hEX_21_07

The

in Harrogate, North

7,

The Conference has continued to take shape in

weeks

the announcement of several

You can find details of the

papers

the Hazardex event

www.hazardex-event.co.uk.

a running order for the Conference

be announced shortly with a full event preview set to be published in the September issue of Hazardex.

Amongst those taking part in the Hazardex 2021 Conference will be speakers from the UK

Petroleum Industry Association (UKPIA), the Health & Safety Executive (HSE), the Tank Storage Association, CompEx, the Association of Electrical and Mechanical Trades (AEMT), BakerRisk, DEKRA, DNV GL, and Cogent Skills, plus many more.

There will be an array of topics covered across the two-day conference including Personnel Protection Technology (PPT) content, cyber security, artificial intelligence, UKCA/UKEX, fire & gas detection compliance, safety culture, the new edition of the IEC 60079-11 Intrinsically Safe Equipment Standard, and e-learning. With plenty more topics to be confirmed as we get closer to the event, you can stay up-to-date with the latest information regarding the Conference, speakers, papers, and Hazardex 2021 in general by keeping an eye on www.hazardex-event.co.uk.

…Alistair Hookway, Editor, Hazardex alistair.hookway@imlgroup.co.uk

Majority of UK offshore workforce to be in low carbon energy roles by 2030, new study says

Anew UK Offshore Energy Workforce Transferability

Review by Robert Gordon University (RGU) highlights that the offshore energy workforce mix will change significantly in the next 10 years, with roles in decarbonised energies projected to increase from 20% to 65% of all jobs in the offshore energy sector (oil & gas, offshore wind, carbon capture utilisation and storage and hydrogen).

The Review also indicates that over 90% of the UK’s oil and gas workforce have medium to high skills transferability and are well positioned to work in adjacent energy sectors. The opportunities for the UK energy supply chain and for jobs are significant, with over £170 billion investment to be made in capital and operating activities in the UK offshore energy sector over the next ten years.

The Review calls for the UK and the devolved Governments to work together with the offshore energy industry and further and higher education sector to ensure the managed transition of skills and experience in a way that protects and sustains key UK energy jobs.

Key findings of the review:

- Around 80% of the jobs in 2030 are envisaged to be in nine key areas: Operations, Technicians, Engineering, Projects, Commercial/Business

Development/Marketing, Procurement/ Supply chain management, Finance, HR and HSE.

- Around 100,000 (c 50%) of the jobs in 2030 are projected to be filled by people transferring from existing oil and gas jobs to offshore renewable roles, new graduates and new recruitment from outside the existing UK offshore energy sector.

- Around 200,000 people are likely to be required in 2030 to underpin the developing offshore wind, hydrogen, carbon capture and storage as well as the vital ongoing oil and gas activities in the UK offshore energy sector. This compares to around 160,000 people directly and indirectly employed in the UK offshore energy sector in 2021.

- The offshore energy workforce mix is expected to change with over 65% of the workforce by 2030 projected to support low carbon energy activities.

- Of the c. 200,000 people projected to be directly and indirectly employed in the UK offshore energy sector by 2030. c. 90,000 (c. 45%) are expected to support offshore wind, c. 70,000 (c. 35%) oil and gas, and c. 40,000 (c. 20%) other offshore related energy projects and clusters.

EDF to move Dungeness B into defuelling phase

EDF confirmed on June 7 that it would be moving its Dungeness B nuclear power station in Kent, southeast England into the defuelling phase with immediate effect. Since September 2018 the station has been in an extended outage in which EDF has been managing a range of unique, significant and ongoing technical challenges that are not found at the other six AGR power stations, the company said in a statement.

Although many of the challenges have been overcome, new detailed analysis has further highlighted additional station-specific risks within some key components, including parts within the fuel assemblies, EDF said.

As a result, the energy company has taken a decision not to restart the plant but to move it into the defuelling stage. The final generation of electricity in 2018 means the plant ran for 10 years longer than its original design life, and in line with expectations when it was acquired by EDF in 2009.

Defuelling is the first stage of decommissioning a nuclear power station and a process which involves continued use of EDF’s uniquely experienced teams, and specialist supply chain companies, preserving an important source of jobs in Kent and the surrounding area, EDF added.

Rolls-Royce reveals updated small modular reactor design, aims to be assessed by regulators in late 2021

The consortium, led by Rolls-Royce, which is creating a compact nuclear power station known as a small modular reactor (SMR), has revealed its latest design and an increase in power as it completes its first phase. It has also announced that it aims to be the first design to be assessed by regulators in the second half of 2021 in the newlyopened assessment window.

If the design is assessed by regulators in the second half of 2021, it will mean that the consortium is on track to complete its first unit in the early 2030s and build up to

10 by 2035. As the power station’s design has adjusted and improved during this latest phase – with more than 200 major engineering decisions made – the team has optimised the configuration, efficiency and performance criteria of the entire power station, which has increased its expected power capacity, without additional cost, from 440 megawatts (MW) to 470MW, Rolls-Royce said in a statement.

The refreshed design features a faceted aesthetic roof; an earth embankment surrounding the power station to integrate with the surrounding landscape; and a more compact building footprint.

With a focus on continuing its progress at pace, the UK SMR team is transitioning from being a collaborative consortium to a stand-alone business, which will deliver a UK fleet of power stations to become a low carbon energy bastion alongside renewables, while securing exports to make the power station a key part of the world’s decarbonisation toolkit.

The power station’s compact size makes it suitable for a variety of applications, helping decarbonise entire energy systems. Each power station can supply enough reliable low carbon power for around one million homes, or be used to power net zero hydrogen and synthetic aviation fuel manufacturing facilities, desalination plants or energy intensive industrial sites.

In the UK alone the power station programme is forecast to create 40,000 regional UK jobs by 2050, generate £52 billion of economic benefit, have 80% of the plant’s components sourced from the UK, target an additional £250 billion of exports, cost initially c.£2.2bn per unit dropping to £1.8bn by the time five have been completed, and operate for at least 60 years.

The design, which will be finalised at the end of the regulatory assessment process, proposes that all used fuel will be stored on each site for the lifetime of the plant.

Owner of tanker repair company pleads guilty to violating safety standards and making false statement to OSHA

The owner of tanker testing and repair company KCCS Inc. in Idaho, US has pleaded guilty to making an illegal repair to a cargo tanker in violation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) and lying to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The case stems from an incident in August 2018 where an explosion seriously injured an employee.

The US Attorney’s Office for the District of Idaho announced in a statement that it had reached a plea agreement with the owner of KCCS, Loren Kim Jacobson. According to the agreement, the injured KCCS employee’s welder flame pierced the skin of a tanker, which contained residual flammable material, resulting in the tanker exploding.

After the explosion, an OSHA investigator interviewed Jacobson about the circumstances surrounding the accident, as part of an investigation into whether Jacobson had violated OSHA safety standards for cargo tanker repair work. Jacobson made a materially false statement to the OSHA investigator during that interview, namely that his employee was merely an “observer,” not an employee, and that KCCS did not have any employees.

This was an important point, the US Attorney’s Office said, because OSHA requirements only apply to “employers.”

Jacobson lied about not having employees to evade legal repercussions and penalties for his violation of various Occupational Safety and Health Act safety standards during the repair that resulted in the explosion.

“The terrible injuries involved this case are a stark reminder of the need for workplace safety requirements and enforcement,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Rafael M. Gonzalez, Jr.

Jacobson also admits in the plea agreement that he did not possess the necessary certification to conduct cargo tanker repairs that he regularly conducted. Under the HMTA, all repairs to the skin of a cargo tanker require that the repairperson hold an “R-stamp,” which can be obtained only after meeting extensive training requirements. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that those conducting repairs on cargo tankers (which often haul flammable materials) have adequate training and expertise to do so safely.

Jacobson admitted that he had a regular practice of making repairs requiring an R-stamp, despite knowing he did not have one, and that he would send employees into the cargo tankers to weld patches from the inside of the tanker so that the illegal repairs would not be visible from the outside. Jacobson did not follow OSHA safety standards for protecting employees from such dangerous “confined space entries.” According to the plea agreement, Jacobson directed his employee to conduct a hidden repair of this type on the tanker that subsequently exploded, in violation of both OSHA safety standards and the R-stamp requirement.

Jacobson is scheduled to be sentenced on August 25, 2021. Both the HMTA violation and the false statement offenses that Jacobson pleaded guilty to are punishable by up to five years in prison, up to three years of supervised release, and a fine of up to $250,000.

Tanker explosion kills one person, injures another in South Africa

Aman was killed while cleaning the inside of a tanker in the KwaZuluNatal region of South Africa on May 29.

The incident happened on the premises of a cleaning services company in Cliffdale.

