the narrow, non-regional, liberal, ideational, Eurocentric and non-Arab-centric terms that have dominated the post-1993 1S2S exchange.
PART I
1S2S: an Immanent Critique
P
ost-1993 1S2S scholarship merits two complementary critiques: transcendental and immanent. A transcendental critique is an assessment leveled from outside the discursive domain under scrutiny. In a forthcoming article titled ―Unparallel Universes: Iran and Israel‘s One-State Solution‖4 – I present such a critique, highlighting contextual dimensions surrounding the1S2S exchange and possibly suffocating it. I conclude that the huge post-1993 corpus comprising the 1S2S spectrum is scholastic, hypothetical and ideational once juxtaposed with material socio-politics (domestic, regional and global). The present article ignores these findings and instead develops an immanent critique of the hegemonic 1S2S discussion. By immanent critique I mean an assessment leveled from within the discursive domain under scrutiny. An immanent critique thus accepts as valid and viable the host of existing assumptions and parameters that underpin the 1S2S discussion as it manifests itself scholarly and/or publicly. Such acceptance enables one to engage with the debate internally – offering it a corrective from within. This corrective rests on identifying significant omissions pertaining to the 1S2S exchange‘s own terms of reference, i.e., those terms that to begin with make possible the very idea of 1S2S scholarship and its collectively acquired hegemonic configuration in the post-1993 aftermath of the Oslo debacle. Is Palestine an Island? Being the territorial domain of the 1S2S discussion, ‗Mandatory Palestine‘ was demarcated as recently as 1922 under the auspices of British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill. In 1920 the newlyestablished League of Nations awarded mandates to Britain (over greater-Palestine and Iraq) and France (over Syria and Lebanon). Clear Forthcoming in Global Society, 25/3 (July, 2011); readers may find it useful to read this article in conjunction with the present one. 4
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borders between these formerly-Ottoman domains were lacking – a fact that generated British-French tensions. In March 1921 Churchill convened in Cairo what would become a historically momentous gathering of experts to assess (i) the question of British-controlled territories vis-à-vis French-controlled ones and (ii) the fate, and territorial composition, of Iraq (Mesopotamia), Transjordan and Palestine.5 The meeting‘s main conclusions were to offer the Iraqi throne to Emir Faisal (son of Sharif Hussein ibn ‗Ali al-Hashemi) and the emirate of Transjordan to his brother Abdullah. During this occasion the territory nowadays known as ‗historic Palestine‘ (or Eretz Yisrael) was prosaically demarcated too. The experts drafted a clause that would later be added (as Article 25) to the final binding text of Britain‘s Palestine Mandate that extended over the combined territories of present-day Jordan and Palestine/Israel. The clause‘s final version of read: In the territories lying between the Jordan [River] and the Eastern [Iraqi] boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled […] to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions. If we combine present-day Jordan and Palestine/Israel, Article 25 enabled the British to carve away some 75% of the territory, juridically construct (Trans-) Jordan and award it to the Hashemites (Britain‘s allies during the war). Consequently, as presently debated by 1S2S scholars – ‗historic Palestine-Eretz-Yisrael‟ refers to the post-1922 colonial demarcation encompassing the tiny 26,320 km2 area stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Nearly all post-1993 publications that discuss the 1S2S conundrum refer exclusively to this Lilliputian territory.6 From a materialist-informed Marxist vantage-point, this The team included Gertrude Bell, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, Sir Percy Cox, T.E. Lawrence (―of Arabia‖), Sir Arnold T. Wilson and Iraq‘s Defense Minister (later Prime Minister) Ja'far al-'Askari. Also invited was Sasson Heskel (Effendi, Sir), Iraq‘s first Finance Minster and most legendary Jewish statesman in the 20th Century AME. 5
This body of writing is huge. A small sample includes Meron Benvenisti, Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land (Berkeley: University of California, 1995); Graham Usher (1995) Bantustanisation or bi-nationalism? An interview with Azmi Bishara‘ Race & Class 37/2, pp. 43-49; Jenab Tutunji & Kamal Khaldi, ―A Binational State in Palestine: The Rational Choice for Palestinians and the Moral Choice for Israelis,‖ International Affairs, 73/1 (Jan. 1997), pp. 31-58; Ghada Karmi, ―After Oslo: A Single State in Israel/Palestine?‖, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 11/2 (1998), pp. 212-26; Uri Avnery, (1999) ‗A Binational State? God Forbid!‖, Journal of Palestine Studies, 28/4, pp 55-61; Salim Tamari, (2000) ‗The Dubious Lure of Binationalism,‘ Journal of Palestine Studies, 30/1, pp. 83-87; Gary Sussman, ―Is the Two-State Solution Dead?‘, 6
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submissive adherence to Churchillian cage appears excessive and may thus benefit from scrutiny.
PART II
Partition/Regionalization/Arab-Jews (1936-67)
T
he principal notion of a Two-State-solution – the slicing of Lilliputian Palestine into ‗Arab‘ and ‗Jewish‘ states – became salient in July 1937 upon the publication of the 400 page report by the Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel. The proposed Jewish state was to include some 20 percent of the territory, including most fertile northern areas. Since nearly half its population would be Palestinian-Arab, the Commission recommended transferring 230,000 Palestinians from their homes in the Galilee. Peel‘s envisioned Arab state was to include a Jewish minority comprising 10 percent of the population (ergo a lesser need for analogous transfer of Jews although several hundred Zionists may have been instructed to relocate to the Jewish State). Peel‘s Two-State-partition was rejected outright by non-Zionist JewishMarxists, all Zionist Revisionists, Religious Zionists, some of the General Zionists and most sections within the dominant Zionist Labor movement. Hosting nearly 500 delegates, the 20th Zionist Congress, which convened in Zurich in August 1937, rejected – effectively unanimously – the Peel partition plan. However, following the strategically savvy leadership of David Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann the Congress ―empowered the Executive to enter into negotiations with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Current History, 103/669 (January 2004), 37-43; Daniel Gavron, The other side of despair: Jews and Arabs in the promised land (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004); GhaziWalid Falah, ―The Geopolitics of ‗Enclavisation‘ and the Demise of a Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict‖, Third World Quarterly, 26/8 (2005), pp. 1341-72; Virginia Q. Tilley, The one-state solution: a breakthrough for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian (Detroit: University of Michigan Press, 2005); Yosef Gorni From Binational Society to Jewish State: Federal Concepts in Zionist Political Thought, 1920-1990, and the Jewish People (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Uri Davis (2006) ‗Whither Palestine-Israel? Political Reflections on Citizenship, Bi-Nationalism and the One-State Solution,‘ Holy Land Studies, 5/2, pp. 199210; Ali Abunimah, One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse (New York: Metrpolitan, 2006); Hillal, Ibid.; David Unger, ―The Inevitable Two-State Solution‖, World Policy Journal (Fall 2008), pp. 59-67; George E. Bisharat, ―Maximizing Rights: The One State solution to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict‖, Global Jurist, 8/2 (2008), pp. 1-36; Alexander Yakobson & Amnon Rubinstein, Israel and the Family of Nations: The Jewish Nation-State and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2009); As'ad Ghanem (2009) ―The Bi-National State Solution,‖ Israel Studies, 14/2, pp. 120-133. 102
Majesty‘s government for the proposed establishment of a Jewish state.‖7 Put differently, the Zionist Congress accepted – with unmistakable public agony – the principle of partition. It simultaneously insisted on a major border expansion for the proposed Jewish State while flatly rejecting Peel‘s foundational diagnosis that the (1922) British Mandate had proved unworkable. Instead, the Congress demanded the Mandate‘s full realization which meant the establishment of a ‗Jewish National Home‘ throughout Mandatory Palestine. Scholars have amassed a plethora of evidence that the Zionist consideration of partition was tactical and non-substantive.8 It resulted from the movement‘s structural weakness and lack of material or demographic parity vis-à-vis the indigenous Palestinians. Jews at the time (non-Zionist Orthodox and Sephardic Jews included) comprised some 27 percent of the population and owned at best 6 percent of the land.9 As the Congress‘s moderate delegate, Ben-Gurion delivered the most conciliatory Zionist position vis-à-vis Peel‘s report: The proposed Jewish State – even if all the necessary and possible corrections [we demand are] implemented – is not the Zionist aim. It is impossible to solve the Jewish Question in the territory proposed. However, the proposed state can constitute a critical stage on our way to fulfilling Big Zionism (ha-tsiyonut ha-gdola). In the shortest time possible this state will make possible in Eretz Yisrael the tangible Jewish force that will ultimately bring us to our historical Zionist destination. […] Precisely as I do not view the proposed Jewish state as the final solution for the host of problems faced by Am Yisrael so I do not see the proposed partition as a final solution of the Eretz Yisrael [Palestine] Protocol of the 20th Zionist Congress, reprinted in Y. Galnoor, Partition of Palestine (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 207. 7
Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian-Arabs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel (New York: Pantheon, 1987); Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians (Washington: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992); Benny Morris, Righteous Victims (New York: Vintage, 2001); Tom Segev, One Palestine Complete (New York: Metropolitan, 2000). 8
David Ben-Gurion in Al Darchey Mediniyutenu: Moatsah Olamit Shell Ihud Po‟aley Tsiyon: Din Veheshbon Maleh, Zurich, 29 July-7 August 1937 [Full Report on World Council of Ihud Poaley Tsiyon] (Tel Aviv: Central Office of Ihud Poaley Tsiyon, 1938), 207. According to Zionist scholar Isaiah Friedman, ―Jews owned less than 1% of the territory‖ see ―The Partition Scheme of 1937, against the Background of British-Zionist-Arab Relations,‖ in Meir Avizohar & I. Friedman, Studies in the Palestinian Partition Plans, 1937-47, (Sdeh Boker: Ben-Gurion Research Center, 1984), p. 113. [Hebrew] 9
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question. Correct are those arguing that the territory comprising Mandatory Palestine cannot be partitioned since it constitutes a single entity not only historically but also naturally and economically. The East Bank [Transjordan] was cut-off 15 years ago. Can‘t everyone now see that this dismemberment was a disaster for the East Bank more than it was for the territory [to the west] of Mandated Palestine? In Palestine – development, growth, population increase, not only Jewish but also Arab. In Transjordan – freeze, dwindling, poverty, under-development. Ben-Gurion, purportedly a moderate, went on to explain: The [1922] British Mandate should be understood as the first stage; the [proposed 1937] Jewish State will constitute the second stage; yet it will not be the last stage. There are no eternal political arrangements. We live in a dynamic, changeable world. In the face of all present and future changes we hold a singular testing criterion: the rapid growth of Jews in Eretz Yisrael and the strengthening of their independent force. That‘s the sole pathway to transform Palestine into Eretz Yisrael. If the power and capabilities of the present British Mandate to deliver this objective are weaker/smaller than the power and capabilities of the [sovereign] Jewish State [proposed by Peel] – I choose with no hesitation the proposed state over the present Mandate: that is the case even if the Mandate‘s territory is considerably larger than the territory of the proposed state.10 Some thirty years later, Marxist Naef Hawatmeh – of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) – would start entertaining a ‗gradualism‘ reminiscent of Ben-Gurion (albeit with less success).11 With much agony a ‗gradualist‘ Ben-Gurionist phrase emerged in 1974 during the 12th Palestine National Council (PNC): ―The PLO will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory liberated.‖12 Yet acceptance 10
Ben-Gurion in Al Darchey, 72, 76, 209 (emphasis in the original; my translation).
William B. Quandt, Fuad Jaber & Ann M. Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 103-7; ―What Palestinian State? An Interview with Nayef Hawatmeh (Dec. 10 1973)‖, MERIP Reports, 24 (Jan. 1974), pp. 256. 11
―Political Programme for the Present Stage of the Palestinian National Organization Drawn by the Palestinian National Council, Cairo, June 9, 1974,‖ Journal of Palestine 12
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of the principle of partition remained extraneous to the ten-point programme. This changed 14 years later in Algiers – with 253 PNC delegates voting for, 46 against, and 10 abstaining. As Edward Said explained, ―I myself agree with the policy articulated [...]. I voted enthusiastically for a realistic and above all clear policy. [...] The struggle for Palestine has always been, as Weizmann once said, over one acre here, one goat there. Struggles are won by details, inches, specifics, not only by big generalizations, large ideas, abstract concepts.‖13 Said would modify his diagnosis following Oslo‘s Two-State-debacle.14 These Zionist/Palestinian temporal juxtapositions notwithstanding, BenGurion‘s instrumental approach to the concept of partition, like that of the entire Zionist leadership in (and after) 1937, was clearer in private or confidential communications and writings. The Palestinian/Arab response to the 1937 partition was more candid than the Zionist (and, as such, possibly less productive and rigorous strategically). Peel‘s proposal to terminate the British [Jewish] Mandate; limit Jewish immigration; establish an Arab state over (nearly) 4/5th of Palestine and a Jewish State over the rest yielded the opposite outcome than the British had intended. Peel‘s Two-State-plan profoundly radicalized the revolt. This article cannot provide an analysis of the historically monumental months between July 1937 and May 1939 (when the British Parliament approved the MacDonald White Paper, see below).15 Suffice it to say that in terms of historical magnitude and human and material losses, these critical 22 months were proportionately more destructive than the horrible month of September 1970 or the entire (so-called) al-Aqsa/Second Intifada (September 2000 to the 2009 Gaza onslaught). One more development emerged during 1937-9 – yet one that remains politically obfuscated and scholarly underrated, foremost in contemporary 1S2S scholarship and discussions: a butterfly began flapping its sociopolitical wings outside Palestine and this tiny ripple Studies, 3/4 (Summer, 1974), p. 224 (italics added); Eric Rouleau, ―The Palestinian Resistance at the Crossroads,‖ Journal of Palestine Studies, 3/2 (winter, 1974), pp. 185-186. Edward Said, ―From Intifada to Independence,‖ Middle East Report, 158 (May-June, 1989), p. 13. 13
14
Edward Said, ―The One-State Solution,‖ New York Times Magazine, 10 January 1999.
Ghassan Kanafani, The 1936-39 Revolt in Palestine (New York: Committee for a Democratic Palestine, 1972); Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt. (Arkansas: The University of Arkansas Press, 2003); Matthew Hughes, ‗The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39‖, English Historical Review 124/507 (April 2009), pp. 313–54. 15
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would ultimately develop into a decisive impact on the whole regional interface of the Arab-Zionist conflict. Butterfly (1936-41) Contemporary 1S2S discussions ordinarily debate the future of the conflict and its possible resolutions without delving much into the past – especially the regional/supra-Palestinian past. This impinges negatively on the proposed solutions. To start with, what would be the best way to spell ‗Two-State-Solution‘? I suggest regionalization. The Palestinian 1936-9 uprising generally – and Peel‘s Two-State-plan specifically – affected, and became part of, domestic politics in neighboring Arab societies and states.16 They have as such impacted the very process of national formation and the contingent, inter-dependent consolidation of the Jewish and Arab national collectivities. For practically all 1S2S scholars, the processes dialectically inter-linking (i) the Palestine partition, (ii) regionalization and (iii) Arab-Jews amount to little more than residual dust – a historical nuisance to be brushed-off. These processes are perceived as having neither serious relevance, nor consequence, for the contemporary Palestine/Israel question (its possible resolutions included, whether One-State, Two-States or BiNational State). Yet active Arab support of the anti-colonial Palestinian struggle grew exponentially following the publication of Peel‘s Partition plan.17 As Egypt‘s British ambassador put it: ―the Palestine question has to all intents and purposes become a domestic political issue in Egypt.‖18 I posit that the critical question is this: in what precise manner did this historically momentous regionalization process manifest itself socio-politically? Explicitly or implicitly, most studies assume the standard/hegemonic view, namely, that the so-called real regionalization of the Palestine question materialized in May 1948 after the British departed and upon Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office papers (hereafter FO), 406/75 includes extensive documentation of Arab objections to, and protests of, the Peel report. 16
Y. Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1977); Y. Porath, In Search for Arab Unity (London: Frank Cass, 1986); J. Jankowski, ―Egyptian Responses to the Palestine Problem in the Interwar Period,‖ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12 (1980), pp. 1-38; J. Jankowski, ―The Government of Egypt and the Palestine Question, 1936-1939,‖ Middle Eastern Studies, 17 (1981), pp. 42753. 17
18
FO 407/222, Lampson (Cairo) to Halifax, 24 May 1938. 106
the crossing of armed Iraqi, Egyptian, Syrian, trans-Jordanian and Lebanese forces into the territory assigned to the Palestinian state in UNGA resolution 181. I suggest that the precise opposite is the case. The regionalization of the Palestine question (i) was sociopolitical (rather than military/armed); (ii) manifested itself tangibly more than a decade before 1948; (iii) materialized upon the migration of the Palestine question to neighboring Arab societies/states (rather than the other way around). If these elements evade even contemporary analysts, it is unsurprising that during 1936-38 few observers were successful in detecting sufficiently accurately the multiple dimensions of the region‘s increasingly entangled sociopolitical dynamics and – more crucially – the contingent, sectarian course which nationalist politics inside and outside Palestine had began to take.19 (The ideational layer of cross-religious and cross-ethnic secularist modernism that Euro-Zionists and Arab nationalists often verbalized declaratively remained factually hollow and never really materialized empirically). I suggest that the symbolic butterfly flapping its almost invisible sociopolitical wings – in Bludan, Cairo and Baghdad – affected the (otherwise contingent) consolidation of the phenomenon of nationalism in the AME and, by extension, significantly raised post-1945 prospects for concurrent Arab/Palestinian defeat and Euro-Zionist triumph (which have lasted to this day). ‗Butterfly-effect‘ is defined as ―a small change at one place in a complex system can have large effects elsewhere‖;20 or ―small changes in initial conditions [that] can lead to both large-scale and unpredictable variation in the future state of the system.‖21 Briton C. J. Edmonds was among the few who detected these seismographic vibrations in the early condition of the Arab-Zionist system. In 1937 he explained from Baghdad: The most serious aspect of the Palestine problem is that the communities concerned are not local entities but have racial and religious affinities all over the world and, in particular, that any exacerbation of the situation there reacts immediately not only on the government and Arab majority in Iraq but on the
In this context see also Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). 19
Definition is from WordNet® A lexical database of English, Princeton University (at http://wordnet.princeton.edu/ ). 20
21
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 107
tranquility of the large Jewish [minority] community resident here as well.22 Although Jews are no longer found in Baghdad, Edmonds‘ observations remain relevant in two respects. The first is in relation to contemporary ‗diasporic‘/extra-territorial Jews and/or Palestinians/Arabs – including those Ben-Gurion dubbed ―armchair Zionists‖ and Benedict Anderson ―long distance nationalists.‖23 The second respect is more crucial: it concerns the implicit critique in Edmonds‘ observations regarding the state of Arab national politics in terms of inter-group relations (whether religious, ethnic or sect-based); these remain as bleak today as they were in 1937 and, as such, continue to benefit Zionism. Another analyst who sensed the butterfly effect was Sir John Shuckburgh (1877-1953), Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office. His lengthy 1938 analysis included this observation: No [British] attention seems to be given to the situation of the average non-political Jew. I know that the Jewish community in Egypt, with whose leaders I was on the most friendly terms, are seriously worried at the likelihood of anti-Semitic reactions which they have successfully avoided – indeed, the thing has been utterly unknown in Egypt – which are likely to be the direct result of Zionist politics. Hitherto, the leading Egyptian Moslems, like their humbler compatriots, have entertained most friendly feelings toward Jews. [...] They are now genuinely roused [...] at the idea that fellow [Palestinian] Moslems [...] are eventually to be squeezed out of a country which they have inhabited for many centuries by [Euro-Zionist] immigrants who are regarded as being mostly Communists. I am convinced that if we stick doggedly to partition [in Palestine] it will [...] create a new and unfortunate attitude on the part of the Moslems and the Egyptian Copts to the Egyptian Jews. There seems every reason to believe that the same observation would apply throughout Arabia and Iraq. [...] Why must we deliberately refuse to make any effort to find out how far Jewish sentiment and Zionist fanaticism are really identical?24
22
FO 406/75, Edmonds (Baghdad) to Kerr, 15 November 1937 (italics added).
Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World, (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 58-74. 23
FO 371/21878, Sir J. Shuckburgh (Colonial-Office) to Sir L. Oliphant, 18 July 1938, (emphasis added). 24
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Shuckburgh‘s foresight of the Palestinians‘ ―squeezing out‖ a decade before its materialization was undoubtedly impressive yet easier to extrapolate; more remarkable remains his ability to highlight the regional impacts – on Arab-Jews – of (i) the very concept of partition/two-states and (ii) the (back-then-possible) ―squeezing out‖ of the Palestinians. Yet even for Shuckburgh it was impossible to detect the (possible) long-term impacts of this process on the consolidation of Arab nationalism itself. I argue that at this precise critical juncture lies the most foundational seed for what would culminate in a historically colossal Arab defeat by a half-million Euro-Zionists in the 1940s: the failure to cement a modestly democratic/inclusive denominator for a horizontal Arab collectivity liberated from the host of ethnic, religious and sectarian-diametric divisions. Whether it was voluntary or structural – the gradual Arab slide into the sectarian playingfield fashioned by the Zionists themselves boosted the prospect of defeat. As shown next, this certainly was the case in 1937-41 and probably remains so today (as Part III elaborates). The struggle between the Euro-Zionists and Palestine‘s Arabs intensified between Britain‘s 1917 Balfour Declaration and its 1947 passing of Mandatory Palestine to the newly formed UN. Nonetheless, it was a decade earlier that the conflict in Palestine had began to reverberate regionally. A highly undervalued core variable that facilitated the EuroZionists‘ historical triumph over their Arab-nationalist adversaries resulted from the formers‘ success in furnishing some of their fiercest Arab enemies outside mandatory Palestine with their self-made conceptions, terms and socio-politically sectarian logic. As exemplified next via selected dynamics in Syria, Egypt and Iraq – from the late 1930s a politically-significant number of ‗radical‘ Arab nationalists (of both ‗secular‘ and religious persuasions) began embracing the Euro-Zionist conflation between Judaism and Zionism; this, in turn, would place them at the otherwise contingent outset of a self-defeating path. Syria. Mindful of guilt-by-association as early as 1929, the miniscule community of Syrian Jews felt it urgent to declare publicly their disassociation from Palestine‘s Euro-Zionists: […] Zionism […] was founded by the Jews in Northern Europe and the Jews of Damascus are totally estranged from it. […] We have come to declare […] to our fellow Arab citizens […] our attitude vis-à-vis the Zionist question, and ask them to
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differentiate between the European-Zionists and the Jews who have been living for centuries in these lands. We ask that the population and the press consider the Jews of Damascus to be Arabs sharing completely all of their sentiments in good times and in adversity.25 Of course this perceived need for public avowals was (and remains) degrading for any minority community pressed to assure nationalists in the surrounding majority-community of its ‗loyalty‘ to the given nation and/or state. Yet the association – and subsequently conflation – between Euro-Zionism in turbulent Palestine and minority Jews in the surrounding Arab areas was not salient politically before 1936. During Palestine‘s first month of General Strike the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) naturally appealed for Arab assistance in the struggle over the homeland. After months of coordination with Syrian nationalists and members of the Damascus Committee for the Defense of Palestine, Hajj Amin succeeded in facilitating the first landmark inter-Arab Congress that convened in Bludan on 8-10 September 1937 (soon after Peel‘s publication);26 ―the proceedings were modeled on those of the recent Zionist Congress in Zurich.‖27 As in Zurich, over 400 delegates participated in Bludan – including 160 Syrians, 65 Lebanese, 30 Trans-Jordanians, 12 Iraqis, 6 Egyptians and 1 Saudi. An examination of available documents produced both for and during the Congress (by its three constituent committees for Finance and the Economy; Political Affairs and Education and Propaganda) – reveals the prevalence of a conservative manifestation of religiously-nourished anti-Zionism. The proceedings attest to acute difficulties in comprehending the difference not only between Zionists and Jews generally but, more crucially, between Palestine‘s Euro-Zionists and the region‘s Jews (in 1937 that is). A 30-page tract entitled The Jews and Islam was given to every delegate. It assembled selective Quran and Hadith excerpts portraying (generic)
Primary source reprinted in Norman A. Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times (New York: the Jewish Publication Society, 1991), p. 328. 25
For Hajj Amin consult Philip Mattar. The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). 26
FO 371/20814, 15 September 1937, comprehensive dispatch (plus five annexes) from Gilbert MacKereth (Damascus) to Colonial Office. 27
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‗Jews‘ in an inflammatory and xenophobic manner.28 Resolutions stipulating that Palestine was an integral part of the Arab homeland; that it must not be partitioned; that the Mandate should be abrogated or the Balfour Declaration annulled, made perfect sense given the twinprocesses of Euro-Zionist colonization and the simultaneous dispossession of peasant and working-class Palestinians. But other Congress components were quite racist, should have been charged as such, and rejected publicly. One example is the resolution to ―boycott all Jewish goods, Jewish productions, and Jewish trade [which] is the national duty of every Arab no matter who he may be‖ and that ―he who disobeys should be considered as a supporter of Zionism whom all must boycott as well.‖ Yet it was not Euro-Zionist production and commerce present in markets in Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus; it was, instead, labor by indigenous Jews, overwhelmingly non-Zionist. Delegates also learned that ―before the war, Zionism had been but an idea in the minds of the world-trotters, the Jews‖ and that ―it soon became a definite plan which united them together through the power of authority and wealth.‖ Arabs must therefore ―stand and face all greedy and obstinate peoples.‖ The Congress‘s juxtaposition of good Muslims and Christians, on the one hand, to cruel, greedy, victimizing (generic) ‗Jews‘, on the other, was predictably confusing and misleading – and would also be profoundly counter-productive in terms of the Arab nationalist cause itself. Such was the dominant anti-Zionist framing at Bludan and, more emphatically, during the more (so-called) ‗radical‘ unofficial gathering that immediately followed it. As Marxist Jews (and non-Jews) in Egypt and Iraq argued eloquently already in the 1940s,29 such manifestations of anti-Zionism played neatly into the hands of Zionist strategy in contributing to its overriding efforts at cross-regional and cross-ethnic amalgamation of ethnically differentiated Jewish communities. Either way, it was – as Philip Khouri puts it – the ―pan-
28
29
Ibid, annex 5. Yusuf Harun Zilkha (1946) al-Sihyuniyah ʻaduwat al-ʻarab wa al-yahud [Zionism against
Arabs and Jews] (Baghdad: Matbaʻah Dar al-Hikmah), pp. 63-67; Marsil Shirizi, ‗Against Zionism for the Sake of Jews and Arabs‘ reprinted in Awraq munadil Itali fi Misr [Papers of Italian Fighter in Egypt] (al-Qahirah: Dar al-ʻAlam al-Thalith 2002 [1947]), pp. 52-6; Henri Curiel, Les Communistes égyptiens et le problème juif (Cairo: Huckstep internment camp, 1949), typescript 317 in Inventory of the papers of the Egyptian Communists in Exile (Amsterdam: Institute of Social History). 111
Arab Congress at Bludan which helped to launch the second and most intense stage of the [Palestine] rebellion.‖30 Egypt. Peel‘s proposed Two-State-partition translated into collective action in 1938 Egypt, unlike any that had transpired before.31 The mawlid an-nabī celebrations witnessed hundreds of demonstrating students attempting to break into Cairo‘s Jewish quarter; the police had to employ forceful measures to prevent the escalation of anti-Jewish hostility.32 Palestine‘s partition plan was also assessed by mainstream bodies including Egypt‘s Grand Ulama on the Question of Palestine, which held its meeting in Al-Azhar (on 18 August). Its decisions were personally delivered to the British by Al-Azhar rector Sheikh al-Maraghi who emphasized: the danger which Zionism was preparing for all the Jewish communities in the Middle East. [...] The seizure of a Muslim land [in Palestine] by the Jews [in fact, Euro-Zionists] with the support of Britain was arousing much vindictive feeling. [...] It was quite possible […] that the Jews in Iraq and Egypt […] might shortly find themselves involved in the general anti-Jewish hostility of the Moslem world [as a consequence of the Palestine clashes].33 Al-Maraghi was regrettably correct: three years later, over 150 Jews were killed in Iraq during a two-day spree of violence known as the Farhud. Since then, two chauvinist tendencies prevail: (i) The Farhud is necrophilically over-blown by academic Zionists; to paraphrase the Talmudic proverb, they highlight the Farhud retrospectively ‗less for their love of [Iraqi-Jewish] Mordechai and more for their loathing of [Arab] Haman‘: it is in other words a means of depicting Arabs generically as anti-Semitic racists in order to whitewash Zionist deeds in Palestine.34 Conversely (ii) the Farhud is hardly mentioned and remembered (if at all) Philip S. Khoury, ―Divided Loyalties? Syria and the question of Palestine, 1919-39‖ Middle Eastern Studies (1985) 21/3, p. 332. 30
31
Jankowski, 1980, 1981.
32
FO 371/21876, Lampson to London, 17 May 1938.
33
FO 371/24879, Bateman to London, 23 August 1938.
