International Affairs on the Edge Mag 2 by Mohamed Amine Belarbi

2nd Edition – December 2012

Obama 2016, China and the Middle East

Book Review: The Post American World

Civic Engagement in Egypt Egyptian Institute for Youth Policy Making

What Political Solution for the Western Sahara Conflict? The framework remains a transitory model headed towards the evolution of a full-‐-‐-‐fledged federal system in Morocco. The federal model will uphold all conventional attributes previously established in federations such as the US or Canada.

Egyptian Politics: Between the Immature and the Unorganized Although a gloomy prospect for Egyptian domestic affairs, the Muslim Brotherhood remains the only viable option in a political spectrum hugely divided between disorganized political actors. Whether liberal, secularist or moderate Islamist, the plethora of political establishments in Egypt are far from the political plurality that is a sign of a healthy democracy.

Index • Egyptian Politics : Between the Immature and the Unorganized

• What Political Solution for the Western Sahara Conflict?

• Obama 2016, China and the Middle East

• Civic Engagement in Egypt: Guest post by the EIYPM

• Book Review: The Post American World

Egyptian Politics: Between the Immature and the Unorganized The recent tragedy unfolding in Egypt in the aftermath of the presidential decree is a critical sign of Egyptian politics’ immaturity. An immaturity not only due to the young democracy that is taking shape in Egypt, but also due to the inexperience of the ruling party that has shouldered political responsibility and state management for its first time.

Although not enlisted in the Muslim Brotherhood or in its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, Mr. Morsi showcases all the pathological signs of the Muslim Brotherhood approach to politics and policymaking. The extensive network of the Muslim Brotherhood spans throughout Egypt and the greater Middle East, yet the historical background of the organization doesn’t include in its records periods of time where the brotherhood assumed political office or statesmanship position. Imbued in an activist and underground lifestyle, the Muslim brotherhood drew its power in its ability to mobilize its members and partisans en masse and in short notices, as well as its extensive knowledge of the public opinion’s tendencies and ways to manipulate domestic and foreign events in shaping the street pulse and using it as a leverage to further their agenda and recruitment process.

The issue with underground, and in this case banned groups and congregations, is that ideological battles are their expertise, yet Realpolitik and political practice are not fields of mastery for groups that always strived to assume roles of opposition and state defiance with no intent on engaging in statesmanship and policy making. The case of the attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to assassinate the Egyptian president Gamal Abdennasser in 1954 is a typical trait of the organization: Although the assassination of the president would not have an impact on the course of policies of its administration, the Brotherhood envisioned such attempt as a show of force to further confirm its defiance and opposition stance against the government. If the Brotherhood had any sense

of political engagement, it could have mobilized its extensive human and financial capital to lobby and influence policy makers as a mean to shape policies they see best serve their agenda or that of the Egyptian people.

The same trait of rebellion continued during the Arab Spring and Egyptian revolution, a revolution that remains a standing ovation for the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize a vast human capital and hijack mass protests through a subtle and swift influence and engineering of the public opinion and street pulse. Yet, as the regime fell down and the prospects of power became apparent for the Muslim Brotherhood, the newly legitimate organization assumed political office through its political party, the Freedom and Justice party, a step that is being considered a true game changer in the history of the Brotherhood. For 84 years of activity, the Muslim Brotherhood assumed state responsibility, a responsibility that extends beyond the operational capability of the congregation given the lack of political experience and exposure to the intricacies of governance and state management.

Although a gloomy prospect for Egyptian domestic affairs, the Muslim Brotherhood remains the only alternative in a political spectrum hugely divided between unorganized and scattered political actors.

Whether liberals, secularists or moderate Islamists, the plethora of political establishments in Egypt is far from displaying the political plurality that is a sign of a healthy democracy. The realities enclosing the various political parties in Egypt attest of their inefficacy and inability to run a consensual government cohesive enough to stand the challenges of the postrevolutionary Egypt. The opportunities that the revolution offered seemed immeasurable in political terms, thus the exponential rise in political formation, parties and groups was a much-expected trend in the Egyptian arena, a trend that not only determined the impossibility of forming a nonIslamist majority government, but also signed the death testimony of the Egyptian pluralistic system of governance. Â

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Although some of the political establishments, in great parts remnants of the old regime, have the ability to govern and to strongly handle the domestic affairs in Egypt, they remain hugely overwhelmed by the far reaching discipline and organization of the Brotherhood, and continue to be seen under a negative light due to their association with the fallen dictatorship.

The way forward in Egypt is to be determined by the willingness of the Muslim Brotherhood to both accept a political compromise and an ideological paradigm shift. The Muslim brotherhood lacks the experience that statesmanship requires, an experience that can be offered by the contesting political establishments pioneered by the secularists and the liberals. Although see as an ideological threat, the Muslim brotherhood can still accommodate the opposite factions in state organs by offering a mutual governance of Egyptian affairs, a mutual governance that can be exploited by the Muslim brotherhood as a temporary venture to gain the political maturity needed for a powerful governing organization. The Muslim Brotherhood will not be able to assume fully its responsibilities towards the Egyptian street unless it decides to relegate its rebellious ideology and its affinity towards opposition for a more governance driven line of thought. It is of paramount importance to realize the necessity that the times of staunch opposition are over, and the era of political practice is on. If the Brotherhood is to persist in its ideological supremacy and political immaturity, it will lose the hearts and minds of the supporters who propelled it to the pic of power, and it will miss on the golden opportunity of transforming its principles, values and precepts into actual enforced policies through the powerful medium of the state and parliament.

