What political Model for the Western Sahara Conflict ?
Mohamed Amine Belarbi
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1. Introduction: The necessity to find a solution
The necessity to find a solution for the Western Sahara Conflict is now becoming more pressing than ever. Many countries are entrenched in the conflict and do not allow for solutions to surface. My research of the past solutions led me to analyze the flows and weaknesses that led to the failure of every model; hence my resolution template advocates a win-‐win situation that I intend to advance through a model that I will develop in this assessment. This outcome I maintain would serve the nationalist interests of the Sahrawi struggle and the economic needs necessary for the Moroccan stability. 2. International extension of the conflict: The conflict of Western Sahara is far from being a regional conflict where only Morocco and the Polisario front are involved in. The issue is a complex geostrategic game where not only the known parties are present, but where the international community and precisely the western super powers are actively involved in securing interests and benefits. As Toby Shelley mentioned in his book, “Exploration, evaluation and exploitation of resources run through the plot of the modern history of the Western Sahara. From the late 1940s the spotlight was on phosphates; from the mid-‐1970s fishing rights grew in importance; now oil – always in the wings – has taken center stage. In future, it could be vanadium.” 1 The United States in one part, has an important tactical approach in dealing with the case of WS, since while complying with international laws in not recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, the U.S nonetheless backs the Moroccan position by closing its eyes over the illegal aspects of the Moroccan presence in the territory and protecting their ally in the Security Council by opposing any actions able to condemn Morocco by the international community. This can be easily understood in the framework of the American foreign policy philosophy, clearly pictured by the famous proverb: “The USA doesn’t have friends, the USA has only interests”. These interests, mainly in the domain of counter terrorism and Islamism control, have led the USA to stay careful in not allowing any disturbance of the Moroccan regime who proved over the years to be a fervent server of the US interests in the region. Another major player in the Sahara dossier is France, Morocco’s primary ally. After Moroccan independence in 1956, France didn’t leave the country totally, since the interests of the country in Morocco had to be preserved, and so the French administration made sure to leave a complying regime with the French wishes in keeping a tight grip over the many political and economic interests abounding in the region, especially in Western Sahara. The phosphate exploitation, the fisheries resources and the hypothetical presence of oil has led major countries to approve the situation in Western Sahara and to back Morocco up, and this support has been countered with generous concessions from the Moroccan authorities, be it through the advantageous fisheries agreements with the EU, passing by the military 1 Toby Shelley, End Game in the Western Sahara, p. 61. 2 Professor of International Relations and Management at the Euro med Marseille School of
Management, France
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and intelligence cooperation in counter terrorism with the US, without forgetting the phosphate provisioning for the world industries at appealing rates. This being said, the Polisario finds support as well from international players who try to overcome the western influence in the dossier, and among these states Algeria and Libya, followed by several Latin American and African countries. Algeria, considered as the Big brother who dictates Polisario behavior, has more than once expressed its intent to bring Morocco’s quest for regional hegemony to an end, hence supporting the major military resistance to the kingdom through logistical and financial backing of the Polisario. But the strategic plan of Algiers doesn’t stop at a simple North African supremacy, but extends to economic benefits in seeing the emergence of an independent state in Western Sahara, and that is explained by the need of Algiers administration to find a corridor leading to the Atlantic Ocean instead of keeping one maritime door on the Mediterranean. This international interest in the regions’ resources led to a stagnating situation were resolution attempts were doomed to fail, and one of these failures is the referendum which never took place. A revision of the previously proposed solutions imposes itself in order to examine and thus conclude what led to the failure of these attempts, and to furthermore understand what makes my model stands out in comparison with notably the Referendum and the Autonomy Plan. 3. Proposed solutions: Referendum The referendum, as prescribed in UN resolutions and as emphasized by the UN fourth Committee on Special Political and Decolonization, is the only recourse the international community can have to deal with cases of non-‐self-‐governing territories. The application of the process is an act the UN’s member nations abide by when integrating the UN and adopting the charters, treaties and covenants which the organization’s work has been built upon. The implementation of the referendum would not only be a victory for international law respect, but would also provide the Saharawi population with their right to determine their faith and choose between either integrate Morocco, get their independence or adopt the autonomy plan. Yet, the referendum has failed, and one of the major hindrances that stopped the UN Settlement Plan from being implemented is the difficulty of identification of the voters eligible to participate in the self-‐determination process. While the Polisario holds on the census made by the Spanish colonial administration and which listed the inhabitants of Western Sahara in 1974, Morocco claims the right for Sahrawis living in the Moroccan territories who fled the Spanish occupation and later the Moroccan settlers who’ve been