Examples include Moreh S & Z. Yehuda, eds. (2010) Al-Farhud, The 1941 Pogrom in Iraq, (Jerusalem: Magness) [originally published in Hebrew in 1992] and Black, Edwin (2010) The Farhud, Roots of the Arab-Nazi Alliance in the Holocaust (New York: Dialogue). 34
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by non-Zionist scholars of the Israel/Palestine question who apparently find it too challenging to comprehend the Farhud‘s (Deir Yassinian) magnitude – let alone its dialectic relationship and relevance to the simultaneous Euro-Zionist historical triumph and Arab defeat. Yet be these teleological historiographic tendencies as they may – the British 1938 assessment of the above-cited Ulama report could sense somewhat the emerging regional implications of the conflict in mandatory Palestine: The resolutions of the Grand Ulama of Egypt may have received some of their inspiration and impetus from those recently passed by the Ulama of Iraq. [...] It may not be possible for well-disposed and reasonable Egyptians to stem the tide of pro-Islamic sentiment [vis-à-vis local Jews] if no settlement of the Palestine question, acceptable to the Arabs, is reached.35 The Iraqi Shiite Ulama had indeed called for a jihad two weeks earlier, followed by a similar call by Iraq‘s Sunni Ulama.36 In October 1938, the World Parliamentary Congress of Arab and Muslim Countries for the Defense of Palestine gathered – inaugurating Egypt‘s organized (Arab and/or Muslim) mobilization on Palestine‘s behalf. The biggest of its kind, the Congress hosted some 2,000 delegates from across the Arab and/or Islamic world. As in 1937 Bludan, resolutions cemented around opposition to the partition plan while demanding the reversal of the Balfour Declaration and the termination of Jewish migration to Palestine. The British Embassy reported: We are doing our best to keep the Congress [...] within limits of restraint and moderation. But the course of the events in Palestine has deeply shaken Moslem opinion, and the position of the Egyptian government, who are loyally trying to damp down extremism, is becoming daily more embarrassing. […] The policy of partition will not work [...] even if we succeed in suppressing Arab resistance, Arabs will seize the first opportunity to rise against us. Under present policy, gradual conveyance of Moslem elements in the Near East toward Italy is inevitable.37
35 36 37
FO 371/24879, Bateman to London, 23 August 1938. See FO 406/76, Houstoun-Boswall (Baghdad) to Halifax, 10 August 1938 no. 71&72. FO 407/222, Lampson to Halifax, 10 October 1938. 113
Since not only anti-Zionist but also anti-Jewish material had circulated during the Congress,38 Egypt‘s ―Jewish community – fully alive to the unfavorable repercussion of the trend of events on the security of their persons and property – had taken precautions [to counter the ultraviolent expression of opinions in the press].‖39 A few weeks later, on the occasion of the Balfour Declaration‘s 21st anniversary, a mass pro-Palestinian meeting convened at Cairo University. The pro-Palestinian campaign of Young Egypt – a protofascist subnational contingent within Egypt‘s predominantly liberal national movement – was extended to include a boycott of not only Zionist goods but also of merchandise produced in Egypt by Jews. The Boycott Committee had published lists of names of Jewish merchants whom Egyptians were urged to boycott.40 In July 1939, Young Egypt activists placed bombs in or near synagogues in Cairo, Mansourah, Nahalla Kebir and Assiyut and posted anti-Jewish notices.41 There certainly were anti-Zionist forces that did not conflate anti-Zionism with hostility to local Jews: chiefly secularized liberals and Marxists (rather than Islamists and nationalists), they were ultimately defeated by both Euro-Zionism and Arab nationalism‘s xenophobic undercurrent. 42 Iraq. In Iraq, rage over Palestine‘s partition and the brutal suppression of the revolt was stronger than in Egypt and Syria and fueled actions against local Jews. Scholarly focus on the 1930s is lacking since studies commonly regard the ‗epical‘ late 1940s as the more critical
FO 406/76, Commandant Cairo City Police to Egyptian Under Secretary of State for the Interior, 31 October 1938, Enclosure 103 in Lamposn to Halifax, 2 November 1938; J. Jankowski, ―Zionism and the Jews in Egyptian Nationalist Opinion, 1920-1939,‖ in A. Cohen & G. Baer (eds.) Egypt and Palestine, a Millennium of Association, 686-1948 (NewYork: St. Martin‘s Press, 1984), pp. 314-31. 38
FO 407/222, Lampson to Halifax, Memorandum of the Egyptian Press for September-October 1938. 39
See United States National Archives (USNA), 883.4016-Jews/7, Fish to Washington, 25 September 1939; 883.4016-Jews/6, Fish to Washington, 27 July 1939; J. Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels: “Young Egypt,” 1933-1952 (Stanford: Hoover, 1975), 39. 40
USNA, 883.4016 Jews/5, Murray to Washington, 24 July 1939 and 883.4016-Jews/6, Fish to Washington, 27 July 1939. 41
For bodies not conflating anti-Zionism with activism against local Jews consult Jankowski, 1984; Kramer, 146-54; Gershoni, 1999. 42
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terminus a quo.43 In August 1938, the British Ambassador reported on communications with Iraq‘s Interior Minister on ―the subject of the present position of the Jews in Iraq, with special reference to the bitter feelings which have been aroused against them by the recent Jewish [read Zionist] reprisals on the Arabs in Palestine.‖ The Ambassador explained: I fear that the news received recently of the heavy casualties which resulted from the explosion of a bomb in the Arab bazaar in Jaffa [Palestine] may again incense the Arab public and it will not be surprising if there are further instances of the victimising of Jews in spite of the preventive measures taken by the [Iraqi] government.44 A week earlier, an advisor to Iraq‘s Ministry of Interior approached the Minister following two bombings of Jewish clubs and the publication of a jihad-fatwa concerning Palestine (mentioned above). The Minister predicted: Before long, a demand might arise for the expulsion of all the Jews in Iraq. Every day he [the Minister] reads in the press of some new drive against the Jews in Europe. Nobody has been able to prevent Hitler from carrying out his drastic anti-Jewish measures in Germany. The Arab countries as victims of Jewish [read Zionist] territorial ambitions would have far stronger justification than the Europeans. It was not entirely fantastic to visualise the 90,000 Jews of Iraq being escorted across the Euphrates and told to run the gauntlet of the desert to this Palestine of theirs. No one could tell when such a demand might arise; it might develop overnight, it might not be made for three, four or even five years; but sooner or later it was bound to happen unless there was a radical change [in British Palestine policy].45 These words are remarkable given that 12 years later the entire Jewish community would be airlifted to Israel (as a consequence of Arab/Zionist collusion). It was again left for C.J. Edmonds – a
Abbas Shiblak, The Lure of Zion (London: Al Saqi, 1986). Moshe Gat, The Jewish Exodus from Iraq, 1948-1951 (London: Frank Cass, 1997). 43
44 45
FO 406/76, Houstoun-Boswall (Baghdad) to Halifax, 29 August 1938. Ibid. 115
seismographer of socio-political dynamics – to detect the emerging regional reverberation: There is no doubt that the recent campaign of Jewish [read Zionist] reprisals in Palestine has roused public feeling here to an unusual pitch of intensity. […] For the Arab spokesman, the injustice of the policy of His Majesty‘s Government is so patent that resistance in any form is legitimate, and counter-measures or retaliation by the other side constitute merely intensification of the persecution. I am far from suggesting that any action so sweeping as that imagined [above] by the [Iraqi] Minister [vis-àvis Iraqi Jews] is imminent, or ultimately probable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the idea has been […] canvassed; I remember that Dr Shawkhat, President of the Muthanna Club, entertained me with similar ideas. […] We had a pale indication of some of the possibilities in 1936, when several Jews were murdered in Baghdad in quick succession. It is true that in most cases the murders were attributed to personal motives; they were nonetheless symptomatic of a diminution of respect for the sanctity of Jewish life at a time of popular agitation.46 The meeting with the Iraqi Minister was reported: The [Iraqi] government would not relax their efforts to control the activities of the extremists here, but the repressive measures which the [British] government of Palestine had recently found it necessary to take had not tended to make their task any easier. The Minister had in mind the destruction of certain Arab villages [in Palestine] by British troops. This had greatly incensed local opinion – especially as no Jewish [read Zionist] settlements ever seemed to have met similar fate – and divines, religious leaders and others were continually asking the Prime Minister to remove the present ban on public agitation. The Government were, therefore, very anxious lest events should get beyond their control, when ―something unexpected‖ might happen to the [Iraqi] Jews with whom the Iraqis had lived on good terms for years.47
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid., 14 September 1938. 116
To sum up this Part of the article: most studies of the Arab-Zionist matrix – certainly those constituting the 1S2S debate – view the above dynamics irrelevant to the present time (in case that they are aware of these dynamics to begin with). Such studies never grant a sufficiently central role to a critical, regionally-rooted variable whose underlying sectarian dynamics remain consequential to the conflict to this very day. The late-1930s sequence of events surrounding the AME‘s Jewish minority communities outside Palestine embodies the earliest, single-mosttangible manifestation of the nascent regionalization of the Palestine question and its concrete, bottom-up fusion with Arab national politics. The contemporary overlooking of the process dialectically inter-linking the Two-State partition, regionalization and Arab-Jews is stranger still given that in the post-1949 armistice period (when mass-dispersal of ArabJews began) it would ultimately place two-thirds of them (500,000) in formerly-Palestine-now-Israel where by 1963-4 they constituted over half of Israel‘s Jewish citizenry and the vast majority of its working-class. (By the 1990s scholars would call these individuals Mizrahim). Yet it was already before the Farhud that Britain utilized Jews outside Palestine to partially rationalize its 1939 White Paper: The hostilities in Palestine threaten to become a cause of permanent unrest and friction throughout the Near and Middle East. […] Who can tell what the end might be if the bitterness of Arab Nationalists against the Jews in Palestine were turned against the Jews in Iraq, or elsewhere? His Majesty‘s Government is compelled to take a most sober view of the consequences which policy in Palestine may bring in countries beyond its own borders.48 Instead of Peel‘s Two-State solution, the revolutionary 1939 White Paper proposed a single and unitary Arab state within a ten-year period (1949) which would contain some form of a non-statist ―Jewish National Home.‖ The Zionists rejected the (non-Zionist) One-State-vision in 1939 as zealously as they reject it today (yet from a radically weaker material/demographic position). Via the AHC, the Palestinians also rejected this One-State plan since it neither delivered the immediate independence demanded, nor blocked Jewish immigration completely (but instead restricted it to a total of an additional 75,000 Jews). This may historically constitute the single most significant Palestinian path not taken, particularly given that in 1939 equally important countries also did not (yet) enjoy full liberation and/or non-nominal independence – including India, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Egypt. 48
FO 50406/77 56952, Halifax (London) to Lindsay (Washington), 4 May 1939. 117
These developments in epic and epicentral Palestine notwithstanding – what emerged outside was (and remains) equally critical for the long-term shaping of the Arab-Zionist matrix. As I had the opportunity to explain elsewhere,49 the historically disastrous conflation between ‗Jews‘ and ‗Zionists‘ came into being – and was advanced steadily, simultaneously and independently – by Zionist, Arab and British politicians and bureaucrats alike. It gradually magnetized two avidly sectarian forces: separatist Zionists working to pull Jews into Palestine (and later Israel) and some of their (ostensibly) fiercest Arab opponents whose collective action effectively pushed Jews out of Arab societies/states (without having a concrete geographical destination in mind). This collusion helped the Euro-Zionists materialize their chief dictums, i.e. ‗liquidation of the Jewish exile‘ and Aliya (Jewish emigration) to Palestine-cum-Israel.50 The ‗alliance‘ formed ‗beyond‘ mandatory Palestine across the Arab-Zionist divide affected the direction that the phenomenon of nationalism in the Middle East followed in the 1949-67 period. Briefly put, infant Euro-Israel would ultimately double its Jewish population and become considerably less ‗European‘ demographically and ethnically. In the Arab world meanwhile, forces under the umbrella of Arab nationalism who advanced more horizontal and inclusionary foundations for collective identity and Arab self-determination – including regional, lingual or class – were fractured by the region‘s relative politicization of religiously-informed affiliations (firstly Judaism and later Islam). Between the 1940s and the 1960s the strength of subnational liberal and Marxist groups in, for example, Egypt and Iraq, struggling to institutionalize Arab self-determination on a (more than rhetorical) inter-religious basis correlated negatively with the strengthening of the separatist Jewish nationalism (which was effectively aided by their domestic Islamist and/or ultra-nationalist sub-national competitors). Even if one contests particular elements from the dynamics discussed above, the overriding argument stands: from the late 1930s it was (and remains) impossible to comprehend the Palestine/Israel question in any framework that omits its regional dimension (let alone resolve the question and/or democratize the territory, as part III will suggest). However, that is precisely the Mandated-Imagination and Regional-Void that rule post-1993 1S2S scholarship.
See Moshe Behar (2007) ―Palestine, Arabized-Jews and the Elusive Consequences of Jewish and Arab National Formations,‖ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 13/4, pp. 588-611. 49
See also Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, ―Exile amidst Sovereignty: a Critique of 'Negation of the Exile' in Israeli Culture,‖ Theory and Criticism, 4 (1993), pp. 23-55 [part 1] and Theory and Criticism 5 (1994), pp. 113-132 [part ii] [Hebrew]. 50
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PART III 1993
Continuities and Ruptures: post-1967 vis-à-vis post-
I
am unable to address all the themes missing in the Palestine/Israel discussion as an outgrowth of its ‗mandated imagination‘, neglect of regional dimensions, and Palestine-centric outlook. The remainder thus highlights just one theme by developing a sequential-temporal juxtaposition of two approaches that methodically and politically either surrender to – or resist – the 1922 terms imposed by the Churchillian cage. Between 1949 and 1967, post-Nakba approaches to the Palestine question were Arab-led. Nourished by a 1917 frame of reference more than by a 1948 one, the conflict‘s solution entertained a sociopolitical reversal to a 1917 state of affairs – rather than envisioning inclusive modalities to encompass everyone who was present in Palestine/Israel. For example, Article 7 of the PLO‘s pre-1967 Charter stipulated that only ―Jews of Palestinian origin‖ could be considered part of the liberated Palestinian collectivity – cognizant of the fact that few Jews in Israel/Palestine could actually pass this bar.51 And as many Palestinians concluded after 1967, Ahmad Shuqayri‘s pre-1967 loquaciousness about the consequences that liberation would yield for Israeli-Jews was not productive for the Palestinian cause.52 Following Israel‘s 1967 infliction of a landslide defeat over conventional Arab armies, Palestine‘s liberation struggle changed. Greater efforts were invested in tying it to antiracist and anti-colonial modalities: more emphasis was placed on forward-looking democratic and inclusive solutions to the problem than on pre-1948 Euro-Zionist arrival and/or deeds in Palestine. In the next section I profile Marxists and nonMarxists who emerged around 1967 and then juxtapose their diagnoses and prognoses to those dominating the post-1993 One-State school of the 1S2S debate. Unlike, incidentally, my Jerusalemite grandfather Moshe Behar (b. 1906) and his mother Bechora (b. 1888), among others. 51
Yezid Sayigh‘s Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 222; Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 1984), p. 31. 52
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Resuscitations and Anesthetizations Two principal sub-national forces consolidated to form the renewed and modernized post-1967 Palestinian national movement. The dominant one was the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, known as Fatah.53 (Fatah would later lead the PNC into the aforementioned 1988 vote and, later, into the jaws of the Oslo peace process). Comparatively narrow in its socio-political outlook and focus, Fatah concentrated exclusively on Palestinian nationalist affairs;54 opted to disengage and deemphasize Arab and inter-Arab politics and dimensions; viewed social, economic and political change (including feminism) as secondary to the standard anti-colonial nationalist struggle;55 and emphasized military armed struggle while belittling the need to devote time and material and intellectual resources to the development of what was deemed as abstract strategic plans for the long-run. Fatah was effectively concerned exclusively with the establishment of a unitary single Arab-Palestinian state in Palestine – yet reluctant to push too forcefully the question of its secularism since this could have unleashed intra-Palestinian divisions. The question of the state‘s internal organization – socialist, liberal, etc. – was marginalized too. The second sub-national force constituting modern Palestinian nationalism followed the opposite path from that of Fatah. This force was the unabashedly secular Marxist left – including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the DFLP. Comprehensive in its outlook and more Arab/internationalist in its orientation, the secular Palestinian left supported the notion of popular armed struggle yet acknowledged openly its severe limitations in the absence of thorough social and political changes in the broader Arab world. Rather than recall the PFLP‘s lengthy foundational 1967 and 1969 charters,56 succinct testimonies convey the guiding Marxist-materialist thrust. George Habash explained in 1969:
53
Extensive writing is available on Fatah including Quandt, 1973 and Sayigh, 2004.
As the leading force, Fatah managed to express this in, for example, Article 27 of the PLO‘s post-1967 Covenant. 55 Article 8, Ibid. 54
Both available at http://www.pflp.ps/english/?q=taxonomy/term/5 See also W. Kazziha, Revolutionary transformation in the Arab world: Habash and his comrades from nationalism to Marxism (London: Knight, 1975). 56
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Unlike the Moslem brothers in Egypt and some other groups, we saw the liberation of Palestine as something not to be isolated from events in the rest of the Arab world as a whole. We saw the need for scientific and technical renaissance in the Arab world. The main reason for our defeat had been the scientific society of Israel against our own backwardness in the Arab world. This called for the total rebuilding of Arab society into 20th Century society.57 Before analyzing the explicitly regional dimension of Habash‘s thesis, let us ponder what might have occurred had he uttered these words verbatim in contemporary departments of Comparative Literature or presented them to (non-Marxist) circles advancing One-State Solutions. Habash may have been branded a modernist and Eurocentric. Be that as it may, less than a year after the September 1970 disaster Ghassan Kanafani reiterated the broader Marxist regional outlook: The PFLP has always insisted that we have four equal enemies: Israel, world Zionism, world imperialism led by the USA, and Arab reaction. The overthrow of these reactionary Arab régimes is part of our strategy, part of liberating Palestine.58 Succinctly put, Fatah‘s non-regional outlook – i.e. bypassing (ostensibly non-Palestinian) Arab affairs beyond Churchillian Palestine – was judged ineffectual in theory and praxis by the Marxist Fronts. In applying a non-sentimental, modernist and materialist analysis to the question of Palestine/Israel – an analysis surpassing the always-captivating, yet narrowly-defined, nationalist thesis – the secular Marxist left could identify no tangible path to actualize the liberation of Palestine, let alone materialize its secular democratization in a unitary state, without comprehensive changes in the Arab region surrounding it. In this understanding, the road to (secular/socialist) Jerusalem had little tangible choice other than to pass through civil societies in neighboring Arab states.59 Right across the Arab/Zionist divide, persecuted members of Interview to John K. Cooley, Green March Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs (London: Frank Cass, 1973), p. 135; (emphasis in the original). 57
Ghassan Kannafani, ―The PFLP and the September Crisis,‖ New Left Review, (MayJune, 1971), pp. 50-57. See also Samir Franjieh, ―How Revolutionary is the Palestinian Resistance? A Marxist Interpretation‖, Journal of Palestine Studies, ½ (Winter 1972), pp. 5260; Mehmood Hussain, ―The Palestinian Liberation Movement and Arab Regimes: The Great Betrayal,‖ Economic and Political Weekly, 8/45 (November 1973), pp. 2023-28. 58
See Habash in Cooley, 139; Sayigh, 73, 390; Muhammad Y. Muslih, ―Moderates and Rejectionists within the PLO,‖ Middle East Journal, 30/2 (1976), p. 137. 59
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the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen) were perceptive – in real time rather than in retrospect – in detecting (independently) the critical issue at stake. Their 1969 Position Paper on the Palestinian Movement observed (in Hebrew): […] An important new protagonist has appeared on the MiddleEastern political stage: the Palestinians. True, they had taken action into their own hands a few years before the 1967 War, but the real impetus came only after that war. The positive factor here is that Palestinian action has transferred a struggle formerly between governments into a mass struggle. For nearly twenty years the Palestinians had been an object of history, passively awaiting salvation by the Arab states in general, or by the ―progressive‖ Arab states, in particular Egypt, under the leadership of Abdel Nasser. […] The emergence of a Palestinian mass-struggle […] is a positive phenomenon. But one can also discern a negative and dangerous trend in it. Some sections of the Palestinian movement have adopted die view that the Palestinian masses can and should ―go it alone‖ and solve their problem themselves, in separation from the all-Arab revolutionary struggle. Those who hold this view present the problem solely as a Palestinian one, which can be solved in a purely Palestinian framework. The stick has not been straightened, it is being bent in the opposite direction.60 That must regrettably suffice for a telegraphic background of post-1967 Palestinian nationalism in terms of competing Marxist and non-Marxist explanatory frameworks. Fast-forward to a juxtaposition with the (post1993) present. I first ask: do contemporary scholars or activists promoting the One-State solution resuscitate the post-1967 approach of Fatah while concurrently anesthetizing that of the Marxist Fronts? To start with, contemporary scholars advancing the one seculardemocratic state chiefly respond to the Oslo debacle – including the bankruptcy of the Two-State notion and the relative cooptation of post1993 Fatah (under both Abu-Amar and Abu-Mazen) into the AmericanIsraeli orbit. As such, the overall formulation of contemporary ‗OneStaters‘ resuscitates Fatah‘s pre-1988 argumentation (save, in most cases, for the armed struggle) while anesthetizing its historically competing
Position written by M. Machover & Jabra Nicola, reprinted in Arie Bober (ed.), The Other Israel (New York: Anchar, 1972). See also Machover, 2006, 2009. 60
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theory and praxis as envisioned and exercised by the Marxist Fronts. Like historic Fatah – and unlike the Fronts – post-1993 books, articles, essays, Op-Eds, declarations (etc.) by One-State scholars61 rarely mention anything that is either present – or empirically taking place – in the regional areas surrounding the otherwise (mandated) borders of the wishful single state. Socio-economic factors – certainly socialism (but I would add feminism too) – remain peripheral and are displaced, rather than supplemented, by legalistic discourses of human rights and international law. For the Ramallah-based Palestinian National Authority (PNA) the road to (East) Jerusalem begins in official Washington – with the fantasy that the US will deliver the goals of ‗Peace‘ and a ‗State‘ by Western remote control. The PNA‘s One-State critics ironically seem to share this logic: in their case, the road to liberation and a unitary state is chiefly assumed to begin in the civil societies of London, Madrid, New York and San Francisco; Amman, Cairo, Damascus or Beirut are rarely mentioned in pre-2011 One-State studies. The main thrust underlying this approach – its associated activism included – is Eurocentric and non-Arab: it postulates that it was chiefly white Western civil society that toppled Apartheid South Africa (via boycotts, divestments and sanctions). OneState scholarship devotes little mention, emphasis or attention to domestic actions and long decades of pre-1992 systematic, sustained and risky organized mobilization – both inside South Africa and in states regionally surrounding it – by such potent organs as the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party, organs that have no Palestinian or Arab equivalents. Furthermore, there are barely even calls – let alone viable plans – to create such organs in Palestine and/or the Arab world. Post-1993 One-State scholarship likewise seems to find it too daunting to consider lucidly the proposition that the situation of the Palestinians is probably worse than that of pre-1993 Black South Africans. Seldom referred to, for example, is the significance – let alone possible implications for Palestine/Israel – of the considerable material dependency that white South Africa had on ‗its‘ black labor-force – a dependency absent in the case of Zionism/Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Nonetheless, notwithstanding being critical factors in their
61
Consult note 7. 123
own right62 -- these are tangential issues to the present article. My principal contention here is much simpler: It may be productive to recall a Marxist-informed materialist vantagepoint and then probe the Fatahite (and liberal) ‗narrowing of perspective‘ effectively promoted by contemporary One-State studies. I posit that the prospects for materializing – as opposed to envisioning ideationally – a modestly unitary secular-democratic solution in the territory of Mandatory Palestine are likely to remain unattainable as long as parallel/complementary changes fail to surface in the region surrounding it. Contrary to what both ‗Two-State‘ scholars and (non-Marxist) ‗OneState‘ scholars would have us believe – the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is not a regionally-secluded island (as has factually been the case since the 1930s) and the surrounding region continues to comprise a gigantic variable that cannot be ignored (as it presently is by scholars along the 1S2S continuum). Contemporary 1S2S solutions strike me as ideational and formulaic. They seem incapable of confronting daringly the sociopolitical crisis that since the 1930s has been metastasizing across the entire AME (Palestine/Israel included): the territory comprising Mandatory Palestine is unlikely to be sufficiently transcended without nontrivial advancements towards a nonsectarian popular Arab democracy. All other configurations of Arab society – whether inspired by such competing societal foundations as those advanced by Hamas, Hizb Allah, al-Qaida, authoritarian rulers, the Muslim Brothers, the PNA or ostensibly secular exclusionary nationalists (as those who prevailed in the 1940s) – stand as much chance of success vis-à-vis Zionism/Israel as the Arab world has experienced since 1882. The reason is that such foundational formulations structurally remain unable to amass a sufficiently potent nonsectarian force to counter the formidable Israeli/Zionist power they face (as has actually been the case in – and since – 1937). And as I further explain below, such configurations of Arab society seem incapable of producing a counterweight to Zionism/Israel for the (possible) mutual benefit of Arabs and Israelis regionally. Contrasting Euro-Centricities As indicated in Habash‘s above citation, post-1967 Marxists (Israelis included) were as unabashed about – and committed to – their secularism as were competing sub-national forces about their own See Mona N. Younis‘s tour de force Liberation and Democratization The South African and Palestinian National Movements (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 62
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fundamentals (religion, culture, language, narrow-nationalism, etc.). The guiding Marxist-materialist thrust was unapologetically modernist. Yet unlike modernization theory‘s liberal formulators, Marxists conceptualized the progression non-linearly – as a bumpy process fraught with struggles, turmoil and contradictions whereby liberation and equality revolutionize personal dispositions and collective existence. Accordingly, without succumbing sycophantically to neighboring conservative sub-national forces – the Marxist PFLP (for example) maintained: The struggle for Palestine will – as regards the Palestinian and Arab masses – be a gateway towards the culture of the age and a transition from a state of underdevelopment to the requirements of modern life. Through the struggle we shall acquire political awareness of the facts of the age, throw away illusions and learn the value of facts. The habits of underdevelopment represented by submission, dependence, individualism, tribalism, laziness, anarchy and impulsiveness will change through the struggle into recognition of the value of time, order, accuracy, objective thought, collective action, planning, comprehensive mobilization, the pursuit of learning and the acquisition of all its weapons, the value of man, the emancipation of woman - which constitute half of our society - from the servitude of outworn customs and traditions, the fundamental importance of the national bond in facing danger and the supremacy of this bond over clan, tribal and regional (iqlimiyya-like) bonds. Our national, long-term liberation struggle will mean our fusion in a new way of life which will be our gateway towards progress and civilisation.63 Contemporary postcolonial and/or postmodern theorists – possibly including Arab-Americans working in the Western Academia – may have charged the entire PFLP thesis as Eurocentric, modernist and possibly Orientalist.64 It nonetheless cannot be denied that post-1967 Arab (and Israeli) Marxists were an integral part of their (non-Western) societies – that their diagnosis and activism evolved from within, wholly directed PFLP, A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine (1969), Part 1, Chapter 10 (emphasis added). 63
Arif Dirlik – in his ―Is There History after Eurocentrism? Globalism, Postcolonialism, and the Disavowal of History,‖ Cultural Critique, 42 (1999), pp. 1-34 – describe this relationship as follows: ―interestingly, it is a new generation of Third Worlders, firmly established in the structures of Eurocentric [academic—M.B] power, who now speak [in the West] for the societies from which they hail, while those back at home are condemned to inaudibility – or parochialism‖ (p. 25, emphasis added). 64
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inwardly. Liberation could only originate from within the (nonEuropean) Middle East and could not be delivered by Western remote control. Bearing these fundamentals in mind, I now wish to ask whether– in sharp contrast – it is liberal Eurocentrism that governs the (Zionist/non-Zionist) continuum comprising the (post-1993) 1S2S studies? Let me first address the Two-State school before then tackling its One-State counterpart. The Spaniard Jewish physician and philosopher Judah Halevi (c.1075– 1141) penned a legendary epigram: ‗my heart is in the East and I in the uttermost West‟. Halevi‘s maxim is turned fully on its head in the scholarly (and existential) conception underlying left-Zionist formulators of the Two-State solution. This school‘s ultimate dream is a gigantic cargo vessel capable of dragging Israel from the Middle East and the affixing it, across the Mediterranean sea, somewhere between Italy, Corsica and France. Much more than neo-conservative scholars, left-Zionist TwoState scholars conceive of Israel as a European outgrowth politically and culturally. As notoriously coined by Israel‘s former Chief of the General Staff and former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, ―Israel is a villa in the jungle,‖ i.e., a European-style democratic villa-state amidst an Arab authoritarian ―jungle.‖ Scholars promoting the Two-State idea find it daunting to entertain, politically or analytically, the possibility that such a construct as ‗a Jewish and democratic state‘ might constitute a contradiction in terms (and if so – then no real villa in Barak‘s jungle).65 Equally difficult for left-Zionist scholars is to come to terms with the fact that non-Jews generally – foremost Palestinian-Arabs – cannot really appreciate the (ostensibly) benign characteristics of the democratic-andJewish-European-villa. Enter now the Euro-centricity of the post-1993 One-State school. NonZionist scholars writing at the other end of the 1S2S continuum effectively share some of the assumptions underlying Barak‘s construct of a European-style ―villa in the jungle.‖ Why is that so and what is the difference between these two schools? Among One-State scholars this ―villa‖ is assigned the futuristic form of a de-Zionized unitary seculardemocratic state, envisioned as shared peacefully by (nationalist and religious) Zionist-Jews and (nationalist and religious) Palestinian-Arabs, wishfully hoped to be living in equality and mutual co-existence. Most crucially, the Middle East‘s Western European style, anti-Zionist, seculardemocratic, One-State-villa is hypothesized to materialize amidst – as well as altogether independent of: 65
For example Unger, 2008; Yakobson & Rubinstein, 2009; Morris, 2009. 126
(a) a dysfunctional consociational democracy in Lebanon -- bordering Palestine/Israel to the north – which has experienced two horrific civil wars between its Arab citizens and non-citizens of various sectarian denominations (and with no Zionist-Jewish contingent present); (b) a hereditary-authoritarian Syrian ―republic‖, bordering Palestine/Israel to the northeast, ruled by a sectarian ('Alawi) minority; (c) a nonconstitutional Jordanian monarchy, bordering to the east, where a Hashemite minority rules over an overwhelmingly Palestinian populace; and (d) an authoritarian Egyptian state, ruled by precisely three men since 1952 (one of whom was ousted by assassination), bordering Palestine/Israel to the south. Due to lack of space, I will skip Iraq‘s unitary secular-democratic state where Arabs (chiefly Shiites and Sunnis) attempt to coexist with apparent difficulties and much bloodshed. In all cases of Palestine/Israel‘s bordering states/societies, difficulties in consolidating a unitary secular-democratic state are evident notwithstanding that – in contrast to the territory comprising Mandatory Palestine – they do not include a sizeable (or miniscule) community of Jews (Zionist or anti-Zionist) who not only differ culturally, linguistically, religiously and (partially) ethnically but who are also (i) rabid anti-Arab Eurocentrics, let alone (ii) happen to think of themselves as a separate group possessing a right of national self-determination in their own state in the post-Holocaust world. Put differently, if Arab societies/states find it hard to amass secular-democratic entities even without the nationalist/statist presence of avidly-Eurocentric Zionists in their midst – what real material prospects are there for such a project to first evolve successfully in Palestine/Israel (while somehow circumventing societal complexities typifying such bi-national or bi-ethnic entities as Belgium, Sri Lanka, or the former Yugoslavia)? In striking contrast to post-1967 Marxists – effectively all post-1993 tracts advocating for a secular-democratic or bi-national state are devoid of anything existing – or empirically taking place – beyond the (mandated) borders of their otherwise hopeful projection, i.e., a European-like secular-democratic-villa-state in a unified Israel/Palestine. Contemporary One-State scholars hypothesize that the seculardemocratic island-state will ripen somehow within the surrounding ―womb‖ of neighboring states, all of which are neither secular nor democratic. For materialist readings of historical and contemporary affairs, such mandated imaginations in a regional void are bewildering: if the diagnosis is largely off the mark, then the corresponding prognosis runs the risk of becoming das Opium des Volkes. To paraphrase Barak‘s notorious conceptualization, the future of the region may well be this: either (i) a system of federated villas with no ―jungle‖ surrounding them; 127
or (ii) a so-called ―jungle‖ with effectively zero (Arab or Palestinian/Israeli) villas. The latter fully amounts to a banal continuation of the socio-political present.
Conclusion
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s a consequence of a territorially Palestine-centric vantage-point, ‗mandated imagination‘ and a non-Arab centric outlook, many studies of the Palestine/Israel matrix are ipso facto incapable of appreciating a core, regionally-rooted variable that reverberates to this day. That variable is the sequence of events that surrounded Arab-Jews from the late 1930s that embodies nothing less scholarly-dramatic than the earliest, single-most-tangible manifestation of the nascent regionalization of the entire Palestine question as well as its concrete, material sociopolitical fusion with Arab domestic politics – in contradistinction to speculative, verbal or ideational fusions on the level of doctrines, ideology, journalism or shuttle-diplomacy. A central – yet neglected – reason for the historically-monumental Arab defeat by Zionism/Israel was the former‘s inability to first generate, and then inflict, a nonsectarian response to Euro-Zionism. Contemporary 1S2S prescriptions for the Palestine/Israel question seem formulaic. They approximate wishful ideational shortcuts chiefly due to their inability to confront head-on the inter-dependent crisis that has been spreading across the AME since the late 1930s (including in Palestine/Israel). While 1S2S scholarship conveniently depicts Palestine/Israel as a sociopolitically secluded island – this territory ceased being so in the 1930s and remains so today. As such, it is unlikely to be sufficiently transcended without nontrivial advancements towards nonsectarian popular democracy in the (Arab) ‗womb‘ surrounding it. Furthermore, the sole reservoir for a counter-weight to Israel‘s potent force (social, military, economic, technological, etc.) rests in the Arab world and its under-utilized human ―capital.‖ Put differently, sources capable of modifying the existing (asymmetric) balance of power are unlikely to emerge from anywhere else – including from within Israel itself (i.e. its non-existent left) or from within Palestine-alone or the Palestinians generally (due to their inability to amass a Vietnamese/Algerian-type sources of power). Nor is a sufficient counterforce likely to emerge from within the Euro-American sphere, its civil society included; liberation of any part of Palestine – let alone a seculardemocratic-state – are unlikely to be delivered by benevolent Western 128
remote control (as 1S2S studies effectively imply), be it Western states or (the partly pro-Palestinian) Western civil society. Once again, it was first and foremost persistent, painful and long decades of organized mobilization by the triangular South African alliance and force – comprising of the ANC, COSATU and the SA Communist Party – that toppled Apartheid. With all due respect to Western civil society, ending Apartheid would not have materialized without the democratic nonsectarian power that these South African organizations generated. Whereas Western boycott may have been the icing on the cake, the cake does remain what is was: South African domestic and regional democratic and non-sectarian activism. A lucid and non-escapist diagnosis of any problem whatsoever obviously constitutes a necessary pre-requisite for formulating a solution that stands a chance of success. The outward-looking Euro-centricity typifying 1S2S studies can perhaps benefit from the reinvigoration of a Middle-Eastern/Arab-centric vantage-point informed by (the ostensiblyoutdated) Marxist materialism that existed in both the Arab world and Israel during the late-1960s/early-1970s. Unlike contemporary liberal and ideational 1S2S scholarship, Israeli and Palestinian Marxists suffered from neither ‗mandated imagination‘, nor a regional void. They were therefore reluctant to prescribe sedative shortcuts that bypassed Arab capitals directly to an island-democracy in Palestine/Israel. In fact, Marxist Jews in Iraq and Egypt understood this mutual inter-dependency already in the 1940s.66 While few bothered to listen to them then – even fewer today seem capable of making sense of their existence, activism and thought or their relevance to the 21st century.
66
See footnote 30. 129
This paper was presented at the international conference ―Ethno-Politics and Intervention in a Globalised World,‖ Exeter University‟s Centre for Ethno-Political Studies (EXCEPS), 27-30 June 2010. Differences in scholarly orientations notwithstanding, I thank conference participants Ilan Pappé, Virginia Tilley and Ali Abunimah for their remarks. On 26 August 2010 this paper was submitted to International Journal of Middle East Studies (where I published an article in 2005). On 27 September 2010 I was emailed a two-sentence letter by the editor notifying me of her decision to deny my paper entry to the standard anonymous peer review process. This choice was undoubtedly scholarly and had nothing to do with any less divine realm pertaining to the paper‘s contents. On 3 January 2011 – one day before the untimely death of Tunisia‘s martyr for economic justice, Mohamed Bouazizi – this paper was submitted to Middle East Critique (MEC). In early February – a week into the Egyptian revolution – I felt that the region‘s postsubmission developments highlighted the increasing relevance of the paper while also lending empirical support to its chief dictum, namely, the historical and contemporary primacy of the regional-Arab dimension surrounding the Palestine/Israel question. Such argumentation has typically been neglected by the countless non-Arab-centric pre-2011 studies comprising the One-State/Two-State debate – whose framework has remained confined to the Lilliputian territory of mandatory Palestine. In light of the region‘s developments I decided that it makes more (social) sense to remove the paper from the very lengthy review process typifying such hard-copy publications as MEC and instead seek quicker exposure and critical scrutiny by general and specialized readers. I am profoundly indebted to MEC‘s editor Prof Eric Hooglund – and editorial assistant Ms Erin Frazier – for their kind understanding of my difficult decision; I was fortunate that they understood that unprecedented historical developments sometimes call for actions that otherwise may seem unorthodox scholarly. I finally thank MESOJ‘s editor – and the journal‘s two anonymous referees – for their exceptional speed in reviewing this paper and writing their reports.
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Research Paper Iraqi Dogmatism A Historical and Critical Approach Rawaa Mahmoud Hussain
Abstract: Iraq has a long history among world civilizations, a strategic geopolitical
place which connects the ancient world continents; rivers shape the history of humanity, and different ideologies that seem to be conflicting all over the Iraqi history. Iraq also played a major role in the world of middle ages; when Baghdad became the capital of the caliphate, which stretched from the east to the west. It has been shaped by a group of communities and minorities and ethnic groups that coexist with each other through a long history. However, Iraqi ideology mobilizes socially, politically, and historically in a dogmatic context, which forces analysis this dogmatism from many perspectives, historically, philosophically and critically.
Key-words: Iraq, Mesopotamia, philosophy, rites, ideology, values, dogmatism...
