The rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy rise of the

back-and-forth as both Americaand Japan sidedwiththe EntentePowersagainst Germany–Japan providingmilitarysupport in Asia.However,muchtoAmerica’s dismay,Japan used thewar to extend its enterprisesinChina whilethe Imperial Japanese Navy –which hadbecomeanearautonomousinstitution in Japan’spolitical andmilitaryset-up–pushedout into the Pacificand wrestled various island groups from German hands.

By theend of theconflict therewas no doubtthat Japanhad become oneofthe leadingworld powers,and played akey role in postwarnegotiations andsettlements as one of thebrokers of theVersaillespeace treaty anda founding member of theLeague of Nations. Japan’semergence wasn’t necessarily viewed as an out-and-outthreat in theUS– butthe increasing frequency of itsendeavours in Chinaand further afieldcausedalarm,asdid thefrightening capability of itsnavy, which was nowone of themostadvancedinthe worldand had been utilised to devastatingeffectagainst Russia in 1904 andGermany throughout 1914-1918. Thefailure of postwartreatiesto quell fearsofanotherEuropeanwar andthe ever-increasing scopeand powerofJapan’s military over itsforeign affairsapproach were furtherareas of concern.

In response,USSecretaryofState Charles EvansHughesinvited Japanand sevenother nations to Washington in 1921 with two primaryaims: striking an agreementon howeachwould pursue itspoliciesinEast Asia,and reaching an accord on naval disarmamentand limitations.The meeting–andsubsequent gatherings in 1922 –became knownasthe Washington NavalConference.

Therewerethree majortreatiesagreed at theconference,and althoughtheywould ultimately fall shortoftheir goal to prevent tensionsbetween Japanand America evolving into war,their implementation did manage to uphold andmaintainastatusquo in Asia andthe Pacificfor thebestpartof thenextdecade.

AJapanese lithograph that historians believe showsthe Imperial Japanese Army fightingGerman troops in the German colonyofTsingtao during the First WorldWar.The original caption locates the action as being in Siberia after 1918, but there’snoevidence of German soldiers being in Asia during this time

Treaties of theWashington NavalConference

TheFive-PowerTreaty

Signed by theUS, Great Britain, Japan, France andItaly

This wasthe centrepieceagreementand called for thesignatories to maintain aset ratioofwarship tonnage –America andBritain allowed500,000 tons,Japan 300,000 tons and France andItaly 175,000tons; thenumbers reflectingthe fact thatthe US andUKhad to maintain fleetsinboth theAtlantic andPacific. Thenations also had to scrap older vesselsand they were preventedfrombuilding newcapital ships.Whilethe system was widely regarded as asuccess,the tonnagecontrolsdidn’t cover certain classes and so prompted anew race to build cruisers. Aside from itshardware restrictions,the treatyalso recognised American, Britishand Japanesebases in the Pacific butoutlawedany expansion

TheFour-Power Treaty

Signed by theUS, Great Britain,Japan and France

Thecountriesagreed to consult with each otherinthe eventofafuture crisis in East Asia before taking unilateral action.The strength of Japan’s military andits abilitytoact quickly in theregionwerekey factorsinthispartof theagreement, as wasthe need to replace the1902Anglo-JapaneseTreaty–American policymakersfearing thatif warwithJapan were to occur then Britain wouldbeobligated to sidewiththe Japanese. Thetreaty ensured thatnoneofthemwerecommitted to involvementinany argumentorconfrontation betweenother members, butput in placea mechanismthatwould hopefullydefuse any incidentand preventitfromdevelopinginto full-scale military action

TheNine-PowerTreaty

Signedbythe US,Great Britain, Japan, France,Italy, Belgium,the Netherlands, Portugal andChina

The final agreementofthe conferences formalised America’slong-held ‘opendoor’ approach to China andguaranteed thatall nationswould have an equal chancetodo business there.The treatydid recognise JapanesedominanceofManchuria, butalso reaffirmed China’sterritorialintegrity–akey elementthatwas designed to endJapanese expansion.For itspart, China agreed notto discriminate againstany countryseeking commercial opportunity.Aswould later become apparent,the one major flawwas thatitcalled for furtherconsultation in response to anyviolation andso lacked amethodbywhich to enforceits rules

Theinterwar years

TheWashingtonNaval Conference –along with thecomplex web of additional treaties andagreementsdesigned to settle the issues which prompted theFirst World War andprevent arepeat– managedtoupholda relatively peacefulstatusacrossthe globein the1920s,but troublewas brewing. Conflict had been costly –particularlyfor thelosing sides–and many European economieswent throughperiods of desperatestruggle.

It was thesamestory in Japanwhere, despiteits lightindustryhavingestablished itsplace in theworld market as aresult of thewar,its economywentintorecession in 1926. Thecircumstances were slightly differentinthe US –and thedecline would come alittlelater –but it wasn’timmune andeventhoughithad enjoyedarelative boom in itseconomyinthe early1920s it meantmanyofits citizenshad the opportunitytoborrow; andtheydid so to invest in thestock market.Itwas a houseofcards waitingtocollapse, and it didonTuesday,October 29,1929with theWallStreetCrash andthe onset of thedebilitatingGreat Depression

It meantthat the1930s beganwith global economic turmoil, anditwas an environmentthat sparkedawaveof nationalism andmilitaristictendencies across some of theworld’s superpowers–most notablyinGermany,Italy andJapan. TheactionsofGermany andItaly were of immediatethreattoEurope, andthe US –concentratingonits ownfinancialrecovery –heldtruetoits principles that it wouldnot entangle itself in affairsonthe othersideof theAtlantic. Westwardsacrossthe Pacific, however, Americahad aproblem

Japanese strength layinits manufacturingprowess andindustrial capability,but as ageographicallysmall nation it lacked thehugequantityof rawmaterials it needed andsobecame dependent on western supplies.With politicalinstability andeconomic pressure creating unrest in thecountry,a militarist faction –led by army generalHidekiTojo, a member of Japan’sfascist party–was able to assume largeswathes of powerwithin thecountry’s corridors of power. Tojo,and othermilitaryleaders underthe direction of Emperor Hirohito,refocused attentionon expansioninEastAsiawhere thenecessary resourceswereplentiful andfar cheaper to come by.Pressurewas building,and it resulted in an eventthat couldbeargued as beingthe first military engagement of thePacificWar –the Mukden Incident

Manchuriahad been ahotspot for international wranglingfor many years, and on September18, 1931,asmall explosion occurred on aJapanese-ownedrailway line in theregion.Damagewas negligible –so muchsothat apassingtrain justminutes laterwas unimpeded– butthe Imperial Japanese Army blamed Chinesenationalists forthe ‘attack’and used it as apretextto invade.Untrained andill-equippedChinese forces coulddolittle, andJapan achieved full occupation of Manchuriawithout difficultyoropposition. Theidentityofthe ‘attackers’remains controversialtoday –evidencesuggestingthat theact was carriedout by Japanese military officers intent on provoking aggravation,looking for areasonto flextheir muscles andwanting an excuse to take controlofthe region