Reports by local news outlets say the man was killed after an explosion occurred inside the tanker that he was cleaning. Another man was injured after becoming overcome by carbon monoxide while

attempting to rescue his colleague inside the tanker.

Firefighters attended the scene to recover the deceased man’s body and ensure the site was safe. The injured man, a 40year old employee at the company, was transported to a local hospital for treatment.

An investigation has been opened by police to find out the exact cause of the explosion.

Factory

According to Indonesian news sites, the blast occurred while workers were checking a sensor level instrument on a methanol tank when it exploded.

Indonesia

The incident occurred at a factory belonging to PT Cita Adi Sarana (CAS) Indonesia in the Gresik district of East Java. Several news outlets have reported the blast happened near a methanol tank; however the exact details of the incident remain unknown.

Some reports say workers had been using welding equipment at the time of the explosion.

On June 9, the local fire department told reporters that firefighters remained at the scene and were working to safeguard the area. The Chief of the fire department said that an investigation is underway to find out the exact cause behind the blast.

Four men and one woman are believed to have died in the incident. All were employees at the factory. Two other employees were seriously injured by the blast and were rushed to hospital where they were placed in intensive care.

In March, an oil refinery fire in West Java injured five people and forced the evacuation of hundreds of local people. The blaze at Indonesian state oil company Pertamina’s Balongan refinery burnt through the night and could be seen from several miles away.

Five people were killed by an explosion at a factory in Indonesia’s East Java Province on June 8.

Colonial Pipeline incident showed an “obvious wilful ignorance to take cybersecurity seriously”

Adirector of a tech market advisory firm has said that the May 7 cyber attack on US pipeline operator Colonial Pipeline exposed an obvious wilful ignorance to take cybersecurity seriously. ABI Research’s Michela Menting has also answered several critical questions about the Colonial incident and said that any company that is unprepared for such attacks has been purposefully skimping on basic cybersecurity tools, training, and strategy.

With the world asking how the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack could happen to such a large and sophisticated company, ABI Research turned to its Digital Security Research Director Michela Menting with some pressing questions about the stunning breach.

Perhaps the most significant statement made by Menting was: “Any company (especially one with upwards of $500 million in annual revenues) that is not prepared for such attacks has clearly been purposefully skimping on basic cybersecurity tools, training, and strategy.”

ABI Research conducted the following interview with Menting in order to provide

a deeper understanding of what actually occurred.

1. In simple terms, what was the exact nature of the hack?

It was a ransomware attack. In general, this means a threat actor infiltrated corporate IT systems and installed some malware, which encrypts data and systems. As a result, these systems become unusable without a decryption key. The threat actor then offers to deliver the key only in exchange for a ransom payment.

In the case of the Colonial Pipeline attack, the threat actor is a group known as DarkSide. The group uses an additional tactic that involves stealing a copy of the data before encrypting the original. This puts additional pressure on the company, as DarkSide threatens to release the data publicly unless the ransom payment is received.

2. What was the primary infrastructure weakness that enabled entry? Was there more than one critical entry point?

The primary infrastructure weakness is unknown at this point as Colonial Pipeline has not revealed any information pertaining to how the threat actors got in. Typically, however, such groups use a mix of social

engineering, such as phishing emails, and vulnerabilities of remote access mechanisms, to get in and then privilege escalation (e.g., gaining elevated access to restricted resources) and lateral movements (e.g., using one system to access other systems in order to move deeper into the network) inside the infrastructure to identify weaknesses and assets.

3. What should have been in place to prevent the hack, or to make it more difficult/less successful?

This is also unknown since no information has been shared yet. However, the fact that ransomware shut down most of their operations, both IT and OT, means that their security posture must have been poor at best.

Ransomware is neither new nor revolutionary. The fact that there is a sophisticated, organised cybercriminal market for ransomware shouldn’t be news for anyone in the industry. On the contrary, it is a longstanding, experienced, and mature black market. Any company (especially one with upwards of $500 million in annual revenues) that is not prepared for such attacks has clearly been purposefully skimping on basic cybersecurity tools, training, and strategy.

4. This hack is a harbinger of cyberthreats to come. Do you have one or two solutions/recommendations that are critical for companies/governments/ utility authorities to implement to prevent hacks like this from happening again?

Attacks like this have been happening since the dawn of the first virus and will continue to happen indefinitely. Cybercrime is as lucrative as the IT industry itself.

For companies that take these threats seriously, there are a great many resources available, including guidelines, standards, regulations, best practices, technologies, architectures, strategies, and information sharing processes. These tools are available at the public, private, and international levels, and the U.S., where the attack took place, is among the leaders in the cybersecurity space. Therefore, a failure as big as that of Colonial Pipeline simply shows an obvious willful ignorance to take cybersecurity seriously, to their unfortunate detriment.

Many

Expanding connectivity in both IT and OT will mean continuously increased threat vectors. The key is to understand that even the best cybersecurity solutions will not, and cannot, always guarantee absolute protection for all assets. Consequently, organisations large and small should always be prepared for an eventual attack, which means architecting their infrastructure so that it can continue to operate despite an ongoing attack while simultaneously recognising and dealing with the threat. This is not an easy feat, but there are concepts such as zero-trust security and cyber-resiliency which can aid in creating such a posture.

have abstained from such large, publicfacing, debilitating attacks against one another, as they could be considered acts of war. As such, and despite the dangers, cybersecurity efforts have been sporadic, fragmented, and half-hearted in critical infrastructure, leaving many gaping holes in security postures.

ABI has forecasted that cybersecurity spending for critical infrastructure will grow to reach US$106 billion in 2021. Should it be more?

Many in the industry expected attacks against critical infrastructure of this nature and breadth to have been launched by nation states. However, despite global geopolitical tensions, most of the big powers

Unsurprisingly, the organised cybercriminal market has stepped in to pick the lowhanging fruit, but ransomware is such a profitable market that it has become highly competitive, with sophisticated ransomware gangs going after bigger and bigger targets. However, there is still a fine line for the types of companies organised crime is willing to go after. The closer these groups get to undermining critical infrastructure, the more dangerous they become to national security and the greater the risk of serious repercussions from concerned governments.

Additionally, these repercussions may not just come from the victim country, but also potentially from their host nation, especially when this country might be Russia or China.

To that end, while there is no conclusive evidence that most of these groups are state-sponsored, there is clearly an implicit understanding between the gangs and their home countries that allow them to conduct their illicit operations with impunity. If these gangs start to cause too much trouble from a national security perspective and create problems for their host nations, reprisals back home may be likely.

It is clear DarkSide is conscious of such consequences, as evidenced by their recent half-apologetic press release and their efforts to distance themselves from any political motivation some may want to infer about their attack. Nonetheless, it may be that, in this instance, they may have gone after too big a fish, however poorly secured Colonial Pipeline seems to have been. Hopefully, however, it will give large corporations a push to revise and strengthen their cybersecurity strategies, especially those in critical infrastructure, and show them – yet again – that they are not exempt from common cyberattacks.

5. Do you think this hack will speed IoT security efforts in the U.S. or globally?

UK government urged to deliver ‘world-leading’ geothermal sector to secure Green Recovery

Anew report has urged the UK government to provide targeted support for the deep geothermal sector to aid the ‘green recovery’. On May 13, the Association for Renewable Energy and Clean Technology (REA) and ARUP published a report, ‘Deep Geothermal Energy: Economic Decarbonisation Opportunities for the United Kingdom’, which underlines the environmental and economic potential of deep geothermal.

The report estimates that, should the Government establish a Geothermal Development Incentive, 12 deep geothermal projects could be operational by 2025, creating 1,300 jobs and generating more than £100 million of investment, predominately in towns and cities in the North of England, Midlands and South West. The scheme would provide a catalyst to the industry, with 360 sites being established by 2050.

This would provide an additional £1.5 billion of investment, 10,000 direct jobs and 25,000 indirect jobs, and an annual carbon saving of 3 megatons, the report argues.

Deep geothermal energy is a space efficient, utility scale renewable heat resource that can be deployed in urban areas, specifically with the potential to heat thousands of large commercial and other properties for generations, REA said. Heat accounts for around 40% of the UK’s energy consumption and nearly a third of UK greenhouse gas emissions. According to the report, it is estimated that there is currently enough deep geothermal heat energy to supply all of the UK’s needs for at least 100 years.

Dr Nina Skorupska CBE, Chief Executive of the Association for Renewable Energy and Clean Technology (REA), said: “As this report demonstrates, deep geothermal must be central to

the Government’s energy policy for the next 30 years, but with real and tangible benefits in the immediate future. Deep geothermal has the potential to become a world leading industry here in the UK, provide a stable transition away from oil and gas, and help meet the Government’s net zero ambitions by decarbonising heat on a mass scale.”

