Lutra Associates - If CBRN in Ukraine is a possibility can it be defended against?

IF CBRN IN UKRAINE IS A POSSIBILITY CAN IT BE DEFENDED AGAINST?

Lutra is frequently asked what the issues are in Ukraine in terms of the fighting and in particular the use of CBRN.

In simplified form this is what we tell people. The stress has to be on “simplified” because that is what it is. There are lots of throw away lines any of which can be picked apart but in essence it is the situation. There is not space here to cover the whole context but it is important to understand it. The press have covered the actual conduct of the fighting and it’s outcomes. We have got to a point where a number of stalemates are the result. The much vaunted Russian Armed Forces have been unable to complete Putin’s invasion plans in scope or timeframe. This does not mean though that its “game over” . There are probably several rolls of the dice to occur before that can be called and use of CBRN is one possible roll or series of rolls.

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine caught the Western and Allied democracies off guard. Fuelled by decades of kowtowing to Russia’s view of itself the liberal left and academic thinkers failed to realise they were not in an intellectual argument but a stand up fight with a playground bully The soft left people in power, or advising them, caved in expecting that he, and his cronies, would back off.

However he wanted more. This is key to the person; he was brought up in a system where being a bully was encouraged and he was used to all those around him being bullies. The playground rules applied. The rules are the bully’s not the teachers. Unless the other boys and girls come together and fight back or the teachers impose discipline the situation deteriorates. Mix that with his failure to accept the demise of the power of the Soviet Union, and therefore his value system, and one sees the problem. The original plan was classic Soviet Military theory it would not have been out of place in West Germany. Advance on a broad front, aim to engage as many of the enemy as you can pin them down developing a line or two of main effort. Throw all your available forces down those lines to rapidly advance and achieve political and strategic objectives. So what went wrong? The Ukrainians have fought with courage, guile and determination to defend their homeland. Secondly they have been fighting the Russians for 8 years and are well versed in their tactics. Thirdly Ukraine was advised and equipped by some pretty capable armies who had read the Russian pamphlets and understood their way of war and the technology needed. Finally the Russians have perhaps gone a bit soft and corrupt. From generals downwards Russian soldiers have seen their political master and his friends getting richer whilst the gain share has not reached them. Couple all this with a propensity to make them look 10 feet tall especially in their own eyes and issues are bound to arise.

Anecdotally there are lots of reasons for it and we have all seen them in the press but a personal experience was listening to a retired German general explaining tank design. He spread his arms to their full extent and said “tank tracks need to be this wide” . Students on the course asked why that was, expecting some wonderful formula to be explained. He simply said “At this time of the year the mud is very deep in Ukraine!” Those who have read the books and talked to old soldiers who did the fighting know that if the only route is the road you have a problem; read about Arnhem. If there is lots of rubble infantry is king. Too much mud, too few roads and lots of rubble equals nowhere to go. Get stuck on a road unable to move and the result for a motivated, savvy, innovative defence is what the Americans call a target rich environment. The plan shuddered to a halt and Putin was left wondering what to do next.

Apart from using his remaining forces to crash and smash to a limited objective and then presenting failure as a victory or threaten more of the same conventional vandalism or engage in a war of attrition, all of which are unacceptable, about the only card he has got left is the use of CBRN. He has been making noises about special weapons aka Chemical Weapons or Tactical Nuclear warheads or Enhanced Radiation Munitions and then test launches his latest Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) all to ratchet up the uncertainty level. The threat and the message; stop supporting the kid I have decided to bash up. There is an Arab proverb, you cheated me once shame on you, you cheated me twice shame on me. One hopes the Western Democracies are not shamed.

How do you defend against CBRN? First look at the threat. Although successful in Syria the fact that the majority of his CW has been destroyed under Chemical Weapons Convention terms probably makes its availability and use unlikely. He may have some Novichok but unless he has set up a plant in total secrecy it will probably only be laboratory not war fighting stocks available. He could resort to use of toxic industrial chemicals e.g. Chlorine, as in Syria but the delivery methods:, barrels rolled out of helicopters or release from ground based cylinders are probably not viable against the Ukrainians with effective air defences and sophisticated surveillance devices. Russian helicopter and ground casualties so far would actively discourage others from such ventures.

