PSI Journal 2014

PSI The McGill Psychology Undergraduate Journal

Issue IV March 2014

PSI

On the Cover Neuron Forest Can a forest exist without its trees, a brain without its neurons? The fourth cover of PSI is inspired by the wonderfully intricate network of dendrites and axons upon which psychology is founded: the neuron forest. Much like a brain, it is a complex whole, a shaded trove, filled with unknown wonders. Yet, like the old saying goes, one must not miss the forest for the trees. This year’s edition demonstrates how both forest and tree, brain and neuron, can exist simultaneously.

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McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI

Foreword Dear Reader, There is always something rewarding about seeing a project to completion ad This year we are pleased to present to you the fourth edition of the PSI McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal. Our team has put a lot of hard work into its creation for your reading pleasure and we hope that you will enjoy it as much as we enjoyed working on it.

The main goal of this jounal was to create a forum by which our undergraduates students could showcase their hard work in addition to showing the McGill community exactly what a team of undergraduates are capable of doing when they work together.

Throughout these few months, we have had the chance to interact with some very talented and dedicated individuals .We are also fortunate to have been able to work alongside a great team of editors and contributors and to read some of the insightful work that our undergraduate authors have submitted. This edition is more concise than previous years, as we chose to publish only ten articles,however, this journal is far from lacking in substance. This edition contains articles spanning a broad range of psychological topics from Neuropsychology , to Law and Ethics, and Transcultural psychiatry.

In addition, thanks to our hardworking website developing team, we would like to announce the first year of the creation of the journal’s very own website. This is exciting news as we believe that this will give our journal much more exposure in the McGill community, facilitate the process for future editions and most importantly, create a space that is more easily accessible for both potential authors, editors and psychology staff to gain information about our journal.

This may only be the fourth year that this journal is in circulation but we are extremely proud of the results of this publication. It is our hope that as you go through these pages, it will inspire you to continue the quest for knowledge of which psychology has been founded on.

Sincerely,

Bethsheba Ananng

Issue IV  March 2014

Terina Morgan

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Acknowledgements

This journal would not have been possible without the help of everyone who was involved in any way, whether big or small, in creating this journal.

However, there are a few people that we would like to highlight, of who without there support, this journal would not have been possible.

We would like to thank : Professor Debra Titone for her suggestion to create a website and for her willingness to provide us with her insightful council The Arts Undergraduate Society for providing us with funding that has allowed us to print this journal The executives of the McGill Psychology Students Association All the volunteers who took the time to give us valuable advice about the website, advertising, design

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McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI McGill Psychology Undergraduate Journal

PSI

Journal Committee 2013 – 2014

Journal Coordinator

Bethsheba Ananng

Editor-in-Chief

Terina Morgan

Editorial Board

Clara Nencu Allison Larussa Yolanda Song Shrabani Debroy Mark Saffran Seema Emami Anna Park Marichelle Leclair Maria Tippler Nika Booker-Grandea Serena Remutalla-Langlois

Website Developers

Vanessa Sunahara Isabelle Beaupré

Graphic Designer

Issue IV  March 2014

Mark Saffran

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword

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Acknowledgements

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Journal Committee 2013-2014

LITERATURE REVIEWS

RESEARCH ARTICLES

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6

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Praise and Passion in Athletes: How Competition Influences this Relationship

by Tamaryn de Kock

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The Effect of A Priori Mood State on Preference of Background Music

by Sara Florence

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Are Multiword Sequences Directly Retrieved or Compositionally Built? Evidence from a Cross-Modal Semantic Judgment Task of Idiomatic Expressions

by Caleb Harrison

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Implicit Theories of Goal Pursuit and University Students’ Adaptation Over A School Year

by Ignacio Valdes– Manzanedo

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Le Rôle du Gène Récepteur de la Mélanocortine de Type 1 Dans la Médiation de la Douleur

by Khadidja Chougui

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Superadditive Effect of Central Predictive Arrow Cue on Visuospatial Attention

by Renee Yan

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The Current Uses and Misuses of Neuroscience in the Courtroom

by Guido Guberman

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Ontology and Therapeutic Intervention Amongst the James Bay Cree: Towards a Culturally Competent Psychology

by Mark Saffran

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Attention Supersedes Consciousness

by Jaclyn Marcovitz

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Who Qualifies For Care? The Ethics of Not Providing Care for People Who are Homeless and Mentally Ill

by Alice Escande

McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI RESEARCH ARTICLE

Superadditive Effect of Central Predictive Arrow Cue on Visuospatial Attention Renee Yan* Supervised by Professor Jelena Ristic *email: Keywords: Visuospatial attention, Endogenous attention, Exogenous attention, Central predictive arrow cue, Superaddititive effect

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Abstract Traditionally, it has been thought that the mechanism of human visuospatial attention can be captured by the endogenous-exogenous dichotomy. Endogenous attention is voluntary and goal-directed, whereas exogenous attention is engaged involuntarily and is controlled by external stimuli. The current theory is that central arrows that are spatially predictive (i.e. task relevant) will predict endogenous attention, in isolation from exogenous attention.