Asst. Prof. Dr. Islamic Philosophy. Islamic University – Baghdad. E-mail: rawaa_mahmoud@yahoo.com
1. Introduction:
A
long history among world civilizations1, a strategic geopolitical place which connects the ancient world continents; rivers2 shape the history of humanity, and different ideologies that seem to be conflicting all over the Iraqi history. Actually, Iraqi dogmatism cannot be understood without understanding the nature and concept of dogmatism itself. Therefore, there is a need to start studying its philosophical, ideological and methodological concept before proceeding studying its implementations on Iraqi ideology. Philosophically, there is no agreement on submitting a unified and comprehensive definition of dogmatism among philosophers, but it can be observed that the concept of dogmatism differs from a philosopher to another based on personal philosophical and methodological, and cognitive point of view. John Beversluis thinks that the term dogmatism is particularly unhappy. The historical roots of dogmatism go back to Aristotle, the first to ascribe positive doctrine to Plato, and Diogenes Laertius, according to Plato reflects his ideas thorough four characters: Socrates, In order to be aware of the history of Iraq from the ancient time to the present, see the following list of sources and references: Gareth Stansfiled, Iraq: People, History, Politics, UK, 2007, Charles Tripp, a History of Iraq, UK, 2000, Courtney Hunt, the History of Iraq, US, 2005, Geoff Simons, Tony Benn, Forwarder, Iraq from Sumer to Saddam, US, 1994, Henner Fürtig, Kleine Geschichte des Iraq, München, 2003. 2 Tigris and Euphrates, which make the ancient Iraqi poet said: O Rivers, creator of all things, When the Great gods dug your bed, They set well – being your banks. See: Benjamin R. Foster & Karen Polinger Foster, Civilizations of Ancient Iraq, US, 2009, p. 1. Therefore, it is noticeable that Iraqi culture, all over its history, is a culture of rivers. Rivers always have determined framing the form of Iraqi ideology. The big civilizations, states, cities which appeared and still appear, until this moment, are near the rivers. Rivers are not only supply Iraqis with the elements of life but they are formatting their ideologies too. 1
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Timaeus, and the Athenian and Eleatic Strangers. There is a historical precedent for denying that the Platonic dialogues advances positive ideas and doctrine, which is non skeptical or dogmatic tradition that goes back to new academy of Arcesilaus and Carneades. 3 Aristotle’s ideas are often characterized as dogmatic, because of his opinions about the difference between men and women and their roles in the city. He believes that women are both politically and biologically inferior to men, and that, while the function of women is reproduced and keeps a household, the function of men is to govern and defend the polis. Therefore, Aristotle’s dogmatism could be comprehended as both to reveal and to conceal truths about nature. He impresses upon his audience the considerable extent to which human beings cannot escape the political implications of the intellectual and physical strengths and weakness nature gives them. While that dogmatism discourages political challenges to the natural order in the name of freedom or progress, it encourages philosophic investigation of the natural order in order to reach the truth. His dogmatism is meant recognize that its purpose is not only to stress natureʼs inescapability, but to conceal from the less reflective and more politically ambitious members of his audience natureʼs changeability, which is a truth equal to the truth of natureʼs inescapability. 4 Kant indicated that there are three main possibilities for philosophy: dogmatism, criticism and scepticism. These elements were presented by means of analogy with forms of government: the government of reason, under the administrations of the dogmatists, was at first despotic, but through intestine wars gave way to completely anarchy. He claimed that the critique clips the wings of dogmatism completely as far as knowledge of supra-sensory objects is concerned, and in place of the dogmatists' enquiry into things, it proposes a critical enquiry concerning the limits of
David Sedley, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, 2006, p. 86. For more discussion on this point, see: Plato, Republic, UK, 1997, Alfred Fouillée, La Philosophie de Platon, US, 2005, p. 8. 4 Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins, editors, Action and Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle, US, 1999, pp. 225-226. For more discussions on Aristotleʼs dogmatism, see: Aristotle, Politics, UK, 2006, Aristotle, Ethics, UK, 2006, Eberhard Grisebach, Gegenwart: Eine Kritische Ethik, Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Klaus- M. Kodalle, Würzburg, 2005, p. 273, L. Stephen Brock, (a cura di), LʼAttualità di Aristotele, Roma, 2000, p.147. 3
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possibile knowledge, and shows that our knowledge is limited to appearances constituted by human understanding. 5 He says that: "we may call the faculty of cognition from principles a priori, pure Reason, and the inquiry into its possibility and bounds generally the Critique of pure Reason, although by his faculty we only understand Reason in its theoretical employment, as it appears under that name in the former work; without wishing to inquire into its faculty, as practical Reason, according to its special principles. That [Critique] goes merely into our faculty of knowing things a priori, and busies itself therefore only with the cognitive faculty to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure and pain and the faculty of desire; and of the cognitive faculties it only concerns itself with Understanding, according to its principles a priori, to the exclusion of judgment and Reason (as faculties alike belonging to the theoretical cognition), because it is found in the sequel that no other cognitive faculty but the understanding can furnish constitutive principles of cognition a priori. The critique, then which sifts them all, as regards the share which each of the other faculties might pretend to have in the clear possession of knowledge from its own peculiar root, leaves nothing but what the Understanding prescribes a priori as law for nature as the complex of phenomena (whose form also is given a priori). It relegates all other pure concepts under leads, which are transcendent for our theoretical faculty of cognition, but are not therefore useless or to be dispensed with. For they serve as regulative principles; partly to check the dangerous pretensions of Understanding, as if (because it can furnish a priori the conditions of the possibility of all things which it can know) it had thereby confined within these bounds the possibility of all things in general; and partly to lead it to the consideration of nature according to a principle of completeness, although it can never attain to this, and thus to further the final design of al knowledge."6 Hegel defines the concept of dogmatism as “the substitution of the category of cause and effect for that of substantial relation in philosophical reflection about the relation of the Absolute to its appearance in the knowing consciousness of Reason." 7 Howard Caygill, A Kant Introduction, US, 1995, p. 163. Kant, Critique if Judgment, New York, 2007, p. 1. 7 Hegel, the Difference between Fichteʼs and Schellingʼs System of Philosophy, An English Translation of G. W. F. Hegelʼs Differenz des Fichteʼschen und Shellengʼschen 5 6
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He says that: "the knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is. Our approach to the object must also as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to comprehend it."8 Thus, what we want to indicate is that Iraqi dogmatism is a system of knowledge that is being formed historically and ideologically in the social sphere. This knowledge system represents a convergence moment of rigid and non-dynamic consciousness with convulsive and unilateral act; i.e. when ego reaches its peak of transcendent, and does not advance any recognition to other, but only for ego itself. The moment of ego negative transcendent is the same moment of exclusion of other, this action that represents filtration with several levels; cultural, political, social, economic, and even physical. 2.
The Mythical Ideology and Manhood Superiority Ideas that begin with what, or maybe before, is now known as the Supervisor's Advice to a Younger Scribe, which constructs ironically an ideal image of a humble, conscientious scribe through the self – description of a boastful, bossy supervisor. He shaped the ideology in ancient Iraq with: One – time member of the school, come here to me; Let me explain to you what my teacher revealed. Like you, I was once a youth and had a mentor. The teacher assigned a task to me – it was man's work. Like a springing reed, I leapt up and put myself to work. I did not depart from my teacher's instructions; I did not start doing things on my own initiative. My mentor was delighted with my work on the assignment. He rejoiced that I was humble before him and he spoke in my favour.9 Thus, we could notice in the aforementioned Iraqi ancient poet that the teacher had an essential position in Iraqi ancient history. But this teacher is different during the historical periods. Dictators, heroes, System der Philosophie, prepared and edited by H. S. Harris & Walter Cerf, US, 1977, p. 33. 8 Hegel, Phenomenology, Translated A. V. Miller, analysis of the Text and Forward by J. N. Findlay, New Delhi, 1998, 58. 9 Eleanor Robson, Mathematics in Ancient Iraq, a Social History, US, 2009, p. 116.
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mythical persons, military commanders and priests, for example, were the masters of Iraqi ideology. Archeology shows that the appearance of Uruk and elsewhere of the first cities known anywhere in the history was in Sothern of Iraq. A later Babylonian poem honoring the god Marduk as a creator of the world saw the process as dramatic changes and sudden creation. It is possible to appeal this doctrine as the Mardukian ideology, which said: No holy house, no house for the gods, had been built a sacred place, No reed had come forth, no tree had been created No brick had been laid, no brick mold had been created, No house had been built, no city had been created,â&#x20AC;Ś The world was marsh and canebrakeâ&#x20AC;Ś The Marduk built Uruk, he created Eanna. Therefore, the archeologists study the development of urban life in Manhattan from 1600 to 1900 and conclude that the enormous changes seen in the material culture of the island began with the advent of new peoples, and then took off with incredible rapidity; as hunter â&#x20AC;&#x201C; gatherers gave way to framers, all within a 300- year period. An influx of settlers, whom they suggested to came by sea or down from the mountains. The archeologists named the new comers by the Sumerians around to 3600 B.C.E. It is possible to say that this is an imagined immigration and there is no visible break in material culture between the modest Ubaid centers and the gigantic city of Uruk.10 Dogmatic Ideology appeared also in ancient Iraqi rituals. Ritual can privilege certain doctrines by suggesting an alignment between the elements of reality and some supreme sources of power in the universe. Social systems may be objectified through ritual expressions, and concomitantly be sanctified. The formalization of ritual speech includes such features as fixed patterns of loudness vs. choice of loudness, limited choice of intonation, partial vocabulary, and illustrations taken only from certain sources vs. relatively few illustrations. Sumerian hymns and cult songs contain many of the aforementioned features of formalized speech. Furthermore, ritual speech quite frequently includes utterances called performatives, that is, conventional statements. When an authorized person makes a performative statement, others are expected
10
B. Foster & K. Foster, op. cit, p. 16.
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to respect the effect of that statement. The ideology of temple institution can be found in titles of gods and lyrics of hymns. The practical component of the temple ideology ranges from overt gestures, such as the pouring of libations, to tacit gestures, such as recognizing the boundary of a sacred precinct. The discursive and practical are, in fact, frequently combined, as it is shown in the case of the akitu, or New Year festivals held by the Assyrians rulers. Thus, any group, even one opposed to the dominant group, can elaborate an ideology to advance its interests, the materialization of ideology, by communication ideas across distances and through time. 11 The mortality ideology in ancient Iraqi thought led to one of the famous epics in history, i.e., the epic of Gilgamesh. He was the renowned king of Uruk in Mesopotamia. These poems have a distinguished place in the world's literature, not only because they antedate Homeric epic by at least one and a half thousand years, but mainly because of the quality and character of the story that they tell. "It is a mixture of pure adventure, of morality, and of tragedy." It is "a very human concern with morality, the search for knowledge, and for an escape from the common lot of manâ&#x20AC;Ś If Gilgamesh is not the first man hero, he is the first tragic hero of whom anything is known. He is at once the most sympathetic to us, and most typical of individual man in his search for life and understanding, and of his search the conclusion must be tragic." 12 There is a comparative perspective of Gilgamesh epic which could shed lights upon the personal psychology of current Iraqi. We have talked earlier about the impact of rivers in the formation of Iraqi ideology. Iraqi person, in a key aspect of his psychological and social composition, is a rustic individual. Iraqi rural values are ideological ones, make the individual arises whereby and within a group of educational values that conclude the pride of manhood superiority. The manhood superiority is the strategic keyword of the nature of Iraqi individual. It concludes the upbringing of the individual since childhood as a hero, a Andrew C. Cohen, Death Rituals, Ideology, and the Development of Early Mesopotamian Kingship: Toward a New Understanding of Iraq's Royal Cemetery of Ur, Netherlands, 2005, pp. 10, 11, 14. 12 N. K. Sandars, the Epic of Gilgamesh: An English Version with an Introduction, London, 1972, p. 7. For more ideas on the epic of Gilgamesh, see the following references: Stephan Mitchell, Gilgamesh: A New English Version, New York, 2004, Herbert Mason, Gilgamesh: A Verse Narrative, US, 2003. 11
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brave man, and a person cannot be overcome or dominated. He is the man of difficult tasks, and he has the solution to every problem. The conception of manhood superiority makes Iraqi person interferes with a complicated psychology which contains opposite meanings, such as: the sense of courage, even if he was a coward in the depth of his character, generosity, even if he did not wish to do so honestly. And because of his superiority in terms of manhood; he needs the money which must be obtained in various way. Thus, politics becomes a panacea and a short cut not only to get money, power and women, but to achieve an internal harmony with the complexities of the psychology of male superiority, and thus the dogmatic ideology arises. Ali al-Wardi, the known former Iraqi sociologist, provides an important social analysis to the phenomena of virility and manhood in the Iraqi social applications. He points out that the phenomena mentioned, virility and manhood are originally nomadic values. These values do not apply to rural population; but also exist among the population of Iraqi cities, less pronounced in them, and take various forms. For example, the city's children, while they are playing in the alleys, have developed a tendency to plunder, conquer and respect the force. And thus, it is being developed, in their mind, the concept of the strong and cowardly. The strong child is that who can tend others and kidnaps from them something, whereas the coward one who is plundered, vanquished or deceived; therefore he has a very low status in their eyes, and is being used by them too.13 It is not required here to submit a chronological survey to the historical development of Iraq, as a country, from the ancient time to the present, because many studies have been achieved in the same subject. What we want, here, is to identify some basic lines and general observations; in order to understand the nature of Iraqi mind, its ideology, and specifically in order to reach an understanding of what happened in the past and what is happing now in Iraq. 3. The Political Ideology of Middle Ages – Current Iraqi Implications Iraq played a major role in the world of middle ages; when Baghdad became the capital of the caliphate, which stretched from the east to the Ali al-Wardi, Lamaḥat Ijtimaʽia Min Tarikh al-Iraq al-Ḥadith, (eng. Social Profiles of Iraqi Modern History), Baghdad, 2009, Vol. 2, pp. 8 – 9. 13
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west14. But before that, Iraq witnessed major events that are still steeping down their influences in the shape of Iraqi ideology until the recent time. Iraqi ideology is still deeply divided between the perceptions of Sunni and Shi'ite sects according to full – political events in Islamic world in the first century A.H. And what exacerbates the sectarian divide in Iraq that it had witnessed the eminent bloody events and specifically on the Iraqi ground. The first represented by the assassination of Imam Ali15, the fourth caliph, in Kufa, south of Baghdad, in 40 A.H. The second important event in the history of Iraqi ideology is the death of Imam Hussein bin Ali16 and his brother Abbas bin Ali and several members of his family in Karbala, south of Baghdad in 61 A.H., which continues to affect the general feeling of all Muslims, Sunni and Shiʽi. Whatever, Joyce M. Davis says, Hussein's death at Karbala spilt Muslims into distinct sects, Sunni and Shiʽi. While today, Sunni lament Hussein's brutal massacre ad are inspired by his example of self – sacrifice, it is the Shiʽi who lament his death as if it happened yesterday. Taazieh is the re-enact Hussein's death at the battle at Karbala and are held during Ashura commemorations. In Ashura street celebrations, women in the ubiquity black chador, in Iran (and in Iraq), wail and men beta themselves bloody with chains to share in his suffering, as do they think. 17 The fact is that "with the death of Hussein at Karbala, Iraq assumed its status as the birthplace of Shiʽism." And "the story of Karbala and the slaying of Hussein became a rallying point of the Shiʽa, and the succession was maintained with Hussein's son and subsequent family members." 18
14On
this point, see the following sources: André Vuachez, in Association with Barrie Dobson and Michael Lapidge, eds, Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages, A – J, UK & US, 2000, p. 141. And for more clarification on the history of Iraq in the Middle Ages, see the following references: Barbara H. Rosenwein, a Short History of the Middle Ages, Canada, 2009, p. 110, William R. Polk, Understanding Iraq, UK, 2006, pp. 55 – 58, Chris Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean, 400 – 800, UK, 2005, p. 24, 15For more information on Imām Ali, see: Reza Shah – Kazemi, Justice and Remembrance: Introducing the Spirituality of Imam ʽAlī, US, 2007. 16For more information on Imam Hussein, see: Sheikh Hamed Soltanian: Imam Husayn ibn 'Ali, (the Master of Martyrs), New Zealand, 2008. 17 Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs, Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East, England, 2003, pp. 48 – 49, see also: Peter B. Clarke, ed., the Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, UK, 2009, pp. 550 – 551. 18 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfiled, the Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division? New York, 2004, p. 120.
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What was happened in Karbala is now remembered by what is called al-Majalis al-Husseinia. The majlis, in Shiʽi current sense, is a "context has historically constituted a network of overarching, albeit disparate, themes that wind their way through the grids of the Karbala event. It is vitally important to remember that a different mode of Shii-Karbala commemorations exits side by side dialogically at time and discordantly at other times, as is true of the larger historical paradigm of Islam in general. Any singular interpretation of Islam, as of Karbala, is overridden by linguistic, regional, and broader contextual discourses. The event of Karbala, like Islam itself, appears in a wide – ranging panorama of devotion, contradiction, conciliation, aesthetic maneuvering, and manipulation. Such is the scope of improvisation inhering within this seventh – century event on the banks of the Euphrates that its chartered realms can matter – of – factly extend for the South Asian subcontinent to the United States." 19 Iraq is gripped through its long history from the middle ages up to the recent times a sectarian conflict passes in different periods and degrees of sectarian tension. It intensifies sometimes and calm otherwise based on political factor, internal and external, particularly the regional one. It could be ascribe this sectarian conflict, within the Iraqi society, to what we have indicated of extensions of this historical conflict, back to the early periods of Islamic history. 4.
Critique of Iraqi Dogmatism: Any analysis to the nature of Iraqi thought and personality system requires, basically, a comprehension to one of the dynamic and important philosophical issues, i.e., ideology and dogmatism. Terry Eagleton indicates that ideology contains variety of meanings, as the randomized list below: 1The process of production of meanings, values, and signs in social life.
Syed Akbar Hyder, Reliving Karbala: Martyrdom in South Asian Memory, USA, 2008, P. 71, see also for comprehension of the Shiʽi sense – mentioned, Karman Scot Aghaie, the Martyrs of Karbala: Shiʽi Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran, US, 2004, Karman Scot Aghaie, ed., Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourse in Modern Shiʽi Islam, US, 2005, Jamshid Malekpour, the Islamic Drama, Britain, 2004. 19
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2Ideas of characteristic of a particular social group or class, ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power, and false ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power. 3Systematically distorted communications that which offers a position of a subject, and forms of thought motivated by social interests. 4Identity thinking and socially necessary illusion. 5The conjuncture of discourse and power, and the medium, in which conscious social actors make sense of their world, and action – reoriented sets of beliefs. 6The confusion of linguistic, phenomenal reality and semiotic closure. 7The indispensible medium, in which individuals live out their relations to a social structure, and the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality. 20 We would like here to offer a critical analysis to the definitions that have been submitted by Terry Eagleton of the concept of Ideology, based on the historical movement of Iraqi reason and social activity. Iraqi ideology is certainly the result of signs, meanings and values produced in the normal social life, and in particular is what being produced by the political superstructure. Historically, political power in Iraq played an axial role in the formation of Iraqi reason systems across what might be called the public mobilization. The mass is the source of authority of political power; if it has been mobilized through various means distributed between coercion and honor. That is, if we take into consideration the ideological exploitation of the theological teachings and principles by ethnic groups which represent sub – identities that are collected by Iraqi construction overall. Any study that does not take into account the study of religious signs, and their historical development, and social use will inevitably end to wrong results. Using Eagleton's expressions - mentioned, Iraqi ideology is a set of ideas and beliefs, and perhaps, dreams, perceptions and aspirations of groups and social classes living in Iraq. Thus, these themes represent in the sectarian and ethnic groups that use several names to reflect the ideological presence, in the process of ideological engagement with other 20Terry
Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction, UK, 1991, pp. 1-2. For more ideas on Ideology, see: Karl Mannheim, Ideologie und Utopie, Frankfurt am Main, 1995, Claude Grignon, Sociologie et idéologie, Genève – Paris, 2008.
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groups. All this, of course, contributes to legitimize their existence. Thus, the ideological groups in Iraq, and when using themes of power, political, religious and ethnic legitimacy, facts of history and its falls stories of events, which may not never occur historically, dialectic of arms and money, shuffle and play, and when producing values and meanings regardless of their values, positively or negatively, useful or not useful, these ideologies, in fact, reflect the fundamental element of the self-presence. Any of these ideological groups reflects something strategic, which occupies a leading and important position for them, namely the identity. Here, we should acknowledge the factual truth that there is no unified ideology and major identity in Iraq, which can collect the Iraqi sects and ethnic groups, indeed. What is on the earth is a group of divided, non – consolidated and sub – identities, clearly; but perhaps roughly at other times. Frankly, it cannot resolve a complicated and interrelated identity, such as the Iraqi one, into a complete analysis. A considerable work like this is beyond the demands of our current research. Despite such difficulties, we feel, in the context of the Iraqi identity, in general, that the virility and masculine values, in their eastern nature, are important element for analysis. And because of that mentioned – values, characteristics and features of Iraqi ideology; it must be recourse to its major principle, the symbol. It is one of the important principles in any analysis to the ideological thinking of Iraqi people and its current implications. The symbol reduces the ideology, if we risk in reducing it under the same title. Thus, the ideological symbol has different shapes, an ideological religious symbol, a hero defending the sufferings of the community and national liberator too. In fact, Iraqi ideology, and perhaps dogmatism, derives its legitimacy and existence from Iraqi lifestyle, which is molded and determined their beliefs and values. One of them is family loyalty. "The family is a cohesive social unit that nurtures its young and old alike. Iraqis also greatly value a personʼs honour and dignity, and take all efforts to maintain an honorable reputation. Central beliefs held by all Iraqis include the ultimate controlling nature of fate, difference between men and women, and the increase to turn him or her down."21
21
Susan M. Hassig, Cultures of the Worlds: Iraq, US, 2003, P. 63.
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This tension does not stop at the level of individual meeting with social structure, but it extends even up to the individual's relationship with the political authority in Iraq. Ali al-Wardi says about this fact: "In Iraq, there is a phenomenon, we almost observe everywhere, is that the Iraqi individual is inclined to criticize his government, and to put the blame on it, in all of the life matters. He does not like it, and often compares his government with high civilized governments; then begin to grumble and insult. He wants his government to be the finest one in the world; but he forgets that he does not cooperate with it, and obey its laws. Or, in other words, he wants it to be like the Swedish government, for example, while he exhibits as his father as exhibited with the Ottoman government. He keeps the rights that he owns from his government like Swedish citizen; but he does not carry out his duties toward the government. I do not say this by the way of defense of the Iraqi government; but it is a social fact which must be said."22 5.
Conclusion:
1Iraqi dogmatism is a system of knowledge that is being formed historically and ideologically in the social sphere. This knowledge system represents a convergence moment of rigid and non-dynamic consciousness with convulsive and unilateral act. 2Iraqi rural values are ideological ones, make the individual arises whereby and within a group of educational values that conclude the pride of manhood superiority. 3The manhood superiority is the strategic keyword of the nature of Iraqi individual. It concludes the upbringing of the individual since childhood as a hero, a brave man, and a person cannot be overcome or dominated. 4Iraq is gripped through its long history from the middle ages up to the recent times a sectarian conflict passes in different periods and degrees of sectarian tension. It intensifies sometimes and calm otherwise based on political factor, internal and external, particularly the regional one. 5Iraqi ideology is certainly the result of signs; meanings and values produced in the normal social life, and, in particular, is what being
22
Ali al-Wardi, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 302 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 303.
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produced by the political superstructure. It is a set of ideas and beliefs, and perhaps, dreams, perceptions and aspirations of groups and social classes living in Iraq. 6There is no unified ideology and major identity in Iraq, which can collect the Iraqi sects and ethnic groups. What is on the earth is a group of divided, non – consolidated and sub – identities, clearly; but perhaps roughly at other times. 7The symbols, virility and masculine values, in their eastern nature, are important element for analyzing Iraqi dogmatism. 8Iraqi ideology, and perhaps dogmatism, derives its legitimacy and existence from Iraqi lifestyle.
6.
Future Work: The ultimate goal is to study Iraqi dogmatism on scientific principles, for dismantling and re-formed it, on the basis of more dynamic activity; makes Iraqi ideology more open, fully pride of freedom, and fully rejection to negative values of virility, social exclusion and marginalization, totalitarian rule, and political despotism. This intellectual process is giving way to broad the popular participation in the formulation of strategic decisions, and reaching, finally, establishing a comprehensive system of Iraqi freedom and toleration.
7. Bibliography: 1-
2-
345-
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Aghaie, Karman Scot, the Martyrs of Karbala, Shiʽi Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran, (US: the University of Washington Press, 2004). ______, Karman Scot, ed., Women of Karbala, Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourse in Modern Shiʽi Islam, first edition, (US: the University of Texas Press, 2005). Aristotle, Politics, (UK: The Echo Library, 2006). Aristotle, Ethics, (UK: The Echo Library, 2006). Anderson, Liam and Gareth Stansfiled, the Future of Iraq, Dictatorship, Democracy or Division? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
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Bartlett, Robert C., and Susan D. Collins, editors, Action and Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle, (US: State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999). Brock, Stephen, (a cura di), LʼAttualità di Aristotele, (Roma: Armando Editore, 2000), Studi di Filosofia. Caygill, Howard, A Kant Introduction, (US: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), the Blackwell Philosopher Dictionary. Clarke, Peter B., editor, the Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, (UK: Oxford University Press, 2009). Cohen, Andrew, C. Death Rituals, Ideology, and the Development of Early Mesopotamian Kingship: Toward a New Understanding of Iraq's Royal Cemetery of Ur, (Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005). Davis, Joyce M., Martyrs, Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East, (England; Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Eagleton, Terry, Ideology – an Introduction, first published, (UK: Verso, 1991). Foster, Benjamin R., & Karen Polinger Foster, Civilizations of Ancient Iraq, (US: Princeton University Press, 2009). Fouillée, Alfred, La Philosophie de Platon, (US: Adamant Media Corporation, 2005), Elibron Classics. Fürtig, Henner, Kleine Geschichte des Iraq, (München: Verlag C. H. Beck 0HG, 2003).
16- Grignon, Claude, Sociologie et idéologie, (Genève – Paris: Libraire Droz, 200), Revue européenne des sciences socials, Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto, Directeur: Giovanni Busino, Tome: XLVI-2008-N0 142. 17- Grisebach, Eberhard, Gegenwart: Eine Kritische E Ethik, Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Klaus- M. Kodalle, (Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen, 2005), Kritisches Jahrbuch Der Philosophie, Band 9, Thüringische Gesellschaft für Philosophie Jena. 18- Hassig, Susan M., Cultures of the Worlds: Iraq, second edition, (US: Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2003). 19- Hegel, the Difference between Fichteʼs and Schellingʼs System of Philosophy, An English Translation of G. W. F. Hegelʼs Differenz des Fichteʼschen und Shellengʼschen System der Philosophie, prepared and edited by H. S. Harris & Walter Cerf, (US: State University of New York Press, 1977). 20- ______, Phenomenology, Translated A. V. Miller, analysis of the Text and Forward by J. N. Findlay, first Indian edition, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998).
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21- Hunt, Courtney, the History of Iraq, first published, (US: Greenwood Press, 2005). 22- Hyder, Syed Akbar, Reliving Karbala: Martyrdom in South Asian Memory, (USA: Oxford University Press, 2008). 23- Kant, Critique of Judgment, (New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2007). 24- Shah – Kazemi, Reza, Justice and Remembrance: Introducing the Spirituality of Imam ʽAlī, (US: I. B. Tauris & Co. ltd, 2007). 25- Malekpour, Jamshid, the Islamic Drama, first published, (Britain: Franck Cass Publishers, 2004). 26- Mannheim, Karl, Ideologie und Utopie, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995). 27- Mason, Herbert, Gilgamesh: A Verse Narrative, (US: Marine Books, 2003). 28- Mitchell, Stephan, Gilgamesh: A New English Version, (New York: Free Press, 2004). 29- Plato, Republic, (UK: Wordsworth, 1997). 30- Polk, William R., Understanding Iraq, the whole Sweep of Iraqi History from Genghis Khan's Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation, 2006).
31- Robson, Eleanor, Mathematics in Ancient Iraq, a Social History, (US: Princeton University Press, 2009). 32- Rosenwein, Barbara H., a Short History of the Middle Ages, third edition, (Canada: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2009). 33- Sandars, N. K., the Epic of Gilgamesh: An English Version with an Introduction, reprinted with revisions, (London: Penguin Group, 1972). 34- Simons, Geoff, Tony Benn, Forwarder, Iraq from Sumer to Saddam, first published, (US: St. Martin's Press, 1994). 35- Soltanian, Sheikh Hamed, Imam Husayn ibn 'Ali, (the Master of Martyrs), (Auckland, New Zealand: Fadak Publications, 2008). 36- Sedley, David, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (Oxford: New York, 2006). 37- Stansfiled, Gareth, Iraq: People, History, Politics, first published, (UK: Polity Press, 2007), Hot spot in Global Politics. 38- Tripp, Charles, a History of Iraq, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 39- Al-Wardi, Ali, Lamaḥat Ijtimaʽia Min Tarikh al-Iraq al-Ḥadith, (eng. Social Profiles of Iraqi Modern History), second edition, (Baghdad: Dijla wa al-Furat House and Library, 2009). 40- Wickham, Chris, Framing the Early Middle Ages, Europe and the Mediterranean, 400 – 800, (UK: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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Research Paper The Era of Globalisation and Ethnical Developments in the Middle East (Current challenges and perspectives of the future) Akbar Valadbigi Shahab Ghobadi
Abstract: Ethnicities and nations are nowadays engaged in identity-related issues and their subsequent challenges more than ever. In the present paper, the major identity-related challenges of the Middle Eastern ethnicities are discussed from the point of view of globalisation. There are various and contradictory insights on globalisation, nation, and ethnicity. This paper seeks to discuss these subjects while holding a cultural view and go on to suggest solutions like tolerance, opportunity-making, paying attention to the elites, and maintaining plurality.
Akbar Valadbigi is PhD candidate at the Department of Sociology of Yerevan State University (YSU) and lecturer at the universities of Kurdistan, Iran. He is a member to several committees of the International Sociological Association (ISA). He is now working on his doctoral dissertation that is about social capital and trust. His research interests include social capital, poverty, ethnicities, and globalization. He has published actively on the socio-cultural and political affairs of the Middle East. He has also been invited to numerous international conferences to present his works. His latest publication, “Perspective” which has a socio-cultural insight into the regional and international developments of the region.
Shahab Ghobadi is majoring in English language and literature at the University of Kurdistan, Iran. He will graduate with a B.A. degree in 2012. During the last two years, he has focused most of his researches and studies on his main research interests, globalization, ethnicities, and the Middle East studies. As a co-author to Mr. Valadbigi, he has recently published "Challenges to sociology in Iran" in Asian Social Sciences. He is also a member to the International Sociological Association(ISA). He is going to continue his education in the Middle East studies and is in touch with several international universities to get a position for his M.A. course.
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Globalisation in the Middle East, at least during the last three decades has functioned as a double-edged sword; at one hand, it has promoted employment and increasing ethnic and identity diversities and movements; at the other hand, however, it has sought to equalize ethnicidentity relations, and create structural development in unsuitable patterns on consumption, conflict-making, cultural genocide, collapse of plurality and so on. Our main emphasis is on cultural mechanisms and plural opportunities that can be considered as some excellent opportunities for the governments of the Middle East and be applied as a unique alternative to mitigate the current destructive conflicts. Then, we argue that civil society, tolerance and considering diplomatic relations, viewing the existing differences as opportunity ,and morally supporting the identities are some rational solutions for the region's governments in the era of globalisation. Key-words: Globalisation, the Middle East, ethnicities, civil society, cultural mechanisms, ethnic and identity-related issues...
