Hex 17 08

hazardexonthenet.net

August 2017

the journal for hazardous area environments

Offshore Optimising combined operations manning Risk management What plant is suitable for Risk-Based Inspection?

Offshore Australian regulator’s 2016 safety report

Process sector cybersecurity Managing cyber risk

Process Safety Why tackling PSM silos is vital for safe performance

al i ec ion p S dit E

If you invest in a CULTURE OF CARE you invest in YOUR FUTURE

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contents august 2017 When SPE Offshore Europe 2017 opens its doors in Aberdeen on September 5, the oil and gas industry will have faced the longest and most severe downturn in decades.

These challenging circumstances are forecast to continue well into the future, and it is a testament to the sector’s flexibility and adaptability that many companies have been able to reinvent themselves and find new ways of operating within this changed environment.

This will be a major theme of the 2017 event, and many visitors will be interested in finding out just how this has been achieved.

Another theme will be the cyber threat to the oil and gas sector. The scale and severity of attacks on industrial cyber systems is growing and has the potential to put

14 20

infrastructure, critical processes and workers’ lives in danger. SPE Offshore Europe 2017 will host a keynote panel session on cyber and physical attacks on the industry to help delegates understand the risks, manage detection of threats and defend against malicious actions.

This will also be a major focus for the Hazardex 2018 Conference and Exhibition, to be held in Runcorn at the end of February, although our remit will be to cover cybersecurity considerations for all the process and high hazard industries. We hope to announce keynote presentations from senior figures at the HSE and National Cybersecurity Centre shortly, and will be building up to this by including articles looking at different aspects of this issue in every edition leading up to the event, starting with this one.

An emergency response plan is vital when units such as flotels or MODUs are connected to offshore platforms

27

…Alan Franck, Editor, Hazardex Against a challenging background, the Australian offshore sector saw no fatalities or major injuries in 2016

in this issue News Extra

5

36

• US researchers discover role of microbes in remediating Gulf of Mexico oil spill • Nuclear plants in Ukraine and USA affected by cyber attacks • Scrapping Japan nuclear reprocessing facility will cost $8.9 billion and take 70 years • Siberian craters thought to be formed by methane released by melting permafrost • Samsung could offer explosion proof batteries for mobiles within two years

13

Standards: Singapore – an IECEx trailblazer

15

Event preview: SPE Offshore Europe 2017

20

Offshore: Optimising combined operations manning

27

Australian offshore regulator reports no fatalities or major injuries in 2016

31

Why tackling Process Safety Management silos is vital to sustaining safe performance

36

Reducing the risk: Maximising the performance of HAZOP (and similar) studies

43

What plant is suitable for Risk-Based Inspection?

49

Uncertain threat: Managing cyber risk

56

Datafiles & Buyers Guide

A successful HAZOP study is about segmentation, with segments providing clarity and traceability of points raised

43

Risk based inspection can improve safety and realise cost benefits, but is not suitable for all types of plant

Hazardex is a controlled circulation journal published monthly.

Completed print or online registration forms will be considered for free supply of printed issues, web site access and online services. Annual subscription for non-qualifying readers is UK £84.00, EU €113.00, Airmail £178.00 and single copy price is £17.00 plus P&P.

Hazardex content is the property of the publishers or relevant content providers. The publishers and sponsors of this magazine are not responsible for the results of any actions or omissions taken on the basis of information in this publication. In particular, no liability can be accepted in respect of any claim based on or in relation to material provided for inclusion.

Editor Alan Franck alan.franck@imlgroup.co.uk

Group Publisher Russell Goater russell.goater@imlgroup.co.uk

Sales Executive Kathryn Startin kathryn.startin@imlgroup.co.uk

Circulation subscriptions@imlgroup.co.uk Tel: +44 (0)1732 359990

Production and Events Sara Clover sara.clover@imlgroup.co.uk

Design Graham Rich Design www.grahamrichdesign.co.uk

IML Group plc Blair House, High Street, Tonbridge, Kent TN9 1BQ, UK Tel: +44 1732 359990 Fax: +44 1732 770049 Email: events@imlgroup.co.uk ISSN 1476-7376

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News Extra Still from DOE video of Macondo well leak

5

Through DNA sequencing of its genome they were able to identify its mechanism for degrading oil. They gave this newly discovered bacterium the tentative name of Bermanella macondoprimitus.

“Our study demonstrated the importance of using dispersants in producing neutrally

US researchers discover role of microbes in remediating Gulf of Mexico oil spill

T

buoyant, tiny oil droplets, which kept much of the oil from reaching the ocean surface,” Andersen said. “Naturally occurring microbes at this depth are highly specialized in growing by using specific components of the oil for their food source. So the oil droplets provided a large surface area for the microbes to chew up the oil.”

he oil spill from the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, which resulted in the destruction of the Deepwater Horizon rig, is one of

release of 4.1 million barrels of crude oil as well as large amounts of natural gas from a mile below the surface of the ocean. After the initial explosion and uncontained release of

The importance of this study is that it identified the mechanisms the bacteria used to degrade oil and the relationship of these

the most studied spills in history yet scientists had not agreed on the role

oil, researchers observed a phenomenon that had not been seen before: more than 40% of

organisms involved in the spill to previously characterised hydrocarbon-degrading

of microbes in eating up the oil. Now a research team at the US Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Berkeley Lab) has identified

the oil, combined with an introduced chemical dispersant, was retained in a plume nearly 100 miles long at this great depth.

organisms.

all of the principal oil-degrading bacteria as well as their mechanisms for chewing up the many different components that

Andersen and his team returned to the spill location four years later to collect water at depth. A suspension of insoluble oil droplets

have occurred in other offshore oil-producing regions. “The Gulf of Mexico is home to one of the largest concentrations of underwater

make up the released crude oil.

along with the more soluble oil fractions and chemical dispersant were recreated to mimic the conditions of the oil plume. Over the next

hydrocarbon seeps, and it has been speculated that this helped in the selection of oil-degrading microbes that were observed in

ecologist Gary Andersen, is the first to simulate the conditions that occurred in the aftermath of the spill. Their study, “Simulation

64 days the composition of the microbes and the crude oil were intensively studied.

the underwater plumes,” he said.

of Deepwater Horizon oil plume reveals substrate specialization within a complex community of hydrocarbon-degraders,” was published in The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in June 2017.

The researchers witnessed an initial rapid growth of a microbe that had been previously observed to be the dominant bacterium in the early stages of the oil release, but which had eluded subsequent attempts by others to recreate the conditions of the Gulf of Mexico

Uruguay, and India have now exceeded 2 miles below the ocean surface. By capturing water from these areas and subjecting them to the same test, it may be possible in the future to understand the consequences of an uncontrolled release of oil in these areas in

This oil spill was the largest in history, with the

oil plume.

greater detail.

The team, led by Berkeley Lab microbial

Andersen noted that it is not clear if the degradation of oil at these depths would

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News Extra

Chernobyl nuclear site

But cybersecurity experts quoted by the US media giant said that now that the network has been infiltrated, the nuclear systems had become “much more vulnerable.”

The Naked Security website run by cybersecurity consultants Sophos said:

Nuclear plants in Ukraine and USA

affected by cyber attacks M

“Reportedly, the US nuclear breach wasn’t considered serious enough to warrant the filing of a full report with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but it did, disconcertingly, end up being given its own ominous code name, ‘Nuclear 17’.

onitoring systems at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine were taken down by the worldwide cyber attack in late June dubbed ‘Petya’.

Systems usually used to monitor the area around the power station for radioactivity

on Windows. That operating system is also thought to be the software hit by the attack, which could be a variant of the ‘Wannacry’ ransomware that took down computers across the world in May.

“At the moment, little is known about the dimensions of this incident but code names for cyberattacks are never a good sign in the security sector, let alone nuclear power.

following the nuclear meltdown there in 1986 were not working, the Ukrainian

‘Wannacry’ has been traced to North Korea, but as yet no one has found the origins of

“The energy sector is still digesting the significance of two attacks on Ukrainian

authorities said, and the area was monitored manually until automated systems were restored a few days later.

‘Petya’.

power systems a year apart from one another in 2015 and 2016. In an earlier story covering the later incident, Naked Security noted that

The attack also took down the power plant’s website, which usually hosts information about the incident and the area, but systems

looking into cyber intrusions this year at several nuclear power plants across the country.

within the plant continued to operate normally, authorities said.

Meanwhile, energy industry news site E&E News reported that US investigators were

it’s as if Ukraine had become a laboratory for probing energy systems for weakness.

“Chernobyl being caught up with Petya

This was corroborated by ABC News, which reported ‘sources familiar with the matter’

was probably coincidental but nevertheless symbolic. That catastrophe was an accident, but the thought that someone might come

Security firm Kaspersky Lab said on June 27 that the attack has hit around 2,000 computers in around a dozen countries. The

saying that unidentified hackers recently breached at least one US nuclear power plant and the situation was being investigated by the

back to deliberately sow mayhem in a nuclear or energy system is one the world might yet have to come to terms with.

most affected organisations were located in Russia and the Ukraine, with systems in the UK, Germany, France, Italy, the US and Poland also hit.

FBI and Department of Homeland Security.

Authorities suggested that the problems were a result of that monitoring system running

The name and location of the plant have not

“As with Petya, and WannaCry, the private worry about Nuclear 17 is that the unfolding

been released. The attack was contained to the business-associated side of the plant, and evidence indicated that critical infrastructure was not affected, ABC News said.

EternalBlue leak of alleged NSA spying tools and vulnerabilities might be feeding attacks that are starting to manifest in all sorts of sectors.”

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8

Rough platforms - Image: Centrica

News Extra

Centrica to shut UK’s main offshore gas storage site

T

he Rough field, the UK’s biggest natural gas storage site under the North Sea, will be permanently

injection and storage operations.

shut by operator Centrica because of the age and poor condition of injection and recovery infrastructure.

Rough accounts for about 70% of the

gas field with associated offshore infrastructure in the Southern North Sea, approximately 18 miles off the east coast of Yorkshire, together with an onshore

was able cover a tenth of the country’s peak winter demand.

country’s gas storage capacity and a lack of alternative storage facilities is likely to increase dependency on

gas processing terminal at Easington, approximately 27 miles south east of Hull. Nearly 200 staff and contractors

but they offer more limited capacity. Without Rough, the country is likely to be more vulnerable to winter price hikes. Wholesale

imports and gas market volatility.

are employed within the operation, both onshore and offshore.

prices would have to rise to attract more gas from Norway, Europe or liquefied natural gas (LNG) suppliers, with a knock-

undertaken an extensive test programme and concluded that, “as a result of the high operating pressures involved, and the fact

Centrica said it would recover the estimated 183 billions of cubic feet (bcf) remaining in the field and seek licences to close the site

on effect on consumer prices.

that the wells and facilities are at the end of their design life and have suffered a number of different failure modes while testing,” it could not safely return the facilities to

down.

euros from gas storage facilities, triggering site closures and divestments in a market suffering from oversupply and weak demand.

The facility consists of a partially depleted

The UK gas and energy supplier said it had

Seasonal gas storage provides security and flexibility of supply. At times of low demand

and therefore low gas prices in the summer, gas is injected into storage to be kept for when demand rises in the winter. Rough

The UK has seven other gas storage sites

European utilities are losing billions of

News Extra Tokai reprocessing plant – Image: JAEA

9

time estimated for dismantling and removal is around 30 years for the main facilities, such as a reprocessing plant that extracts uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear fuel; around 50 years for facilities used in processing high-level radioactive waste or storage facilities including those for tubes used to hold spent fuel; and around 70 years for facilities used to process low-level radioactive waste.

Scrapping Japan nuclear reprocessing facility will cost $8.9 billion and take 70 years

All of these estimates are based on the precondition that there is a disposal site for the waste to be sent. If the selection process for a permanent disposal site is delayed, so may be the decommissioning schedule.

T

he planned decommissioning of the Tokai spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Ibaraki Prefecture will take 70 years and cost taxpayers about 1 trillion yen ($8.9 billion), according to the

which are currently in the plant, and vitrification of resulting high level wastes, will continue for the next 20 years.

Japan Atomic Energy Agency. The JAEA submitted its estimate to the country’s

calculated to come to 217 billion yen. Over the subsequent 60 years, the JAEA said it planned

fuel since then.

Nuclear Regulation Authority on June 30 for approval.

to demolish the facilities and decontaminate buildings at a total estimated cost of 770 billion yen.

France is among countries that already have experience of dismantling reprocessing facilities, but it would be the first time this is carried out in Japan. The Tokai plant was

be to assess the level of on-site contamination, decontaminate facilities and implement measures to secure safety of the site and

That figure was broken down as follows: 250 billion yen to process the radioactive waste materials; 380 billion yen to dispose of the

designed by Saint Gobain NuclĂŠaire (SGN) of France, now part of the EDF subsidiary Areva.

workers, including enhancing earthquakeresistance of the facilities. That alone would take 10 years.

waste; and 140 billion yen to dismantle the facilities. The NRA will first check safety and other issues before reaching a decision. If

Tokai achieved worldwide notoriety in 1999 when a criticality accident occurred at the JCO fuel fabrication facility that led to two fatalities,

it gives its approval, the JAEA will start the project.

radiation exposure to over 600 workers and members of the public and a significant trauma amongst the local population. The

According to the timetable, the decommissioning work will start from the facilities with the highest radioactivity. The

announcement of the closure of the plant in 2014 came one day prior to the 15th anniversary of the 1999 accident.

