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EFORMATION VOLUME 7 NUMBER 6

“I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy.”

Predestination and the Freedom of God

NOVEMBER

I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy: Predestination and the Freedom of God FEATURES 5 “God’s Purpose According to Election”: Paul’s Argument in Romans 9 Steven M. Baugh As much as some may try to deny it, Paul clearly teaches double predestination.

10 “Neither Reason Nor Free-Will Points to Him”: Luther’s Assertion That the Whole Man Is in Bondage

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Benjamin E. Sasse The root defect of most arguments that reject predestination is an insufficient grasp of the fall. If there is to be any relationship between God and humanity, God must take the initiative.

18 Neglected Sources of the Reformed Doctrine of Predestination: Ulrich Zwingli and Peter Martyr Vermigli Frank A. James III Calvin jumps to mind when predestination is mentioned, but the Church has always known Augustinian interpreters of Paul. Meet Ulrich Zwingli and Peter Martyr Vermigli.

26 The Lutheran Doctrine of Predestination…

A Melanchthonian Perspective Scott L. Keith Melanchthon is certainly more timid about reprobation than is Luther, but we would be well-served to recognize that Melanchthon’s divergence is more of emphasis than substance.

29 “Make Your Calling and Election Sure”: Predestination and Assurance in Reformed Theology Michael S. Horton Election is not the occasion for speculation. Instead, it is meant to comfort those who have been crushed by the Law and raised to life by the Gospel.

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DEPARTMENTS 2 In This Issue…

3 Letters 6 Romans 9 17 Quotes 20 Three Views on Predestination

23 35 42 43 45 48

Free Space Preaching Christ In Print Review Endnotes On My Mind

38 Did Calvin’s Successors Distort His Doctrine of Predestination?

Joel E. Kim While Calvin and his followers may have used different methods, neither he nor they made predestination the center of their theological system.

Cover: Jan Sanders van Hemessen, Isaac blessing Jacob. Museum of Fine Arts, Budapest, Hungary. Art Resource

EFORMATION

IN THIS ISSUE…

By Michael S. Horton

Predestination ohn Stott has written, “The doctrine of predestination was not invented by Calvin of Geneva or Augustine of Hippo. It is above all a biblical doctrine and no biblical Christian can ignore it.”1 But ignore it we have.

How can a teaching be so clearly revealed and so repeatedly expounded in Scripture, and yet so easily dismissed by the Church? It has been said that salvation is by faith alone so that it may be in Christ alone so that all of the glory may go to God alone. If that’s true, then surely election is one of those glittering gems in the crown which belongs exclusively to the Great King.

Not only is the knowledge of election essential for true worship—giving credit where credit is due—but also for our consolation. We know our hearts, at least when God’s Word tells us the nature of true righteousness. So if our salvation, at any point, depends on the goodness of our will or works—even foreseen ones—how can we ever rest assured that we are safe from God’s judgment and co-heirs with Christ?

God has always accompanied the preaching of his electing grace with favor, as its prominence in every sound reformation and awakening demonstrates. But treating a subject as vast as predestination is like trying to empty the ocean with a spoon. We asked ourselves whether all of the articles should be biblical expositions or systematic and historical treatments. This issue ended up being tilted heavily toward the historical, but what do you expect from modernREFORMATION? We hope that it will whet your appetite to study God’s Word more thoroughly in the company of the giants who have blazed these trails before us.

Also in this issue, we are pleased to unveil two new columns that are part of an ongoing effort to improve both the content and the form of this magazine. Free Space is our new interview column. The name aims to communicate that this is the place in the magazine to interact with ideas that are not within our normal bounds.

Occasionally, as in this issue’s interview with Professor Clark Pinnock, this will enable someone with whom confessing evangelicals typically differ to speak freely and frankly.

This will ensure that we are fairly engaging real—rather than caricatured—nonReformation views. On other occasions, this space might be used to seek an understanding of a matter that is not directly theological (and thus is probably not going to have a full issue devoted to it), but which still has some bearing on the concerns of these pages.

The second column, Preaching Christ, will offer examples of redemptive historical sermons, showing how, as Jesus said, all of the Scriptures testify to him. In this issue, we are excited to have a contribution from Professor Edmund Clowney, a man who has taught so many of us how to find Christ throughout both testaments. Here he preaches on NEXT ISSUE: Genesis 22, the binding of Isaac and the infinite price paid only by Christ. And as always, we Eschatology welcome your feedback on this magazine’s project and its execution.

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A publication of Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals Editor-in-Chief Dr. Michael S. Horton Assistant Editor Benjamin E. Sasse Production Editor Irene H. Hetherington Column Editors Brian Lee Copy Editors Ann Henderson Hart Deborah Barackman Layout and Design Lori A. Cook Proofreader Alyson S. Platt Production Assistant Kathryn Baldino Alliance Council Dr. John H. Armstrong The Rev. Alistair Begg Dr. James M. Boice Dr. W. Robert Godfrey Dr. John D. Hannah Dr. Michael S. Horton Mrs. Rosemary Jensen Dr. J. A. O. Preus Dr. R. C. Sproul Dr. Mark R. Talbot Dr. Gene E. Veith, Jr. Contributing Scholars Dr. Sinclair B. Ferguson Allen C. Guelzo Dr. D. G. Hart Dr. Carl F. H. Henry Dr. Arthur A. Just Dr. Robert Kolb The Rev. Donald Matzat Dr. John W. Montgomery Mr. John Muether Dr. Richard A. Muller Mr. Kenneth A. Myers Dr. Tom J. Nettles Dr. Leonard R. Payton Dr. Lawrence R. Rast Dr. Kim Riddlebarger Mr. Rick Ritchie Dr. Rod Rosenbladt Dr. David P. Scaer Ms. Rachel S. Stahle Dr. David F. Wells Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals © 1998 All rights reserved. The Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals exists to call the church, amidst our dying culture, to repent of its worldliness, to recover and confess the truth of God’s Word as did the Reformers, and to see that truth embodied in doctrine, worship and life. For more information, call or write us at: ALLIANCE OF CONFESSING EVANGELICALS 1716 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103 (215) 546-3696 • ModRef@Alliance Net.org www.AllianceNet.org

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LETTERS Michael Horton introduces the “Come, Holy Spirit” issue of modernREFORMATION (July/August) with reference to the near collapse of Promise Keepers only one year after it was heralded as the solution to the problems of home, church and nation. An ordinary Sunday worship service with an attendance of eighty people will never appear to herald the kingdom of God as does a million men holding hands as they march on the nation’s capital.

Whatever the various New Testament gifts may have been, the gift of prophesy may have been good preaching. (It is difficult to believe that God inspires bad preaching, but since he works through weak human beings, imperfect rhetoric may be the most common form of communicating revelation to the people.)

Others are entitled to believe that the gift of prophesying means foretelling future events, which is probably the traditional view. To support the view that the gift of prophesy refers to the preaching and not primarily to making predictions, consider the Old Testament prophets themselves. They spent more of their time preaching Law/Gospel than they did predicting (and if Jeremiah is normative, they curtailed their Gospel preaching and excelled in the Law).

A prediction about the coming Savior could only be supplied by God himself, but some predictions require no more insight than evaluating present circumstances and choosing the most probable options, like filling in the blanks in a crossword puzzle. If one word doesn’t work, try another. Pencils and not pens should be used in this redefined prophesying. Making predictions belongs to every day life. Johnny’s failure to do his homework is a sufficient basis to predict that Johnny will flunk out of school.

Scholars opting for late dates for the Gospels are unaware of this ordinary understanding of prophesy that some future events are predictable by present circumstances and behavior. They argue that Jesus could not have possibly predicted the fall of Jerusalem as early as 30 C.E. and so the prophesies in the Gospels about the fall of Jerusalem require that they were written after 70 C . E . and more likely as late as 85 to 100. “Ex eventu” is the technical term for saying that an event was reported only after it had happened. Putting aside the dogmatical issue of Christ’s omniscience of all past and future events, his contemporaries could put two and two together. If the Palestinian populace continued to engage in revolutionary activities against their Roman oppressors, their capital city with its temple would be destroyed. One stone would not be left upon another.

The church and its ministers have a duty, yes, even a

divine duty to respond to false doctrine and fraudulent movements, such as revivals. (Again, see the “Come, Holy Spirit” issue of modernREFORMATION.) At the beginning of seminary teaching, I considered it a great privilege to respond to the current theologies. While all theologies are at one time current, mass media has cut down on their shelf life. In the 1960s, the names were Rudolf Bultmann, Karl Barth, and Emil Brunner. Then came the theologies of hope, history, and revolution.

Feminism lingers like lead in old paint. Form criticism was followed by redaction and literary criticism. Postmodern deconstructionism is now the rage. Theologians committed to the Bible have an obligation to answer each movement as it comes, but the enterprise becomes more tiring. Each time it requires facing a new team on the tennis court and sometimes changing the rules. Promise Keepers’ program cannot be considered serious theology.

Like many of the American revival movements, it is put together by the uninformed and packaged by marketing experts. It has attracted a wide following among some ministers in my denomination. Other ministers have made the group a major target in their sermons. At this point the gift of prophesy is helpful. My own prediction (call it the gift of prophesy) was that the movement would crumble because of scandal.

Our seminary’s systematic department responded to the August 1998 decisions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) to enter into full communion with several Reformed churches. At the same time, the ELCA agreed to enter into a mutual understanding with the Roman Catholic Church that Refor mation differences over the doctrine of justification were resolved or at least no longer obstacles.

In the Lutheran-Catholic Declaration, each Church’s condemnations of the other were no longer seen as operative. Our department not only pointed to the inadequacy of the detente in avoiding such issues as Marian devotion, penance, and mass, but also offered the modest prediction that Rome might not consummate the ecumenical nuptials. It had more to lose by signing on to the Declaration than by accepting it. In other words, when push came to shove, the pope would back down. In accepting the Declaration, Rome would repudiate the Council of Trent with its four century tradition. Moreover, with supervision of over one half of all Christians in the world, the pope has nothing to gain in accommodating himself to the Reformation doctrine on justification, especially at a time when the churches with Reformation roots are in NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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such disarray. The Lutheran World Federation and its members who have signed on to the Declaration will soon have egg on their faces, if they do not already. They have been left standing at the altar. These Lutherans have forgiven Rome for its past aberrations, but Rome has not reciprocated. Lutherans remain sinners and Rome is absolved. If Rome manages a modest gesture, it may only be a home-made Valentine sent in the mail. With Rome there will be no gala rally like the one the ELCA plans with her newly adopted Reformed sisters. Our department at the seminary knew all along that this was going to happen. Call it the gift of prophecy or a more general ability for reading the signs of the times.

Hundreds of years from now, someone will say our department wrote these predictions ex eventu. Probably nobody will care.

The real question for us is why do the church and her ministers have to take these theological aberrations seriously. A lot of time and effort was spent in responding to 1997 ecumenical decisions of ELCA. Rome’s recent reactions to the Declaration may have made our response redundant. My church is asking for an official response on Promise Keepers, but by the time our paper is ready, that group may have slipped into the sands of time. We may have been found to take the writings of some movements more seriously than they do themselves. So it may be with all revival movements.

— David P. Scaer, Chairman Department of Systematic Theology Concordia Theological Seminary Fort Wayne, Indiana I was raised in, went to Bible college in, and was ordained in the Assemblies of God. In 1996, I resigned and enrolled in a Reformed seminary for reasons directly related to revivalism and reformation. As such, I thank you for the July/August issue of modernREFORMATION and your helpful critique of revivalism.

Yet I find some tensions in the issue as a whole.

Don’t get me wrong: Michael Horton (as usual), Lawrence Rast, John Muether, and D. G. Hart make very strong, clear assertions as to the place “revivalism” should have in Reformation thought: none. But other articles, certain advertisements, and especially the interview with Ian Murray seem to muddy the waters.

As Hart argues, some Reformed folk want to preserve the sacred memory of the First Great Awakening and blast the Second, without recognizing the organic connection between the two. As David Wells has pointed out, Jonathan Edwards is the last great theologian of the New World, and it’s his own fault that he’s the last, because of his approval of the revivals.

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Revivalism (Murray wants to distinguish between this word and “revival,” but it’s not convincing) is a way of envisioning the Christian life that is wholly unbiblical.

My father still sends me a subscription to the weekly “Pentecostal Evangel,” an Assemblies of God publication that is circulated in local churches. One of the recent editions was an 85th anniversary edition, featuring articles from each decade the publication has been in existence. The revivalistic roots of the A/G were spelled out in stark terms. When Michael Horton says that there is no sense of redemptive history among these enthusiasts (p. 6), he knows what he is talking about.

Here are just three examples: 1) In an article from 1916, an author boasts that “the older denominations have a past which … they can trace … to its foundation.

The Pentecostal movement has no such history; it leaps the intervening years crying, ‘Back to Pentecost.’” 2) In an article from 1924, an author argues from past revivals that the “general laws of revival” apply to Pentecostal revivals. What is the first “revival” he cites? The exodus of the Israelites from Egypt. That’s all it was: a revival; not a redemptive historical event relevant for the whole people of God. 3) In an article from 1934, an author characterizes the book of Acts as “the book which records how people received the baptism in the Holy Spirit.” In explaining Acts chapter 8, he asks about the importance of Peter and John going to the Samaritans: “Who were Peter and John?… [They] were two of the 120 … in other words, they were two Pentecostal preachers who went to Samaria to help these converts receive the Baptism.” The fact that Peter and John were Apostles seems to have no currency!

— Blane Conklin via America Online

Let us hear from you! modernREFORMATION: Letters to the Editor 1716 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103 Fax: (215) 735-5133 ModRef@AllianceNet.org www.AllianceNet.org

MODERN REFORMATION

“God’s Purpose According to Election”: PAUL’S ARGUMENT IN ROMANS 9 STEVEN M. BAUGH The doctrine of predestination has fallen on hard times. Not that it was ever very popular. Given today’s theological climate, most Christians probably think that predestination— to the extent that they think about it at all—is an abstract, philosophical notion invented by a few cranks in the past.1 In reality, though, most of the famous adherents of the biblical doctrine of predestination, besides not being cranks, held to this belief because they were convinced that the Bible clearly teaches it.2 And though there are many places where predestination is explicitly or implicitly taught, it is most clearly and definitively taught in chapter nine of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. There are other places we could examine in the New Testament where human actions related to redemptive events were predestined by God in such a marvelous way that human responsible liberty was preserved (Acts 2:23, 4:28; and 1 Cor. 2:7).3 We should note, however, that these are events, not people. Paul repeatedly says that believers themselves are such only because they were predestined to this grace as God’s gift (Rom. 8:29–30; Eph. 1:5, 11). This only follows since we are expressly taught that both faith and repentance originate from God, not from ourselves (Eph. 2:8–9; Phil. 1:29; 2 Thess. 2:11; 2 Tim. 2:25; cf. Heb. 12:17).4 But Romans 9 has brought more than one reader to his knees before our awesome God who “does as he pleases with the powers of heaven and the peoples of the earth” (Dan. 4:35). This passage teaches divine election and predestination of individuals to salvation, and the hardening of whom God wills, as candidly as anything is ever taught in the Bible, despite the resolute and persistent efforts of many to obviate it.5 Happily, though, persistent readings of this lofty

section of Scripture have brought many people to finally accept its teaching. Let one striking example illustrate.

After quoting Romans 9:11–13, one prominent theological writer wrote this early in his career: This moves some people to think that the apostle Paul had done away with the freedom of the will, by which we earn the esteem of God by the good of piety, or offend him by the evil of NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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Romans 9:1-29 Paul’s Grief for National Israel 1 I tell the truth in Christ, I am not lying, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Spirit, 2that I have great sorrow and continual grief in my heart. 3For I could wish that I myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my countrymen according to the flesh, 4who are Israelites, to whom pertain the adoption, the glory, the covenants, the giving of the law, the service of God, and the promises; 5of whom are the fathers and from whom, according to the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, the eternally blessed God. Amen.

Thesis and Main Issue: Saving Grace Depends on Predestination 6 But it is not that the word of God has taken no effect. For they are not all Israel who are of Israel, 7nor are they all children because they are the seed of Abraham; but, “In Isaac your seed shall be called.” 8That is, those who are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted as the seed. 9For this is the word of promise: “At this time I will come and Sarah shall have a son.”

10 And not only this, but when Rebecca also had conceived by one man, even by our father Isaac 11 (for the children not yet being born, nor having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works but of Him who calls), 12it was said to her, “The older shall serve the younger.” 13As it is written, “Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated.”

Answer to Objection that Predestination Makes God Unjust 14 What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? Certainly not! 15For He says to Moses, “I will have mercy on whomever I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whomever I will have compassion.”

16 So then it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. 17For the Scripture says to the Pharaoh, “For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I may show My power in you, and that My name may be declared in all the earth.” 18Therefore He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens.

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impiety. For, these people say, God loved the one and hated the other before either was even born and could have done either good or evil. But we answer that God did this by his foreknowledge, by which he knows the character even of the unborn… . Therefore God did not elect anyone’s works (which God himself will grant) by foreknowledge, but rather by foreknowledge he chose faith, so that he chooses precisely him whom he foreknew would believe in him; and to him he gives the Holy Spirit, so that by doing good works he will as well attain eternal life.6 This position is the same as that of Pelagius, the great opponent of predestination.7 And yet, the same author just quoted reexamined Romans a few years later at the request of a friend and totally reversed himself to embrace Paul’s teaching on predestination. He even argues against his earlier position, when he says: If election is by foreknowledge, and God foreknew Jacob’s faith, how do you prove that he did not elect him for his works? Neither Jacob nor Esau had not believed, because they were not yet born and had as yet done neither good nor evil. But God foresaw that Jacob would believe? He could equally well have foreseen that he would do good works. So just as one says he was elected because God foreknew that he was going to believe, another might say that it was rather because of the good works he was to perform, since God foreknew them equally well… . If the reason for its not being of works was that they were not yet born, that applies also to faith; for before they were born they had neither faith nor works. The apostle, therefore, did not want us to understand that it was because of God’s foreknowledge that the younger was elected to be served by the elder.8 Subsequently, this author held firmly to predestination for the rest of his long and distinguished career. In fact, many people regard him as one of the greatest theologians in Christianity’s history: Augustine of Hippo.

This brief dig ression into the history of interpretation illustrates just one point. I will ask you, the reader, to reconsider Romans 9, as did Augustine— no matter how you have understood it in the past—and to carefully follow the Apostle Paul’s train of thought.

You will find it one of the more awesome chapters in Scripture. We will look specifically at Rom. 9:1–29 in this brief survey and refer to this section simply as “Romans 9.”9

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The Context Chapters 9–11 are normally seen as a distinct unit in Romans. Some people think of this section as a disconnected appendage to the rest of the book. But careful reflection shows that Romans 9–11 answers some key questions which Paul had raised earlier, especially in Romans 3 about God’s faithfulness to his promises to the Jews.10 This comes into view when we notice that Rom. 9:6 is really the key question and answer Paul develops throughout Romans 9–11: “It is not as though God’s word had failed. For not all who are descended from Israel are Israel” (NIV).

The implicit question in Romans 9:6a is: “Has God broken his promise to Israel?” Paul’s argument in Romans up to chapter 9 may seem to have led to this conclusion. Israel was the seed of Abraham and heirs of God’s oath-bound covenant of grace (Gen. 15; Ex. 2:23–25; Psalm 105:8–10; Luke 1:72–73; etc.). Yet the Israelites are under judgment, and their circumcision and possession of the Law is of no profit whatsoever if they are found to be transgressors (Rom. 2:17–29); and all universally, both Jew and Gentile, are under the cruel and relentless dominion of sin (Rom. 3:9–18; Rom. 5:18–20). Has God then thoroughly annulled his covenantal commitment to Israel? Will he now eradicate them (Rom. 11:1)? Paul’s answers to these urgent questions are what Romans 9–11 explains. And his answers take us deep into the divine purpose.

Romans 9 The str ucture of Romans 9:1–29 is fairly straightforward. The main sections are: 1) Paul’s grief for national Israel (v. 1–5); 2) Thesis and main issue: saving grace depends upon predestination (v. 6–13); 3) Answer to objection that predestination makes God unjust (v. 14–18); and 4) Answer to objection that predestination removes responsibility (v. 19–29). This outline accounts for the main contours of the passage, but its glory lay in the details.

Paul begins in Romans 9:1–3 by heading off a possible misperception of his rigorous defense of the inclusion of the Gentiles into full covenantal citizenship by faith alone (cf. Eph. 2:12). Specifically, he vehemently denies that his theology is driven by hatred of his countrymen (even though he expected immanent grief from them [Rom. 15:31]). Paul denies any antiSemitism on his part by affirming most vigorously his own grief for them (9:2), his testimony on their behalf for religious zeal (10:2), and his warning that the Gentile must not despise the stock to which he has been ingrafted (11:18, 20). To these things, the apostle gives the most solemn testimony, sealed on his own eternal destiny (9:1, 3). We must gather from this grave affirmation that the issues in Romans 9 are weighty.