1. Introduction:
E
thnic identity is defined based on the cultural characteristics (e.g., language, religion, customs, historical records, etc) through which people are related to the entire or some aspects of a certain group's identity. In the turn of the 20th century, sociologists regarded ethnical, racial, and lingual interests and identities as some historic anomalies that either were succumbing to communism, and then destroyed, or incorporating into the liberal-democratic frameworks. Ethnicity was found to be a relic of the earlier stages of human society's development, which was fated to disappear eventually. (Golmohammadi, 2002: 159) The assumption was that through the development of capitalism, establishment of nation-states, increased relationships and information, urbanization, increased rate of literacy, and socialization, ethnical identity seeking would be filed into the archive of history. This assumption was strongly backed by introducing theories related to globalisation. The process of globalisation, and especially globalisation of culture, was thought to entail the establishment and dominance of a certain culture on the whole world which in turn, makes grounds for forgetting local cultures, lifestyle of the ethnical subcultures, and even their languages. (Tohidfam, 2003: 267)
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By the process of globalisation, we do not mean forgetting the local, ethnical, and regional cultures; rather, this process strengthens the emergence of the frames of non-national collective identities among which ethnical identities being of higher significance. The international community passed the later years of the second millennium and entered into the third one in such a situation in which ethnical, lingual, and racial identities have gained increased importance and it can be definitely claimed that most of the world's countries are engaged in some sorts of ethnic conflicts and movements. (Ahmadi, 2005:65) Nowadays, there are next to 8000 ethnicities speaking some 6700 languages; however, the United Nations has just 192 state members. (Khobroyepak, 2001:18) Through the penetration of the mass media into the realm of human life, globalisation has gathered cultures and ethnicities around and created a situation that lets the ethnical identities return; therefore, globalisation accelerates this process and weakens the idea of ethnical and racial excellence. In the past, debates over identity, nationality, and their subsequent national identity across the Middle East were not so widespread. It is more debatable in terms of coherent academic theory-making and research, rather than historic and cultural aspects. The recent developments in thoughts, and more importantly the emergence of academic circles are among the most crucial elements in the orientation toward identity, nationalism, and nationality. In this regard, one can discuss about the role of the postmodern approach, and then the modern critical insights into the developments brought by globalisation. Since the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, from one hand, and the rise of the holistic insights like " The End of History" suggested by the American scholars, from the other hand, inspired the critics to focus on the consequences of globalisation, criticize the hegemonic holistic thoughts, and introduce new perceptions from identity, state, nationality, and ethnicity. The impact of the anti-holistic insights of the postmodern approach, their emphasis on "difference" instead of "identity", and their struggles for deconstructing fundamentalist insights were the vital elements in the rise of new critical thoughts within the discourse of globalisation. The emergence of these intellectual approaches (i.e., postmodernism and cultural insights) within the discourse of globalisation has got a significant role in the approach to
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debating over identity, ethnicity.(Ahmadi, 2004:11)
nationalism,
nationality,
state,
and
2. Importance of this paper: A great deal of writings of the major theorists of postmodernism and the critics of the discourse of globalisation have a historic sociological hue; that is, they have mainly focused on the experiences of the West in its discussions; as a result, they have criticized the shortages of modernism, the process of globalisation, and its consequences in the context of the negative consequences of western states. However, the western researchers have adopted them as universal frameworks (unlike the eternal rational of postmodern approach and globalisation), they have also put the traditions of developing countries under discussion. It is obvious that such universal implications have absorbed attentions of the Middle Eastern researchers; it has, however, been the subject of some works written on identity, nation, nation-building, and ethnicity (Ahmadi, 2004:12). Although the works of ethnicity researchers have been more or less superficial with their political, ideological, and sentimental themes, rather than academic researchers which are based on historical facts, the ability of these groups in interesting propaganda activities, from one hand, and the appropriate situation in the wake of the multiple crises in the Middle Eastern societies (i.e., social, political, cultural, and economic crises), from the other hand, have resulted in absorbing some parts of society, especially from the crisis-stricken youth. The extensive publication and advertisement activities of such groups displaying their shallow power as higher than their minor social status, are generally based on the ideological, undocumented, and slogan writings; these works, however, have mainly tried to distort the contemporary historic events in order that develop local sentiments, ethnic hostility, and to stimulate ethnical conflicts and disputes. Public officials' concerns on the merely religious matters and the domestic conflicts over power and states have given rise to illunderstanding ethnical challenges; as a result, there is no appropriate policy-making to consolidate national correlation and identity across the Middle Eastern countries. (Ahmadi, 2004:13)
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In our time, all forms of nationalism have sought to highlight a special part of the fragmented identity of people; however, they have denied the mosaic-like feature of social identities. The ideological projects have considered purifying identity as their mission; in contrast, dissimulation of such projects means to recognize impurity and inevitable multidimensionality of identities. Historical dialect considers ethnics and nationalities, like other social phenomena, to be supplementary, multidimensional, and synthetic items. (Bashirieh, 2004 ) The claim of cultural, lingual, national, religious, and ethnic purity is the result of a fake knowledge suggested under the influence of general ideologies. Taking this closely into account, it appears that the pure civilized, cultural, and ethnic identity has no historical reality; rather it is a product of ideology. To the extent that the claim of racial purity is unreal, the claim of culture, religion, ethnicity, and civilization's coherence is unrealistic. The twentieth century experienced the rise of all forms of identitybuilder ideologies: Socialism tried to give meaning and form to the sociopolitical acts of its followers through creating new frames for selfknowledge and identity giving; Fascism, in its part, was in search of establishing special social acts, self-knowledge, and identity. Religious fundamentalism, however, sought to rear its special doctrinaire followers; nationalistic ideologies, likewise, were always struggling to omit "margins" and strengthen" center". (Bashirieh, 2004) In these societies, the nation and identity-builder elements have undertaken major stages in nation building through their gradual and historical interaction. Some original elements including: ethnicity, language, and religion or establishing territorial identity have been enhanced via supplementary elements like increased communication, oil industry, urban development, equipping armies with modern weapons, and focused imperial governments. The inspirational elements such as development of bureaucratic systems and establishing national education systems created appropriate adherence to national identity. In spite of these concerns, the major issue of these societies relates to the nature of national state, legitimacy crisis, and its subsequent participation. With respect to the recent worldwide and Middle East-wide political
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developments in terms of growing democratic regimes, human rights, and the appearance of a modern generation of non-authoritarian states in the Middle East, the political structure of the authoritarian governments are challenged. At the same time, these authoritarian governments are facing the rise of an extensive educated middle-class in their societies who push for more participation in politics and power. To put it differently, this generation seeks to nationalize political power, capture it from the authoritarian entities, and then transfer it to the nation. In fact, the subsequent claims of civil rights have been the main challenge of Arab states in the process of globalisation. 2. Globalisation; Ethnic identities and movements: There are two major statements as regards the influence of globalisation on ethnical movements. Most of those who have regarded ethnicity through globalisation and its theories believe that globalisation has given rise to these movements; others who are expertise in ethnical studies agree that there is no relationship between such influences and the process of globalisation. Globalisation provokes the development of ethnical movements in three different ways. First, it diminishes governments' authority. Second, the current meta-national relations pave the ways for ethnic groups to pursue their goals and requests. Third, globalisation creates some difficulties for states to employ immediate and harsh suppression. Zapatista movement, for instance, changed itself into an international movement through applying such relations. In addition, some consequences of globalisation intensify ethnic sensitivities. The movement of Hawaiian natives, for example, was the result of their sensitivity to destroying Amazon Forests. (Shult, 2003:210) Along with the decrease in the role of political borders, the distance between ethnic groups, as a consequent, has decreased, too. This matter, in turn, leads to increasing the role of such groups. Developments of technology have increased minorities' understanding of their differences with other groups. Once the central state tries to diffuse its culture among ethnic regions, the aggressive reactions from the side of minorities will grow. (Naderpour, 2003:239)
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The era of globalisation is accompanied by weakening the role of national state and identity both at international level and in domestic policies. The emergence of some new players like multi-national companies, international organizations, meta-national groups, and the same has undermined the positions of national state and identity; therefore, globalisation is thought to be a source for developing ethnical knowledge and subsequently, expanding ethnic conflicts worldwide. (Mawlaee, 2001) The rapid growth of ethnicalism in the wake of globalisation, which is the development of ethnic identities within national borders of the Third World countries and challenging identity either theoretically, practically, or methodologically is indefensible. The relationship between globalisation and the growth of ethnicities have been exaggerated; yet, the role of other elements, that is the nature of international structure and policies of the major players have been neglected. (Ahmadi, 2002:30) The interventions and aids of the foreigners are amongst the main causes of most of the ethnic movements that have taken place across the Third World countries. (Naderpour, 2003:244) The role of globalisation should not be exaggerated, as it is a doubleedged sword: expanding welfare and promoting economic spaces, the trend of capital as an aspect of globalisation can decrease ethnic conflicts in long-term. It is the development of information space and the growing current of data allows ethnicities to exhibit their cultures in the international arenas; nevertheless, it decreases prejudices and dogmatism and alters people's view from the blind ethnic prejudices toward humankind. (Ghavam, 2003:314-317) With respect to the consequences of ethnicities' globalisation, we can name of three changes: first, undermining nation-states; second, breeding and strengthening ethnic identity seeking; and finally, creating virtual ethnic societies. Whether direct or indirect, globalisation provokes ethnic identity seeking. Globalisation shifts insights and orientations of different classes from
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sociopolitical issues to cultural ones, then it makes ethnic identity seeking as the basis of most of the challenges global system will encounter in the future. 4. The Middle East and enduring ethnic and identity conflicts: The sensitive and strategic region of the Middle East, which once has been the cradle of the early civilizations and a ground for the rise of religions, still holds its importance as the focus of international policies. Although there are different insights on the borders of this region, the following elements of this region are worth to be considered in defining the Middle East: the traditional field of Islamic civilization, oil resources, geopolitical importance, and the widespread international sufferings due to the prolonged conflicts that are common in this region. Holding a wide diversity in religions, languages, and races, the Middle East has always drawn attentions from the researchers who have vested interest in the fields of ethnicity and nationalism. In most of the cases, these researchers have applied widespread notions and theoretical frameworks for studying religious, racial, and lingual groups. The works of these researchers indicate of their orientation toward universal generalizations and lack of probing into historic writings of this region. (Ahmadi, 1999; 16) Two significant occurrences, one taking place in politics and the other in intellectualism, motivated the Middle Eastern researchers to study ethnical issues across the region. In the field of politics, the collapse of the multi-national emperors (the former Soviet Union, for example) and some multi-ethnical countries (e.g., Yugoslavia), from one hand, and the rise of ethnic sentiments across the western and Third World countries, from the other hand, draw the attentions of the Middle Eastern researchers and informed them of the necessity of this subject. Concerning intellectualism, the popularity of postmodernism and its aspire to call the heritage and perceptions of modernism(e.g., identity, nation, and nationalism) in question and trying to deconstruction, made researchers sensitive to conceptions like citizenship, ethnical groups, and identity. (Ahmadi, 2002)
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Although postmodernism has concentrated its focus on developed western society, and as a result its theorists have focused their historical point of view on the experiences of the west, their eastern followers, who are teaching and researching in northern America and Europe, have adopted this approach, regardless of its historic fit , to investigate the affairs of developing world. Under the light of these political and intellectual developments, some Middle Eastern researchers have embarked on examining identity, nationalism, ethnicity, and ethnic groups. The main problems of such works whose writers are lacking in theoretical sensitivity to the abovementioned issues, the other problem is that there is lack of historicism and sensitivity to the importance of "historic sociology" in social, political, economic, and cultural studies. Subsequently, in the first type of works, we face a lot of articles and descriptive books that lack a theoretical framework around ethnical conflicts or ethnicity in the Middle East. In the second classification, there are limited number of works applying critical postmodern approach with the same conception and methods; such works, therefore, are lacking in understanding historic sociology, time, place, and societies, like those of the Middle East, which are beyond experiences of the western world. 5. EU and regionalism promotion in the Middle East: The Middle Eastern regionalism in the era of globalisation is supposed to be the reason of strengthening the economic and commercial ties in the countries of this region at international level. Not only is such regionalism at odds with globalisation, but also it strengthens it; it can also enjoy globalisation, especially in the realm of developing communications and accelerating the cycle of information to promote regional convergence. The EU supports regional cooperation in different parts of the globe, especially in the Middle East. Regional cooperation in this area is amid EU's important political objectives. According to Karen Smith (2003), the EU encourages cooperation among the states of this region due to several reasons including: first, addressing challenges at a regional level is a rational approach, as problems like tackling with pollution, terrorism, and organized crimes are of a cross-border nature. Second, based on its
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productive experiences, the EU can offer some helpful best practices to integrate the states of this region. After experiencing centuries of war on the continent of Europe, the EU has reached peace and wishes to expand this peaceful stable situation to its neighborhoods. Third, foreign policy of the EU is characterized by regionalism promotion and this, in turn, helps the EU to have its identity as a global actor. The European Union considers instability and lack of regional cooperation in the Middle East as a threat to its security, energy supply, and labor market. Through helping the Middle Eastern states to become well governed and peaceful, the EU will promote the rate of its stability. 6. Cultural developments of the Middle East and their effects on ethnic and identity-related issues: It was colonialism, among other things, that introduced modernity in the Middle Eastern nations. Colonialism, however, happened both directly and indirectly with intervention in the internal affairs being the most important form. In the aftermath of discovering oil in the Middle East, colonial powers, from one hand, applied ethnical and religious gaps as a means to consolidate their governance, and the continuation of colonial procedures, from the other hand, resulted in the rise of anti-colonial nationalistic movements. Modernity is a completely transformational, yet circular set. Being lacking in stability, while this set is conveyed to the Middle East, one cannot surely find any sign of stability in which. The form of modernity, which took place in the Middle East, has not developed in vacuum; rather it appeared in a context in which Arabic-Islamic traditions as well as totalitarian approaches were dominant. As some leaders use a widespread totalitarianism in the region, and this situation would not let some modern conceptions like: individualism, human rights, and women's rights get dominance. Anyway, these laggings, that is, lack of development and a factor that allows an appropriate social stratification to be established and confirm thought at a social level, remain as the major problems. This situation makes the Middle East inconsistent with modernity.
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The form of technology dominated across the region is fundamentally consumption-based, thus extends patterns of consumption in these societies. Except for a few industries, petrochemical, for example, that is handled mostly by foreigner employees; this technology has no linkage to the past or future of the region. This technology, therefore, does not deal with training local people and has nothing to do with local production or their traditional sciences. No matter from which context technology arrives in this region, it will observe itself in a situation for which it has not prepared itself culturally. The introduction of the western technology has had such a noticeable influence on the countries of this region that even it has changed the cultural aspects and contemporary literary works of the Arab nations. One can follow the track of a rupture with the past in the contemporary literary works of the region. The sudden arrival of technology and the dominant culture of the west in the local life and stirring the traditional lifestyle have been well portrayed in Arabic stories. In the recent years, modernity and new cultural patterns have taken widespread aspects in the critical thoughts of the Middle Eastern intellectuals and writers; these notions, thus, indicate of the existing crisis in the culture of this region. Reconstructing the Middle East in the 1960s and 70s through Westernisation and technology development, was in need of compatible moral and social perspectives. In education systems, for example, unreligious institutes controlled by governments superseded the traditional religious schools. Increased wealth of urban people, which concentrated among the elites, exacerbated the economic gap between the poor and the rich. Furthermore, there is a sense among the people of this region to have their rights violated; that is, they think the status qua of the Middle east and Arab World could have been higher than what they held now. The gap between political aspirations and the existing realities result in the expansion of a sense of disparity, hatred, prejudice, and terror. These
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sentiments, however, have no room in most of these nations due to the totalitarian structures ruling over them. While the people of the Middle East disgust the imperialist culture and the wealth of west, they are fond of acquiring western products and their political power. Such opposing emotions of love and disgust create a two-folded ill-like attitude toward world. Such attitudes, from one hand, results in people's ambiguity about "Who are they?", and they are scared to have their religious and cultural past at risk, from the other hand. This fear, in turn, makes grounds for the Islamic movements to be strengthened. Currently, culture in the Middle East and specially in the Persian Gulf countries, has turned into a complicated contentious debate, as upon the diffusion of global cultures into the local cultures, some new configurations will appear; hence, this situation integrates both poles (i.e., global vs. local) and creates the contradictory powers of colonialism and resistance, global similarisation against forms of new hybrid identities. 7. Cultural mechanisms of globalisation influencing the Middle East: Similar to all the regions of the world, culture in the Middle East has not been exempt from international events and developments. The unique features of such culture consequently have complicated studying it as an independent variable. One cannot anticipate the cultural features of this region without taking globalisation of culture and the consequences of internationalism into precise consideration. The affectability of this region and its consisting nations from globalisation in the form of extended trend of global thought and culture, the rise of globalized media, and the similar consequences may not be denied. It is a while that the Middle East has experienced the revolution of information and suffers from its inevitable challenges. The way people, organizations, and governments cope with and apply the opportunities of such apparently naive challenges, is the main force that shapes the cultural perspective of the Middle East.
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The Middle Eastern countries, their populations, and their elites are recommended to do their best in order to localize the contents of their internet and their TVs. Scholars and decision-makers, in their part, have a significant role in renovating authentic culture of the region through information networks and the media. 8. Common challenges and suggestions for getting out of them: It is clear that the consequences of those incentives and elements that have influenced this region over the last century will maintain in the future, too. Being common across most of the countries of the Middle East, these challenges can be classified into: population challenges, environmental challenges, information, global economy and globalisation, single-product economies, sovereignty disputes, unemployment, social transformations, extremist violence, terrorism, fundamentalism, and arm-race(to name a few).( Ahmadi, 2004) In the era of modernity and in the process of tackling with dominant global tools, the Middle Eastern countries are left with no choice but succumbing to rational and intellectual solutions. What follows is a set of procedures suggested to these countries in order to overcome the existing challenges:
Maintaining diversity in the cooperation, increasing the level of political, social, cultural, economic, and communication cooperation among the countries of the middle east; Respecting plural identities, increasing collective self-awareness among the masses and maintaining regional convergence according to the plural cultural identities; Promoting security based on self-reliance, maintaining independent cultural identities, law-abiding, and so forth; De-conflicting: based on discipline, dialogue, tolerance, and holding diversity; and Trust building: based on local management, transparent policies, opportunity- making, and recruiting local elites.
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9. Developing civil society; a unique alternative for the modern Middle East: Although the researchers of the Middle Eastern affairs may study civil society from different perspectives (realistic, theoretical, conceptual, and normative, for example), it is crystal clear that civil society today consists a part of political discourse in this region. Besides academic circles' discussions, civil society is by itself a forum for discussing contemporary events of the Middle East.( Afzali, 2000: 100) Generally evaluating the process of civil society's development in the Middle East, we can clarify four stages: First, in most of these countries, the institutes of civil society are experiencing their embryonic period, and in spite of various social configurations, they are very tender and fragile; Second, institutes and organizations of civil society are not institutionalized in these countries; most of the fractions and parties have come into being temporarily and serve merely for certain political functions; Third, parties are generally local-based and have little in common with what we know of this perception. To put it differently, parties and fractions in this region are family or individual-bound and are mainly based on ideological principles; and Fourth, groups such as trade unions and commercial guilds in these countries are normally based on non-economic principles. Most of these groups are in a certain way political and have a little, if at all, willingness to pursue commercial interests.( Afzali, 2000: 284) It is worth to say that civil society nowhere has an external presence; rather it is just an abstract idea, which is theory-based. In that, it should be applied just as a means in facilitating analysis, rather than an actual phenomenon in analysis. Norton warns that it is the bewilderment of the real world from the ideal prototype that resulted in capturing some disappointing findings about civil society, the efficiency of the idea of civil society in the Middle Eastern studies relies on its usefulness in facilitating understanding political and social phenomena, power structures, and the nexus between government and society. No approach can in itself explain a
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phenomenon and civil society is no exception from this rule.(Afzali, 2000:59) 10. Conclusion: Globalisation serves as a double-edged sword for ethnic identities and movements; in short-run, it entails the promotion of ethnic movements and identities, however, in long run, in the absence of some pivotal elements (e.g., government support, international potentials, rich written heritage, and non-monopoly in a certain country), the culture of these ethnic identities will collapse. We can draw on two conclusions from the modern history of this region. First, there will be a significant continuation from present to 2020, but the regional masses should not divert our attention from the main affairs. Second, these changes probably result from the current forces rather than the new variables affecting the Middle East for the first time. However, finding a democratic solution for the issue of ethnicities in the Middle East is amongst the major paradigms of internal policies, and the international community has always called for such solution. Exclusion, murder, or cultural exploitation of the minorities cannot decrease from the predicament; the aggressive military reactions of internal groups in this region are the aftermath of power monopoly, military governments' iron fist policy, and lack of sufficient grounds for the rise of civil society. When masses, ethnicities, and minorities are deprived from their legitimate rights (individual and collective freedom for requesting political, social, and cultural rights, for example), what they will find is clenched fists, then it is why interaction and participation are replaced by de-empowerment, decentralization, and the current historic vengeances. The foremost solution to get out of this deficit historic cycle is through trust-building and transferring power to the elites of ethnicities and internal minorities. Promoting civil political freedoms results in developing cultural and political atmosphere across the society; this solution, while increasing the rate of internal security, promotes the internal authority and legitimacy of governments. Procedures that can be recommended for decreasing existing gaps and conflicts among identities in the Middle East include: increased focus on balanced development, comprehensive urban management, idealistic acceptation of identityrelated distinctions, especially by the engaged ruling groups and political
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forces, making grounds for engagement and intellectual interactions of identities, directing the potentials of identities into the conduits of civil society and political institutes, and their legal participation in popular and political areas.
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آفاق
سورٌا على طرٌق ثورة الكرامة والحرٌة د.برهان غليون
لفت صمت الشعب السوري أمام اندالع ثورة الكرامة والحرٌة فً تونس ومصر وانتقالها المدوي إلى جمٌع األقطار العربٌة ،بما فٌها دول الخلٌج النفطٌة الغنٌة، والملكٌات األكثر رسوخا فً بعض األقطار ،نظر جمٌع المراقبٌن فً العالم. وتبارى كثٌر من هؤالء فً تحلٌل األسباب التً منعت رٌاح الحرٌة المنعشة التً هبت على المنطقة العربٌة ،وألهبت حماسة شعوبها ،ووحدت فكرهم ومشاعرهم وإرادتهم ،كما لم ٌحصل فً أي زمن سابق ،من التأثٌر فً مجرى الحٌاة السورٌة.
ٌٚؼً إٌظبَ اٌغٛس ٞالزٕغ أ٠ؼب ثبألؽشٚؽخ اٌز ٟسٚعزٙب اٌظؾبفخ ٕ٘ب ٕ٘ٚبن، ٚاػزجش أْ اٌزفبف اٌشؼت اٌغٛس ٞؽٛي ل١بدرٗ ثغجت ِٛالفٙب اٌؾّ١ذح ِٓ اٌمؼب٠ب اٌم١ِٛخ ،أِش ِفشٚؽ ِٕٗ ٠غٕجٗ اٌّغبءٌخ ف ٟلؼب٠ب اٌؾىُ ٚاٌغ١بعخ اٌذاخٍ١خ ٚاٌؾش٠بدٛ٠ٚ ،فش ػٍ ٗ١اإلطالؽبد اٌزِ ٟب وف ػٓ اٌٛػذ ثٙب ِٕز ثذا٠خ اٌؼمذ اٌّبػ ِٓ ،ٟد ْٚئظٙبس أ ٞسغجخِّٙ ،ب وبٔذ ِؾذٚدح ،ف ٟرؾم١مٙب. ٚسغُ ِشٚس صالصخ أشٙش ػٍ ٝصٛسح شؼج١خ ػشث١خ ػبسِخ أد٘شذ اٌؼبٌُ ٚأطجؾذ ِؾٛس ا٘زّبَ إٌّظِٛخ اٌذ١ٌٚخ ثأوٍّٙب ِٓ ،ع١بعِٚ ٓ١١ضمفٚ ٓ١فالعفخ ٚخجشاء فٟ اٌغ١بعخ ٚاإلعزشار١غ١خِ ِٓٚ ،شب٘ذ اٌشؼٛة اٌز ٟؽشسد ٔفغٙب ثمٛح ئسادرٙب ٚػضّ٠زٙب ٚرظّّٙ١ب ،فِٛ ٟاعٙخ أػز ٝإٌظُ اٌمّؼ١خ ،فمذ ظً إٌظبَ اٌغٛسٞ طبِزب رّبِب وّب ٌ ٛأْ ِب ٠غش ِٓ ٞؽ ٌٗٛال ٠ؼٕ ٗ١ثزبرب ،أ ٚأْ عٛس٠ب ِٕ١ؼخ وٍ١ب ػٍٝ أ ٞرأص١شاد ػشث١خ أ ٚػبٌّ١خ . أستاذ علم اإلجتماع السياسي بجامعة السوربون ،ومدير مركز دراسات الشرق المعاصر .باريس.
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ٚثّٕ١ب ٌُ ٠جك ٔظبَ ػشثٚ ٟاؽذ ٌُ ٠جبدس ئٌ ٝرمذ ُ٠رٕبصالد ع١بع١خ ٚاٌٛػذ ثجشاِظ ئطالػ أ ٚاٌذػٛح ئٌ ٝؽٛاساد ٚؽٕ١خ٠ ٌُ ،غذ اٌّغإ ٌْٛٚاٌغٛس ْٛ٠ػشٚسح ؽزٝ ٌٍزٛعٗ ثخطبة أ ٚثىٍّخ أ ٚثج١بْ ٌٍشؼتٚ ،اوزفٛا ثّب رٕششٖ أ ٚرجضٗ ٚعبئً اإلػالَ اٌغٛس٠خ ػٓ ئٔغبصاد إٌظبَ االعزضٕبئ١خ ،اٌٛؽٕ١خ ٚاالعزّبػ١خ ٚااللزظبد٠خ . ٚثّٕ١ب ثبدسد ٔظ ٌُ ال رمً صمخ ثمٛح اٌشدع اٌز ٟرزّزغ ثٙب أعٙضرٙب األِٕ١خ ،ئٌ ٝئؽالق عشاػ ِؼزمٍٚ ٓ١ارخبر ئعشاءاد فٛس٠خ ٌزجش٠ذ األعٛاء ٚاٌزخف١ف ِٓ اٌؼغٛؽ ٚاٌزٛرشاد اٌز ٟرؼ١شٙب اٌغّب٘١ش اٌّزفغشح رٛلب ئٌ ٝاالٔؼزبقٚ ،أػٍٓ ثؼغ اٌضػّبء فٙ١ب ػٓ ػذَ سغجز ُٙف ٟئػبدح رشش١ؾٌٛ ُٙال٠خ أخشٚ ،ٜثبدس ثؼؼ ُٙا٢خش ئٌ ٝوف ٠ذ األعٙضح األِٕ١خ ػٓ اٌّالؽمبد اٌزؼغف١خ ٚاعزخذاَ اٌمٛح ٚاٌؼٕف ِغ اٌّزظب٘ش،ٓ٠ ٚألش ثؼغ صبٌش ثؼشٚسح رٕظ ُ١أزخبثبد ٔضٙ٠خ ٚؽشح ،ػبػفذ أعٙضح األِٓ اٌغٛس٠خ ِٓ رشذد٘ب رغبٖ إٌشطبء اٌغ١بعٚ ،ٓ١١صعذ اٌّض٠ذ ِٕ ُٙف ٟاٌغغ ْٛألدٔٝ األعجبة٘ٚ ،ب ٘ ٟرزٛسؽ فِٛ ٟاعٙخ اٌّظب٘شاد ثبٌشطبص ثؼذِب وبٌذ ٌ ُٙرّٙب رغب ٞٚاٌخ١بٔخ اٌٛؽٕ١خ. ٚؽز ٝف ٟاٌٍّى١بد اٌشاعخخ ٚاٌغٕ١خ٠ ٌُ ،غذ اٌمبدح ثذا ِٓ ارخبر ئعشاءاد ع١بع١خ عذ٠ذح ثبإلػبفخ ئٌ ٝاإلعشاءاد االعزّبػ١خ ٚااللزظبد٠خٚ ،شؼش لغُ ِٕ٠ ٌُ ،ُٙؼزذ ِخبؽجخ اٌغّٛٙس ٚال ِغبصٌزٗ ،ثؼشٚسح أْ ٠زؾذس ٌشؼجٗ ٠ٚخبؽجٗ ،وزؼج١ش ػٓ االػزشاف ثٛعٛدٖ أ ٚاٌزظب٘ش ثبؽزشاَ سأٚ .ٗ٠أػٍٓ ٍِه اٌّغشة اٌز ٞال ٠شه أؽذ ثّب ٠زّزغ ثٗ ف ٟثالدٖ ِٓ شؼج١خٔ ،ظشا ٌّب شٙذرٗ ثذا٠خ ؽىّٗ ِٓ أفزبؽبد دّ٠مشاؽ١خ ِّٙخ ،ػٓ ِششٚػٗ اٌغذ٠ذ ٌزمٍ١ض وج١ش ف ٟطالؽ١زٗ اٌغ١بع١خ ٚسثّب اٌزّ١ٙذ إللبِخ ٍِى١خ دعزٛس٠خ. ثبٌّمبثً٠ ٌُ ،زشدد اٌشئ١ظ اٌغٛس ٞف ٟأْ ٠إوذ خالي ِمبثالد ؽذ٠ضخ ِغ اٌظؾبفخ األعٕج١خ ،أْ اإلطالػ اٌغ١بع ٟف ٟعٛس٠ب ِغأٌخ ؽٍ٠ٛخ ٚطؼجخ٠ ٌٓٚ ،ىِٓ ْٛ اٌّّىٓ رؾم١مٗ لجً ِشٚس ع ً١عذ٠ذ. ٌؼً اٌمبدح اٌغٛس ٓ١٠اسرأ ْٚا أْ ِٓ األفؼً أْ ال ٠زؾذصٛا ف ٟاٌغ١بعخ ؽز ٝال ٠فزؾٛا ػٍ ٝأٔفغ ُٙثبة اٌزفى١ش ف ٟاإلطالػ اٌغ١بع ،ٟأٌ ٚؼً ثؼؼ ُٙاػزمذ ثبٌفؼً أْ رغ١ٙضارٚ ُٙعب٘ض٠ز ُٙاألِٕ١خ ل٠ٛخ ثّب ٠ىفٌ ٟشدع اٌغٛس ٓ١٠ػٓ اٌم١بَ ثأ ٞػًّ ال ٠شػ ٝػٕٗ إٌظبَ ،أ ٚثأْ شؼج ُٙلذ فمذ رّبِب اٌشؼٛسٚ ،أطجؼ عضخ ع١بع١خ ،أ ٚأٔٗ رؾٛي ئٌ ٝعبئجخ ال رؼٌٕٙ ٟب اٌىشاِخ ش١ئب ٚال رض١ش٘ب س٠بػ اٌؾش٠خ . أٌ ٚؼٍ ُٙاػزمذٚا ثأْ خٛف اٌشؼت ثؼؼٗ ِٓ اٌجؼغ ا٢خشٚ ،رخ٠ٛفٗ ثبٌؾشة األٍ٘١خ ثغجت االٔمغبِبد اٌّز٘ج١خ ا ٚاٌغ٠ٛٙخ ،ع١ؼطً ئسادرٗ ٠ٚشٍٗ ػٓ اٌم١بَ ثأٞ ِجبدسح ػٍّ١خ . ٘ىزا طُ إٌظبَ اٌغٛس ٞأرٔ ٗ١رّبِب ػٓ ٔذاءد ٟ٘-أشجٗ ثبالعزغبصخ -طذسد ػٓ ثؼغ ِٓ ال ٠ضاي ػٍ ٝل١ذ اٌؾ١بح اٌغ١بع١خ ،ف ٟشؼت ٠ىبد ٠خزٕك ِٓ شذح ػغؾ أعٙضح األِٓ اٌز ٟرؾظ ٟػٍ ٝاألفشاد أٔفبع ُٙثبٌّؼٕ ٝاٌؾشفٌٍ ٟىٍّخٚ ،ال ٠ىبد فشد
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عٛاء أوبْ ٔبشطب ع١بع١ب أ ٚثؼ١ذا ػٓ أٔ ٞشبؽ٠ -خشط ِٓ رؾذ اٌغ١طشح األِٕ١خاٌّجبششحٚ ،ال ٔشبؽِّٙ ،ب وبْ طغ١شا أ ٚوج١شا ،رغبس٠ب أ ٚصمبف١بّ٠ ،ىٓ أْ ّ٠ش ِٓ ث ٓ١شجىبد اٌّشالجخ اٌؼ١مخ ٚشىٛوٙب اٌّشػ١خ ِٚالؽمبرٙب اٌذائّخ ٚاٌ١ِٛ١خ . اإلشبسح اٌ١زّ١خ اٌز ٟلجً إٌظبَ أْ ٠مذِٙب ف٘ ٟزٖ اٌظشٚف اٌزبس٠خ١خ اٌز ٟرٍٙت ِشبػش اٌؼشة عّ١ؼب ٚرذفؼٌ ُٙشوٛة وً اٌّخبؽش ثّب فٙ١ب ؽًّ اٌغالػ ٌّمبرٍخ أػذاء اٌؾش٠خ ،وّب ؽظً ف١ٌ ٟج١ب ٟ٘ ،ئؽالق عشاػ ٘١ضُ اٌّبٌؼ إٌبشؾ اٌؾمٛلٟ اٌّغٓ ،ثؼذ عٕٛاد ِٓ اٌّؾبوّبد ٚاالػزمبالد اٌزٕى١ٍ١خ . ٚؽز ٝف٘ ٟزٖ اٌؾبٌخ ،اعزىضش إٌظبَ أْ ٠طٍك اٌّبٌؼ ثؼف ٛخبص ،فغٍّٗ ف ٟػفٖٛ اٌؼبَ اٌذٚس ٞػٓ اٌغشائُ ٚاٌغٕؼ اٌّذٔ١خٚ ،أوذ أْ األطً ف ٛ٘ ٗ١اٌغٓ اٌّزمذَ ،ؽزٝ ال ٠ؼف ٟػٍ٘ ٝزا اٌؼف ٛػٓ شخض ٚاؽذ ؽبثؼب ع١بع١ب ٠غز ٞأ٘ٚبَ إٌبشطٓ١ اٌؾمٛلٚ ٓ١١اٌغ١بع ٓ١١ثأْ ِٓ اٌّّىٓ رؼّ ّٗ١ف ٟاٌّغزمجً أ ٚرٛع١غ دائشرٗ . أوضش ِٓ اإلؽجبؽ ،أصبس ٘زا االٔغالق اٌغ١بع ،ٟاٌؼّ١ك اٌذالٌخ ،ر٘ٛي األٚعبؽ اٌغ١بع١خ ٚاٌضمبف١خ عّ١ؼب١ٌ ،ظ ف ٟعٛس٠ب فؾغت ٌٚىٓ ف ٟاٌؼبٌُ اٌؼشث ٟثأوٍّٗ. ٚفغش طّذ إٌظبَ سٚػ اٌضٛسح اٌىبِٕخ ،ثّب أثشصٖ ِٓ ػذَ االؽزشاَ ٌٍشؼٛة، ٚاالعزٙزبس ثّشبػش إٌبطٚ ،رغبً٘ رطٍؼبرٚ ،ُٙاالعزٙبٔخ ثّخبٚفٚ ُٙلٍم ُٙػٍٝ ِغزمجٍٚ ،ُٙاالعزّشاس ف ٟاٌّشإ٘خ ػٍ ٝوغش ئسادر ِٓ ،ُٙأعً اإلثمبء ػٍ ٝئرػبٔ،ُٙ ٚرّذ٠ذ ؽبٌخ اٌؾظبس اٌّفشٚع ػٍٚ ،ُٙ١رؾ ٍُٙ٠ٛئٌ ٝأعشِ ٜؾزغض ٓ٠داخً رٚارُٙ ُ٘ أٔفغ. ُٙ ٘ ِٓٚزا اإلؽجبؽ ٚأغالق ا٢فبق ٚلزً اِ٢بي ،أطٍمذ ِ 51 َٛ٠بسط/آراس اٌغبسٞ أٚي ششاسح ف ٟؽشوخ ٠خطئ إٌظبَ ئرا اػزمذ أْ ِٓ اٌّّىٓ اٌمؼبء ػٍٙ١ب ثٛػغ ِٓ شبسن فٙ١ب ف ٟاٌغغٓ ٚئػبفخ ِؼزمٍ ٓ١عذد ئٌ ٝػششاد اٌّؼزمٍ ٓ١اٌغبثم.ٓ١ ٌ١ظ ِب ؽذس ٠ٚؾذس ف ٟدِشك ٚثبٔ١بط ٚدسػب ٚؽّض ٚاٌمبِشٍ ٟعٜٛ اإلس٘بطبد األٌ ٌٝٚضٛسح اٌىشاِخ ٚاٌؾش٠خ اٌز ٟؽٍّذ ثٙب عٛس٠ب ِٕز ٚلذ ؽ،ً٠ٛ د ْٚأْ رغذ ٚعٍ١خ إلخشاعٙب . ٚأطجؼ أطؼت فأطؼت اٌ ،َٛ١ف ٟع١بق االٔزفبػخ اٌشبٍِخ ٌٍشؼٛة اٌؼشث١خ ،ئخّبد ٔبس٘ب ثبٌٛعبئً ٚاألعبٌ١ت اٌمذّ٠خ اٌز ٟاػزبدد ػٍ ٝاعزخذاِٙب األعٙضح األِٕ١خِٓ ، ػٕف ِفشؽ ٚػشة ٚشزُ ،ثً ٌٓ ٠ض٠ذ٘ب رٌه ئال اشزؼبال ،ثّمذاس ِب رغبُ٘ ٘زٖ األعبٌ١ت ف ٟرأو١ذ اٌٛالغ اٌز٠ ٞض١ش صبئشح اٌشؼٛة اٌ َٛ١ف ٟوً ِىبْ٠ٚ ،ذفؼٙب ٌالٔزفبع ػٍ ٝؽىبِٙبٚ ،ع٘ٛشٖ ؽىُ إٌبط ثبٌمٛح ٚاٌمٙشٚ ،اؽزمبس آسائٚ ،ُٙرغفٗ١ خ١بسارٚ ،ُٙاٌزؼؾ١خ ثىشاِزٚ ،ُٙاالعزٙزبس ثٛعٛدُ٘. ٌ١ظ اٌغٛسٚ ُ٘ ْٛ٠ؽذُ٘ اٌزٌ ٓ٠فذ عّٛد إٌظبَ ٚطّ ُّٗ أٔظبسُ٘ ٌُٚ ،رمزظش اٌّمبالد ٚاٌزؼٍ١مبد إٌمذ٠خ ػٍ ٝاٌغٛسٚ ،ٓ١٠ئّٔب أطجؾذ ،أوضش ،شبغال سئ١غ١ب
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ٌىزبة ِٚضمفِٚ ٓ١فىش ٓ٠ػشثب وبٔٛا ٚال ٠ضاٌ٠ ْٛؼزجش ْٚأٔفغ ُٙؽٍفبء أ ٚأطذلبء ٌٍٕظبَ . ٠ ٌُٚزشدد ٘إالء ف ٟرزو١ش اٌّغإ ٓ١ٌٚاٌغٛس ٓ١٠ثأْ اٌّٛالف اٌخبسع١خ اٌؾّ١ذح ال ٕ٠جغ ٟأْ رى ْٛثذ٠ال ٌالػزشاف ثؾمٛق اٌشؼت اٌغٛسٚ ٞؽش٠برٗٚ ،أْ رمذ٠شُ٘ ٌغ١بعبد إٌظبَ اٌغٛس ٞاٌخبسع١خٚ ،ؽشط ُٙػٍٙ١ب ٚػٍّ٘ ،ٗ١ب اٌٍزاْ ٠ذفؼبٔ ُٙئٌٝ رؾز٠ش اٌّغإِ ِٓ ٓ١ٌٚخبؽش ٘زٖ اٌغ١بعخ ٕ٠ٚبشذ ٗٔٚاٌم١بَ ثاطالؽبد ع١بع١خ عش٠ؼخ ٚفٛس٠خ رٍزمِ ٟغ آِبي اٌشؼت اٌغٛسٚ ٞرشد ػٍ ٝرطٍؼبرٗ اٌّششٚػخ ،لجً فٛاد األٚاْ. وّب ٘ٚ ٛاػؼ٠ ٌُ ،ذسن اٌمبدح اٌغٛس ْٛ٠أْ شؼج ُٙلذ رغ١ش رّبِب ،ف ٟأر ْٛاٌضٛسح اٌّغزّشح اٌز٠ ٟؼ١شٙب ثىً عٛاسؽٗ ػجش اٌمٕٛاد اٌزٍفض٠خ٠ٚ ،شبسن فٙ١ب عبػخ عبػخ، ؽز ٛ٘ٚ ٝلبثغ ف ٟثٛ١رٗ أ ٚفِ ٟمبػذٖ اٌذساع١خ . وّب أٔ٠ ٌُ ُٙذسوٛا أْ اٌؼبٌُ ٔفغٗ لذ رغ١ش ثفؼً اٌضٛسح اٌؼشث١خ رارٙبٚ ،رغ١شد ِؼٗ أ٠ؼب اٌغبِؼخ اٌؼشث١خ ،وّب أثشص رٌه اٌّضبي اٌٍ١ج٠ ٌُٚ .ٟؼذ أؽذ ٠مجً اٌِ َٛ١شب٘ذ اٌؾشة اٌز٠ ٟشٕٙب ِغإٚي أ ٚصػ ُ١ع١بع ٟػٍ ٝشؼجٗ ٌّغشد ؽّٛؽٗ ف ٟاٌجمبء فٟ اٌغٍطخ أ ٚؽّب٠خ ثؼغ االِز١بصاد . ٌٚمذ فبد اٌٛلذ اٌز ٞوبٔذ ع١بدح اٌذٌٚخ ف ٗ١رؼٕ ٟؽك أ ٞؽبوُ أٔ ٚظبَ ؽىُ ِّٙ-ب وبْ أطٍٗ ِٚظذس ششػ١زٗ -ف ٟأْ ٠غزفشد ثشؼجٗ ٠ٚفشع ػٍ ٗ١اإلرػبْ . ٠ ٌُٚؼذ ِٓ اٌّّىٓ ٌٍشأ ٞاٌؼبَ اٌؼبٌّ ،ٟفٔ ٟظبَ اٌؼٌّٛخ اٌشا٘ٓ ٚاٌزٛاطً اٌّجبشش ػجش ٚعبئً اإلػالَ ،أْ رزٕىش ؽىِٛبرٗ ٌٛاعت اٌزؼبِٓ ِغ اٌغّبػبد ٚاٌشؼٛة اٌّؼشػخ ٌّخبؽش اإلثبدح ٚاالعزؼجبد ،أ ٚأْ رغزٙزش ثّظبدسح ئسادرٙب ِٓ لجً عّبػبد خبسعخ ػٍ ٝاٌؼشف اٌذٚ ٌٟٚاٌمبٔ ،ْٛعٛاء اػزّذد ف ٟئخؼبع شؼٛثٙب ػٍ ٝاٌمٛح اٌؼغىش٠خ إٌظبِ١خ أ ٚاألعٙضح األِٕ١خ ِٓٚ ،ثبة أ ٌٝٚػٍ ٝػظبثبد اٌّشرضلخ ٚأِضبٌ.ُٙ ِّٙب رأخش اٌٛلذ ،ال ٠غزط١غ ٔظبَ ِزىٍظ ٠شعغ ّٔٛرعٗ ئٌ ٝؽمجخ عبثمخ وض١شا ػٍٝ صٛساد اٌزؾشس ٚاٌذّ٠مشاؽ١خ ٚاالٔزفبػبد اٌشؼج١خ اٌؼشث١خ ،أْ ٠غزّش ٌ.مذ أطجؼ أصشا ِٓ آصبس ِب لجً اٌزبس٠خ ..ربس٠خ اٌؾش٠خ اٌغذ٠ذ اٌز٠ ٞؾشن اٌشؼٛة ٍّٙٙ٠ٚب. ٚاٌغٛس١ٌ ْٛ٠غٛا ألً عذاسح ِٓ اٌشؼٛة األخش١ٌٚ ،ٜغٛا أشجبٖ سعبي ،أّٔ ٚطب خبطب ِٓ اٌشؼٛة اٌز ٟال رؼٕٙ١ب اٌىشاِخ ٚال رؼشف ِؼٕ ٝاٌؾش٠خ٠ ٌٓٚ ،مجٍٛا أْ ٠ىٛٔٛا أٔظبف ِٛاؽِٕٚ .ٓ١ب ٕ٠شذِ ٛ٘ ٗٔٚب رزّزغ ثٗ عّ١غ شؼٛة اٌؼبٌُ اٌَٛ١ ٚرٕشذٖ أ٠ؼب :ؽىُ لبئُ ػٍ ٝاٌّشبسوخ ٚاالػزشاف ثأٍ٘١خ اٌشؼٛة ٚؽمٛلٙب ٚؽش٠برٙب األعبع١خٚ ،اٌزخٍض ِٓ ػغف اٌّخبثشاد ٚرغٍطٙب اٌجغ١غ ػٍ ٝؽ١بح إٌبط ِٚظبدسح أؽالِٚ ُٙآِبٌ١ٌٚ .ُٙظ ف٘ ٟزا أِ ٞطٍت اعزضٕبئ ٟأ ٚرؼغ١ض ..ٞثبٌؼىظ ئٔٗ اٌؼٛدح ئٌ ٝاٌؾبٌخ اٌطج١ؼ١خ ،أ ٞاٌغٍّ١خ .