Total costs during the first 10 years were

Under the JAEA plan, the immediate task will

At the same time, the agency said it would start work to vitrify about 400 cubic metres of high-level radioactive waste liquids, a by-product of the reprocessing process. The processing of uranium and plutonium solutions

Level switches

The Tokai reprocessing facilities were constructed at a total cost of 190 billion yen.

They started full-scale operations in 1981, and have reprocessed 1,140 tons of spent nuclear

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10 News Extra Yamal crater – Image: Alexandr Sokolov, Yamal Region

Siberian craters now thought to be formed by exploding methane released by melting permafrost

A

ccording to The Siberian Times on July 2, two new craters were

This crater has been examined by a group of scientists led by Dr Alexandr Sokolov,

discovered on the Yamal peninsula in northern Siberia the previous week with one reported to be 8 metres in diameter and about 20 metres deep.

The news source said a local reindeer herder witnessed the explosion that led to the creation of one of the

deputy head of the Arctic Research station of the Institute of Plant and Animal Ecology, Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, during an expedition to carry out long-term monitoring of the Yamal peninsula’s terrestrial ecosystems.

craters.

The Scientific Centre for Arctic Research said its sensors recorded a seismic event, which was probably associated with a gas explosion.

Local TV reported that the reindeer herder was near a hill that exploded, with fire and smoke rising from the ground and large chunks of soil flying out from the epicentre.

After the explosion the hill had vanished.

At least ten pingos are known to have exploded in Siberia in recent years forming large craters, of which four have been closely examined by scientists.

The Siberian Times said this evidence was consistent with the scientific theory that these craters can be formed by exploding

Some are close to the infrastructure associated with the peninsula’s extensive

pingos, plugs of expanding ice that cause the permafrost to bulge upwards forming mounds or small hills. When the plugs

oil and gas industry. One of the recent discoveries is close to Sabetta port, which is being built as part of a $27 billion project

melt as the Siberian climate gets warmer, methane trapped underneath the ice escapes to the surface and can ignite.

by Yamal LNG on the Ob River estuary to export 16.5 million tons of liquefied gas from the Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye field.

News Extra 11

Samsung could offer explosion proof batteries for mobiles within two years

the current generation of lithiumion batteries. The report, quoting an unnamed Samsung SDI executive, said initial use would likely be for mobile phones, with solid-state batteries for cars further down the line.

These batteries contain solid electrolytes, whereas li-ion batteries contain liquid electrolytes that can ignite or explode when the liquid leaks and is exposed to air or water.

The executive told The Korea Herald on condition of anonymity: “Our technological level to produce a solid-state battery for smartphones will be mature enough in one to two years. However, it depends on Samsung Electronics whether it will be used for phones.”

This follows a series of battery fires and explosions affecting smartphones, including Samsung’s Galaxy and Apple’s iPhone range.

Last year, Samsung discontinued the Galaxy Note 7 after a string of battery explosions, costing the South Korean giant at least $5.3 billion dollars in recall costs and damages.

In its own report into the incidents published in January 2017, Samsung found that both li-ion battery designs for the Note 7 had significant problems.

The problem with Battery A was that there was not enough room to allow for the expansion of its electrodes, which happens during the normal charge and discharge cycle of the battery, and there was too little separation between the positive and negative electrodes.

He also said he thought rival LG Chem had reached a similar stage in developing solidstate batteries.

Samsung relied on a different manufacturer for Battery B, the second batch of batteries

Herald said that Samsung SDI will be able to produce solid-state batteries within the next two years, posing far

As for use in cars, he said more time was needed to conduct stricter safety checks,

installed in new units of the Note 7 sent out to replace the original ones. In this case there were problems with the manufacturing quality

less of a fire or explosion risk than

with a possible introduction date of 2025.

and safety norms were ignored.

I

n a report dated June 30, the Korea

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Standards 13

Singapore – an IECEx trailblazer

Every two months, IECEx Chairman Prof. Dr. Thorsten Arnhold provides an update on developments within the organisation

petrochemical, chemical and pharmaceutical companies, EPCs, machine builders and shipyards can be found in such a small area.

into an enclosure is a modification and shall not be carried out without reference to the manufacturer’s certified drawings, or, in exceptional circumstances, e.g.,

As usual, it was a busy week. I visited many customers and found great interest in the IEC and IECEx systems. On the last day of my stay, my company, R. STAHL, organised a big customer event. About 200 people accepted our invitation and

manufacturer discontinued trading, to the certifying authority.”

I had the opportunity to talk about the current status of IECEx, highlight its benefits and answer many questions. There was particular interest in the new regulations on non–electrical explosion protection.

The two standards, IEC80079-36 and -37, were published over a year ago and their acceptance among the Certification Bodies

facility. For such critical issues it is more than important that a competent and independent certification body is looking after the fulfilment of all specified requirements. By doing this, our IECEx system is building trust between the parties involved - the original manufacturers, the repair facilities and the end users.

(ExCBs) and customers is rapidly growing.

During the first half year in operation at IECEx, some 26 CoCs have been published

I was also asked how the repair facilities should act in future with regard to non-

Singapore is an important location for

electrical explosion protection. As mentioned before, we are now starting to certify this.

But what about the repair and overhaul of these products in a couple of years’ time?

to visit. Every time I come there are interesting changes - beautiful new buildings have been erected, new parks

EPC and OEM companies in the offshore oil and gas business. The interest of such companies for a third party certificate

There is no easy answer to this question.

Even in the new 5th edition of IEC 6007919 which is under preparation (CDV status),

laid out or a new stadium opened. I like the clean streets with all the friendly and industrious people and the quiet

covering explosion protection of the mechanical parts of equipment such as compressors and pumps seems to be

the new topic is not mentioned. And the 6th edition will not be published for at least another six years. So the repair facility has

evenings on the Singapore River.

Unfortunately, I am always in the city on business and must be missing many

especially high.

to follow the general requirements of the standards, which are valid both for electrical and non-electrical equipment.

of the city’s other attractions.

industry show particular interest because of their involvement in the repairing and overhauling of large and expensive explosion protected equipment such as single motors

T

his time I am writing from Singapore, a city I always like

Nevertheless, that business is important.

Singapore is one of the countries that

and more than 10 ExCBs got a scope extension.

This means that there has to be a close relationship between the manufacturer of the flameproof product and the repair

Certified repair facilities for the offshore

for many years has directly accepted IECEx Certificates of conformity (CoC) for explosion protected products. It is also participating very actively in other IECEx system schemes. For example, 57 individuals have received a certificate of personal competence (CoPC) and 10 repair facilities are certified within the service

and pumps.

During my discussions with end customers and experts in these repair facilities, I was often asked what activities are permitted and what is forbidden at repair facilities.

My answer? Always look in the standard.

IEC 60079-19 provides a detailed

facility scheme.

specification of all dos and don’ts.

I also have the opportunity to visit many process industry customers, both national and international. There is no other

Even the drilling of holes in flameproof encapsulations is possible under certain circumstances, as paragraph 5.2.1.1 of

place in the world where so many large

60079-19 points out: “The drilling of holes

If there is a need for special specifications for non-electrical equipment, IECEx could help out with an Ex TAG decision sheet until the 6th edition of the standard is published. This is a good example of the close cooperation between the standard generation process in IEC committee TC 31 and the IECEx system.

So, step by step, we are developing standards and conformity assessment procedures, greatly assisted by the feedback we receive in Singapore and around the world. By doing this, we follow technical advances in different areas and make the whole system safer and more convenient for all stakeholders.

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Event preview 15

SPE Offshore Europe 2017

S

PE Offshore Europe 2017 is taking place at a time when confidence

Drilling Group, Schlumberger said: “The industry’s technical and financial performance

in the current climate: from people safety, big data, cyber and physical security,

levels are gradually climbing following the longest and most significant downturn the oil and gas industry has

has been challenged for some time now.

Learning the lessons from the most severe downturn for the past 30 years, there is

transformative technologies, sustainability and decommissioning to new business models for mature basins, making capital

seen in decades.

Over four days, under the central theme

no doubt that the industry must reinvent itself. The traditional industry response to market downturns, which has included

work, the talent pool, breakthroughs in supply chain effectiveness and learning from other industries.

Embracing New Realities: Reinventing our Industry, 65 free-to-attend technical presentations and a programme of business breakfasts and topical lunches,

halting exploration investment, decreasing development activity, pressing for price reductions throughout the supply chain, and letting talented people go, is no longer

will provide opportunities to debate, knowledge-share and take new courses of action that will shape the future of the industry.

viable.”

The 2017 conference chair, Catherine MacGregor, and her executive committee of 17 senior international industry figures, have put together a focused and hard-hitting keynote programme that will tackle the issues the industry is facing as it adjusts to the realities of the ‘new normal’.

Catherine MacGregor, who is also President,

Conference programme The opening plenary session promises a packed hall with a top-level line-up of industry CEOs. Ben van Beurden, CEO of Royal Dutch Shell; Bob Dudley, group chief executive of BP; Pedro Parente, CEO of Petrobras and Robin Watson, CEO of Wood Group will address the hundreds of visitors attending the opening plenary.

Eleven panel sessions will cover the gamut of topical issues that are relevant

OE & Me SPE Offshore Europe 2017 has the strong support of leading industry figure Sir Ian Wood who kicked off a new campaign ahead of the event to encourage visitors, exhibitors and speakers to share their experiences of OE past and present. Sir Ian was the first contributor to the online hub which invites people to share their stories of Offshore Europe - what they are looking forward to at the event, what they will be speaking about or showcasing as an exhibitor.

Decommissioning A new event feature for 2017 is the Decommissioning Zone, which will include a themed exhibition hall for 20+

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Event preview 17

decommissioning technology and service providers and a conference programme that is being organised in association with Decom North Sea, IMechE, ITF and SUT. Independent North Sea operator Fairfield Energy, which is in the process of decommissioning the Greater Dunlin assets, will share details of progress.

Exhibition The exhibition floor is seeing a diverse range of new companies booking space for the first time as well as the return of several of the industry’s major players. A large international exhibitor presence will be present with 20 national and international pavilions booked so far including Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Nigeria and USA.

Technology Zone

will bring together start-up companies and SMEs, showcasing their ideas and solutions. Also, there will be a series of short presentations followed by a Q&A session with the Technology Centre’s board and leadership

Tech Trek

The Oil & Gas Technology Centre’s Technology Zone will present a series of technologies used in alternative sectors to encourage the oil and gas industry to

Also new is Tech Trek, designed to make it easier for visitors to find what’s new, more easily. Technologies, products and solutions

think differently about the adoption of new products. The Centre believes technologies such as robots, composite materials, additive

Inspire Programme

launched within the last 12 months are eligible.

Visitors will follow the Tech Trek logo visible on the website exhibitor list, app and catalogue

manufacturing and augmented reality are all currently underutilised in offshore oil and gas, despite being part of a general industrial

Continuing on from the success of SPE’s Inspire Programme in 2015, a series of activities, workshops and lectures

and can look out for it on the stands.

transformation in other industries. The Zone

specifically focused on supporting and

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team on its priorities and how to get involved.

18 Event preview informing young people interested in joining the oil and gas industry or just beginning their careers will be held from Monday 4th (the afternoon before the show starts) to Friday 8th. For younger generations there will be introductions to the industry and the importance of STEM topics though SPE’s schools engagement programme. SPE is also working with local schools to show the opportunities within the industry and meet professionals to talk about what they do.

OPITO will also be connecting industry to students with a tour of the exhibitions and discovering what projects the industry is working on. For those already starting their

Investment Workshop This one day programme connects Oiltech’s

meetings to discuss investment projects with various grant, early seed and direct industry

career in engineering there will be a series of lectures, workshops and networking opportunities for University students and young professionals. They will have a chance to learn some key skills and discuss

investor members with innovative technology providers, giving entrepreneurs industryspecific advice on partner funding and providing access to funding opportunities.

On the morning of 6th September, a series

funding providers.

job options with experienced professionals one-to-one. This year, SPE also hopes to inspire a wider number of people through

of drop-in sessions will be held where industry experts will give guidance on getting technology to market in the fastest and most

industry for the next ten years and beyond.