The success of geothermal developments in countries such as Germany, France and the Netherlands is closely linked to their governments’ commitment to supporting this technology through policies, regulations, incentives and initiatives, the report says. This success is specifically linked to the availability of a long-term, stable regulatory framework and the willingness of the state to share economic risks during the early stages of development.

Read the report in full here: https://bit. ly/3zh5R9V

Innovative geothermal energy scheme in northeast England given green light

Arenewable energy scheme which will draw geothermal energy from abandoned flooded mines in South Tyneside, northeast England has been given a green light. The scheme will cut annual carbon dioxide emissions by hundreds of tonnes, South Tyneside Council has said.

Work will start immediately on the multimillion-pound Hebburn minewater scheme in South Tyneside, which has been granted planning permission for the initial testing phase. The scheme will draw geothermal energy from abandoned flooded mines in the former Hebburn Colliery then used to heat council-owned buildings, including a residential tower block.

Two wells will be drilled to extract water from the mines before testing is carried out to ensure the scheme remains fully viable. Specialist drilling company Dunelm Geotechnical and Environmental Ltd will construct the wells and carry out associated ground investigation works.

The minewater scheme is expected to deliver a reduction of 319 tonnes of carbon emissions a year.

The water will be extracted by drilling vertical boreholes to a depth of 300400m into the flooded coal mines underground. A water source heat pump will extract the heat from the minewater before it is compressed to a much higher temperature. It will then feed into an energy centre located above ground and then be distributed via a new pipe network to buildings in the town centre, providing them with low carbon and sustainable heat.

Electricity generated locally using solar panels and a Combined Heat and Power Unit will be used to help power the system. The drilling works and construction of the wells are likely to take until the autumn to complete.

Image: South Tyneside Council

Gravity energy scheme adds hydrogen to energy storage mix

Gravitricity, the team behind a system that stores excess renewable energy in weights suspended above disused mine shafts, has revealed plans to add hydrogen and heat storage to its underground gravity energy system. The

Edinburgh innovators have submitted a global patent to turn purpose-built shafts into pressurised energy stores, capable of safely accumulating significant quantities of the gas.

“The future hydrogen economy will need to find economic and safe ways to store hydrogen where it’s needed,” says company founder Martin Wright. “At present our domestic gas network has vast amounts of storage built in – under the North Sea. The gas grid of the future will be powered by intermittent renewables – and that means we need to find ways to store green hydrogen when energy is plentiful, close to where it’s required.

“Our idea is to make each Gravitricity shaft serve as a very large, sealed pressure vessel, and to use the shaft itself to hold significant quantities of gas. We believe this will be far more economic and safer than above-ground storage pressure vessels – and will massively increase the storage capacity of the system.

“We envisage building single or multiple shafts which, when co-located with a green hydrogen

electrolysis plant, would have a very clear dual function: to store excess electricity for use by the electrolysers when needed, and to store the plant’s output as a buffer into the gas grid.

“The hydrogen store could also be used as a fuelling point, providing low (or zero) carbon hydrogen fuel for heavy goods vehicles, ships or trains, or be used to generate significant additional quantities of electricity if required,” Wright says.

To date, Gravitricity is currently operating its 250kW demonstrator in Edinburgh and is scaling up to commence work on their first 4-8MW scheme later this year.

Company Managing Director Charlie Blair explains the company’s goals: “The majority of early schemes will be built in existing mine shafts, but we are already in discussion with a major UK concern with plans to build a purpose-built shaft – solely for our gravity system. In the decade ahead, we believe that the capacity to sink single or multiple shafts exactly where required could result in the rapid scale-up of our technology. Not just in the UK, but around the world.”

US Chemical Safety Board releases report into fatal 2019 hydrogen sulphide release

On May 21, the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) released its final report into the fatal October 2019 hydrogen sulphide release at the Aghorn Operating waterflood station in Odessa, Texas. The release fatally injured an Aghorn employee who was working at the facility that evening, as well as his spouse who attempted to locate him at the facility after he did not return home.

The Aghorn Operating waterflood station is used as part of a process to extract oil from underground reservoirs in West Texas. During extraction, oil comes out of the ground with some water in it. The water is removed from the oil, but it can contain some residual oil and other contaminants such as hydrogen sulphide, a toxic gas. At the Aghorn waterflood station, pumps, in a building called the “pump house,” are used to pressurise and inject the water back into the oilfield. The injected water adds pressure to the reservoir allowing a larger quantity of oil to be extracted.

CSB Chairman Katherine Lemos said: “Waterflood stations are common throughout Texas. The CSB report determined that additional safeguards are needed to help ensure that a similar event is prevented.”

The CSB reports that on the night of the incident, the waterflood station’s control system activated an oil level alarm on a pump. An Aghorn pumper was notified,

drove to the waterflood station, and attempted to isolate the pump from the process by closing two valves. The CSB found, however, that the pumper failed to isolate the pump from energy sources before performing the work. At some point while the pumper was in the vicinity of the pump, the pump automatically turned on, and water containing hydrogen sulphide escaped into the pump house. The pumper was overcome and fatally injured by the toxic gas.

After the incident, the CSB found that a plunger on the pump had shattered, which had allowed the release to occur. Due to the limitations of the available evidence, the CSB was unable to determine whether the pump failure and toxic release happened before the pumper arrived at the facility, or when the pump automatically turned on while the pumper was closing valves.

A couple of hours passed, and when the pumper did not return home, his spouse drove with their two children to the station to check on him. She located him on the floor of the pump house and was also overcome and fatally injured by the toxic hydrogen sulphide gas. The children remained in the car and were not injured.

The CSB’s report details the following safety issues found at Aghorn: Non-use of Personal Hydrogen Sulphide Detector: The pumper was not wearing his personal hydrogen sulphide

detection device inside the pump house on the night of the incident, and there is no evidence that Aghorn management required the use of these devices.

Non-performance of Lockout / Tagout: At the time of the incident, Aghorn did not have any written Lockout / Tagout policies or procedures. The pumper did not perform Lockout / Tagout to deenergize the pump before performing work on it.

Confinement of Hydrogen Sulphide Inside Pump House: The pump house could be ventilated by two bay doors, exhaust fans, and natural vents. Due to the limitations of the available evidence, the CSB was unable to confirm whether the exhaust fans were operational at the time of the incident. The two bay doors were approximately 60% open. The building was not adequately ventilated during the incident.

Lack of Safety Management Program: The CSB found the formal company safety or operational policies and procedures used by Aghorn Operating were incomplete and inadequate.

Nonfunctioning Hydrogen Sulphide Detection and Alarm System: The waterflood station was equipped with a hydrogen sulphide detection and alarm system. However, the system’s control panel did not receive signals from the internal and external detection sensors on the night of the incident, and, therefore, did not trigger either of the two alarms.

Deficient Site Security: As per Aghorn’s informal policy, when an Aghorn employee is working at the facility, the access gates are normally left unlocked. The unlocked gates allowed the pumper’s spouse to drive directly to the waterflood station and enter the pump house, where she was also fatally injured.

As a result of its investigation, the CSB is making several recommendations to Aghorn Operating, Inc. for safety improvements at all waterflood stations where the potential exposure to dangerous levels of toxic hydrogen sulphide gas exists.

Read the CSB’s final report in full here: https://www.csb.gov/csb-releases-finalaghorn-investigation-report/

US steel mill blast injures eight, company previously cited for explosion risks

An explosion at a steel mill in Colorado, US injured eight people on May 29. The incident, which occurred at the EVRAZ Rocky Mountain Steel plant in Pueblo, is said to have been a furnace explosion. The steel mill has previously been cited by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for putting employees at risk of an explosion.

Three of the injured employees are reported to have been in critical conditions and were rushed to hospital with respiratory issues and burns. The Vice President of Operations at the EVRAZ Pueblo mill, Dave Light, told reporters the day after the incident that three employees remained in hospital. Light added that an initial inspection suggested water had got into a furnace, causing a build-up of pressure and an explosion.

The blast was first reported at around 18:00 local time with firefighters from the Pueblo Fire Department attending the scene shortly after. An investigation as been opened by local authorities with the plant expected to be closed for some time.

According to local news channel, News 5, the EVRAZ Pueblo mill has previously been cited by OSHA for placing employees at risk of an explosion and other hazards. The mill was cited in 2017 for serious safety violations. Amongst the issues at the plant, OSHA said that employees were exposed to explosion hazards around the facility’s vacuum tank de-gasser unit (VTD).

The May 29 explosion, however, was not related to these previous citations since the VTD was located in a different part of the mill.