Paul does not acknowledge the value of Israelite citizenship out of mere sentiment. He is avowing Israel’s privileged status in God’s redemptive program: “Salvation is of the Jews” (John 4:22). Israel was entrusted with God’s oracles; to her belongs the adoption, the glory, the covenants, the Law, the priestly service, and the promises (3:2, 9:4). Israel not only has the patriarchs, but in an act of unspeakable condescension, the incarnate Son of God himself deigned to be born as a son of Abraham (9:5), not as the son of any other tribe. Thus through the vast stretches of eternity Abraham will be known as the father of all the sons and daughters of God (Rom. 4:11; Gal. 3:29). Jesus by his incarnation as the great Seed of Abraham and as the Root and Branch of Jesse has sanctified that holy Israelite rootstock (Rom. 11:16, 15:12; cf. Gal. 3:16; Rev. 5:5; Heb. 10:29).

Answer to Objection that Predestination Removes Responsibility 19 You will say to me then, “Why does He still find fault? For who has resisted His will?”

20 But indeed, O man, who are you to reply against God? Will the thing formed say to him who formed it, “Why have you made me like this?”

21 Does not the potter have power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?

22 What if God, wanting to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, 23and that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He had prepared beforehand for glory, 24 even us whom He called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles?

25 As He says also in Hosea: “I will call them My people, who were not My people, and her beloved, who was not beloved.” 26“And it shall come to pass in the place where it was said to them, ‘You are not My people,’ There they shall be called sons of the living God.” 27 Isaiah also cries out concerning Israel: “Though the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, the remnant will be saved.

28 For He will finish the work and cut it short in righteousness, because the Lord will make a short work upon the earth.”

29 And as Isaiah said before: “Unless the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a seed, we would have become like Sodom, and we would have been made like Gomorrah.”

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National Versus Eternal Benefits When Paul accepts the privileged status of Israel as a national, covenantal entity, he is accepting the primary tenet of his theological antagonists. But they mistakenly equated membership in national Israel with inheritance of the eternal benefits of the covenant. 11 For Paul, Israelite privileged status is a biblical teaching which must be qualified by other truths. Specifically, Paul sees that membership in theocratic Israel with its national benefits does not guarantee membership in elect Israel whose benefits are righteousness, salvation, and eternal life.12 This is the point of his thematic statement in Romans 9:6: “They are not all Israel who are of Israel”; i.e., elect Israel and national Israel are not coextensive.

Put another way, sonship in the Abrahamic line does not guarantee that one is a child of God (9:8).

This is not merely a squabble about national privilege. Paul argues at the profoundest theological level that his opponents’ position is a refusal to accept God’s terms for righteousness. It rejects Jesus Christ whom God has put forward as our great substitute and Covenant Head (Rom. 5:12–21), our very righteousness (Rom. 10:4; 1 Cor. 1:30; 2 Cor. 5:21; Phil. 3:9; Titus 3:4–7). Their refusal to submit to God’s righteousness (Rom. 10:3) brings personal obligation to fulfill all the terms of the Law (Gal. 5:3), and a personal liability with disastrous results: guilt and the just wrath of God (Rom. 3:9–20, 23). God’s strict fairness is the basis for his thorough judgment of all hidden matters (Rom. 2:11, 16). So Israel has stumbled over the Rock of offense (Rom. 9:31–33).

The Answer of Romans 9 This leads us into the great issue of Romans 9. If privileged Israel has betrayed the true import of her inheritance through unbelief and disobedience, has God’s whole redemptive program failed? Has his promise to make Israel the light to the Gentiles and the channel for the Abrahamic blessing failed? (Rom. 9:6a).

Paul’s answer to buttress his thesis statement in Rom. 9:6b (“They are not all Israel who are of Israel”) is as direct as it is profound: God has not betrayed his redemptive program, because membership in elect Israel has always depended solely upon God’s personal selection of individuals. He has not rejected the Jews en masse, as evidenced by Paul’s own election and by God’s remnant strategy in the Old Testament (Rom. 11:1–10).

The eternal benefits of God’s covenant of grace have always been guaranteed only to those upon whom God has from eternity chosen to show mercy (9:15). Jacob, not Esau, was the heir of the promise. And this promise cannot be broken, because all of God’s promises are fulfilled in Christ Jesus in whom all elect Israelites, whether Jew or Gentile, become children of promise 8

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(Rom. 9:8; Gal. 3:29; 2 Cor. 1:20).

Paul does not merely assert the spiritual character of belonging to Israel with personal faith as its requirement in Romans 9. If that were the case, Paul would have launched into a quite different direction here. He would have said, for instance, that circumcision is a matter of the heart, not of the flesh, a thread of biblical teaching stretching far back into the Old Testament and one he had already stated in Romans (Rom. 2:28–29; Deut.

10:16, 30:6; Jer. 4:4, 9:26). Instead, Paul is addressing a more fundamental issue: why don’t all ethnic Israelites believe and thereby partake in the eternal inheritance?

Paul’s answer to this deeper question pours out in a staccato stream in Romans 9:10–13. One believes only because God so chooses. The root of all God’s benefits is his own predestinating free will. It is eminently true that God foreknows the faith and the works of all people from before the world’s foundation, but that does not enter at all into God’s consideration for election (see Augustine’s insights above). Salvation does not ultimately depend on any human factor, whether good or bad deeds (v. 11), the human will or course of life (“running”) (v. 16), but only upon the God who shows mercy (v. 16). This “in order that God’s purpose according to election might prevail” (v. 11).

The rest of Paul’s statements in Romans 9, particularly his interpretation of the Old Testament material, buttress this idea of predestination. The choice of Isaac over Ishmael (9:7–9), the choice of Jacob over Esau before either had done anything good or evil (9:10–13), the hardening of Pharaoh (9:17–18), all serve to confirm the basic, underlying point: God has mercy on whom he wishes and rejects whom he wishes because he so wills (9:15, 18).

But, you may say, “This is unfair!” Paul anticipates that objection by denying even the possibility of that scruple and by reasserting God’s essential and necessary justice even to the extent of saying that God hardens whom he wishes (9:14–18). “Shall not the Judge of all the earth execute justice?” (Gen. 18:25; cf. Rom. 3:5–6).

But you may then respond, this doctrine of predestination takes away human responsibility! Paul also anticipates this objection with the only possible answer there is: God does not answer to us or to any other human standard of justice for his actions (Rom. 9:19–29). Just who are you, O man, who speaks thus with God (v. 20)! Does he not hold the rights to us as our sovereign Creator? But Paul does not stop there, for he reveals that God’s predestination of “vessels of wrath” and of “vessels of mercy” serves to magnify his g race upon the vessels “which he has prepared beforehand for mercy” (9:23–24). This shows that God’s choice is not absolutely arbitrary. Yet this predestinating choice is based upon his own reasons, and MODERN REFORMATION

he takes no creature into his fathomless and inscrutable counsel at this point (Rom. 11:33–36).

Objections Assuredly, not everyone reads Romans 9 in this way.

However, the other views cannot endure more than casual scrutiny. Two popular anti-predestinarian interpretations are: (1) Paul is simply addressing the historical destiny of Israel in its redemptive role in Romans 9, not the eternal destinies of individuals; and (2) Paul is pointing to corporate election of the Church, not to God’s choice of individuals. The remarkable thing about both these positions is their similarity with notions that Paul here refutes. While he acknowledges the privileges of corporate election, Paul says that this election and its benefits (Rom. 3:2, 9:4–5) do not guarantee citizenship in Israel, i.e., elect Israel who holds inheritance to the eternal promises (Rom. 9:6–9). And both Israel and Jacob are individuals illustrating individual election, not corporate. Paul drives at this deeper level throughout Romans 9–11, and refuses to stop at the level of the corporate or of the redemptive role. And, again, for Paul to put his eternal destiny on the line for the redemptive role of a group as he does in 9:1–3 trivializes the great issues at stake in his Gospel.13 Another attempt to modify Paul’s teaching on predestination in Romans 9 is a little more subtle. In a handbook on principles of biblical interpretation (of all places!) while discussing the potential value of rhetorical criticism, Grant Osborne rather cautiously advances this line of interpretation: [If] the predestinarian passages of Romans 9 are part of a diatribe against Jewish-Christian misunderstandings regarding the nature of God (due to the divine judgment against Israel), this may mean that the statements regarding divine election there do not comprise dogmatic assertions regarding the process by which God saves people (the traditional Calvinist interpretation) but may instead comprise metaphors describing one aspect of the process (that is, God’s sovereign choice [the emphasis in Romans 9] working with the individual’s decision [the emphasis elsewhere]). Paul would be stressing one aspect of a larger whole to make his point.14

(called an “interlocutor”) in a sort of dialogue to head off potential objections to one’s position.15 What is curious about Osborne’s argument is that he says, in effect, Paul’s use of the diatribe style forces him to present his position in an unbalanced fashion. Paul emphasizes God’s sovereign choice at the expense of absolute human freedom—“the emphasis elsewhere” according to Osborne, though he does not say where.16 Osborne’s argument is curious because he evaluates the effect of the diatribe style in just the opposite direction of how it should logically be understood.

Osborne thinks that Paul’s use of this form boxes him into a theological corner and thereby skews his teaching a little. However, just the opposite is true. By using this imaginary interlocutor to address potential objections (such as the anti-predestinarian notion of “free will”— see Rom. 9:19 again!), Paul produces a balanced view of his position which takes into consideration potential objections.

Rather than narrowing Paul’s position, his “diatribe” guarantees he has considered and addressed the key qualifications for his detailed teaching on predestination.

Conclusion Romans 9 (and Romans 10–11) does teach quite clearly and in fair detail the biblical doctrine of predestination defended so ably by Augustine and many of his theological successors. Calvin properly warns us against approaching this awesome element of biblical teaching with undo curiosity to answer questions God does not answer, but he also warns against failing to accept teaching about the marvelous character of God’s inscrutable wisdom and sovereignty. This is certainly how Paul ends this section, as he wonders: “Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths beyond tracing out!” (Rom. 11:33; NIV). MR Steven M. Baugh (Ph.D., University of California, Irvine) is associate professor of New Testament at Westminster Theological Seminary in California and the author of A New Testament Greek Primer (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1995).

It may not be quite clear from this quote, but the position is pretty well-known from other places. Paul is thought to be using the ancient rhetorical mode known as a “diatribe” to advance his case in Romans 9 (and throughout Romans and other of his works). This method is known particularly by its use of an opponent NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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“Neither Reason Nor Free-Will Points to Him”: LUTHER’S ASSERTION THAT THE WHOLE MAN IS IN BONDAGE BENJAMIN E. SASSE

Such expectations seem hardly believable to those living after the Reformation—or, more specifically, after Luther and Erasmus’ heated public exchange about the human will. For Luther opened his 1525 response to Erasmus’ Freedom of the Will by announcing that using Erasmus’ brilliant eloquence to convey such a weak argument “is like using gold or silver dishes to carry garden rubbish or dung.” 2 And he concluded his critique by offering a sincere—but nonetheless shocking—prayer that Erasmus might one day be converted to Christianity.3 Yet, in spite of the debate’s vigor, it was possible for men in earlier years (c. 151710

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Morna Kint, charcoal

In the years immediately following Martin Luther’s emerging fame after posting the Ninety-Five Theses in 1517, many European observers wondered how the Renaissance and Reformation movements might relate to one another in the future. After all, both were interested in a type of reform in the Church.

Furthermore, each movement was led by a brilliant man who had angered the Church’s hierarchy, and who might therefore benefit from an alliance with another visible figure.

Individually, the men might be marginalized, but together, some speculated, their refor m proposals might receive more serious attention.

Desiderius Erasmus (c. 1466-1536) was more than fifteen years older than Luther (14831546), and considerably less interested in theology proper. Yet, as J. I. Packer has written, “many anticipated that the outspoken young Saxon and the cool clear-thinking Lowlander would join forces.”1

1519) to speculate about common cause. Such hopes were encouraged by the attempts of Philip Melanchthon, who was both an evangelical and a humanist, to bring the two men closer together.

Additionally, the evangelicals had been the beneficiaries of much of the humanists’ work. Most obvious is Erasmus’ Greek scholarship which aided Protestant New Testament exegesis, but Erasmus had MODERN REFORMATION

also in fact been a political asset to the evangelicals on a number of occasions: He had urged the Church to be moderate in its judgment of its critics (Luther particularly), he had argued that Rome should stop burning the reformers’ books, and he allegedly declined an offer of a bishopric if he would publicly reject Luther’s teaching.4 Ultimately, though, as the visible leader of the humanist movement too often identified with the new Evangelicalism, Erasmus decided that he must comment on Luther’s destabilizing writings. After the death of Pope Leo X and the ascent of Adrian VI in 1521, Erasmus was on better terms with Rome. For Adrian was a friend of Erasmus’. Additionally, Luther’s increasingly public observations that Erasmus was able to critique the Church but was not able to offer anything better (specifically because Erasmus’ theology was not Christocentric enough), surely angered the elder scholar.5 Finally, though, it seems to have been Luther’s dismissive statements about the human will—which Erasmus understood to deg rade the entire man (and, by implication, God)—which prompted Erasmus to action.

The result was the 1524 publication of Erasmus’ Diatribe [or Discussion] Concerning Free Will, despite a prior letter from Luther warning him that he would be better off not getting in over his head.6 Erasmus had long made it clear that he was wary of theological dispute because it tended to be divisive. He preferred peace within the Church because Christ was, after all, the agent of peace.

Yet, under pressure from both friend and foe to reveal where he stood regarding Luther’s teaching on Christian freedom, Erasmus concluded that engaging Luther on the will would be beneficial for at least three reasons: He could publicly distance himself from the heretical Luther, he could defend the dignity of man from the abuses of Luther’s “extreme” view of Adam’s fall, and he could offer a public sermon about the superiority of piety (which is beneficial to both the pious and their neighbors) over doctrine (which is often destructive).

Luther’s response, The Bondage of the Will (1525), which he generally considered his best work, is surprisingly forceful. (At least Erasmus accomplished his goal of showing his distance from the zealous Luther!) The other two aims of Erasmus’ book (his position on the freedom of the will, and his prioritization of piety over doctrine) are, Luther insists, intimately connected. For Erasmus can only place his hope in man’s piety because he believes that man’s will is free to attain piety. Protestants, on the other hand, despair of attaining righteousness by their own actions, so if man is to have any hope at all, it must be found in theology, not ethics.

But, Erasmus replies, is that to imply that theology is silent on ethical matters? Did not Jesus, God

Incarnate, say that the summary of the law is love of God and love of neighbor?

Identifying the Chief Division in Theology: Law and Gospel Clearly, our interlocutors need to reach agreement on some definitions. Most importantly, Luther complains that Erasmus “makes no distinction at all between the voices of the law and of the gospel; so blind and ignorant is [Erasmus’ book] that it does not see what the law and the gospel are.”7 The problem here is that the law is not good news to a law-breaker; it is horrifying to learn that God demands something from man that he does not have (righteousness). It is only as a consequence of this horror—that is, as a consequence of law—that the message of Christ’s living and dying has any meaning. To the poor and the despairing, Luther writes, “the gospel is preached and this is just the word that offers the Spirit and grace for the remission of sins which was procured for us by Christ crucified. It is all entirely free, given by the mercy of God the Father alone as He shows His favour towards us, who are unworthy, and who deserve condemnation rather than anything else.”8 This is not to say that the law is unimportant. It is essential; it drives us to Christ. “By the law is the knowledge of sin” (Rom. 3:20), and an awareness of sin yields an awareness of the need for a Savior. This is what Luther calls “the work [or] the office of the law,” for “it is a light to the ignorant and blind… .”9 The law in this most basic theological incarnation does not tell man that he is weak and exhort him to do better. Instead, it displays disease, sin, evil, death, hell and the wrath of God. It does not help nor set them free from these things; it is content merely to point them out. When a man discovers the sickness of sin, he is cast down and afflicted; nay, he despairs. The law does not help him; much less can he heal himself. Another light is needed to reveal a remedy. This is the voice of the gospel, which displays Christ as the Deliverer from all these evil things.10 Obviously then, Luther’s charge that Erasmus fails to distinguish between the voice of law and the voice of Gospel is tantamount to saying that he does not understand the first point of theology. Luther argues that Erasmus seizes man’s problem (the severity of the law) as if it is an answer—and thus has no real need for God’s answer (the Gospel). Throughout The Bondage of the Will, Luther reiterates both points: that Erasmus regards the unattainable standard of the law as attainable; and that he “will not take the slightest trouble to know about Christ.”11 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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Helpful vs. Idle Theologizing In addition to distinguishing the parts (law and Gospel) within the whole of theology, Luther also draws a distinction between theologizing that is profitable and theologizing that is pointless. This distinction is derived from the division between those things which God has revealed and those on which he has remained silent (or left hidden).

[We] must discuss God, or the will of God, preached, revealed, offered to us, and worshipped by us, in one way, and God not preached, nor revealed, nor offered to us, nor worshipped by us, in another way. Wherever God hides Himself, and wills to be unknown to us, there we have no concern. Here that sentiment: “what is above us does not concern us,” really holds good… .

Now, God in His own nature and majesty is to be left alone; in this regard, we have nothing to do with Him, nor does He wish us to deal with Him. We have to do with Him as clothed and displayed in His Word, by which He presents Himself to us.12

between our sense of justice, and what God has revealed as his way of action, Luther exclaims with Paul: “Let God be true, but every man a liar” (Rom. 3:4).14 The problem in any conflict, of course, is not God but us, so Luther counsels: “In everything else, we allow God His Divine Majesty; in the single case of His judgement, we are ready to deny it! To think that we cannot for a little while believe that He is just, when He has actually promised us that when He reveals His glory we shall all clearly see that He both was and is just!” The Christian waits on God’s timing, because the day of Christ’s return will reveal the God “to whom alone belongs a judgement whose justice is incomprehensible, as a God whose justice is most righteous and evident— provided only that in the meanwhile we believe it… .”15

“Now, God in His

own nature and majesty is to be left alone; in this regard, we have nothing to do with Him, nor does He wish us to deal with Him. We have to do with Him as clothed and displayed in His Word, by which He presents Himself to us.”

If God has not spoken on a matter, Christian theology should not regard that matter as a topic on which it needs to speak definitively. “But if [the topic under consideration] is a matter of concern to Christians and to the Scriptures, then it ought to be clear, open and plain, just like all the other articles, which are perfectly plain.”13 Yet to say that the Word defines the theologian’s business is not to say that the Christian never brings questions with him to the text. It means, instead, that the Christian will patiently trust God even if the answer in the Word is neither complete nor completely satisfying. If God’s answer (or lack of an answer) seems inexplicable, recall with Job who is God and who is man in this questioning. If there appears to be conflict 12

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The Whole Man Is “Flesh” But Adam’s children are rebels by nature, and we are not content to wait with the Word. Reason asserts herself, and demands that God justify himself now. When he does not submit to our commands, we choose to engage in speculative theology. Like our parents, we believe we know better than God, and we lust after forbidden fruit.

According to this story, however a theory divides one (simply into mind and body, or into the reason, the will, and the passions), it is impossible to shield any part of him or her from complicity in—and the consequences of—Adam’s fall. The mind is guilty of unbelief, the will of pride, and the passions of lust.

This is the foundation of Luther’s entire argument in The Bondage of the Will: No part of the self is untainted; therefore, no part of the self either will or can seek the pure God, who neither will nor can tolerate any contamination. (The root defect of most arguments which reject predestination then is an insufficient grasp of the effects of the fall.) If there is to be any relation between God and humanity, God must take the initiative. In the case of every Christian, God has been the pursuer, just as he pursued Adam and Eve as they hid from him in the garden. As descendants of a line of MODERN REFORMATION

rebels, we have inherited fear of the just Law-Giver.

But, Erasmus asks, shouldn’t some distinctions be drawn within human nature? Does not Paul distinguish between “spirit” and “flesh,” implying the former is noble and the latter ignoble? Church father Jerome takes up the distinction and lodges man’s weakness first in the flesh.

No, Luther bellows, Paul is not following Plato; he is not praising some higher part of man (mind) and condemning some lower part (body). He is not talking about two parts of an individual man, but two parts of collective humanity: What is the meaning of: “Ye are not in the flesh, if the Spirit is in you,” but those who have not the Spirit are of necessity in the flesh? And he that is not Christ’s, whose else is he but Satan’s? It stands good then, that those who lack the Spirit are in the flesh, and under Satan.

Now let us see what Paul thinks about endeavour and the power of “free-will” in carnal men. “They that are in the flesh cannot please God.” Again: “The carnal mind is death.” Again: “The carnal mind is enmity against God.” Once more: “It is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be” (vv. 58). Let the guardian of “free-will” answer the following question: How can endeavours towards good be made by that which is death, and displeases God, and is enmity against God, and disobeys God, and cannot obey him?16 Human pride wants to ensure that at least the higher or “best parts” do not belong in the category of the corrupted. Yet, Christ “plainly proves that what is not born of the Spirit is flesh.” In other words, the man who has not become a Christian by the converting power of the Holy Spirit is, in his reason and will just as much as his body, entirely “flesh” (or sinful).17 Paul and Luther are not offering a Greek distinction between mind and body as higher and lower, pure and impure. Instead, the biblical distinction is between those who have and those who have not been initiated into the kingdom.