As Sir Ian Wood says: “If you decide not to go there, you are actually missing on probably

the SPE Cares Programme by working with the Marine Conservation Society, inviting attendees to help us clean the local beaches

effective way, and offer advice and expertise around partner funding. On the afternoon of Wednesday 6th September, a limited number

the biggest learning opportunity in terms of changing your business.”

during the conference.

of companies will be invited to one-to-one

www.offshore-europe.co.uk

SPE Offshore Europe 2017 promises to be an agenda setting conference and exhibition, embracing the topics that will shape the

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20 Offshore

Optimising combined operations manning T

he pressures faced by operators to maintain and enhance oil and gas producing installations can require

Manning levels Excluding any bed space limitations, the upper manning limit on a stand-alone installation

• Control of work, i.e. capacity to safely manage a number of coincident work streams

significant scopes of work to be carried out. Limited bed space often requires mobile accommodation units such as

is often dictated by the total capacity of lifeboats or Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft (TEMPSC) adjacent to its

• Risk tolerability to individuals and the larger than normal number of workers exposed to platform hazards (i.e. societal risk).

flotels or mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) to accommodate additional workers. Typically, the additional

temporary refuge (TR). For installations that are composed of multiple jackets, manning limitations are also often placed on jackets

DNV GL provides an assessment methodology which covers the EER aspects

accommodation unit will be connected by a gangway link to the offshore installation.

away from the TR due to the possibility of bridges to the TR being impaired in a major accident event.

as this is often the key factor.

When two or more installations are joined in this way, there is a need to define a suitable plan for emergency

During ComOps, there is often a need to increase manning levels significantly above the normal levels, which will generally require

A hierarchy of emergency evacuation and escape options is available on offshore

response should a major accident hazard occur on either installation. This plan would include all aspects from emergency mustering to abandoning the installation and would be referenced in a ComOps notification to the regulator.

Given the need to optimise production in the current economic climate, additional

evacuation to the accommodation unit in an emergency. Taking benefit for the gangway in emergency response does however need to be justified and this is likely to be case specific.

complexity occurs when undertaking ComOps without a platform being shut down. In this article, Paul Murray of DNV GL Risk Advisory takes a look at the issues raised.

www.hazardexonthenet.net

Escape, evacuation and rescue

Manning limitations during ComOps are

platforms: • Helicopters, which are capacity constrained and may not be available to rapidly evacuate • Fixed bridge to an unaffected jacket where personnel can wait-out an event, though this may not be possible all personnel on board (POB)

defined by a number of criteria, including: • Overall bed space (and welfare) which sets an upper figure on the number of personnel that can be accommodated • Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER)

• TEMSPCs, whose capacity often defines the maximum manning and whose use has an associated risk • Liferafts, which are far less protected than TEMPSC and credit may often not

Decision aspects

provisions to evacuate safely in an emergency

be taken for them in defining manning limitations.

Offshore 21

In the UK, the Prevention of Fire Explosion and Emergency Response (PFEER)

In almost all cases, the total TEMPSC capacity will likely be greater than the

the flotel or MODU) with its own lifeboat provision.

regulations and its approved code of practice state, unless shown otherwise by appropriate risk assessment, that the TEMPSC capacity should be 150% of the POB with 100% readily accessible from the TR. Often a risk assessment may conclude that an optimal TEMPSC philosophy may

number of beds on the installation.

Operators often take advantage of this during walk/fly to work campaigns where personnel are transported onto the installation during on-shift time and are accommodated elsewhere during off-shift time.

The key part of a ComOps EER strategy is whether to take credit for the gangway and so relax the normal manning constraints for the operational facility. In setting manning limits, consideration should be taken for: • The reliability/availability of an evacuation

be to include one spare TEMPSC at the TR, which aligns with the approach in NORSOK. This is particularly relevant for installations such as flotels, with a high POB, where applying the 150% rule would result in a significant number of TEMPSCs.

During ComOps, the additional accommodation is permanently linked to the installation by a gangway that also acts as an additional means of evacuation from an installation to a place of safety (i.e.

method in events for which it is required • Diversity/redundancy in the form of backup evacuation means. For example. evacuation to another jacket. In this case, the location of the alternative evacuation means in relation to the accommodation unit may be critical.

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Offshore 23

Gangway considerations If it is not justified to take credit for the gangway during evacuation scenarios (i.e. the likelihood of it being impaired in the hazardous event requiring evacuation is high), then the manning restrictions cannot increase above the limited capacity of the operational

A hierarchy of emergency evacuation and escape options is available on offshore platforms

facility.

Normally, the gangway should connect to

in place for cases where the gangway is unexpectedly unavailable.

is removed and the manning restriction implied

by EER provision could be lifted.

Multiple jackets Given the difficulty in guaranteeing gangway availability in all scenarios, the total TEMPSC capacity on a single platform can only be exceeded after careful analysis of the hazards and the overall EER strategy. However, in the case of an installation with multiple

a relatively safe location on the production installation. However, just having a low frequency of impairment is not sufficient.

Relaxing the 150% criterion Normal operations manning restrictions

jackets or multiple accommodation units, the fixed bridges or gangways may offer a considerable amount of redundancy if they

Crucially, if the gangway is to offer an alternative to additional TEMPSC provision on the operating facility then it must be available for most of the events that would drive

recognise potential failure mechanisms in TEMPSCs and so ensure redundancy usually either by provision of 150% capacity, or one spare TEMPSC justified by a risk assessment.

have diverse landing points. This additional redundancy, again negating the need to use TEMPSCs, may provide justification for a further manning increase.

The presence of a gangway potentially negates the need for the primary evacuation means to be by TEMPSC – they still provide the redundancy, or secondary evacuation method, should the gangway be unavailable.

Due to this, the manning level may be increased up to the full TEMPSC capacity on

Platform status

evacuation by TEMPSC. This is therefore not a straightforward risk assessment as the gangway needs to provide similar availability to TEMPSC in the conditions where a TEMPSC would be required.

There are additional considerations for a flotel using dynamic positioning, as there are circumstances where the gangway will need to lift, particularly in the case of poor weather. Weather forecasting will provide warning, allowing the production facility to be downmanned in a controlled manner.

the platform.

However, some contingency needs to be

offered in its design, then reliance on TEMPSCs

Should the gangway availability be guaranteed in all foreseeable evacuation events, for example, due to its location, or protection

During ComOps maintenance and construction campaigns, it is often necessary to shut down and depressurise sections of process plant and so a range of operating statuses may apply such as: • Producing - Platform ‘live’ as in normal operations, with hydrocarbon systems pressurised • Topsides depressurised - All topsides systems isolated and depressurised.

However, wells, risers and pipelines may remain pressurised

www.hazardexonthenet.net

24 Offshore While the above is rightly an onerous set of conditions, it may temporarily allow for additional manning on, for example, a bridge linked platform during ComOps.

Summary The pressure to expedite work requires man-hours to be maximised during ComOps. However, the need to manage the safety implications of having a large number of personnel on board, particularly when an installation is producing, may place a limit of the maximum manning. DNV GL has assisted several operators in optimising their ComOps manning strategy and, as each operation is different, the chosen manning strategy needs rigorous assessment to demonstrate that risks are As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

About the author

• Fully depressurised - As above, but with wells isolated at the downhole safety valve

Liferafts While liferafts are considered the secondary

and annuli depressurised. All risers isolated and depressurised up to the subsea isolation valve, or interfield pipelines fully

means of evacuation on normally unmanned installations without TEMSPC, their use on platforms with TEMPSC is normally only as

depressurised

a tertiary means of escape. The intention is that they are only used in rare cases of an emergency and multiple TEMSPC failure, or the unlikely scenario of persons being

When a platform operating status is changed from the norm, hazards are reduced or eliminated, such that relaxing the manning constraints further may be justified as the likelihood of gangway impairment in an evacuation event may be significantly reduced or removed entirely. In some cases, a fully hydrocarbon free installation may have no manning constraints from an EER perspective if, other than hazards that occur with no warning and are not necessarily designed for, such as sudden and severe ship impact, there are no remaining major accident hazards that could impair the gangway and result in insufficient evacuation means on the host platform.

www.hazardexonthenet.net

trapped in one part of a platform unable to reach the TR or a TEMPSC. However, under highly controlled conditions and appropriate risk assessment, it may be appropriate to take some credit for them. Likely restrictions on their use are that: • There is another evacuation route (most likely a bridge to a flotel, or other jacket) with a remote possibility of being unavailable or impaired • It is only possible in calm weather with the ERRV in close standby • The numbers of persons involved is limited.

Paul Murray is a Chartered Mathematician and Principal Consultant with DNV GL Risk Advisory. He has more than ten years’ experience in undertaking various Technical Safety studies for offshore installations in the North Sea and worldwide. Based in Aberdeen, Paul works closely with operators and engineering contractors to provide consulting services for Offshore Installations at various stages in their lifecycle - from concept design through to decommissioning. His main areas of focus are in risk based decision making, ALARP demonstration, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), and consequence modelling.

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Offshore 27

expectations for consultation, engagement and transparency by the industry. These changing expectations place an onus on the regulator and industry to respond with actions that ensure maintenance of our social license to operate.

Among the factors that influence community

Australian offshore regulator reports no fatalities or

acceptance of offshore oil and gas activity is the quality of the industry oil spill risk management arrangements. In 2016, NOPSEMA inspectors conducted a focused inspection program of seven titleholders with regard to oil spill risk management

rates continued the downward trend observed since 2010 and the total number of injuries

and visited the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC) premises in Victoria and Western Australia. These targeted inspections supplemented the usual NOPSEMA inspection program and verified titleholder oil spill preparedness and response capabilities.

The results of the inspections were encouraging.

Management Authority (NOPSEMA) report for 2016 confirms that last year was the first since the establishment of a

also decreased. Measures for process safety were less definitive with hydrocarbon releases increasing, while dangerous occurrences

Areas for improvement were also identified that are applicable to all titleholders operating

national safety regulator in 2005 that no fatalities or major injuries were reported.

NOPSEMA CEO Stuart Smith said the

decreased overall. From 2015 to 2016, there was a 28% increase in the total number of hydrocarbon releases reported to NOPSEMA. The majority of these releases were in the

in Australian waters. NOPSEMA recognises and supports the industry’s cooperative approaches to oil spill risk management as they provide oil spill risk reduction measures

improvement in many safety indicators had been achieved against a challenging background of falling oil and gas prices.

lower releases category (> 1-300 kg), but any uncontrolled hydrocarbon release warrant attention due to the risk of ignition and the

not possible on a single titleholder or activity basis. NOPSEMA also sees scope for the industry to continue expanding these

In the report’s executive summary, Smith said: This year’s report continues our focus on

potential widespread damage and associated threat to lives they could cause. Conversely, the number of dangerous occurrences

cooperative efforts so oil spill risks are managed to as low as reasonably practicable.

sharing key findings from NOPSEMA’s inspections and other activities. These findings provide valuable insights into industry

reported fell by 17% with the majority relating to unplanned events. Analysis indicates that the vast majority of dangerous occurrences

The 2016 Annual Offshore Performance Report is available to download at: www.nopsema.gov.au

performance and identify specific areas for improvement.

which required the implementation of emergency response plans were the result of false alarms or inadvertent manual call point activation due to human activities. These

major injuries in 2016

T

he Australian National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental

Included in [the report] are detailed analyses of key NOPSEMA findings from occupational health and safety inspections covering loss of containment, dropped objects and diving systems, and environmental management inspections examining the management of planned discharges.

Statistical highlights are given overleaf.

causes may provide reassurance to some, but NOPSEMA is concerned about the frequency of the occurrences and the risk of workforce complacency.

Despite another challenging year of falling oil

A proposal in 2016 to undertake exploration drilling in the Great Australian Bight divided opinion with support from some community

and gas prices, it was encouraging to see improvement in many safety indicators. There were no fatalities or major injuries reported in 2016, which is the first time there have been no major injuries reported for a full year since

groups and strong opposition from others.

The proposal attracted environmental campaigns, increased media scrutiny and parliamentary inquiries. While the increased scrutiny related to a particular proposal and

the inception of NOPSA in 2005. Accident

region, it reflected changing community

NOPSEMA CEO Stuart Smith

www.hazardexonthenet.net

28 Offshore

Australian offshore industry performance in 2016 Total offshore hours worked 9.7 million hours in 2016, a decrease of 38% from the 15.7 million in 2015. In 2016, 65% of the hours worked occurred on fixed facilities and 35% on mobile facilities.

Facilities • 20 mobile facilities (MODUs and vessels), a decrease from 29 in 2015.

• 129 fixed facilities (pipelines, FPSOs, normally attended platforms and not normally attended platforms), an increase from 119 in 2015.

Offshore hours reported by mobile facilities decreased 65% from 9.8 million hours in 2015 to 3.4 million in 2016.

Submissions to NOPSEMA 161 submissions of key permissioning documents were made by duty holders to NOPSEMA in 2016, a 14% decrease on the 187 submitted in 2015. These submissions included: • 76 safety cases and Diving safety management systems (DSMSs) • 45 Well Operations Management Plans (WOMPs) • 32 environment plans and offshore

Dangerous occurences

project proposals (OPPs) • 8 Petroleum Safety Zones (PSZs) applications.

No fatalities or serious injuries No fatalities or serious injuries were reported to NOPSEMA in 2016. This is first time since its inception in 2005 that there were no serious injuries reported.

Injuries 52 injuries were reported on offshore facilities in 2016, a 41% decrease on the 88 injuries reported in 2015. This is the lowest number of injuries reported in a single year since 2005.