In its 2017 report on the EVRAZ Pueblo mill, OSHA said: “On or about November 30, 2016 and at times prior, employees were exposed to explosion and struck by hazards in that maintenance, inspection and testing procedures were not employed to ensure that the flow switch interlock device stopped VTD operations when water flow was below safe operating parameters.”

The report also said certain fail-safes were not properly in place to prevent an explosion or other hazards. “The Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) was also programmed with a code that prevented: 1) automatic execution of the shutdown procedure, and 2) the operator station from displaying the flow switch status,” the citation said.

OSHA said the violations resulted in a steam explosion. EVRAZ paid an $8,500 settlement in March 2017 as a result.

Chemical plant explosion injures four in Japan

An explosion at a chemical plant in Fukushima prefecture, northeast Japan injured four people on May 11.

The blast happened at Sakai Chemical Industry Co.’s Yumoto Factory in Iwaki which manufacturers chemicals used in paint, printer ink, and plastics.

Four people were injured in the explosion,

which happened at around 07:45 local time, after suffering burns. One of the injured was in a serious condition and was rushed to a local hospital. In total, 18 workers were on site at the time of the explosion.

Several explosions were heard by locals throughout the incident, with some worried that the smoke may have contained

dangerous toxic materials. The plant produces materials such as zinc oxide and zinc powder. Local officials said that no toxic materials were detected in the air following the blast, however.

The cause of the blast is unknown, however police and fire officials have opened an investigation.

Every two months, SGS Baseefa Technical Manager Ron Sinclair MBE gives his perspective on the latest developments in the world of standards.

Aweek after the press date for this article, but before its publication, the UKEX Approved Bodies Group (UKEX-ABG) will meet to agree a format for their new website.

All the former UK based European Notified Bodies for the ATEX Directive were automatically converted to UK Approved Bodies on January 1 this year. They were also given a restricted Notification to the European Commission for the purpose of issuing ATEX Certificates that would be accepted in Northern Ireland only. UKEX certificates, to the UK regulations that are equivalent to ATEX, are not legally acceptable in Northern Ireland according to the current protocol.

Having previously been Notified Bodies, we were certainly familiar with the way that the European Commission financed the operation of the secretariat to the ExNBG. This paid for the operation of the ExNBG secretariat, including running a website that gave public access to Clarification Sheets issued by the ExNBG (it also paid for the hosting arrangements (room and food) for the annual ExNBG meeting in Brussels). Distribution of “private” documents was through the European Commission’s CIRCABC documentation system. Thus, there were no direct charges to the individual Notified Bodies.

The UK Government has, to date, not put funding in place for a similar system for the UKEX-ABG. All bodies had previously met as an adjunct to the UK shadow committee for IECEx (Committee L/6/10) and BEAMA

Getting at the information

provided the secretariat for that group, with the Notified Bodies paying an additional contribution to the funds to cover the specific UK Notified Body activity.

With the new legal arrangement, there is an added requirement for the Approved Bodies to meet and discuss matters, so we have contracted with BEAMA to provide enhanced secretarial services. This is to include operation of a website that will, as far as reasonably practical, provide similar facilities to both CIRCABC and the Clarification Sheet database, making the UKEX Decision Sheets available to the public, along with other useful information.

You will notice that we are using the term “Decision Sheet” which is the term used within the IECEx system. And, as with IECEx, all bodies have committed to implement a published Decision Sheet. In contrast, the ExNB Clarification Sheets are regarded as advice, without an absolute commitment by any one Notified Body to follow them exactly.

In addition to the UKEX Decision Sheets, we will consider what other information might be useful to manufacturers, installers, and users of Ex equipment. This might include links to all the relevant UK Statutory Instruments and additional advisory documents that have been circulated by BEIS.

We anticipate that BEIS may eventually publish “Guidelines” to the statutory instruments, similar to the European Commission’s ATEX Guidelines; an incredibly useful document. In the meantime, where the text permits, we will be following the EU ATEX Guidelines in determining what might be in or out of the scope of the Directive/ Statutory Instrument Guidelines, for example (I am obliged to say it is useful, as I was on the Commission working group that put the current version together!).

We will try and make the website as helpful as possible to everyone who needs to understand the regulations, and how they are being implemented by the UKEX-ABG.

Although technically, because there has been no change in the standards and no change in the Essential health and Safety requirements (EHSRs), the activities we undertake as an Approved Body are no different from those of our previous role as a Notified Body, Brexit has caused a lot of work.

For eighteen months prior to the Brexit date (1 January 2021) we spent a lot of time arranging for the existing ATEX certificates to be transferred to our partner EU27 based Notified Bodies. Now we are feverishly working with our customers to provide them with UKEX certificates, which they will require by 1 January 2022, if they intend to sell the equipment in Great Britain (the transferred ATEX Certificates remain the requirement for Northern Ireland.)

At first thought, the two processes might seem similar, but there is a critical difference. The ATEX certificate was transferred while the new UKEX certificate is created. For ATEX, it was just the change in supervision of an already existing certificate. Therefore, if the ATEX certificate was not up to date, i.e. did not refer to harmonised standards, it could still be transferred. However, we cannot issue a new certificate which does not reflect the “state of the art”, so the certification has to be to the current designated standards. For further information on this, a very good explanation is contained in § 139 and § 140 of the ATEX Guidelines.

About the author

SGS Baseefa’s Technical Manager Ron Sinclair MBE will continue to attend the European Notified Bodies Group for ATEX (ExNBG), although representing SGS Fimko, their partner EU Notified Body, now that the UK bodies are excluded.

He is Chair of the IECEx Service Facility Certification Committee and a member of the IECEx Executive. He is chair of the UK Standards Committee operating in this area for electrical equipment, and recently retired as chair of the European committee.

Ex Special Interest Group Briefing Note: Ex Inspection Sample Nomination

The Institute of Measurement and Control Explosive Atmospheres

Special Interest Group (Ex-SIG) aims to promote good practice and support continuing professional development in the Ex discipline through a range of activities and publications. The group produces briefing notes to help inform members on key topics. These are first released to members of the SIG before being made publicly available. This article is one such briefing note on Ex inspection sample nomination.

Sample Ex inspections per IEC 60079-17 are constituted not to detect random failures but rather systematic issues; issues that are liable to be common to an asset type and deployment circumstance (Note there is no requirement for all assets to be subject to a periodic detailed inspection.)

Sample inspections should not be expected to reveal faults of a random nature, such as loose connections, but should be used to monitor the effects of environmental

conditions, vibration, inherent design weakness, etc.

IEC 60079-17: 2017 4.3.3

In this respect the important thing about an inspection sample is that it should be representative; this means that the assets selected should reflect both the range of equipment types employed, and their duties (if these may vary significantly across an installation). If there is a confidence that a given subset of a wider population suffers more severe conditions of use, then a sample drawn from that subset may be taken as conservatively representing the total population.

In terms of systematic issues, for a given equipment type, a single asset that had operated in the harshest duty and was of the greatest age could be taken as conservatively representative of all those items of the same type that were on less severe duties or were younger. This may appear counter-intuitive, with a residual concern that one might be ‘lucky’ with the

selected asset, but luck implies a random aspect which is specifically excluded. Additional units might be selected as a confidence boosting measure, but there would be no additional value in terms of identification of systematic effects.

Simple nomination of X% of assets is often employed but this may involve an unwarranted degree of disturbance and may not produce a properly representative sample. Detailed inspection is necessarily invasive and will require disturbance to the installation; there is the very real possibility that the inspection itself may compromise the protection, particularly in respect of cover fitting and sealing, which may be made more difficult through the ageing of the asset or subsequent painting for example.

If there is some uncertainty in identifying appropriate duty subsets, or the degree to which these may or may not overlap, then it may be appropriate to expand the sample size.

Post initial detailed inspection at commissioning, the focus of subsequent detailed sample inspections pertaining to safety (as distinct from loss of service) should be those faults that: a) Represent a potential ignition hazard AND b) Would not be revealed through functional failure (prompting intervention) AND c) Would not be revealed by close/visual inspection.

Note that in this respect there is no requirement for a detailed inspection of a single circuit field item if the protection is Ex ‘i’, since degradation of the field asset would not generate an ignition source. If the field item is unsuitable in some way, this should be revealed by a close/visual inspection.

Note that there is an obligation here to investigate or isolate zoned equipment that has failed in service with appropriate urgency (possibly linked to zone of use and the nature of the equipment), since the fault may have produced a potential ignition source.

The sample should be drawn from the population on the most severe duty on which the equipment type is deployed, or from a selection of such duties if different duties are identified as being severe for different reasons. One population subset might suffer high vibration and another high temperature cycling. If there was a subset that suffered both, the selection should be made from that

subset. The selected sample should be drawn from the oldest of those assets within this subset population.