Whereas, when the arrows are spatially non predictive (i.e. task irrelevant), they should not produce an endogenous shift in attention. However, recent evidence indicates that behaviourally meaningful cues, like arrows, will trigger exogenous shifts of attention even when they are non-predictive (Ristic & Kingstone, 2006). This paper partially supports these findings, as it demonstrates that predictive arrows actually elicit a unique form of attention, but does not fit the classic dichotic theory. This unique attentional effect greatly surpasses the individual or summed effects of endogenous and exogenous attention. This suggests that central predictive arrows elicit a synergistic interaction between endogenous and exogenous attention, to create a superadditive effect. Based on these findings, future research should focus not only on human attention itself, but also on the tools that are currently used to study attention, such as central predictive arrows and spatial cueing paradigms.

Attentional processing plays an essential role in our ability to efficiently adapt our behaviours to the environment.

Indeed, because our senses are constantly bombarded by stimulating events, efficient cognitive processing requires adequate selection of relevant information to coordinate behaviours accordingly. In that respect, attentional resources can be deployed towards different stimuli in the environment in order to boost this attentional processing . Prevailing theoretical models postulate that the control of attention can either be driven by one’s internal goals and expectations or by external stimuli from the environment, (Posner, 1978). Looking on both sides before crossing the road is an example of attention being driven by internal goals and expectations, whereas the orientation to a sudden salient event, such as an unexpected movement or a change in luminance, is an example of attention being driven by external stimuli. Respectively labeled endogenous and exogenous orienting, both modes of orienting are typically conceived as independent Issue IV  March 2014

attentional systems ( Corebetta & Shulman, 2002). While this view has guided a large body of scientific literature, one could argue that it carries low ecological validity. Some studies have reported that endogenous and exogenous orienting systems do interact (Ristic & Kingstone, 2006), while other studies point out that complex behaviours are often caused by the combined action of both modes of attention (Kingstone, Smilek, Eastwood, 2008 On the basis of these findings, the purpose of this study is to further investigate how interactions between endogenous and exogenous orienting influence the processing of attended events.

Typically, spatial cueing paradigms are used to measure and quantify shifts in attention orienting mechanisms( Posner, 1978, 1980). In this methodological approach, a cue is used to engage a participant’s attention and it can have an effect on where they orient their attention in space prior to the onset of a target. Participants’ expectations of the

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PSI target location can be manipulated with changes in probabilistic information provided by the cue. Cues that carry high levels of probabilistic information about the target’s location (i.e., predictive cues, such as an arrow that correctly predicts the location of target onset above chance level) are traditionally used to elicit endogenous attention, whereas exogenous attention can be elicited using cues that do not provide any probabilistic information regarding the target’s location (i.e. nonpredictive cues, such as an arrow that predicts the location of target onset at chance level). Both predictive and non-predictive cues can be manipulated to either correctly (i.e. valid trials), or incorrectly (i.e. invalid trials) indicate the target’s location. Accordingly, the effect of a cue on attention is measured by computing the difference in reaction time (RT) performance in valid trials relative to that in invalid trials. A cue’s effect on attention is seen when performance to validly cued targets is enhanced (e.g. faster RT for valid trials as compared to invalid trials) as a result of the cue engaging attention to the same location where the target will later onset.

This enhancement in performance is known as facilitation (Posner, 1980).

Jonides (1981) suggests two key differences between endogenous and exogenous attention. He found that endogenous attention is affected by cognitive load to a greater extent than is exogenous attention and is also more easily suppressed than is exogenous attention. This demonstrates that endogenous orienting is influenced by the capacities of working memory (Jonides, 1981). Researchers have also mapped out the time course of development for the two kinds of orienting by manipulating the StimulusOnset Asynchrony (i.e., SOA), which is the time interval between cue-onset and target-onset. Müller and Rabbitt (1989) found that the time courses of endogenous and exogenous attention are distinctive from one another; exogenous attention is said to be fast -acting while endogenous attention is relatively slowacting. Although endogenous attention is slower to engage, its effects are longer lasting and can be sustained at long SOAs (Müller and Rabbitt, 1989). On the other hand, exogenous attention develops a facilitatory effect immediately after cue-onset, however, this facilitatory effect is transitory and fades away if the target onset is 300-500 ms after the cue. For SOAs that are longer than 300 ms, the initial facilitation was no longer observed as it was replaced by inhibition.