Accidents 4 accidents (resulting in incapacitation >= 3 days lost time injury - LTI) were reported in 2016, down from 12 in 2015.

www.hazardexonthenet.net

Total recordable cases

Total recordable cases (TRCs)

There were 52 TRCs reported in 2016; a

TRCs (commonly referred to as ‘total injuries’) are calculated by adding the number of fatalities, major injuries, lost time injuries (LTIs), alternative duties injuries (ADIs) and medical treatment injuries (MTIs) reported.

41% decrease from 2015. The TRC rate (which takes into account industry activity levels) in 2016 also decreased from 5.60 to 5.36.

Offshore 29

Of the 52 TRCs, 6 were Lost time injuries (of which 4 involved more than 3 days off work), 22 Medical treatment injuries and 6 Alternative duties injuries.

Dangerous occurrences 302 dangerous occurrences were reported, a 17% reduction on the 364 reported in 2015, and lower than the 5-year average of 351, taking into account the reduction in industry activity during this period.

Damage to safety-critical equipment

Damage to safety critical equipment

There was a 25% decrease in the number of damage to safety-critical equipment incidents from 108 in 2015 to 81 in 2016.

Of these incidents, 58 (72%) occurred on FPSOs, 20 (25%) on platforms and three (4%) on MODUs.

NOPSEMA activity

Safety-critical equipment (or element) is any

Average assessment time

component part of structure, equipment, plant or system whose failure could cause a major accident event.

• Safety case average assessment time in 2016 was comparable to previous years • WOMP average assessment time increased

Major investigations

OHS hydrocarbon releases

• Environment plan average assessment time increased.

incidents) warranted a major investigation by NOPSEMA in 2016.

28% increase from 18 in 2015 to 23 in 2016. All incidents were of negligible or

Assessment time is often dependent on the

Enforcement actions

minor severity. 65% occurred on platforms and 3,703 kg of gas released in total. 15 (65%) occurred at platforms, 7 (31%) on

duty holder providing timely responses to requests for information, and it should also be noted that new well regulations came into

10 enforcement actions were issued to 6 duty holders in 2016. This was a reflection of reduced industry activity.

FPSOs and 1 (4%) on a MODU.

effect in 2016 which required duty holders to resubmit their WOMPs in accordance with new content requirements.

The future

Inspections 143 inspections were undertaken in 2016,

with industry to ensure that corrective actions are appropriately targeted and that it would hold duty holders to account for any identified

a 27% decrease on the 195 inspections in 2015. Inspections in 2016 included: • 6 well integrity (50% decrease compared to 12 in 2015)

breaches of their duties or responsibilities.

Damage to safety-critical equipment continues to be a risk, it said, and this would continue to be an area of primary focus for the future.

Environmental reportable incident notifications 38% decrease from 13 in 2015 to 8 in 2016.

Complaints Two complaints were received by NOPSEMA in 2016.

100% Submissions notified on time 100% of submissions made to NOPSEMA in 2016 across all divisions were notified within legislated timeframes (time from submission to first notification).

• 93 occupational health and safety (18% decrease compared to 114 in 2015) • 44 environmental management (36% decrease compared to 69 in 2015).

The reduction in inspections reflects the industry wide reduction in activity in 2016.

No reported incidents (accidents, dangerous occurrences or reportable environmental

NOPSEMA said it would continue to work

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Process safety management 31

Why tackling PSM silos is vital to sustaining safe performance

E

fforts to galvanise global industries against the threat of hazardous catastrophes are being hampered by an uncoordinated and disjointed approach to Process Safety Management (PSM)

is still seeing evidence of process safety management approaches being disjointed, with a wide variation in the uptake and application of PSM. HSE investigations and inspection programmes show no shortage

There are clear economic benefits from tackling the silo factor - for example not overspecifying equipment, reducing the amount of in-service testing and inspection, more efficient sharing of process safety information

- the silo factor. This is the principal finding of a research project carried

of serious failures to adequately manage process safety risks.

and not duplicating safety studies.

out by ABB’s global engineering and consultancy group, based on almost 500 recommendations from 16 site process safety risk assessments carried out over

Furthermore, the latest EU Major Accident Hazard (MAH) directive ‘Seveso 2015’, calls for operators to review ‘Global’ lessons

recent years.

The aim of this paper therefore is to encourage industry wide debate that will help to take the high hazard sector closer to an agreed and consistent approach to process

In this paper, Conrad Ellison and Graeme

learned from industry and demonstrate that they are understood and systems implemented to reduce the likelihood of

safety management.

As you will see, our research highlights some

Ellis of ABB present the common PSM weaknesses that have been identified, discuss their underlying causes and

occurrence. Any company reviewing, for example, the EU’s Major Accident Reporting System (eMARs) web site will see that major

interesting findings. Some are surprises, others, simply worrying. What is clear is that silo practices in process safety management

present some ideas on how to eradicate the factors that can lead to silo thinking.

incidents continue to occur, though not attracting the same media attention as given to some of the events in the last decade.

are a real and present threat facing the process industries and that we have a significant job on our hands to tackle this issue.

Without urgent attention to this endemic problem, we could be lowering our defences against more disasters on the scale of Buncefield, Texas City and Macondo in future. Such events have intensified focus on process safety management, leadership, key performance indicators and competence in recent years.

The uptake of these activities by operating companies’ and industry bodies is certainly encouraging. Amid tighter budgets, however, and a sharper focus on balance sheets, process safety performance is being threatened by the interminable rise of the silo factor - an inability within process safety management circles to collaborate and be consistent across all departments in the organisation.

The UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

What does process safety cover?

www.hazardexonthenet.net

32 Process safety management What is the silo factor?

Modern PSM is complex and involves an

operations to determine that the risk is now too high to continue operations or for

The pie chart below shows the most common areas of weakness identified in the

array of engineering disciplines, functions, and often different businesses in ensuring that performance is sustained or improved.

the process safety team to determine that another independent protective system is no longer required.

studies. Some examples to illustrate typical issues are then described below.

Each engineering discipline, function or business involved in PSM has its own responsibilities and role to play in the

A robust management of change system is at the heart of ensuring the communications described above, but achieving effective

overall PSM picture. However most of the parties involved are also responsible for many other day-to-day activities, such as production, quality, cost savings or process improvements.

communication flow in every instance, given the often very different systems for storing information, is a real challenge. Often the silo factor impedes this flow of information.

PSM responsibilities.

The silo factor we are describing occurs when each of these parties thinks more about optimising their own area of responsibility and less about optimising the overall

Analysis of PSM shortcomings from sample audits

organisation’s PSM performance. Effective performance of the PSM system, however, can only be achieved through integrated and

Common areas of weakness Inadequate testing of safeguards which addresses the third of the key PSM

collaborative thinking and processes that encourage a constant focus on MAHs.

questions. Example findings include: • Not differentiating between safety critical and other systems. ABB found

One way the silo factor can impact on PSM can be seen through an example of the maintenance organisation; they play a very important role in ensuring that safety critical protective systems are appropriately tested and maintained. This focus can potentially be lost however, as they also maintain many other systems that are not safety critical.

The maintenance team may see benefit from standardising test intervals and maintenance methods across all of the systems they are responsible for, but in doing so can lose sight of the safety critical nature and requirements of protective systems.

Another way the silo factor can negatively impact both PSM and financial performance is linked to the inconsistencies found in sharing and passing on information.

Using a maintenance example again; the technicians need information to understand how, for example, a temperature sensor is protecting against a runaway reaction so that they can assure adequate reliability of the measurement device. This needs to be communicated to others if any changes they make (for example testing less frequently or introducing a more reliable device) may reduce or increase the level of protection provided. This information could allow

www.hazardexonthenet.net

PSM responsibilities Findings of common weaknesses in PSM systems

in certain cases that the term ‘safety critical systems’ was not in place and therefore there was no differentiation in

At ABB, we strongly support the HSE view that any person responsible for process safety

the standard of testing for all systems • Lack of access to design or previous inspection data

in an operating company needs to be able to answer ‘yes’ to the following three questions: • Do we understand what can go wrong?

• Not completing end to end proof tests of safety instrumented systems. ABB found that in many cases the Electrical,

• Do we know what systems we have to prevent this happening?

• Do we have information to assure us these systems are working effectively?

Control and Instrumentation (EC&I) team specified the testing requirements and end to end testing of ‘barriers’ was not in place and no reference to Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) documentation was being made in determining testing requirements • Reduced maintenance on safety critical measurement devices leading to

By implementing robust process safety hazard identification and risk assessment processes during design, comprehensive risk controls during operations and maintenance, and implementation of reliable monitoring of these risk controls, we should all be able to answer ‘yes’ to all the above.

Yet through our analysis of over 500 recommendations from 16 site process safety risk assessments carried out over recent years. we have identified that many operators cannot answer yes to the above due to inconsistencies and in some cases a complete lack of information sharing.

increased plant trips.

Inadequate PHA information - which addresses the first of the key PSM questions. Example findings included: • Not reviewing PHA assessments when designs are modified or new ones introduced • Not updating LOPA studies based on real reliability data • Not identifying critical alarms based on the PHA

Process safety management 33

• Not documenting PHAs well enough to pass on the nature of the hazardous event or the likely consequences. This often means that the SIL determination stage has to ignore the poor PHA output and start from scratch to identify hazardous events • Not updating PHA records following an incident or near miss. ABB found that for one company a potential fatality near miss had not been captured as part of the PHA process Inadequate safeguards in place - which addresses the second and final of the key PSM questions. Example findings included:

Swiss cheese model

• Not providing operators with information on how to respond to alarms • Not considering some of the relief scenarios identified in the HAZOP during relief system design

not integrating effectively.

The process safety implications of many of the examples above are clear with instances of: people performing safety critical tasks

• Poor initial PHAs due to a lack of availability of relevant information • PHA findings not being clearly recorded in a way that takes into account the needs of the subsequent users (silos)

• Frequent removal of some elements of trip systems during certain operations

without understanding the significance of these tasks and the hazards they are protecting against; protective systems not

• PHA results not being shared with the right people or in the right format • PHA actions not being well specified or

Poor understanding of hazards - is another common theme with examples including:

designed with an adequate understanding of the scale of consequences they need to protect against; and management systems

closed out robustly • Consequences not adequately described or modelling results not made available in a

• No regular training in key hazards being given to operators. When conducting reviews ABB often finds that operators are

not identifying and rectifying shortcomings.

consistent manner

There are also economic implications from

Weaknesses linked to inadequate

not aware of worst case credible events as a result of PHA documentation not being shared and process safety training not being carried out effectively

silo thinking such as: people recreating information that exists in another silo; protective systems that are over specified and expensive to maintain; and management

safeguards arise from failure to: • Validate that the specified safeguards adequately deliver the risk reduction required by the PHA

• Risk assessment reports not being accessible • Not investigating incidents adequately to identify potential new weaknesses

systems that don’t identify the true risks and therefore fail to focus scarce resources on the areas of greatest concern.

• Robustly ensure all risk reduction requirements are identified, designed and installed • Appropriately prioritise efforts towards major accident hazards

Lack of clarity about the basis of safe operation and a lack of alignment between emergency responses and the

PSM requires an integrated approach across the organisation. Poor PSM performance through silo behaviour means that there is potential for the holes in the ‘swiss cheese’

PHA. Example findings include: • Unnecessary protective and emergency response systems not being removed when no longer required • Safety equipment not being positioned

model to align - each silo should be focused on making sure that their slice of cheese has fewer, smaller holes, but who is accountable for making sure that small holes don’t line up?

where hazards are located • Procedures not being updated when new best practice is available Our analysis of the findings suggests there are a range of common weaknesses as well as areas of best practice. That said, in most cases the weaknesses were in some way a result of silo approaches to PSM with different functions / specialists / departments

What leads to silo behaviour?

We can consider the six main areas of shortcoming identified in the research and use these to explore the underlying causes of the silo factor.

The silo factor related causes of PSM weaknesses linked to inadequate PHAs include:

The other silo related causes of shortcomings, covering the other four themes, include: • Safeguard test intervals and procedures not consistent with PHA findings • Test results not being reviewed and fed back to PHA teams to update assessments • People carrying out safety critical tasks not being informed and trained in plant risks and PHA findings • Hazard identification and risk control documentation not being simplified in a suitable format for all staff to understand • Management of change not considering every step of the risk process from PHA to auditing and training

www.hazardexonthenet.net

34 Process safety management It can readily be concluded that the majority of the above causes relate to effective and

Communication What needs to be communicated to and by

clear two way communication of all relevant process safety information between the various departments in the organisation.

each party?

How can the silos be broken down?

In concluding it is important to point out that removing silo behaviour, whilst vitally

A shared understanding of this information flow is a good starting point for making sure that it is achieved. Identifying the barriers to the smooth flow of information and taking them down may mean looking

important, is not enough on its own to assure good process safety performance - that line of thinking is a good example of silo thinking.