So, the assets selected for inspection should, as far as is practicable, be the oldest on each identified distinct severest duty subset.

Note that key to effective sampling is the identification of relevant duty subsets. Although a high vibration environment might be perceived as presenting higher severity than one with high temperature, they may present entirely different degradation mechanisms. If an environment presented high temperature AND high vibration AND included the oldest asset from the three environmental sets (high vibration, high temperature, high vibration and temperature) then that oldest asset could be selected for detailed inspection as conservatively representative of all three.

If all the assets of a given type operate in essentially the same environment, the oldest within that population would be the preferred sample to represent that population.

This document is distributed by the ExSIG as an information service to the SIG membership. No guarantee is made by the institute or the author(s) concerning the accuracy, reliability or completeness of the information provided. This

In selecting sample units for detailed inspection, consideration should also be given to practical concerns. If the preferred asset happens to be relatively inaccessible then it may not be a practical candidate for selection; as long as the selected asset(s) are well towards the oldest age and do not exhibit any significant degradation through ageing, and such ageing mechanisms are considered progressive, then there can be appropriate confidence that the oldest asset itself will not have suffered significant systematic degradation.

The disturbance to the installed population may be minimised by making a point of undertaking a detailed inspection of those assets that must be disturbed for reasons of routine maintenance or repair, or those that are being retired.

Detailed inspection is a significant burden on plant operation and maintenance and it is well to use a suitably discriminating approach in the nomination of the sample to avoid unwarranted disturbance and demand on inspection resources.

document should not be construed as providing advice. Readers should satisfy themselves of the applicability of the information provided. Readers make use of the information provided at their own risk.

Are your tank wagons at risk Hazard prevention at rail terminals when

Large amounts of liquids can be transported over long distances in an eco-friendlier way in railway tank wagons compared to road tankers. In the oil and gas industry, this transport mode is typically established between oil ports, refineries, storage depots, distribution depots and industrial consumers with railway siding. Block trains are used to transport very large amounts of liquid while individual tank wagons are used for smaller quantities.

When handling tank

presence of an

atmosphere is highly likely.

Loading and unloading tank wagons can take place at terminals of different scales. Applied loading technologies are, for instance, mobile transloading systems, top loading platforms with hoses or drop pipes, on spot loading facilities with one or more loading spots, or series loading gantries with one or multiple tracks. Unloading usually takes place from the bottom of the wagon through connected hoses or arms. In terms of automation, the terminal may range from manual operation up to being

risk of electrostatics? loading flammable liquids

a facility with remote-controlled shunting and automatically positioned filling lances.

Top loading dome cones can house a highlevel sensor to prevent against overfilling and a vapour return line. Quantity preset, flow control, metering/weighting and DCS visualisation are common at highly frequented terminals.

Presence of a flammable atmosphere

When handling tank wagons with crude

on the ground, through cavities and form explosive mixtures with air. Vapours can spread over great distances and be present even in remote places.

Liquid flashpoint determines evaporation

The specified flashpoint of the liquid provides an indication of the liquid surface temperature when evaporation starts. Uncertainties to this indication may result from the actual temperature inside the tank, air concentration or liquid mixture

[IEC TS 60079-32-1:2013, Section 7.1.1]:

In areas of high ambient temperature and strong sunlight, flammable atmospheres may even occur from liquids that have flash points above 60°C.

The concentration of the flammable vapours in air determines if a mixture is flammable or not. When handling a liquid at a temperature well above its flash point, the saturated vapours may result in a non-flammable atmosphere. But in practice, the actual atmosphere above the liquid may not be saturated (e.g. because of ventilation) and so may be flammable.

Residues of volatile liquid or vapour from earlier operations with the same equipment or from nearby operations can contribute to a flammable atmosphere. Residual vapours may occur during switch loading, when a liquid having a high flash point (e.g. diesel) is loaded into a tank which previously contained a liquid with a low flash point (e.g. gasoline).

oil, fuels, petrochemicals or chemicals at rail terminals, the presence of an explosive atmosphere is highly likely.

The flammable atmosphere is formed by the evaporation of flammable gases from the transported liquid:

The evaporation happens inside the tank.

When opening the dome hatch or loading couplers, the flammable vapours escape.

Vapours are heavier than air, spread

Last but not least, future liquid specifications should be taken into consideration. For instance, in the field of bio fuels, mixtures may change the evaporation behaviour.

If it cannot be ruled out with certainty that a flammable atmosphere may be present, rail tank wagon loading or unloading facilities should be classified as hazardous areas. This avoids potential risk from existing ignition sources, such as electrical equipment being installed and used.

Electrostatic charge accumulation and dissipation

A source of energy capable of igniting an explosive atmosphere is provided by electrostatic charges. Liquids can become electrostatically charged when they move through pipes and hoses. Mixing, spraying or splashing can also create highly charged liquids or mists. The generated charges can accumulate at the liquid or on isolated equipment and surfaces. An uncontrolled discharge of static electricity can provide enough energy to ignite the mixture.

To avoid sparks, a dissipative connection of every piece of plant equipment and the tank wagon itself to earth must be

established. Arising charges by loading or unloading processes then can be safely diverted to earth potential.

Electrostatics are a physical phenomenon characterised by very high electrical voltages, up to 20,000V, and very low electrical grounding currents at the same time. Accordingly, a resistance of 1 MOhm is considered sufficient in international standards to safely dissipate the electrostatic charges [IEC TS 6007932-1:2013, Chapter 7.3.2.3.4].

In contrast, there are publications which

An uncontrolled discharge of static electricity can provide enough energy to ignite the mixture.

discuss considerably lower dissipation resistances, e.g. 10 Ohm [based on suggestions in IEC 60079-32-1:2013; for instance Chapter 13.2.2, table 22].

These values do not result from the physics of discharging electrostatics. Rather, they are an expression of the practicability to verify the presence of the grounding connection. The reason is very simple: Low resistance values can be measured by using simple measuring equipment. Existing damages or interruptions of the grounding connection can be identified easily, for instance, by using a multimeter.

Check resistance before every loading operation?

This question almost answers itself. And this is where ground indication monitors come into play. These so-called Grounding Control Devices are protective pieces of equipment to set up and to verify a grounding connection to avoid the accumulation of electrostatic charges at the railway wagon. Furthermore, they reduce the time required for manual checks of grounding lines and dissipation paths.

When using Grounding Control Devices capable of impedance measuring, the limit value of 10 Ohm should not be applied. It unnecessarily affects the reliability of the grounding detection. In extreme cases, wagons may not be allowed to load and still intact grounding cables and clamps may have to be replaced prematurely, although the present grounding connection is more than adequate.

Railway top loading gantry

Are tank wagons sufficiently grounded by rails or drop pipes?

Some argue that wagons standing on rails are already sufficiently grounded.

The question is, what could interrupt the grounding path provided by the tracks?

Interruptions or high electrical resistances in the dissipation path from the tank body to the wagon’s chassis and further to the tracks may result for instance from coatings, rust, grease layers, noise reduction measures or vibration damper. From the terminal’s point of view, all of these influencing factors are beyond its control.

The argument is similar for grounding via the inserted drop pipe in on-spot loading facilities. The relevant rules require that the drop pipe touches the bottom of the tank. This can also be used to make a grounding

connection. But this alone is not a sufficient proof of established grounding. And it remains the question, if a drop-pipe should be inserted before a grounding connection is given. Thus, presence and actual evidence of low resistive electrical contact should also be provided at drop pipe loading facilities. For instance, by manually to connect or integrated grounding measuring circuits.

Grounding control technologies

Grounding Control Devices verify that a grounding connection is present each time when a loading or unloading process takes place. In case of a lost grounding connection, they interrupt pump operation to avoid accumulation of static electricity. One thing all types of these devices have in common is that an intrinsically safe signal is used for resistance, capacitance or

impedance measurement of the grounding loop and object to ground. Two measuring methods can be distinguished:

1. Contact measuring

This method verifies the contact resistance of the Grounding Clamp at the grounding pin of the tank wagon. Usually this refers to a two pole measuring where the measuring loop is built by two conductors inside the Grounding Cable. The first line transmits the measuring signal in direction to the Grounding Clamp. The second line will receive the measuring signal and provide the dissipation path to earth potential through the Grounding Control Device. The measuring loop is closed at the contact point at the tank car, but not through the tank body and rails. An isolated piece of metal could be misinterpreted by this measuring as a valid grounding contact point.

2. Impedance measuring loop through ground potential

This method refers to a single conductor measuring and grounding line to the tank wagon. Using the measuring signal, the resistance in the grounding cable, the contact resistance at the grounding pin, the resistance from the pin through the tank body and finally the impedance from tank body to and through ground potential can be verified. This gives evidence that the clamp is attached to a grounding pin, that is not isolated at the rail wagon, and that a dissipative grounding connection is provided by the tracks or through the Grounding Control Device.