Outside the kingdom are those who do not despair of their own works. Instead, they strive for (an intrinsic) righteousness by the law. (To Luther, this lack of despair in their own merit is par t of what distinguishes non-Christians from Christians. For unlike Christians, “the rest of men resist this humiliation; indeed, they condemn the teaching of selfdespair; they want a little something left that they can do for themselves. Secretly they continue proud, and enemies of the grace of God.”18) Inside the kingdom is the other group, those who have the righteousness of Christ, which comes by faith. This is an imputed or

“reckoned” righteousness, which “consists, not in any works, but in the gracious favor and reckoning of God. See how Paul stresses the word ‘reckoned’; how he insists on it, and repeats it, and enforces it.” This is significant to Luther because it is very odd to repeat that a man is called or reckoned something that he actually is (intrinsically). Who is surprised that the ocean, which is deep, is called deep? The point is that man is not righteous (intrinsically), yet God calls him righteous (on account of Christ). This is the “God who gives life to the dead and calls those things which do not exist as though they did…” (Rom. 4:17).

Luther continues his exegesis of Paul: “‘To him that worketh,’ he says, ‘the reward is reckoned, not of grace, but of debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reckoned for righteousness,’ according to the purpose of God’s grace.”19 Highlighting Paul’s use of the word “reckon … about ten times” in Romans 4, Luther is arguing that “flesh” corresponds to those outside the kingdom, those who work for their salvation and trust in themselves.

“Spirit” corresponds to citizens of God’s kingdom, those who do not work for their salvation but instead by the power of the Spirit trust in the vicarious living and dying of Christ.

A Will, But Not a Free Will Once the reader begins to understand that Luther is talking about the universal sinfulness (or “fleshliness”) of man in his fallen state, it becomes clearer why he makes so little effort to distinguish between reason and will— and why he is even discussing (attacking) reason at all in a debate which is supposedly about the will rather than the reason. Luther’s book is called The Bondage of the Will, but it could just as easily be titled The Bondage of the Whole Man. No one claims that the affections are pure.

Luther’s goal is to ensure that no one can claim that any other part of man is pure either. It seems self-evident that only a pure part of man would seek a pure God who destroys all impurity (e.g., Lev. 10). If God is holy, it is only by positing that some portion of man is free from unholiness that one can argue that man (or that portion of man) yearns after such a terrifying God. Luther, as if to economize his writings, is arguing for the contamination of the reason and of the will side-by-side.

Both of them are dead in trespasses and sin. Neither contributes anything to man’s salvation.

Yet, contrary to Erasmus’ reading of this argument, Luther is not saying that the will and the reason were not good creations, that they do not exist, or that they are of no earthly value. Where Erasmus, in Luther’s view, is continually jumping from theolog y to philosophy, and mixing “up everything, heaven with hell and life with death,” Luther is trying to have an NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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exclusively theological discussion about whether humans contribute anything (besides the sin) to salvation. “I cannot worship, praise, give thanks or serve Him, for I do not know how much I should attribute to myself and how much to Him. We need, therefore, to have in mind a clear-cut distinction between God’s power and ours, and God’s Work and ours, if we would live a godly life.”

Anticipating Calvin, Luther sees this matter as intimately connected to the starting point of all existential knowledge: knowledge of God and knowledge of self.20 In an argument that could grow monotonous if it were not so wonderfully life-producing, Luther repeatedly charges Erasmus with applying Paul’s condemnation of “the old man” only to the “gross affections” rather than also to “what you call the most exalted faculties, that is, reason and will.”21 Mocking Erasmus’ claim that knowledge of man’s complete depravity can serve no constructive purpose, Luther shouts the incapacity of humanity and the complete (and even good works–producing) work of God all the more. Regarding the will: “Who” (you say) “will try and reform his life?” I reply, Nobody! Nobody can! God has no time for your practitioners of self-reformation, for they are hypocrites. The elect, who fear God, will be reformed by the Holy Spirit; the rest will perish unreformed. Note that Augustine does not say that a reward awaits nobody’s works, or everybody’s works, but some men’s works. So there will be some who will reform their lives.

Regarding the mind: “Who will believe” (you say) “that God loves him?” I reply, Nobody! Nobody can! But the elect shall believe it; and the rest shall perish without believing it, raging and blaspheming, as you describe them. So there will be some who believe it.

You say that a flood-gate of iniquity is opened by our doctrines. So be it.22 Contrary to many caricatures of Lutheranism (sadly often even by her sister faith, Calvinism), Luther does not deny sanctification; he simply (and properly) will not allow it to eclipse justification. Christians do grow in intrinsic righteousness, but only as an effect of—never as a cause of—the imputed righteousness of Christ. This is his point when he criticizes Erasmus for not distinguishing between commands (law) given to Christians and those given to non-Christians. The indicative and imperative moods must be distinguished.

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Meaningful exhortation (what Calvinism calls the “third use” of the law) can only come after condemnation (what Calvinism calls the “first use” of the law).23 This is because the will that was dead to God has been made alive by God. This is not to exalt the “free will” of the unregenerate but rather to praise the Spirit who converts people and now uses them for the glory of God. So does Luther understand the productive and barren trees: “those who are not justified are sinners; and sinners are evil trees, and can only sin and bear evil fruit.”24 Erasmus, in repeatedly attacking Luther’s position of “necessity,” apparently thinks that Luther is embracing philosophical determinism or fatalism. What he doesn’t understand, though, is that Luther isn’t trying to address this philosophical problem. As noted earlier, Luther believes the theologian’s task is assigned by the Word, and the Christian Scriptures do not speak to the philosophical problem of the appearance of fatalism—a problem which is common to every articulated belief system. As he frequently reiterates, Luther is not talking about “compulsion.” A will, by definition, cannot be under compulsion, or it would cease to be a will. Luther is not disputing the existence of man’s will; instead, he is asserting that all of the desires of the fallen will are sinful.25 When the reader hears this, he wants to argue, offering distinctions between higher and lower objects, greater and lesser actions. Luther is not disputing these distinctions. He is arguing rather that even the noblest impulse or action of which any child of Adam can conceive is stained with sin. Luther is not saying that we shouldn’t draw distinctions between civic (earthly) righteousness and unrighteousness. We should; but we shouldn’t thereby conclude that God’s standard (the right act proceeding from the right motive: his glory) is the same as the county courthouse standard (the right act).

When Luther says the will is bound, he is saying that it has no options which are not sinful. He is not saying that one thereby has no options at all. He frequently distinguishes these things as man’s will “above” and “below” him. We may “credit man with ‘free-will’ in respect, not of what is above him, but of what is below him. That is to say, man should realize that in regard to his money and possessions he has a right to use them, to do or to leave undone, according to his own ‘free-will’… .” Nonetheless, “with regard to God, and in all that bears on salvation or damnation, he has no ‘freewill’, but is a captive, prisoner and bondslave, either to the will of God or to the will of Satan.”26 The Christian (by the converting work of the Spirit) is willfully enslaved to the will of God; the natural person (by the receipt of Adam’s nature by birth) is willfully enslaved to the will of Satan. Neither will is free (to pick its master at random), but both wills, by definition as wills, willfully serve their received master.

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Reason, But Not Reason as King The same distinction between freedom below and universal bondage in things above applies to reason as much as to will. It is the universal sinfulness of reason (as it doubts or tries to go beyond the Word) that Luther is attacking when he condemns reason as the “Devil’s whore.” He is talking again about speculation, about impatience with the Revealed God and yearning to know the secrets of the Hidden God, of believing Satan’s lies about the tree, of boredom with God’s incarnational revelation in Christ.

Some theologians draw a helpful distinction here between the ministerial and magisterial uses of reason.

Ministerial reason is the basic way we think about things below and about those things which God has chosen to reveal from above. Magisterial reason is the mind’s prideful claim that it is not created, that it is the maker of reality, that it will not abide any limits God may place on it. This is the distinction which is at work when Luther distinguishes between the (proper) “Kingdom of Reason” (earth) and the “Spiritual Kingdom” (heaven).

Just as Luther could place no hope in a will enslaved to sin, he can place no hope in human reason blind to this enslavement: “Show me out of the whole race of mortal men one, albeit the most holy and righteous of them all, to whose mind it ever occurred that the way to righteousness and salvation was simply to believe on Him who is both God and man, who died for men’s sins, and was raised, and is set at the right hand of the Father!” And not only will man not allow that (true heavenly) righteousness comes from another, he also will not allow that there is divine judgment for man’s (earthly) righteousness: “Look at the greatest philosophers!

What thoughts had they of God? What have they left in writing about the wrath to come?” The unregenerate have no ability to believe this truth apart from the “predestinating” Spirit.27 For when natural man

Son of God must be “lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have eternal life” [John 3]? Did the best and acutest philosophers ever mention it?

No, so “the whole world,” and “human reason” and “freewill, are forced to confess that they had not known nor heard of Christ before the gospel entered the world.”28 Reason is naturally self-justifying, Luther says, which is why Erasmus naturally assumes either that man can fulfill the law or that he already knows he cannot. In reality, though, the law comes to condemn, as the preparation for the Gospel, telling the person what his self-justifying reason would not: that he is a sinner. For “neither reason nor ‘free-will’ points to [God]; how could reason point to Him, when it is itself darkness and needs the light of the law to show it its own sickness, which by its own light it fails to see, and thinks is sound health?” The person thus humbled, given the gift of faith in Christ, will then trust God even when God tells him that the penalty for sin is death—be that the death of the sinner or the death of the Substitute. “Faith and the Spirit” believe “that God is good even though he should destroy all men.”29 The problem of the person who knows himself to be a sinner and naturally the enemy of God is not why God predestines only some, but why he predestines any at all! 30 This is where Luther unleashes his string of glorious paradoxes: God quickens by killing, justifies by pronouncing guilty, carries up to heaven by bringing down to hell, reveals by concealing; he is merciful though he damns, just though he creates objects for destruction.31 When the interlocutor inquires further regarding the philosophical question of why the “will of Majesty purposely leaves and reprobates some to perish,” Luther points to Romans 9 and the command that man be silent about God’s “dreadful hidden will.” Luther knows that man is not yet satisfied, but he thinks the theologian’s task is sufficiently fulfilled when he gets Erasmus to the place where the Word commands him to be silent:

The problem of the person

who knows himself to be a sinner and naturally the enemy of God is not why God predestines only some, but why he predestines any at all!

hears Christ teach the true way of salvation, by new birth, does he acknowledge it and confess that in time past he sought it? No; he starts back, and is confounded; and not only says that he does not understand it, but turns from it as an impossibility… . Who ever thought that the

But here Reason, in her knowing and talkative way, will say: “This is a nice way out that you have invented—that, whenever we are hard NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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pressed by force of arguments, we run back to that dreadful will of Majesty, and reduce our adversary to silence”… . I reply: This is not my invention, but a command grounded on the Divine Scriptures… . Paul says: “Why then does God find fault? Who shall resist His will? O man, who art thou that contendest with God? Hath not the potter power?” and so on (Rom. 9:19, 21).32 Everyone Willfully Cooperates with God Luther’s position is neither fideist (having faith in faith) nor irrational. Instead, it is reason based on revelation. This theological task might properly be distinguished from apologetic tasks (for example, seeking to persuade the non-Christian that the Bible is in fact God’s revelation).33 But within the context of those who claim to believe in revelation (as in the case of this debate with Erasmus), it would be utterly insane for the reason of finite creatures to ignore the limits prescribed by the infinite God’s revelation.

As J. I. Packer argues, Luther’s picture—and indeed the biblical picture—is of anything but a deistic or Epicurean god. 34 While Aristotle’s god may be so unaware of this world that he sleeps, Luther’s God is “incessantly active” in both the creative and redemptive spheres, in the initiation and sustenance of each. In this, human nature reflects God’s nature, for God will not allow humans “to be idle.” One does not merely exist, but is always active, and is always willfully desiring and acting “according to his nature.”35 The only question is about that nature. Either one wills and acts according to the fallen nature received from Adam, as one “ridden” by Satan. Or one wills and acts as the new creation of God, trusting in Christ and directed by the Spirit. Both the non-Christian and the Christian, though, are animated by God—that is, both receive their existence and energy from him, for there is no such thing as an act independent of God. And both individuals in a sense fulfill the will of God: the first his hidden will (of glorification in justice); the second his revealed will (of glorification in mercy). “Yet God does not work in us without us; for he created and preserves us for this very purpose, that He might work in us and we might cooperate with Him, whether that occurs outside His kingdom, by His general omnipotence, or within His kingdom, by the special power of His Spirit.”36 Luther is not saying that the “dead” person cooperates with God as God makes him alive; this is God’s action alone. Nonetheless, after God’s justification and regeneration, one does indeed cooperate with God in the glorification of his Creator and Redeemer. The redeemed person does this willfully— but because God gave him the will, not because his will was free to change itself.

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Though the great theologians who guard “freewill” may not know, or pretend not to know, that Scripture proclaims Christ categorically and antithetically, all Christians know it, and commonly confess it. They know that there are in the world two kingdoms at war with each other. In the one, Satan reigns (which is why Christ calls him “the prince of this world” [John 12:31], and Paul “the god of this world” [2 Cor. 4:4])… . In the other kingdom, Christ reigns. His kingdom continually resists and wars against that of Satan; and we are translated into His kingdom, not by our own power, but by the grace of God, which delivers us from this present evil world and tears us away from the power of darkness. The knowledge and confession of these two kingdoms, ever warring against each other with all their might and power, would suffice by itself to confute the doctrine of “free-will,” seeing that we are compelled to serve in Satan’s kingdom if we are not plucked from it by Divine power. The common man, I repeat, knows this, and confesses it plainly enough by his proverbs, prayers, efforts and entire life.37 In yet another paradox, while the Christian begins with despair, he receives complete assurance: “I have the comfortable certainty that I please God, not by reason of the merit of my works, but by reason of His merciful favour promised to me; so that, if I work too little, or badly, He does not impute it to me, but with fatherly compassion pardons me and makes me better. This is the glorying of all the saints in their God.”38 MR

Benjamin E. Sasse is a Ph.D. student in history at Yale.

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QUOTES “When ‘you teach free grace, absolutely free grace, and mean it,’ Warfield wrote, ‘you are a predestinarian.’”

— David B. Calhoun, Princeton Seminary, 2:188 We are discussing, not nature, but grace; we ask, not what we are on earth, but what we are in heaven before God. We know that man was made lord over things below him, and that he has a right and a free will with respect to them, that they should obey him and do as he wills and thinks. But our question is this: Whether he has “free-will” God-ward, that God should obey man and do what man wills, or whether God has not rather a free will with respect to man, that man should will and do what God wills, and be able to do nothing but what He wills and does. [John the] Baptist here says that man “can receive nothing, except it be given him from above.”

Which means that “free-will” must be nothing!

— Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 309-10 My sheep hear My voice, and I know them, and they follow Me. And I give them eter nal life, and they shall never perish; neither shall anyone snatch them out of My hand. My Father, who has given them to Me, is greater than all; and no one is able to snatch them out of My Father’s hand.

— John 10:27-29 All those whom God hath predestined unto life, and those only, He is pleased, in His appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by His Word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death, in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation, by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God, taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and, by His almighty power, determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ: yet so, as they come most freely, being made willing by His grace.

— Westminster Confession of Faith, Chap. 10

The constant exhortation [of Finney and many other revivalists] is, to make choice of God as the portion of the soul, to change the governing purpose of the life, to submit to the moral Governor of the universe the specific act to which the sinner is urged as immediately connected with salvation, is an act which has no reference to Christ. The soul is brought immediately in contact with God, the Mediator is left out of view. We maintain that this is another Gospel. It is practically another system, a legal system of religion.

We do not intend that the doctrine of the mediation of Christ is rejected, but that it is neglected; that the sinner is led to God directly; that he is not urged, under the pressure of the sense of guilt, to go to Christ for pardon, and through him to God… .

— Charles Hodge, quoted in David Wells, Reformed Theology in America, 49 Praise be to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in the heavenly realms with every spiritual blessing in Christ.

For he chose us in him before the creation of the world, to be holy and blameless in his sight. In love he predestined us to be adopted as his sons through Jesus Christ, in accordance with his pleasure and will—to the praise of his glorious grace, which he has freely given us in the One he loves.

— Ephesians 1:3-6 We confess a predestination of the elect to life, and a predestination of the wicked to death; that, in the election of those who are saved, the mercy of God precedes anything we do, and in the condemnation of those who will perish, evil merit precedes the righteous judgement of God. — Council of Valence (A.D. 855)

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Neglected Sources of the Reformed Doctrine of Predestination: ULRICH ZWINGLI AND PETER MARTYR VERMIGLI FRANK A. JAMES III Although its reception has been varied, the doctrine of predestination—and particularly double predestination— has nevertheless had a significant impact throughout church history. Augustine, Fulgentius of Ruspe, Isodore of Seville, Gottschalk of Orbais, Thomas Aquinas, the sixteenthcentury Reformers, and, more recently, Karl Barth all devoted careful attention to this question, even if the church did not always appreciate their effor ts. But of all the religious movements in history, few have been more closely associated with the doctrine than the early Reformed theologians.1 At this point a caveat ought to be issued against overgeneralizations. Not all of the major Protestant Reformers agreed with Calvin’s doctrine of double predestination. Some Protestants (both Lutheran and Reformed), such as Bullinger, Bibliander and later Melanchthon, found double predestination objectionable.2 Furthermore, not every Roman Catholic rejected this doctrine out of hand. Although the vast majority of Roman Catholic theologians strongly refuted a rigorous doctrine of double predestination, nevertheless a few early sixteenth-century Roman Catholics, such as Konrad Treger, considered it a legitimate part of their Augustinian heritage.3 Despite the common historical misconception, John 18

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Calvin was not the exclusive source of the Reformed branch of Protestantism. From a distance, he may appear to tower over other Reformed theologians, but the intervening centuries have distorted the historical reality. In recent years, it has been increasingly recognized that the origins of Reformed theology do not derive exclusively from Calvin, but rather from a coterie of theologians who were associated with Swiss reform, including Ulrich Zwingli, Heinrich Bullinger, Peter Martyr Vermigli, and Wolfgang Musculus.4 This study concentrates on two of the leading lights from this constellation of theologians who gave formative shape to early Reformed theology: Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531) and Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499-1562). These men represent two important but different strains within the Reformed tradition. Zwingli was a first-generation magisterial refor mer and MODERN REFORMATION

inaugurator of Swiss reform. He did not give much attention to the topic of predestination until his meeting with Luther at the Colloquy of Marburg in 1529. While there, Zwingli preached a sermon on providence and predestination to an audience which included Luther himself. This sermon was later expanded and published as De providentia (On Providence).

Peter Martyr Vermigli belonged to the secondgeneration of Reformed theologians who, along with Calvin, gave definitive shape to the Reformed branch of Protestantism. Vermigli is somewhat unusual in that he had been a prominent Roman Catholic theologian before embracing Protestantism. During his first fortythree years in Italy, he was an active reformer within the Roman Catholic Church, but fled the Roman inquisition in 1542 and sought refuge among the Protestants. Almost immediately after his flight from Italy, he rose to prominence as a Protestant theologian.

In his new Protestant capacity, his sphere of influence extended to the major centers of the reformation movement—Bucer’s Strasbourg, Archbishop Cranmer’s Oxford, and Bullinger’s Zurich. His prominence in the Reformed community was such that one contemporary could say: “the two most excellent theologians of our times are John Calvin and Peter Martyr.”5 Vermigli does not make predestination the signature doctrine of his theological system. But like Calvin, his name became associated with it because he was repeatedly called on to defend it and thus he became one of the principal apologists for a reformed doctrine of predestination.6 He championed it against Johann Marbach in Strasbourg and Theodore Bibliander in Zurich.7 Like most of the early Protestants, both Zwingli and Vermigli held strong views on predestination.

Although there was diversity, this doctrine came to be inextricably linked to Reformed theology. But how did the Reformed doctrine of predestination develop?

Sources for the Reformed Doctrine of Predestination Historically, as noted above, predestination is not a doctrine that distinguishes Protestants from Roman Catholics. The Reformed doctrine of predestination was essentially a recovery of Augustine’s view, yet it was not just theological mimicry, for the reformers sought above all to return to the teaching of the Apostle Paul.

Paul was, however, interpreted through an Augustinian theological grid.

It is well-known that the apostle employed the term “predestination” as well as its near equivalent “election,” on a number of occasions in his epistles.8 Furthermore, Paul derived the essence of his conception of predestination from the Old Testament; broadly from the idea of Israel as God’s chosen people, and narrowly

from the divine choice of Jacob and the divine rejection of Esau.9 The language and the idea of God choosing some to the exclusion of others is an important substrata throughout the biblical writings.

Like every predestinarian before the sixteenth century, Refor med theologians drew par ticular inspiration from Paul. The ninth chapter of Romans served as the biblical epicenter of their doctrine of predestination. This passage contains the powerful language of the divine hardening of Pharaoh’s heart, God’s election of Jacob and rejection of Esau before their birth, as well as the imagery of vessels of wrath prepared for destruction and vessels of mercy prepared for glory. Whatever criticism may be leveled against Reformed theologians, they were determined to forge their theology from Scripture, and Paul especially served as the chief source of their doctrine of predestination.