Effective PSM requires each area / silo to operate effectively in its own right, but in addition there must be no impediments to the

at procedures, systems and information storage. A key requirement is to ensure that there is an effective relationship between MAHs and safeguards and that this relationship is managed continuously during the safety lifecycle.

flow of information between each of the many groups involved in delivering PSM. Indeed, there needs to be careful thought around the implementation of processes and protocols to ensure formal two way communication

Simplification How to simplify PSM and pass on the information everyone needs in ways that they can understand and act on? PSM

is consistent and becomes embedded as ‘business as usual’ within operators.

can be very complex and some elements of it very technically challenging, but many groups need only the clear simple messages.

The aim of this paper, as previously stated, is to spark some debate as to how to overcome the organisational factors that can lead to silo

The output from a HAZOP is not for the HAZOP team, but for the people that need that information to determine criticality,

thinking. So we conclude by suggesting three key areas that must be considered to avoid silo thinking.

understand the top site hazards etc.

Accountability and oversight Who in your organisation is accountable for the overall management of process safety risk? These are the people who must look across the slices of cheese and make sure that the holes don’t align. They must ensure that information in a consistent format flows freely between the different parties and that the whole system is healthy by having an adequate range of audit programmes and other measures of performance in place.

www.hazardexonthenet.net

About the authors

Conrad Ellison is a Fellow of the Institution of Chemical Engineers and a chartered environmentalist with 28 years of process engineering and process safety experience.

He has supported numerous organisations across the process industries with their COMAH Safety Reports and has extensive Hazard Study experience majoring on HAZOP and Process Hazard Review studies across the chemicals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, power and oil and gas sectors. He also advises and supports companies on aspects of Process Safety Management.

So can the output be simplified to give them something that meets their needs? Can aids to communication, like bow-ties, be used more effectively to share the overall picture more widely?

We would be very interested to hear your feedback on the ideas in this paper and about your own related experiences. Please do get in touch and express your interest in this topic so we can share with you more information on our research. Go to: contact@ gb.abb.com

Graeme Ellis is a Principal Lead Consultant with ABB with 35 years’ experience in the process industry, now specialising in Process Safety for major hazard installations. He is a Fellow of the IChemE and initially worked as a Process Engineer in design for MW Kellogg and Hercules before gaining operational experience and training as a hazard study leader with ICI. Since 1994 Graeme has provided PSM consultancy services in all sectors of the process industry, specialising in PHA revalidation for existing operations.

He is a member of the UK Energy Institute Process Safety Committee, and completed an update of EI guidance on Inherent Safety in Design in 2014.

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36 Risk

Reducing the risk: Maximising the perfo R

isk assessment methodologies

such as Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) are broadly established across the industry as best practices for hazard identification and evaluation. However, despite the level of knowledge built to date, and even with extensive research and studies into identifying weaknesses and areas for improvements, techniques such as HAZOP still face ordinary challenges common to any risk assessment process.

informs and improves the decisionmaking process.

compromise the efficiency of performance of

What is HAZOP?

It is well documented that, for example, having an experienced and diversified

HAZOP, in summary, is a systematic, teambased method of identifying possible hazards in a work process. The technique makes detailed examination of the process intentions of new and existing facilities to assess the hazard potential of operations outside the design intention, or malfunction of individual items of equipment and their consequential effects on the facility as a whole.

This paper, by Fillipe Dobbin Caruso of Bureau Veritas UK, presents lessons and good practices intended to demonstrate how organisations can look to maximise the performance and added value of the HAZOP, ensuring it more effectively

www.hazardexonthenet.net

What are the challenges of a HAZOP implementation?

the HAZOP process.

HAZOP team, with experienced facilitator, is crucial for the success of the assessment; the same as having reliable documentation and information available for preparing and conducting the workshops.

There are, however, further concerns that need to be addressed when seeing the HAZOP from a wider risk management perspective.

From the workshop preparation until the delivery of the final results, several factors

For example, a HAZOP carried out for an offshore Oil & Gas production facility during FEED can generate more than 200

must be properly managed so as to not

recommendations and over 500 pages long

Risk 37

ormance of HAZOP (and similar) studies hazards log spreadsheets. In such case, the HAZOP workshop could be conducted based on more than 100 P&ID’s, covering over 80 different process nodes, and involve teams composed of varied personnel (e.g. the project designers, the facility operator, managers, vendors etc.) and take place over months of work to be concluded.

In a situation like the above, the following concerns can be raised and, if not properly answered, jeopardise the final goal - the HAZOP study: 1. How can one assure that all possible hazards have been effectively covered for the whole facility?

2. How to effectively communicate the HAZOP results and conclusions to all stakeholders?

3. How to ensure that optimal performance (thus maximum value) is delivered at the end of the process?

HAZOP as part of the risk management process To answer the above questions, the first step is to understand the HAZOP as a key element of the wider risk management process.

Notably, the BS ISO 31000 Standard (2009) emphasises that Risk Management is a crucial part of decision making, as it “helps decision makers make informed choices, prioritise actions and distinguish among alternative courses of action�. Moreover, it states that Risk Management should be tailored to the nature of the business and support continual improvement.

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Risk 39

The ‘Risk Assessment’ is defined as the core element of the risk management process.

Other key elements can be translated into, for example: • Establishing the scope and basis of the analysis, the limitations and assumptions; • Building up an appropriate HAZOP team; • Communicating with stakeholders; • Continuous monitoring to ensure assumptions remain valid and controls remain effective.

Therefore, a HAZOP can form a vital part of the Risk Management, hence playing a crucial role in ensuring that maximum

and the pipework between them. A cause for a Gas Blow-by scenario in this case could be the failure of the LCV (excessive opening leading to low level on the vessel) - the cause is originated within the node - and the likely consequence can be overpressure in a downstream vessel, which would be in a different node.

performance is delivered, maintained, and continuously improved throughout the wider process.

Process segmentation An essential part of a successful HAZOP study is about ‘process segmentation’. The process (or system) segments are also called

Presentation of results

HAZOP Nodes. These nodes account for small sections of the overall process in which typically constant and common conditions are

will lead to an over scrutinised and detailed assessment, which is likely to result in outputs that are confusing, not concise and

As previously discussed, a key challenge of the HAZOP implementation process is presenting the results clearly and concisely

observed – e.g. flow streams, temperature, pressure etc. Within such nodes, there will be specific pieces of equipment and process

generally overburdened as to its level of detail of information. On the other hand, extensive nodes will normally result in a superficial

and, above all, ensuring that the final results address the needs of and bring value to the various stakeholders.

components through which the HAZOP shall investigate the potential hazards that may take place, its causes, and what may the

assessment, which might miss key aspects of the process, and will ultimately fail to provide the assurance that the HAZOP has been

Here, the objective is not to generate additional information but rather to extract

likely consequences be.

comprehensively and effectively deployed.

The main point of carrying out a thorough and

One crucial rule that should be followed when

efficient segmentation is that, after the overall process is broken down into several ‘smaller environments’, there is significantly more clarity and traceability of the points where the HAZOP concerns are raised. This should give improved assurance and confidence about the coverage of the assessment, ensuring no areas of the process were missed. Based on the structured nature of the HAZOP

assessing a specific node is: The investigation of deviations pertaining to one node shall be limited to the causes that can be specifically originated in the node, whereas the associated consequences may take place anywhere in the process.

For example, consider the following: A process segment commences in an oil/gas

There are certain improvements that, although slight, can significantly emphasise the key outputs and messages from the risk

methodology, after investigating one node after another, step-by-step, moving from one small section to the next - when all pieces of the process are covered under a specific node - one will ultimately come up with the

manifold pipe, going into a separation vessel (pressure vessel), which has a pressure control valve (PCV) on the top gas outlet line (connected to a pressure control loop, with pressure transmitters in the vessel etc.), and

assessment results, for example: • Depicting key figures on graphics; • Providing smart and target-oriented outputs (see examples discussed next); • Listing actions/recommendations

full coverage of the process.

controls its level via a Level Control Valve (LCV) on the bottom liquid outlet.

segregated by plant/process areas, and with respective actions by the responsible disciplines (piping, electrical, process, maintenance, etc.); • Listing and/or emphasising recommendations associated with the scenarios of higher risk levels.

At this point, one important question to be answered is: how comprehensive should one single node be?

As a general rule, excessively small nodes

In this case, the investigation of deviations should be limited to the causes that can be associated to any of the following: the inlet pipework, the pressure vessel, the PCV, LCV

and aggregate the most valuable data from within the analysis that can be useful for the end users considering the varied possible audiences. It is important to remember that, most likely, various people that didn’t participate in the workshop will have to read, understand, and go through the decisionmaking process based on the HAZOP report.

www.hazardexonthenet.net

40 Risk

Figure 1. Example of Risk Ranking Results (Initial and Residual) using a Risk Matrix Dashboard Generally, it is a good practice to anticipate who is likely to read the HAZOP report in order to target the right information to make it easy for them to get the results.

Figure 2. Example of Risk Ranking Results (Initial and Residual) on simple Chart

existing safeguards in reducing the risk levels of the HAZOP scenarios.

For example, an extremely useful resource for a plant manager could be a table or a

However, Figure 1, because of how it is presented, generates additional value by providing further useful information. One advantage is that Figure 1 details the risk

pie-chart which gives statistics regarding the most critical scenarios (e.g. with the higher risks or catastrophic consequences)

levels statistics across the whole LikelihoodSeverity spectrum of the Risk Matrix, thus more clearly demonstrating how the various

with their associated plant or process segments and equipment. This can be the input information needed for taking urgent corrective actions on the facilities,

scenarios ‘descend’ from high to medium risk, and from medium to low risk, after the risk control measures are taken into account.

coordinating the works and ensuring the participation of the workforce accordingly prioritising to tackle the high risk scenarios

Reporting the outcomes of a risk assessment clearly and smartly, in a way that is easily understood and effectively addresses

first and planning to work on the low risk ones in a later moment. This could ultimately result in optimised resource usage and

the needs of end-users, offers numerous benefits.

minimised plant downtime.

Final Considerations

In the examples above, Figures 1 & 2 give

Management of information, timely analysis and action are key business factors in

the risk ranking results in two different ways for the scenarios of a HAZOP conducted for a specific process. These are based on a specific 5 x 5 Risk Matrix with three different

our new era of technology. Therefore, it is imperative that the risk assessment process, such as a HAZOP study, is effective in delivering its intended outcomes and

Risk Levels (High, Medium and Low Risk), which are a combination of the Likelihood and Severity categories. The numbers on both Figures correspond to the amount of HAZOP scenarios which have been ranked to specific risk levels based on the Risk Matrix definitions.

is efficient in doing so, so as to enable organisations to achieve optimal safety and operational performances.

Both Figures effectively demonstrate the risk levels without Risk Control Measures (i.e.

Safeguards) in place (also called Initial Risk) and the risk levels with such measures in place (Residual Risk). This gives a visual and clear representation of the effectiveness of

www.hazardexonthenet.net

By introducing the aforementioned techniques, organisations can look to maximise the performance and added value of the HAZOP, ensuring it more effectively informs and improves the decision-making process. While this paper specifically addresses HAZOP, the same techniques could be extended to similar studies, such as HAZID (Hazard Identification) and FMEA (Failure Modes Effects Analysis), among others.

About the author

Fillipe Dobbin Caruso is a Risk & Safety Engineer at Bureau Veritas.

In this role he provides specialised safety and risk management consultancies to various industries worldwide via a range of Technical Safety, Compliance Management and Auditing services, including HAZOP, HAZID, FMEA, Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA), COMAH and Offshore Safety Case, and Emergency Response.

He previously worked as a Risk Advisory Consultant at DNV GL, where he was responsible for providing safety, risk and reliability consultancy to hazardous industries. Prior to this, Caruso worked as a project engineer at Siemens. In total, he has eight years’ exposure to major industrial projects, including onshore and offshore oil & gas, maritime, chemical, petrochemical, power & utilities.

He is a Certified OHSAS 18001 (OH&S Management Systems) Lead Auditor and has a BSc degree in Chemical Engineering.

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Risk 43

What plant is suitable for Risk-Based Inspection?

B

y prioritising inspection regimes according to the degree of risk, Mike Brown of British Engineering Services explains how inspection

when considering specific issues are: • fatigue • creep; and • corrosion under insulation.

intervals can often be extended, safety improved and cost/profit benefits realised.

In these instances, RBI is more appropriate, as careful consideration will be given to how the

There has been an increase in the use of a risk-based inspection (RBI) approach as

damage may materialise in the given operating conditions and how these will impact the equipment’s life.

an alternative to traditional fixed-interval inspection regimes outside of the established use in the oil, gas and chemical industries.

There is equipment in common use, across many industry sectors, where the damage mechanisms

RBI should identify these potential failure mechanisms. In circumstances where the results are not fully understood for SCC & CUI,

and how they will manifest themselves will be well known. Examples include: • compressed air receivers

for example, it will require the RBI team to look at historical evidence and this may be specific to an individual site.