This biphasic characteristic of exogenous attention is called inhibition of return (IOR) and it is not observed in the time course pattern of endogenous attention (Müller and Rabbitt, 1989). Using a two

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alternative forced-choice discrimination task, Cheal & Lyon, (1991) also found a difference between the time courses of exogenous and endogenous attention.

Exogenous cues produced largest facilitation effect on discrimination performance (indicated by short reaction time and high accuracy) when the SOAs are less than 100 ms. In contrast,a n endogenous cue required a minimal SOA of 300 ms to achieve a maximal facilitation effect (Cheal & Lyon, 1991). These differences in the time required to reach their relative maximal facilitation effect suggests that exogenous cues take less time to process, whereas it takes longer time for people to process endogenous cue.

Traditionally in the attention literature, it was thought that symbolic cues (i.e., cues that carry intrinsic meaning) solely engage endogenous orienting when they are task-relevant, that is, when they are made predictive of the target’s location (Jonides, 1981). This is because participants are deliberately using the information conveyed by this type of cue to orient their attention. On the other hand, it was a common belief that non-predictive and task-irrelevant symbolic cues (i.e., cues that do not convey meaningful information about the target’s location) would not engage any attention (Jonides, 1981). This assumption has recently been challenged by numerous reports showing that task-irrelevant symbolic cues can indeed produce exogenous orienting of attention Tipples, 2002).

Friesen and Kingstone (1998) studied the effect of eye gaze cues on attention orienting. They used a simple schematic face that looked left, right, or straight ahead. The subjects could not be voluntarily orienting their attention to a spatial location before the targetonset because they were explicitly told that the line drawing’s gaze direction (the cue) was not predictive of the target’s location. However, despite this knowledge, reaction time performance was reliably better when the peripheral target onset on the same side as the gaze direction relative to when it onset on the opposite side, which indicates that attention is engaged to the cued location involuntarily, confirming that non-predictive gaze cue engaged exogenous orienting of attention.

Tipples (2002) investigated whether this effect was specific to eye gaze. He found that spatially non-predictive arrows can also trigger exogenous attention, as participants were reliably better at detecting targets that appeared at locations where the arrows pointed as compared to when the targets appeared at other locations. Thus, while participants were made fully aware that task-irrelevant arrow cues did not convey meaningful information about the McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI target’s location, the directionality of the arrow still engaged attention. Because these attentional shifts were unintentional, this series of findings show that behaviourally relevant stimuli such as eye gaze, or symbolic cues such as arrows, elicit exogenous orienting of attention.

This novel finding offers a new perspective about the effect of symbolic cues on attention, and hence the theory that predictive symbolic cues were the only type to trigger voluntary shifts in attention becomes untenable .To investigate the effect of highly predictive symbolic cues on attention, Ristic and Kingstone (2006) contrasted it with the effects of isolated exogenous orienting and that of isolated endogenous orienting. They used a detection task in which participants were required to respond as quickly as possible to a target onset. All cues were presented at fixation while the targets could onset at four possible peripheral locations (i.e., up, down, left and right). To measure the effect of endogenous orienting, they introduced a predictive number cue condition.

Numbers cues are posited to be valid measures for isolating pure endogenous attention since they do not have intrinsic directionality, and thus, should not trigger exogenous shifts of attention. This was confirmed, as attentional shifts resulting fromnon-predictive number cues were measured. The results showed, as predicted, that number cues failed to engage exogenous attention.

By making these same four number cues (i.e., “1”, “3”, “6” and “9”) predictive of the target’s location, they were used to elicit endogenous orienting. For example, whenever the number “1” was presented, it meant that the target had 80% chance to onset at the top location.

This manipulation produced an orienting effect.

Accordingly, because non-predictive number cues failed to produce shift of attention, whereas predictive number cues did engage attention, Ristic and Kingstone (2006) confirmed that they had isolated and measured endogenous attention using predictive number cues. On the other hand, they used non-predictive arrow cues to trigger exogenous attention. To address their key question of what kind of attention effect central predictive arrow cues elicit, they compared the attention effect triggered by the predictive arrow against the endogenous attention effect that was elicited by the predictive number cue, and against the exogenous attention effect that was elicited by the nonpredictive arrow cue. They found that the magnitude of the attention effect triggered by the predictive arrow cue was: (a) much greater than the magnitude of endogenous attention effect triggered by the predictive number cue; (b) much greater than the magnitude of Issue IV  March 2014

exogenous attention effect triggered by the nonpredictive arrow cue; and (c) even greater than the summed magnitudes of the endogenous effect triggered by the predictive number and the exogenous effect triggered by the non-predictive arrow. Based on the finding that the attention effect produced by predictive arrows significantly surpassed the sum of endogenous and exogenous attention, this robust attention effect elicited by predictive arrow cues was named the superadditive effect. Ristic and Kingstone’s (2006) demonstration of the supperadditive effect challenges the classic dichotomy of attention, which may be overly simplistic., Results show that the attention effect elicited by the predictive arrow is neither the same as exogenous nor endogenous attention, nor does it approximate their additive effect.