History also reveals that, beginning with Augustine, a distinctive hermeneutical tradition emerged which drew from Paul’s words an unequivocal doctrine of predestination. Reformed theologians knew the writings of all of the major fathers, both Greek and Latin, but it was Augustine who occupied first place in the pantheon of fathers. Although not infallible, he was viewed as the preeminently judicious and wise mentor on most theological questions, not the least of which was the doctrine of predestination.10 Just as these Reformed theologians interpreted Paul under the guidance of Augustine, they also encountered Augustine under the shaping influence of late medieval theolog y. As such, one cannot understand the development of the Reformed doctrine of predestination without some acquaintance with the late medieval theological influences that shaped their thought.

Stoicism and Ulrich Zwingli Gottfried Locher judges that of all the major Protestant reformers, Zwingli articulated the most extreme doctrine of predestination.11 Calvin himself expressed concern about the “immoderate” and “paradoxical” formulation of Zwingli’s view of providence and predestination. It was not until the publication of his work De providentia that Zwingli expressed his mature understanding of predestination. He was deeply indebted to Erasmian humanism and its penchant for seeing the classical pagan authors as rhetorical mentors. The important catchphrase of the humanists was ad fontes (back to the fount or original sources). Humanists such as Zwingli took this to mean a return not only to classical authors but also to the church fathers and the Bible in its original languages. It was Zwingli’s humanism that made him highly NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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amenable to appropriating insights from pagan philosophers for his theology.

Zwingli’s De providentia reveals his strongly philosophical cast of mind. Indeed, because of the philosophical strains in this treatise, many scholars have concluded that Zwingli is more philosopher than theologian. 12 Most obviously, his philosophical orientation is signaled by the constant parade of ancient philosophers across the pages of this work. While Calvin and Vermigli also alluded to classical authors, there is a fundamental difference between Zwingli’s use of ancient philosophers and that of Vermigli and Calvin. These two looked to the classical philosophers as illustrations of Christian truth, where Zwingli sees them as guides to it.

Of all the ancients, Zwingli’s greatest praise is reserved for the last great representative of Roman Stoicism, Lucius Annaeus Seneca, “that unparalleled cultivator of the soul among pagans.” For Zwingli, Seneca was a “theologian,” and his writings were “divine oracles.” 13 So prevalent is the spirit of Seneca throughout the De providentia that François Wendel concludes that it “reads almost like a commentary on chosen passages from Seneca.”14 The most significant impact from Seneca is found in Zwingli’s all encompassing doctrine of providence, of which predestination is a subcategory. Following Seneca, he insists there is no secondary causality: “it is established therefore that secondary causes are not properly called causes.” He adds: “Nothing is done or achieved which is not done and achieved by the immediate care and power of the Deity.” Providence in fact looms so large that there appears to be no room for human will or human responsibility. Thus Zwingli’s understanding of

predestination as indistinguishable from providence, logically inclines him to the conclusion that God is the cause of human sin. If, as Zwingli affirms, absolutely everything is under divine providence, then is not human sin also under the direct control of divine providence?

To be sure, God is absolved of any personal culpability, yet Zwingli can assert that God is the “author, mover and instigator” of human sin.15 When this all-pervasive divine providence is applied to the matter of reprobation and to eter nal condemnation, it necessarily follows that God is the direct and exclusive cause, since God is the cause of everything. Eternal condemnation is explicitly traced back to the pretemporal rejection by the will of God. Temporal sins may be the occasion for eter nal condemnation, but they are not the ultimate and direct cause. For him, reprobation, as well as election, is conceived teleologically. 16 The divine will does not simply reject, it rejects with a specific purpose in view.

To Zwingli’s mind, reprobation includes eter nal consequences. Just as election is unto eternal life, so reprobation is unto eternal punishment.

At the core of Zwingli’s predestinarian thought about election and reprobation is the notion that both issue directly from the divine will. Zwingli attributes both to the divine will in the same way, constructing an absolutely symmetrical doctrine of double predestination.

The cause and means of both election and reprobation are precisely the same. For Zwingli, God is the exclusive and immediate cause of all things.

Late Medieval Augustinianism and Peter Martyr Vermigli As a Roman Catholic theologian, Vermigli actually read Zwingli but did not embrace a Stoical-flavored

Three Views on Predestination Predestination is a doctrine which has occupied an uneasy place in the history of the church. Few have attempted to construct their theological system on the edifice of predestination. As most scholars now recognize, not even Calvin made it the central dogma from which all other doctrines derive.1 If predestination generates uncomfortable questions, it also invites theologians to grapple with the most profound implications of a religion which proclaims a sovereign God. Taken seriously, it forces one to consider the ultimate questions of meaning, existence and salvation. How one understands the relationship between God and humanity is fundamentally affected by one’s acceptance or rejection of predestination. Without necessarily occupying the center, a strong doctrine of predestination is like a pebble dropped in a pond; it creates ripples throughout the entire theological system.

Properly understood, the doctrine of predestination has to do with the exercise of God’s will in eternity past with regard to the eternal future of each member of the human race. Generally, this doctrine has two component parts, election and reprobation, or the divine choosing and rejecting. In the broad scope of church history, especially since Augustine, advocates of predestination fall into three general categories. First, there are those who take a non-Augustinian view and advocate a conditional predestination, that is, the divine will to elect or to reprobate is contingent upon the foreseen deeds of humans. If God foresees that a person will respond favorably to the 20

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view of predestination. Although Vermigli’s primary inspiration came from Augustine, he went beyond his mentor in his interpretation of Paul’s predestinarianism.17 The explanation for this intensified Augustinianism is found at the University of Padua, where as a student Vermigli first read and appreciated the robust Augustinian theology of Gregory of Rimini.

What is significant for our purposes is that Gregory was “the first Augustinian of Augustine.”18 Reading Gregory at the formative stage of his theological training, Vermigli had encountered one of the most vigorous double predestinarians of the late medieval period. The modern editor of Gregory’s works offers this caveat to unwary readers: “Leafing through Gregory’s pages one may be shocked by the predestinarianism, and ask oneself whether Gregory’s God was the Mexican War God.”19 Gregory was probably unfamiliar with Mexican deities, but there was indeed a militancy in his defense of Augustine’s doctrine of predestination.

Gregory is credited with having given birth to a late medieval “academic Augustinianism” committed to the pursuit of—and obedience to—the genuine theology of Augustine. This intensive form of late medieval Augustinianism began a concer ted effor t in the fourteenth century to recover the whole corpus of Augustine’s works and to develop a systematic acquaintance with his entire thought. Gregory of Rimini not only knew the writings and followed the doctrines of Augustine more closely than any other late medieval theologian, he also restored long neglected works to circulation and evidenced a highly developed critical sense to distinguish genuine from apocryphal works.20 In the fourteenth century, one can speak of an “Augustinian renaissance” which some have designated

the schola Augustiniana moderna.21 This new intensified Augustinianism developed a ferociously anti-Pelagian theology of grace, including a vigorous doctrine of double predestination.

Although more than a century separates these two theologians, there are remarkable parallels between the predestinarianism of Gregory and that of Vermigli.

Time and time again, the same issues are isolated and resolved with the same theological conclusions, often employing the same terms, and always based upon the same twin sources, Scripture and Augustine. Vermigli’s most mature exposition of this doctrine occurs in an extended locus from his commentary on Romans, where he, much like Gregory, develops the doctrine of predestination within a causal nexus.22 On the matter of election (which he technically equated with predestination), God’s will in eternity was the exclusive cause. Vermigli follows Augustine’s line, thinking of all humanity as a massa perditionis (mass of perdition), doomed to eternal condemnation unless God intervenes.

Divine election is construed as the rescue of doomed sinners, who can do nothing to aid in their own rescue.

After being elected from the mass of fallen sinners in eternity past and granted the gift of faith, the elect exercise that gift of faith in time and thus will inherit eternal life.23 In sum, Vermigli, like Gregory before him, taught an unconditional election.

Vermigli did not shy away from the difficult matter of reprobation. There are two important features in his understanding of reprobation that underscore this.

First, he understood reprobation as a passive expression of the sovereign will of God. Although the will of God is absolutely free and sovereign, God wields it passively in reprobation. By passive willing, Vermigli meant

Gospel, then he predestines them to salvation. On the other hand, if God foresees that an individual will reject the Gospel, then God rejects or reprobates them to eternal punishment. In both cases, God’s will is conditioned by what a man wills.

The second category, which might be viewed as semi-Augustinian, includes those who construe election in a different light than reprobation. Election is regarded as unconditional, that is, God elects some to salvation from his sheer mercy without regard to foreseen works or to anything outside himself. In contrast, reprobation is viewed as conditional and thus depends upon foreseen rejection of the Gospel by sinners. This is also called single predestination. One important variation of this view is simply to ignore the question of reprobation as being beyond human comprehension or as liable to create undue consternation, while affirming the positive idea of election.

(See Scott Keith’s article on Philip Melanchthon in this issue.)

The third category may be designated Augustinianism, and it adopts a full unconditional double predestination. God elects some to eternal salvation and reprobates others to eternal damnation without regard to foreseen deeds. The fundamental idea in double predestination is that both election and reprobation issue from the divine will and nothing else. Within each of these three general categories, there have been many variations and different nuances, but most of the theological expressions of this doctrine throughout church history can be placed in one of these three categories.

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something more than mere permission but less than an active willing. For Vermigli, God is not to be pictured as sitting back and simply permitting matters to take their course. Rather, God engineers and orchestrates men and events without coercion in order to produce his predeter mined salvation result. To reprobate is characteristically described as “not to have mercy” or “passing over.”24 Yet, it does not conjure up visions of a dispassionate deity arbitrarily hurling helpless victims into a lake of fire. Vermigli’s vision of election and reprobation is more complicated; it portrays God as actively rescuing some sinners, but deliberately and mysteriously bypassing others.

A second major feature of Vermigli’s view of reprobation is the adoption of the distinction between reprobation and condemnation. Reprobation has reference to the decision not to have mercy in eternity past, and its cause lies in the inscrutable sovereign will of God. Condemnation, on the other hand, has a temporal orientation, where causality lies within the matrix of original and actual sins. For Vermigli, “sins are the cause of damnation but not the cause of reprobation.”25 God’s role in condemnation is confined to the institution and execution of the general principle that sins are to be punished. Condemnation is the expression of divine justice. So then, the tr ue cause of condemnation is sinful man, but the true cause of reprobation is the unfathomable purpose of God (propositum Dei). Ver migli’s version of double predestination differs from that of Zwingli in that the latter has a symmetrical double predestination while the for mer has an asymmetrical version of double predestination. For Vermigli, God does not deal with the elect in precisely the same way as he does with the non-elect. For the elect, God not only is the ultimate eternal cause, but by granting the gift of faith, he is also the temporal cause of the elect attaining eternal life.

That parallel is not sustained when it comes to reprobation. Although the ultimate eternal cause of election and rejection is precisely the same, the cause for condemnation does not correspond to the cause for eternal blessing. For the condemned, it is their sins that cause their eternal destruction.

Conclusion The development of the Reformed doctrine of predestination reminds us first and foremost that the primary source for Reformed theology is and must continue to be the Scriptures. Second, a good knowledge of church history can be a useful guide to the interpretation of Scripture, and on most issues, there is no better guide than Augustine. Third, we must exercise caution about the subtle cultural and intellectual influences that infiltrate our theological system.

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Doctrine is never formed in a theological vacuum and so we must examine and refine our presuppositions to conform to historic Christianity. Finally, predestination, although alien to most twentieth-century minds, is a vital, indeed necessary truth which stops us in our tracks, destroys our pride, and relieves us of the arrogance of thinking we did it our way. MR

Frank A. James III (D.Phil. Oxford) is associate professor of church history at Reformed Theological Seminary (Orlando) and the author of Peter Martyr Vermigli and Predestination: The Augustinian Heritage of an Italian Theologian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

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FREE SPACE INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR CLARK H. PINNOCK, PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AT MCMASTER DIVINITY COLLEGE IN HAMILTON, ONTARIO MR: Dr. Pinnock, you were once a Calvinist theologian.

Today, you are at the vanguard of a movement among evangelical scholars away from Augustinian or Reformational theology. Do you believe your odyssey is illustrative of our moment? And if so, why?

CP: People move in different directions over a lifetime. Some move to Calvinism, others away from it, according to their consciences, God being their judge.

My pilgrimage may not have any wider significance than it has for me personally. I am God’s unworthy servant. He leads me and I try to follow—like you do yourselves.

Setting up this exchange (though) suggests that you think it worth discussing. From my standpoint, what my pilgrimage may signify is that I along with others have sensed the need for a better theological articulation of our dynamic relationship with God. Theological determinism makes it difficult to view that relationship as real and it is (I think) existentially repugnant in robbing human life of its God-given significance. If God has already decided everything, it is hard to make sense of the give-and-take relationships of love and it suggests that we add nothing to what God has already decided. Unless Calvinism can help with this dilemma more effectively, something like the “openness” model of God will have an appeal.

I encourage you to make a better case for your model in order to help people overcome the paralyzing implications of what you seem to be saying. I suppose my pilgrimage is a challenge in that I don’t think you can do it. That is not to say Reformed theologians as such cannot help—such as Karl Barth, Hendrikus Berkhof, Vincent Brummer, Donald Bloesch, and Adrio Konig— only that paleo-Calvinism probably cannot.

MR: Could you explain to us what the “new model” is, and what it offers that the “old model” does not?

CP: The “openness” model of God is not new in most respects. Like your own position, it is founded upon a confession of the triune God. It also holds to God’s ontological otherness and the creation of the world out of nothing. But it has novel features, too. Most notably, according to the model (which has Wesleyan/Arminian roots), God sovereignly grants human beings significant freedom, because he wants relationships of love with them. In such relationships, at least in the human realm, either party may welcome or refuse them. We may choose to cooperate with God or work against his will for our lives. God has chosen to enter into dynamic give-and-take relationships with us which allow God to affect us and also let us affect God. As co-laborers with God, we are invited to bring the future into being together along with him. The openness model of God is a variation of what is often called “free will theism,” and I think it makes better sense both of the Bible and of our walk with God. The problem with the “old” model in its Thomist or Calvinist versions has to do with the fact that it emerged out of a synthesis of the Bible and Greek philosophy. Several (but not all) of its features are unscriptural and inappropriately dependent on Hellenistic thinking. Categories like God’s impassibility, timelessness, immutability, exhaustive omniscience are badly skewed. They give the impression that God is immobile and reminds one uncomfortably of Aristotle’s unmoved mover. It makes God look a lot like a metaphysical iceberg. I am not alone in pointing this out—many Thomists like Norris Clarke and Calvinists like Karl Barth have made the point.

What needs to be corrected (and it is not hard to do) is a certain one-sidedness in favour of God’s otherness to the detriment of God’s nearness and selfsacrificing. We need to reflect more the awesome tenderness of God in bending down to us and making himself vulnerable within the relationship with us (Hos. 11:1-9). Hendrikus (not Louis) Berkhof shows how it can be done in Christian faith (chapters 18-22). I hope we will not be too stubborn to make reforms in our thinking according to God’s Word.

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MR: How do you respond to the charge that the new model’s rejection of some basic elements of classical theism, and your criticisms of classical understandings of sin and redemption, simply reflect the same Pelagian assumptions of old liberalism? Distinguish new model evangelicalism and old liberalism for us. And in this connection, could you help us understand what you meant when you wrote that “we have finally made our peace with the culture of modernity”?

CP: The openness model of God views salvation in relational, not in causal terms. That is an important difference between us, no doubt. God desires relationships of love and to this end has taken strong initiatives. God has said an unequivocal “yes” to sinners in Jesus Christ and offers them reconciled relationships through the atoning death and glorious resurrection of Christ. (Please, I am not an old liberal or a new one either.) But offering a relationship is not the same as having it. Love being mutual and reciprocal cannot be forced. Human assent, therefore, is essential for these relationships. Yes, God takes the initiative (am I not Reformed?), but he is also a lover who wants people to love him freely in return. He is not satisfied with puppets or automata. Therefore, God woos but does not coerce our response. My view could fairly be called semi-Augustinian (I suppose) but it is certainly not Pelagian or liberal. I agree with G. C. Berkouwer that it is easier to spot the error of Pelagius than it is to supply the ideal alternative truth.

Regarding the comment you cite on modern culture (which does not sound like me), I am simply saying that evangelicals are called to preach the Gospel in the modern setting in which God has placed us. This means that our message should be intelligible and have appeal to modern people if possible. Just as classical theists used Greek categories (too enthusiastically, I’d say) to communicate the Gospel in the early centuries, so we are free—even obliged—to make use of moder n philosophical resources to get the Word out. In my opinion, the openness model is less influenced by modern philosophy than classical theism was influenced by ancient metaphysics. Some critics, when they criticize me on being influenced by modernity, do not seem to be conscious of the problem which they have with philosophy.

MR: The old model talks in terms of the imputation of Adam’s guilt and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. Does the new model regard sin and justification in terms of imputation? Or is this all part of the “legal” model that has, in your view, received too much emphasis?

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CP: Western theology since Tertullian has (I think) been too fixated on legal categories. It is not incidental that Calvin, like him, was a lawyer, too. This gave them a certain bias toward jurisprudence in relation to the meaning of salvation. It put the emphasis (for example) on the sinner’s change of status with God the judge rather than on the goal of union with God in Christ who is our lover. I think we need a more relational model with the judicial dimension as part of that.

Notice, it is not a question of dropping the judicial but of placing everything in a better all-over framework, which (I think) the theology of recapitulation in the early Greek church may provide. Anselm and Calvin are too modern for me—we have to go further back to get a better balance and orthodoxy.

On the matter of the imputation of Adam’s sin, you and I know that there is a diversity of opinion in Christian theology, and even in Reformed theology.

The Old Testament takes no position and the New Testament addresses it only once, in Romans 5, to which everyone is forced to appeal. Along with certain Calvinists, I understand the imputation of Adam’s sin, not in the sense that we are held guilty for what another person did (Ezek. 18:2-4 makes that problematic), but in the sense that Adam’s act placed us all in a morally vitiated condition at birth as members of a fallen race.

This would explain the universality of sin among us but not make us guilty. To cite Reformed theologian Donald Bloesch: “Original sin does not become rooted in man until he assents to it and allows it to dominate his whole being.”1 Federal Calvinism, with its more precise doctrine of the imputation of Adam’s guilt, was (I think) going beyond what Scripture requires and creating unnecessary burdens. In the case of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, Paul says it is not automatically applied but is something which has to be received (Rom. 5:17).

MR: How would your model account for the biblical treatment of election and predestination?

CP: What do I do with texts on predestination and election? First, I do what everyone does—I read them in relation to an overall model. Texts on election point to God’s choice of a person or a people to serve him.

Abram was called to be a vehicle for God’s blessing of every nation. Israel as a people were chosen to be a light to the Gentiles (Is. 49:6). Election is never a question of God electing or reprobating individuals to heaven or hell for mysterious divine reasons. It points to the calling of a person like Moses or a people like Israel to bear the name of God. God’s purpose in blessing them is always in order to have mercy on others, too. Is not MODERN REFORMATION

Romans 11:32 clear on that point? Election is corporate and potentially inclusive of outsiders. I think Augustine erred greatly (and Calvin, by following him) when he gave election an individualistic slant. It does not refer to the arbitrary choice of a restricted number of individuals to be saved but to the corporate body which, in Christ God is saving and using to bless the world. William Klein has written on the corporate view of election in The New Chosen People (1992).

Texts on predestination are also read in a context.

Some read them to teach that God is an absolute and all-controlling monarch and “lo and behold” they discover what they want. I read them in relation to the loving, reciprocal relationships which God desires to establish with people in his dynamic creation project. In this context, God’s power is not abstract but the power of love that sustains relationships. It is the kind of power revealed in the cross where God loves us selfsacrificially and refuses to bully us. Predestination does not refer to manipulative, divine behavior but is the divine power at work bringing humankind into the image of Christ (Eph. 1:5). God wants his bride to love him but even God cannot control his wife, as Jeremiah notes. He can only woo her because this is the way of genuine relationships. In Acts 4:28, it says that Jesus’ enemies in killing him did what God’s plan had predestined to take place. This does not mean that God ordained the murder and then used these people like pawns to carry it through. Rather it indicates that their foul actions were redirected by God’s own plan to save humankind through suffering. Had they known it, Paul adds, they would not have crucified him (1 Cor. 2:8).

Like a master chess player, God outfoxed them.

MR: What are your personal hopes for the direction of evangelicalism?

CP: I hope that we will all continue to grow in the knowledge of our God and Savior Jesus Christ. Part of sanctification is maturing as hearers of the Word of God, so let us not call a halt to it. Theology is an unfinished conversation that did not stop with (say) the Westminster Confession or any other sectarian standard.

Can we not all admit, whatever our position, that there is more to be known than we presently know? Is it not true that our best insights are seeing as though in a mirror dimly? Let us view our theology as preliminary and anticipatory of the full disclosure at God’s coming and, in the meantime, try to enrich each other’s thinking rather than writing one another off.

A seminar on reformation theology for pastors and lay people.

The church in sixteenth-century Europe needed a reformation. Might the evangelical church of today be equally in need of a reformation? Many evangelical leaders say yes.

This seminar shows that truth is recovered only when the Bible has its rightful place as the supreme authority in the life of every Christian and every church. Here We Stand! calls believers to return to the authority of the Bible and to apply it faithfully to their lives and worship.