For example, utility companies and distilleries are now turning to this approach as a way of addressing asset management shortcomings identified by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

However, risk based inspection is not suitable for all types of plant. It is generally most suitable in the following environments:

• horizontal multitubular steam boilers; and • refrigeration systems.

often found on complex equipment include: • Fatigue and Creep i.e.: plant operating with cyclic duty at high temperatures, or a combination of both; and • Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) & Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI). These are less predictable because there are other factors such as plant location, temperature and stress that can effect such equipment.

2. Higher likelihood or consequences of failure

These types of equipment have been used over a long period of time, so issues affecting the integrity of the equipment that have arisen are now understood and the most appropriate way(s) to prevent significant failure have been identified. Organisations such as the Safety Assessment Federation (SAFed) have refined inspection techniques that address these historic deterioration mechanisms that will

The roots of RBI lie in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries for good reason: in these industries, integrity failure can have catastrophic and far-reaching consequences.

In such circumstances, it is important that: • all potential failure mechanisms have been identified • that the consequences of such failures are assessed; and

affect the integrity of the plant, including damage mechanisms. For a plant that has been bought ‘off-the-shelf’ without any need for customisation, then its wide usage will mean that the damage mechanisms will be

lead to such failures. They have compiled technical guides that address the inspection requirements of common types of plant.

• the likelihood of failure based on knowledge of the equipment and operating conditions are understood.

For complex equipment there can be less

Sometimes, there are complexities as well as

typical and widely known.

intellectual knowledge around damage mechanisms and mitigation such as inspection, to prevent problems escalating. They may, however, still be subject to common damage mechanisms, but its presence (or how it manifests itself) might not be as clearly understood. Common damage mechanisms,

the bespoke nature of the plant that exist at a plant with problems that aren’t fully appreciated by the end users. For instance, when equipment is designed, the damage mechanism - such as fatigue - may not be fully appreciated and it’s RBI that may bring this to light.

1. Complex plant - where the damage mechanisms are less understood Fixed interval inspection regimes take a broad-brush approach to factors that may

When a plant has had to be manufactured to meet specific requirements, then the damage mechanisms and how they will manifest themselves may be less understood. Typical problems that may arise

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Risk 45

Where there is not inherent redundancy within the plant, RBI can be a useful tool to reduce the frequency of plant shutdowns.

As an example: following a recent RBI process we looked at approximately 350 plant items. The outcome was that the frequency for the original shutdown process was extended from 3 to 5 years.

This meant that over a 15-year period, the operator would be saving circa €10 million.

The RBI process also resulted in a more robust system for managing their ageing assets, as damage mechanisms were predicted and inspection effort targeted, where it was required

3. Onerous operating conditions Onerous operating conditions such as high pressure, high temperature, low pressure and low temperature environments can take their toll on a plant and should be considered as an additional risk over-and-above any typical failure

and a subsequent and suitable inspection undertaken.

5. Justification for a less intrusive inspection regime

Conclusion As can be seen, risk based inspection maximises safety and can realise cost benefits in certain scenarios. However,

For some organisations, loss of production, or other costs associated with closing down

with the upfront costs of risk based inspection generally higher than for fixed interval inspection and integrity risks

As part of an RBI process, British Engineering

the plant and equipment for inspection can be significant. This has led them to seek out RBI as a potential way of reducing the number of

more predictable for certain plant, careful consideration should be given as to which option is the best for your

Services was asked to look at storage tanks in Scotland. When the design of the tanks was reviewed, it became apparent that the effects

inspections required. This contrasts with some organisations where there may be inherent redundancy or quieter periods that can be

organisation.

of wind loading had not been fully considered.

This was confirmed when a site inspection revealed deformation of the tanks in the

utilised to minimise any disruption.

windward direction.

drivers for adopting RBI is to optimise the cost of compliance with statutory duties”.

But it also emphasises that the “duty holder

risks.

RBI should scrutinise the way the plant is operated and the training/ skills of the operators. For example, plant start up or shut down processes may be complex and require a high level of skill from the operator, which may inherently increase the likelihood of failure during this part of the process.

4. Unusual fluids

The HSE acknowledges that “one of the main

should ensure that safety of personnel and the public is not compromised by financial considerations and broader company concerns”. Companies undertaking RBI should, therefore, ensure that it achieves at least similar safety standards to fixed interval inspections.

As with operating conditions, unusual fluids whose compatibility is not clearly understood can react with plant equipment in different ways, resulting in potentially unforeseen risks.

The additional expertise of a metallurgist may predict these problems during the RBI process.

In a recent case, an increased concentration of ethanol in aluminium containment had an undesirable effect on the gasket material. This was predicted during the RBI process, confirmed as being present

www.hazardexonthenet.net

46 Risk

Case study – Risk-Based Inspection British Engineering Services recently carried out a Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) at a major chemical site located on the UK coast. The site is around 30-40 years old.

The Initial Situation There was no robust strategy to address the degradation to the site, due to Corrosion Under Insulation (also known as CUI) and Stress Corrosion Cracking (also known as SCC). This was exacerbated as a result of being on the coast. This

- for employers to ensure (as far as reasonably practicable) the health, safety and welfare of employees.

2. The requirements of the Pressure Systems Safety Regulations, 2000 3. The Pressure Equipment Regulations, 1999 4. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations, 1999 5. The Provision and Use of Work Equipment, 1998; and 6. The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations, 2005.

quickly became clear at the outset of the RBI study, because CUI and SCC were identified as the most likely cause of failure, with little history as to the condition of the plant with respect to this.

Corrosion Under Insulation and Stress Corrosion Cracking

Study Team

In the early stages of the Study it became clear that Corrosion Under Insulation

A detailed study was carried out by a multi-disciplinary team, drawn from plant management, the site inspection function

in carbon steel and Stress Corrosion Cracking in stainless steel were issues common to many of the plant items.

and representatives of British Engineering Services, with knowledge of pressure systems and process safety.

To promote consistency in both the assessment of risk and the specification of inspection regimes, decision matrices were generated.

Study Process Summary For each item, inspection history was reviewed and modes of deterioration were

The matrices in each case were based on two main parameters:

considered in the light of all foreseeable operating conditions such as: • normal operation

• operating temperature; and • plant type.

• start-up • shutdown • cleaning

Information regarding temperature ranges was drawn from API571. Judgment and experience of where the corrosive

• inspection/maintenance; and • foreseeable abnormal operations including operator error.

environments might be expected to occur were used to differentiate between plant types.

The risk of failure was then assessed through a process based on guidance from the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) Contract Research Report 363/2001, Best Practice for Risk-Based Inspection as part of Plant Integrity Management (the Best Practice Guide).

In each case, a three-by-three decision matrix was generated and applied to all items. Account was also taken of the potential health and safety consequences of failure due to these specific mechanisms.

Legal Framework The assessment process considered the following regulations: 1. The general requirements under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974

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About the author

The outcome from this project was that a robust process was instigated to ensure that Corrosion Under Insulation and Stress Corrosion Cracking did not lead to a significant plant failure.

Mike Brown is Technical Manager Pressure Discipline at British Engineering Services Brown has a BEng(Hons) Degree in Mechanical Engineering and is a Chartered Engineer registered with the Engineering Council.

He has responsibility for the control environment for services including those supplied under: Pressure Equipment Directive (PED); Pressure System Safety Regulations (PSSR); Transportable Pressure Equipment Directive (TPED); ASME Inspection Services: as Authorized Inspection Agency 001; and Carriage of Dangerous Goods regulations (CDG).

He trained as an Engineer Cadet officer in the Merchant Navy and worked for P&O Cruises as an Engineer Officer, through which he qualified with a Class 1 Certificate in Marine Engineering. He has also worked for National Vulcan (part of SunAlliance Insurance Group) and RSA Insurance Group plc.

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Process industry cybersecurity 49

Uncertain threat: Managing cyber risk F

At its worst, a cyber attack could result in physical destruction of equipment

attacks is on the rise. In 2016, there were 4,000 ransomware attacks occurring each

threat of cyber attack is an increasing concern for managers of high hazard and process plant. Hazardex will be running

and threaten personnel. This intent was demonstrated in an industrial setting when a classified computer worm infected an

day, according to a June 2016 report from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property

a series of articles from companies prominent in cyber protection, with a special focus on process plant and

Iranian nuclear enrichment facility in 2009.

Referenced today as the Stuxnet malware, the worm infected the nuclear facility’s

Section (CCIPS) of the US Department of Justice noted that this figure showed a 300% increase over 2015.

systems.

industrial control systems and destroyed approximately one-fifth of the centrifuges.

ollowing the upsurge in damaging incidents over the last few years, the

In this article, the first in the series, Matt Mowrer, David Campbell and Derek Bergeron of ABS Group explain why understanding evolving cyber risks is a vital part of an organisation’s enterprise risk management strategy.

That compromise went undetected by the operator as the centrifuges self-destructed without exhibiting signs that the facility was under attack. The risk of such a disease spreading rapidly in real time was brought to bear in this example when the computer

Understanding evolving cyber risks should be part of an organisation’s enterprise risk management strategy. Start by asking, “How exposed are my technology systems to cyber attacks that could result in major process outages or physical consequences?”

Differences in IT/OT

Petroleum and chemical process industry owners and operators face risks every day.

From the hazardous processes used in asset-intensive industries to the extreme locations in which they operate, risk is an

code’s self-replicating behavior escaped its test case scenario and ended up infecting other computers around the world. The Stuxnet attack occurred 8 years ago; since then the threat landscape has changed

In this environment, corporate executives are becoming increasingly concerned with cyber threats and most have made major investments in their cybersecurity programs.

These programs are typically governed by

inherent part of the business landscape.

Among the most dynamic and least understood risks today is cyber risk, when anonymous actors can exploit weaknesses in technology systems to cause financial impacts, operational disruptions or even physical consequences.

dramatically with the rapid change in technology.

the corporate IT departments, and their focus is on protecting the confidentiality of proprietary or personal data and ensuring the availability of critical business systems by implementing a robust strategy that includes: • Executive-level oversight by a chief information security officer (CISO)

Beyond this, cybercriminals have continued to attack information technology (IT) systems resulting in data breaches within major corporations. And the number of cyber

www.hazardexonthenet.net

50 Process industry cybersecurity

Increasing Concern for Operational Technology (OT) Cybersecurity

Historically, OT systems were physically or virtually isolated from information technology (IT) networks, but the days of OT isolation are coming to an end.

With the rise of technologies, such as Big Data, Data Analytics, and the Internet of Things, companies have increasing business needs to integrate OT with IT networks to remain competitive. This raises significant challenges to protect OT systems from exploitation.

International HQ

Landside Facility Physical security systems typically operate on IT networks

External hackers can exploit systems remotely through the internet IT cybersecurity is governed at the corporate level with programs designed to: protect, detect, respond, and recover from intrusions

IT/OT CYBERSECURITY

IT

Simple local OT system controls bulk liquid transfers to/from ships Segmenting IT/OT into multiple functional zones is a best practice

Information Technology creates, processes, stores, retrieves, & sends information

OT

Operational Technology monitors & controls how physical devices perform

IT & OT systems typically use different languages & protocols but may share wiring infrastructure Consequences of System Exploitation

IT

Financial Impacts

• Business interruption • Sensitive data loss • Reputational damage Insider threats can exploit well-segmented OT systems well through direct physical access

Marine Terminal www.abs-group.com/security-risk

O Physical Impacts OT • Deaths & injuries • Property damage • Environmental impacts

Opposite System Priorities

Highest

Confidentiality

Preserving authorized restrictions

Integrity

Performing its intended functions

Availability

Ensuring timely & reliable access Highest

© Copyright 2017 ABS Group of Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.

• Governance policies and procedures • Cybersecurity training • Cyber vulnerability assessments

damage and environmental impacts.

• Design of a secure architecture • Configuration and maintenance of hardware and software

they have nearly the opposite system priorities. OT systems emphasise integrity, availability and confidentiality in that order,

• Incident response plans

whereas IT prioritises confidentiality, then availability and then integrity.

Since IT and OT have different purposes,

While most companies have implemented

Industrial Internet of Things, companies have increasing business demand to integrate OT with IT to improve operational efficiency in order to remain competitive.

Cyber risk framework for integrated systems Engineered processes at petroleum and chemical processing facilities are designed

an IT cybersecurity program, far fewer are extending their cybersecurity programs to address their operational technology (OT). OT systems detect or cause changes through the direct monitoring and control of physical devices, processes and events.

Common OT systems are industrial control systems, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and distributed

Historically, OT systems have been isolated, whether virtually or physically, from IT networks. OT systems are often managed by companies’ engineering or operations departments, which are primarily concerned with verifying that the systems are “up and running” and providing effective control over operations. Since availability of OT system functionality is paramount, they are designed

to provide multiple layers of protections to prevent major accidents. These include administrative functions (e.g. training, procedures and emergency response), safety instrumented systems and mechanical protection devices (e.g. relief valves). While designed for a different purpose, these barriers can also prevent cyber attacks from resulting in operational, safety and

control systems (DCSs).

to be simple and reliable. OT systems typically are expected to have a much longer lifespan (e.g. 30 years) than business systems (e.g. 6-10 years).

environmental consequences. So, even though cyber vulnerabilities may exist, the facility may not be at a significant risk with respect to physical consequences due to the existence of safeguards that are not

The isolation of OT systems has traditionally been viewed by engineering/operations groups as the ultimate safeguard against outside threats, but the days of physical isolation of OT systems and manual process control are coming to an end. With the rise of Big Data, Data Analytics and the

susceptible to cyber exploitation.