The finding that predictive symbolic cues engaged attention in a fashion different from exogenous orienting, endogenous orienting, or their combination, introduces a novel perspective on the relationship between these modes of orienting. While it may be true that endogenous and exogenous attention represent separate systems, their resources dedication reflects a different picture than mere additivity and independence. Based on additive factors logic, if two underlying mechanisms are operating independently, they will influence performance (e.g., mean RT) in an additive fashion (Sternberg, 1969) \ \ And hence the synergistic effect of endogenous and exogenous attention suggests an interaction, rather than an independency between the two attentional systems.

Ristic and Kingstone’s (2006) finding was based on reaction time performance in a simple detection task, in which participants were asked to respond to a target that appears on the screen. However, besides facilitating reaction time performance, past research has also demonstrated that attention facilitates the processing of sensory input, and hence increasing the accuracy of the performance (Hawkins et al., 1990).

Hawkins et al.’s (1990) have demonstrated that the efficacy of sensory processes is modulated by attention in that signal detection is enhanced at attended locations as compared to unattended ones. Other researchers, such as Bashinski and Bacharach (1980) demonstrated that spatial attention enhances reaction time performance as a result of enhanced perceptual sensitivity. I n line with this perspective, the aim of the present study is to investigate the effects of

predictive arrow cues on attention orienting and sensory processing. As an extension of Ristic and

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PSI Kingstone’s (2006) findings, the current study investigated whether superadditivity was also reflected in measures of sensory processing when attention is elicited by central predictive arrow cues in a target discrimination task. It was hypothesized that the superadditive effect would be reflected in reaction time.

To test this hypothesis, a cueing paradigm similar to that used in Ristic and Kingstone’s (2006) study was employed.

Method Participants A total of 25 undergraduates were recruited from McGill’s participant pool. All participants were naive about the purpose of the study and had either normal or corrected-to-normal vision.

All participants completed all experimental conditions in a randomized order. Upon completing the experiment, they were granted 2 course credits.

Material

This study used a within-subject design, wherein each participant was required to complete each of the four spatial predictiveness x cue type conditions (i.e. nonpredictive shape; predictive shape; non-predictive arrow; predictive arrow). To better assess deployment of attention, cue-target time interval (i.e., SOA) was manipulated. Therefore, Cue type (i.e., shape, arrow), spatial predictiveness (i.e., nonpredictive, predictive), SOA (100, 300, 600, 900 ms) and cue validity (valid, invalid) were manipulated within-subjects. Each participant completed a total of 2048 experimental trials. Individual combinations of cue type and spatial predictiveness were grouped in blocks; each condition consisted of 512 trials equally distributed into 8 blocks.

Upon completing each block, participants were prompted by the computer to press the “enter” key to start the next block. Conditions were randomized across participants. All participants completed 10 practice trials at the beginning of each testing session.

Target stimuli could either onset to the right or left of the display. In the non-predictive conditions (i.e., non-predictive shapes and non-predictive arrows), target had equal chance (i.e. 50%) to onset on either side. In the predictive shapes condition, shape cues predicted the target’s location such that the square cue correctly predicted that the target would onset on the right 80% of the overall trials, whereas the circle cue correctly predicted that the target would onset on the left 80% of the overall trials. In the predictive arrow cue condition, the directionality of the arrow cues correctly predicted the location of the target in 80% of the trials.

Cue direction, target location, target type, and SOAs

Central arrow cues (3.5° long) were made by combining a straight line (2.4°) with an arrowhead and arrow tail. Central geometric cues included a square (3.5° x 3.5°) and a circle (3.5° of diameter). The two target stimuli to be discriminated were 4 x 3 checkerboards pattern stimuli, each subtending a visual angle of 2° x 1.5°, and where the top row of the checkboard was filled-in for one stimulus, and the left column of the checkboard was filled-in for the other. The mask stimulus was 2° x 1.5° rectangle filled by randomly disorganized lines. Response keys were the “H” and “B” on a standard QWERTY keyboard. The assigned associations between target stimuli and response keys were counterbalanced across participants. The stimuli and a sample timing sequence are illustrated in Figure 1.