Recommendation for highest level of safety

Based on the previous considerations, it is highly recommended to zone liquid loading/unloading areas at oil and gas rail terminals as Ex Zone 1 and to use electronic Grounding Control Devices to protect against dangers resulting from electrostatic charges. When deciding for a grounding control technology, attention should be paid to the incorporated measuring principle and further provided technical advantages.

The decision should be based on the following checkpoints:

✔ Continuous impedance ground loop measuring – instead of simple resistance measuring

✔ Configurable limit values to adapt measuring to local requirements

✔ Auto-diagnosis functions to make sure the equipment is always proper working

✔ Failsafe control outputs to protect from signal transmission errors

✔ User friendly explosion protection to ease installation and maintenance –without type of protection Ex d

✔ SIL2 approved functional safety

About the author

Alexander Zelck is the Sales and Product Lead Gas-Ex at TIMM. He has a Degree in Engineering and Business Administration and a PhD in manufacturing plant engineering. Alexander has been working in different roles at TIMM for eight years. TIMM develops and manufactures electronic measuring and control equipment for tank farms, harbours, and industrial sites. Its devices are used mainly in the petrochemical industry to safeguard loading and unloading of inflammable liquids or bulk solids, or to control access to restricted areas.

Standards / Code of Practice on electrostatic grounding of rail tank wagons

IEC TS 60079-32-1:2013: Explosive atmospheres - Part 32-1: Electrostatic hazards, guidance. Published by The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

TRGS

substances: Avoidance of ignition

due to

by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Germany.

NFPA 77: Recommended Practice on Static Electricity. Published by the

National Fire Protection Association, USA.

API RP 2003: Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents. Published by the American Petroleum Institute, USA.

Loading bridge with grounding control device

Model of electrical measuring loop to verify grounding connection

Improving pipeline safety through

Safety is undisputedly a key priority for oil and gas pipeline operators. It goes without saying that an incident on a pipeline network will have devastating consequences, both to human life and to the environment. Effective monitoring is a critical part of pipeline asset management and central to a safety strategy as it is vital for keeping the networks secure from a range of threats. This article looks at the challenges associated with monitoring pipelines, and how innovative smart technologies are giving operators full visibility of the integrity and security of their entire pipeline network.

The importance of pipeline monitoring

In the last decade there have been a number of pipeline incidents resulting in loss of life and property. Records of fossil fuel pipeline incidents between January 2010 and November 2018 reveal that in the US alone there were 5,500 events. Such incidents included almost 300 explosions, more than 800 fires, and associated costs in damages exceeding US$4 billion. More sobering still is the human cost of these events, which left more than 125 people dead, almost 600 injured and almost 30,000 needing urgent evacuation as a result. Overall, the figures show that on average in the US alone, there is a pipeline fire every four days, which

results in an explosion every eleven days, with fatalities every 26 days, and injuries every five days.

In Europe, one of the worst incidents in recent times was the rupture of a highpressure natural gas pipeline following third party damage. Twenty-four people died at the site near Ghislenghien, Belgium, in 2004, and 150 people were hospitalised, most with severe burns, when damage to the pipeline occurred during the final stages of a car park construction project. Incidents are a problem worldwide, and in Mexico, in January 2019, a pipeline transporting gasoline and owned by Pemex, the state oil company, exploded in the town of Tlahuelilpan. The blast, which

killed at least 137 people and injured dozens more, was believed by Mexican authorities to be caused by fuel thieves, who had illegally tapped the pipeline.

The challenges associated with traditional monitoring technologies

Pipeline failure can be caused by a number of factors – ruptures and leaks caused by corrosion, mechanical damage, etc. – or by theft-related events. Monitoring for these threats enables pipeline operators to improve their safety, and failure to do so adequately can easily cost an operator millions.

Due to the vulnerable nature of pipelines, which extend over long distances that also include some of the most isolated and remote regions on the planet, monitoring is a big task. Historically, monitoring for leaks

has been achieved using internal based systems, such as mass balance and real time transient modelling (RTTM). However, these systems infer the presence of a leak by computing different operational conditions using computational pipeline monitoring (CPM) based systems and, as such, tend to have long detectability times and very low sensitivity to small leaks. As a result, leaks are often missed or alarms are raised when large quantities of product have already been lost.

In contrast, external based systems such as Fibre Optic Sensing take direct measurements of different response dynamics associated with the leak, such as the noise produced by the orifice leak. This provides a quicker detection of smaller amounts of product.

Right-of-way surveillance for theft detection is also very difficult in remote locations under extreme conditions. Line walkers and aerial surveillance can be useful, but they don’t provide continuous detection of events. As a result, large sections of pipeline in remote locations might be entirely unmonitored and extremely vulnerable to accidental damage or even criminal threats for large periods of time.

Indeed, the efficacy of traditional pipeline monitoring systems has been found to be lacking. Assessments of commonly used systems in the US has found that leak detection systems were less than 20% effective, while data from European pipeline incidents revealed that the majority of leaks were discovered through means other than the chosen leak detection system. These figures are alarming when early leak detection plays such a crucial role in minimising the risk of an incident. The faster a leak can be identified and dealt with, the better the outcome.

There is an urgent need for a continuous monitoring solution that enables operators to detect leaks and theft attempts accurately and quickly, supporting them in efforts to improve safety.

DAS delivers continuous monitoring

The latest pipeline monitoring technologies can provide a real solution to the problem. With the ability to offer continuous monitoring and accurate detection, as well as provide instant visibility of the entirety of a pipeline network, Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) can help to make significant improvements to safety, while also protecting pipeline operators from financial losses.

Using photonics, DAS technology essentially turns a fibre optic cable running alongside a pipeline network into thousands of vibration sensors, able to detect any disturbances along the length of the pipeline. The technology sends thousands

of pulses of light along the fibre optic cable every second and monitors the fine pattern of light reflected back. When acoustic or vibrational energy – such as that created by a leak or by digging – creates a strain on the optical fibre, this changes the reflected light pattern. By using advanced algorithms and processing techniques, DAS analyses these changes to identify and to categorise any disturbance. Each type of disturbance has its own signature and the technology can tell an operator, in real-time, what happened, exactly where it happened and when it happened.

Accurate detection in real-time

This highly reliable technology is able to cover impressive ranges of up to 100km. With vital information about an incident being delivered within minutes or even seconds of it taking place, in practical terms this means that notification of an incident can be given before a single barrel of product has been lost.

The intelligent DAS technology can adapt the system’s response depending on whether an incident occurs in a high or low risk zone, while accommodating shift patterns and areas where authorised activity may be taking place. This avoids the inconvenience of “false alarms”, and the time and cost associated with investigating them. Instead, in the event of an incident, pipeline operators can take appropriate action rapidly, with all the necessary information having been made immediately available to them.

DAS technology effectively provides an invisible smart barrier along the entire length of the pipeline, which can accurately detect and alarm leaks of different sizes and their position along and around the pipeline in real time. DAS can detect vibrations caused by liquid being forced through a pipeline rupture, or by ground displacement associated with small leaks in pipelines that would otherwise remain undetected.

If the source of a leak is a tiny orifice, it could easily remain undetected or it could take days for the location of an incident to be identified with existing CPM systems.

In the time it would take to locate such a leak, many millions of barrels worth of oil could have been lost. DAS has proven that it can detect leaks as small as 20 litres per minute, raising the alarm in just 90 seconds, by which time only 30 litres will have escaped. This speed is an improvement by a significant order of magnitude to existing technology. DAS can identify oil and gas leaks from many different sized orifices, even as small as 1mm.

DAS in action

Pipeline monitoring solutions using DAS are the most reliable and advanced systems currently available, allowing operators to instantly view the integrity and security of their entire network. Using a pipeline operating system based on DAS allows operators to confidently make quick decisions, assured that they have been given all the information needed to get a clear view of the situation.

By using a DAS pipeline monitoring system, common threats to pipelines, such as vandalism, theft, and accidental damage are prevented before they even occur.

Indeed, DAS is already proven worldwide, and operators who have already embraced the technology have reaped the rewards. For example, in India, a DAS monitoring system alerted the operator of digging being carried out in a specific location, which enabled the company to prevent 26

hot-tapping attempts. Meanwhile, in South America, unauthorised activity was detected near a pipeline and located to within a 10-metre range, allowing swift and efficient deployment of the security team.

DAS is the solution needed for today’s pipeline management

It is clear that there is a real need for continuous pipeline monitoring systems, both for improving safety and for preventing costly loss of product. DAS is one such solution, offering continuous monitoring of pipelines, even in otherwise inaccessible regions.