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transported onto the territories to participate in the referendum, a claim Polisario front rejects strongly and categorically. As Yahia H. Zoubir2 puts it, although the provisional list of voters was finalized by MINURSO in December 1999 and made public by the UN in January 2000, Morocco blocked the countdown to the referendum again. It lodged some 130.000 appeals, 95% of which were devoid of any legal or practical basis.3 The Polisario, who refers to the demographic manipulation which the Sahrawi society has been subject to, sees in the obstruction made by Morocco on the 1974 census a way to stop the efforts for a potential realization of the referendum, and accuses the Kingdom’s authorities of allegedly transporting Moroccan settlers onto the Western Sahara while deporting Sahrawis into Moroccan territories in a clear attempt to make use of the settlers as a safe card to display if a referendum is ever to be hold. The Moroccan authorities have more than once made objections on the holding of a referendum by obstructing UN efforts in the identification process of eligible voters, and that has been displayed by the submission of Morocco of an additional list of 130.000 voters after the end of the UN census in 2000. As the current situation of the status quo is favorable for the Moroccan regime, both economic and politically, the potential enrollment of the Kingdom in serious efforts to find an adequate solution remains improbable, especially that the major superpowers encourage such a stagnation which serves their interest in the area. Yet, an agreement in the fields of politics, economy and security could be reached if efforts are deployed in order to adopt a win-‐win situation where both parties benefit while making few sacrifices. This agreement framework is further detailed in previous sections where I discussed the mechanisms of overcoming the winner-‐takes-‐all deadlock. Although the referendum short-‐term consequence will be the fulfillment of a long wished outcome, the long-‐term impact on the Moroccan internal situation will be as disastrous as the continuity of the conflict itself. The Moroccan society is a complex and diverse entity which counts in its ranks several ethnical groups, among which appears the Arabs, the Berber native population and the Rif population as well as the Sahrawis living in the southern part of the country. This social mixture is more of an explosive cocktail which has, throughout the years been living together in a nervous peaceful situation, subject to destabilization by minor disputes or social differences. A potential establishment of a referendum in the Western Sahara would ultimately sparkle claims all over Morocco for such a process, and the requests from different regions to be 2 Professor of International Relations and Management at the Euro med Marseille School of
Management, France 3 IPJET, Yahia H. Zoubir, International Law and the Question of Western Sahara, 284
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granted similar privilege will tear apart the centralized power of the regime in Rabat, leading it to losing control over the political, judicial and economic privileges it was given throughout the 1200 years of royalty in Morocco. If the economic and socio-‐political benefits of the Western Sahara exploitation are to remain, this would ultimately pose no threat to the internal stability of the kingdom, regardless of the party who controls the region. An advanced collaboration and mutual exploitation of the WS resources in the cadre of a common economic system where both the Moroccan administration and the Polisario cooperate in investing in and supporting each other’s financial structure would serve as a potential solution to the fear of social disturbance Morocco is trying to prevent. This framework solution will be discussed later on in the economic and socio-‐political benefits section of my personal model. Unachievable, the referendum has been discarded in favor of other solutions, among which the Autonomy plan supported by Morocco. The Autonomy plan: The constant deadlock the negotiations have been through imposed a new reality over the conflict resolution, a reality not abiding necessarily by UN resolutions. The status of the Western Sahara, according to international law is without opposition a non-‐self-‐governing territory that requires the implementation of a referendum in order to allow the native population to determine their faith, yet we notice the constant stagnation of the dossier in the UN corridor. The Realpolitik as we know it today imposed a whole new approach to international conflict, and the Western Sahara dossier is part of this global chess game where the interests are served regardless of the international law. Morocco, by maintaining the status quo in Western Sahara, serves its political and social stability while ensuring the economic interests of the EU and the USA, in a everyone-‐is-‐ winning situation. The proposal of the autonomy is a breakthrough and a premiere in Morocco’s concessions in the issue, and enabling the Polisario to become a political power able to operate from the inside of the Western Sahara through governmental organs is a chance the front ought to consider. In his report to the Security Council, Annan stated that, in addition to the fact that the referendum could not take place until at least 2002, in view of the differences between Morocco and Polisario: “[…] it would be essential that the parties now offer specific and concrete solutions to the multiple problems relating to the implementation of the plan that can be agreed to or,