Design

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Figure 1. Illustration of stimuli and sample sequence of events: at the start of each trial, a fixation point appeared on the screen for 675ms. Then an arrow cue (pointing left, right, up or down), or a central shape cue (circle or square) appeared. The target appeared to the left or right 100, 300, 600, or 900ms after the cue onset. The target is then masked on the screen until a response was made or 2,700ms had elapsed, whichever came first. The intertrial interval was 525ms. (stimuli not drawn to scale)

McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI were distributed randomly across all trials.

Participants were informed oft the cue-target contingencies at the beginning of each spatial predictiveness by cue type condition (i.e., nonpredictive shapes, predictive shapes, non-predictive arrows, predictive arrows).

Procedure An eye-level 16-inch CRT computer monitor was placed 57 cm away from participants. On the computer screen, black stimuli were presented on a white background.

Each trial began with the presentation of a central fixation point for 675 ms, which was then replaced by the central cue for a SOA of 100, 300, 600, or 900 ms, followed by target onset and was masked after 150ms display. The mask remained on the screen until a response was made or 2,700 ms had elapsed, whichever came first. Inter-trial interval was set at 525ms.

Participants were instructed to indicate whether the stimulus was target or a non-target by pressing either the “B” key with the index finger or the “H” key with the middle finger using the right hand. All participants were asked to respond as fast and as accurately as possible and to maintain central fixation at all times during the task.

Results Anticipations (RT < 150ms) and timed-out responses (RT > 1500ms) were classified as errors and were excluded from the analyses. Only 3 out of the total 25 participants that were recruited showed excessive number of errors (> 10%) and were excluded from analyses.

predictive conditions as compared to non-predictive ones. Significant interactions were found for cue type by cue validity, [F (1, 21) = 58.432, p < .001], and cue type by SOA by cue validity, [F (3, 63) = 4.185, p < .0092]. These interactions revealed that the difference in RTs between valid and invalid trials was greater for arrow cues as compared to shape cues, and that this effect grew with increases in SOA time .

Table 1. Reaction times according to cue type and cue predictiveness, for different SOAs

Arrow Non-predictive

Predictive

SOA

Condition M

SD

M

SD

100-ms

Valid

507.7

68.1

511.1

82.0

Invalid

514.0

64.3

536.5

79.6

Valid

482.9

60.0

478.8

79.6

Invalid

508.5

52.8

531.7

84.6

Valid

470.8

62.1

475.0

72.0

Invalid

500.3

51.6

524.2

79.6

Valid

480.5

59.5

482.2

75.9

Invalid

498.5

52.0

523.4

86.2

300-ms

600-ms

900-ms

Note: SOA= Stimulus Onset Asynchrony

Reaction Time The mean RTs for all four conditions are presented in Table 1and shown in Figure 2 as a function of SOA and validity. A four-way repeated measures ANOVA with spatial-predictiveness (non-predictive; predictive), cue type (shape, arrow), SOA (100ms; 300ms; 600ms; 900ms), and cue validity (invalid; valid) as factors was performed as omnibus test. This analysis found a main effect of SOA, [F (3, 63) = 23.26, p < .0001], and cue validity, [F (1, 21) = 111.36, p < .0001] reflecting overall slower responses at shorter cue-target intervals as compared to longer ones, while overall responses were faster for valid trials relative to invalid ones. A spatial predictiveness by cue validity interaction, [F (1, 21) = 26.637, p < .001], indicated that RT differences between invalid and valid trials were significantly greater for Issue IV  March 2014

Next, four separate two-way repeated measures ANOVA with SOA (100ms, 300ms, 600ms, 900ms) and cue validity (invalid, valid) as factors were performed for each of the four attention conditions separately (non-predictive shape, predictive shape, non-predictive arrow, predictive arrow).

Non-predictive shape. The analysis for nonpredictive shape yielded a main effect of SOA, [F (3, 63) = 15.168, p < .0001], reflecting again, slower response at shorter cue-target intervals compared to longer ones (see Figure 2A). Critically, no main effect of cue validity (F=.282, p = .6007) and no cue validity by SOA interaction (F= 1.235, p=.3044) was

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PSI found. This result replicated past findings (Ristic & Kingstone 2006 and confirmed that non-predictive shapes did not trigger any attentional effect.