Biological is too much of a two edged sword. You are as likely to kill or injure as many or more of your own side as the other and deployment and dissemination is a really difficult activity. At best it’s a long term option not a flick of the fingers, turn the switch effect. A threat yes but a slow burning one. That all leaves a radiological threat. It’s probably best to leave the use of an ICBM off the list. By definition it would probably impact, in one way or another, a NATO member. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would kick in and US, UK and French retaliation in kind would occur. Not his desired result. If he were to use battlefield nuclear warheads or Enhanced Radiation Munitions the same may be true. Strikes would have to be on territorial Ukraine with no overspill of radiation or fall out into neighbouring NATO members. Whilst feasible it’s probably not likely. Having captured the Chernobyl region and other Ukrainian nuclear power sites he has had access to radioactive material which is semi deniable, as if he needs more, and he could deploy that material by a number of means. This is probably the most likely course especially as he can deny it and claim it was the Ukrainians all along, as he has been crying out through his warped press, media and social media campaigns from before the start of the invasion. There are lots of imponderables to do with the use of radiation or nuclear options. Amongst other things radiation is a psychological weapon. Often the physical injuries are not as great as the fear of the effects that they generate which causes chaos and disruption amongst the population and less well trained forces. Just the sort of thing to threaten resolute defences with: well possibly. However would intelligent Russian soldiers venture into such dangerous areas post strike. If they won’t what would be the point of using these weapons. Deliberate use of any of these weapons would almost certainly result in war crimes trials. How many senior Russians would put their neck on the block to save their president? Equally if Chernobyl taught anyone anything it was that radiation clouds are unpredictable as the Russian troops who occupied it have reportedly found out to their cost due to inhalation of dust stirred up by vehicles.

So how to defend against CBRN if used? First and foremost effective CBRN defence is a deterrent to the use of CBRN weapons of all sorts. Secondly the threat of retaliation and legal response such as war crimes are all part of defence. As for physical defence it’s a long term goal but in essence the mantra is the same for all CBRN Defence. An holistic defence is required. A chain formed of strong links. A weak link means there is no defence. The links, the taxonomies in the trade, are: detection and identification, protection for individuals and groups, contamination control including decontamination and countermeasures (including appropriate medical measures). All of these must be backed by education and training and effective information management. Each one of these would individually require a full edition to fully cover so the intention is to concentrate here on radiological detection first because it is probably the most important and then touch on some of the other taxonomies for radiological defence which will give a very rough and ready defence capability. Effective detection allows you to: generate and manage and use the threat data, help decide whether an attack is real or a false alarm, if it’s an incident or an attack, bound the contaminated area, see whether the contamination is moving-that dust cloud, identify the threat ie it tells you how dangerous the isotope actually is, how much there is of it and its intensity. Most importantly it allows you to deal with rumours and false alarms before they become panics. The best detectors and identifiers such as the Kromek D3/D5 range, but there are others, allow simple intuitive operation, have simple read outs and can be used as hand held or fixed devices. The information is in digital format as well as on the display allowing onward transmission by any means ranging from a smart phone to a secure radio. Then the data can be fed into a management system allowing further processing to calculate where radiation clouds may travel in the prevailing weather conditions. They can be used as hand held, deployable or fixed units, fixed to vehicles, UGVs and UAVs and so used remotely without having to deploy people into the contaminated area. Arguably by using your detectors correctly and if you do not have adequate protective equipment you can move your troops and civilians to areas that are not contaminated or are are less so. Detection is one of the building blocks, arguably the foundation, of CBRN defence. Then the issue is how to protect the people involved. The best protection is avoidance. However defenders have to hold firm in position post strike. If you can not “avoid” firstly prevent inhalation. Some form of respiratory protection for individuals is required. Some would argue that collective protection for groups is important, so it is, but we are talking survival and a respirator although not as comfortable as collective protection prevents inhalation. Contamination control stems from good detection and identification. People who do not need to remain in position can be moved away i.e. avoid the contamination. The detectors can be used to control entry to clean areas and measures can be taken to clean contaminated people. Getting people into cover and keeping them clean is key. People who must enter contaminated areas have to be given protective clothing which they can change or clean when they come out of the contamination. There are lots of decontamination equipments available and in the absence of bespoke items extemporising can play a major part in radiological decontamination. The data needs to be fed into a hazard management processing system. The Bruhn Newtech Analysis is probably the best and most available in the world and will speed up decision making, and therefore directing people away from contamination, and starting countermeasures. All this needs to be backed by sound training. Argon Electronics provides a range of simulators which allow CBRN detection and Identification equipment to be realistically simulated in realistic scenarios to enable real time training exercises and confirmation that drills and skills are being implemented correctly. This basic equipment set will allow defenders to defend and the survival of as many of the unprotected as possible. It’s not a perfect set but as a rough and ready compromise and first step it would work. Let us hope it’s not needed.