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alternatively, be prepared to consider other ways of achieving an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute over Western Sahara”4 The autonomy proposal, first presented by the Secretary Generals’ special envoy James Baker annexed to his report to the Security Council on 20 June 20015, was developed as an alternative framework agreement to the deadlock the conflict was in, and the draft framework agreement conferred on the “population” of Western Sahara the right to elect their own executive and legislative bodies and to have exclusive competence over local government administration, territorial budget and taxation, law enforcement, internal security, social welfare, […]. Morocco would have exclusive competence over foreign relations, national security (including anti-‐secession measures), and external defense, and the flag, currency, customs, and postal and communication systems of the Moroccan Kingdom should be the same for Western Sahara.6 Yet looking as an appealing option, many are those who suspect the political willingness of Morocco to implement effectively such a solution, and these fears have been reported in Franks’ Rudy work in a simple yet expressive sentence : “The Moroccan limited autonomy plan for Western Sahara […] might sound like a step forward, at least until one reads the not-‐so-‐fine print ”7 Though an appealing prospect for the conflict resolution, the Polisario front repeatedly rejects the autonomy plan on several bases, some emanating from a legal aspect and others relating to a more deep mistrust between the Sahrawis and the Moroccan authorities. From a legal perspective, the autonomy plan and its enforcement over the Sahrawis is a breach of the internationally recognized rights of the non-‐self-‐governing territories and populations to determine their faith through a fair and just referendum, and that any attempt to impose a certain solution on these people is an unlawful act and a violation of their sovereign right over their future. Besides the legal contradiction of the proposed autonomy with international law, the Sahrawis have deeper motives to reject such a proposal, mainly because of the lack of trusteeship between the parties of the conflict. The autonomy, as a political framework which grants a certain region more independence from the central power and which enable its people to govern themselves by themselves through governmental organs under their supervision and control, needs first to be allocated mechanisms of Human rights protection in order to ensure the fair and real implementation of such framework without the intervention of the authorities with the aim of limiting or taking hold of the powers conferred to the people in order to dictate freely the laws they want to be subject to.
4 UN Doc. S/2000/461, 22 May 2000
5 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a stalemate, 106 6 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a stalemate, 106 7 IPJET, Frank Ruddy, International Law and the Question of Western Sahara, 12
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Finally, the Saharawi people have more than once expressed their will for independence, as reported by the UN Visiting Mission to Western Sahara8. According to the report of the Mission, there was an overwhelming majority consensus among the population in favor of national independence and against integration with any neighboring State. 9 Imposing a certain political solution over the population will bring more animosity and refusal from the Sahrawis, and even in case the solution is enforced, it will only make from Western Sahara an instable region where the armed struggle will be the first option the Sahrawis will go for, bringing the conflict to the starting point again. 4. My plan: • General framework My plan stands upon several pillars, those being economic, political and social attributes to be observed in any future settlement solution. The main feature of my framework is the inclusion of the UN or the OAU as a primary collaborator in the implementation of the framework, and that through including the Western Sahara under the supervision of the UN/OAU administration, this administration being a collaborative structure involving representatives from Polisario and Morocco. The first assignment of the new administration would be to ensure the return of the refugees to the WS. This administration would have as well the exclusivity of making a study on the prospects of holding a future referendum and the establishment of voting lists based on 1974 census, and also the administrative body would have the privilege of modeling the cooperation mechanisms between the two future distinct political bodies, this being done along with trust building measures between both the Moroccan and Saharawi population and also between the political entities of Morocco and the Polisario front. The study led by the transitional administration would focus on the establishment of resources division, sharing and exploitation plans, and the drafting of a special UN status for Western Sahara in case of non-‐feasibility of referendum, this special status having the following aspects as a starting point for the finalization of the entire plan: No border drawing with virtual delimitation of areas Collaboration and partnership in resources sharing Mutual investment and exchange of expertise between political bodies Different and distinct political administrations with advanced collaboration escalating to potential overlapping and merging of functions v Non-‐militarized zone in previously high tension regions with ability to be crossed in case of mutual agreement for military or police assistance v Withdrawal of UN/OAU administrative and military personnel after specific period unless otherwise requested by both parties v v v v