IT and OT exist for different purposes, use different technologies and require specific protocols. There are also different consequences if they fail. Successful attacks on IT systems can impact a company’s bottom line, compromise private information and affect the performance of a variety of key business functions. OT failures can affect control of operational processes, which can result in physical consequences, property

www.hazardexonthenet.net

But how can organisations understand their exposure to risks? Companies can answer this question, with just a little extra effort, by leveraging studies that nearly all companies already perform.

Call for papers now open

The 2018 Hazardex International Conference and Exhibition will be taking place once again at the Holiday Inn Hotel in Runcorn, Cheshire, UK, on February 28 and March 1.

The two-day Conference & Exhibition, which also includes workshops, a networking dinner and awards ceremony, aims to strengthen and expand the community that looks to the Hazardex website and journal for industry intelligence and information.

New for 2018 will be the Industry 4.0 village & workshop, which will focus on the safety and security aspects of this key global issue.

The other main areas of interest at next year’s conference will be systems, procedures, competence, human factors, legislation, non-electrical, risk and asset management, but anyone with an original take on any aspect of hazardous area operations or process safety is encouraged to get in touch.

The conference committee has also issued a special request for end user/ operator experiences, particularly relating to regulation, cultural change, ageing plant and decommissioning.

Sponsorship or exhibitor queries should be addressed to the Event Director Russell Goater at russell.goater@imlgroup.co.uk or phone +44 (0) 1732 359990.

Please contact Hazardex Editor Alan Franck – alan.franck@imlgroup.co.uk – to submit presentations for consideration or for any queries about the conference.

www.hazardexonthenet.net

5-8 SEPT 2017

REGISTER FOR FREE NOW AT OFFSHOREEUROPE.CO.UK

EMBRACE THE FUTURE, TODAY: FIND EFFICIENT SOLUTIONS TO ALL YOUR OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS NEEDS • Connect with 50,000+ professionals from across Offshore E&P community in the Subsea centre of excellence • Engage with 1,000+ suppliers from around the world offering live demos, consultations and interactive sessions, such as Schlumberger, Siemens, GE, Aker Solutions, Shell and Saudi Aramco • Learn with high calibre technical content in 65 free-to-attend presentations including an outline of new business models to address mature basin challenges • Keep up-to-date with the latest trends and learn from case studies from industry experts and business leaders

SESSION SPEAKERS

OPENING PLENARY SESSION

KEYNOTE PROGRAMME

BEN VAN BEURDEN, CEO, ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC

TECHNICAL PROGRAMME

PEDRO PARENTE, CEO, PETROBAS

UKTI COUNTRY BRIEFINGS

BREAKFAST BRIEFINGS & TOPICAL LUNCHES

BOB DUDLEY, CEO, BP

OTM INVESTMENT WORKSHOP

EMBRACING NEW REALITIES: REINVENTING OUR INDUSTRY The SPE Offshore Europe conference 2017 chair is CATHERINE MACGREGOR, PRESIDENT, DRILLING GROUP, SCHLUMBERGER LIMITED

Organised by

Process industry cybersecurity 53

To support the development of riskinformed strategies, and to promote safer,

Cybersecurity threats involve the intentional disruption or exploitation of a

more reliable industry practices related to maintaining cybersecurity systems in asset-intensive industries, an independent, third party risk advisor can perform cyber risk analyses using the results of cyber vulnerability assessments, process hazard analyses (PHAs), layer of protection analyses

computer network or control system by adversaries. These attacks can employ a variety of techniques to disrupt system functions, compromise data or gain control of systems. There is an innumerable array of potential attacks from a wide range of adversaries, which vary in

computer • Software or configuration errors – installing software with undetected bugs or improperly configuring a system

(LOPAs), operational risk assessments and/ or safety case studies.

One recommended approach begins with a scoping discussion to discuss the organisation’s cybersecurity concerns and

objectives, capabilities and sophistication.

Cybersecurity threats can include: • External bad actor – an adversary who, while not physically within the facility perimeter, can access the site remotely via wired or wireless connections

PHA advisors, prepare for cyber risk analyses by reviewing (1) cyber vulnerability assessments to understand critical gaps and (2) hazard assessments (e.g. PHAs, LOPAs) to understand the overall process, potential loss scenarios and the associated

the decisions that the management team would like to inform with the results of a cyber risk analysis. This is an essential step which helps the engineering team carrying out the assessment to determine the scope

• Internal bad actor – an adversary who is physically within the facility perimeter, or with authorised access to the facility’s IT/OT; internal bad actors potentially have direct physical or virtual

causes, consequences and safeguards.

Cyber vulnerabilities are identified for each potential scenario.

of the analysis and the form of the results (e.g. qualitative, semi-quantitative).

of malicious code by charging phones from USB drives on the control system

ABS Group’s security risk management team, which includes cybersecurity and

The team also facilitates a workshop with

access to computers or control system components

multi-disciplinary personnel, including process engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, instrumentation and controls

Since cyber threats are diverse, compounded by the complexity of their environments, the assessment team must clearly define

Cybersafety threats involve the accidental disruption of cyber systems by employees or authorised third parties, such as vendors

engineers and IT (local and/or corporate) personnel. Past incidents and cyber attacks are discussed in order to understand the

these factors in the analysis scope. The two major threat categories considered are cybersecurity and cybersafety.

or guests, who can cause: • Accidental corruption – inadvertently introducing variability into the functions of

overall threat landscape. The analysis team then conducts a systematic evaluation of each potential loss scenario and considers

control systems, such as the introduction

these questions/issues:

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54 Process industry cybersecurity

About the authors

1. Could this scenario be initiated from cyber? (e.g. open valve and overfill tank) 2. For each safeguard/independent protection layer (IPL), could its performance can be degraded (e.g. disable high level alarm) or failed (e.g. disable high level alarm and automatic shutdown on tank) from cyber? a. If so, categorise degradation potential (degree of difficulty) and identify potential corruption vectors (e.g. hardware ports, remote access)

assessment should contribute to more reliable decision making, which will also enable more effective management of risk and security across the spectrum of highperformance, data-driven assets found in today’s complex facilities.

Risk of the foreseeable future Cyber risk should never be overlooked.

It is important to understand the enterprise-wide exposure to this risk as threats in the cyber environment can

b. If not, note that the safeguard/IPL is not susceptible to cyber (e.g. pressure relief valve)

be extensive and multifaceted, and the nature of cyber attacks continues to evolve while the frequency is increasing.

Organisations can confront this broad

Once all scenarios have been analysed, the security risk management team develops a risk profile that identifies the highest risk scenarios and compares these to the baseline risk to characterise the client’s overall cyber risk. Recommendations are then provided which include both cyber and

range of threats – some known and some unknown – to their IT and OT systems by leveraging existing PHAs and cyber vulnerability assessments to address this uncertainty.

physical safeguards to address critical vulnerabilities. This process can be repeated for all sites within a company to develop an enterprise risk profile.

prioritised (based on which assets are at the most risk) and managed effectively from an enterprise perspective to protect industrial assets against potential incidents – now and into

The results of a cyber vulnerability

the future.

www.hazardexonthenet.net

As a process safety hazard, cyber risk must be systematically identified,

Matt Mowrer (above) is the Director of Applied Technology and Data Analytics at ABS Group. He specialises in developing innovative, risk-based solutions to help government and commercial clients maximise their performance. Mr. Mowrer is a recognised practice leader in enterprise risk management (ERM), riskbased decision-making (RBDM), hazard analysis, and physical/cybersecurity risk assessment applications.

David Campbell is a Senior Risk/ Reliability Engineer at ABS Group.

He has over 40 years of experience in risk assessment/risk management of industrial plants and systems.

Mr. Campbell has worked in the petroleum, chemical processing, nuclear, biofuel, electric power and paper industries.

Derek Bergeron is a Senior Risk/ Reliability Engineer with ABS Group.

He has over 19 years of chemical, refining and petrochemical experience encompassing process safety, risk management, project management, production, engineering and facility design.

@P E R F T E C

Antweep 2017

In the regions hazardexonthenet.net Protecting Plant, Process & Personnel

We are pleased to announce the next Hazardex in the Regions event will take place in Antwerp, Belgium on November 29th 2017 and will be co-located with PEFTEC, the event for petroleum refining & environmental monitoring technologies.

The underlying philosophy of Hazardex in the Regions is to bring the latest safety-related intelligence to process plant and hazardous area specialists at a venue near their workplace, reducing travel time and expense. The conference will be supported by an exhibition of products and services relevant to those working in hazardous environments, and offers free access to PEFTEC conferences, seminars & the wider exhibition.

Following on from the success of the decade long series, this is another opportunity for all those interested in process plant safety in Belgium and the surrounding countries to participate in one of our hazardous operationsfocused one-day conference & exhibitions.

These events will be useful for engineers, safety managers, directors with corporate liability and other members of the hazardous area community from all the process and high hazard industries, including oil & gas, petrochemicals, fine chemicals, pharmaceuticals, mining, manufacturing and the food & beverage sector, amongst others.

If you are interested in presenting a paper, exhibiting or attending the event, please contact:

russell.goater@imlgroup.co.uk or phone + 44(0) 1732 359990 www.hazardexonthenet.net

CONFERENCE EXHIBITION & SEMINARS 29th - 30th NOVEMBER 2017 - ANTWERP, BELGIUM

29th & 30th NOVEMBER

2017

ANTWERP

BELGIUM

Antwerp was chosen as PEFTEC’s location as it is situated in the World’s second largest cluster of Petrochemical Industry activities and the largest outside of the USA. Antwerp is an ideal location for visitors as it is placed in the heart of Europe with easy access by car and by rail with excellent Air links for visitors from the Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Americas.

Peftec 2017 is a focused international Conference and Exhibition for Companies specialising in monitoring and analytical technologies for the Petroleum, Refining and Environmental Industries.

Peftec offers international visitors and experts an extensive conference and seminar programme on case studies, CONFERENCE EXHIBITION & SEMINARS regulation, standards and analytical techniques with a focussed exhibition of product and service providers.

29 - 30to th NOVEMBER 2017 - ANTWERP, BELGIUM Thethneed produce accurate analytical and monitoring data is essential to industry.

For more information email: info@peftec.com Hazardex will be staging a one day high hazard process safety conference within PEFTEC, contact events@imlgroup.co.uk for attendance and exhibiting options.

www.PEFTEC.com

Topics and products featured at Peftec 2017 will include: • Laboratory Testing and Measurement • Petrochemical Analysis • Emissions Monitoring in Air, Water and Soil • Portable and Field Sampling • Process Monitoring • Reference Materials • Oil Analysis • Calibration • Regulation and Standards

Organiser: International Labmate Ltd, Publisher of Petro Industry News, International Environmental Technology, Asian Environmental Technology, International Labmate and Lab Asia.

56 Product Datafiles SPE OFFSHORE EUROPE 2017 FOCUS Tab-Ex® 01 Series Explosion-proof Tablet Computers In cooperation with Samsung, ecom has developed the Tab-Ex® 01 series—the world’s first tablet computers for use in Zone 1/ Division 1, Zone 2/Division 2 and harsh industrial environments.

Using the explosion-proof Tab-Ex® 01, mobile users can quickly and efficiently complete tasks at any time in any location. They can retrieve data in real-time and interact with remote experts and backend systems.

These tablet computers offer completely new possibilities for mobile workers.

The Tab-Ex® 01 is lightweight and compact. It is the ideal companion for tasks like asset surveys, material tracking, and inspection. It will be on display on the ecom stand at SPE Offshore Europe 2017 in Aberdeen, Hall 3A, Booth 174, from 5 - 8 September. ecom instruments GmbH, Industriestr. 2, D-97959 Assamstadt Internet: www.ecom-ex.com E-Mail: sales@ecom-ex.com

Pressure relief specialists to showcase outstanding range of products and services at Offshore Europe 2017 – Stand 3B47!

Industry-leading pressure management experts for over 80 years’, Elfab offer a wide range of products including rupture discs, explosion panels and BPRVs in addition to its technically superior products. Elfab has developed a range of online tools to make the buyer and engineering process more efficient. Its online engineering resource (ElfabTech) will also be showcased throughout the event demonstrating the benefits of sizing calculations and online ordering.

To discuss your application or requirements, please visit stand (3B47) where a technical sales expert will be available to answer any underlying queries. In the meantime, if you would like to arrange a meeting prior to the show, please get in touch via

BEKA ‘BEKA associates is an independent British company with over 30 years dedication to the design and manufacture of display instrumentation.