Mohamed Amine Belarbi

Arab Institute for Youth Policy Making

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What Political Solution for the Western Sahara Conflict? Introduction: The necessity to find a solution The necessity to find a solution for the Western Sahara Conflict is now becoming more pressing than ever. Many countries are entrenched in the conflict and do not allow for solutions to surface. My research of the past solutions led me to analyze the flows and weaknesses which led to the failure of every model; hence my resolution template advocates a win-win situation that I intend to advance through a model which I will develop in this assessment. This outcome I maintain would serve the nationalist interests of the Sahrawi struggle and the economic needs necessary for the Moroccan stability. International extension of the conflict: The conflict of Western Sahara is far from being a regional conflict where only Morocco and the Polisario front are involved in. The issue is a complex geostrategic game where not only the known parties are present, but where the international community and precisely the western super powers are actively involved in securing interests and benefits. As Toby Shelley mentioned in his book, “Exploration, evaluation and exploitation of resources run through the plot of the modern history of the Western Sahara. From the late 1940s the spotlight was on phosphates; from the mid-1970s fishing rights grew in importance; now oil – always in the wings – has taken center stage. In future, it could be vanadium.” 1 The United States in one part, has an important tactical approach in dealing with the case of WS, since while complying with international laws in not recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, the U.S nonetheless backs the Moroccan position by closing its eyes over the illegal aspects of the Moroccan presence in the territory and protecting their ally in the Security Council by opposing any actions able to condemn Morocco by the international community. This can be easily understood in the framework of the American foreign policy philosophy, clearly pictured by the famous proverb: “The USA doesn’t have friends, the USA has only interests”. These 1

Toby Shelley, End Game in the Western Sahara, p. 61.

interests, mainly in the domain of counter terrorism and Islamism control, have led the USA to stay careful in not allowing any disturbance of the Moroccan regime who proved over the years to be a fervent server of the US interests in the region. Another major player in the Sahara dossier is France, Morocco’s primary ally. After Moroccan independence in 1956, France didn’t leave the country totally, since the interests of the country in Morocco had to be preserved, and so the French administration made sure to leave a complying regime with the French wishes in keeping a tight grip over the many political and economic interests abounding in the region, especially in Western Sahara. The phosphate exploitation, the fisheries resources and the hypothetical presence of oil has led major countries to approve the situation in Western Sahara and to back Morocco up, and this support has been countered with generous concessions from the Moroccan authorities, be it through the advantageous fisheries agreements with the EU, passing by the military and intelligence cooperation in counter terrorism with the US, without forgetting the phosphate provisioning for the world industries at appealing rates. This being said, the Polisario finds support as well from international players who try to overcome the western influence in the dossier, and among these states Algeria and Libya, followed by several Latin American and African countries. Algeria, considered as the Big brother who dictates Polisario behavior, has more than once expressed its intent to bring Morocco’s quest for regional hegemony to an end, hence supporting the major military resistance to the kingdom through logistical and financial backing of the Polisario. But the strategic plan of Algiers doesn’t stop at a simple North African supremacy, but extends to economic benefits in seeing the emergence of an independent state in Western Sahara, and that is explained by the need of Algiers administration to find a corridor leading to the Atlantic Ocean instead of keeping one maritime door on the Mediterranean. This international interest in the regions’ resources led to a stagnating situation were resolution attempts were doomed to fail, and one of these failures is the referendum which never took place.

A revision of the previously proposed solutions imposes itself in order to examine and thus conclude what led to the failure of these attempts, and to furthermore understand what makes my model stands out in comparison with notably the Referendum and the Autonomy Plan. Proposed solutions: Referendum The referendum, as prescribed in UN resolutions and as emphasized by the UN fourth Committee on Special Political and Decolonization, is the only recourse the international community can have to deal with cases of non-selfgoverning territories. The application of the process is an act the UN’s member nations abide by when integrating the UN and adopting the charters, treaties and covenants which the organization’s work has been built upon. The implementation of the referendum would not only be a victory for international law respect, but would also provide the Saharawi population with their right to determine their faith and choose between either integrate Morocco, get their independence or adopt the autonomy plan. Yet, the referendum has failed, and one of the major hindrances which stopped the UN Settlement Plan from being implemented is the difficulty of identification of the voters eligible to participate in the self-determination process. While the Polisario holds on the census made by the Spanish colonial administration and which listed the inhabitants of Western Sahara in 1974, Morocco claims the right for Sahrawis living in the Moroccan territories who fled the Spanish occupation and later the Moroccan settlers who’ve been transported onto the territories to participate in the referendum, a claim Polisario front rejects strongly and categorically. As Yahia H. Zoubir2 puts it, although the provisional list of voters was finalized by MINURSO in December 1999 and made public by the UN in January 2000, Morocco blocked the countdown to the referendum again. It lodged some 130.000 appeals, 95% of which were devoid of any legal or practical basis.3