8 See UN Doc. A/10023/Add.5,Annex, pp. 48-‐56 9 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a stalemate, 66
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The framework remains a transitory model headed towards the evolution of a full-‐fledged federal system in Morocco. The federal model will uphold all conventional attributes previously established in federations such as the United States of America or Canada. Under such political and economic federalism, regions with distinct cultural, geographic and political inclinations would be granted advanced autonomy, with an autonomous government and unique flag, as well as enjoying the benefits federalism offers in terms of self-‐governance. It is of paramount importance to point out that an advanced autonomy granted to the Western Sahara, as proposed by the Moroccan authorities, is not a viable option if applied on a unique and discriminatory basis. Given the cultural and historically driven political differences, Morocco under a centralized powerful center of decision in Rabat cannot sustain the political blowbacks of an advanced autonomy in Western Sahara along continued denial of the aspirations of the different regions within the country. Federalism would thus tackle such challenge by offering an advanced autonomy to all regions within the country, avoiding thus any political turmoil driven by cultural and historical contrasts. •
Economic partnership benefits (Resources)
Talking about the Western Sahara without discussing its economic importance for Morocco, the Saharawi people and the international community is simply scratching the surface of a deep rooted conflict in the free market economy game. Any framework should ultimately preserve the economic benefits that Morocco enjoyed during its excessive exploitation of the Western Sahara wealth, especially that these benefits are securing the stability and royalty insurance inside Morocco, making from the Kingdom’s prosperity a closely bonded subject the framework should insure. The Military expenditures in the Western Sahara have been and are, throughout the conflict, a major issue for the national budget which sees a big share of it allocated to the maintenance of military facilities and ground troops in a part of the continent which, because of its harsh environmental conditions, dooms the maintenance fees to an exponential increase. In 1983, US Congress heard estimates that Morocco was spending 1.9 billion $ a year on prosecuting the war.10 These expenses tend to decrease, but the major financial input in the conflict came after the war, with the wall of sands’ construction. The project, partly funded by the Saudi Arabian regime, yet still a painful financial weigh which cut on a budget supposedly meat for Morocco’s development.
10 Cited by Leo Kamil, Fueling the fire: US policy and the Western Sahara conflict, Red Sea Press, New
Jersey, 1987 p. 80
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Given that the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces comprise approximately 250,000 men, it can be roughly estimated that around half the kingdom’s military budget is devoted to the Western Sahara.11 With these military costs being redirected to investments inside Morocco, financing efficient projects to create employment opportunities and attract foreign investments through more modernized infrastructures and public services, Morocco’s mediocre performance in development indexes and world rankings can be brought back to more positive advance, especially that 15% of the national budget, previously spent into military presence in Western Sahara, could be spared and incorporated in other institutions funds and financial prospects. Besides the benefits from such a withdrawal of Moroccan military presence in the area, my framework focuses on the potential economic collaboration between Morocco and an independent state, and how such cooperation would allow a bilateral benefit in the cadre of a win-‐win situation. Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø
Military expertise exchange Free trade agreements Fishing/Mining licenses Moroccan investment in W.S Employment opportunities growth • Geopolitical and strategic cooperation gains
If the Western Saharan conflict is a regional issue, its implications are far greater, and the frozen Moroccan Algerian relations as well as the stagnation of the Maghreb Union plus the internal divergences inside the Organization of the African Unity are only one of the many repercussions of the conflict on the international scene, as advanced by I. William Zartman: ‘The result of the non-‐solution of the Saharan conflict was the temporary destruction of the African regional organization, of its activities, and of its progress toward conflict resolution.’12 The resolution of the issue will not only boost the regional cooperation between the Maghreb countries, but would also enhance the economic and political cooperation between the North African countries that enjoy complementary economic systems. •
Social advantage of the framework
One of the major points which Moroccan partisans advance is the necessity of maintaining the Moroccan presence in Western Sahara as a mean to secure the social and political 11 Morocco’s military budget rose to $1.7 billion in 2004. See “L’Année Stratégique 2004”, Institute of