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ٌىٓ ئرا ٌُ ٠ىٓ ِٓ اٌّّىٓ اٌّؾبفظخ ػٍٔ ٝظبَ ٠شعغ فّٛٔ ٟرعٗ ئٌ ٝػظش اٌؾشة اٌجبسدح ،فٍ١ظ ٕ٘بن ِب ّٕ٠غ أطؾبثٗ أ ٚاٌز ٓ٠إِٓٛا ثٗ ِٓ أْ ٠غٕجٛا أٔفغِ ُٙظ١شا شجٙ١ب ثّظ١ش اٌخبسط ػٍ ٝاٌمبٔ ْٛاٌز ٞرؾٛي ئٌ ٗ١اٌمزاف- ٟاٌضػ ُ١اٌٍّ -ُٙثؼذِب غبِش ثشٓ اٌؾشة ػٍ ٝشؼجٗ ٚأساد أْ ٠فشع ٔفغٗ ػٍ ٗ١ثبٌمٛحٚ ،ال ؽز ٝثّظ١ش ثٓ ػٍِٚ ٟجبسن اٌٍز ٓ٠اػطشا ئٌ ٝاالٔغالي أ ٚاٌزغًٍ خٛفب ِٓ اٌغؼجخ اٌشؼج١خ . ٚاٌغج ً١ئٌ ٝرٌه ٌ١ظ ثبألِش اٌظؼت ٚاٌخط١ش ..ئٔٗ ثجغبؽخ ِاللبح ِطبِؼ شؼٛثُٙ ٚرطٍؼبرٙب اإلٔغبٔ١خ اٌطج١ؼ١خٚ ،اٌزغشؤ ػٍ ٝئػالٔٙب شؼٛثب ؽشحٚ ،االػزشاف ثأٍ٘١زٙب ف ٟؽىُ ٔفغٙب ٚاخز١بس ِّضٍٙ١ب ثؾش٠خٚ ،رغ ً١ٙأزمبٌٙب اٌؾزّٔ ٟؾ ٛاٌذّ٠مشاؽ١خ، ٚاٌّغبّ٘خ ف ٟرخف١غ رىبٌ١ف ٘زا االٔزمبي اٌّبد٠خ ٚاٌّؼٕ٠ٛخ . ٚال أػزمذ أْ وض١شا ِٓ اٌمبدح اٌغ١بع- ٓ١١ثّٓ فِ ُٙ١غإ ٌْٛٚوجبس ف ٟأعٙضح األِٓ- ِٓ اٌز ٓ٠أر١ؼ ٌِ ٟمبثٍز ُٙثّٕبعجخ اٌؼذ٠ذ ِٓ اٌزؾم١مبد اٌز٠ ٟشبسوٕ ٟفٙ١ب أغٍت ػٕبطش إٌخجخ اٌضمبف١خ ،غ١ش لبدس ٓ٠ػٍِ ٝضً ٘زا اٌخ١بس ،أ ٚغ١ش آث ٓ١ٙثّغزمجً شؼٛثٚ ُٙساغج ٓ١ف ٟرغٕ١ت ثالدُ٘ ِخبؽش اٌؼٕف ٚاٌؾشٚة اٌذاخٍ١خٚ ِٓٚ ،سائّٙب اؽزّبي االٔضالق ٔؾ ٛاٌزذخالد األعٕج١خ اٌمبثؼخ ٚساء اٌجبة. اٌغض٠شح -0255/3/02 ،إٌمذ االعزّبػ :ٟثش٘بْ غٍ.ْٛ١
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Perspectives Tunisie : Réflexions sur une révolution Que nous apprend la transition de la dictature vers la démocratie ? Faten Karoui-Bouchoucha Résumé: Après le 14 janvier 2011, le peuple tunisien commence son combat contre toutes les formes de servitude, enracinées dans les différentes institutions sociales, politiques et économiques afin d’accéder à la démocratie. Toutefois, la voie d’accès à celle-ci semble très ardue. En effet, plusieurs obstacles s’opposent à la volonté de notre peuple pour décider de son sort. D’où ce problème : de quelle puissance disposons-nous effectivement en ce moment délicat pour vaincre toutes les forces de résistances qui entravent la voie vers la démocratie ? Et pouvons-nous réellement parvenir à nous libérer de l’attitude dictatoriale qui s’affirme encore d’une manière assez « puissante » à travers toutes les formes de dogmatisme dans tous les domaines, pour élaborer d’une manière libre et rationnelle le projet d’une vie humaine fondée sur des principes démocratiques ?
Mots-clés : Révolution tunisienne, démocratie, société civile, régimes politiques…
Docteur en philosophie de l’Université de Tunis. Auteur de : Spinoza et la question de la puissance. Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010.
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i l’on part de l’idée selon laquelle c’est grâce à la maturité de notre conscience collective que nous devons ce changement radical dans notre attitude à l’égard de l’ancien régime dictatorial qui nous a trop longtemps terrifiés, on peut établir que la révolution tunisienne révèle la manière suivant laquelle « l’impuissance » de la masse devient puissance alors que celle du despote devient impuissance. Il convient en effet de se demander : Quelle est la vraie puissance ? Est-ce le pouvoir dont dispose l’Etat pour s’imposer par la force à ses sujets, ou est-ce plutôt le pouvoir dont dispose un peuple pour imposer sa volonté d’être gouverné comme il le souhaite ? Evidemment, il s’agit de deux formes de puissances qui entrent dans un rapport de force, mais qui selon les circonstances, chacune peut l’emporter sur l’autre. Aujourd’hui c’est la volonté de notre peuple qui l’emporte sur la force de l’Etat despotique. Ceci nous incite à remettre en question le sens de puissance et d’impuissance pour affirmer que la puissance qui se révèle à travers la violence est en fait impuissance. Et que la vraie puissance se révèle à travers l’affirmation du pouvoir d’être et d’agir.1 Ce qui le confirme c’est que l’Etat qui était tout puissant révèle dans cette révolution en recourant à la violence son impuissance, alors que le peuple dont la seule arme dont il dispose est sa volonté d’arracher ses droits humains qui émane d’une puissance psychologique remarquable, apparaît tout puissant. Assurément, la révolution elle-même n’aurait jamais pu voir le jour s’il n’y avait pas autant de gens cultivés qui ont pu vaincre la peur et prendre leur courage à deux mains pour affirmer ensemble leur puissance d’agir afin de mettre fin à l’autorité du despote : « dégage ». C’est ce renversement de rapport de force qui mérite à nos yeux d’être souligné parce qu’il confère à la révolution tunisienne toute son originalité. A ce propos, Je ne résiste pas au plaisir de citer ce texte: « Ce qui fascine dans cette révolution arabe, avec ce printemps des peuples moyen-orientaux, ce soulèvement des opinions publiques, c’est ce qui la rend profondément originale : sa dimension historique ne figure ni dans l’histoire ni dans le souvenir des histoires. Si nous ne
Dans la troisième démonstration de la proposition11, Spinoza définit la puissance comme suit : « pouvoir exister est puissance » et ce à l’opposition de l’impuissance définie ainsi : « ne pas pouvoir exister est impuissance. » Si l’on part de ce principe ne convient-il pas de se demander : qui est le plus puissant : le despote ou le peuple ? 1
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parlons pour le moment que de la Tunisie et de l’Egypte, ce sont les innovations et non les répétitions qui éblouissent notre regard. »2 Il est donc évident que nous devons prendre en considération la puissance du peuple dans la détermination de son avenir. Néanmoins, cette puissance s’affronte concrètement à une autre puissance de résistance qu’elle soit interne ou externe qui s’oppose à elle. Nous savons en effet à quelle profondeur de notre conscience collective s’enracine les conséquences du régime totalitaire telles que le dogmatisme, l’égoïsme, le repli sur soi et la violence… C’est pourquoi nous devons mener d’abord un combat contre nous-mêmes et contre les ennemis extérieurs de la révolution pour vaincre toutes les forces irrationnelles3 qui pourraient nous empêcher de passer du totalitarisme à la démocratie. Certes, Il est difficile après 23 ans de vie sous le règne d’un régime totalitaire de dépasser les différents obstacles qui s’opposent à notre accès à la démocratie. C’est d’ailleurs ce que révèle la phase actuelle dans laquelle nous nous trouvons, une phase de crise totale où on se trouve devant de multiples problèmes dans tous les domaines (social, politique, économique et même spirituel) qui doivent être résolus progressivement mais auxquels le peuple, trop longtemps réprimé, réclame des solutions immédiates. Il est donc urgent d’élaborer une stratégie pour résoudre d’abord ces problèmes et pour déterminer les conditions nécessaires du passage du totalitarisme à la démocratie. Certes, les hommes sérieux et compétents de ce pays qui s’attachent à mener à bien cette révolution sont en place pour faire face à ces multiples problèmes et peuvent souvent nous rassurer. Néanmoins, le problème demeure de savoir : Si en ce moment à nos yeux la démocratie est considérée comme étant le meilleur régime, il convient de chercher quel type de démocratie peut convenir à cette étape de notre histoire à la conjoncture sociale économique et politique de notre société ? Cette question est d’autant plus justifiée qu’on trouve tout au long de l’histoire plusieurs formes de démocraties parmi lesquelles on trouve des formes saines et d’autres corrompues. Certaines « démocraties » sont, en effet, des régimes totalitaires masqués.
Le nouvel observateur, L’ambition démocratique, Jean Daniel, n°2431/3au 9février, p.16. 3 Il s’agit de toutes ces passions tristes telles que le mépris de ceux qui sont différents de nous, l’envie, la haine, la jalousie, etc… qui nous nous empêchent de vivre en accord avec nous-mêmes et avec les autres » 2
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Or malgré la multiplicité de ses formes, la démocratie reste en son essence même « le gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple, et pour le peuple. » Dans cette formule les prépositions « du », « par » et « pour », qui déterminent la relation entre le peuple et le pouvoir mettent au clair les principes fondamentaux sur lesquels elle se fonde à savoir le règne de la loi, un gouvernement légal reconnaissant les "droits de l’homme" (qui ne sont autre que la reconnaissance et le respect de l’individu). C’est pourquoi Spinoza déjà dès le 17ème siècle a pris le soin de souligner le fait qu’on peut concevoir divers genres de démocratie ; et que le meilleur régime est celui où « ceux qui sont régis par les seules lois du pays, ne sont point sous la domination d’un autre, et vivent honorablement, possèdent le droit de suffrage dans l’Assemblée suprême et ont accès aux charges publiques. » 4 Or, aujourd’hui le problème des régimes politiques ne se pose plus en termes de : quel est le meilleur régime démocratique ? Mais plutôt en ces termes : Jusqu’à quel point un régime démocratique pourrait se maintenir en tant que tel ? Par cette question on aperçoit que le problème qui s’impose à nous est celui de l’écart entre ce que nous concevons comme « meilleur » et ce que nous parvenons à mettre en œuvre. Le problème est donc celui de l’aliénation politique. Ricœur écrit à ce propos à juste titre : « il ya une aliénation en politique spécifique, parce que le politique est autonome (…) le nœud du problème est que si l’Etat est raisonnable en intention, il avance à travers l’histoire à coup de décisions ».5 Ce que nous devons alors déduire par là que si grâce à la révolution nous sommes réveillés de notre sommeil dogmatique, nous serons en mesure de distinguer une démocratie saine de celle qui est corrompue, et ce par l’exercice d’une pensée rationnelle et critique, et par conséquent d’évaluer à chaque étape de notre expérience démocratique le fonctionnement de nos institutions. C’est pourquoi aujourd’hui, la démocratie ne se présente pas à nous comme un idéal vers lequel nous tendons sans pouvoir l’atteindre, mais c’est un projet dont la réalisation est possible grâce à l’élaboration d’une stratégie libératrice de toutes les formes de servitude. Il ne s’agit donc plus pour nous de rêver mais de reconstruire sur de nouvelles bases une forme de vie libre. Cette reconstruction s’opère par étapes.
4 5
Spinoza, Traité politique, chap. XI , trad. de S. Zac, Paris, Vrin , 1968. Paul Ricœur, Histoire et vérité, le paradoxe politique, II , Tunis, éd, Cérés, 1995 ,p.298.
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En ce moment, nous sommes dans la première étape où il s’agit de commencer par la détermination des conditions de possibilité d’une vie démocratique à savoir les conditions sociales, politiques et économiques. Soyons donc patients, et rappelons-nous que si nous voulons nous pouvons. F.K.B.
Bibliographie •Aristote, Le politique, traduction par J.Tricot, Paris, Vrin, 1970. • BODEI (R), Géométrie des passions, Peur, espoir, bonheur : de la philosophie à l’usage politique, Paris PUF 1997. •Jean-Claude Guillebaud, l’Homme révolté, le nouvel observateur, n°2413 /3-9 février2011. • Spinoza, Traité politique, traduction et notes par Appuhn (Charles), Paris, Garnier Flammarion, 1954. • Spinoza, Traité politique, traduction par Moreau (Pierre-François), Paris, Ed Réplique, 1979. • Spinoza, l’Éthique, traduction et notes par Caillois (Roland), Paris, Gallimard, 1954. •Paul Ricoeur, histoire et vérité, Tunis, éd Cérés, 1995 . •Raymond Aron, Démocratie et totalitarisme, Paris, Gallimard, 1965.
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Perspectives Economic Perspective of Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Technology Transfer and Rural Water Use in Darfur Professor Dr. Issam A.W. Mohamedď&#x201A;§ Abstract: There are growing increases in Darfur population's water demand in recent years due to rapid demographic expansions that led to increased consumption per capita associated with improved standards of living and water-related commodity production, agriculture and service industries. In addition to this, the problem of water stress which is attributable to increased per capita demand over fixed levels of supply and its concomitant land desiccation resulting from activities such as deforestation and overgrazing. Water scarcity continues in arid and semi-arid areas due to precursory climatic conditions of aridity and droughts. Together these have led to acute water scarcity and consequently, a shortfall in the amount of water available for human use. The current paper discusses issues of economic and sustainable utilization in Kutum area, Northern Darfur region using field data and economic model. Key-words: Darfur, technology transfer, water supply...
Introduction
S
harp increases in Darfur population's water demand in recent times have been due to rapid population growth, an increased consumption per capita associated with improved standards of living, and expansion in water-related commodity production, agriculture and service industries (United Nations, 1976). In addition to this human problem of water stress which is attributable to increased per capita demand over fixed levels of water supply and its concomitant land desiccation resulting from activities such as deforestation and ď&#x201A;§
Professor of Economics, Alneelain University, Khartoum-Sudan. P.O. Box 12910-11111. issamawmohamed@yahoo.com
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overgrazing, there has been continued water scarcity in arid and semiarid areas (ASA) due to precursory climatic conditions of aridity and droughts. Together these have led to acute water scarcity and consequently, a shortfall in the amount of water available for human use (Falkenmark et al., 1989; Clarke, 1993). There is growing evidence of a decline in water availability in northern Sudan due to rainfall seasonality and variability (Woo and Tarhule, 1994; Hess, et al, 1995). At the same time, the competition for water by human activities is exerting tremendous pressure on the limited water resources and the environment (Kimmage, 1991; Dabi and Anderson, 1998a). The allocation of the water to these competing uses has been based entirely on traditional practice following indigenous knowledge systems. When inefficient decisions are taken, severe shortages may occur for some if not all the uses with inevitable adverse repercussions. This, in combination with the quest to increase food production, has contributed to the recent drive for western technology in the form of water pumps, tube wells, boreholes and dams to augment water supply particularly for irrigated agriculture (Kimmage, 1991). However, these innovations have been met with further complications and concomitant problems. Over the past five decades, technology and growth have increased the total water use in the world up to four times. This has been achieved through the construction of dams, reservoirs and conveyance structures that made up to 44 percent of the world's reliable runoff water resources accessible to man. Also, through various means of water harvesting, an increased utilization of rainwater has been made possible. However, of all the water available, the challenge is to allocate it to the best possible use in order to maximize the benefits, particularly for people living in areas prone to droughts (Clarke, 1993). Essentially, the challenge is to promote a strategy which aims at proper management of the demand for water and not a continued supply-oriented management. The combined effects of complex environmental (climatic) conditions and human activities now threatening and regions have necessitated the development of methods for investigating the problem from a multi-disciplinary perspective and on a micro-scale. This will facilitate better management of water resources and enhance sustainability in the development process. This bottom-up approach will ensure a better understanding of the problem as experienced by the affected people rather than assumed from a larger perspective.
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Part of the study seeks to account for the total water used in the economy of Kutum village in Northern Sudan. Also it is important to aim at the understanding the indigenous knowledge systems regarding water scarcity and strategies aimed at mitigating the problem to ensure continued production from one season to another. It adopts a bottom-up approach and examines four issues: (i) strategies adapted for water procurement, sourcing and withdrawal, vis-Ă -vis seasonal fluctuations, to ensure long term availability and use; (ii) strategies at the household, activity and farm levels for ensuring safe delivery (conveyance and distribution) of water to final demand, through the production system and minimizing losses; (iii) technologies available for water processing (storage, retrieval, use, conservation), considering the high production requirement and excessive evaporative demand by the economy and environment respectively; and (iv) strategies employed during use (production) in order to maximize the utility of water in terms of reuse, recycling or reduction in quantity used. The use of introduced technologies for the same purposes will also be considered and compared with indigenous ones. We also report the findings of field observations and measurements made in this regard. Information generated from this study will be used in conjunction with results of an extended inputoutput model to address various policy options or water management strategies. Conceptual Perspectives Indigenous knowledge systems are defined in the context of innovation, technical knowledge, associated social organization and decisionmaking processes (Brokensha et al., 1980; Kidd and PhillipsHoward, 1992). These four basic components of knowledge systems are based on `factual knowledge' that relate to
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concepts, prepositions, symbols or memory derived through human perception, and 'procedural knowledge' that follow the rules of logic and empiricism. Here, technical knowledge is considered as factual; innovation as procedural; social organization as both factual and procedural; and decision-making as procedural. Together, these components enable the utilization of the knowledge systems that affect decision-making and cause a pattern of behavior. The pattern of behavior determines the use of resources. Incorporating indigenous knowledge systems in rural studies is by targeting the practical realization of a viable development policy (Kidd and PhillipsHoward, 1992). Technology is defined as the skills, knowledge, and procedures used in the provision of goods and services for any given society (Hope., 1996). It is seen as a mode of production that carries within it economic, social, cultural and cognitive structural codes that differ between societies (Galtung, 1978 and Vanderburg 1986). Technology transfer involves the two-way relationship of sending and receiving technology primarily between and among firms, industries and
governments (Hope, 1996). The transfer of technology (TOT) paradigm is a mutually supported set of concepts, analyses, methods, and behavior in which western-trained scientists generate technologies on research stations and in laboratories, to be transferred through extension services to farmers (Chambers, et al., 1989; Gladden and Phillips-Howard, 1992). Therefore the transfer of Western technology to the less developed countries (LDCs) is seen as a structural invasion, fragmented and perceived poorly because of the difference in structures (Galtung, 1978; Vanderburg, 1986). Appropriate technology is a term used to describe both a method and a movement. As a method it is considered to be the appropriate application of scientific knowledge to development, while the movement is believed to have started in the 1960s and is now active globally (Kerr, 1989). Appropriate technology is based on interactive innovation where an interactive process occurs, and its techniques or tools are transformed by incorporation into the recipient culture (Pacey, 1983). Idealistically, appropriate technology uses production methods that are less damaging to the environment of communities than
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previously used methods, consume less energy and fewer resources, and recycles wastes or handles them more acceptably (Hope Sr., 1996). The notion of `appropriate technology' or 'intermediate technology' has been met with criticisms based on a neo-colonial connotation of superior goods for the developed nations and inferior ones for the third world or LDCs (Schumacher, 1991). But the fact is that LDCs need access to technologies which are appropriate to their stage of development, rather than 'state-of-the-art' technologies imported from the developed world. Needed are technologies that build on the structures of existing traditional (indigenous) technologies and take advantage of those from developed countries. Such 'intermediate' technologies would be immensely more practical and productive than the indigenous ones but more affordable and accessible than the sophisticated, highly capitalintensive technologies of the West (Schumacher, I991). Less developed countries in ASA need technologies that are sustainable, those that are acceptable, affordable, usable, and manageable by the users. Such technologies also consider the precariousness of environmental and economic conditions they face. Thus, the idea of appropriate technology must be looked at in terms of demand with basic needs as goals and supply using the desired production process (Hope Sr., 1996). This is only achievable if the needs and aspirations of the people, their capabilities, and deficiencies are known. An understanding of indigenous technical knowledge systems is therefore paramount. In Africa, as elsewhere, there is an increasing interest in traditional systems of agriculture and indigenous technical knowledge (Chambers, 1983; Richards, 1985; Adams, 1985; Gladden and Phillips-Howard, 1992). Most this interest emanated from the fact that the large-scale dam projects meant to replace the age long small-scale initiatives and to boost agricultural production and water supply in different parts of Africa, especially Sudan, have not performed to expectation (Mons, 1987; 1989; Mitchell, 1990; 1994; Salau 1990). Such introduced `solutions' only outperform the indigenous initiatives in certain favored situations. Moreover, the formal irrigation schemes were very expensive in terms of construction costs, external management, and infrastructure (Mons, 1987; 1989). Other problems have been noted. Priorities were distorted as emphasis was placed on commercial crops to the detriment of food crops. And the large dams cut off the downstream seasonal flood affecting traditional practices (Scudder, 1980) or Wadi cultivation in parts of Sudan (Turner, 1985; 1986; Adams, 1986; Adams and Carter, 1987; Mods, 1989; Kimmage, 1991; Kimmage and Adams, 1990; 1992). In addition, there are the environmental and human problems associated with the water development projects (Biswas, 1978; Scudder, 1989; Mitchell, 1990; 1994; Salau, 1990).
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The World Bank-sponsored work undertaken by Briscoe and deFerrartti (1988) is one major example of the use and performances of introduced technologies for water supply in rural community of developing countries. They observed that many water improvement projects have proved to be neither sustainable nor replicable. The gains of the new water supply systems were eroded because of the widespread failure attributed to inadequate maintenance. Such failure was more because of the topdown approaches in the design of systems and maintenance of facilities such as hand-pumps and boreholes or pipe connections, with central governments and donor agencies taking dominant roles, rather than the complexity of the technology. Furthermore, the improved systems often did not meet local expectations local institutional realities were not taken into account, while government support was very erratic. Moreover, the nonchalant attitude of the people toward water supply schemes, regarding such projects as governmental provisions and for which they need take no responsibility is pernicious. Interestingly, Briscoe and deFerranti (1988) advocated for a communitybased (bottom-up) approach to water development, in which communities develop primarily through self-help activities. Such an approach allows users to decide on the type of improvement to be made, pay for most of the costs (usually by providing the required labor), and take responsibility for maintaining the facilities they have chosen and implemented. While government and external donors create the enabling environment, supplemented with technical and training support, and provide materials. Gladden and Phillips-Howard (1992) acknowledged that resource-poor farmers in LDCs posses active and useful indigenous knowledge systems including experimentation, technical knowledge, social organization and decision-making systems as noted by Warren et al. (1989). However, they suggested a combination of transfer of technology and farmer first paradigms. These permit mutual learning and effective `co-research' and lead toward well-facilitated, participatory action programs. Again, in our
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opinion, this is parallel to the idea of appropriate technology which Smith et al (1994) argued for in that it contributed to the intensification of agriculture more significantly than population and market driven forces. Data Collection The case study village for this study is Kutum in semi-arid zone of Western Sudan. Population growth has been largely due to immigration more recently due to natural increases. Islam is the sole religion with Arabic (Koranic teaching) as the basic form of education. Decisionmaking is mostly based on a hierarchy of community leadership and religious beliefs. As a typical village with similar environmental characteristics and human activities to the rest of the region, the prevailing conditions are similar to others in the region. As indicated in the introduction, drought conditions and water scarcity are prevalent; rainfall is limited to four months of the year; stream flow is seasonal; and groundwater which serves as the major source of water is declining. The extensive sedimentary Chad Formation, recharged by seasonal surface flow, is the main source of the groundwater. The undulating terrain is covered mostly by Sudan savanna-type vegetation, basically patchy grasses and scrub as well as scattered acacia and baobab tree species. These provide wild animals and fruits for their consumption and sale, leafs and pasture for their domestic animals; and wood for fuel and construction. Wood extracted from the bushes is also sold as export commodities at neighboring markets.
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The major economic activity in the village is rain fed agriculture by sedentary farmers who grow staple crops mostly at subsistence level. All households are involved in rain fed agriculture but the activity is predominated by the more settled Zhagawa, Berti, Mahria and Ziadia groups. Animal husbandry of camels, sheep, goats and poultry is the next most widespread activity the households participate. Irrigated cultivation of vegetables and grains is also practiced. Irrigation is limited to a short period of the year and few locations accessible to surface and groundwater sources called Wadis that bypass the village. Other ethnic groups are also involved in animal and vegetation gathering for food, fuel and construction. Other economic activities include rural industrial production, e.g., small-scale manufacturing of goods such as processed food and handicrafts and services traded mostly within the local market by the Hausa and Kanuri groups. The village lacks most urban facilities such as piped water and electricity. Turner (1985:18) defined Wadi as land seasonally flooded or waterlogged. In other words, low land seasonally inundated due to water intrusion. Assistance is limited forcing the people to depend on their traditional heritage and environmental resources. Therefore, water procurement, delivery and processing for the activities enumerated above rely on traditional initiatives with few modern methods. This has made water use and conservation a problem in the area. In a previous work (Dabi and Anderson, 1998b), we reported the use of water for commodity production in this village. The agricultural sector consumes more than 60% of the groundwater, basically for irrigation and animal watering. And later (Dabi and Anderson, 1998c) we developed and applied a product-by-industry economic-ecological model (CLEEM) which accounts for the direct and indirect use of groundwater in the village. This provides the major analytical tool for the research. This analytical procedure is ideal for depicting water use under normal circumstances. It incorporates input-output relations defined under normal rainfall conditions. However, it is expected that during drought periods (dry spells) there will be severe water shortage and people are bound to develop alternative measures for coping with the situation.
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They may develop new water sources and storage systems, new methods of water use, and new water saving strategies. Such strategies are revealed through field monitoring of indigenous knowledge systems and technologies reported here. Cases of introduced, transferred technologies and strategies for future development appropriate technologies are also considered. Data required for this research were collected during two field seasons (wet and dry) in the study village. Most of the data required were gathered during the dry season. The field exercises targeted activities undertaken during this dry period. Resultant changes in water use and their effects on the economy and environment were noted. Key informants, including the village head, ward or tribal group heads, major farmers and school teachers, were consulted to ascertain changes in activities and possibly water use. Field assistants were then selected and trained before actual data collection. Data gathering was based on 10% sample survey of households engaged in industries that exhibited the highest demand for water in an initial study. Therefore, emphasis was placed on the agricultural sector particularly, irrigated agriculture and animal watering. Field observations and measurements were made regarding indigenous knowledge systems and technologies for water demand, use and management, and water shortage coping strategies including: 1. changes in water sources, 2. water use behavior and decision-making process, 3. methods of water procurement (withdrawal or abstraction), 4. methods of water processing (storage, retrieval, use and reuse or conservation), 5. methods (techniques) of water delivery (conveyance and distribution), and 6. Economic and social costs involved. Facilities for water withdrawal and conveyance were noted. And quantities of water Dabi and Anderson (1998b) have indicated a total population of 2,734 people with 424 households engaged in 27 industries and producing more than 100 commodities in Kutum village. The
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agricultural sector especially irrigated agriculture and animal husbandry is the highest consumer of groundwater as it is extracted and conveyed to households and industries determined. Quantities were determined by measuring the volume of containers used for water extraction (withdrawal from wells) and those used for conveyance delivery. For example, households were observed to withdraw between four (4) and 18 liters of water per day for domestic use, and up to 200 liters for other activities like construction or sale by vendors. Quantities of water used by animals were measured by monitoring the number of times animals are watered and the quantity consumed in the process. The average size of containers, usually 4 liters used for hauling water from the wells was determined. This was multiplied by the number of times the water was poured into the animal's drinking container a halfsized barrel or an opened gourd. The result was then divided by the number of animals that drank from it. Results from these measurements were similar to estimates given. The quantity of water extracted for irrigation was determined from two perspectives. First, the traditional methods of delivering water from the source to the crops whereby the number of calabashes of water delivered to the cropped area are counted. Second, the introduced form of technology in which the rate of pumping and quantity of water released is multiplied by the duration of irrigation, using 2-3 horse power engines water pumps. These quantities were calculated for a week and multiplied by the number of weeks the crops were irrigated. Irrigation and animal watering were done in situ, that is at location of the shallow wells. Data were collected on a daily basis from morning to late evening by monitoring the number of times individuals visited the wells. The monitoring was spread over the sampled industries and households during the period of the survey. Indigenous Water Management The various indigenous equipment or facilities used for water procurement, delivery. Techniques for water procurement, sourcing and withdrawal, and those for delivery conveyance and distribution, are labor intensive, time consuming and perhaps inconvenient. Men are responsible for sourcing as digging wells. This requires a lot of energy and expertise. Water withdrawal, fetching or extraction, does not follow gender lines and is performed by men, women and children, male and female. The same goes for water delivery, but adults convey larger quantities of water and perform more of the skilled labor. Children carry smaller containers and assist with the menial jobs at home and at the production unit. The nature, size and capacity of facilities for water processing, storage, retrieval and use/reuse in households and most other industries are
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rather small. Quantity of water stored in these containers is equally small, less than 100 liters. Thus, the need for more effort and time investment for water procurement emerges. The construction or building industry uses larger containers up to 200 liters for water storage, although most of it or even more can be used in a day. Only irrigation and animal watering use water at location of shallow wells, as indicated earlier. Water contained or stored in these wells depends on recharge and withdrawal rates. At the peak of the dry season, the recharge rate is minimal but withdrawal rates very high. All these indicate that water management and conservation are in jeopardy.