With impressive results already seen by those pipeline operators who have adopted the technology, DAS delivers on the key factors of instant detection, precise location identification, and overall visibility of the whole pipeline network. This means that such a monitoring system can play an active role in improving safety.

This technology can also work together with existing monitoring measures to complement them, rather than to replace them. Combining information gathered from multiple monitoring and maintenance sensors into an overarching view gives operators a detailed understanding of what is happening on the pipeline at any given moment. Operators can then respond with confidence to any events before they become major incidents and improve the safety of their networks.

About the author

As Fotech’s Industry Sector Manager for Pipelines, Pedro Barbosa works closely with pipeline operators, EPC’s and fibre optic integrators, all over the world to develop and to deliver cutting edge Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) solutions for monitoring and protecting pipelines.

Pedro’s skills combine technical, commercial and managerial expertise gained during almost 15 years in the pipeline industry, both as an engineer for a Natural Gas Transmission System Operator (REN Gasodutos in Portugal) and as a Project Manager and Business Development Manager for a pipeline In-Line Inspection service provider (T.D. Williamson).

Pedro holds an MSc in Mechanical Engineering from the Instituto Superior Técnico in Portugal and is in the process of finishing his second MSc in Pipeline Engineering at Newcastle University in the UK.

Minimising machine

It is a common assumption in industry that if machinery has the CE marking, no further action on the purchaser’s part is required. However, it is vital that machinery owners understand both their responsibilities and those of their machine’s manufacturer.

Now that the United Kingdom has left the EU, machinery end-users in the UK will slowly start to see a UKCA mark appearing on compliant products, rather than the EU’s CE marking. As EU Directives are transposed into National Law, the UK already has a legal system in place that

applies. EU harmonised standards have therefore been carried across as UK designated standards, in order to maintain a single model.

In the UK, the Supply of Machinery (Safety) Regulations implement the EU’s Machinery

directive may be presumed. They therefore represent the surest way to compliance. However, the end-user, must still ensure that the equipment complies with the Directive and is in fact safe.

Machinery must be able to satisfy the EHSRs for any corresponding hazard which may apply to it. The EHSR requirements are wide ranging, taking into account potential dangers to operators and other persons who may be at risk. A typical example of an EHSR is the requirement to provide adequate warning labels where there are moving parts that might trap parts of the body of personnel using the machine. Another would be the requirement to provide safety guards to machine tools.

However, taking into account the state of art, it may not be possible to meet all the objectives set by EHSRs, as technologies often move more quickly than the standards trying to catch up with them. With this in mind, the machinery must be designed and constructed with the purpose of approaching these objectives.

machine safety risk

Directive (2006/42/EC2) and contain detailed requirements for the manufacture of safe new machinery for both the UK and European markets.

All machines supplied in the European Economic Area (EEA) from 1 January

1995, must comply with the Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC) and be safe. The Essential Health and Safety Requirements (EHSR) lay down the minimum compliance criteria. While the use of standards is not mandatory, if a standard is applied correctly conformance with the relevant EHSRs of a

The preferred way to comply with EHSRs is by risk assessment and the application of harmonised EN standards. Risk assessment is therefore a vital step in ensuring compliance and a fundamental starting point for designers of machinery under the Machinery (Safety) Regulations. Some useful references include the standard EN ISO 12100 “Safety of Machinery – Risk Assessment”, which defines risk assessment as “a series of logical steps to enable, in a systematic way, the analysis and evaluation of the risks associated with machinery.”

EN ISO 12100 goes on: “Risk assessment is followed, whenever necessary, by risk reduction. Iteration of this process can be necessary to eliminate hazards as far as practicable and to adequately reduce risks by the implementation of protective measures.”

A risk assessment must therefore be carried out to examine any potential hazards associated with the machinery. This provides information for a risk

evaluation, in which a decision is made on the safety of that machinery, so that risks can be reduced where necessary.

EN ISO 12100 outlines the hazard analysis/ risk assessment procedure as follows:

• Determination of the limits of the machinery

• Hazard identification

• Risk estimation and risk evaluation

EN ISO 12100 also provides guidance on the safety of machinery and the type of documentation required in verifying a risk assessment. The first step in the risk assessment process is to identify anything that has the potential to cause harm. Secondly, an assessment must be made of the likelihood of a person coming into contact with these hazards and how much damage it would cause.

Examples of hazards that have the potential to do harm include: - crushing due to moving elements - electrical shock or electrocution due to faulty parts which become live - permanent hearing loss due to prolonged exposure to noise caused by stamping of parts

A risk assessment would normally be

carried out for each hazard identified. Control measures can then be applied to mitigate the risk. Once these have been implemented, a re-assessment must then be actioned to ensure that they provide an adequate level of safety. The process is repeated until an adequate level of safety is achieved.

The technical file for a machine will prove

due diligence and provide the evidence of compliance. However, it does not have to include detailed information such as the sub-assemblies of the machine, unless a knowledge of them is essential for verification and compliance with the EHSRs.

The technical file must remain available for inspection by a competent national authority, such as the HSE, for a period of ten years. One of the items that a technical file must contain is the risk assessment documentation demonstrating the procedure followed. This must include a list of the EHSRs which apply to the machinery, and a description of the protective measures implemented to eliminate identified hazards, or to reduce risks, and an indication of any residual risks. The technical file can be a traditional paper file, or stored electronically, with hyperlinks to documents, and it must be updated as the product is adapted.

Machinery owners

To immediately identify any issues, a thorough and correct risk assessment should be completed before any new machinery goes into operation. Problems can then be rectified with the manufacturer, so that they or the machinery owner no longer run the risk of a prosecution under the Supply of Machinery (Safety) Regulations or the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (PUWER).

Section 6 of PUWER requires that inspections must be repeated ‘at suitable intervals’ if machines are exposed to conditions that may lead to deterioration. This means that risk assessments must therefore be conducted at appropriate intervals as every machine will experience some form of deterioration.

Although, risk assessments must therefore be conducted conscientiously and at appropriate intervals, we still visit sites that simply forget and have not taken any action for five years or more. An internal process must therefore be set up, which is overseen by an individual who is capable to ensure that risk assessments are carried out as required. Taking this simple

approach ensures that risk assessment is swiftly integrated into the everyday working practices of an organisation, and it is never neglected.

The person who decides what the assessments cover and how they are done, must of course be competent to do this. While the exact definition of a competent person is not currently regulated, the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) definition is: “Someone who has sufficient training and experience or knowledge and other qualities that allow them to assist you properly. The level of competence required will depend on the complexity of the situation and the particular help you need.”

The machinery risk assessment process can be complex and once completed, may result in significant changes to the workplace environment. The failures we see on site are often due to a lack of appropriate internal expertise and physical resource to do an in-depth and correct assessment of all machinery. A decision to ‘make do’ or not invest in the appropriate expertise could result in expensive fines, or worse still prove fatal to machinery users.

About the author

Paul Taylor is the Business Development Director for Industrial Services at TÜV SÜD, a global product testing and certification organisation.

TÜV SÜD’s Machinery Safety Division is the official partner of the Process and Packaging Machinery Association on regulatory affairs.

Induction for EEMUA Mechanical Integrity Practitioner Certificate course (blended learning)

Date: July 2021

Location: Online

EEMUA’s Mechanical Integrity Practitioner Certificate (MIPC®) course helps engineers stay on-site and on top of the latest industry developments and good practice in primary containment of hazardous substances.

Using a blend of live, online classes, one-to-one sessions with expert tutors, and e-learning, enhanced by a mentor’s support and guidance, EEMUA’s Mechanical Integrity Practitioner Certificate course delivers in depth training to engineers where they work – to give professionals

the flexibility to learn on-site or on-call.

Course Learning Cycles cover: Legislative Environment, Written Scheme of Examination (WSE); Equipment Design Elements, Operational Considerations, Risk and As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP); Asset Condition, User Responsibilities and Competencies; Inspection Process, Inspection and Test Techniques, Inspection Roles; Responses to Findings and Reporting, Postponement, Record Keeping; WSE Review, Audit, Feedback, Industry Good Practice. This in-depth training for experience professionals requires a Learner’s time commitment of

around 110 hours spread over 27 weeks –equivalent to 4 hours per week.

Registration is open now for the next EEMUA MIPC® training course, with Induction to suit Learners’ schedules from July 2021, Learning starting in September 2021, and final assessment for five-year certification in April 2022.

https://www.eemua.org/Training-andcompetency/MIPC/MIPC-general.aspx

Nigeria Oil and Gas Conference & Exhibition 2021

Date: 5-8 July 2021

Location: Abuja, Nigeria

The Nigeria Oil and Gas Conference & Exhibition (NOG 2021) provides a platform for the international energy industry to meet with Nigerian oil and gas decision makers to hear policy announcements, explore partnership opportunities and discuss the strategies that will drive the nation towards energy sufficiency.