Professor of International Relations and Management at the Euro med Marseille School of Management, France 3 IPJET, Yahia H. Zoubir, International Law and the Question of Western Sahara, 284

The Polisario, who refers to the demographic manipulation which the Sahrawi society has been subject to, sees in the obstruction made by Morocco on the 1974 census a way to stop the efforts for a potential realization of the referendum, and accuses the Kingdomâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s authorities of allegedly transporting Moroccan settlers onto the Western Sahara while deporting Sahrawis into Moroccan territories in a clear attempt to make use of the settlers as a safe card to display if a referendum is ever to be hold. The Moroccan authorities have more than once made objections on the holding of a referendum by obstructing UN efforts in the identification process of eligible voters, and that has been displayed by the submission of Morocco of an additional list of 130.000 voters after the end of the UN census in 2000. As the current situation of the status quo is favorable for the Moroccan regime, both economic and politically, the potential enrollment of the Kingdom in serious efforts to find an adequate solution remains improbable, especially that the major superpowers encourage such a stagnation which serves their interest in the area. Yet, an agreement in the fields of politics, economy and security could be reached if efforts are deployed in order to adopt a win-win situation where both parties benefit while making few sacrifices. This agreement framework is further detailed in previous sections where I discussed the mechanisms of overcoming the winner-takes-all deadlock. Although the referendum short term consequence will be the fulfillment of a long wished outcome, the long term impact on the Moroccan internal situation will be as disastrous as the continuity of the conflict itself. The Moroccan society is a complex and diverse entity which counts in its ranks several ethnical groups, among which appears the Arabs, the Berber native population and the Rif population as well as the Sahrawis living in the southern part of the country. This social mixture is more of an explosive cocktail which has, throughout the years been living together in a nervous peaceful situation, subject to destabilization by minor disputes or social differences.

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A potential establishment of a referendum in the Western Sahara would ultimately sparkle claims all over Morocco for such a process, and the requests from different regions to be granted similar privilege will tear apart the centralized power of the regime in Rabat, leading it to losing control over the political, judicial and economic privileges it was given throughout the 1200 years of royalty in Morocco. If the economic and socio-political benefits of the Western Sahara exploitation are to remain, this would ultimately pose no threat to the internal stability of the kingdom, regardless of the party who controls the region. An advanced collaboration and mutual exploitation of the WS resources in the cadre of a common economic system where both the Moroccan administration and the Polisario cooperate in investing in and supporting each otherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s financial structure would serve as a potential solution to the fear of social disturbance Morocco is trying to prevent. This framework solution will be discussed later on in the economic and socio-political benefits section of my personal model. Unachievable, the referendum has been discarded in favor of other solutions, among which the Autonomy plan supported by Morocco. The Autonomy plan: The constant deadlock the negotiations have been through imposed a new reality over the conflict resolution, a reality not abiding necessarily by UN resolutions. The status of the Western Sahara, according to international law is without opposition a non-self-governing territory which requires the implementation of a referendum in order to allow the native population to determine their faith, yet we notice the constant stagnation of the dossier in the UN corridor. The Realpolitik as we know it today imposed a whole new approach to international conflict, and the Western Sahara dossier is part of this global chess game where the interests are served regardless of the international law. Morocco, by maintaining the status quo in Western Sahara, serves its political and social stability while ensuring the economic interests of the EU and the USA, in a everyone-is-winning situation. The proposal of the autonomy is a Â

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breakthrough and a premiere in Morocco’s concessions in the issue, and enabling the Polisario to become a political power able to operate from the inside of the Western Sahara through governmental organs is a chance the front ought to consider. In his report to the Security Council, Annan stated that, in addition to the fact that the referendum could not take place until at least 2002, in view of the differences between Morocco and Polisario: “[…] it would be essential that the parties now offer specific and concrete solutions to the multiple problems relating to the implementation of the plan that can be agreed to or, alternatively, be prepared to consider other ways of achieving an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute over Western Sahara”4 The autonomy proposal, first presented by the Secretary Generals’ special envoy James Baker annexed to his report to the Security Council on 20 June 20015, was developed as an alternative framework agreement to the deadlock the conflict was in, and the draft framework agreement conferred on the “population” of Western Sahara the right to elect their own executive and legislative bodies and to have exclusive competence over local government administration, territorial budget and taxation, law enforcement, internal security, social welfare, […]. Morocco would have exclusive competence over foreign relations, national security (including anti-secession measures), and external defense, and the flag, currency, customs, and postal and communication systems of the Moroccan Kingdom should be the same for Western Sahara.6 Yet looking as an appealing option, many are those who suspect the political willingness of Morocco to implement effectively such a solution, and these fears have been reported in Franks’ Rudy work in a simple yet expressive sentence : “The Moroccan limited autonomy plan for Western Sahara […] might sound like a step forward, at least until one reads the not-so-fine print ”7 4

UN Doc. S/2000/461, 22 May 2000 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a stalemate, 106 6 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a stalemate, 106 7 IPJET, Frank Ruddy, International Law and the Question of Western Sahara, 12 5