Table 1. Indigenous Techniques for Water Procurement Activity Digging
Item Digger Shovel Iron bar Bucket Withdrwal Habil Dalow
Description and Use Metallic tool for digging with sharp end Flat metallic blade for shoving dug soil Heavy spear bar with sharp end Metallic container to collect and remove soil Rope for drawing water from the well Rubber or plastic container to withdraw water
These observations show that local techniques for water extraction, storage, retrieval and delivery in the village are very simple capital extensive but manually operated labor intensive and perhaps sustainable because they are based on local materials and initiatives thereby reducing purchase and maintenance costs. But there are no specialized skills for rainwater harvesting and farming to take advantage of the `excess' rainfall and runoff water stored in ponds and stream at the end of the rainy season. This may be attributed to their lack of interest in developing these measures as confirmed by the comments, made by some of the key informants. For example, water from the mudconstructed roofs gets contaminated with sand, thatched roofs do not yield sufficient water for us to bother with and water in ponds does not look good for use. However, these sources of water could be developed as discussed later. The water can be stored and retrieved for use during periods of scarcity. The annual scheduling of activities tends to depend on water and labor availability. Generally, activities start at the end of the dry season in agricultural societies such as this. Just before the rains in June, land is prepared (clearance and tillage), to at the new planting season for rain fed crops. All other activities (including animal husbandry, the rural industry, trade, and services) except for irrigated agriculture also take place during the rainy season. Activities undertaken at this period rely on direct
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rainfall, stream flow and `abundant' water in the village wells and ponds. During the dry season, irrigated agriculture thrives along the Wadis. Other activities with the exception of rain fed farming are intensified at this period. Unfortunately, the only dependable source of water is the shallow wells. Deep groundwater may not be accessible because most of the village (deep) wells are dry and Tube-wells/water pumps broken down. The diagram illustrates the scheduling of activities during the year. These have been spread around in form of a clock. Starting with January at one o'clock and going clockwise with December at twelve, the activities and water availability are located appropriately. The main activities requiring so much groundwater during the dry season are irrigated agriculture, animal rearing and building construction (Dabi and Anderson, 1998b). It is very disheartening to note that all these high water demand activities are concentrated at about the same time of the year during which groundwater from shallow wells is the main source of water. At this period, deep groundwater becomes inaccessible as most of the deep village wells dry up. This arrangement seems to create undue pressure on the limited water sources and increase the potential for conflict among users. However, the daily tinting of water extraction during the water scarce dry seasons is based on a well defined social and cultural organization which allows for the use of shallow wells at different times of the day by the different users. For example, water for domestic and other activities requiring less water, is extracted early in the morning (from about 6.00am) while animal watering is done in the afternoon (starting from 2.00pm), while other high water demand activities like irrigation and construction extract theirs afterwards. Some of the irrigated farms have private shallow wells for use at other times of the day, especially in the morning and late afternoon. In between these schedules, the wells are given 'sufficient' time to recharge. This process has tended to minimize or eliminate any possible conflict between the different users. There are other indigenous knowledge systems used for water conservation by the villagers. For example, at the farm level, farmers do a lot of mulching to reduce the rate of evaporation and to maintain soil moisture. Irrigation activities are usually de-intensified when water becomes inaccessible. Farmers resort to delivering water at a per plant basis rather than pouring water into the whole plot through a channel. From field data, some of which is discussed Dabi and Anderson (1998b), this practice can save at least 15% of irrigation water or up to 2.12% of total groundwater used in the village.
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Animal herders embark on transhumance activities to take advantage of distant watering points and to reduce pressure on existing sources of water around the village. And at the household and industry levels, some form of water reuse is practiced. Normally, people do not pour away water they may have used for washing or cleaning but it is stored to be used again for some other purpose say, wetting fiber or grass for weaving and sand for mending cracked or fallen walls. Such water could even be poured under a plant to add soil moisture for its growth. If all the wastewater generated from household and industry is reused, another 10% of groundwater would be saved, although this may be too ambitious for Kutum village because of technological constraints. The seasonal transfer of livestock to areas of greener pasture is practiced by pastoral nomads in arid and semi-arid areas. The Role of Transferred Technology The nature and type of introduced technology are available in the community. Most, if not all, are for water sourcing and storage for agricultural purposes. A wash borehole is used for extracting deep groundwater with the aid of water pumping machines or hand pumps. There are two types of facilities for water storage in the village: two commercial manufactured water tanks and one ground cistern. The tanks were used to store water extracted from the wash borehole and the ground cistern was meant for a fish pond. None of these contains water now all but seem to have been abandoned. This attests to the argument that local people are nonchalant about facilities provided by government or other external organizations as discussed earlier. This is often the case, when they do not initiate or participate in planning for such facilities. At the household or place of production, facilities like connection pipes and standing pipes/taps are not available for water delivery. Neither are facilities for water storage, except for containers like empty oil barrels and jerry cans that are converted into storage tanks. The most sophisticated introduced technology in this village, as is the case in most parts of northern Sudan, is the water pumping machine. The pumping machines are very efficient facility for water extraction, either from a shallow well or tube-well. It has enabled farmers to increase production and thereby increase their income. This has led to the overwhelming acceptance of the innovation here in Kutum and elsewhere. Detailed differentiation between traditional initiatives of indigenous technology and the use of water pumps transferred technology for irrigation in the village are illustrated. Almost 80% of the irrigation farmers use water pumps on their farms. Although only four of the farmers own the machines, the others lend them to use on their farms. The rest (a little more than 20%) use the traditional method to
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irrigate their crops. However, those who rely entirely on the water pumps have had tremendous disappointments at times due to the sudden breakdown of engines. Farmers have had to abandonee parts or even a whole farm prepared for irrigation farming during the dry period. For example, the farmers had to delay his irrigation activity for the season because his machine broke down. He had to purchase the part required to fix it at centers more than 400 km away because we could not even find it nearer. Even then, the owner would not do it immediately. Asked why he made such a decision, he said if I fix it now, other farmers would want to lend it from me and soon there will be a breakdown again and I may not cultivate any crops this year. Water in the shallow wells were fast declining and reducing the amount available for irrigation. Soon the rains would come and it would be time to prepare other lands for raided crops, thus diverting labor. Another problem associated with water pumps is the loss of water during delivery to the crops. During irrigation, water delivery is usually through small channels (furrows) into a larger farm plot. This process allows excess water loss by infiltration, seepage and evaporation, without reaching the targeted crops. Therefore, more water has to be extracted and delivered before the plants get sufficient moisture for their growth and development. The point to note here is that, although the water pumping machine is very useful in accessing groundwater and making the irrigation process more efficient and rewarding, there are problems associated with it as enumerated above. These problems tend to make the whole irrigation operation using water pumps counterproductive and unsustainable. This is because the cost of engines is prohibitive as they require expensive maintenance because of sometimes total breakdowns and contribute to excessive water demand. This is always met with technological dilemmas, whether to go traditional or rely on introduced technology (machines). Farmers who own water pumps keep complaining about the problems involved with using and maintaining the engines. Many who do not have water pumps keep yearning for theirs, while `skeptics' stick to the traditional methods. Numerous strategies for water procurement, delivery and processing exist especially in and around the ASA, all of which can be enhanced or introduced in this village. Such technologies have been tried and proven useful in areas with similar physical and human characteristics but will be deemed appropriate only when tried and accepted in the village. These include simple, sometimes, complex technologies such as rainwater harvesting and fanning (e.g. in India and Botswana); earth dams, and wind pumps (in the Turkana desert); solar pumps (in Somalia); Ferro-cement tanks (Papua New Guinea) and so forth (Pacey and Cullis, 1986; Kerr, 1989, Lee and Visscher, 1992). Notwithstanding, the appropriate technologies are those that will ensure adequate supply procurement, moderate water use, processing and at the same time convenience in terms of
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maintenance and functionality (delivery) and thus, be sustainable (Mons, 1989). If we consider rainwater harvesting and farming as an example, changes may be required in the roofing style of buildings. Thatched roofs may have to be replaced with corrugated iron sheets (zinc) as seen over a few buildings including the primary school, dispensary and staff quarters. Alternatively, mud roof surfaces may have to be paved with cement or other similar impermeable material. Rainwater incident on these `new' surfaces (roofs) can then be channeled down into ground tanks or cisterns through gutters. The cistern can be made from local material like earthen pots or other larger containers, jerry cans and fabricated metal tanks and the gutters made from local carved wood, bamboo or fabricated metal sheets. Blacksmiths in the village indicated that they can construct some of these materials. The large ponds around the village can be converted into water storage tanks or cisterns during the rainy season for use in the dry period. The sides and floor of the ponds can be straightened and built with brick and cement with some reinforcement, and then plastered into a kind of Ferro-cemented ground cistern similar to the one meant for the fish pond. Some material, such as a plastic sheet or a thin oil layer, can be used to prevent or reduce the excessive evaporation. With this arrangement, water can be secured for use in activities as brick making and building construction which do not require higher quality water. For all of these, local materials can be used except for the cement, plastic and oil and constructed using direct labor by the villagers. These innovations are possible as they have been done in water scarce areas of Zimbabwe, Kenya, Indonesia and Thailand (Pacey and Cullis, 1986). The Darfur state government has proposed building a dam across some wadis. Dam construction is another form of introduced technology for large-scale water supply and irrigation development projects in parts of Northern Sudan. The problems associated with these have been discussed earlier but are perhaps unfamiliar to the people. Thus, the people of Kutum, and the neighboring settlements received the news with great enthusiasm. However, this may not necessarily be a good idea for the village and other users downstream. This is due to the problems
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associated with large-scale dam projects discussed earlier. Rather, simpler strategies for water storage and conservation such as groundwater dams including sub-surface dams and sand-storage dams may be worth considering (Nilsson, 1988). Other conservation methods may include the 3 R water saving strategies of reduction using less water per activity or modifying the irrigation practice/crops to reduce water use, reuse, using already used gray water again for activities requiring low quality and recycle as a long tern attempt to improve the quality of larger volumes of waste water for subsequent use especially for activities requiring water of medium quality). This idea is consistent with the 3R policy approach to waste management (waste recycling, reuse and reduction described by Baetz et al. (1991) and Huang et al. (1994). Moreover, the reuse of waste water for irrigation is very important as it can supply almost all of the nitrogen, most of the phosphorus and potassium, as well as the important micronutrients required by many crops (Bartone, 1991). Nonetheless, a better conservation measure may rest on the rescheduling of activities during the year to correspond with the timing of water availability. Figure 5.3 illustrates some of the suggested strategies for the annual rescheduling of activities in the area. By and large, the diagram is similar to figure 5.2. But rather than congesting the higher water demanding activities when the `only' source of water is the shallow wells, some of the activities are spread to take advantage of the `surplus' rain and surface water during the rainy season. For example, construction activities are rescheduled to commence soon after the rains and before irrigation activities. Although the villagers understand the need to schedule activities more appropriately when water is available, they enumerated a number of problems associated with such an arrangement. For example, one farmer said that if we leave our crops in the farms for too long, animals will intrude and consume everything. But we also have to mend our houses and fences too. So we have to harvest the crops and bring them home first before building. And if we build in the rainy season, the rains will destroy the walls. These constraints are understandable, but labor availability is apparently the main impediment to any kind of adjustment that can be made. Evidently, the rescheduling of activities is achievable if communal effort (participation) is employed in carrying out tasks rather than individualistic production. Groups of four to five people were seen constructing roofs for friends or colleagues who indicated that such effort was meant to save money, time and energy. In the same disposition, larger groups can come together and be involved in different aspects of farm work and construction. Such an arrangement will make more labor available, thereby saving even more effort and time to warrant the rescheduling of activities. Wadi farmers in Sudan have
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demonstrated the value of such communal effort and the possibility of shifting activities to take advantage of the dry season farming period which would otherwise be almost impossible once the rains come (Dabi, 1992). As indicated earlier, decision-making is mostly based on a hierarchy of community leadership and religious beliefs. The village head is at the top of the hierarchy answerable to the local and state governments. These people are vested with other responsibilities including decision making from domestic and household, through the ward back to the community levels in a reverse order. The imam (religious leader) and school teachers also partake in decision-making on religious matters and when prayers are required to invoke rain and making water available. Other bodies also play significant roles. These bodies have a great deal of knowledge to handle most of their immediate problems. However, they look forward to external assistance when it comes to major ones such as intermittent droughts and water perennial scarcity as well as the need to increase water supply. Ultimately, the people have to be educated and empowered to be able to achieve most, if not all, the suggested strategies. Most importantly they must be involved right from the planning and implementation stages for the projects to be fully participatory and acceptable. The dissemination of information is also through the same channel as decision-making, community and religious leaders. One major example of innovation diffusion and acceptance is the use of water pumps for irrigation. The people also need encouragement in order for them to exploit further their own technologies and knowledge systems. This is exemplified by the recent collaboration between researchers and the Kutum people to improve on earthen pots for water storage. Besides, there is general consensus and evidence supporting conventional knowledge, that education has a positive effect on the performance and efficiency of rural people in LDCs (Lockhead, et al., 1980; Phillips, 1994). Summary and Conclusions Increase in the demand for water during the dry season is attributable to two major factors: inherent scarcity at this period of the year; and an escalation of activities requiring larger quantities of water. Irrigation farming, animal watering, brick making and housing construction are intensified just when water is most scarce in the area. The findings have revealed that little or no sophisticated technologies exist in the village for water procurement, sourcing and withdrawal, water delivery, conveyance and distribution and processing, storage, retrieval and use. The villagers tend to depend on a number of introduced technologies for water procurement the tube well and water pumping machines and for water storage tanks. These technologies have proved to be unsustainable due
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to high purchase and maintenance cost, and contribute to excess water loss by infiltration, seepage and evaporation. Additionally, the scheduling of activities does not take proper cognizance of the timing of water availability. The villagers lack specialized skills for rainwater harvesting and farming, and making the best use of excess water stored in ponds and stream at the end of the rainy season. However, a number of indigenous technologies are available for these processes. Such technologies are locally fabricated tools and facilities manually operated by the villagers. Although these are labor intensive, they are capital extensive, have the advantage of water conservation, and are perhaps sustainable. There is also evidence of wastewater reuse and the villager's willingness to accept new innovation and/or technologies. All these efforts are geared toward reducing the impact of water scarcity and therefore sign of the drought mitigation process. But the perpetuation of the problem and the people's yearning for assistance also indicate the need for alternative approaches to water conservation in the area. Therefore, a number of appropriate strategies based on a combination of indigenous knowledge systems and the transfer of technology to enhance water use and conservation in the area are suggested. These among others include: rainwater harvesting and farming, utilization of water ponds, construction of groundwater dams, rescheduling of activities and communal participation. However, the ultimate strategies are education, empowerment and encouragement. These will enable the people exploit further their own technologies and knowledge systems and to participate in the planning and implementation of any strategies or projects for them to be fully acceptable and sustainable. Some of these ideas are being simulated as policy scenarios for water use efficiency using a product-by-industry economic-ecological model. Results of these simulations will serve as policy options for economic development and technology use.
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Perspectives Vers une nouvelle théorie d’engagement : action communicationnelle et choix rationnel Hassan El Mossadak Résumé: Reprendre la notion générale d'engagement Illocutoire dans une perspective
linguistique et sociale du discours, nécessite un cheminement bien particulier dans les travaux de Searle, de Vanderveken (Foundations of IIlocutionary Logic d'une part, et celle de l'interactionnisme symbolique de Goffman d'autre part. (Faute de place, seul le premier volet sera discuté ici). Mots-clés: philosophie du langage, typologie du discours, communication, rationalité discursive…
La pragmatique universelle et la logique illocutoire Reprendre la notion générale d'engagement Illocutoire dans une perspective linguistique et sociale du discours, nécessite un cheminement bien particulier dans les travaux de Searle, de Vanderveken (Foundations of IIlocutionary Logic d'une part, et celle de l'interactionnisme symbolique de Goffman d'autre part. (faute de place, seul le premier volet sera discuté ici). Cette notion thématise les relations éventuelles existant entre deux actes de langage. Elle est posée en ces termes: «Étant donné un locuteur accomplissant avec succès un acte illocutoire d'une certaine forme dans un certain contexte d'énonciation, à quel (s) autre (s) acte (s) illocutoire
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(s) la réalisation de ce dernier l'engage-t-il ? »(1). (C'est moi qui souligne). Tenter de la comprendre revient à examiner conjointement la nature et la mise en place des relations éventuelles existantes entre les différents types d'illocutions. En fait, il s'agit de dire sous quelles conditions l'engagement discursif s'accomplit, comment le locuteur s'engage non par rapport à un acte en face mais comment il se positionne par rapport à la structure d'ensemble du discours ? Décrire cette problématique appelle un certain nombre de pré-requis. Ce sont eux qui font l'objet d'une grande partie de Foundations of illocutionary logic. Nous ne détaillerons pas ici ces notions premières mais nous en proposerons simplement une description limitée. La définition de l'accomplissement avec succès et sans défaut d'un acte illocutoire constitue le point de départ de la théorie de l'engagement discursive articulé sur un engagement social. En effet, la réponse à la question ci-dessus présuppose la connaissance des conditions de réalisation réussie et non défectueuse d'un acte de langage. Dotée de cette définition initiale, la philosophie linguistique établit alors cette théorie en structurant l'ensemble des relations entre actes illocutoires. Cela dit, la théorie de la l'engagement illocutoire sera nettement enrichi lorsqu'elle sera réexaminée par Vanderveken en l988, puis en 2001. Dans le premier ouvrage, seule la réalisation de l'acte de langage est évoquée, l'aspect perlocutoire (effet de l'acte sur le monde) n'est pas traité. Autrement dit, pour prendre un exemple de la pragmatique universelle et les modèles constructiviste de l'interaction, on s'intéresse aux conditions de l'accomplissement d'un acte illocutoire mais on ignore la structure hiérarchique d’ensemble dans laquelle il se réalise. Notre démarche consiste justement en cette intégration de l'acte de parole dans une structure de discours et le discours dans le genre, la forme de vie dans la quelle il est forme et contenu. Les conditions de satisfactions émanent donc plus de la structure d’ensemble du discours et ne se base pas sur des axiomatiques des actes de parole et de la sémantique formelle de vérité.(2) Cette pragmatique formelle procède à une unification partielle de la théorie des actes de parole et de la sémantique formelle de la vérité (Vanderveken, 1988:8). Plus d'une adjonction donc. Ce n'est plus seulement d'intégration des deux valeurs sémantiques d'un acte de langage (conditions de succès et conditions de satisfaction) qu’il faut parler.
1-
Searle, J.& Vanderkeven, D. (1985). Foundations of lllocutionary Logic. Cambridge University Press, p.6 2- Vanderveken, D. (1995). Principles of Speech act Theory. Tokyo. Ed. Shohakusha.
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Il faut contribuer aux fondements d’une typologie du discours et en montrer les arrières plans de leurs différents types, comment ils s'effectuent et transgressent leurs propres règles. Un acte de langage est l'énonciation (monologue/dialogue) d'un énoncé en contexte. Il n'est pas possible de gloser à propos de deux actes illocutoires (c'est le contenu de la question ci-dessus) sans travailler cette relation d'implication qui lie deux énoncés dans une structure hiérarchique de discours d'ensemble et dans un genre discursif particulier. En somme, le discours (structure) prime sur l'acte (élément). Il nous est donc nécessaire de réfléchir sur la relation acte de parole/discours et de ce dernier dans une concrétisation supérieure: le genre. Cela n’est pas sans présenter une version élargie de la notion d'engagement illocutoire dans une pragmatique sociale critique, un agir décrit en termes d’engagement fort et engagement faible à travers des implications non seulement argumentatives, puisque la dimension argumentative du langage ne peut occuper tout la structure du discours, mais voir comment les conduites discursives réelles s'effectuent. 2. Les logiques illocutoires et leurs buts dans une conception matérialiste du discours : Rappelons, le polygone de sustentation de la logique illocutoire admet pour schéma les points suivants: la formule F(P), les directions d'ajustement, les cinq classes de forces illocutoires, la décomposition en sept unités, la force illocutoire, les conditions de succès et de non-défectuosité d'un acte de langage et enfin l'hypothèse de constructibilité. L'acte de langage est considéré comme la plus petite unité -minimale-, il est schématisé par l'application d'une force illocutoire F sur un contenu propositionnel P; d'où la forme A= F(P). «Je prédis la victoire de la sagesse» s'écrit par ce moyen: F1 (PI), avec FI, force illocutoire de prédiction et P1 le contenu propositionnel, la victoire de la sagesse. «J'espère la victoire de la sagesse» et «Je prédis le retour imminent de la paix en Irak» diffèrent de notre acte initial par la force [F2(PI) avec F2, force illocutoire expressive d'espoir] ou par le contenu propositionnel seulement [F2(P2) avec P2- «le retour imminent de la paix»]. L'objectif premier des fondateurs de la logique illocutoire que sont Searle et Vanderveken est d'établir ce que l'on pourrait appeler une axiomatisation de l'ensemble des actes de langage que peut permettre l'utilisation d'une langue. Plus précisément ils ont pour ambition d'étudier les propriétés des forces illocutoires et les schématiser. La force illocutoire est tangible et soluble, elle peut se localiser ou être quantifié dans quatre types d'action: ajuster les mots au monde, ajuster le monde
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aux mots, (les ordres, les promesses) où le monde qui doit s’ajuster aux mots (pour que l’acte soit réussi et sans défaut), les mots au monde et le monde aux mots (double direction d’ajustement) ou ne rien ajuster du tout (consiste en l’expression d’états psychologiques)(3). Ajuster les mots au monde c'est par exemple représenter un état du monde, le «chameau est un animal saharien». Ajuster le monde aux mots, c'est par exemple faire en sorte que l'état du monde devienne conforme aux mots. «Je t'ordonne de te taire» ou «Je te promets de vous le rendre» conduit à ce type d'ajustement. Ajuster le monde aux mots et les mots au monde c'est constituer, par son dire, un nouvel état du monde ainsi par exemple de «Je déclare la séance ouverte», «Je te déshérite». Ne rien ajuster du tout c'est représenter un état mental, «J'adore le couscous marocain». Appelés «directions d'ajustement», ces rapports mots/monde sont au nombre de quatre. Ces quatre types de rapport cimentent l'assise de cinq classes de forces illocutoires, appelées classes des assertifs, des commissifs, des directifs, des déclaratifs et des expressifs. Les assertifs au nombre desquels figurent par exemple «affirmer», «relater», «attester», renvoient à la direction d'ajustement des mots au monde. La double direction d'ajustement (mots au monde et monde aux mots) concerne les déclaratifs produisant un changement de l'état de choses; pour exemples, «baptiser», «abdiquer», «pactiser». Les expressifs, manifestations d'états mentaux, ont une direction d'ajustement vide(4); c'est le cas de «féliciter», «désapprouver», «déplorer» ou «protester». La quatrième direction d'ajustement met en jeu le rapport du monde aux mots. Selon que ce dernier est sous la responsabilité du locuteur, comme par exemple «je m'engage à vous faire une copie de cet article », ou celle de l'auditeur, comme dans le cas de «Je t'invite à réfléchir», la force illocutoire sera dite respectivement commissive ou directive. Ainsi c'est l'auteur de l'accommodation du monde aux mots qui distingue ces deux ensembles de forces illocutoires. Ces cinq classes, bien que largement autonomes les unes par rapport aux autres, ne forment pas pour autant une partition de l'ensemble des forces illocutoires d'une langue. La raison n’en est pas que certains verbes ne peuvent être classés. Au contraire, toute allocution appartient à une classe au moins (...) mais pas forcément à une seule. Et c'est bien là que la partition universelle échoue; il n'est que de réfléchir à ces verbes qui appartiennent à deux classes: «certifier», «assurer», «renoncer» (la liste 3-
Voir le chapitre.5<<On the Logical Form of the Various Components of illocutionary Force>>. In Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Op., cit. 4- On peut parler d’un vide pour le but expressif considéré comme l’expression d’un état mental du locuteur à propos de l’état des choses représenté par le contenu propositionnel de l’acte illocutoire.
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n'est pas close). «Je te certifie que le feu était rouge», «Je te certifie que te rendrai ton livre»: deux utilisations du même verbe, l'une en tant qu'assertif, l'autre en tant que commissif. Searle et Vanderveken affirment (1) que toute force illocutoire est élément d'une des cinq classes (2) qu'elle est constructible à partir du verbe ‘’primitif’’ représentant la classe, au moyen d'ajouts de conditions d'utilisation en contexte. Cette hypothèse dite de constructibilité des matérialités discursives régule et forge l'ensemble des forces illocutoires exprimable dans une langue: on comprendra mieux le comment de cette construction après la présentation suivante de la décomposition de la force. L'acte de langage, de forme F(P), est l'unité minimale de la communication humaine mais F n'est pas une notion appartenant à une "situation idéale de parole". L'option matérialiste du discours lui préconise une substance et lui forge une forme. En effet, elle se décompose en sept éléments: le but Illocutoire, le mode d'accomplissement, le degré de force, les conditions préparatoires, les conditions sur le contenu propositionnelles, les conditions de sincérité et le degré de puissance. Cette décomposition a pour but d’arracher la rationalité communicationnelle aux avatars restant du pragmatisme kantien. Entre ces sept éléments, on peut prédire un engagement fort au cas où le locuteur réussirait à joindre la plupart d’eux dans son énoncé (au plus fort reste), ou il les présentera dans un engagement faible, s’il se trouve incapable d’en réunir le minimum. Cependant, il est formellement hasardeux de prétendre qu’un locuteur peut les joindre tous à la fois: le problème de la contingence oblige. Mais ce qui nous importe c’est de postuler un passage de la ‘’situation idéale de parole’’ vers une matérialité pragmatique d’usage du langage ordinaire. - Le but Illocutoire, ou la recherche de la finalité de l'action: il détermine la direction d'ajustement entre l’expression linguistique utilisée et les choses d’un monde extra-linguistique. C'est par exemple pour les assertifs, représenter le monde, pour les expressifs exprimer un état mental. - Le mode d'accomplissement détermine le mode de fonctionnements et d'atteinte; c'est l'ensemble des conditions spéciales nécessaires au fait d'atteindre le but. Par exemple, la position d'autorité requise pour la réalisation d'un ordre. De l’accomplissement réussi d’un acte illocutoire résulte une interaction entre les mots et le monde. - Le degré de force correspond à l'intensité avec laquelle le but est réalisé. Par exemple, la demande est plus intense lors d'une imploration que lors d'une prière. - Les conditions préparatoires sont à la force illocutoire ce que les présuppositions propositionnelles sont au contenu propositionnel. Elles
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correspondent à l’ensemble des propositions qui sont présupposées par le locuteur dans une proposition, tout comme l’existence d’un roi de France est présupposée par «Le roi de France est chauve», celle d'un retard effectif de la part du locuteur l'est pour l'expressif «Je m'excuse d'être en retard». Une condition préparatoire à un ordre est que l'auditeur soit dans la capacité d'ajuster le monde aux mots prononcés par le locuteur (ce n'est pas le cas si on ordonne à un sourd: «Répète ce que j'ai dit! »). - Les conditions de contenu propositionnel sont des conditions de contraintes imposées par la force sur le contenu propositionnel. Par exemple, une promesse ne peut s'exprimer qu'au futur, un témoignage au passé. L'illocution directive «Fais en sorte d'avoir appris l'arabe l'année dernière », est telle que les conditions de contenu propositionnel ne sont pas remplies. - Les conditions de sincérité correspondent aux états mentaux que le locuteur accomplissant un acte de langage doit posséder. Mais en termes de vérification langagière, il imprime un ton et un débit à sa façon de parler. Elles sont liées aussi aux attitudes propositionnelles relatives aux forces (croyance pour les assertifs, désir que l'auditeur fasse P pour les directifs, intention de faire P pour les commissifs). Un locuteur qui ment accomplit une affirmation en ne remplissant pas les conditions de sincérité. - Le degré de puissance correspond à l'intensité avec laquelle l'état mental relatif aux verbes illocutoire est possédé. Par exemple, le degré de puissance est plus marquant lors de la profération de «Je suis vraiment désolé » que lors de celle de «Je suis désolé». Au niveau de la matérialité discursive, on retiendra un aspect plus marquant: il s’agit de l’aspect prosodique et intonative de l’acte de discours (émotionnel et volitif, au plan psychologique), l’orientation axiologique, exprimant la variété des relations axiologiques du locuteur. Bakhtine5, un autre théoricien de la pragmatique sociale disait: «l’activité génératrice du ‘’mot’’ (lire aussi discours) pénètre et se reconnaît axiologiquement dans le côté intonatif du mot, s’enrichit d’un jugement de valeur dans le sentiment de son intonation active. Nous entendons par ‘’côté intonatif du mot’’ sa capacité d’exprimer la multiplicité des jugements de valeur du locuteur à l’égard du contenu de l’énoncé (…). L’activité de l’auteur de vient l’activité d’une évaluation exprimée qui colore tous les côtés : le mot invective, caresse, exprime son indifférence, rabaisse, délivre, etc. ». Sentences puissantes où s’exprime la relation intonation, la coloration propre du singulier et l’évaluation dans ses
-Bakhtine, M. (1929). Le Marxisme et la philosophie du langage. Paris. Ed. Minuit. 1977:77 et p.195. 5
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rapports avec une ‘’communauté linguistique’’, telle que définie par la linguistique sociale. Autrement dit, « la communauté des principales évaluations est le canevas sur lequel le discours humain vivant borde les ornements de son intonation». Cette idée de décomposition de la force illocutoire étaye celle de la constructibilité évoquée plus haut. A partir du primitif des directifs, par exemple, il est possible de construire «demander», «faire une enquête», «prier», «inviter», et «convoquer». La progression est constante et s'effectue par ajouts successifs de certaines conditions. Par exemple le passage du premier au second de ces verbes est fondé sur un monde d’accomplissement un peu plus contraignant pour le second; la condition de sincérité est plus importante pour la prière que pour la requête; "convoquer implique une nécessaire position hiérarchique entre le locuteur et l’auditeur, position non requise pour ’’prier‘’. En résumé, la définition de l’ensemble de ces forces illocutoires et de leurs conditions de succès résume les lois de la logique illocutoire sous la forme de ses sept axiomes. La notion de la force illocutoire est alors définie comme le septupler des composantes. Deux idées fondamentales sont entremises dans cette notion, celle de conditions de succès et d’accomplissement sans défaut d’un acte illocutoire. C’est -à- partir de ces sept composantes que s’élaborent les quatre conditions nécessaires et suffisantes pour accomplir avec succès sans défaut un acte donné F(P). Ces conditions concernent le locuteur, l'interlocuteur, leur monde respectif et l’acte qui est accompli, sa réception et le genre dans lequel il prend forme. Reprenons la définition que donne Vanderveken de la notion de "conditions de succès": << Par conditions de succès d'un acte illocutoire, j'entends ici les conditions qui doivent être remplies dans un contexte d'énonciation pour que le locuteur réussisse à accomplir cet acte dans ce contexte. Une promesse a, pour exemple, comme conditions de succès que le locuteur s'engage à accomplir une action future dans le monde d'énonciation. Un locuteur qui ne s'engage pas à accomplir d'action dans le contexte d'une énonciation, ne fait aucune promesse dans ce contexte. De même, un remerciement a comme condition de succès que le locuteur exprime sa reconnaissance envers l'allocutaire. Si le locuteur n'exprime pas sa reconnaissance à l'allocutaire dans un contexte d'énonciation, il ne le remercie pas dans ce contexte.>>6 Vanderveken reprend ici comme conditions de succès d'une promesse le but illocutoire engageant, à savoir,"(…) engager le locuteur à une action future" (Vanderveken, 1988: 109) qui détermine la direction d'ajustement des énonciations ayant la force d'engageant. Autrement dit, 6
- Vanderveken, D. (1988). Op.cit. p.33.
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une promesse ne serait effectivement accomplie que si le locuteur avait réellement, effectivement " l'intention qu'une correspondance soit établie entre le langage et le monde suivant une certaine direction d'ajustement" (Vanderveken.1988:108), direction d'ajustement qui consiste dans ce cas précis à ajuster les choses aux mots, à transformer le monde par son action future (Vanderveken, 1988:109-110). Il s'agit ici en fait d'une volonté de purifier l'acte de promettre de tous les abus possibles, purification qui échoue dans le cas où l'acte de promettre est effectivement posé mais où, par exemple, le locuteur n'a pas l'intention de faire ce qui est compris dans l'acte de promettre. L'exemple est encore plus probant lorsqu'on s'interroge sur les conditions de succès d'un acte assertif. Si un locuteur dit:"J'affirme que la terre est plate" tout en étant convaincu du contraire, peut-on raisonnablement dire que son affirmation est un insuccès? N'a-t-il pas justement affirmé quelque chose? N'a-t-il pas, pour reprendre les propres termes de Vanderveken, réussi à accomplir cet acte? Encore une fois, ces remarques n'invalident nullement ce que peut appeler Habermas les conditions idéales de production des différents actes de langage. Nous retiendrons seulement de ce rapide survol de la controverse un aspect qui semble nécessaire de réinterroger l'acte de langage à partir, non pas du but illocutoire, mais de ce qui constitue sa qualité même, à savoir sa matérialité. Selon le modèle de la logique illocutoire, le philosophe canadien Daniel Vanderveken (2001) propose-la possibilité- de forger une logique du discours. Il suggère de décomposer chaque genre discursif en cinq espèces de composantes, à savoir : un but discursif interne, ce qui est leur composante principale, des modes d’atteinte de ce but discursif, des conditions sur le thème, des conditions préparatoires d’arrière plan et les conditions de sincérité. Quoi qu’il en soit, rien ne dit que l’on puisse fonder sur la logique illocutoire un modèle interactionnel capable de nous donner une théorie formelle du dialogue. Cela est interdépendant d’un enrichissement de la théorie actuelle des actes illocutoires au moyen d’une théorie plus générale du discours quotidien. Habermas (2001) à l'opposé d'Apel repense le cadre problématique du dialogue en ramenant la logique illocutoire à la condition sine qua non de réalisation effective, non découlant d’un a priori discursive. C'est un premier chemin tracé sans qu'il se détourne pour le moment de la primauté de l'acte au lieu de leur structure d'ensemble le genre. Peut-on élaborer une schématisation des conversations à but discursif ? Si oui, Quelles en sont ces composantes ? Ces questions sont prises comme des postulats de bases. Au cœur de ce dispositif, la notion de genre et la réalisation de l'acte pris dans une structure hiérarchique de discours acquiert un rôle déterminant. Le prix à payer pour la pragmatique universelle se traduit : Quelle est la structure formelle de
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l'ensemble des types de discours ? Comment en définir les conditions de satisfaction? (7) Aucune réponse n’est à formuler à ce niveau. Seulement, l'éthique de la discussion prend le devant sur la scène des difficultés quand il suggère l'aboutissement heureux d’un dialogue, une fois que l’argumentation la meilleure a acquis l'adhésion qui fonde tous consensus élaboré. De façon essentielle, la ‘’matérialité signifiante ‘’ n’autorise point ce genre de qualificatif sur l’argumentation. Les arguments ne le sont comme tels, que dans un contexte, non en dépit de toute une évaluation sociale. Comment relancer le procédé argumentatif dans une théorie de la praxis sociale, ou comment rester fidèle à l’esprit de la théorie critique: l’émancipation. Cela n’est pas sans prendre à notre compte, les observations pertinentes de Rüdiger Bubner: « le concept d’argumentation remonte à la tradition rhétorique, on ne peut pourtant pas le déterminer adéquatement- aussi univoquement qu’il faudrait En effet, il se meut entre le parachèvement de preuves théoriques et un comportement de langage lié à une situation. (…) On peut se contredire en argumentant comme il est faux de prétendre que nous sommes toujours en train d’argumenter. Aussi ne faut-il jamais rendre absolus des arguments et des expositions argumentatives, de manière à leur concéder un statut de rationalité pure et simple (…). De même, il ne s’en suit pas du tout que l’on doive supposer une espèce de prémisse d’argumentation comme condition transcendantale de possibilité de chaque comportement linguistique».8 Il convient de parler d'engagement discursif (fort et faible) et non de l'argumentation la meilleure. Il faut aussi repenser le cadre de la prétention à la validité véridique en termes de satisfaction relative propre au contexte des discours. Si l’engagement se reconnaît effectivement dans l’argumentation, et vice versa. Il faut l’inscrire dans son genre d’appartenance, sans lequel, on absout les divers contextes de son utilisation. Il s’agit plutôt de mettre en lumière la nature pragmatique de l’engagement qui est derrière chaque proposition pour identifier son genre d’appartenance et l’arrière fond socio-historique qu’elle véhicule. Les mêmes arguments peuvent être utilisés différemment. Ce qui rend opaque la -vrai- nature de leurs types 7-
A ce jour, la pragmatique n'a pas formulé de modèle adéquat ni de réponse construite. Reste que l'École de Genève dans ses Cahiers de linguistique française de (1995, 1998-2000) et l’Ecole de paris 5 dans ses Cahiers d’acquisition et de pathologie du langage (CALAP) proposent différemment une approche modulaire et fonctionnelle des structures du discours. Aussi Vanderveken poursuit ses efforts pour une formulation d'une logique formelle du discours. 8- Bubner, R. (1988). << Moralité et ‘’ Sittlichkeit’’ sur l’origine d’une opposition >> In Revue Internationale de Philosophie. 3 /1988. N166., pp.355-357.