International and Strategic Relations, 2004. 12 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution conflict and Intervention in Africa, Updated Edition, New York Oxford, Oxford University press, 1989, p.47
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stability of the Kingdom by not allowing the different ethnic groups of following the path of the Sahrawis in their struggle for independence or advanced autonomy. But what we must not overlook is the deep connection between the social stability and the socio-‐economic conditions of the country. Lebanon, for example, though being a far more diverse and conflicting case, has been able to stabilize the country through the major economic investments and the importance given to the socio-‐economic situation in ensuring the peaceful cohabitation of the Sunnis, Shia and Christians to mention only those, during the period of Rafiq Hariri. If Morocco is to invest strongly in the sectors of social welfare, the threat of ethnical chaos would become an unnecessary worry for the regime. As explained in the section above about the economic benefits of the possible withdrawal of Morocco from Western Sahara, the internal economy would be revived thank to the spared investments in the military and in the territory plus the economic partnership with a Western Saharan government. 5. Limitations of the model: The model argued for in this essay redresses most of the issues normal templates solutions have failed to address, and the mechanisms with which to implement a lasting win-‐win solution are talked about whereas conventional frameworks advanced by both antagonists and the UN are lacking practical devices able to bring ideal resolutions into the field. Yet, my model has its own set of disadvantages that limit its efficacy and realization. One of the disadvantages is the lack of an enforcement mechanism that will push the conflicting parties to adopt it regardless of their willingness and consent. Enforcement, if one is to be planned and led by the UN or the AU will have a negative impact on the conflict, leading to an expenditure of the armed struggle into neighboring countries due to alliances and security pacts. Furthermore, my research lacks statistics which are fundamental to any solution template since it gives a preview of the general tendency several fields will adopt, ranging from economic impact of the implementation of the plan till the social response of the country’s citizens, as well as the influence that would have on international relations and world politics. This model faces not only challenges in its implementation due to the interests’ conflict between Morocco and the Polisario, but also its efficiency is subject to questioning especially in a geostrategic cadre where international parties are actively involved. 6. Conclusion: The richness of the Western Sahara region with fisheries, Phosphate mines and potential oil deposits can sustain both the Moroccan and Sahrawi economic system if spent efficiently.
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By Giving the Western Sahara its independence, Morocco wouldn’t gain spare the financial resources spent on military presence in the region, resources which can be redirected towards empowering the industrial sector in the country and boost production capacities Morocco lacks, but also the kingdom can have still access to the wealth of the Western Sahara through special licenses of exploitation given exclusively to Morocco. The establishment of a privileged status for Morocco, in the same way the EU granted the country an advanced cooperation status with the European Union, assigned by the Western Sahara’s government, would allow the young country to benefit from the logistical and political support of Morocco, in exchange of low rates of financial costs on exportation to the kingdom and additional exploitation rights. Securing financial benefits from the Western Sahara will ultimately lead to the stabilization of the internal situation in the country, where the investments due to the spared money on military and the income from the Western Sahara’s privileges will increase in a way the political security of the regime who won’t be threatened by a socio-‐economic catastrophe. The cooperation between an independent state in the Sahara and the Moroccan government would be far more fruitful and rewarding than the prolonging of the conflict, a conflict which has been withdrawing considerable resources out of the national budget for more than 36 years.
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Bibliography: Books •
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Shelley, Toby. Endgame in the Western Sahara What Future for Africa's last colony?. London New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2004. Print. Zartman, William. Ripe for Resolution Conflict and Intervention in Africa. Updated Edition. New York Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Print. Ruddy, Ruddy, IPJET. International Law and the Question of Western Sahara
Reports •
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Arieff, Alexis. Western Sahara. CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2011. eBook. Theofilopoulou, Anna. The United Nations and Western Sahara A Never-ending Affair. Special Report 166. 1200 17th Street NW Washington, DC 20036: United States InsInsInstitute of Peace, 2006. eBook. WESTERN SAHARA: OUT OF THE IMPASSE. Middle East/North Africa Report N°66. International Crisis Group, 2007. eBook.
UN Documents •
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The situation concerning Western Sahara, Decision of 31 January 1996 (3625th meeting): resolution 1042 (1996), Advance version, 13th Supplement UN Doc. A/10023/Add.5,Annex
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