With global energy demand evolving and oil production cuts, a global drive toward the utilisation of cleaner energy sources and a

requirement for a legislative framework for oil production, provide both challenges and opportunities for Nigeria’s oil dependent economy. President Muhammadu Buhari’s recently launched “Decade of Gas” pledge will certainly help to utilise the enormous gas resources in the country to elevate the economy and drive industrialisation.

Serving the Nigerian oil and gas industry for 20 years, NOG 2021 will focus on the strategies that will be employed by the Nigerian government and private sector leaders to navigate the emerging business environment

– helping to set the nation’s energy agenda for the next 12 months and beyond.

dmg Nigeria events is working closely with all stakeholders and local partners to ensure a safe and secure in-person event in July 2021 and is looking forward to reconvening the 20th Nigeria Oil and Gas Conference & Exhibition.

www.nogevent.com

International East Russia Oil and Gas Forum

Date: 7-8 July 2021

Location: Vladivostok

The East Russia Oil and Gas Forum is a professional international platform providing unprecedented opportunities to establish dialogue, share experience, search for solutions and consolidate the efforts of business and government for efficient development of key

O&G projects in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, including the projects for processing facilities construction.

The event will see over 200 participants discuss over 25 investment projects over two days. Speakers include government officials and project managers from Gazprom, Sakhalin Oil, and Vostok LPG.

eastrussiaoilandgas.com/en/

OTC Houston 2021 Preview

The Offshore Technology Conference (OTC) 2021 is taking place on August 16-19 at NRG Park in Houston, Texas. The OTC showcases leading-edge technology for offshore drilling, exploration, production, and environmental protection. OTC is one of the world’s foremost events for the development of offshore resources with the conference attracting attendees and exhibiting companies from around the globe.

Following the cancellation of OTC 2020 due to COVID-19, OTC 2021 will be a hybrid event with 2,200+ exhibiting companies representing 40+ countries coming together both in-person and virtually in August. The event will have 23 international pavilions and an expected attendance of 59,000+ attendees representing 100+ countries.

OTC is sponsored by 13 industry organisations and societies, who work cooperatively to develop the technical programme. OTC 2021 will have over 350 peer-selected technical presentations, 23 topical breakfast and luncheons, and 8 panel sessions. The conference programme leverages the 13 organisations’ collective knowledge and will cover topics from the wellbore to topsides and everything in between.

While OTC 2021 will be held inperson at NRG Park in Houston, all registered attendees will also be able to access OTC content online as well. Whether you attend in person or virtually, registration for OTC 2021 will be the same cost. The virtual components will have but are not limited to: the technical program, real-time Q&A, exhibitor presentations, virtual exhibit floor, panel discussions, networking components, and more.

OTC has said it is monitoring the COVID-19 situation closely in partnership with NRG Park and the City of Houston. If an in-person event is not feasible, OTC is set up to provide the virtual program and exhibit floor in August.

If you are from outside the US and cannot travel to the event, there is the option to attend virtually. The conference will be recorded, and you can watch during the time zone that works to your favour, with the exception of live sessions which will be uploaded at a later date.

OTC brings together the technical and scientific knowledge from offshore energy game-changers as they share best practices, technical innovations, and emerging trends. During the conference, you can hear from

scientists, engineers, researchers, and executive-level speakers talking about their progress in revolutionising the ever-changing environment of offshore projects.

Among the keynote speakers at OTC 2021 will be high-level executives from Total, bp, Halliburton, Equinor, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and many, many more.

There will be an awards programme featuring:

- Spotlight on New Technology®: This awards programme is exclusively for OTC exhibitors and showcases the latest and most advanced technologies that are leading the industry into the future.

- OTC Distinguished Achievement Award: This award recognises major technological, humanitarian, safety, environmental, and leadership contributions to the industry each year.

- OTC Emerging Leaders Program: This award programme recognises young professionals who are making key contributions to the offshore energy sector.

For more information about OTC 2021, visit: https://2021.otcnet.org/welcome

Dron & Dickson has expanded its operations in the UK, opening a new premises to service its growing customers in the North West of England. In addition to branches in Aberdeen, Stirling, Hull and Lowestoft the new location supports its growing UK client base and demand in the North West for hazardous area, marine grade and industrial electrical equipment.

Dron & Dickson partner with all major hazardous area and industrial manufacturers to supply an extensive range of products with market

The new enclosures of the EJBC series from Cortem Group are characterised by a multi-step joint that allows the installation in areas with danger of explosion and/or fire due to the presence of all the Gases of Group IIA - IIB - IIC classified as Zone 1, 2, 21, 22. This is the element that distinguishes the new EJBC series enclosures from the historic EJB series enclosures characterised instead by a flat flanged joint and suitable for the IIB + H2 gas group.

The multi-step joint has been designed with an angle that guarantees not only the precise coupling between body and cover, but also an easy opening/closing of the enclosure in case of maintenance, thanks to the high quality and precision of the mechanical processing.

The EJBC series is mostly used as a box to carry terminals and busbars, fuse carriers, transformers, reactors and barriers,

In continuation of its growth, LabTest Certification has announced the expansion of its Hazardous Locations services in the Houston, TX area and the addition of Mr. Vijay Rangarajan, who joins the LabTest team as the manager of our HazLoc department.

Mr. Rangarajan (MS EE, MBA) comes to LabTest with vast experience in the Hazardous location Certifications world. He started out as a testing engineer and quickly transitioned to certifying motors & generators to

Worker safety in Hazardous Areas is critical, and the use of correct tools and cleaning equipment is an important factor in removing potential ignition sources for fires and explosions. Engineered from Conductive Polypropylene, LPD’s innovative range of Static Dissipative Non-Sparking Cleaning and Workplace Tools is designed in compliance with IEC 60079-32 for use in all industries wherever there are potentially explosive atmospheres. View our catalogue online or contact us now for product and pricing info: www.LPDtrade.com graham@LPDtrade.com +44 (0) 7931 126602

leading service levels. Uniquely, all Dron & Dickson’s internal sales staff have completed the CompEx Foundation course, qualifying them as the most competent Sales Team in the industry. They are also a leading Third-Party Assembler of Weidmuller (Klippon) and Hawke junction boxes and build to any spec in-house to the highest safety standards.

drondickson.com

Kari.Montgomery@drondickson.co.uk

though it is also used to produce control and signalling boards, light and power boards and surge arresters, and motor starter boxes with various configurations.

These enclosures are customized based on size, on the number of terminals or cables they are due to accommodate or considering the number of cable entries and cabling requirements inside a system. All terminals can be fitted with your requested accessories and mounted on special rails that are fastened to the enclosure’s internal mounting frames. Terminal strips can be arranged in various ways, as specified by the customer and always within the limits allowed by the certificate.

The options are vertical, horizontal, in several rows, or on different levels using suitable spacers.

Cortem SPA, export@cortemgroup.com www.cortemgroup.com

CSA/UL/ IECEx & ATEX requirements. He has a unique blend of both manufacturer and compliance industry experience and has worked with over 100 customers to certify products to various Hazloc protection methods. He is an IRCA certified ISO 9001:2015 lead auditor and can offer expertise in both quality assessment reporting & quality assurance notification for IECEx & ATEX products.

www.labtestcert.com erika.nordio@labtestcert.com

The ATEX Vortex A/C Enclosure Cooler is certified for ATEX Zones 2 and 22 with a T4 temperature rating. The units operate in environments up to 80°C and are designed to cool enclosures quietly with their 62 dBA sound level, rather than adding to industrial noise. The unit is built to ensure no ambient, dirty, or humid air enters the cabinet. A mechanical thermostat turns the unit on only when necessary, optimizing performance and operating costs. All Vortex A/C models have a small footprint that easily mounts on any enclosure and in confined spaces. www.vortec.com | sales@vortec.com | Tel: +1-800-441-7475

New EJBC series of explosion-proof enclosures for gas group IIC of Cortem Group

Dron & Dickson continues UK expansion with new branch location in Runcorn

AUTOMATION CONTROL & TECHNOLOGY

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Data files

AUTOMATION CONTROL & TECHNOLOGY

Heaters

Heaters

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Training

Training

Control Panels

Control Panels

Panels

website: www.hazarex-event.co.uk Entry is free, and this is the ideal opportunity to reward those companies and individuals you think most deserve recognition for the most innovative products, systems and services. The deadline for nominations is August 6 after which Hazardex readers and website users will be asked to vote for the winners in each category.

All COVID-19 regulation and UK government guidelines will be observed to ensure the safety of all participants.