Though an appealing prospect for the conflict resolution, the Polisario front repeatedly rejects the autonomy plan on several bases, some emanating from a legal aspect and others relating to a more deep mistrust between the Sahrawis and the Moroccan authorities. From a legal perspective, the autonomy plan and its enforcement over the Sahrawis is a breach of the internationally recognized rights of the non-self-governing territories and populations to determine their faith through a fair and just referendum, and that any attempt to impose a certain solution on these people is an unlawful act and a violation of their sovereign right over their future. Besides the legal contradiction of the proposed autonomy with international law, the Sahrawis have deeper motives to reject such a proposal, mainly because of the lack of trusteeship between the parties of the conflict. The autonomy, as a political framework which grants a certain region more independence from the central power and which enable its people to govern themselves by themselves through governmental organs under their supervision and control, needs first to be allocated mechanisms of Human rights protection in order to ensure the fair and real implementation of such framework without the intervention of the authorities with the aim of limiting or taking hold of the powers conferred to the people in order to dictate freely the laws they want to be subject to. Finally, the Saharawi people have more than once expressed their will for independence, as reported by the UN Visiting Mission to Western Sahara8. According to the report of the Mission, there was an overwhelming majority consensus among the population in favor of national independence and against integration with any neighboring State. 9 Imposing a certain political solution over the population will bring more animosity and refusal from the Sahrawis, and even in case the solution is enforced, it will only make from Western Sahara an instable region where the armed struggle will be the first option the Sahrawis will go for, bringing the conflict to the starting point again. My plan: General framework 8 9

See UN Doc. A/10023/Add.5,Annex, pp. 48-‐56 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a stalemate, 66

My plan stands upon several pillars, those being economic, political and social attributes to be observed in any future settlement solution. The main feature of my framework is the inclusion of the UN or the OAU as a primary collaborator in the implementation of the framework, and that through including the Western Sahara under the supervision of the UN/OAU administration, this administration being a collaborative structure involving representatives from Polisario and Morocco. The first assignment of the new administration would be to ensure the return of the refugees to the WS. This administration would have as well the exclusivity of making a study on the prospects of holding a future referendum and the establishment of voting lists based on 1974 census, and also the administrative body would have the privilege of modeling the cooperation mechanisms between the two future distinct political bodies, this being done along with trust building measures between both the Moroccan and Saharawi population and also between the political entities of Morocco and the Polisario front. The study led by the transitional administration would focus on the establishment of resources division, sharing and exploitation plans, and the drafting of a special UN status for Western Sahara in case of non-feasibility of referendum, this special status having the following aspects as a starting point for the finalization of the entire plan: No border drawing with virtual delimitation of areas Collaboration and partnership in resources sharing Mutual investment and exchange of expertise between political bodies Different and distinct political administrations with advanced collaboration escalating to potential overlapping and merging of functions • Non-militarized zone in previously high tension regions with ability to be crossed in case of mutual agreement for military or police assistance • Withdrawal of UN/OAU administrative and military personnel after specific period unless otherwise requested by both parties • • • •

The framework remains a transitory model headed towards the evolution of a full-‐fledged federal system in Morocco. The federal model will uphold all conventional attributes previously established in federations such as the United States of America or Canada. Under such political and economic

federalism, regions with distinct cultural, geographic and political inclinations would be granted advanced autonomy, with an autonomous government and unique flag, as well as enjoying the benefits federalism offers in terms of self-‐governance. It is of paramount importance to point out that an advanced autonomy granted to the Western Sahara, as proposed by the Moroccan authorities, is not a viable option if applied on a unique and discriminatory basis. Given the cultural and historically driven political differences, Morocco under a centralized powerful center of decision in Rabat cannot sustain the political blowbacks of an advanced autonomy in Western Sahara along continued denial of the aspirations of the different regions within the country. Federalism would thus tackle such challenge by offering an advanced autonomy to all regions within the country, avoiding thus any political turmoil driven by cultural and historical contrasts.

Economic partnership benefits (Resources) Talking about the Western Sahara without discussing its economic importance for Morocco, the Saharawi people and the international community is simply scratching the surface of a deep rooted conflict in the free market economy game. Any framework should ultimately preserve the economic benefits which Morocco enjoyed during its excessive exploitation of the Western Sahara wealth, especially that these benefits are securing the stability and royalty insurance inside Morocco, making from the Kingdom’s prosperity a closely bonded subject the framework should insure. The Military expenditures in the Western Sahara have been and are, throughout the conflict, a major issue for the national budget which sees a big share of it allocated to the maintenance of military facilities and ground troops in a part of the continent which, because of its harsh environmental conditions, dooms the maintenance fees to an exponential increase. In 1983, US Congress heard estimates that Morocco was spending 1.9 billion $ a year on prosecuting the war.10 These expenses tend to decrease, but the 10