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d’agir. Tandis que la description de la forme et le contenu de l’engagement qui est derrière une proposition ne peut pas être le même dans une interaction et par tout. Il est à présent possible de mieux préciser la logique de l'accomplissement réussi et non défectueux d'un acte de discours. Réussir l'accomplissement sans défaut d'un acte de langage c'est affirmer ou réaliser le but illocutoire d'une certaine manière, avec une certaine intensité, en exprimant un état mental approprié avec une certaine force et en remplissant les conditions préparatoires, la nature de l'engagement et celles de contenu propositionnel dans un discours donné. Si toutes les conditions sont remplies, l'acte de discours est réussi et non défectueux (on dit aussi qu'il s'est réalisé avec succès et sans défaut) ; si toutes le sont, hormis les conditions préparatoires de sincérité, il est réussi mais est défectueux (on dit aussi qu'il est réussi avec succès et avec défaut). Avant de donner une définition précise de l'accomplissement réussi et non défectueux d'un acte de discours, il nous faut préciser un dernier point. Il est important de ne pas confondre l'accomplissement de l'acte avec l'effet, dit perlocutoire, qu'il produit. Le perlocutoire(9) était longtemps absent de la définition de l'accomplissement réussi et non défectueux d'un acte de discours :«Un acte illocutoire de la forme F(P) est accompli avec succès et sans défaut dans un contexte d'énonciation si seulement si : 1) Le locuteur, dans ce contexte, parvient à atteindre le but illocutoire de F sur le contenu propositionnel P avec le mode d'accomplissement et le degré de force du but illocutoire requis. 2) Il exprime le contenu propositionnel P et celui-ci satisfait les conditions de contenu propositionnel imposées par F. 3) Les conditions préparatoires de l'allocution et les présuppositions propositionnelles sont obtenues dans le monde d'énonciation. 4) Il exprime et possède l’état psychologique déterminé par F avec le degré de sincérité caractéristique de F »(10). En somme la nuance doit être de mise, personne n’est en mesure de préciser à la virgule près, l’impact des discours sur les personnes. Si certains réagissent avec ‘’philosophie’’, d'autres succombent facilement au bon-heurs des paroles. A ce stade du cheminement, nous connaissons la définition de l'accomplissement réussi et sans défaut d'un acte illocutoire. Elle concerne essentiellement la matérialité d’usage de la force illocutoire
9-
Le perlocutoire: il s’agit de ce que l’on fait par le fait de le dire; il se situe au niveau des effets entraînés par la parole. 10- Searle, J., Vanderveken, V. (1985). Op. cit. P. 24.
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laissant de côté l'aspect véri-conditionnel de la réalisation de l'acte et la problématique du genre.
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Perspectives Hommage à Kurt Rothschild… Sur les traces d’une théorie économique pour demain ! Philippe Jourdon Résumé: On a souvent parlé de Karl Marx comme du « mélange de la philosophie allemande, de l’économie politique anglaise et de l’inspiration révolutionnaire française ». Mais une approche plus dynamique et moins statique des choses – et pour cette raison, inscrite dans une histoire des idées plus récentes – nous invite à nous demander ce que donnerait dans le domaine de la dialectique des idées en matière d’économie une confrontation entre « école historique allemande », « approche marginaliste autrichienne » et « recherche de la régulation à la française »… soumises à la théorie des systèmes et aux recherches de modélisation du développement durable. Si Kurt Rothschild qui vient de nous quitter (né le 21 octobre 1914 à Vienne où il s’est éteint le 15 novembre 2010) n’a pas grand point commun avec Marx, et ne nous semble pas non plus avoir beaucoup abordé les grands espaces de la systémique ou encore du développement durable, en revanche occupant tout l’entre deux dans une carrière exceptionnellement longue remontant presque à toutes ces soixante dix dernières années soit comme Enseignant soit comme Conseiller, il nous paraît être en une seule personne le Professeur d’Economie autrichien représentatif des préoccupations de son pays au sein de la féroce compétition mondiale dans la Globalisation, l’homme qui a poussé jusqu’au bout l’analyse et la modélisation des questions tenant au modèle social démocrate (politiquement comme économiquement), et enfin celui qui aussi du point de vue théorique nous rappelle par bien des aspects tout ce que l’école autrichienne d’économie a à apporter au monde. Mots-clés: social-démocratie, macro-économie, école de Vienne, Economistes, théories économiques…
Philippe Jourdon. HEC, Docteur en Economie. Independant Researcher.
1) L’apport de l’école d’économie autrichienne.
A
u fond la caractéristique de l’école économique autrichienne, qui a connu des représentants aussi différents et prestigieux que Ludwig Von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, ou Carl Menger ou encore Joseph Schumpeter, est de privilégier l’examen des facteurs psychologiques face à ceux relevant de causes purement mécaniques telles celles relevées par exemple dans la Théorie de l’Equilibre Général de Walras. Cette option nous paraît terriblement moderne et actuelle, de même que les conséquences en termes d’étude des cycles. « Dans la conception autrichienne, le capital est un ensemble structuré de biens utilisés dans les processus de production et non une masse homogène résumée par un équivalent monétaire macroscopique. A chaque processus est associé un ensemble de biens capitaux particuliers, et chaque bien capital occupe une place particulière dans le processus de production. La liste des biens et la population des producteurs ne sont pas exogènes ; leur formation et leur évolution sont des sujets fondamentaux de la théorie économique ». Cette approche tournée vers la mentalité de l’entrepreneur lui-même est donc aussi actuelle parce qu’au-delà de la querelle faite souvent aux penseurs autrichiens d’être partisans du « libéralisme » - un mot pas très à la mode désignant une réalité sociale pourtant en vogue depuis les années 80, les « people » volant au secours des marchés financiers crise après crise1 – on pourrait de façon plus heureuse les décrire comme les défenseurs d’une économie forgée autour de la figure de « l’entrepreneur » - et il y a des entrepreneurs en contexte libéral comme il peut bien sûr exister aussi des « entrepreneurs sociaux » dans l’art, les idées et les médias, le sexe ou encore l’éducation et les sciences… d’autant plus qu’il existe des « entrepreneurs » dans le sport et même dans la religion ! « Pour les « autrichiens », une explication d’un phénomène économique n’est valide que si elle rattache logiquement ce phénomène à ses causes ultimes, qui sont par définition les choix volontaires d’êtres pensants (individualisme méthodologique). La tradition autrichienne récuse donc la distinction entre microéconomie et macroéconomie : elle reconnaît comme contradictoires et tient pour dépourvus d’intérêt les agrégats comme le niveau général des prix, le taux d’inflation ou le produit intérieur brut, ainsi bien sûr que les relations fonctionnelles postulées entre ces statistiques ». On comprend que le rapport au temps (pas classique) ou le libre arbitre séparent l’approche autrichienne de « calcul à la marge » en Même si nous pensons que c’est assez malsain et nécessite donc de trouver les vraies sources d’ « eutropies » permettant enfin de cerner le phénomène afin de prétendre le contenir une sorte de « social containment » ou la recherche d’une porte interne psychologique et non fermement précisée géographiquement : à l’Europe. 1
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partant des préférences individuelles, de l’approche néo-classique toute de formalisation et de pondération. Mais ceci reste extrêmement discutable2. A partir d’une approche différente de quatre branches fondamentales de la théorie économique, les auteurs autrichiens tirent une perspective transversale à la fois puissante, souple et symptomatique de la contemporanéité. Quatre axes d’analyse largement introspective : - la théorie de la monnaie et du crédit ; - la théorie de la production et du capital ; - la théorie des cycles et des crises ; - la théorie de l’entrepreneur et du calcul économique ; Donnent un vecteur d’investigation de la réalité économique en vue de proposer de nouvelles politiques : Le tryptique introspectif entre des revenus macroéconomiques, des coûts microéconomiques et un profit psychologique, va être retraité par un système fondé sur l’utilité comptable ex post, mais ceci dans un environnement interne et externe marqué par une radicale incertitude. En aval, une école d’économie d’une telle recherche de pensée débouchera sur des auteurs en cybernétique tels Norbert Wiener et Oscar Lange. En amont elle était préparée par les différentes controverses qui, au-delà de la défense en théorie d’un « introuvable libéralisme » (Parle t’on du « libéralisme politique » ou du « libéralisme économique » ? Même si une telle question peut paraître « violente » dans le débat classique la poser pourrait nous inviter à mesurer les propositions méthodologiques des autrichiens pour affronter un tel « cactus » dans la crise actuelle afin de trouver des solutions institutionnelles, juridiques, idéologiques). A chacune de ces controverses les « autrichiens » semblaient « seuls contre le reste du monde ». Aujourd’hui ils semblent avoir pris nombre de problèmes par le bon bout. Nous voulons parler aussi de l’histoire des idées. Dans la mesure où « l’école de Vienne » s’est trouvée si proche d’autres « portes » de l’Europe que naturellement elle était fondée sur des réflexions méthodologiques comme épistémologiques également très riches. Imaginons que l’épistémologie poppérienne de l’auteur hongrois Karl Popper creuse une brèche dans l’approche scientifique en énonçant qu’une théorie scientifique est scientifique pour autant qu’elle soit falsifiable, c’est-à-dire qu’on peut la discuter jusqu’au point de démontrer Et c’est peut-être tout l’intérêt : de même que la « porte imaginaire » dont nous venions de parler un peu plus haut… 2
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qu’elle est en partie fausse, et pourra donc servir de « monnaie d’échange » pour enrichir de futures théories elle aussi incomplètes ou imparfaites et donc ayant tout intérêt à progresser en se trouvant améliorées. D’un autre côté on parle tout le temps de Keynes comme du fondateur de la macro économie en semblant oublier qu’un auteur polonais, Kalecki – et inspiré par son compatriote : l’ historien de l’économie Polanyi – appelé volontiers le « Keynes polonais » a aussi élaboré une théorie macroéconomique avec plus de phénomènes de stocks et de retards que la théorie keynésienne : de ce fait elle semble plus fidèle à la représentation des phénomènes de dépendances que celle de Keynes basée sur des calculs avant tout probabilistes essayant finalement plus de deviner « des sous-jacents à des contrats légalement formés » (et ceci dans le but d’améliorer la gestion des marchés financiers afin de « sauver le système », plus que de créer « la sécurité sociale » ou « l’Etat Providence »). De ce fait elle nous semble plus proche des besoins liés à la situation mondiale actuelle où manifestement les pays sont « dépendants les uns des autres ». Même en Europe une telle dépendance est manifeste ne serait-ce que sous la forme des crises grecque et irlandaise. Donc un préambule sur la « porte magique de l’Europe ». Deux conclusions simples : - la conclusion pratique de vingt ans de néo-libéralisme financier à l’échelle de la planète semble nous indiquer qu’au-delà des phénomènes de dépendance obligatoire que cela entraîne (l’autre « côté magique » ou « à force de trop tirer sur la corde ») la façon de s’en sortir rend hommage au calcul marginaliste des autrichiens qui en sont vraiment les promoteurs en dernier recours… pour s’en sortir dans un contexte de dépendance il n’y a qu’à voir ce qu’à la marge on peut échanger. Ce peut être d’ailleurs parfois sordide. - Deuxièmement il nous reste à citer un autre très grand auteur autrichien Eugen Von Böhm-Bawerk qui qualifie le capital de « détour de production ». Un détour de production sur le plan de l’accumulation matérielle et sur le plan des idées peut aussi provoquer des phénomènes étranges, qualifier des réactions à des « chocs exceptionnels » plutôt qu’à des chocs ordinaires. Mais on devine aussi comme au tiret précédant que cela peut mener à des phénomènes parfois non souhaités que ce soit socialement ou aussi parfois moralement. Et c’est pourquoi nous devons en arriver maintenant à la pédagogie de l’école économique autrichienne d’après 1945 où rapidement – 1947 retour en Autriche après un séjour de neuf années formatrices à l’Université de Glasgow dans les brumes écossaises – le
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Professeur Rothschild va trouver sa place dans le nouveau paysage viennois et ne plus jamais l’abandonner... au point d’en devenir un des piliers au sein du WIFO qui a analysé les conjonctures des pays de l’Union Européenne depuis de longues années pour en tirer à la fois d’utiles de recommandations de prudence dans les politiques économiques, et des recommandations à la fois précises et « acérées » dans leur modélisation guidant les politiques européennes dans leur longue série de réformes afin d’espérer un jour « sortir du tunnel » comme on peut tous le souhaiter. 2) Des épistémologies distinctes : Plus jamais le Professeur Rothschild ne reviendra sur les controverses qui ont toujours opposé les penseurs autrichiens au reste du monde. Tout comme dans la musique Joseph Haydn, au sommet de la maturité musicale autrichienne, avait pensé avoir trouvé « les harmoniques universelles » pouvant s’adresser et parler à n’importe quel être humain, à côté du grand Friedrich Hayek à l’Université d’Economie de Vienne – mais aussi à côté de grands spécialistes des cycles économiques, tel le Professeur Joseph Steindl – Kurt Rothschild va développer sa voie, faite d’angles d’attaque des questions assez proches du thème fondamental de la situation nationale de son pays, mais aussi d’une exploration des thèmes de la sociale démocratie sous formes modélisées, enfin une pédagogie qui est aussi une méthode et où l’affleure « le pain sacré » qui a souvent révélé les grands économistes dans l’histoire3 : la possibilité de Il faut dire que cela prête au moins à discussion. Le thème de la « modélisation caricaturale » ou « non caricaturale » est un angle d’attaque. Mais la théorie économique n’est-elle pas à améliorer – en améliorant les modèles pour ce faire – en abordant les problématiques « en biais », puisque de toutes façons il y a toujours un horizon à repousser, afin de créer des richesses – repousser les crises pour l’Etat, la faillite dans le cas de l’entreprise. Quel économiste n’est-il pas prescripteur d’une forme de sagesse, ou n’a-t’il la prétention de le devenir au moins en fin de carrière. Ce débat n’est pas anodin car un caractère dramatique de la crise actuelle est celui qui pousserait de « jeunes économistes » à donner plus que « leur opinion » sur la situation économique et sociale, mais vraiment des axes épistémologiques ou méthodologiques ayant une visée « éthique », afin de refonder leur discipline… d’où le risque de « rouler en avant » en montrant par là même que la discipline que leur ont inculqué leurs maîtres repose sur des fondements totalement « pourris ». Il en est peut-être de « l’éthique » en économie par exemple économie financière et de l’assurance (et des incitations) comme il est du « dopage » en sport : l’occasion d’une « course poursuite » entre acteurs de différents types, les uns « institutionnels » et les autres non – ou moindrement. Par une démarche extrêmement rigoureuse le Professeur Rothschild a semblé circonvenir à cela presque toute son œuvre, mais à la fin reconnaissait : « nous avons un problème ». Nous ne savons absolument pas prédire à partir de nos théories et de nos équations ce qui va se produire maintenant dans le monde. 3
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laisser deviner une dimension morale derrière les calculs ; donc un positionnement entre cet horizon moral présent et qu’il faut apprivoiser et dont il faut tenir compte, mais qui n’appartient pas à la science économique (et est donc toujours repoussé, ici par le calcul marginaliste mais ailleurs par une distinction toujours en partie factice entre implicite et explicite des modèles, révélé et caché… un casse-tête sur lequel bute particulièrement l’école néo-classique comme se plaît à le souligner le Professeur Rothschild), l’utilisation que l’on doit faire de la mathématisation et plus généralement de la formalisation comme méthode d’accès à une vérité formelle faisant pourtant sens relatif dans le contexte des institutions ou des mœurs économiques d’une époque, et enfin la modélisation proprement dite. Et dans le domaine de la modélisation le Professeur Rothschild a connu des succès exceptionnels. 3) Une découverte l’assurance.
fondamentale
sur
l’économie
de
Lorsque Rothschild et Stieglitz en 1976 produisent leur article fondateur en économie de l’assurance, ils irriguent la discipline de la science économique en inspirations de modèles pour cinquante ans au moins. L’idée de base de l’article est que l’équilibre d’un marché de l’assurance – un secteur de l’économie soumis à plus d’asymétries d’informations que tous les autres – peut être soit un « équilibre mélangeant » soit un « équilibre séparateur ». Ce modèle peut être reproduit soit pour la question des migrations pour le travail – au fond il s’agit de « marchés financiers » dans lesquels existent de sérieuses asymétries d’informations – soit même pour la question des retraites. « Devenu un classique, l'article sur la sélection adverse de Stiglitz, et cosigné avec Rotschild, " Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets : an essay on the economics of imperfect information " (ROTSCHILD et STIGLITZ, 1976), constitue un complément logique aux analyses (1970) et de SPENCE (1973, 1974). Rotschild et Stiglitz se demandent comment des agents non informés peuvent améliorer leurs résultats sur un marché avec asymétrie d'information. Plus spécifiquement, ils considèrent un marché de l'assurance où les compagnies n'ont pas d'information sur le risque présenté par leurs clients. Les compagnies non informées offrent à leurs clients informés différentes combinaisons de primes et de franchises et, si certaines conditions sont remplies, les clients choisiront la police d'assurance préférée par les firmes. Un tel processus de filtrage à travers l'autosélection est très proche des analyses de VICKREY (1945) et MIRLEES (1971) sur la taxation optimale des revenus, où l'autorité fiscale (ignorant les préférences et productivités des agents) fournit des
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incitations aux salariés telles qu'ils choisiront le montant " juste " de l'effort au travail. Le modèle de Rotschild et Stiglitz peut être illustré au moyen d'un exemple simple. Supposons que tous les individus sur un marché d'assurance soient identiques, à l'exception de leur probabilité de se blesser d'une ampleur donnée. Initialement, tous les individus ont le même revenu y. Un individu à haut risque encourt une perte de revenu d < y avec la probabilité ph et un individu à faible risque souffre de la même perte de revenu avec une probabilité plus faible pl avec 0 < ph < pl < 1. Par analogie avec l'acheteur d'AKERLOF et l'employeur de SPENCE, qui ne connaissent ni la " qualité " des vendeurs, ni la productivité de ceux qui occuperont l'emploi, les compagnies d'assurance ne peuvent observer le risque des détenteurs de police d'assurance. Du point de vue de la compagnie d'assurance, les détenteurs de police d'assurance avec une haute probabilité d'être blessé ph sont de " faible qualité ", tandis que les détenteurs de police d'assurance avec une faible probabilité pl sont de " haute qualité ". Toujours par analogie avec les exemples précédents, le marché de l'assurance est un marché de concurrence pure et parfaite. Les compagnies d'assurance sont neutres au risque (voir l'hypothèse initiale et implicite de rendements d'échelle constants), autrement dit, elles maximisent leurs profits espérés. Un contrat d'assurance (a, b) spécifie une prime a et un montant de compensation b en cas de perte de revenu d. La franchise correspond ainsi à la différence d - b. Rotschild et Stiglitz établissent que les équilibres peuvent être divisés en deux catégories : mélangeants et séparateurs. Dans le cas d'un équilibre mélangeant, tous les individus achètent la même police d'assurance, tandis que dans le cas d'un équilibre séparateur, ils achèteront différents contrats. Rotschild et Stiglitz montrent que leur modèle n'a pas d'équilibre mélangeant. La raison est qu'avec un tel équilibre une compagnie d'assurance pourrait profiter du marché au lieu d'offrir un contrat qui soit meilleur pour les individus à faible risque et pire pour les individus à haut risque. Tandis que, dans le modèle d'Akerlof, le prix devenait trop bas pour les vendeurs de " haute qualité ", ici l'équilibre des primes est trop élevé pour les individus à faible risque. Le seul équilibre possible est un équilibre unique séparateur, où deux contrats d'assurance distincts sont vendus sur le marché. Un contrat (aH bH) est acheté par tous les individus à haut risque, l'autre (aL, bL) par tous les individus à faible risque. Le premier contrat fournit une couverture pleine pour un montant de prime relativement élevé : aH > aL et bH = d, tandis que le second combine une prime plus faible avec seulement une couverture partielle : bL < d. En
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conséquence, chaque client choisit entre un contrat sans aucune franchise, et un autre contrat avec une prime plus faible et une franchise. À l'équilibre, la franchise dissuade à peine les individus à haut risque, qui sont tentés par une plus faible prime mais choisisse une prime plus élevée afin d'éviter la franchise. Cet équilibre unique séparateur correspond à l'équilibre socialement le plus efficace du modèle de signalement. Rotschild et Stiglitz identifient également les conditions sous lesquelles aucun équilibre (stratégie pure) n'existe. Le caractère unique d'un tel équilibre est typique des modèles de signalement comme l'est également la correspondance entre l'équilibre de filtrage et l'équilibre de signalement le plus socialement efficace. L'article de Rotschild et Stiglitz a été très influent. Notamment, leur classification des équilibres est devenue un paradigme ; les équilibres séparateurs et mélangeants sont maintenant des concepts standards de la théorie microéconomique en général et de l'économie de l'information en particulier. » 4) Les « grands » et les « petits » pays. Dans les Universités on présente volontiers le fonctionnement de la politique macro économique américaine comme celui d’un « petit pays ouvert ». Et les petits pays sont sensés être plus vertueux en matière de politique monétaire que les pays qualifiés de grands. Ils seraient plus vertueux car plus réactifs dans leur interprétation des signaux donnés par le marché et les recommandations immédiatement appliquées qui en sont tirées. Au-delà de l’interrogation sur la pertinence de présenter les Etats-Unis comme un « petit pays », il apparaît conforme aux régressions statistiques de constater effectivement la réactivité de la FED. Face aux crises, elle donnerait souvent le conseil aux pays touchés par elle de ne pas attendre pour engager des mesures vigoureuses. Il nous semble alors relativement raisonnable d’affirmer que les « petits pays », parce que contraints d’être plus ouverts dans un environnement changeant, ont intérêt à gérer leurs affaires de près. Dans ce sens on pourrait poser une hypothèse d’un comportement « de plus grande vertu de la politique monétaire » - au regard par exemple de règles prudentielles standard reconnues par la Communauté internationale – que des grands pays qui pourraient être tentés d’abuser de leur pouvoir de « seigneuriage monétaire » - produire de la monnaie au nom d’une souveraineté qui s’érodera dans le contexte international si elle n’apporte pas les preuves précisément de sa bonne gestion au service de la gouvernance globale et améliorant la réputation
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individuelle et collective des agents qui sont amenés à en exercer la fonction. C’est l’honneur des approches comme celle de Kurt Rothschild de n’avoir jamais perdu de vue les paramètres « durs » - ceux qui résistent, d’un modèle social européen que l’on cherche mais qui semble apporter de plus en plus de preuves de son existence. C’est bien au nom de ces préoccupations qu’une pédagogie était possible au sujet du libéralisme financier affiché par les Institutions Financières Internationales depuis vingt ans – par rapport à la question dont nous ne pouvons pas ignorer la sensibilité, des pays en développement. Mais cela entraîne deux commentaires de méthode de notre part : -
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D’une part c’est tout le débat sur la suite de la construction européenne, sous l’angle des politiques économiques qu’il conviendrait d’y mener, de dire : oui à la fin pour que ces politiques soient crédibles, pour qu’elles entraînent l’adhésion, pour qu’elles soient comprises, et donc pour qu’elles soient efficaces au final (croissance, emploi, qualifications…) il faut qu’on explique comment au centre même du « jeu économique » et des conventions d’une époque, supposées admises et connues par tous, l’ajustement se fait entre l’aspect « à la marge » provenant du nouveau crédit global, et l’aspect « général », stricte application des mesures décidées dérivant directement du modèle social européen (qui est un aboutissement d’un processus de convergence entre le droit et les mœurs… à l’échelle européenne !). Cela le Professeur Rothschild ne l’a pas expliqué. Mais pourtant tout est peut-être dans la nuance et dans la litote provenant du style des équations. Pour que cet ajustement soit possible, et grâce justement à une liberté permise par l’inter agencement des équations en dernier recours, Rothschild indique clairement dans quelles directions s’oriente sa réflexion. Il prend le parti de défendre une forme de « discrimination » dans la façon de gérer le personnel. En particulier la gestion des incitations afin de gérer la frontière entre insiders et outsiders dans le cadre de la théorie du marché du travail dual, est un de ses derniers grands axes de modélisation. Cet axe est la conséquence logique du fait de défendre le modèle de type social démocrate dans un contexte épistémologique « à l’autrichienne » où la séparation entre micro économie et macro économie n’est pas posée comme allant de soi. On peut donc soit énoncer l’hypothèse selon laquelle le Professeur Rothschild aurait réussi le Tour de Force de réunir théorie de la discrimination
économique, économie du travail, économie globale, soit pointer les limites de cette approche face à « l’introuvable modèle social européen » - dont l’horizon serait éventuellement à apprivoiser avant que de prétendre à en fixer des contenus « dans le marbre » ! 5) Modélisation « caricaturale » contre une modélisation qui ne le serait pas ? Le prix Nobel d’Economie Milton Friedman avait cette formule « plus un modèle est caricatural, plus il a de chances d’être utile ». En cela il nous semble trancher avec l’approche du Professeur Rothschild, faite de compromis, d’essais, de gouvernance, et même de « discrimination bien tempérée » afin d’encadrer fermement les qualifications de chacun. Au-delà d’une « approche américaine » où les moyens paraîtraient « illimités » et une « approche à l’européenne » où ces mêmes moyens pourraient souvent apparaître chichement comptés - au regard aussi de la conquête de la maîtrise du calendrier… ou le « il faut donner du temps au temps » du Président français Mitterrand qui signalait ses talents d’économiste en plus de « sa part de vérité » - on peut dire certes que le chemin intellectuel emprunté par le Professeur Rothschild fut à la fois escarpé, rigoureux, ce qui traduit à la fois ses grandes forces et ses limites toutes relatives au regard des résultats modélisés. Quel « étroit chemin » que de s’attaquer à la seule frontière commune à la fois à la macro économie monétaire d’un côté, et à l’économie du travail de l’autre côté, qu’est l’économie de l’assurance. C’est en effet bien cette gageure qui plus que toute autre pouvait faire gagner de précieux « points » à une économie européenne et à un modèle social et politique européen en devenir à la recherche d’un poids nouveau sur le calendrier des affaires du monde. La condition était cependant de proposer des « modélisations non caricaturales ». Elles n’agissaient pas de l’extérieur, à la taille de la planète, mais de l’intérieur dans l’entreprise elle-même tout en ayant une signification globale accompagnant, imperceptiblement mais avec le degré de persévérance nécessaire, l’odyssée de l’Europe à la recherche de son unité et de sa souveraineté dans sa capacité à se fixer à elle-même ses propres politiques et à les appliquer, les voir appliquer, les faire appliquer… après avoir redonné « du temps au temps » ! Ainsi le Professeur Rothschild accompagne ses modélisations d’une critique des régressions statistiques d’ordinaire sous-jacentes aux décisions prises en politique économique, afin d’en tirer les seuls enseignements utilisables conformément à des principes de raison et de
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prudence. Il commente dans le même temps le fait que chaque politique économique peut atteindre des résultats bien différents « selon l’époque historique, la situation, les conditions ». Peut-être quand le temps sera venu, pourra t’on accorder des modèles « caricaturaux » avec d’autres qui ne le seraient pas mais plutôt dans l’esprit de l’économiste individualiste n’oubliant jamais la philosophie morale, que fut le grand homme qui vient de tirer sa révérence. Et qu’un tel alliage pourrait permettre de gérer de façon encore plus satisfaisante la ligne de pente entre tendance statistique, utilisable seulement si on comprend « sa situation » - notamment dans le temps – et la cause par définition inatteignable et toujours hors de portée. Un objectif donc inatteignable par les seules voies du calcul mais qu’une « praxéologie idoine » replace en permanence sous les yeux des décideurs amenés à réduire des distances, gérer des tensions, allouer des moyens. Peu de modèles tels ceux du Professeur Rothschild nous l’ont replacé à ce point constamment « devant les yeux », même si à la fin cela pourrait paraître souvent frustrant, voire, rageant. 6) Les limites de la sociale démocratie. Monsieur Dominique STRAUSS-KAHN Président du Fond Monétaire International Bouillargues, le 19 Octobre 2010, Cher Monsieur Strauss-Kahn, Je rends hommage, une fois de plus, à votre œuvre. Après avoir été l’inlassable pédagogue de l’économie au Parti Socialiste en France, vous dirigez désormais le FMI avec une vision et une détermination sans pareilles. Je crois que c’est cette détermination qui sortira l’économie mondiale de la crise, un processus qui ne peut être immédiat. Votre connaissance de toutes les théories de la macro économie, de même que celle des acteurs qui comptent, et votre science – et art – du crédit, permettront ce tour de force dans la mise en œuvre jusqu’au bout des grandes directions que vous avez annoncées dès votre arrivée à la tête de cette Institution. Cependant une fois sorti de cette crise, il faudra appliquer à un nouveau monde, une nouvelle économie, une nouvelle planète : une nouvelle vision de la macroéconomie. Vous savez parfaitement qu’après la promotion par Keynes et Kalecki, de la macro économie complétant la
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seule micro économie, aujourd’hui un nouveau cadre maîtrisant les effets d’éviction fiscale et de torsions qui menacent notre monde peut ouvrir vers une « macro-économie durable » prévenant risques et conflits sociaux, économiques, sociétaux, géopolitiques… énergétiques… Si nous n’y parvenions, la social-démocratie mourrait hélas de trop considérer le crédit, ou encore la négociation : comme des buts en soi… en oubliant qu’ils doivent servir un projet social. Je vous souhaite un bel été indien et vous prie d’agréer, Cher Monsieur Strauss-Kahn, l’expression de mes respectueuses salutations, Philippe Jourdon 32 rue bel horizon 30230 BOUILLARGUES Economiste indépendant (09, 72, 91, 43, 17…] 7) Des voies de la recherche et une question fondamentale. La théorie de l’équilibre mélangeant et de l’équilibre séparateur peut être vue d’au moins une autre façon que telle que présentée d’une façon au fond technique – dans la figure présentée ; mais cette figure ouvre de nombreuses « portes » ;) condition de continuer à être elle-même fermement gérée – par l’européen Rothschild et l’américain Stiglietz.
Conclusion : Le Professeur Kurt Rothschild est un idéal type du parfait Professeur aussi un grand chercheur. Il illustre magistralement le fait que l’école d’économie autrichienne, traditionnellement isolée centrant les recherches autour de la figure controversée de « l’entrepreneur » (Von Mises), la destruction créatrice ou la concurrence entre monnaies privées, a gagné un galon supplémentaire en signant des pages essentielles de l’économie de l’assurance : de l’entrepreneur vers l’assureur ? Peut-être un signe avant-coureur d’une « résurrection » de l’économie européenne au terme d’une crise longue de trois ou quatre décennies, récompense pour ce petit pays d’avoir « défendu un modèle scandinave » en étant au cœur de l’Europe… non avare de paradoxes. Nous
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formulons ici le vœu que dans ce style caractéristique entre tous de nouvelles sonates à l’avenir se chargent d’encadrer les modélisations préparant une symphonie économique aux couleurs du XXI siècle, et assurant celui-ci le mieux possible.
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Book Review Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn Author: Asef Bayat Book: Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. Publisher: Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. Hardcover: 320 pages ISBN-10: 0804755949 ISBN-13: 978-0804755948 Key-words: democracy, Egypt, Iran, Islam, Middle East, political history, political theology. Reviewed by: Jacob Greenberg
W
hile other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities have made use of comparative methodologies, History has been slow to join the trend. Most historical analyses investigate a single locale, individual, or neighborhood in order to offer conjectures about larger contexts. This allows the researcher to become well versed in the archives of their research site, and make informed and sound conclusions about their subject matter. It is rare to see a comparative analysis within History, due, seemingly due to fear of conducting incomplete research for two different case studies. However, some researchers are seeking to rectify this shortcoming. In Making Islam Democratic, Asef Bayat uses a comparative methodology to highlight the differences in political Islamic mobilization in Iran and Egypt from 1960 to the present day. His
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analysis offers unique perspectives into the motivations of both government and citizen actors in these two countries, and seeks to explain why Iran of 1979 underwent an Islamic revolution, while Egypt of the 1980s did not. What follows is a nuanced analysis of the two countries civil societies and governmental apparatuses. Despite some minor analytical shortcomings due seemingly to space constraints, Making Islam Democratic is a highly valuable book because of its comparative methodology, and its contribution towards studies on political mobilization in the modern Muslim world Bayat closely focuses on the way politics have operated in states that experienced various Islamic revolutions in the second half of the twentieth century, and argues that political organizing, both at the local and the national level, have been greatly influenced by the “post-Islamist turn.” Bayat defines “post-Islamism” as a “conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains.” Bayat argues that post-Islamism occurs in states where Islam fails to properly harness the political aspirations of normal everyday citizens. When this happens, people turn to new movements/organizations that are can emphasize what Bayat feels defines the post-Islamist turn: the “fusion of religiosity and rights” (11). Bayat’s analysis is focused on the late 1980s and 1990s in Iran and Egypt, when both the Islamic government of Iran and the secular government of Egypt were dealing with rising challenges from Islamic organizations, in both moderate and extreme forms. Bayat’s central research question asks why Iran of the late 1970s experienced an Islamic revolution, while Egypt of the 1980s, faced with similar conditions, only experienced an Islamic movement. For Iran, Bayat concludes that the Shah’s autocratic rule, which crushed political opposition, while providing favorable conditions for Western businesses and expatriate communities galvanized a crosssection of Iranian society, and provided for remarkable “unity of purpose” in overthrowing the regime. After the revolution completed, the revolutionary government allowed for public protest to continue in order to preserve the legitimacy of clerical rule (36). However, for Egypt, Bayat concludes that while “popular mobilization” in poorer urban neighborhoods played a key role in spreading both Islamic practice, it also politicized large swaths of the Egyptian population, and made them ready to “ask questions, debate key issues, and clarify movements’ aims” (19). This allowed groups like the Muslim
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Brotherhood and the Jam’a al-Islami, as well as youth organizations and social welfare groups, to control large sections of civil society, and mobilize large numbers to accomplish a variety of political tasks from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. However, Bayat sees the state as key in quelling a potential Islamic political revolution in Egypt throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. While Iran offered insurgent political groups concessions in order to maintain clerical rule, Egypt’s government cracked down on oppositional groups, increased the strength of his secret police, and actively co-opted (or silenced) key figures in the Islamist movement. This resulted in a “passive revolution” in Egypt that Islamicized civil society, but failed to bring down the Mubarak regime (191). Bayat argues that this crackdown, in turn, made the Egyptian government more religious in nature, as increasingly pious individuals became the leaders of various governmental apparatuses. Since the state, through co-optation, began to control alternative forms of political protest, many of its doctrines and figures began to play a large role in the government itself. In this way, Iran and Egypt diverged when confronted with the possibility of a mass Islamic revolution. This book is highly useful for studies on Islamic co-optation of civil society. It highlights the ways the state and civil society interact through organizations like the Muslim Brotherhoood and Jama’a alIslamiyya. Rapidly changing conditions often accelerate the importance of political groups, and Bayat argues that studying these institutions allows for a better understanding of how “rights” and “religiosity” merged in the 1980s. For example, Bayat explains how the Egyptian government’s expansive infitah program, which liberalized the Egyptian economy and encouraged foreign investment, caused a steep standard of living decrease for poor residents of both Cairo and Alexandria. As government programs in these areas declined, independent humanitarian organizations from wings of the Muslim Brotherhood provided communities with essential services (134). Such acts bestowed legitimacy upon political-religious groups, and inspired political activism within pious individuals. Bayat’s analysis closely analyzes these dynamics. However, the book is not without shortcomings. Bayat’s attempt to compare political Islam in modern Iran and Egypt is limited to 203 pages. While Bayat devotes large amounts of his analysis to the historical narratives of Iran and Egypt, there is little attention given to the protesters themselves. Indeed, the information given about various institutions and organizations within the two countries provides useful
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information into their tactics and scope, but we learn little about the motivations and actions of the protesters at an individual level. Such an analysis would be useful not only for learning more about past actions, but also would provide some possible reasons for the mass protests on January 25th that ended the Mubarak regime. Nevertheless, this is a well-written comparative work that analyzes the differences in political participation for Muslim activists in modern Egypt and Iran. It is a valuable effort, and useful for students and teachers who wish to learn more about political mobilization and Islam in the modern world.