Predictive shape. The analysis for predictive shapes yielded significant main effect of SOA [F (3, 63) = 10.156, p < .0001] again confirming that RT responses were slower for short cue-target intervals compared to longer ones. A main effect of cue validity [F (1, 21) = 11.631, p = .0026] was found, which confirmed that predictive shape cues elicited endogenous attention, as RT responses were faster for valid trials as compared to invalid ones. This facilitation did not vary across SOAs, as no significant SOA by cue validity interaction was found (F = .287, p = .8348). (See Figure 2B) Non-predictive arrow. The analysis for non-predictive arrow yielded a significant main effect of SOA [F (3, 63) = 12.135, p < .001] confirming that RT responses were faster for short cue-target intervals as compared to longer ones. Replicating past studies ; Tipple, 2002), the analysis yielded a main effect of cue validity, [F (1, 21) = 34.847, p < .001], as well as an SOA by cue validity interaction, [F (3, 63) = 8.642, p < .001], indicating that non-predictive arrows engaged attention, while this effect increased at longer cuetarget intervals. (See Figure 2C) Predictive arrow. The analysis for predictive arrow yielded a significant main effect of SOA [F (3, 63) = 12.160, p < .001] showing that the RT responses were modulated as a function of SOA. A main effect of cue validity [F (1, 21) = 129.953, p < .001] was also found confirming that predictive arrow cues engaged attention. A significant SOA by cue validity interaction [F (3, 63) = 4.720, p < .01] was found, showing that the effect that predictive arrow has on attention increased as a function of cue-target intervals. (See Figure 2D) Magnitudes of Attentional Effects To investigate which conditions elicited the largest effect on attention, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with conditions (non-predictive shape, predictive shape, non-predictive arrow, predictive arrow) and SOA (100ms, 300ms, 600ms, 900ms) as factors was performed on the magnitudes of attentional effects (mean corrected RT for invalid trials â&#x20AC;&#x201C; mean corrected RT for valid trials). This analysis found a significant main effect of condition [F (3, 63) = 37.446, p < .001], showing that the attentional effect elicited by predictive arrow condition was larger than the effect from non-predictive arrow and predictive shapes conditions (Figure 3). Main effect of SOA was also significant, [F (3, 63) = 8.022, p = .001], confirming overall increase in attentional effects at longer cue-target intervals. No significant interaction was found (F=1.852, p = .0615), revealing that the attentional effects elicited by the cues did not vary as a function of SOA. (Figure 3) Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the mean reaction times (RTs) plotted as a function of cue-target stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) and cue validity for each of the four experimental conditions. Figures 2A and 2B illustrate mean RTs as a function of SOA and cue validity for non-predictive and predictive shape, respectively. Figures 2C and 2D illustrate mean RTs as a function of SOA and validity for non-predictive arrow and predictive arrow conditions, respectively.

Error bars depict standard error of the difference of the means.

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McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI To verify whether predictive arrow cues elicited a superadditive effect on attention, the magnitude of the attentional effect in the predictive arrow condition was compared against the summed magnitudes of attentional effects in the predictive shape and non-predictive arrow conditions. This comparison was performed using a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with condition (sum of predictive shape and non-predictive arrow, predictive arrow) and SOA (100ms, 300ms, 600ms, 900ms) as factors. Main effect of condition was significant, [F (1, 21) = 8.286, p = .009]. Therefore, replicating past findings (Ristic and Kingstone, 2006 , , the analysis confirmed that predictive arrow did produce a superadditive attentional effect. The attentional effect elicited by the predictive arrow had a magnitude that was greater than the summed effects of non-predictive arrow and predictive shape (Figure 3). Significant main effect of SOA was also found, [F (3, 63) = 8.293, p <.001], showing that attentional effects varied as a function of SOA. (See Figure 3)

Discussion The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of spatially predictive central arrow cues on the orienting of attention in a target discrimination task. Replicating previous findings

by Ristic & Kingstone, (2006 ), and Tipples (2002) behavioural performances in all four experimental conditions (i.e., non-predictive shapes, predictive shapes, non-predictive arrow, predictive arrow) produced their expected effects.

The results showed that non-predictive shapes failed to engage attention, attesting that these shapes do not cause automatic orienting of attention. Moreover, it was shown that these shape stimuli elicited endogenous attention when they were made spatially predictive of the targetâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s location. Together, these results verified that predictive shapes isolated endogenous attention since the cueing effect was resulted from deliberate and intentional use of the probabilistic information conveyed by the cue. It was also Issue IV ď&#x201A;ˇ March 2014

shown that non-predictive arrow cues produced exogenous orienting of attention.

Critically, analyses of the magnitudes of attentional effect confirmed that both exogenous and endogenous attentions were concurrently engaged when arrow cues were made spatially predictive of the targetâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Location. The results from this study in fact confirmed that endogenous and exogenous attention combined in a superadditive manner, since the attentional effect elicited by predictive arrow cues was not only greater than the effect of endogenous (elicited by predictive shapes) and exogenous (elicited by non-predictive arrow cues) attention in isolation, but was also greater than their additive sum.