Cincinnati, OH • November 21, 1998 James Boice & John Hannah Pasadena, CA • January 16, 1999 Michael Horton & Robert Godfrey Call 215·546·3696 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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The Lutheran Doctrine of Predestination, A Melanchthonian Perspective In the earliest editions of his Loci communes theologici (“Common Topics of Theology”), Luther’s friend and colleague Philip Melanchthon did not address in great detail the doctrine of predestination.

In the Loci of 1521, for instance, he discussed it only briefly in the section dealing with the freedom of the human will. Following the teaching of Luther he stated: “If you relate human will to predestination, there is freedom in neither external nor internal acts, but all things take place according to determination.”1 Other than this statement, he avoided the discussion of predestination, stating that man should be very cautious about delving into the mysteries of God, but rather look to Christ and his redemption.

Later in his career (c. 1535), however, while never claiming to drift from the doctrine as taught by Luther, he began to focus not on the sovereignty of God and his power to elect, but rather on God’s gift of election as a comfort to the Christian believer. “First, he has demonstrated with manifest miracles that there certainly is a definite gathering of people which he loves, cares for, and will adorn with blessings… . And in order that we may continue to possess this comfort, it is useful to say something about the doctrine of predestination.”2 Thus, believers are to cling to the words of Christ in John 10:27, “My sheep hear my voice, and I know them and they follow me, and I give them life eternal, and they shall never perish, and no one will snatch them out of my hands.” Therefore, 26

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says Melanchthon, a Church of the elect will always remain.

Concer ning the causes of election, Melanchthon gives three. “First is that we might judge regarding our election not on the basis of Law but on the basis of Gospel. Second is that the entire number of those who are to be saved is chosen (electus) for the sake of Christ (propter Christum). The third is that we may seek no other cause.”3 Election is predicated upon the redemption we have in Christ which we apprehend by faith. “Thus Peter is elect because he is a member of Christ, just as he is righteous, that is, pleasing to God, because by faith he has been made a member of Christ.”4 Melanchthon affirms that God wills all to be saved because the immutable will of God is that we hear his Son, as he has said [Matt. 17:5], “Hear him.” “And just as the preaching of repentance is universal and accuses all, as it is clearly stated in Romans 3, so also the promise of grace is universal, as many passages testify.”5 “Romans 11:31, ‘God has imprisoned them all under disobedience, that he might have mercy upon them all,’ that is, he accuses the disobedience of all, he calls all to repentance, and again he offers mercy to all.”6 As to the cause of reprobation, according to Melanchthon, there is only one, that is, the sin of men who do not hear the voice of the Gospel or who reject the faith. “In those people it is certain that the cause of their reprobation is sin and human will. For it is a completely true statement that God is not the cause of sin and does not will sin.”7 On the other hand, Melanchthon teaches, it is correct to say that the cause of election is the merciful will of God, who on account of his Son gathers and

Philip Melanchthon, Medallion. Art Resource.

SCOTT L. KEITH

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preserves the Church. There is no doubt that the elect are those who in faith take hold of God’s mercy in Christ and never give up that confidence. “Assuredly all are elected for eternal life who, through faith in the Lord Christ, in the conversion of this life receive comfort and do not fall away before their death; for thus says the text, ‘Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord’” [Rev 14:13].8 God calls the elect to himself on account of his Son through faith (propter Christum per fidem). “God begins and draws us by his holy Word and the Holy Spirit, but it is necessary for us to hear and learn, that is, to take hold of the promise and assent to it, not to fight against it or be hesitant and filled with doubt.”9 “In Ephesians 1:4 he says, ‘He has chosen us in Christ,’ in order that he may teach us that the cause of our election is not our own worthiness, but Christ, so that we do not consider our election apart from Christ and the Gospel, but always seek the cause of our election in the promise of Christ.” 10 According to Melanchthon, this truth brings the believer a threefold comfort. First, they who are called are those who hear, learn and confess the Gospel. “So, it is very comforting and true that only those who are called are numbered among the predestined, that is, among those who listen to and learn God’s Word, for ‘Those whom he has chosen, he also calls.’”11 Second, God has chosen us because he has decreed to call us to the knowledge of the Son, and because of this his blessings will be upon us. Third, the testimony of God is present with the visible company which he has called, and is efficacious in this called company, the Church. “Therefore we should not turn our eyes away from the universal promise, but include ourselves in it and know for certain that in it the will of God is expressed.”12 This is the doctrine that Melanchthon taught until his death in 1560. For Melanchthon, the cause of election is the mercy of God on account of Christ and is to be seen in light of the Gospel promise. For those who confess Christ as their Savior it brings great assurance. God’s offer of grace is to be seen as universal and the cause of reprobation is to be assigned only to the sin of men who do not hear the voice of the Gospel or unbelief of those who reject the faith. “Therefore let us strengthen our faith and pray that the Son of God will preserve his sheep, because at the same time he also says, ‘They hear me and follow me.’”13

not as different as some have thought. Says Luther: “If men believe the Gospel, they shall be saved. Indeed all the saints have had confidence and comfort with their election and with eternal life, not because of a special revelation of their predestination, but rather by faith in Christ.”14 When asked where to look for assurance of election, Luther responds, “Rather, hold to the promise of the Gospel. This will teach that Christ, God’s only Son, came into the world in order to bless all nations on the earth, that is, to redeem them from sin and death, to justify and to save them.”15 Here one sees the many similarities between Luther and Melanchthon.

Yet Luther places more importance on the fact that election is all part of God’s immutable sovereignty. In Melanchthon, we can see Luther’s affirmation of the sovereign will of God being replaced by the universal saving will of God effectuated through the universal call of the Gospel. Always affirming that it is the power of the Holy Spirit that allows us to believe, Melanchthon explains that we must, therefore, assent to the promise of the Gospel. Luther teaches that we are unable to ascend to God and reiterates the absolute necessity for God to descend to us. “They are elect, Peter says. How? Not of themselves but according to God’s purpose; for we are not able to raise ourselves to heaven or create faith within ourselves. God will not admit all men into heaven. He will very carefully count those who belong to him.”16 The difference is thus subtle, but real. For both men, the faith that results from the election of God on account of Christ is a gift of God through the Word. Yet, for Melanchthon, it is necessary to act on this gift, while Luther allows this gift of God to stand alone through grace. In other words, Luther’s doctrine of election is summed up by the Reformation hallmarks, sola gratia soli Deo gloria (by grace alone and to God alone goes all the glory). On the other hand, for Melanchthon, election can be explicated by the phrase, propter Christum per fidem (on account of Christ through faith).

As is often the case, these small differences did not lead the two men to disag ree with one another significantly concerning this doctrine. But the followers of these men did seem to side with either one or the other. In other words, later Lutheranism faced some turmoil concerning which is the proper emphasis in election: God’s sovereignty or God’s universal saving will through the call of the Word.

Do Melanchthon and Luther Agree?

In his formulation of the doctrine of election, Melanchthon continually placed great stress on God’s electing people on account of Christ through faith.

Furthermore, election is never to be viewed apart from this Gospel message. In many ways, the same could be said of Luther. In fact, on this point the two men were

The Impact of Melanchthon’s View of Predestination on Lutheran Theology The Formula of Concord, which is the Lutheran Confession written seventeen years after Melanchthon’s death, in many ways reads as though it had been written by him. It affir ms all the hallmarks of a Melanchthonian view of election. (1) Election as NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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Propter Christum: “We should accordingly consider God’s eternal election in Christ, and not outside of it.”17 (2) The universal call to repentance and belief: “If we want to consider our election to salvation profitably, we must by all means cling rigidly and firmly to the fact that as the proclamation of repentance extends over all men (Luke 24:47), so also does the promise of the Gospel.”18 (3) The elect are brought into salvation per fidem: “God has ordained in his counsel that the Holy Spirit would call, enlighten, and convert the elect through the Word and that he would justify and save all who accept Christ through faith.”19 (4) Finally, that the only cause of reprobation is man’s stubborn will in rejecting the call through the Word: “The reason for such contempt of the Word is not God’s foreknowledge but man’s perverse will.”20 The Formula of Concord, though, goes further in delineating the difference between God’s eternal foreknowledge and God’s eternal decree of election.

The Formula states that God’s eternal foreknowledge extends to all while his eternal election extends only to the children of God.21 In doing so, the Formula clarifies an area that Melanchthon (with his stress on faith) leaves unclear. It affirms a sort of “middle road” between Luther and Melanchthon. God’s decree of election remains sovereign and his call universal. “Our election to eternal life does not rest on our piety or virtue but solely on the merit of Christ and the gracious will of the Father, who cannot deny himself because he is changeless in his will and essence.”22 Later Lutheranism, as represented by the seventeenth-century dogmaticians did not always follow this careful formulation. Some of the dogmaticians lost this paradoxical image of God as having a will which is both partly hidden and partly revealed, sovereign and merciful, the freedom of his divine will and the bondage of ours, the careful distinction between God’s Law and his life-giving Gospel. In many of the dogmaticians, these concepts were philosophically formalized, thus losing their life and vitality. The careful molding of Luther’s concept of God’s sovereign will with Melanchthon’s teaching of God’s saving will was lost.

Rather, many of the great dogmaticians followed Melanchthon’s emphasis on God’s universal saving will alone. This led many (for example, the great Johann Gerhard) to teach the synergistic doctrine of intuitu fidei (God elects in view of foreseen faith). The efficacy of God’s eternal decree became dependent on the faith of each individual. God wills all to be saved, but God’s will does not come to pass unless we make the decision to believe. Says Gerhard, “And because God from eternity foresaw which humans might finally believe, and so that he decides to save these, that the eternal decree about the eternal salvation being shared to the finally believing, in view of the merits of Christ and the foreseen faith in 28

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Christ, done and precisely seen it is called especially by the name of predestination or election.”23 This led many to look to themselves for assurance rather than to Christ. Faith became a human work which had the ability to manipulate the decree of God. The result is a theology that focuses on man rather than God, a theology of glory rather than the theology of the Cross.

Conclusion Much can be learned from Melanchthon’s teaching concerning election. It is certainly profitable and biblical to view election not on the basis of Law but on the basis of Gospel. Surely, it is proper to teach that the entire number of those who are to be saved is chosen (electus) for the sake of Christ (propter Christum), and we should seek no other cause. Great benefit is also found in affirming the Scriptural teaching that the Gospel must be believed. That we must trust in Christ alone as our only hope for salvation is the whole of the good news of Christ. This Melanchthon not only affirmed but taught until his death.

Yet, to take this doctrine and lose sight of God’s sovereignty to save those whom he elects is to go against the Scriptures themselves. This Melanchthon did not do. Never theless, it must be admitted that Melanchthon’s followers took his emphasis on faith and the universality of the call beyond his own position, and thereby fell into great error. Our faith must be not seen as the cause of our election. Rather, faith is the product of election through the Word, by which we are brought into the benefits of Christ. As Melanchthon himself has said: “God’s mercy is the cause of election, but it is necessary that this be revealed in the Word and that the Word be accepted. Thus he definitely offers this universally, and this is repeated in other chapters: ‘All who believe in the Son shall not be confounded (Romans 9:33; 10:11).’”24 MR

Scott L. Keith is a master’s candidate at Concordia University (Irvine, California). His work focuses on Melanchthon.

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“Make Your Calling and Election Sure”: PREDESTINATION & ASSURANCE IN REFORMED THEOLOGY MICHAEL S. HORTON Concord (Lutheran) offers a similar caution:

According to the most lengthy of the Church of England’s Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion:

Speaking of the doctrine of election as “a comforting article when it is correctly treated,” the Formula of

During the magisterial Reformation, the doctrine of election was regarded as a corollary to justification, the nail in the coffin of synergism (justification and regeneration by human cooperation with grace). Pastorally, election was used to drive away despair and anxiety over one’s salvation. John Bradford, an Edwardian divine who was martyred under “bloody Mary,” wrote that this doctrine was a “most principal” tenet since it places our salvation entirely in God’s hands. “This, I say, let us do, and not be too busybodies in searching the majesty and glory of God, or in nourishing doubting of salvation: whereto we all Corey Wilkinson, scratchboard

The godly consideration of Predestination and our Election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfor t to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh in their ear thly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things, as well because it doth establish and confirm their faith of eternal Salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God. And yet, the study of the subject has most dangerous effects on the “carnal professor.”1

Accordingly we believe and maintain that if anybody teaches the doctrine of the gracious election of God to eternal life in such a way that disconsolate Christians can find no comfort in this doctrine but are driven to doubt and despair, or in such a way that the impenitent are strengthened in their self-will, he is not teaching the doctrine according to the Word and will of God… .2

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are ready enough.”3 As we will see, all of this is carefully expounded by Calvin as well.

Did Calvin Invent Predestination?

More than anything else, Calvin and Calvinism are known for this doctrine. In one sense, that is quite surprising. First, the doctrine held by Calvin—namely, predestination to both salvation (election) and damnation (reprobation)—was insisted upon by many of the church fathers. Augustine took it for granted as the catholic teaching, in opposition especially to Pelagius. Aquinas wrote, From all eternity some are preordained and directed to heaven; they are called the predestined ones: “Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children according to the good pleasure of his will” [Eph. 1:5]. From all eternity, too, it has been settled that others will not be given grace, and these are called the reprobate or rejected ones: “I loved Jacob, and I hated Esau” [Mal. 1:2-3]. Divine choice is the reason for the distinction: “…according as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world.”… God predestines because he loves… . The choice is not dictated by any goodness to be discovered in those who are chosen; there is no antecedent prompting of God’s love [Rom. 9:11-13].4 Lodging the cause of election in the foreknowledge of human decision and action, says Aquinas, is the fountainhead of Pelagianism.5 Thomas Bradwardine, the fourteenth-century Archbishop of Canterbury, recalled his discovery of this great truth: Idle and a fool in God’s wisdom, I was misled by an unorthodox error at a time when I was still pursuing philosophical studies. Sometimes I went to listen to the theologians discussing this matter [of grace and free will], and the school of Pelagius seemed to me nearest the truth… . In this philosophical faculty I seldom heard a reference to grace, except for some ambiguous remarks. What I heard day in and day out was that we are masters of our own free acts, that ours is the choice to act well or badly, to have virtues or sins, and much more along this line… . But every time I listened to the Epistle reading in church and heard how Paul magnified grace and belittled free will—as in the case in Romans 9, “It is obviously not a question of human will and effort, but of divine mercy,” and its many parallels—grace 30

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displeased me, ungrateful as I was… . However, even before I transferred to the faculty of theology, the text mentioned came to me as a beam of grace and, captured by a vision of the truth, it seemed I saw from afar how the grace of God precedes all good works… . That is why I express my gratitude to Him who has given me this grace as a gift.6 This personal revolution was so deeply practical that Bradwardine turned his energies toward the recovery of the doctrine of grace and, with it, a strong emphasis on God’s unconditional election. The Case of God Against the Pelagians was his declaration of war on “The new Pelagians who oppose our whole presentation of predestination and reprobation, attempting either to eliminate them completely or, at least, to show that they are dependent on our merits.”7 “I received it all from Staupitz,” Luther said of his mentor, Johann von Staupitz, the Augustinian abbot whose most famous work was titled, Eternal Predestination and its Execution in Time.8 “And thus the claim for man, namely, that he is master over his works from beginning to end, is destroyed,” Staupitz wrote. “So, therefore, the origin of the works of Christian life is predestination, its means is justification, and its aim is glorification or thanksgiving—all these are the achievements not of nature but of grace.”9 Luther’s defense of a rigorous version of predestination in The Bondage of the Will is wellknown and it is also defended in both earlier and later editions of his Romans commentary.

Countless other examples from church history could be offered. It is not all of one piece, of course: especially in the Middle Ages, where confidence in human ability was a practically—if not always officially—held dogma. Facienti quod in se est Deus non denigat gratium was the medieval slogan: “God will not deny his grace to those who do what lies within them.”

Nonetheless, predestination was well-established before the Reformation, and then defended again by the first generation reformers. As such, there was little peculiar about a young Frenchman defending this doctrine in his commentaries, tracts, and in his famous Institutes.

The predestination which Calvin taught was catholic and evangelical, as it was faithful to the biblical text despite the scandal to human wisdom, speculation, and pride.

How Central to Calvin’s Thought?

Many of Calvin’s critics would concede that he was not the first to promote such a doctrine. What made Calvin’s system distinct, however, was that it was the first to make predestination central. Or, at least, that is how the story is often told. But there are some serious flaws in this popular assumption.

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First, as historical theologian Richard Muller has pointed out indefatigably, the notion of a “central dogma” is itself imported from the Hegelian tradition of historical theologians. “According to Schweizer’s reading of the older dogmatics,” says Muller, “the orthodox Reformed theologians attempted to build a synthetic, deductive, and therefore irrefutable system of theology upon the primary proposition of an absolute divine decree of predestination.”10 Later, the Reformed writer Heinrich Heppe just assumed this central dogma idea and it became a way of reading (or misreading) the literature. Even before Muller’s thorough critique, Francois Wendel complained, “After Alexander Schweizer in 1844 and Ferdinand Christian Bauer in 1847 had claimed that predestination was the central doctrine of Calvin’s theology and that all the originality of his teaching proceeded from it, historians and dogmaticians went on for three-quarters of a century repeating that affir mation like an article of faith which did not even need to be verified.”11 The problem with this approach is, well, Calvin. One simply cannot read the most representative of his works and conclude that he is obsessed with predestination. When the subject comes up, as in his exposition of key biblical passages, or when he is engaged in specific polemical battles with opponents of the doctrine, he faces it squarely and rigorously. He does not, however, spin a systematic web around a predestinarian core.

Calvin’s emphasis on this doctrine grows over time in the crucible of pastoral questions and debates. One does not even find the doctrine spelled out in his early catechetical and confessional work. Even in the final edition of the Institutes (1559), Calvin declares concerning the doctrine of justification that we must “consider it in such a way as to keep well in mind that this is the principal article of the Christian religion” (3.11.1).12 If one is searching for a central dogma, then such references (viz., justification is “the main hinge upon which true religion turns,” etc.) would seem to support justification, rather than predestination, as the most likely candidate.

While this point can be overstated, it is interesting that even in his final edition of the Institutes, Calvin placed the discussion of election after the treatment of prayer. Surely it does not occupy systematic centrality in

the Institutes. But then, nothing does. Calvin’s classic was a defense of the Reformed faith in the teeth of practical life (namely, persecution) organized around the articles of the Apostles’ Creed and Paul’s letter to the Romans.

The discussion of election begins (3.21.1) with the pastoral concern for assurance: “We shall never be clearly convinced as we ought to be, that our salvation flows from the fountain of God’s free mercy, till we are acquainted with his eternal election… .” But speculation on this topic is deadly. He writes: The discussion of predestination—a subject of itself rather intricate—is made very perplexed, and therefore dangerous, by human curiosity, which no barriers can restrain from wandering into forbidden labyrinths, and soaring beyond its sphere, as if determined to leave none of the Divine secrets unscrutinized or unexplored… .

[The curious] will obtain no satisfaction to his curiosity, but will enter a labyrinth from which he will find no way to depar t. For it is unreasonable that man should scrutinize with impunity those things which the Lord has deter mined to be hidden in himself (3.21.1).

Even the sovereignty and

glory of God are not to be considered in themselves, for apart from Christ our knowledge of God will only result in terror and judgment.

It follows, then, says Calvin, that if we want to know anything about predestination in general, or our own election in particular, we are to look no further than Christ and the Gospel. If some want to boldly transgress the Word, others want to extinguish even the knowledge of this great truth which the Scriptures plainly and repeatedly afford. The only approach to the subject, then, is for the Christian to be addressed by God, making sure that “as soon as the Lord closes his sacred mouth, he shall also desist from further inquiry” (3.21.5). We cannot obtain certainty of our election by attempting “to penetrate to the eternal decree of God,” for “we shall be ingulfed in the profound abyss.” We must not seek to “soar above the clouds,” but must be “satisfied with the testimony of God in his external word.”

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of God without the word, plunge themselves into a fatal abyss, so they who investigate it in a regular and orderly manner, as it is contained in the word, derive from such inquiry the benefit of peculiar consolation (3.24.3-4).

When timid souls seek to discover their election beyond this external word (“Come unto Christ all ye sinners”), they will doubtless question their salvation, occupied with the question, “Whence can you obtain salvation but from the election of God? And what revelation have you received of election?”

These questions can only tor ment the conscience, Calvin says.

“No error can affect the mind, more pestilent than such as disturbs the conscience, and destroys its peace and tranquillity towards God,” than such speculations. The discussion of predestination is a dangerous ocean unless the believer is safely standing on Christ the rock (3.24.4).

So how does one obtain assurance of election from the external word?

assurance of our election in ourselves, who would be confident enough to say with certainty, “I am chosen in Christ”? Further, says Calvin, to be “in Christ” is an ecclesiological matter: it is to be in the Church, which is Christ’s body. Thus, the external word is joined to baptism, catechesis, the Eucharist, and the discipline and fellowship of the Savior’s commonwealth. Although the reprobate are scattered among the elect in this community, there is no way of separating the sheep from the goats until the last judgment. Assurance of election therefore is linked to the proper use of the means of grace and incorporation into the visible Church (3.24.5-6).