Cited by Leo Kamil, Fueling the fire: US policy and the Western Sahara conflict, Red Sea Press, New Jersey, 1987 p. 80

major financial input in the conflict came after the war, with the wall of sands’ construction. The project, partly funded by the Saudi Arabian regime, yet still a painful financial weigh which cut on a budget supposedly meat for Morocco’s development. Given that the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces comprise approximately 250,000 men, it can be roughly estimated that around half the kingdom’s military budget is devoted to the Western Sahara.11 With these military costs being redirected to investments inside Morocco, financing efficient projects to create employment opportunities and attract foreign investments through more modernized infrastructures and public services, Morocco’s mediocre performance in development indexes and world rankings can be brought back to more positive advance, especially that 15% of the national budget, previously spent into military presence in Western Sahara, could be spared and incorporated in other institutions funds and financial prospects. Besides the benefits from such a withdrawal of Moroccan military presence in the area, my framework focuses on the potential economic collaboration between Morocco and an independent state, and how such cooperation would allow a bilateral benefit in the cadre of a win-win situation. • • • • •

Military expertise exchange Free trade agreements Fishing/Mining licenses Moroccan investment in W.S Employment opportunities growth

Geopolitical and strategic cooperation gains If the Western Saharan conflict is a regional issue, its implications are far greater, and the frozen Moroccan Algerian relations as well as the stagnation of the Maghreb Union plus the internal divergences inside the Organization 11

Morocco’s military budget rose to $1.7 billion in 2004. See “L’Année Stratégique 2004”, Institute of International and Strategic Relations, 2004.

of the African Unity are only one of the many repercussions of the conflict on the international scene, as advanced by I. William Zartman: ‘The result of the non-solution of the Saharan conflict was the temporary destruction of the African regional organization, of its activities, and of its progress toward conflict resolution.’12 The resolution of the issue will not only boost the regional cooperation between the Maghreb countries, but would also enhance the economic and political cooperation between the North African countries which enjoy complementary economic systems. Social advantage of the framework One of the major points which Moroccan partisans advance is the necessity of maintaining the Moroccan presence in Western Sahara as a mean to secure the social and political stability of the Kingdom by not allowing the different ethnic groups of following the path of the Sahrawis in their struggle for independence or advanced autonomy. But what we must not overlook is the deep connection between the social stability and the socio-economic conditions of the country. Lebanon, for example, though being a far more diverse and conflicting case, has been able to stabilize the country through the major economic investments and the importance given to the socio-economic situation in ensuring the peaceful cohabitation of the Sunnis, Shia and Christians to mention only those, during the period of Rafiq Hariri. If Morocco is to invest strongly in the sectors of social welfare, the threat of ethnical chaos would become an unnecessary worry for the regime. As explained in the section above about the economic benefits of the possible withdrawal of Morocco from Western Sahara, the internal economy would be revived thank to the spared investments in the military and in the territory plus the economic partnership with a Western Saharan government.

I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution conflict and Intervention in Africa, Updated Edition, New York Oxford, Oxford University press, 1989, p.47

Limitations of the model: The model argued for in this essay redresses most of the issues normal templates solutions have failed to address, and the mechanisms with which to implement a lasting win-win solution are talked about whereas conventional frameworks advanced by both antagonists and the UN are lacking practical devices able to bring ideal resolutions into the field. Yet, my model has its own set of disadvantages which limit its efficacy and realization. One of the disadvantages is the lack of an enforcement mechanism which will push the conflicting parties to adopt it regardless of their willingness and consent. Enforcement, if one is to be planned and led by the UN or the AU will have a negative impact on the conflict, leading to an expenditure of the armed struggle into neighboring countries due to alliances and security pacts. Furthermore, my research lacks statistics which are fundamental to any solution template since it gives a preview of the general tendency several fields will adopt, ranging from economic impact of the implementation of the plan till the social response of the country’s citizens, as well as the influence that would have on international relations and world politics. This model faces not only challenges in its implementation due to the interests’ conflict between Morocco and the Polisario, but also its efficiency is subject to questioning especially in a geostrategic cadre where international parties are actively involved.

Conclusion: The richness of the Western Sahara region with fisheries, Phosphate mines and potential oil deposits can sustain both the Moroccan and Sahrawi economic system if spent efficiently. By Giving the Western Sahara its independence, Morocco wouldn’t gain spare the financial resources spent on military presence in the region, resources which can be redirected towards empowering the industrial sector in the country and boost production capacities Morocco lacks, but also the kingdom can have still access to the wealth of the Western Sahara through special licenses of exploitation given

exclusively to Morocco. The establishment of a privileged status for Morocco, in the same way the EU granted the country an advanced cooperation status with the European Union, assigned by the Western Sahara’s government, would allow the young country to benefit from the logistical and political support of Morocco, in exchange of low rates of financial costs on exportation to the kingdom and additional exploitation rights. Securing financial benefits from the Western Sahara will ultimately lead to the stabilization of the internal situation in the country, where the investments due to the spared money on military and the income from the Western Sahara’s privileges will increase in a way the political security of the regime who won’t be threatened by a socio-economic catastrophe. The cooperation between an independent state in the Sahara and the Moroccan government would be far more fruitful and rewarding than the prolonging of the conflict, a conflict which has been withdrawing considerable resources out of the national budget for more than 36 years.

Mohamed Amine Belarbi

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Obama 2016, China and the Middle East With a dramatic campaign brought to an end, it is reasonable to let loose the festivities and celebrate the second term of the 44th president of the United States. Yet, behind the stunning smile and the theatrical performances, Obama’s to do list is filling up with major challenges, and celebrating along Michelle is far from being the paramount priority of the overburdened president thus far.