Two important implications can be made about the (state that is being studied . First, by replicating previous findings that employed a target detection task (Ristic & Kingstone, 2006 , , the existence of superadditive interaction between

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fully controlled or monitored.

This limited the solidity of our interpretation. Accordingly, future studies would need to better control for eye movements using eye-tracking technology.

The spatial-cueing paradigm is vastly employed in attention research for various applications, such as the exploration of brain mechanisms that underlie human attention. Also, using the central arrow cueing task, the rate of endogenous attention development over the lifespan has been mapped out for developing children (Goldberg et al., 2001). Given the importance of the use of central predictive arrows, the current study is

Figure 3. Magnitudes of attentional orienting for each condition. Error bars depict standard error of the difference of the means.

attentional systems was supported. Furthermore, it was shown that the joint activation of endogenous and exogenous attention was presenting a target discrimination task. Thus, the joint activation of attentional systems in response to a predictive arrow cue generalizes beyond the processes that are involved in simple target detection to those that are involved during the discrimination of visual stimuli. Second, since attention has been found to enhance sensory processing for attended stimuli compared to unattended stimuli (Hawkins et al., 1990), the results suggest that the joint commitment of endogenous and exogenous can lead to enhanced processing at the sensory level of stimulus processing in a superadditive manner. However, while RT results showed that this joint commitment can enhance sensory processing of target stimuli, future studies are needed to investigate if this result can be replicated in accuracy rate data and perhaps investigate using a harder target discrimination task. Moreover, neuroimaging techniques also represent a reliable approach to investigate the superadditive effect at the sensory-processing level . Limitations Although participants were instructed to maintain fixation on the center of the monitor for the duration of the experiment, eye-movements were not f

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meaningful as it sheds new light onto the application of this cue in the spatial-cueing paradigm, and the way that past, present and future findings should be interpreted.

References Bashinski, H. S., & Bacharach, V. R. (1980).

Enhancement of perceptual sensitivity as the result of selectively attending to spatial locations. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 28(3), 241-248 .

Cheal, M., & Lyon, D. R. (1991). Central and peripheral precuing of forced-choice discrimination. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology , 43(4), 859-880.

Corbetta, M., & Shulman, G. L. (2002). Control of g oal-directed and stimulus-driven attention in t he brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3(3), 215-229. doi:10.1038/nrn755 Friesen, C. K., & Kingstone, A. (1998). The eyes have It! Reflexive orienting is triggered by nonpredictive gaze. Psychonomic bulletin & r eview, 5(3), 490-495 .

McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI Goldberg, M.C., Maurer, D., & Lewis, T.L. (2001). Developmental changes in attention: The effects of endogenous cueing and of distractors. Developmental Science, 4, 209- 219.

Hawkins, H. L., Hillyard, S. A., Luck, S. J., Mouloua, M., Downing, C. J., & Woodward, D. P. (1990). Visual attention modulates signal detectability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance;16(4),802. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.16.4.802 Jonides, J. (1981). Voluntary versus automatic control over the mind’s eye’s movement. In J.B. Long & A. D. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention & performance IX (pp. 187-203). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Kingstone, A., Smilek, D., & Eastwood, J. D. (2008).

Cognitive ethology: A new approach for studying human cognition. British Journal of Psychology, 99(3), 317-340. doi:10.1111/c ogs.12087 Müller, H. J., & Rabbitt, P. M. (1989). Reflexive and voluntary orienting of visual attention: Time course of activation and resistance to interruption. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and performance, 15(2), 315. doi: 10.1037/0096- 1523.15.2.315 Posner, M. I. (1978). Chronometric Explorations of Mind . Oxford University Press.

Posner, M.I. (1980). Orienting of attention.

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32(1), 3-25 .

Ristic, J., & Kingstone, A. (2006). Attention to arrows: Pointing to a new direction. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 5 9(11), 1921-1930 .

Sternberg, S. (1969). The discovery of processing stages: Extensions of Donders' method. Acta Psychologica30,276-315. doi:10.1016/00016918 (69)90055-9.

Tipples, J. (2002). Eye gaze is not unique: Automatic orienting in response to uninformative arrows. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(2), 314-318 .

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PSI LITERATURE REVIEW

Who Qualifies for Care? The Ethics of Not Providing Care for People Who are Homeless and Mentally Ill Alice Escande* April 16, 2013

Abstract Keywords Homelessness, ethics, health care, addiction, mental illness

Homelessness is a major problem in contemporary society. Individuals who are homeless are at a higher risk for incarceration and hospitalization, and homelessness is associated with high rates of both physical and mental illness. In fact, mental illness and addiction have been found to be major causal factors in homelessness (Riordan & Dewing, 2004).