Thus, certainty of election is obtained neither within oneself nor by oneself, but in Christ and with his chosen people.

God revealed election, not for

our curiosity, nor to confirm us in our laziness, but to raise our eyes to him in gratitude, acknowledging that he alone is worthy to receive praise.

In the first place, if we seek the fatherly liberality and propitious heart of God, our eyes must be directed to Christ, in whom alone the Father is well pleased… . Consider and investigate it as much as you please, you will not find its ultimate scope extend beyond this… . If we are chosen in Christ, we shall find no assurance of election in ourselves; nor even in God the Father, considered alone, abstractly from the Son. Christ, therefore, is the mirror, in which it behooves us to contemplate our election; and here we may do it with safety (3.24.5).

This “external word,” therefore, is nothing other than the universal offer of the Gospel. Embracing Christ alone, one is assured of “every spiritual blessing in heavenly places in Christ,” including election (Eph. 1:4). It is to be sought neither in God’s eternal hiddenness, nor in ourselves, but in Christ alone as he is offered to us in the external call. If we were to find 32

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Is Predestination Central for Calvinists?

There is a popular thesis (explored more fully in Joel Kim’s article in this issue), promoted largely by neo-orthodox scholars, driving a wedge between Calvin and the Calvinists. In other words, everything we have said, thus far, is granted by these thinkers: Calvin was utterly christocentric and avoided speculation like the plague. But, say the proponents of the “Calvin versus the Calvinists” debate, Calvin was followed by those who were eager to return to the scholastic method of doing theology. Led by Theodore Beza, Calvin’s successor in Geneva, these Aristotelian theologians placed the discussion of predestination under the doctrine of God instead of under the discussion of salvation.

In reality, however, Beza’s own writings reflect diversity in the placement of predestination. Sometimes it is under the doctrine of God, but it is also positioned there in Melanchthon’s Loci communes, and Melanchthon was hardly a Calvinist. Furthermore, the Westminster divines—often targeted as the epitome of scholastic Calvinism—placed the discussion under “The Covenant of Grace and Its Mediator.”

The bottom line is this: In neither Calvin, his colleagues, nor his successors, is predestination the central dogma. There are differences in pastoral strategy. For instance, while the Puritans directed consciences to Christ, they also emphasized Peter’s admonition to “make your calling and election sure.”

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This could be done, they said, not by searching out God’s hidden decree, but by leaning on Christ. But how do I know that I’m truly leaning on Christ and not on my own merits? How do I know that my faith is strong enough, that my repentance is sincere enough? This, the Puritans (at least most of them) insisted, was to make faith and repentance new works which could earn justification. So they separated faith from assurance, arguing that one was justified simply by looking to Christ alone—even if one did not have assurance.

While both Calvin and the English Puritans were driven by pastoral concerns to preserve the clarity of God’s free grace in justification, the Puritan view of assurance (as not necessarily an element of saving faith) marks an important difference with Calvin and the magisterial Reformation. After all, the magisterial Reformation insisted that faith simply was assurance.

This difference is easily discerned by comparing the continental Reformed view (Belgic Confession and Heidelberg Catechism) with the Westminster Confession (see especially Article 18) and Catechisms.

The continental Reformed view regards assurance as belonging to faith itself. The Westminster Confession, however, sees assurance as a reflexive effect of discerning even the slightest traces of God’s work in one’s life.

Although faith did not come and go depending on one’s obedience, assurance could. Like the reformers’ teaching, the Puritan view was calculated to console disquieted consciences, but it could also be used to disturb consciences with the fear of not discerning one’s election through introspective measures. In fact, the practical and casuistic literature of the English Puritans often reflects a preoccupation with attaining assurance.

As we have seen, this was the very course that Calvin warned against in his treatment of election. Many later Puritans complained of this tendency and sought to redress imbalances.

In 1619, the Synod of Dort issued its famous canons, from which the popular expression, “Five Points of Calvinism” or “T.U.L.I.P” (Total depravity, Unconditional election, Limited atonement, Irresistible Grace, Perseverance of the Saints) emerged. An international synod, the meeting included delegates from the established churches of England, Scotland, and Ireland, as well as the continental churches of Switzerland, France, Germany, Hungary, Bohemia, and The Netherlands. At least publicly, King James I was as eager to extinguish Arminianism from his kingdom as the delegates he sent to Dort. (Interestingly, the Patriarch of Constantinople drew up his own version of the Canons of Dort for the Orthodox Churches, but this was rescinded and repudiated after his death.) In this definitive confession, the Reformed churches condemned Arminianism and asserted the Calvinistic

distinctives. No other document in Reformed history has been so useful in offering a careful but concise treatment of the differences between Calvinism and Arminianism. But Dort has to be seen in its context. It was a response to a crisis in the Dutch church, which sister Reformed churches were battling as well, even as they continue to do to this day. Unlike the confessions and catechism of the Reformation period, Dort was a polemical statement targeting a particular error. It was never intended as a stand-alone statement of the Reformed faith. Those, like myself, who subscribe to the Reformed confession, embrace not only Dort but also the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism, where predestination is not only not central, but is mentioned only in passing. Together, they are the “Form of Subscription.” The Westminster Confession and Catechisms, drafted three decades later by order of the English parliament, also had Arminianism in view, but sought to offer a full explanation of Calvinism beyond the dispute over the “Five Points.”

The reason for mentioning these historical facts is to point out that it is highly problematic to reduce Calvinism or Reformed theology to the “Five Points.”

Genuine Calvinism is certainly more than this. It involves a distinct covenantal hermeneutic, including the covenant of works (“in Adam”) and the covenant of grace (“in Christ”), and this entails certain views of the sacraments and the Church. Even the isolated defense of “T.U.L.I.P.” can present election or the sovereignty of God in a way that is markedly different from the Reformed understanding. Ironically, the mistake of critics who reduced Reformed theology to predestination is too often repeated by friends of Calvinism. They have discovered the richness of the doctrines of grace and yet fail to see that it is a doctrinal system which comprehends the essential teaching of Scripture.

By abstracting the “Five Points” from that system, many contemporary “Calvinists” have failed to see the sovereignty of God in his electing and redeeming grace in the covenantal unfolding of God’s plan in redemptive history. Thus, their treatment of predestination sometimes appears to be bold speculation into God’s eternal hiddenness, apart from the external call offered to everyone and sealed by the Holy Spirit through the external means of grace. Furthermore, it seems to be a central motif in their thinking, either relegating the more central themes under which election is properly ordered to the outer edges or rejecting them altogether. No wonder, then, that such distorted versions of “Calvinism” often result in morbid introspection, severe piety, and a lack of assurance which gives no rest to the conscience. As we have seen, Calvin and the Reformed confessions (including Westminster) regard Christ and union with him as central.

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considered in themselves, for apart from Christ our knowledge of God will only result in terror and judgment.

If our critics should be expected to deal more responsibly with the actual development of Reformed theology, our friends should also be encouraged not to pull up the “tulips” from their native soil in God’s redemptive scheme.

The Consolation of Election There are various reasons why people reject the biblical doctrine of election. Some do so, as Luther surmised, because of “the wisdom of the flesh,” seeking glory for self. Others, of a more philosophical bent, curiously probe beyond Scripture, demanding an accounting of God for why some, but not all, are chosen. It is just at that point where the biblical witness forbids further speculation (“Who are you, O mortal, to question God?”), and where human wisdom often prefers to reject God’s revealed utterance. Further questions ensue about the problem of evil, which is, we should add, not just a problem for Calvinists. In fact, it’s a problem for everyone but God. And God knew that we would throw up just such objections: “You will then say to me, how can God still blame us? … Is God unjust?” (Rom. 9).

As Luther said, the doctrine of election is as plainly revealed in Scripture as the notion of a supreme being.

Thus Luther answered Erasmus’ weak refrain of ignorance of this doctrine with the reply, “The Holy Spirit is not a sceptic!” God revealed election, not for our curiosity, nor to confirm us in our laziness, but to raise our eyes to him in gratitude, acknowledging that he alone is worthy to receive praise. This doctrine is the occasion for worship and not for speculation or debate.

It is just such thoughts of God’s goodness which lead us to exclaim, “Who shall lay anything to the charge of God’s elect?” As we have been reminded, knowledge of this truth is of sweet comfort to those who have been crushed by the Law and raised to life by the Gospel, but it is deadly for those who have not.

Since God has entrusted his Word to his Church, it is only a measure of our pride and self-will that we should attempt to silence God’s voice on a matter of such importance. It is difficult to find a doctrine that is so clearly and prominently proclaimed in Scripture and yet so obscured and ignored in the Church. And yet, every great recovery of the apostolic Gospel throughout church history has involved a rediscovery of this great truth.

If I may be per mitted to conclude on an autobiographical note, I remember well the day I finally “got” Romans chapter nine. Already disoriented and reoriented by the first eight chapters of Romans, despite my meager understanding, I was at first outraged by the 34

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sheer freedom of God. You already know what I mean, and if you don’t, read Professor Baugh’s ar ticle.

Throwing my Bible across the room, I determined not to pick it up again, but my resolve was short-lived. After reading the chapter several times, I found my hard heart softening under the warm rays of God’s unmerited favor.

Grace really is grace, I began to say to myself. God is greater, I am smaller, and salvation is sweeter. Whenever I get into a discussion of grace, I find that sooner or later (usually sooner), the conversation turns to election.

And no wonder. While it may not be the center of Christianity, it is certainly the test of just how central the central things really are. MR

Michael S. Horton, Ph.D., is associate professor of historical theology at Westminster Theological Seminary in Escondido, California, and serves on the council of the Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals.

COURAGE TO STAND: JEREMIAH’S BATTLE PLAN FOR PAGAN TIMES P H I L I P G R A H A M RY K E N How can Christians effectively live for the Lord when their society has turned its back on God? Jeremiah offers many answers.

Linking the pagan culture of Jeremiah’s time to our own culture’s escalating secularism, Ryken’s lively study of the Old Testament prophet’s book and life makes this book an unusually effective wake-up call for those who are ready to take a stand now and influence the current culture for Christ.

B-RYKE-1 Paperback, $11.00 To order call (800) 956-2644.

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PREACHING CHRIST

HOW ALL OF SCRIPTURE POINTS TO HIM SEE WHAT IT COSTS, GENESIS 22:1–19 EDMUND P. CLOWNEY You put down the fork as your phone rings: “Congratulations, Mr. and Mrs. Target! You and your wife have just been awarded an all-expense-paid cruise on the Caribbean!” Or was it ten million dollars that was reserved for you according to the junk mail yesterday? Do you read the fine print on those million dollar offers? Of course not. You don’t need to.

Do you think the Gospel offer is like that? Check out the experience of Abraham described in Genesis 22. God promised Abraham more than a Caribbean cruise, or even ten million dollars. God promised him a land, a nation, and blessing to share with all the families of the earth. Yet some of God’s promises were long in coming. Ten years after reaching Canaan, Abraham had neither a land nor a nation. In fact, his wife Sarah did not even have a son. Desperate for descendants, Sarah gave her slave Hagar to Abraham, and Ishmael was born. The Lord, however, kept promising a son to Abraham and Sarah. Fifteen years later the Lord was still promising.

At the advanced ages of 100 and 90, Abraham and Sarah found this absurd. Both laughed at God’s impossible promise. But Sarah laughed again; her little son was named Isaac, “He laughs.” The Lord had the last laugh.

Abraham was certainly blessed: he had wealth, two sons, and open pastures. What about the fine print?

The cost of blessing came in God’s command.

“Abraham,” God called. “Take your son, your only son Isaac, whom you love, and go to the region of Moriah.

Sacrifice him there on one of the mountains I will tell you about” (Gen. 22:2 NIV).

The meaning of the name “Moriah” already suggests that something will be seen. On that mountain it is the cost that will be seen. Abraham will see the cost in the experience of faith. There, too, God will show the cost that only he can meet: the cost of grace.

Abraham will see that God is the Savior.

For Abraham, the cost is everything. All that God

has promised walks beside him in his son Isaac. If the price is Isaac, nothing else is left. At God’s command, Abraham had sent Ishmael away, for he was not the son of the promise. “Take your son, your only son, Isaac…” Without Isaac there is none to be heir of the land, none to found a great nation, none to be a blessing to the whole world. God called, “Abraham!” God had given him that name: “Father of a multitude.” How could he be “Abraham” without Isaac? Isaac is the seal of Abraham’s faith and the son of his love.

Early the next mor ning, Abraham prepared for the journey. Two servants will go with him. He saddled his donkey, cut wood to burn the sacrifice, but chose no sheep from his flock. He left Beersheba with the wood, a knife, and his beloved Isaac.

The “whole burnt-offering” was a gift of consecration. Abraham was to return to God what he had received from God. God did forbid human sacrifice as practiced by the surrounding nations, but God has every right to condemn sinners to death. Indeed, when God judged the land of Egypt before the exodus, he required the life of the firstborn sons of Israel as well as of Egypt. The oldest son, as representing the family, was doomed, but the Lord provided the Passover lamb as a substitute, marked by the blood on the doorpost. Later, God continued to assert his claim on the firstborn (Ex. 13:15; Num. 8:17). The sacrifice of Isaac was not to be, for he was not a perfect offering, a lamb without spot; he could not pay the price of the sins of others. Abraham could not give the fruit of his body for the sin of his soul.

Abraham obeyed without delay, but his test was not over. It had continued as he chopped the wood. There must be wood enough for the burnt-offering at the distant place he had not yet seen. Every blow of his axe prepared for the stroke of his knife. Then, for three days his obedience paced on. The donkey carried the wood as they went together.

At last Abraham lifted his eyes and saw the very mount the Lord had identified. This was the place; this was the time. The servants must come no further.

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settled it on his shoulders. Abraham car ried a smoldering torch. They reached the hill in Moriah and began up the slope. Isaac broke the silence: “My father,” he said. “Here am I, my son,” answered Abraham. Their courteous form of address was measured against eternity. “Here are the fire and the wood, but where is the lamb for the burnt-offering?”

“God will see for himself the lamb for a burntoffering, my son,” answered Abraham. In the agony of his testing, Abraham could only cling to God. He was on the mount he had seen, the Mount of God, with the son God had given. God saw him there. God would see the offering that he would provide for himself. The verb for “see” in Hebrew also means “see to” or “provide.”

Abraham was not evading the question. Beyond his own knowledge, he was prophesying. Abraham would pay the price, but God’s promise could not fail. Abraham had told the servants, “We will return to you.” If need be, God would raise Isaac from the dead (Heb. 11:17-19).

They went, both of them together, father and son, to the crest of the hill. They gathered rocks and stones to build the altar. The obedience of Abraham is matched by the faith of Isaac. He does not resist, but is led by his father as a sheep to the slaughter. He allows himself to be bound, hand and foot, and laid on the wood he has carried. Not till Abraham stretches out the knife does the Angel of the Lord call from heaven, “Abraham, Abraham…”.

Abraham was ready to give everything in devoted obedience. Because he feared God, he would pay the price. On the mount, Abraham looked up, and saw a ram just caught by its horns in a bush. He took the ram and offered it in the place of his Isaac. Abraham called the place, “The Lord Will See (to it).”

The cost to Abraham was everything, yet as he clung to the Lord in faith, the cost was nothing. He declared that the Lord would provide, and the Lord did provide.

Abraham’s obedience was the obedience of faith. Isaac was given to Abraham a second time. He was his by birth and his by redemption. The offering of the sheep symbolized not only consecration, but atonement in the blood of a substitute.

In the total commitment of faith the cost is everything, but in the simple trust of faith, the cost is nothing. Abraham worshiped as God renewed his covenant with him.

The demand that the Lord made of Abraham is not unthinkable. He makes the same total demand of you.

Jesus asks it of everyone who would follow him.

Whoever loves father, mother, son, or daughter more than the Lord is not worthy of him. Indeed, only as we are ready to receive our own death sentence and take up our cross do we receive everlasting life (Matt. 10:37-39).

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ourselves and follow him, his demand has not changed.

Look at the cost: it’s everything.

Not only in the experience of faith, but in the reality of grace, the price of redemption is revealed. In his goodness, God sends us times that try us. While Jesus was on trial before the high priest, Peter was on trial in the priest’s courtyard, before a servant girl. Jesus had prayed for Peter, that his faith would not fail. It failed. Peter swore by God that he never knew Jesus, but Jesus turned from his accusers to look at Peter. Weeping, Peter stumbled out into the night. Yet the testing did not come to destroy Peter, but to show him the cost. At a resurrection breakfast by the lake, Jesus restored Peter’s faith.

Through Abraham’s trial, his faith was confirmed, and the Lord confirmed his own promise with an oath.

Indeed, the testing of Abraham is all about grace. God tested to bless. The Lord instructed Abraham’s faith, even as he put it to the test. We are given two keys to this event. First, we are told that God tested Abraham, and that he was blessed for his obedience, since it showed that he feared God. The second key is found in the name Abraham gave to the place the Lord had shown him. We know it as “Jehovah Jireh” (YahwehYireh would be better): “The Lord Will See (to it).”

When God provided the ram, he not only spared Isaac (and Abraham!), but showed Abraham that the price of redemption was greater than he could pay. The Lord himself must provide the offering that brings salvation.

That provision must be made at the place God showed Abraham. The Lord therefore showed Abraham that after his descendants had gone to Egypt, and had been brought back, this would be the place where the promised nation would gather to worship God. Isaac could not be the offering; neither could the real sacrifice be a sheep. The One descended from Abraham must come, in whom all the families of the earth will be blessed. “The Lord Will Provide” promises the coming of Christ. Abraham rejoiced to see Christ’s day when Isaac was born, and rejoiced again when God provided the ram as a substitute for Isaac, but Abraham looked further. Not Isaac but the Lamb of God was the Sacrifice that the Father would provide.

Abraham the prophet spoke words that endured, words that explained Jehovah Jireh: “In the mountain of the Lord he shall be seen” (Gen. 22:14).

Who is the “he” that shall be seen? When Hagar, pregnant with Ishmael, fled from Sarah’s anger, the Angel of the Lord found her by a well, and she named the Lord, El Roi, “The God Who Sees Me.” She called the well, “The Well of the Living One Who Sees Me” (Gen. 16:13,14).

Hagar saw the Angel of God’s presence, because the Angel first saw her. Does Abraham name the mountain as the place where the Lord is seen? But the Angel of the MODERN REFORMATION

Lord called to Abraham from heaven. The Lord did not come down to the mountain to stay Abraham’s hand.

Abraham had looked up to see the mountain. He said that the Lord would see to the sacrifice. Abraham looked up again, and saw the ram, caught by the horns.

In Abraham’s saying, who then is the “he” that shall be seen? The simplest answer is the ram that Abraham saw.

(The “he” is masculine for the ram: see “offered him up” v. 13.) In the mountain of the Lord, God’s provision, the ram that God “saw to” was seen.

Well may we still hold to Abraham’s word. In the mountain of the Lord, the Lamb of God will be seen.

A popular chorus sings, “Jehovah Jireh, the Lord provideth for me” but misses the heart of the passage.

Jehovah Jireh: in the mountain of the Lord Jesus Christ will be seen. What we see is Jesus Christ lifted up on Golgotha in the hills of Moriah.

The cost to Abraham was everything. He must not spare his beloved son. But Isaac was spared. Yet if Isaac was spared, the Father’s Beloved must be offered up.

Paul tells us that the Heavenly Father spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all (Rom. 8:32). God’s revelation of the cost of redemption in the life of Abraham points us to the Lamb of God: the Lamb that God provides, that he offers for sinners. The Son paid the price on Calvary. So did the Father. In mystery beyond mystery, the Eternal God was silent as the incarnate Son cried, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” Not just at the incarnation did God give his Son. He gave him also in the darkness, in the silence, as he forsook his Beloved. God commended his own love for us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us (Rom. 5:5).

The cost to Abraham was nothing, for God provided. The cost to God was infinite. He paid the price. Yet, for the joy that was set before him, Christ endured the cross, despising that shame, and is enthroned with the Father. The infinite price that was paid is met only by God’s infinite love—for God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believes in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. How dare we even speak of such wonders, wonders that angels cannot comprehend? But it is that love, that infinite love for us, that God pours out in our hearts. Can we endure such love without ourselves being consumed with the fire of his presence?

Only his grace can enable us to receive it. God’s fine print is bright with the glory of his love, love that draws us to love him and moves us to love others.

Thus might I hide my blushing face while his dear cross appears; dissolve my heart in thankfulness, and melt mine eyes to tears.

But drops of grief can ne’er repay the debt of love I owe; here, Lord, I give myself away, ‘tis all that I can do.

— Isaac Watts, 1707

Dr. Edmund Clowney, who was the first president of Westminster Theological Seminary (Philadelphia), is professor of practical theology at Westminster Theological Seminary in California. He is the author of a number of books on preaching, including The Unfolding Mystery: Discovering Christ in the Old Testament (Col. Springs: NavPress, 1998).

God moves in a mysterious way His wonders to perform; He plants His footsteps in the sea.

And rides upon the storm.

Deep in unfathomable mines Of never-failing skill He treasures up His bright designs, And works His sovereign will.

Ye fearful saints, fresh courage take; The clouds ye so much dread Are big with mercy, and shall break In blessings on your head.

Judge not the Lord by feeble sense, But trust Him for His grace; Behind a frowning providence He hides a smiling face.