From the Iranian nuclear aspirations to the growing Chinese influence in the Middle East, this essay will draw on the time urgency and contextual realities of the MENA region in order to bring the casual reader a step closer to understanding how the US policies should evolve with regard to the Arab World if the US interests are to prevail in the region.

“Iran is now 4 more years closer to the production of a nuclear bomb”, how familiar this seems given that Romney’s foreign policy hovered around this very sentence throughout his campaign, yet, as we see it today, the round of international sanctions championed by the Obama are bearing fruitful results and bringing the Iranian regime closer to a financial meltdown. While the economic sanctions might prove to be the way to salvation, regional powers dependent on Iranian oil might beg to differ on the US strategic vision to impede the ayatollahs from procuring themselves nuclear capabilities. The Obama administration is faced with the choice of continued sanctions that might prove inefficient given the continual opposition of China (resources driven) and Russia (geopolitically immersed in the safeguard of the Iranian regime), or with the alternative of striking deep down in the Iranian territory. Such military venture, as foolish it might be, is rebutted by the former national security adviser and world renown strategist Brzezinski in the following terms:

“A war in the Middle East, in the present context, may last for years, and the economic consequences of it are going to be devastating for the average American: High inflation. Instability. Insecurity. Probably significant isolation for the United States in the world scene” Brzezinski to Newsmax TV Two choices, neither as promising as marketed to be, puts the US administration in the embarrassing position of accepting a nuclear Iran as a reality, a reality that might serve the American interests in fact, regardless of the catastrophic image the Israelis attempt to wave in mass media in order to favor a preemptive strike.

While Israel’s ties to the US are unshakable and enhanced by a certain sense of commonality in terms of political, cultural and historical similarities, the Arab states converge with the US strategic vision only when mutual interests are involved. These interests range from security (as in the case of the Gulf countries) to economic assistance (Egypt among others), yet the critical aspect of such interests is that they are not exclusive to the United Sates, but are tightly linked to the economic and geopolitical performances of international and regional hegemon. Such regional hegemon is embodied by China, an aspiring world player with an economy large enough to have its take on international politics and regional influence. China has been absent from the Middle East largely due to the US status in the region, yet as the US foreign policy accommodates the growing needs and fancies of Israel (ultimately alienating the Arab street), and as Washington’s tight policies increase pressure on post-revolutionary governments with a leadership not ready to accept a full allegiance to the white house, alternatives start shaping and Arab states are most likely to identify regional powers who can substitute the US in the Middle Eastern chessboard. China, with an appealing financial portfolio and a reassuring posture in the world scene is prone on undertaking the role of the major player in Middle Eastern politics, a role that doesn’t stem from choice but from necessity given the growing needs in oil of the Chinese industry and economy.

“China’s presence in the Middle East has grown exponentially over the past decade and is affecting the region’s strategic environment. Chinese influence is multidimensional, encompassing economics, defense, diplomacy, and soft power.” 13

In such circumstances, attending to the fancies of a certain ally become less urgent than securing states whose allegiance can be lost to potential competitors, thus the Middle Eastern agenda of Barack Obama should cut on the support to Israel (not much of a political suicide given the fact that the presidential campaign is over and the super PACs are not as meaningful now that the results are out), and deploy a strategic vision preliminary aimed at accommodating the post-revolutionary Arab states through financial, political, diplomatic and military support. Such attempt would leverage the US interests on two levels: first by providing a stronger geopolitical stance in the region for American interests through US-friendly governments, and second through the establishment of a pressure regional bloc that can downsize Chinese access to oil resources.

Such US foreign policy, coupling stronger unconditional support for postrevolutionary Arab states and firm refusal to bend to Israeli appeals will inevitably disarm Iran from its main source of support in the Arab and Islamic world, depriving it from popular compassion and thus disabling proxy factions such as Hezbollah from tapping into anti-US feeling as main recourse for recruitment and military support to the mullahs in Teheran.

Mohamed Amine Belarbi 13

James Chen, The emergence of China in the Middle East, Institute for National StrategicStudies

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Civic Engagement in Egypt Yes, we made it, after 30 years in Egypt … 40 years in Libya … 25 years in Tunisia… and 32 years in Syria … we, THE YOUT,H made it; we demolished the system, we destroyed the corruption and we made the sun of democracy rise. Arab youth made it and they wrote the first chapter in their new democratic history.

I think we have just only one key word that played this important role, and the same keyword will play a new role in developing the society and building the countries. This key word is: “YOUTH”

In Egypt, the formal governmental body in charge of youth issues, the National Council for Youth defines youth as the age group from 18 – 30 years old. This long period of time is due to the fact that large sectors of young people between 18 and 30 in Egypt usually face the same problems and challenges, such as unemployment, poor education, low health awareness and limited access to training, education, volunteering and job opportunities.

But generally the entire Arab region has been experiencing a massive youth bulge, with more than half of most countries’ populations under the age of 25. Young men and women in the Arab region today are the most educated; thus they hold the potential to make a considerable contribution to the development of the region.

“Taking the youth seriously” is not an option but an urgent priority for many countries in the region, a region that has witnessed the readiness and ability of the young men and women to mobilize the society and become an integral part of the social transformations in tandem with the Arab spring in 2011.