Impacts of GNSS interference on military systems

In the light of the Ukrainian war, reports emerged that the full spectrum of Navigation Warfare is being used within Ukraine on both sides. This especially includes intentional GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) interference and has a significant influence on troop and also civilian operations in the area. The most recent reports of system malfunctions due to GNSS signal issues show that there is a clear need for improvement in terms of defence against Navigation Warfare attacks and training within Navigation Warfare environments.

Background

Due to their nature, GNSSs are susceptible to intentional interference without requiring very high signal power or overly complex equipment. The two main factors for the vulnerability of GNSS signals against interference are the low received signal power (below thermal noise) and the open and publicly known signal structure. Although modernized signals counter the vulnerabilities by employing more sophisticated modulation schemes like higher-order binary offset carrier (BOC) or incorporating authentication features, these countermeasures cannot provide perfect interference mitigation and also many systems still rely on older signals. Governmental authorities, armed forces, system integrators and GNSS equipment manufacturers should be aware of the danger caused by GNSS signal interference. They should get the possibility to test their equipment in a protected and realistic environment to assess vulnerabilities and improve equipment in order to better tackle GNSS interference.

What is interference?

Interference to GNSS can be unintentional (e.g., inter-system interference, multipath, etc.) or intentional. Unintentional interference can generally be better controlled and mitigated. Intentional interference is categorized into the two main categories jamming and spoofing, which pose a significant risk to GNSS measurements. Jamming denotes the transmission of highpowered signals with the goal to shadow the GNSS signals so that a receiver cannot acquire and track them. Typical jamming signals are chirp or noise signals with a bandwidth matching or exceeding the bandwidth of the respective GNSS bands they target. In general, jamming detection can be performed pre-correlation or postcorrelation, while the most suitable approach depends on the type and possibilities of the receiver in use. Since different detectors have different advantages and disadvantages, an optimal jamming detector should be based on the combination of several detector values.

jamming spoofing

Spoofing denotes the transmission of fake GNSS signals with the goal to falsify (spoof) the position, velocity and time (PVT) solution of the receiver under attack. For this, spoofing signals have to be modulated in the same way than authentic satellites are modulated and also the navigation messages usually have to be mimicked for

a spoofing attack to work well. Typical spoofing attacks rely on either a GNSS signal generator or a modified (usually software-defined) GNSS receiver.

Detection of GNSS spoofing is more complex than jamming detection given the different nature of the attack, where a finetuned spoofing cannot necessarily be seen in the frequency spectrum. While some published spoofing detection algorithms target multiple antennas or are only applicable with relative movement between spoofer and receiver, the approach of GIDAS (GNSS Interference Detection & Analysis System) developed by OHB Digital Solutions is suitable for a static single-antenna receiver, which is considered to facilitate Interference has multiple potential impacts on military systems. The most common impact is the complete loss of GNSS reception, which results in loss of position, navigation and time. The effects of spoofing are even more dangerous than those of jamming because the falsified position is often not noticed and the integrity of the GNSS application is not doubted. The consequences of a GNSS interference attack are, in addition to a total loss of PNT capabilities, also increasing the own risk, collateral damage and leadership problems. However, since the use of GNSS and PNT will continue to increase in the future, it can be assumed that jamming and spoofing will continue to increase. Navigation Warfare would therefore also affect the use of navigation systems in the public domain and for each individual.

eventual certification procedures due to the lower complexity of the overall system.

GNSS interference in military systems