His purposes will ripen fast, Unfolding every hour; The bud may have a bitter taste, But sweet will be the flower.

Blind unbelief is sure to err, And scan His work in vain; God is his own interpreter, And He will make it plain.

— William Cowper

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Did Calvin’s Successors Distort His Doctrine of Predestination?

JOEL E. KIM The division of history into various periods serves as a helpful pedagogical tool. I walked out of my courses in ancient, medieval, Reformation, and moder n history with a sense of accomplishment in having somewhat mastered important events, individuals, and trends of thought that make each period distinct from one another. Such divisions offer convenient and accessible methods of studying history. At the same time, these divisions come with serious side-effects. They lead to an oversimplification of history by dealing with highlights that fail to portray the diversity and complexities of each period. More importantly, such divisions overlook the necessity of identifying the continuities and discontinuities of each period with the period that precedes and succeeds it.

Such oversight often results in oversimplification and erroneous historical conclusions.

The study of the Refor mation has not been immune from such isolation and over-simplification.

Recent studies into the medieval background of the Reformation have challenged the once popularly accepted belief in the complete discontinuity of the Reformation from its medieval predecessors. Moreover, the apparent continuities have shown the complexities and diversities found in both the medieval scholasticism and the Reformation.1 However, such advances have not significantly affected the study of the relationship between the Reformation and the Protestant theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, or, specifically, Reformed and Lutheran orthodoxy. The notion of a strict separation between the Reformation and its 38

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Protestant successors remains popular.

At the center of this discussion are the doctrines of the decree and predestination. Simply stated, the degree is God’s eternal ordering of all things according to his pleasure, while predestination is the eternal decree of God that deals specifically with what God willed for each person. The issue is not whether Calvin or his successors taught and valued the doctrine of predestination; rather, the question surrounds the function and the nature of predestination in theological systems.

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According to one school of thought, Calvin’s understanding of predestination is foremost biblical and historical.2 This concrete formulation of predestination produced a doctrine that is soteriological (salvational) in its usage and Christocentric in its focus. But, these scholars continue, Calvin’s “balanced” approach was abandoned by his successors, who removed the doctrine from its soteriological location and placed it in the doctrine of God and the decree.3 As a result of this relocation, the doctrine of predestination became “speculative.” No longer a soteriological doctrine, predestination is discussed primarily within the eternal decree of God in himself rather than in its execution in history. Furthermore, the advocates of this “decretal theology” abandoned the Christocentric focus of Calvin’s formulation and made predestination the central principle from which all other doctrines were derived.

Thus, some complain, Calvin’s theological successors coiled back to a “speculative determinism which Calvin had attempted to close.” 4 This line of argument is commonly referred to as the “Calvin against the Calvinists” position.

But is this assessment of Calvin and his successors— and the relationship between them—accurate?5 Soteriological Understanding of Predestination In Christ and the Decree, Calvin Seminary professor Richard A. Muller examines the merit of “the Calvin against the Calvinists” position by analyzing the formulations of various writers from the Reformation and the Reformed orthodoxy. In his judgment, a significant continuity exists between the theologians of the two periods.

His investigation begins with Calvin for whom the decree of predestination and Christology are intimately related. On the one hand, the sinfulness of man and the resulting separation from God is resolved in the work of salvation by Christ, the mediator. Redemption accomplished by Christ and applied through calling, justification, and sanctification is historical and temporal in its execution. Salvation, then, is a historical act accomplished in Christ. At the same time, Scripture equally confirms that the author of this salvation is God. The human predicament could not be overcome without God decreeing salvation in eternity. From this perspective, salvation is an eternal act accomplished by God. These seemingly opposite conclusions are reconciled in Christ. Since Christ is both human and divine, salvation is actualized in Christ and by Christ. In other words, Christ as the mediator reconciles man to God by the execution of salvation in history, and Christ as God decreed the very salvation that he himself reveals and accomplishes in history.

A result of interrelating predestination and

soteriology (i.e., the doctrine of salvation) is locating the cause of salvation in the grace of God which is consistent with the Reformed emphasis of the sovereignty of God even in salvation. Moreover, the relationship of predestination and soteriology makes the discussion of the eternal decree possible. Professor Muller states, Indeed, the concept of predestination or of divine decrees can only be properly understood as it is seen to represent one aspect, the causal aspect, of an eternal solution to the temporal predicament: it is the vertical line of the saving will that intersects, at a particular temporal moment, the history of salvation and the life of the individual in that history.6 No longer is the decree a speculation into the mind of God since the decree must be examined to establish the causal aspect of salvation. Thus, the order of salvation in Christ provides a glimpse into the mind of God in the history of salvation. One conclusion from this examination of the decree is Calvin’s doctrine of reprobation.

We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition, rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or death.7 Since Calvin formulated such an explicit statement on reprobation, the conclusion (of the Calvin versus the Calvinists advocates) that God’s decree of reprobation is a later deduction from a predestinarian theology seems unfounded.8 A fuller picture of salvation is possible by relating the decree of predestination with soteriology.

As the sixteenth century neared its end, the Reformed concern for the sovereignty of God, especially in the work of salvation, continued. The causal priorities established by the earlier reformers became more defined and the ordo salutis (the temporal order of causes and effects through which the salvation of the sinner is accomplished) was examined in the ordo rerum decretarum, a statement of the logical priorities within the eternal purpose of God.9 While this investigation into the order of the decree is a movement beyond Calvin’s teaching, Professor Muller’s contention is that this theological step is an attempt to affirm once again the place of divine grace in salvation while remaining firmly rooted in the temporal ordo salutis for its formulation.

Amandus Planus von Polansdorf (1561-1610), an early NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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or thodox theologian who contributed to the establishment of Reformed orthodoxy in Basel, falls within this trajectory of thought. In his muchdeveloped discussion of the mediatorial role of the God-man, the two natures in Christ appear not merely as a doctrinal formulation of the Christ in his essence, but as an explanation for the two states of Christ in his work of salvation: humiliation and exaltation. Within this elaboration of Christology, the essential divinity of the Son and the relationship of the Trinity becomes even more explicit. Since the work of salvation in Christ is essentially a divine act that is not possible apart from the unity of the persons in the Godhead, the decree of predestination must belong to the divine essence.

To place predestination under the topic of God and providence is not to render it abstract or speculative, but to make explicit what is implied in soteriology; the ultimate cause of salvation accomplished in history is a direct result of the decree of God in eternity. This is far from an attempt to build a system based upon the decree of predestination. Instead, it was an effort by Reformed orthodox scholars to produce more precise statements on the relationship between God and his temporal work of salvation, between God’s essence and his saving action. Professor Muller concludes, Thus, in Polanus’ Syntagma, and even in a high orthodox system like Turretin’s Institutio theologicae elencticae, where a fully developed doctrine of God and his attributes with all the scholastic and philosophical language of essence and being appears prior to treatment of predestination, the determining factor in the system is not a speculative interest in the metaphysics of causal determinism but a soteriological interest in the manner in which God relates to his world in Christ.10 Calvin’s discussion of the decree establishes the basic foundation upon which his successors built. Noting that the Reformed orthodox theologians worked within the basic boundaries established by Calvin, Muller comments, “What is more, the development of the doctrine of predestination in the era of Reformed orthodoxy, despite the increased recourse to scholastic argumentation and the relatively greater interest in Aristotelian discussion of causality, did not yield definitions that were more strict than Calvin’s own…”.11 The doctrine of predestination thus serves to undergird the argument for continuity rather than discontinuity between the reformers and their followers.

Central Dogma One of the underlying problems of those who posit 40

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a separation between Calvin and his successors is the impulse to make historical judgments based upon an oversimplification of the various theological systems. To simply designate Calvin as “Christocentric” and his successors as “predestinarian” does not do justice to the multi-faceted nature of their doctrinal systems. While “soteriological emphasis” and “Christological motif ” is clear in Calvin’s writings, these particular doctrinal points did not become the starting point for deducing other doctrinal formulations. This is not to deny the usefulness of the term “Christocentrism.” The term is helpful inasmuch as the reformers “consistently place Christ at the historical and at the soteriological center of the work of redemption.” 12 However, the Christocentrism of Calvin remains an aspect of his system, not the central principle.

In the same way, no determinism or “central principle” of predestination or the decree dominates the writings of Reformed orthodox theologians. The systems of the Reformed orthodox invariably look to Scripture for their doctrinal formulation and view God as the essential foundation of their endeavors. A statement by Francis Turretin (1623-1687), a Reformed orthodox theologian, is typical: “That God is the object of theology is evident both from the very name, and from Scripture which recognizes no other principal object.”13 In fact, the very theological system they used dictates against viewing any doctrine as central. The theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth century fully embraced the locus method in which topics of theological discussions were drawn from their exegetical endeavors. These texts were arranged according to their theological topic and published as a system of theology.

Doctrines, then, are derived from Scripture, not from a central doctrine. In fact, the thought of a “central principle” is a modern theological innovation that was unknown to the theologians of the Reformation and the Reformed orthodoxy.14 The Diversity of Formulation To conclude that the Refor med or thodox theologians abandoned the Reformation by examining their relationship to Calvin is built upon another false assumption; namely, that a period can be represented by a particular figure or writing.15 Calvin is not the only theologian of the Reformation. Therefore, it is wrong to identify the Reformed theologians of the succeeding generations simply as “Calvinists.” While Calvin’s influence is substantial and cannot be minimized, the significant influence of Calvin’s contemporaries should not be overlooked.

In the discussion of the decree, an analysis of his contemporaries underscores the continuity of the Reformation and the Reformed orthodox period. At MODERN REFORMATION

the same time, the variations found in the writings of the Reformed orthodox are not necessarily deviations from Calvin; often, they show the acceptance of alternate Reformation formulations. Professor Muller examines the writings of Heinrich Bullinger, Wolfgang Musculus, and Peter Mar tyr Ver migli, Calvin’s contemporaries, to provide a broader picture of the Reformation scene. Along with Calvin, each scholar exhibits an “overarching concern to delineate the pattern of divine working in the economy of salvation.”16 Yet, their differences are just as significant for the development of doctrine. Calvin dislikes the use of the permissive decree, for example, but Vermigli uses this doctrine to explain the Fall. 17 So, while Calvin’s formulation of Christology and the double decree of election and reprobation had a tremendous influence in the Refor med or thodox theologies, Ver migli’s infralapsarian conception of the election and his use of the permissive decree also received wide acceptance by the Reformed orthodox. Thus, by moving beyond Calvin as the only representative figure in the Reformation, the perceived differences between the Reformation and the Reformed orthodoxy may need other explanations than theological innovation.

up the opinion of the Reformed orthodox: “Theology rules over philosophy, and this latter acts as a handmaid to and subserves the former.”21 This historical debate over the decree and predestination presents us with two challenges. First, it urges us to examine anew the doctrine of predestination to gain greater clarity about this profound yet enriching doctrine. Second, the debate leads us to readdress the history of the Reformed tradition with which many of us identify. Even this par ticular debate over predestination and the decree challenges us to see beyond our narrow understanding of the Reformation and to fully embrace the rich heritage of our faith. MR

Scholastic Method Advocating a general continuity in doctrinal formulation does not mean that Reformed orthodox theologians merely duplicated the previous generations of scholars. One significant change is the method of theological discussion. It does not take long to notice that Francis Turretin’s Institutes is considerably different in style from Calvin’s Institutes. The scholastic method that Turretin employed “elaborates, distinguishes, clarifies and finds technical formulae” for a particular topic in question.18 Usually the word “scholasticism” has a pejorative connotation because of its association with various medieval theologians. But the scholastic method itself does not imply certain conclusions.

Instead, the method provides a tool for an “academic argument … leading to the resolution of objections, the identification and use of distinctions, and the establishment of right conclusions.”19 In fact, the drastic theological differences seen in the so-called “scholastic” theologians, such as Duns Scotus, Gabriel Biel, Jacob Arminius, and others, proves that the method itself does not determine set conclusions.

The assumption that the use of the scholastic method by the Reformed orthodox theologians made predestination determinative and central stems from a faulty conception of scholasticism. 20 Whether for polemical or pedagogical reasons, the Reformation’s successors developed clearer definitions by implementing the scholastic method. Francis Turretin’s statement sums

T H E P R E S E N T E VA N G E L I C A L C R I S I S JOHN H. ARMSTRONG EDITOR

Joel E. Kim (M.Div., Westminster Theological Seminary in California) is a Ph.D. student at Calvin Theological Seminary.

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IN PRINT The Bondage of the Will Martin Luther (Old Tappan, NJ: Revell, 1957) The Bondage of the Will is fundamental to the understanding of the primary doctrines of the Reformation. In this work, Luther gives extensive treatment to what he saw as the heart of the gospel.

This new and accurate translation captures the vitality of Luther’s treatise, thereby conveying its relevance to our lives today.

B-LUT-1 Paperback, $15.00 The Justification of God: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Romans 9:1-23 John Piper (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983) Undergirded by the author’s belief that the sovereignty of God is too precious a part of our faith to dismiss or approach weak-kneed, this book explores the Greek text and Paul’s argument with singular deftness.

B-PI-2 Paperback, $15.00 Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins Richard A. Muller (Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1986; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988) Christ and the Decree establishes the theological history of early Calvinist soteriology. This study of Reformed scholasticism argues that a single doctrine of predestination was developed by Reformers Calvin, Musculus, Bullinger and Vermigli, and the theologians Beza, Ursinus, Zanchi, Polanus and Perkins.

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Saved By Grace Anthony Hoekema (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989) Characterized by careful scriptural analysis and accessible writing, this compendium of doctrinal studies by the late Anthony A . Hoekema clearly teaches the theological foundations of three essential Christian doctrines: anthropology (Created in God's Image), soteriology (Saved by Grace), and eschatology (The Bible and the Future).

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OUT OF PRINT: (available at your local library) Election and Predestination Paul K. Jewett (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985) The Freedom of God: A Study of Election and Pulpit James Daane (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973) Calvin: Theological Treatises trans. and ed. by J. K. S. Reid (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1954)

ALSO AVAILABLE AT YOUR LOCAL BOOKSTORE OR LIBRARY Peter Martyr Vermigli and Predestination: The Augustinian Heritage of an Italian Theologian Frank James III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) All books (except out of print or otherwise noted) are available from MR by calling (800) 956-2644. Phones are answered from 8:30 am through 4:30 pm Eastern Time, Monday through Friday. For further book recommendations and an on-line resources catalogue, please visit our website at www.AllianceNet.org.

MODERN REFORMATION

REVIEW A Review of Peter Kreeft’s Ecumenical Jihad REVIEWED BY GARY L. W. JOHNSON Boston College philosophy professor Peter Kreeft’s Ecumenical Jihad: Ecumenism and the Culture War (Ignatius Press, 1996) is one of the most astonishing books I have ever come across. To begin with, the book’s title is ar resting. The somewhat frightening word “Jihad,” associated in our Western culture with Islamic terrorists, means “holy war” that is carried out as a religious duty. Juxtaposed with “ecumenical,” the title is odd indeed. Kreeft acknowledges that these two words are indeed laden with distinctive religious overtones. “Ecumenism,” he writes, “is a ‘liberal’ idea and one that makes ‘conservatives’ suspicious.

‘Jihad’ is a ‘conservative’ idea and one that makes ‘liberals’ suspicious” (p.

9). I submit the term “Jihad” (which is Arabic) is neither “Christian” nor “conservative,” and should not be incorporated into our evangelical vocabulary.

In the first half of the book, Kreeft aptly describes the state of moral decay in our world today (he is obviously not the first person to call our attention to this state of affairs 1 ) and issues a call to arms to engage in the culture wars that are engulfing humanity. Kreeft contends that this can only be done by enlisting all of the world’s great religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism). Unlike the supporters of the “Evangelicals and Catholics Together” document, Kreeft has moved beyond simply calling Roman Catholics and evangelicals to lay aside their differences and join ranks to fight the fiends of secular humanism.

Instead, he beckons us to embrace the other world religions as allies in this great (greatest?) battle as well.

Let me say, at this point, that the trouble with ECT and Kreeft and their desire to enlist evangelicals in “co-

belligerence” is that, in both cases, evangelicals are implicitly called upon to sacrifice theological distinctives in the process. In the case of ECT, “sola fide” was laid aside and, in the case of Kreeft, the doctrines of God, Christ, and salvation end up being eviscerated of any meaningful biblical content.

Peter Kreeft is in his own right enigmatic. He was reared and nurtured in the Christian Refor med Church and even taught philosophy at Calvin College before converting to Roman Catholicism. He is a gifted writer, which I think accounts for his popularity among many within Evangelicalism. The book carries the glowing endorsement of two very high-profile evangelicals: Chuck Colson and J. I. Packer. Well then, the book can’t be all that bad, can it? Yes, it can, and here is why.

Kreeft advocates, in a way that advances the position of Vatican II and Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner, that the world religions are not outside the scope of God’s saving activities. 2 The way he goes about defending this thesis is very unique. He claims to have had an O.B.E. (out of body experience) while he was surfing off the East Coast of the United States during a hurricane. Suddenly, he tells us, he was overwhelmed by a huge wave and was sure he was going to drown. The next thing he knew, he was surfing through a bright light onto the shore of what he calls a heavenly beach with sand that was golden bright.

He noticed a man with a surf board walking toward him who bore a striking resemblance to the pictures of Confucius that Kreeft had seen in various books. Well, lo and behold, guess who it was? That’s right, it was Confucius! Kreeft had a long and interesting conversation with the Chinese philosopher before discovering that this heavenly beach party was also NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

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attended by Buddha, Mohammed, and Moses (all of whom engage the author in heady theological discussion). As it turns out, Kreeft ends up being scolded by this celestial quartet for his arrogant Christian exclusiveness. His dialogue with Mohammed is particularly revealing. We are told that despite Mohammed’s categorical rejection of the Christ’s claims, the Islamic prophet enjoys everlasting life, because after death he at once recognized Jesus as his Savior and worshiped him. Kreeft has Mohammed saying, “I hope most of my pious followers will follow this last step of my pilgrimage as well. If they cannot do it on earth, they may still do so in Heaven, as I did” (p. 105).

Are we actually to believe that Kreeft went to heaven and there found the likes of Confucius, Buddha, and especially Mohammed?3 Kreeft is not content to simply argue his case based on the biblical and theological evidence. He attempts to sanction his position by a direct appeal to a heavenly experience. In the final analysis, this is no different than the absurd claim made

by Betty Eadie in her runaway best-seller, Embraced by the Light.4 She too claims an O.B.E. and a trip to heaven.

Since neither Eadie nor Kreeft can substantiate their “special revelations” from Scripture, whom are we to believe? (See Gal. 1:8.)

If successful, Kreeft’s book would destroy any need for evangelistic or missionary effort. Why take the Gospel to people who hold different religious beliefs if they are going to end up in heaven when it’s all said and done? If Confucius, Buddha, and Mohammed (and their followers) are in heaven, what about Joseph Smith and his Mormon followers or Charles Taze Russell and his devoted Jehovah’s Witnesses? If all that matters is religious sincerity (which is what Kreeft seems to be concerned with), then three cheers for the Heaven’s Gate crowd that followed their leader in mass suicide. (You can’t question their sincerity.)

I mentioned earlier that Kreeft’s book carries the glowing endorsement of two highly respected evangelicals: Chuck Colson and J. I. Packer. This is baffling. Why would these two men want to give anyone the impression that Kreeft’s thesis had any credibility? It should be condemned, not praised by every biblically informed Christian. I would certainly describe Colson and Packer as biblically informed Christians (and in Packer’s case, theologically learned). So the big question: Why would they give Kreeft’s book any credence? I can only surmise, but I think it is another aspect of “co-belligerence.”

Co-belligerence is an expression that goes back to the late Francis Schaeffer, who used the term to describe the joint effort of Catholics, Mormons, evangelicals, et. al. in opposition to social issues like abortion. Schaeffer certainly never implied that these joint efforts should spill over into legitimate theological concerns that would 44

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end up blurring important doctrinal distinctives, key to understanding the Gospel. But this is exactly where Kreeft’s book leads.

Evangelicals are at times so preoccupied with fighting “culture wars” that they have a tendency to lose sight of the real war. Theology to some is often not very important in light of the great moral issues confronting us today (i.e., abortion, euthanasia, gay rights). Along with all historic Protestants, I disagree. For the spiritual war can be won only with the Gospel of justification by faith alone in Christ alone through grace alone. Kreeft’s book renders this Gospel totally meaningless.

Of course, as a Roman Catholic, Kreeft stands in opposition to the Reformation’s understanding of the Gospel. The Council of Trent, which was convened by the Roman Catholic Church (1545-63), officially condemned the Gospel as understood by the Reformers.

But Trent did at least seek to maintain the exclusivity of Christianity when it came to understanding salvation. I am convinced that had Trent come up against a thesis like Kreeft’s, they would have pronounced it anathema.