So we are here in front of an old concept historically but a new concept practically, and this concept if dealt with academically, we can analyze our situation now that is even after the revolution youth couldn’t make a remarkable development movement, instead limiting its role in to demonstrations without real participation as expected after the Arab spring movements. We can summarize all this in Civic engagement.

There are many challenges in the definition of civic engagement and many scholars and practitioners use a variety of terms to name it, including “social capital, citizenship, democratic participation/ citizenship/practice, public work/public problem solving, political engagement, community engagement, social responsibility, social justice, civic professionalism, public agency, community building, civic or public leadership. The lack of clarity about what is meant by civic engagement fuels a latent confusion about how to put a civic engagement agenda or implement a concrete action plan.

It is legitimate to ask ourselves a series of existentialist questions about whether civic engagement is a process for skill development, a lifestyle, a program, a pedagogy, a philosophy, a strategy, a system, a structure, a chain of values? Can it be all of these?

Irrespective of the semantic confusion, civic engagement involves one or more of the following: accepting and valuing diversity, building cross-cultural bridges, participating actively in public life and community service, developing empathy, social responsibility and philanthropy and promoting social justice.

Civic engagement is not just some quotes but we may consider it as a life style and if we implement and embed this concept strongly in our educational system, especially in universities, we will be able to do miracles, but I think the road is not that easy, we have lots of obstacles, difficulties may face us, difficulties that may be summed up as follows:

Culture: we still in Egypt have a problem with civic engagement as most of the parents are afraid from any kind of political and social engagement, mainly because they lived more than 30 years of suppression where any one wanted to start any initiative ended up with the prison as final destination. Educational system: the children in school are totally away from such a concept. They aren’t raised on any kinds of participative values and there is no channel to seed even the desire of participating. Nature of initiative: most of youth initiative is charitable and they do not separate between real civic education and charity work like visiting orphans and so on, there is a huge difference between both types of engagement ventures and activities. Financial needs: most of the movements or initiative need funding and financial support, but we are here in a poor environment in terms of funds and financial sources, thus lots of projects cannot find a chance of being implemented because of a lack of resources. Governmental support: the Egyptian government is not helpful. Not just only that, it also may stop lots of youth movements because of political and social reasons. Misunderstanding of priority: Egyptian society doesn’t have till now a common agenda with listed needs. We miss the collaboration of ideas, and we also lack a united database that makes us totally isolated from one another. Lack of high level of technology: which affects the speed of communication and the reaching out to foreign experience. This leads to consuming more time and cause unneeded costs.

In spite of all the previous obstacles, we should mention also how we can overcome those problems by introducing several steps:

1. Self – mindfulness: being mindful of self and others means listening to your inner voice, identifying your areas of strengths and weaknesses, and finding

ways to connect with others on meaningful social issues. It is therefore crucial that the youth undergo leadership training based on self-reflection learning so that they discover their preferences and callings. Some particularly helpful self-assessments include: “Myers –Briggs Type Indicator”, “Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behavior”, “SPEED of Trust Audit” and “Emotional Intelligence Self- Appraisal”.

2. Awareness campaigns must be carried out and directed towards youth themselves in order to inform them of the importance and the significance of their role in their society. Moreover, awareness campaigns should be directed towards parents in order to inform them of the importance of endorsing values of citizenship and active participation in the domestic affairs. Finally, education should play a positive role in raising awareness through educating youth about concepts of citizenship and the importance of their participation as means to achieve growth and development in their country. This education should not only be theoretical, but should give youth and children the chance to experience this participation in schools, university projects or “service learning projects”.

3. Proper channels of communication should be created in order to allow youth to voice their ideas, opinions, motivations and disappointments. This would increase the sense of belonging amongst them and drive them to participate in a civil society that respects their presence and admits their involvement. In addition, it is equally important to give youth fair representation in the civil society (according to their number) in order to enforce their role and to elevate their proactive sentiments.

4. Finally, regarding the problem of the existence of a knowledge gap in this particular area of study, we recommend increasing research efforts of scholars in this discipline. We also recommend that universities, institutions of higher education and other research institutions help, support and direct their

students and scholars in conducting research that studies the youth psyche, assess the conditions needed to motivate the youth into participating in their civil society and create solutions to efficiently use youth efforts to maximize the benefits.