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عرض كتب
علم اإلجتماع السياسي في مقاربة ابستمولوجية عربية وٌعد الدكتور إبراهٌم أبراش واحد من أبرز علماء االجتماع العرب؛ ولئن جعل منه الهم الفلسطٌنً جعل منه كاتبا مواضبا ومنشغال بكل مفاصل الحٌاة السٌاسٌة الفلسطٌنٌة ..فإنه سجل األعمال التً ألفها الدكتور أبراش ٌدل على أنه رجل ثقافة ومعرفة عرٌضة الحدود. أما كتابه "علم اإلجتماع السٌاسً :مقاربة ابستمولوجٌة ودراسة تطبٌقٌة على العالم وجوه. عدة من نوعه من األول فإنه العربً" ٌقول الكتاب الفلسطٌنً الدكتور أبراش أنه "بعد عقود من استقاللٌة علم السٌاسة وجهود علماء السٌاسة المتواصلة لبلورة مجالهم المعرفً والتنظٌري والمؤسساتً الذي ٌمكن علم السٌاسة من اإلحاطة العلمٌة الناجحة لدراسة وفهم الظواهر السٌاسٌة ،وصل علم السٌاسة إلى ما ٌشبه األزمة التً تعززت بسبب التطورات المتالحقة فً الحقل السٌاسً وتعدد وتشعب نماذج السلوك السٌاسً والنظم السٌاسٌة بٌن الدول ،وعدم قدرة التنظٌرات الجاهزة لعلماء السٌاسة ولمناهجهم التقلٌدٌة على تمثل هذه النماذج والمتغٌرات السٌاسٌة ،وتقوقعهم حول مزاعم العلمٌة والعالمٌة لمقوالتهم وتنظٌراتهم والزعم بأنها تتوفر على قدرة شمولٌة لإلحاطة بكل الظواهر السٌاسٌة". وٌستطرد أبراش فً مقدمته للكتاب "إال أننا نعتقد بأن األزمة الحقٌقٌة تكمن فً تزاٌد القناعة لدى علماء السٌاسة بصعوبة فهم الظواهر السٌاسٌة واإلحاطة بأوالٌاتها دون الرجوع إلى البنى االجتماعٌة التً تتفاعل فٌها ومعها هذه الظواهر ،فكان لزاما على علماء السٌاسة العودة مجددا إلى المجتمع وإلى البحث عن أوالٌات (السٌاسً) فً (االجتماعً) ،ودراسة الظاهرات السٌاسٌة ضمن أبعادها االجتماعٌة ،فكان علم االجتماع السٌاسً هو اإلجابة العلمٌة على هذه األزمة ،التً أثٌرت فً مجال علم السٌاسة والتً سبق وأن أثٌرت قبل ذلك فً مجال علم االجتماع من حٌث ادعائه
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االجتماعٌة". الظواهر كل دراسة على شمولٌة قدرة وٌقول إنه "لعقود طوٌلة وعلماء السٌاسة الغربٌون والشرقٌون -نسبة إلى المعسكر االشتراكً سابقاٌ -ضفون صبغة الشمولٌة والعالمٌة على تنظٌراتهم ومقوالتهم السٌاسٌة ،وٌنطلقون فً تعاملهم مع الظواهر السٌاسٌة من منطلقات قانونٌة ومؤسساتٌة .وقد تأثر علماء السٌاسة فً دول العالم الثالث بهذه التنظٌرات وقاموا بنقلها ومحاولة توظٌفها على مجتمعاتهم ،فكانت النتٌجة فشال ذرٌعا فً تمثلها فباألحرى فً تطبٌقها على أرض الواقع وقدرتها على التعامل مع مشاكل هذه المجتمعات". وٌشٌر أبراش الى "إن موطن الخلل ال ٌكمن فً النظرٌات والتعمٌمات التً قال بها علماء السٌاسة فً الغرب أو فً الشرق ،ولكن الخلل ٌكمن فً عدم األخذ بعٌن االعتبار الواقع االجتماعً الذي أقحمت علٌه هذه النظرٌات والتعمٌمات .فمن المعلوم أن أٌة نظرٌة أو إٌدٌولوجٌا تدعً العلمٌة إنما تستمد علمٌتها من كونها صٌاغة عقلٌة ناتجة عن مالحظة واقع اجتماعً /سٌاسً ما ،قامت بتحلٌله اعتمادا على قواعد المنهج العلمً ،فكانت هذه النظرٌات هً الخالصة ،بمعنى أن علمٌتها تكمن فً انطالقها من الواقع وإجابتها عن تساؤالته وقدرتها على التكٌف مع تحوالته والتعامل مع بنٌاته العمٌقة .أما إذا انتزعت هذه النظرٌات والتعمٌمات من سٌاقها االجتماعً وحاولنا تطبٌقها على سٌاقات اجتماعٌة /سٌاسٌة مغاٌرة فال ضمانة بأنها ستحافظ على علمٌتها ،ألنها ستكون نظرٌات وإٌدٌولوجٌات مغتربة عن الواقع وعاجزة عن اإلجابة على تساؤالته". وٌتناول الكتاب ،الصادر عن دار "اي كتب للنشر ،المتغٌرات الجدٌدة وخصوصا فً العالم العربً ،بل وٌمكن القول إنه ٌقدم أول محاولة جادة لفهم طبٌعة الثورات العربٌة ضد أنظمة الفساد واإلستبداد. وعلى هذا األساس فقد جمع ما بٌن جانب االبستملوجٌا وجانب التطبٌق من خالل ا لحالة العربٌة ،كما زاوج بٌن تعرٌف المادة وأكثر المناهج إتباعا فً تحصٌل معرفتها ،مبٌنا فً نفس الوقت الصعوبات التً تواجه الباحث فً علم االجتماع السٌاسً وهً صعوبات تشاركه فٌها العلوم االجتماعٌة األخرى ،والتً تتعلق بطبٌعة العلم االجتماعً من ناحٌة وبشخص الباحث ومحٌطه االجتماعً من ناحٌة أخرى. ٌتألف الكتاب من نحو 330صفحة .وٌضم فصوال تشمل: ـ علم االجتماع السٌاسً :مقاربة مفاهٌمٌة ـ النخبة السٌاسٌة ـ المجتمع المدنً
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ـ التنشئة السٌاسٌة ـ المشاركة السٌاسٌة ـ الدٌمقراطٌة والمشاركة السٌاسٌة فً العالم العربً ـ األصولٌة والعلمانٌة بٌن السٌاسة والدٌن ـ العنف السٌاسً بٌن اإلرهاب والمقاومة ـ الثورة فً عالم متغٌر وٌضم كل فصل من هذه الفصول عدة مباحث نظرٌة وتطبٌقٌة ،ففً الفصل التاسع على سبٌل المثال ٌمكن قراءة المباحث التالٌة: ـ فً فقه الثورة ـ مقاربة مفاهٌمٌة لمصطلح الثورة ـ مفهوم الثورة فً الفكر اإلسالمً ـ الثورة نقطة تحول فً تارٌخ الشعوب ـ الثورة لٌست انقالبا عسكرٌا وال هٌجانا شعبٌا ـ سسٌولوجٌا الثورة فً العالم العربً ـ ماضً العالم العربً( :ثورات) بدون ثورة وانقالبات دون تغٌٌرات ـ الثورتان التونسٌة والمصرٌة واستحضار الثورة فً عالم متغٌر. ـ تجدٌد الثورة على أسس وطنٌة دٌمقراطٌة ـ الثورات العربٌة ومخاطر االستنساخ كتاب "علم اإلجتماع السٌاسً "...عمل شدٌد الغنى بالنسبة لطبٌعته العلمٌة ،ولكنه واحد من أعمال سٌسٌولوجٌة قلٌلة التً تمكنت من جعل علم اإلجتماع قرٌبا من الجمٌع ،وقادرا ،بسبب من غناه ،على أن ٌعطً الكثٌر لقارئه.
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A Last Word Is Israel's Right Wing in Eric Cantor's District? David Swansonď&#x201A;§
Abstract: The problem here is more specific than the wild-west financing of U.S. elections. The problem is that the interests of the Israeli government, far from always representing the Israeli people, in no way represent those of the American people or the people of Virginia...argues the author. Key-words: AIPAC, US foreign policy, Middle East, Israel-US relations
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n May 2009, Congressmen Eric Cantor (R., Va.) and Steny Hoyer (D., Md.) wrote to President Barack Obama about U.S. policy toward Israel. Their staff sent the letter as a PDF but forgot to change the name of the file to something other than "AIPAC Letter Hoyer Cantor May 2009.pdf." AIPAC stands for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a group widely recognized as one of the most effective at lobbying Congress, and a group that consistently promotes the positions of the rightwing party of the Israeli government. ď&#x201A;§
David Swanson is the author of War Is A Lie.
http://warisalie.org http://davidswanson.org
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AIPAC also has the distinction of having lobbied against accountability for an Israeli attack on a U.S. ship and in favor of leniency for a man convicted of selling U.S. secrets to Israel. In a separate case, six years ago, two AIPAC employees were indicted for obtaining U.S. secrets from a U.S. military employee who pled guilty. After powerful Congress members like Jane Harman (D., Calif.) lobbied on their behalf, the charges were dropped. That's what it means to be an effective lobby group: having your way. Need sanctions on Iran? You got em. Support at the United Nations for illegal settlements in Palestine or a blockade and bombing of Gaza? Not a problem. In fact, it would be our pleasure to provide the weapons needed, whether it's for bombing Gaza, bombing Lebanon, or killing Turkish and American peace activists on an aid ship as happened last year. We'd be honored, and don't let cost be a consideration! That would be an insult in these times of huge budget surpluses in Washington! (Warning, this paragraph contained sarcasm.) We give $3 billion in "military aid" to Israel every year, more than we give to any other country. This is justified by the need to protect Israel from all the other countries in its region, most of which we also give or sell arms to. Last fall, when pressure was building in Washington to cut off foreign aid spending, Congressman Cantor proposed making an exception for Israel that would help guarantee it $30 billion over the next decade by hiding that funding in the U.S. "defense" budget. That proposal didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t fly, but neither has any funding of Israeli weapons been cut. Is there any spending here in Virginia that Congressman Cantor has defended this tenaciously? Would there be if we could afford it? Cantor is listed on Maplight.org as the top recipient of campaign money from "pro-Israel" groups in the U.S. House of Representatives, having taken in over $200,000. These groups, most of them affiliated with AIPAC, dump tens of millions of dollars into U.S. elections each cycle. And they certainly appear to get what they pay for. In February, continuing a decades-long pattern that has made the United States the leader in U.N. vetoes, President Obama instructed U.N. Ambassador Susan
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Rice to veto and overrule the other 14 Security Council members' backing of a resolution condemning as illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The problem here is more specific than the wild-west financing of U.S. elections. The problem is that the interests of the Israeli government, far from always representing the Israeli people, in no way represent those of the American people or the people of Virginia. Our views may align or diverge. But the Israeli government's hostility toward Iraq or Iran, Lebanon or Palestine, or to independent democratic rule in Egypt and the rest of the region, need not be our own. That should be for us to decide, open to foreign input, but free of foreign financial pressure. AIPAC raises its money in the United States but advances the agenda of a foreign nation, diverging often from the majority views of both Americans at large and Jewish Americans in particular. Later this month, Congressman Cantor will be a featured speaker at AIPAC's annual conference in Washington DC, but over 100 peace and justice organizations will be holding a counter-conference called "Move Over AIPAC." I wonder if Eric Cantor will get the message.
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Received Books
The New Muslim Elites in European Cities
Book: The New Muslim Elites in European Cities: Religion and Active Social Citizenship Amongst Young Organized Muslims in Brussels and London Author: Konrad Pedziwiatr Paperback: 476 pages Publisher: VDM Verlag Dr. M端ller (8 Oct 2010) Language English ISBN-10: 3639270266 ISBN-13: 978-3639270266
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slam in Western Europe ceases to be a religion of immigrants and is beginning to emerge as a religion of European born citizens. As a result of the acts of violence committed by Muslim believers on the continent and elsewhere there has been increased focus on Muslims in Europe, however, very little attention has been paid to the exploration of various dimensions of citizenship of young European Muslims. The book aims to fill this gap by uncovering what the emerging Muslim religious brokers or members of the new Muslim elites mean when they describe themselves as ‘Muslim citizens’ and by exploring relations between Islam and citizenship in two urban/national settings: one in which Muslims are mostly perceived as individuals (Brussels/Belgium) and one in which they are usually viewed as members of religious, ethnic or other social groups (London/Britain). It argues that the shift in the mobilisation of Islam in Europe from a politics of Muslim identity to the politics of Muslim citizenship is closely linked with the development of a civic consciousness among certain segments of the Muslim populations. The book is a must read for all students of European societies and their ‘Islams’. The Author: Konrad PĘDZIWIATR [ member of MESOJ Editorial Board] is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the Tischner European University (Poland). He holds a PhD in Social Science from the Katholieke Universiteit Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium) where he worked as a researcher between 2004-2008. His previous appointments include Department of Social Science and Humanities at the University of Bradford and Institute of Social Anthropology at the University of Oxford. His recent publications include ‘The New Muslim Elites in European Cities: Religion and Active Social Citizenship Amongst Young Organized Muslims in Brussels and London’ (2010, VDM) and ‘From the Islam of Immigrants to the Islam of Citizens: Muslims in the Countries of Western Europe’ (2005, 2007, Nomos). He published on different dimensions of the Muslim presence in Europe in ‘European Judaism’ (2008), ‘Social Compass’ (2007, 2011) and the ‘ISIM Newsletter’ (2006). He is editor of the biggest web portal in Poland devoted to the Middle Eastern and Muslim issues www.Arabia.pl and the National Coordinator of the EAPPI (Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel). ADDRESS: Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Tischner European University, ul. Westerplatte 11, 31-033 Kraków, Poland. [email: k.pedziwiatr@gmail.com
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Received Books LES MUSULMANS : UN CAUCHEMAR OU UNE FORCE POUR L’EUROPE ?
Auteurs: Hichem Karoui, Arno Tausch Editeur: l’Harmattan. Paris. Collection: Histoire et perspectives méditerranéennes ISBN : 978-2-296-13980-0 • avril 2011 • 262 pages Mots-clés: ACTUALITÉ SOCIALE ET POLITIQUE ANTHROPOLOGIE, ETHNOLOGIE, CIVILISATION IMMIGRATION, INTERCULTUREL RELIGION MAGHREB, MONDE ARABE, MOYEN ORIENT EUROPE
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Avant-propos
i après avoir lu ce livre, le lecteur ne verra plus l’islam d’Europe de la même façon, nous aurons ainsi réalisé un des objectifs de cette publication. Ce livre se veut juste une contribution au débat. Une contribution à titre scientifique. En effet, grâce aux outils les plus récents de la recherche en sciences sociales, nous pouvons désormais prétendre mieux connaître les musulmans qui vivent sur le continent européen. Cela nous permet à la fois de les distinguer de l’islam global, et de commencer à établir un cartogramme humain évolutif de l’islam européen. Bientôt, nous serons à même de tracer des lignes de « frontières » distinctes entre l’islam européen et l’islam global. L’islam est d’abord présent en Europe du Sud, au terme de sa première expansion, entre le VIIIème et le XVème siècle : c’est l’histoire, notamment, de l’Espagne musulmane. Avec l’empire Ottoman, à partir du XVIème siècle, c’est l’Europe du Sud-Est (Grèce, Balkans, etc…) qui passe sous influence musulmane. Le déclin, ensuite, de cet empire – fin XIXème, début XXème siècles – correspond aux premières migrations musulmanes de travail en direction de l’Europe de l’Ouest. Nordafricaines, africaines, turques et asiatiques, ces dernières se réclament de plus en plus de l’islam, à partir des années 1970 et séjournent en Europe de façon de plus en plus prolongée.
Combler un vide Nous prétendons que notre travail vient combler un vide. C’est pour la première fois, en effet, qu’on entreprend une étude comparative relative à l’islam européen et l’islam global, basée à la fois, sur l’analyse documentaire, sociologique, anthropologique, et sur les données quantitatives de l’enquête sociale européenne et la World Values Survey. Dans notre approche de l’islam européen, nous amorçons un début de réponse générale et des réponses spécifiques à un nombre de questions que les européens, non musulmans et musulmans, se posent depuis un certain temps. En effet, l’analyse empirique des données concernant les conditions de vie aussi bien que les opinions des musulmans en Europe, nous conduit à des conclusions, sinon surprenantes pour les observateurs de l’islam européen, pour le moins différentes. Jusqu’à récemment, on a plus ou moins maintenu que si les musulmans d’Europe vivent encore dans des espaces « d’exclusion sociale », c’est à cause de la culture qu’ils portent, c’est-à-dire à cause de l’islam (même si
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on ne le dit pas toujours ouvertement). C’est vrai. Mais pour nous, ce n’est pas l’islam qui est fautif, mais ceux qui n’arrivent pas à l’accepter. Nous démontrons ici, que si cette culture différente de la culture occidentale dominante en Europe a causé l’exclusion sociale, c’est bien parce que certaines politiques européennes, sont basées sur de fausses données, des stéréotypes et des préjugés. Notre connaissance directe des deux cultures (occidentale et islamique) nous permet de pousser un peu plus loin l’analyse. Peut-on vraiment dire que l’islam n’est pas fautif, quant à l’exclusion des musulmans d’Europe ? S’agit-il vraiment seulement de politiques européennes biaisées envers les musulmans ? Comment expliquer alors la radicalisation de certains musulmans d’Europe qui va jusqu’à faire de certains d’entre-eux un véritable soutien à Al-Qaeda, s’ils ne sont pas directement impliqués dans des activités terroristes ? Après tout, depuis le 11 septembre 2001, on a découvert que ce sont des musulmans d’Europe qui ont agi à tous les niveaux du réseau terroriste. Il est surprenant en effet, pour quelqu’un qui a passé une grande partie de sa vie dans des pays musulmans, de constater jusqu’à quel point les musulmans de France, par exemple, sont conservateurs par rapport à des pays comme la Tunisie, le Maroc, l’Égypte, etc… et jusqu’à quel point leur conservatisme semble réactif à l’égard de leur environnement direct. Pourtant, ce qu’il est désormais convenu d’appeler « calvinisme islamique » a des bases réelles dans le comportement des musulmans. Quand nous parlons de « bases », cela veut dire qu’on peut chercher loin les racines de ce comportement, essentiellement dans le Coran lui-même, aussi bien que dans la Tradition ou Sunna du prophète Muhammad. En effet, plusieurs versets et Hadith tendent à confirmer le plus simplement du monde les conclusions de l’analyse empirique, qui sans se référer aux textes-sources de l’islam, a pourtant bien vu que lorsque les musulmans cherchent la prospérité et l’intégration dans une société développée, même si elle est culturellement différente, ils ne se sentent pas du tout en conflit avec leur religion. Bien au contraire. Mais avant d’aller plus loin, il faut aussi relativiser. Pour nous aussi, le problème ne se pose pas au niveau de la religion elle-même. Quelle que soit la société dans laquelle un musulman (pratiquant ou non) essaie de s’intégrer, il peut trouver dans sa religion (s’il le veut) tout ce qui l’aide à développer non seulement une interaction active avec la société d’accueil, mais aussi un esprit d’entreprise. Mais s’il est vrai que certaines politiques européennes n’arrivent pas à intégrer les musulmans, il y a aussi un autre facteur entravant, qui provient d’une double interaction négative : avec la société d’origine, et avec la société d’accueil.
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Nous nous proposons ainsi de faire le point sur deux aspects essentiels du problème : 1 : – L’islam représente-t- il une entrave à l’intégration du musulman dans une société occidentale ? La réponse peut être un oui ou un non. Cela présuppose le respect de certaines conditions, sans lesquelles décidément, l’homme (ou la femme) qui se définit comme musulman ne peut pas survivre en Occident. Par exemple, un islam fermé et obscurantiste n’a aucune chance de gagner la sympathie de la population occidentale. Il n’a d’ailleurs aucune chance de plaire aux jeunes générations de musulmans nés en Occident. Mais nous pouvons trouver des exemples démontrant la capacité d’adaptation de l’islam, pris dans le Coran, la Sunna et l’histoire. Nous pouvons démontrer ainsi que l’Islam : a) encourage le commerce, la libre entreprise, et l’enrichissement honnête ; et qu’il b) encourage le dialogue et l’échange avec les autres cultures. Cependant, tout cela reste tributaire de la réponse apportée à la question : quel islam adopter ? Il est bien évident que l’islam des mollahs extrémistes ou celui des ultraconservateurs puritains, sunnites ou chiites, représente la mauvaise réponse en Occident. La raison est simple : l’Occident ne s’adaptera pas à la minorité musulmane qui vit chez lui. Par conséquent, on s’attend à ce que cette minorité s’adapte au système occidental. Ce qui est presque normal. « Presque » parce que ce principe de réalité semble impossible à « digérer » pour deux types de musulmans : les salafistes et autres fondamentalistes tournés vers le passé idéalisé, et tous ceux qui agissent sous l’impulsion d’une réaction épidermique contre la stigmatisation. Mais tant qu’ils ne changeront pas, ils vivront toujours en « décalage horaire ». Bien entendu, cela ne les empêchera pas de s’insérer dans le système économique, de faire des affaires et même de prospérer. Mais du point de vue d’un nombre important d’occidentaux, cela n’est pas suffisant pour faire partie de la société. 2 : – Si l’islam n’est pas une entrave à l’intégration et la bonne entente, alors qu’est-ce qui l’est dans le comportement musulman ? La réponse est dans l’idée qu’on se fait de l’islam. En effet, beaucoup de gens disent : tout est positif et encourageant en islam ; les musulmans peuvent parfaitement mener leur barque à bon port dans la modernité. Maintenant, peut être. Mais si tel est le cas, qu’est-ce qui a donc empêché les musulmans de progresser durant des siècles ? On ne peut pas tout mettre sur le dos du colonialisme et de l’impérialisme occidental. Lorsque nous examinons l’histoire islamique, nous nous apercevons que la décadence n’a pas commencé au XIXème siècle, lorsque les Européens ont décidé d’envahir les pays musulmans. Il y a déjà longtemps que ces pays ont raté le sens de l’histoire et se sont perdus dans un long tunnel
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obscur, sans possibilité de progrès vers la lumière. Quand cette décadence a commencé, les européens n’étaient pas assez puissants ni pour les menacer, ni pour les retarder. Ils ont même beaucoup appris à leur contact. Si la cause de la décadence des musulmans n’est pas européenne, elle est donc intrinsèque. Si elle est intrinsèque, les musulmans ne peuvent pas en être complètement blanchis. Il doit probablement y avoir quelque chose dans leur interprétation de l’islam qui a joué contre la continuation du progrès, qui a même arrêté le progrès, et qui continue encore à entraver les efforts actuels pour « s’en sortir ». Nous insistons ici sur le fait qu’en parlant de l’islam, c’est toujours de sa représentation qu’il s’agit. La représentation est une manière particulière de percevoir et d’interpréter les textes, les rites, et les pratiques qui en découlent, ce qui touche tous les aspects de la vie sociale, économique, politique, et culturelle. La représentation est aussi la clé pour comprendre le comportement. En effet, aucun comportement humain n’est possible sans un cadre de références qui l’ancre dans une optique sociale, philosophique, cosmologique, etc… Dans la présente étude, nous explorons ces questions selon deux axes au moins : l’un, relatif aux rapports des musulmans avec l’Europe ; l’autre, relatif à leurs rapports avec la société d’origine. Les deux genres de rapports nous semblent contenir des éléments provoquant l’échec et prolongeant une mésentente déjà chronique entre les musulmans et l’occident. Nous sommes convaincus que pour réussir leur intégration, les musulmans doivent connaître ce qui l’entrave, qu’il vienne d’euxmêmes, ou de leurs rapports et de leur interaction. Nous serons donc amenés à parler de la représentation et de ce qui influence le comportement. Cet aspect du problème concerne l’examen des données quantitatives en corrélation avec l’analyse historique, psycho-sociale, et sociologique des perceptions et des représentations de l’islam. En effet, sur les attitudes, les valeurs et les positions des musulmans, nous disposons à présent d’une information provenant de plusieurs bases de données, grâce aux enquêtes européennes et mondiales sur ces thèmes. C’est la dimension empirique qui nous permet de fonder notre réponse sur les données quantitatives. Dans le premier chapitre, nous introduisons notre lecteur à l’analyse empirique, par un résumé de la littérature sur la connaissance de l’islam, tout en essayant de traiter les problèmes qui pourraient entraver la connaissance scientifique de l’islam. Nous présentons aussi une première approche des problèmes idéologiques dans le processus de l’intégration, et une analyse comparative des systèmes de croyances musulman et non musulmans. Nous essayons aussi d’avancer sur le terrain de la
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connaissance empirique de l’islam et de voir comment se forme le discours scientifique à ce propos. Nous terminons par une analyse de la politique en islam et des catégories sociales. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous introduisons notre lecteur à la notion fondamentale de « calvinisme islamique, » qui pour nous, éclaire le succès économique des musulmans, ce qui facilite leur intégration. Nous commencerons alors à démontrer les spécificités d’un islam européen. En essayant de répondre à la question : « est-il licite et moral pour le musulman de s’intégrer et de prospérer dans des sociétés non musulmanes » ? Nous analyserons quelques échantillons des textes fondateurs de l’islam. En effet, c’est le Coran et le Hadith (propos) du prophète Muhammad, qui nous fournirons les réponses. Les chapitres suivants (III, IV, et V) sont consacrés aux résultats de l’enquête empirique, qui fondent nos propres conclusions, concernant l’existence d’un islam européen spécifique. Le chapitre III est consacré à une analyse comparative des différences entre l’islam européen et l’islam global, sur la base des données de la World Values Survey (WVS) et Gallup Coexist Index 2009. Le chapitre IV répondra aux questions concernant la sécurité intérieure en Europe en rapport avec les musulmans. Le chapitre V analysera la criminalité et le facteur religieux, la pauvreté et ses rapports à l’intégration. Le dernier chapitre (VI) est un long commentaire et un complément de l’analyse quantitative précédente. Nous y soulevons des questions à propos des origines des problèmes qui peuvent handicaper ou élever des obstacles devant l’intégration et la bonne entente entre musulmans et non musulmans et nous y commentons longuement le conservatisme islamique.
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Received Books “Muslim calvinism”, internal security and the Lisbon process in Europe
NEW BOOK by: Arno Tausch with Chr. Bischof & K. Mueller
Rozenberg Publishers, Amsterdam 16,5 x 24 cm 248 pag. € 26,50 ISBN 978 90 5170 995 7 2011
ABSTRACT
T
his book systematically evaluates the freely available data, contained in the European Social Survey and other international, open sources, on the problems of internal security and social policy in Europe for the Muslim and the non-Muslim populations in Europe. It is the attempt to try to present an interpretation pattern for
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the complex reality of poverty; social exclusion, religious and societal values, and day to day contact of different population groups in Europe with the law. The optimistic results are in line with recent quantitative research results, which maintain that instead of engaging in a culturalist discourse about the general “disadvantages” of Islam, Europe rather should talk about economic-growth-enhancing migration, property rights, discrimination against minorities on the labor markets, and that by and large, Islam as such is well compatible with democracy and economic growth. If there is anything as “integration deficits” of the Muslim communities in Europe vis-à-vis the law, defined in this study along ESS (European Social Survey) indicators of the “shadow economy”, document fraud as well as indicators of lack of trust in the police and in European institutions, these deficits are caused rather by market imperfections and market failures in the European political economy, largely characterized by state intervention, and not by any intrinsic destabilizing or simply “evil” “character traits” of Muslims. In many ways, the polarizing events in France are a kind of laboratory and testing ground for our theories – high state sector involvement, a mediocre Lisbon performance, and a high, and increasing poverty among the country‟s Muslims, which all contribute to rising social tensions, violence and protest in the „banlieues”. Apart from presenting data from the European Social Survey, Tausch and associates evaluate and compare their country level ESS aggregate research results with other research materials, derived from crossnational political science and value research. Thus, a variety of results and methods are presented – aggregations of survey results at the national level, cross-national comparisons of these survey results with cross-national political science data; factor analyses of the opinion and civic culture structure of the totality of Muslims and non-Muslims in all of Europe, multiple regressions of the determinants of their trust in the police, in democracy, and in personal happiness, and a re-linking of the “Muslim Calvinist” results with new global level data about migration, Islam, and national well-being. At the end of this exercise of quantitative political science, Tausch and associates arrive at the conclusion that Islamophobia is baseless, and that European Muslims; above all, deserve economic freedom, markets and respect. JEL-class.: C2, C43, D31, F02, F15, F5, H11, H2, H26, J70, O10, O17, O57, Z12
Keywords: C2 – Single Equation Models; Single Variables; C43 – Index Numbers and Aggregation; D31 – Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions; F02 – International Economic Order; F15 – Economic Integration; F5 – International Relations and International Political Economy;
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H11 – Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government; H2 – Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue; H26 – Tax Evasion; J70 – General – Labor Discrimination; O10 – General – Economic Development; O17 – Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements; O57 – Comparative Studies of Countries; Z12 – Religion
Table of Contents Abstract Chapter 1: The european social survey data, AND internal security in europe (Arno Tausch, with Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller) Chapter 2: Towards empirically defining sectoral integration surpluses and integration deficits (Arno Tausch, with Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller) Chapter 3: Europe‟s inward migration, patterns of labor market discrimination, EU-25 wide poverty rates, and the detrimental efects of state intervention (Arno Tausch, with Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller) Chapter 4: Developing the theory: Migration, the “Muslim factor” and THE european and global Lisbon Process (Arno Tausch) [Looking back on earlier research and developing a research design for understanding the “global Lisbon process”, social cohesion and longterm economic growth on a world scale] Chapter 5: Developing the theory: The empirical results about the European and global Lisbon Process; Minority social inclusion and internal security (Arno Tausch) Chapter 6: Empirical analysis: A factor analysis of European Social Survey data – general populations and European Muslims (Arno Tausch, with Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller) Chapter 7: Empirical analysis: Patterns of national disintegration, crIminality and the religious factor in Europe – myths and reality on the basis of the trade-off between poverty and integration surplusses/deficits (Arno Tausch, with Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller) Chapter 8: Empirical analysis: a multiple regression analysis of integration surpluses and integration gaps (Arno Tausch, with Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller) Chapter 9: On the relevance of barro/Mc CLEARY on religion – results of our multiple regression analyses of key data of the entire european
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muslim and non-muslim population (Arno Tausch, with Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller) Chapter 10: A multi-cultural European union and European muslim civic culture (Arno Tausch, with Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller) Appendix (Arno Tausch; Christian Bischof and Karl Mueller) Error margins and sample size The basic results for internal security in Europe The Lisbon process and the UNDP Human Development Index The number of cases (“Fallzahl”) 1. Joined ESS1 and ESS2 on “satisfied with democracy” 2. Joined ESS1 and ESS2 on “income” Sources and Bibliography (Arno Tausch) Subject Index Person and authorship Index „The idea that Muslims are unique because of their beliefs and pose a threat to European values and aspirations is thoroughly debunked. Professor Tausch should be congratulated for bringing systematic analysis to bear on a public discourse driven by the big event, jingoist media, a nervous public, and opportunistic politicians.‟ Indra de Soysa (PhD) Professor Dept. of Sociology and Political Science Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) N-7491 Trondheim, Norway – « Un livre très clair, très riche faisant état des discriminations et des mauvaises conditions de vie de la communauté musulmane en Europe ce qui ne favoriserait pas l‟intégration et la cohésion sociale. Ce livre, qui attire l‟attention des gouvernements, est recommandé aussi pour le large public. » HAFFAD Tahar, Enseignant-chercheur, Laboratoire d‟Etudes des Economies Maghrébines, Université de Batna, Algérie. – „The book provides a fascinating profile of the Muslim communities of Europe,based on a wide array of social science data, and investigates the problem of their social, economic, and political integration in Europe. The authors see the state of Muslim integration in Europe as a kind of
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litmus issue for the success or failure of the development of the European Union and its Lisbon Strategy. By examining deficits in the integration of one of Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x;s minorities, they can point to deficits in the current development of the European project. Broadly speaking, that is a deficit in the development of a social Europe. Similar to a recent study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the book argues that it is a mistake to treat relations with Muslim communities as nothing but a police and security problem, leading to Islamophobia, and emphasize the importance of the social and economic dimensions. In line with the Theory of Justice by Rawls, Muslim Calvinism by Tausch and associates takes the view that the society of Europe cannot be a just society if it fails to do justice to one of its disadvantaged minorities.â&#x20AC;&#x; Gernot KĂśhler Professor emeritus, Sheridan College, Oakville, Canada
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