I alluded to Kreeft’s standing in the long shadow of Vatican II (1962-65), which enabled the Roman Catholic Church to come to grips with modernity by capitulating to the spirit of the times. This should not really come as a big surprise. One thing that has historically characterized the Roman Church through the ages is her remarkable adaptability. Rome changes on the surface but at the core remains the same. Rome has recognized the pervasive pluralism of the modern age and has therefore assimilated a pluralistic perspective in the stance she shows the world. But the pluralism that Rome embraces serves Rome, not vice-versa. It is interesting that Kreeft urges the various world religions to unite behind the leadership of one man. And who might that be? You guessed it, the Pope. Kreeft further admonishes his readers to adopt a strategy program for culture war that includes the following Roman Catholic distinctives: Reschedule and reprioritize your life to allow at least one or two of the following each day: Mass, Eucharistic adoration, Bible Reading, family prayers, the Rosary.

Consecrate your life to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. She is the one who will win this war. She is the one (as the Bible says) who triumphs over Satan. She is the one all the early Church Fathers call the “New Eve.” (See Genesis 3:15.) She is the “woman clothed with the sun” who will destroy the “dragon” (the Devil). (See Revelation 12.)

If there is a Catholic charismatic prayer group nearby, explore it. Many have found MODERN REFORMATION

remarkable new spiritual power through the “baptism of the Holy Spirit.” That’s how the apostles were transformed from a confused, frightened bunch of losers to world-winners: through the Holy Spirit.5 In the middle of the last century, J. C. Ryle, the evangelical Anglican, admonished the ministers under his charge about this danger.

False doctrine does not meet men face to face, and proclaim that it is false. It does not blow a trumpet before it, and endeavor openly to turn us away from the truth as it is in Jesus. It does not come before men in broad day, and summon them to surrender. It approaches us secretly,

ENDNOTES IN THIS ISSUE—Michael S. Horton 1 John R. W. Stott, God’s New Society: The Message of Ephesians (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1982).

“GOD’S PURPOSE ACCORDING TO ELECTION”—Steven M. Baugh Some New Testament scholars are content to charge predestination with being “abstract” or “philosophical,” as though this disqualifies it from being true. For example, Johannes Munck, writes: “It is clear that this passage [Romans 9:22–24] does not put forward a philosophical doctrine of predestination. As elsewhere in the New Testament, God is portrayed too ‘anthropomorphically’ to make possible a view of predestination with an abstract concept of the deity as its subject.” Christ & Israel: An Interpretation of Romans 9–11 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 70; emphasis added.

Likewise N. T. Wright says: “In some older treatments, it [Romans 9–11] was regarded as a doctrinal section dealing with the abstract doctrine of predestination; but this would find few advocates today.” The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 232; emphasis added.

2 See, for example, John Calvin, Institutes, 3.21.1–4.

3 In the Old Testament we read: “The mind of man plans his way, but the Lord directs his steps” (Prov. 16:9; cf. 16:1, 19:21, 20:24; Gen. 45:5, 7, 50:20).

4 Ephesians 2:8–9 is particularly clear (in Greek if not in translation) that grace, faith, and salvation all originate as a gift from God. See also the remarkable statement in the Old Testament that the sons of Eli did not heed their father’s rebuke and repent of their sins, “because it was the Lord’s pleasure to put them to death” (1 Sam. 2:25; cf. Josh. 11:20).

5 One author says that the history of interpretation of Romans 9 is nothing but “the history of attempts to escape this clear observation [of double predestination].” G. Maier quoted by John Piper, The Justification of God: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Romans 9:1–23 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983), 39.

6 Augustine of Hippo, translated and edited by Paula Fredriksen Landes, Augustine on Romans (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982), 30–33.

7 For instance, see Pelagius’ comments on Romans 9:12: “‘Not because of works, but because of the one who calls, was it said, “The elder shall serve the younger.”

God’s foreknowledge does [not] prejudge the sinner, if he is willing to repent” (Translated by Theodore de Bruyn, Pelagius’s Commentary on St Paul’s Epistle to the Romans [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993], 117).

8 Augustine, ad Simplicianum 2.5; J. H. S. Burleigh, translation, Augustine: Earlier Writings (LCC; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), 389–90.

Emphasis added.

9 This is frequently done in our literature, since Rom. 9:30–33 belongs 1

quietly, insidiously, plausibly, and in such a way as to disarm man’s suspicion, and throw him off his guard. It is the wolf in sheep’s clothing, and Satan in the garb of an angel of light, who have always proved the most dangerous foes of the Church of Christ… . It is the man who tells us we ought not to condemn anybody’s views, lest we err on the side of want of charity… . It is the man who always begins talking in a vague way about God being a God of love, and hints that we ought to believe perhaps that all men, whatever doctrine they profess, will be saved.6 Rev. Gary L. W. Johnson is pastor of the Church of the Redeemer in Mesa, Arizona.

more with the material in Romans 10.

10 See, for instance, N. T. Wright, Climax of the Covenant, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992) 234–35.

11 The theology of Paul’s opponents is a vexing question in New Testament scholarship. However, that Jews sometimes presumed on their connection with Abraham is evident from Matt. 3:9 (parallel Luke 3:8), John 8:33–40, and Rom. 2:17–24. Compare Luke 13:16, 19:9; Rom. 4:1, 12; and Gal. 3:7.

12 It is fair to say “salvation,” as this is the great theme of Romans 9–11.

The words that refer to salvation or deliverance occur more often in chapters 9–11 than elsewhere in Romans. Specifically, these words are the noun, soteria (“salvation”), and verbs, sozo (“I save”) and rhuomai (“I deliver”); the places are: Rom. 9:27, 10:1, 9, 10, 13, 11:11, 14, and 26 (twice). The other places where these words occur in Romans are 1:16, 5:9, 10, 7:24, 8:24, 13:11, and 15:31.

13 See the recent critique of these two interpretations of Romans 9 by Thomas R. Schreiner, “Does Romans 9 Teach Individual Election unto Salvation,” in The Grace of God, The Bondage of the Will: Biblical and Practical Perspectives on Calvinism, Vol. 1 (T. Schreiner and B. Ware, eds. [Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995], 89–106).

14 Grant R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1991), 125.

15 Eduard Norden in his classic work on ancient Greek and Latin prose literature says, “The diatribe is none other than a converted [Platonic] dialogue in the form of a [school] declamation.” E. Norden, Die Antike Kunstprosa, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1909), 129.

16 Calvinism does not deny human “natural liberty”; however this is not a factor at the ultimate level of God’s free choice. No passage of Scripture either explicitly or implicitly teaches that the human will exists with the ability to withstand God’s own purposes or to direct his actions. I invite you to search for yourself. Instead, you find just the opposite as in our passage: “You will say to me, then, why does [God] still find fault? Who can resist his will?” (Rom. 9:19). The word translated “resist” in Rom. 9:19 is the opposite of “submit” (so James 4:7) and synonymous with “oppose” or “contradict” (Luke 21:15; cf. Rom. 10:21).

“NEITHER REASON NOR FREE-WILL POINTS TO HIM” —Benjamin E. Sasse 1 J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston, “Historical and Theological Introduction,” in Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will (Old Tappan, NJ: Revell, 1957), 25.

2 Luther, op. cit., 63. (Unless otherwise noted, all footnotes refer to the previously cited version of Luther’s Bondage.)

3 320.

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4

Packer, op. cit., 31, 36.

Ibid., 26, 36.

6 Ibid., 37.

7 163.

8 180.

9 159, 287.

10 287.

11 164.

12 169-70.

13 129.

14 84.

15 315, 317.

16 299-300.

17 249.

18 100-01.

19 296.

20 164, 78, 305; see also Calvin’s Institutes, 1.1.1-2.

21 313.

22 99.

23 189, 159, 180.

24 301, 189. See also Luther’s The Freedom of a Christian, in Three Treatises (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1960), especially pages 310-16, for further discussion of the good works of Christians.

25 81, 222.

26 107, italics added.

27 276, 297.

28 306.

29 161, 287, 202.

30 233.

31 101.

32 176-77, 169.

33 E.g., “When you are to dispute with Jews, Turks, Papists, Heretics, etc., concerning the power, wisdom, and majesty of God, employ all your intelligence and industry to that end, and be as profound and as subtle a disputer as you can … Such arguments [for divine truth based on human and earthly analogy] are good when they are grounded upon the ordinance of God. But when they are taken from man’s corrupt affections, they are naught.” (Luther’s comments on Gal. 1:3 and 3:15. He also affirms Cicero’s teleological argument for God’s existence.)

34 Packer, op. cit., 51. See also Luther, 262.

35 200, 316, 206, 203-04.

36 103-04, 203-05, 268.

37 312.

38 314.

5

NEGLECTED SOURCES OF THE REFORMED DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION—Frank A. James III 1 Paul K. Jewett, Election and Predestination (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 10.

2 For Heinrich Bullinger’s views, see J. Wayne Baker, Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenant: The Other Reformed Tradition (Athens, Ohio, 1980), 27-54. For Theodore Bibliander’s view, see J. Staedke, “Der Zuricher Prädestinationstreit von 1560,” Zwingliana 9 (1953), 536-546. For Melanchthon’s views, see Clyde L. Manschreck, ed., Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci Communes 1555 (Oxford, 1965; reprinted, Grand Rapids, 1982), xii-xiv, xl-xlii, 187-191.

3 Adolar Zumkeller, “The Augustinian Theologian Konrad Treger (ca.

1480-1542) and his Disputation Thesis of May 5, 1521,” in Via Augustini: Augustine in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation, edited by H. A. Oberman and F. A. James III (Leiden, 1991): 130-142.

4 Richard Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), 39.

5 Gordon Huelin, “Peter Martyr and the English Reformation,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1954), 178.

6 Charles Schmidt, Leben und ausgewahlte Schriften nach handschriftlichen und gleichzeitigen Quellen (Elberfeld: R. L. Friderichs, 1858), 106 7 Frank A. James III, Peter Martyr Vermigli and Predestination: The Augustinian Heritage of an Italian Theologian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 31-36.

8 Paul employs the term repeatedly—Romans 8:33; 8:29; Ephesians 1:5.

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Jesus also made comments concerning the elect: Luke 18:7; Matt. 24:22; and Mark 13:27. For a more complete summary of the biblical data, see Paul K. Jewett, Election and Predestination (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 24-29.

9 Paul’s discussion of predestination in Romans 9:10-24 is self-consciously derived from the Old Testament. Much of Romans 9 is a recitation of Old Testament passages, including Malachi 1:2-3; Exodus 33:19 and 9:16.

10 James, Peter Martyr Vermigli, 94-95.

11 G. Locher, Zwingli’s Thought: New Perspectives (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), 54.

12 W. P. Stephens, The Theology of Huldrych Zwingli (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 81.

13 Huldreich Zwinglis Werke, ed. M. Schuler and J. Schulthess (Zurich, 18281842), IV, 95.

14 F. Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of His Religious Thought (London: Collins, 1963), 29.

15 Werke, IV, 96, 134, 112.

16 Werke, IV, 126, 139.

17 James, Peter Martyr Vermigli, 104-105.

18 Damasus Trapp, “Augustinian Theology in the Fourteenth Century: Notes on Editionis, Marginalia, Opinions and Book Lore,” Augustiniana 6 (1956), 181.

19 Damasus Trapp, “Notes on the Tubingen Edition of Gregory of Rimini,” Augustiniana 29 (1979), 238.

20 Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” 181-213.

21 Heiko A. Oberman, Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence of a New Intellectual Climate in Europe (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981), 70-71.

22 James, Peter Martyr Vermigli, 133.

23 Peter Martyr Vermigli, In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos commentarii doctissimi, (Basel, 1558), 410, 413-14.

24 Romanos, 37, 381, 480, 430.

25 Romanos, 414.

THREE VIEWS ON PREDESTINATION 1 Richard Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), 1-13.

FREE SPACE 1 Donald Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology, I, (San Francisco: Harper & Row: 1978) 107.

THE LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION —Scott L. Keith 1 Philip Melanchthon, Loci Communes Theologici (1521), trans. Lowell J. Satre, ed. Wilhelm Pauk (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), 30.

2 Philip Melanchthon, Loci Communes (1543), trans. J. A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia, 1992), 172.

3 Ibid, 172.

4 Ibid, 172.

5 He cites as examples, Matt. 11:28, John 3:16, Rom. 3:22, Rom. 10:12, and Rom. 11:32.

6 Preus, Loci Communes, 173.

7 Ibid, 173.

8 Philip Melanchthon, Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine Loci Communes (1555), ed. & trans. Clyde L. Manschreck (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1982), 188.

9 Later “followers” of Melanchthon known as the “Philipists” would partially develop this teaching into a form of synergism.

10 Manschreck, Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine, 174.

11 Ibid, 190. cf. Num 16:5; Rom. 8:30; 2 Thess. 2:13-14; I Pet. 1:2.

12 Ibid, 174.

13 Ibid, 175.

14 WA, 21:514.

15 SL, 9:1115.

16 WA, 12:262.

17 The Lutheran Book of Concord, trans. and ed. Theodore G. Tappert, et al, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1959), “The Formula of Concord,” Art. XI. 65, 627.

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18

Ibid. Art. XI, 28, 620.

Ibid. Art XI, 40, 623.

20 Ibid. XI, 41, 623.

21 Ibid. XI, 4-5, 616-17.

22 Ibid. XI, 75, 628.

23 John William Baier, Compendium of Positive Theology, ed. C. F. W. Walther (St. Louis: Concordia, 1877), trans. Theodore Mayes (1996). Loci 12, “Predestination,” 19.

24 Loci praecipui theologici (1559), CR 21, 919.

19

“MAKE YOUR CALLING AND ELECTOIN SURE” —Michael S. Horton 1 W. H. Griffith Thomas, ed., The Principles of Theology: An Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles, with the text of the Articles (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 236.

2 The Book of Concord, tr. and ed. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1959), 497.

3 John Bradford, The Writings of John Bradford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1858), vol. 2, 316.

4 Thomas Aquinas, III Contra Gentiles 164; Disputations, VI de Veritate, I, in St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Texts, trans. Thomas Gilby (Durham, NC: Labyrinth, 1982, from the Oxford University Press edition, 1955).

5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theo., Ia. xxiii.5, op. cit.

6 Cited by Heiko Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought Illustrated by Key Documents (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 135.

7 Ibid., 151.

8 Ibid., 175ff.

9 Ibid., 186.

10 Richard Muller, Christ and the Decree (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), 1.

11 Francois Wendel, “Justification and Predestination in Calvin,” Readings in Calvin’s Theology, ed. Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), 160.

12 All citations from the Institutes in this article are from John Allen, tr.

(Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education).

DID CALVIN’S SUCCESSORS DISTORT HIS DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION?—Joel E. Kim 1 Heiko A. Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966); idem, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967).

2 Basil Hall, “Calvin Against the Calvinists,” in John Calvin, ed. Gervase Duffield (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966); cf. Brian Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy: Protestant Scholasticism and Humanism in Seventeenth Century France (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969); R. T. Kendall, “The Puritan Modification of Calvin’s Theology,” in John Calvin: His Influence in the Western World, ed. W. Stanford Reid (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982); Philip C. Holtrop, “Decree(s) of God,” s.v. in Encyclopedia of the Reformed Faith, ed. Donald K. McKim (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1992), 97-99.

3 Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, 42.

4 Hall, “Calvin Against the Calvinists,” 27.

5 For a specific discussion of the decrees, see Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1986; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988). For a broader continuity/discontinuity of the Reformation and Protestant Orthodox, Richard A. Muller, “Calvin and the Calvinists: Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities Between the Reformation and Orthodoxy, Part I,” in Calvin Theological Journal, 30, no. 2 (November 1995), 345-375; idem, “Calvin and the Calvinists: Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities Between the Reformation and Orthodoxy, Part 2,” in Calvin Theological Journal, 31, no. 1 (April 1996), 125-160.

6 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 19.

7 Calvin, Institutes, 3.21.5.

8 Holtrop, “Decrees,” 98.

9 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 129.

10 Ibid., 180.

11 Muller, “Calvin and the Calvinists, Part 2,” 155.

12 Ibid., 151-57.

13 Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. 1, trans. George

Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992), I:v:3.

14 Muller, “Calvin and the Calvinists, Part 1,” 345-359.

15 Muller, “Calvin and the Calvinists, Part 2,” 134-137.

16 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 68.

17 Ibid., 39-75.

18 Ibid., 138.

19 Muller, “Calvin and the Calvinists, Part 1,” 367.

20 Muller, “Calvin and the Calvinists, Part 2,” 126, 129.

21 Turretin, Institutes, I:xiii:2.

REVIEW—Gary L. W. Johnson 1 To mention only a couple of recent works: James D. Hunter of the University of Virginia authored Culture Wars (Harper, 1991) and Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America’s Culture Wars (1994); Michael Scott Horton wrote an excellent volume on the subject, Beyond Culture Wars (Moody, 1994); Christianity Today devoted two issues to this theme (March 6, 1995) and (June 19, 1995). In other words, Kreeft is not telling us something that we don’t already know.

2 Rahner (1904-1984), who was very influential at Vatican II, advocated the concept of “the anonymous Christian,” that is, there are people who are really “Christians” but don’t know it. They may be out and out pagans or devout followers of some other religion, but this does not disqualify them from really being “Christian”; cf. his Theological Investigation, V (Helicon Press, 1966), chaps. 5, 6, 7. Rahner came under severe criticism from noted Catholic theologian Hans Von Balthasar for reducing the church’s missionary vision; cf. I. Puthiadam, “Christian Faith and the Life in a World of Religious Pluralism,” Concilium 135 (1980).

3 I single out Mohammed simply because he is the only one of the three that came into contact with some form of Christianity and the New Testament.

For an insightful analysis of Islam and Mohammed, see Robert Morey, The Islamic Invasion: Confronting the World’s Fastest Growing Religion (Eugene, OR: Harvest House, 1992).

4 It is interesting to note that Eadie claims that “Jesus” personally told her that all religions are “very precious and important in Jesus’ sight.” The Apostle Paul strongly disagreed with this particular “Jesus” (cf. Acts 17:22-31; Gal. 1:6-9; Col. 2:18; II Cor. 11:4).

5 Kreeft, 169.

6 J. C. Ryle, Warnings to the Churches (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1967), 56, 59.

THE WESTMINSTER

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This collection contains three historical doctrinal statements, which clearly summarize a biblical understanding of various issues of faith and church teaching.

• The Westminster Confession of Faith • The Large Catechism • The Shorter Catechism B-RG-3, Paperback, $3.00 To order call (800) 956-2644.

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47

ON MY MIND

By James Montgomery Boice

Throw-Away Lines am not a collector by nature. I don’t collect illustrations or funny stories or even souvenirs of my travels. But one thing I have collected in recent months are sentences or par ts of sentences that evangelicals use a lot but should get rid of. I call them “throw-away lines” because they should be thrown away.

The worst is probably the most common: “God told me…” I suppose that what some people mean when they say this is that they have been studying the Bible and believe that a certain outlook or decision they are about to make is biblical. I have no quarrel with that. But most of the time people using those words actually mean that God has given them a private revelation of what they are to do, and with that I do quarrel. God speaks to us in Scripture. The Spirit and the Word always operate together, as the reformers insisted. So if a person says, “God told me so and so,” meaning that God has spoken to that person in a special extra-biblical way, the words are simply not true and should be expunged from our ways of speaking. Even people who sometimes mean something better than this should stop talking as if God has spoken to them privately, because the words are misleading.

What we should be saying is something like, “I have been thinking and praying about this matter. I have studied what the Scripture has to say. I have discussed it with wise Christians, and this is what I think I should do.” That is the right way to proceed as well as honest speaking. So let’s throw away the “God told me” line and be honest.

Another line we need to abandon is “What this verse says to me is…”. I know that the desire of some people who say that is for relevance, not merely treating the Bible academically. But this way of speaking usually preempts the actual meaning of the text, since the primary question is not “What does the Bible say to me?” but “What does the Bible say?” That is what matters.

That is what we should be asking first and always in our Bible study. After that we may ask, “How can I apply this to myself ?”

“What does the Bible say?” looks outward for objective truths on which to ground the application.

I

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NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998

Asking “what this verse means to me” turns the Bible into the proverbial wax-nose that can be shaped to any liking and applied to any face.

The third line we especially need to expunge is “I feel at peace about this.” Peace is one of the great gifts of Christ to his people (John 14:27), but the expression is almost always used to justify unbiblical behavior. In such cases, the problem is that the person does feel at peace when he or she should be troubled. The words deal with human feelings, but the question we should actually be asking is, “Is this right?”

These lines all have a few things in common. Most obviously, they are all individualistic and self-centered: “God told me…”; “What the text says to me…”; and “I feel at peace about this.” In this respect they are only Christian versions of the fierce individualism of our time.

Even more significant, however, each of these expressions departs from the objective norms of Scripture. “God told me” is a claim to revelation apart from Scripture. “What the text means to me” is about my own ideas rather than the actual commands or teachings of the Bible. “I feel at peace about this” is most often an attempt to justify a departure from what God has laid down plainly in the Bible.

Evangelicals claim to be people of the Book. When they are asked about the nature and inspiration of the Bible most usually give orthodox answers. Evangelicals are not heretics in theory. But in practice the Bible is being pushed aside and with it all necessary objective norms for faith and Christian behavior. Let’s stop sounding like the world, or even like worldly mystics.

Let’s study the Bible and use our minds to determine right beliefs and right courses of action. Unbelievers might actually notice our honesty and even be willing to listen to what we have to say.

Dr. James Montgomery Boice is the president of the Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals and senior minister of Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia.

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