Samira Mohesen Egyptian Institute for Youth Policy Making

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Book Review: Post-American World In today’s world, the understanding of politics and global affair is not a luxury, or a rare piece of commodity only few can afford. In an interconnected and globalized world, politics, economics, wars and environment boil down to a single and unified understanding, a one bloc of policy and decision making that cannot allow partial understanding or limited expertise. Globalization has not hit only cultural bridging and interfaith dialogue, it has brought together international affairs to a world platform where everyone has a word to say and a policy to influence. Centuries ago, the Brits dominated, decades ago the Americans monopolized and today it is impossible to claim that one superpower is directing the show given the numerous new players who emerged recently. From the BRICS to ASEAN, the trends and patterns of world governance are unfolding away from a western monopoly, getting more diluted in an eastern emerging bloc driven forward by China, the new booming economy that supports world finance as of today. What seems as an observation, an educated guess or a speculative assertion is highly detailed in Fareed Zakaria’s book “The Post-‐American World”, an illuminating piece of writing that is redefining our understanding of international affairs and foreign policy. As plain observers, watching the rise of the Chinese economic dragon, marveling at the booming Brazilian or Indian finance, looking up to Singapore stock market performance or hailing South Korean breaching of new untapped markets is nothing but a piece of news which hardly adds to our everyday life routine, yet on a bigger scale, it is easy to notice how are these turn of events affecting global dynamics on levels never seen before. From an economic perspective, Fareed Zakaria points out in his book that the economic performances we are witnessing are a sign that the world economy is still on track despite the current financial hardships across the Eurozone and elsewhere. The beauty of a global booming economy, or as Fareed Zakaria puts it rightly, the growing economic pie, is that in the absence of monopoly, the financial system can cope with centralized or limited economic downfalls thanks to the performances of nations in other parts of the world. As the pie grows bigger, everyone’s share increases while at the

same time small bites from it hardly affect the whole cake. In this regard, Fareed Zakaria advocates for a multifaceted economy because it is not a harmful source of competition and international cross hostility, but rather a global motivator for better performances and mutual collaborations. “We are now living through the third great power shift of the modern era. It could be called "the rise of the rest" ... Over the past few decades, countries all over the world have been experiencing rates of economic growth that were once unthinkable.” (The Post-American World) As unexpected as it may have seemed decades ago, what is saving western economy are not western allies and western factories, it is Chinese lenders who buy bonds and debts from the EU and the US in a symbiosis no economist could believe possible between presumably communists and capitalists. In such business, everyone is making profit, from the usual overspending American consumer to the Chinese official who salivates at the prospect of holding the US government tightly in its debt grip. It might contrast sharply with what we are served everyday on TV stations, yet the recurrent bad news about rising unemployment and rising prices are all but objective in projecting the state of world economy. The news usually tend to dramatize the world for us in an attempt to draw wider audiences, that is why we hardly hear about the millions of people lifted out of poverty in China or India, or the booming businesses in Africa. We tend to hear about the decline in western performances, yet our news channels disregard the rise of socio-‐economic standards elsewhere. This is where the importance of the “Post-‐American World” resides: It is a lens to asses how does the world perform in a global scale, allowing us to think about western shrinking influence in the world stage all while bringing closer the image of a eastern economic, cultural and political renaissance in the 21st century. This book differs from mainstream publications because of what Fareed Zakaria designed it to be: "This is a book not about the decline of America but rather about the rise of everyone else." (The Post-American World) The world economy is surging as healthy as ever, but what the consequences of such performance are is where Fareed Zakaria tries to move the discussion

in his book due to the critical aspect it upholds. In theoretical and purely statistical terms, everyone is set to win from a powerful Chinese economy due to the interconnectivity which taints world finance, yet politics are in times such as these not movable by statistics, but rather by emotions, nationalism and narrow political games and gains. Fareed Zakaria in his book “Post-‐ American World” attempts to clarify the collateral damages of economic power redistribution. As world economies gain more financial independence if not leadership, their trade relations with western and American blocs become more even, with no on way flow of decisions and power. The shy China of yesterday is now a US debt master who can negotiate in equal terms with US corporates and state officials, with what that induces from downpours on bilateral cooperation in the field of politics, defense and foreign policy. It is crucial for nations to advance their economic interests through all possible ways, sometimes using aggressive policies to counter isolationism or hostile competition, these state behaviors sometimes taking the shape of political disputes and proxy conflicts. It is of the utmost necessity to avoid direct confrontation as Fareed Zakaria advocates, instead establishing a more disparate distribution of power and accepting compromises as the only way to achieve a win-‐win situation for the world players. The world where the US is the only source of legislation and is the only approving office is gone, what is then needed is to live with this new situation without much nationalistic nostalgia for the glorious past days. In that sense Fareed Zakaria aligns himself with the democrat political thought, assuring that a foreign policy based on cooperation and mutual respect is the only way forward for the USA to take advantage from the rise of the rest, a rise Fareed claims inevitable and irreversible. Building partnerships, according to Fareed Zakaria, should shape the future of US politics and foreign policy; a partnership he sees not only restricted to trade, instead it should encompass matters of global relevance such as terrorism and global security. This line of argument is not a mere set of assumptions, for the book “Post American World” sets a historical understanding of cyclic power rise and decline. From the ancient Chinese dynasty to the example of the British Empire, Fareed Zakaria points to the fact

that the opposition of glorious empire to new rising world players usually leads the first to concede to the latter its assets and strategic interests. America ought not to oppose the rise of the BRICS or ASEAN blocs, instead moving towards bridging the divide between world powers and establishing a network of cooperation where the US doesn’t rule but influences greatly the income of any debate or decision making. A good read combining a deep understanding of economics, history, foreign policy and global security, “The Post-‐American World” offers rich resources and ideas to have a grasp on the mechanics of international affairs today, allowing the casual reader to reflect on today’s politics, how they are shaped, and what is the likely outcome they can offer given the many political orientation world powers, and especially the US, decide to follow. Mohamed Amine Belarbi

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