We specialise in intrinsically safe 4-20mA loop powered indicators and continuously develop new products for general purpose and hazardous areas. With a 3-year warranty, BEKA products are often commissioned for the latest processing equipment in the oil, gas, chemical and pharmaceutical industries. A new range of totalisers, counters, timers and clocks complement batch controllers, fieldbus indicators, sounders, beacons and panel lamps.

Our latest Advisor model has been designed with a colourful display and bargraph allowing the digits to be any colour on a black background International certification by ATEX, IECEx, FM for USA /Canada.’

Visit us on stand 3A184 at Offshore Europe or www.beka.co.uk

Leading the Customer Service Experience in the Certification Industry Providing exceptional customer service is a key aspect of the work we do at CSA Group.

Over the last 18 months CSA Group has made significant improvements to the way we provide our service to our customers.

Our customers have scored us 90% in overall customer satisfaction, with 4 out of 5 clients saying they would recommend CSA Group to a colleague.

Interested in learning how we do it? Please contact us to arrange a no obligation project planning meeting.

T: +44 (0) 1244 670 900 E: ukinfo@csagroup.org W: www.csagroupuk.org

exhibition@elfab.com

New Nightstick Dual-Light Flashlight Tops in Safety Industry The new Nightstick XPP-5422GMX Intrinsically Safe Dual-Light Flashlight is changing the safety lighting paradigm forever. Rated as Class I, Division 1, Zone 0 Intrinsically Safe, this cETLus, ATEX and IECEx certified dual-light is ushering in a new era of performance lighting for those working in hazardous environments where explosive gases and dusts may be present.

The XPP-5422GM now leads the 3AA flashlight segment with a 210 lumen LED flashlight beam at 187 meters (613+ feet) for 14 hours. A secondary 130 lumen LED floodlight in the housing directed towards the users feet, has an industry first runtime of 20 hours. Combining both beams together in dual-light mode culminates up to 285 lumens up to 10 hours.

Constructed from engineered polymer, the high-visibility housing is ANSI rated IP-67 dustproof/waterproof. Two integrated magnets located in the handle base and pocket clip provide limitless hands-free usage on 3AA batteries.

“We put more lumens where it is ultimately needed most, and that further separates our Nightstick brand as the innovation leader in safety rated lighting” says Russell Hoppe, Marketing Manager for Nightstick. “The XPP5422GMX combines a high intensity flashlight with a downward facing unfocused floodlight to emit 285 lumens maximizing safety in all directions, not just in front or below you. More lumens with more features and functions are changing the safety lighting paradigm forever.”

More at www.nightstick.com or visit us on stand 5C26 at Offshore Europe

Scotload launches Zone 1 hazardous area SmartLoad® products Scotload, part of James Fisher and Sons plc, is pleased to announce the launch of the newly certified SmartLoad 1Ex® wireless product range. Incorporating the innovative and award-winning SmartLoad® wireless technology, the newly extended suite of hazardous area products features advanced functionality which benefits clients across a range of safety critical industries.

The newly ATEX and IECEx certified Zone 1 products include the SmartLoad® wireless transmitter and ergonomically designed handset, which have been approved for use with Scotload’s load pins, load links, load shackles and line tension monitors.

The ATEX and IECEx certification also covers three standard battery sizes, meaning users are able to conveniently replace batteries directly within Zone 1 and 2 hazardous environments, significantly increasing usability and driving operational efficiency.

Simon Everett, managing director of Scotload says:

www.hazardexonthenet.net

“The exciting addition of SmartLoad 1Ex to our already extensive portfolio of hazardous area products enables us to increase safety and efficiency for our customers operating in a number of critical work areas.”

Our entire product range is fully compatible with ATEX and IECEx certifications for Zone 1 and 2 classifications, and the North American certification is pending. Once achieved, Scotload will be the only company to have gained certification for all three types of hazardous area legislation for its load monitoring products.

T: +44 (0) 1224 877 007 E: info@scotload.com W: www.scotload.com

Product Datafiles 57 Han-Eco® Outdoor connector offers weatherproof seals and A-sized housings

An Engineer’s 3 Step Guide to selecting a static grounding solution

The HARTING Han-Eco® A Outdoor connector is a new variant of the company’s Han-Eco® family, which combines high-performance plastic construction with weatherproof seals for use outdoors. The new version offers standard A-sized housings for configuring robust and flexible interfaces in demanding environmental conditions.

The benefits of Han-Eco® A housings now extend to outdoor use, especially the option of fitting pre-assembled inserts to the back of the mounting housing, saving considerable installation time.

Han-Eco® A Outdoor seals are made of a different material from industrial housings.

High-quality profile and flange gaskets made of fluorinated rubber (FPM) are oriented towards the Han M® housing.

Hazop assessments, and the reports that follow on from them, are a great way of capturing and identifying processes and practices that could lead to the ignition of flammable atmospheres through discharges of static electricity.

What Hazop reports are not so great at doing is identifying what the grounding solution to eliminate the risk should look like.

This 3 Step Guide is about helping you get started on the right path and can be best described as a door opener to the subject of hazardous area static control.

enquiries@harting.com www.harting.co.uk 01604 827500

For more information please contact Newson Gale. www.newson-gale.co.uk

F-Series: For safe and hazardous areas The F-series product range offers you an extensive selection of Indicators, Controllers and Monitoring Systems for liquid and gas flow applications, as well as for Level, Pressure and Temperature Measurement in safe and hazardous areas. The F-Series are available with intrinsically safe approvals according ATEX, IECEx, FM and CSA C-US for gas and dust applications.

Robust enclosures The most visible feature of the Fluidwell F-Series is the one of a kind enclosure. These robust enclosures are available in GRP or durable aluminium. The GRP is a sturdy, light-weight and budget friendly enclosure. Even more rugged is the durable aluminum enclosure with various entry threads. In fact, the F-Series is so rugged, even a truck can stand on it!

The 3 extremely rugged push buttons, won’t wear out on harsh treatment or environmental conditions. The F-Series withstands extreme weather conditions as rain, snow, sun, salty atmospheres or temperatures as low as -40°C or as high as 80°C, which is -40°F to 178°F.

Easy to operate The intuitive and user-friendly menu structure, saves significant time and cost in installation and programming. Fluidwell users all around the world appreciate the clearly indicated, alphanumerical descriptions. Those familiar with a Fluidwell product, can therefore also program and install all F-Series without a manual or hiring technical experts: Know one, know them all!

Video: www.fluidwell.com/hazardex-f-series or contact us at sales@fluidwell.com

DA-720-DPP: X86-Computer for Energy, Transportation, Marine, Oil and Gas

New Ex square shaped beem LED floodlight by Cortem Group

Moxa´s DA-720-DPP series of rackmount computers enables reliable system operation in specialized automation applications, not least due to its compliance with IEC-61850-3-, IEEE 1613-, and IEC 60255. The x86 2U 19-inch high density 14 gigabit Ethernet platform with 6th generation Intel® Core™ i7 CPU offers 2 isolated RS-232/422/485 ports, USB, VGA, and 2 PCIe ports for expansion modules, including 4-port and 8-port 10/100/1000 Mbps LAN modules The standard 19-inch 2U rack-mountable case with a robust design is ideal for specialized industrial automation applications, including power substations, transportation and shipping, and oil and gas production and supply.

The computer is IEC-61850-3, IEEE 1613 and IEC 60255 compliant.

Moxa Europe GmbH Telephone: +49-89-37003-99-0 Email: europe@moxa.com Web: www.moxa.com

Thanks to the “square shaped beam” optics, the SLED series of explosion-protected floodlights from Cortem Group ensures a uniform illumination over large areas, both indoors and outdoors. Characterized by high light output with a white light and a colour rendering index greater than 70, they are able to replace sodium vapour or metal halide floodlights, ensuring quality of the light, energy saving and visual comfort.

Features include: II 2GD Ex de IIB+H2 method of protection for environments with the presence of hydrogen; High luminous efficiency; Energy saving; Optimization of plant engineering and maintenance costs; Cool White LED, colour temperature 6.500 K; Long Term Performance; Zone 1, 2, 21, 22; ATEX/IECEx/TR CU certificates; and IP66.

For more information visit www.cortemgroup.com or write to saleseurope@cortemgroup.com

Schmersal launches new generation of position switches The benefits for the user: The new PS product range offers varied applications, as all the position switches can be used both as complete devices and as modular units.

Type 1 position switches in line with ISO 14119 are for the position detection and monitoring of moving parts on machinery and plants as well as for lateral or pivotable protection equipment. The new range is suitable for a wide range of applications across all individual disciplines of machine and plant engineering - both for automation and safety applications and for lift engineering. The protection types IP66 or IP67 create the prerequisites for using the position switch in unfavourable environmental conditions.

Fewer variants - more flexibility The modular design of the PS range with consistent components across all models reduces the number of variants, reduces storage costs and increases availability. All the position switches in the PS116, PS2xx and PS3xx ranges available within the modular system can be chosen both as complete switches with actuating element or as basic

switches. Depending on the application, the basic switches can be combined with the necessary actuating element, which can be selected from a range of possible versions. This achieves the greatest possible flexibility in application and at the same time reduces the number of different switches available.

Contact us at uksupport@schmersal.co.uk www.schmersal.co.uk or Tel : 01684 571980

www.hazardexonthenet.net

58 Buyers Guide

For a complete range of hazardous area solutions Intrinsic Safety Isolators • Zener Barriers • Zone 1&2 Remote I/O • Fieldbus Exe Enclosures • Exd Control Panels • Ex Lighting • Purge Solutions • Zone 1 & 2 HMI’s PC’s

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Sponsorship & exhibition stands now on sale Contact the HazardEx sales team on +44 (0)1732 359990 or events@imlgroup.co.uk

To advertise in the Product Datafiles or Buyers Guide contact Kathryn Startin on +44 (0)1732 359990 or kathryn.startin@imlgroup.co.uk

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STZ Functional Safety Dual Input Smart HART Temperature Transmitter from Moore Industries The SIL-3 capable, exida-approved STZ Functional Safety Dual Input Smart HART Temperature Transmitter from Moore Industries is a dependable and accurate temperature transmitter for use in Safety Instrumented Systems where dangerous processes occur. It is part of the FS FUNCTIONAL SAFETY SERIES of products that have received certification from exida after rigorous evaluation to ensure conformance with strict IEC 61508:2010 standards.

The STZ offers a dual sensor input that reduces process interruptions. Backup and Fail-Over Protection allows either of the sensors or inputs to be designated as the primary measurement, with the secondary input acting as the backup sensor. The dual sensor input allows for Average and Differential measurements and High-Select and Low-Select options. http://www.miinet.com/ProductInformation/MainProductSelectionIndex/ FunctionalSafetyIEC61508.aspx

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High Pressure Low Volume Dosing Pumps The Verderflex Dura is the first real advance in hose pump technology since the VERDERFLEX_Layout 1 18/03/2016 09:59 Page 1 high pressure hose. The Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7 combine a close coupled pump’s compactness with traditional long coupled pump benefits in superior High Pressure Low Volume dosing pumps. Unlike traditional high shear pumps that reduce flocculent particle sizes and result in both increased chemical use and higher High Pressure Low operating costs, the Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7’s bring gentle pumping to sub-litre The Verderflex Dura is the first real advance in hose pump technology since the per hour flow rates. Off-Gassing liquids, high pressure hose. The Verderflex Dura 5 such as Hypo, often cause traditional and Dura 7 combine a close coupled pumps to vapour lock, however, the pump’s compactness with traditional long Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7 readily coupled pump benefits in superior High Pressure Low Volume dosing pumps. Unlike pumps these liquids with ease.

With no valves or stators to wear, Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7 pump lime and similar highly abrasive chemicals at a pressure of 5 to 8 bar with minimal downtime. Other features of Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7 include: • Care free dry running capabilities • No clogging maintenance costs • Long life heavy-duty hoses • True dry priming eliminating pre-wetting and priming Dosing Pumps Volume • Superior secondary containment and viscous performance.

With no valves or stators to wear, Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7 pump lime and similar highly In addition to the above advantages, the simple abrasive chemicals at a pressure of 5 to 8 bar with to use Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7 provide minimal downtime. Other features of Verderflex scalable performance and low maintenance. They Dura 5 and Dura 7 include: are an excellent chemical dosing solution for water• Care free dry running capabilities • No clogging maintenance costs treatment, brewing and food industries with much • Long life heavy-duty hoses lower operating costs!

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traditional high shear pumps that reduce flocculent particle sizes and result in both increased chemical use and higher operating costs, the Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7’s bring gentle pumping to sub-litre per hour flow rates. Off-Gassing liquids, such as Hypo, often cause traditional pumps to vapour lock, however, the Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7 readily pumps these liquids with ease.

priming • Superior secondary containment and viscous performance.

Verderflex Dura 5 & 7 In addition to the above advantages, the simple Flow: max. 39 l/hr to use Verderflex Dura 5 and Dura 7 provide Pmax: 8 bar Suction: 9.5 mwc scalable performance and low maintenance. They are an excellent chemical dosing solution for watertreatment, brewing and food industries with much lower operating costs!

Verderflex Dura 5 & 7 Flow: max. 39 l/hr Pmax: 8 bar Suction: 9.5 mwc

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