Despite the prevalence of mental illness amongst homeless individuals, these individuals rarely have access to mental health resources, which prevents them from recovering or leading healthy and autonomous lives. This lack of access also violates the ethical obligation of distributive justice in healthcare which states that scarce resources must be fairly distributed among all groups (Gillon, 1994). This essay will demonstrate that political and social developments of the past century, the stigma of mental illness, and the lack of resources for clinical care and social investment are the primary causes of homelessness and its perpetuation. It is proposed that de-stigmatization and prevention of mental illness and addiction, as well as clinical and social investment in mental health programs, will benefit individuals who are homeless, prevent others from becoming homeless, and

Introduction As defined by the Canadian Homelessness Research Network (2012), homelessness describes â&#x20AC;&#x153;the situation of an individual or family without stable, permanent, appropriate housing, or the immediate prospect, means and ability of acquiring itâ&#x20AC;? (p.1). It is often a transient state; the length of homelessness varies widely, from a week or a month to permanent homelessness.

Individuals of all genders, races, and ages are affected by this issue but the majority of homeless individuals are unattached men (Baum & Burnes, 1993). Despite the visibility of homelessness in Canada, there are no accurate national statistics on the size of the homeless population. This is mainly due to the aforementioned transient nature of homelessness. In 2007, Canadaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s National Secretariat on Homelessness has estimated that homelessness affects approximately 150,000 people in Canada, although another report has identified as many as 300,000 individuals (Echenberg &

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Jensen, 2008). In Montreal, the Ministry of Health and Social Services estimated that in 2005, 30,000 individuals had been homeless in Montreal for at least some time during the year. This is an increase compared to the 1estimate made in 1998 which revealed that 28, 214 homeless people were living in Montreal (Roy & Crocker, 2012). This increase is visible in other parts of the world and seems to outline a general trend.

Homelessness is not to be confused with poverty and, contrary to popular belief, most individuals who are homeless do not become homeless solely because of financial difficulties. Lack of affordable housing, as well as declining social and economic benefits are not the only forces that drive people into homelessness either. In Canada, at least one third of homeless individuals stated that their physical or mental illnesses prevented them from obtaining and keeping housing (Riordan & Dewing, 2004). Homelessness is significantly positively correlated with diagnoses of mental illness or substance abuse, which is categorized McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI as the abuse of alcohol, drugs or a combination of the two. Furthermore, it is estimated that between 30 to 50% of homeless individuals have a mental illness (Roy & Crocker, 2012).

Mental illness can be defined as a condition of impairment of an individual’s normal cognitive, behavioural, and emotional functioning, and includes conditions such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depression or post-traumatic stress disorder (American Heritage Dictionary). About 10% of the homeless population is affected by severe mental disorders such as schizophrenia, whereas the majority of the homeless subset is suffering from affective disorders (Franskish, Hwang, & Quantz, 2005). In Ontario for example, it was found that approximately 66% of those who were homeless had a lifetime diagnosis of mental illness, which is roughly two to three times greater than the rate of lifetime mental illness in the general population. In total, 86% had either a mental illness or an addiction or both (Riordan & Dewing, 2004). According to Kemp (2007), homeless individuals with mental illness and/or substance abuse problems are exceptionally vulnerable because they tend to remain homeless for longer periods of time and are at a higher risk for incarceration. In addition, they tend to be in poorer health than other homeless people, and have a higher rate of communicable diseases, such as HIV and tuberculosis. They are also at a higher risk of premature death, with an estimated reduction in life expectancy of 15 to 20 years (Kemp, 2007).

In some cases, homelessness can trigger the emergence of mental illness. Becoming homeless, even if for a short period of time, is a traumatizing experience because life on the streets can be dangerous and risky.

As attested by Alain Spitzer, executive director of the St. James shelter in Montreal, homeless individuals are often assaulted, robbed or even raped by criminals or other homeless people (Spitzer, 2013, personal interview). This experience can trigger psychological trauma leading to depression, bipolar disorder and other mental illnesses. Homeless people are also at greater risk of abusing drugs or alcohol as a way to cope with stress and anxiety (Riordan & Dewig, 2004).

Issue IV  March 2014

Although homelessness has been found to trigger mental illness or addiction, in most cases it is a history of mental illness and/or substance abuse that places people at a greater risk for homelessness (Baum & Burnes, 1993). In some cases, mental illnesses or affective disorders prevent individuals from being able to live autonomously and incapable of maintaining their jobs and housing.. Furthermore, they cannot sustain relationships with others or even sustain themselves because of the effects of drugs, alcohol, psychoses, or emotional problems (Baum & Burnes, 1993). These people are even further at risk if they have had patterns of isolation. Even for the most social individuals, the stigma of mental illness and experiences of discrimination can lead to the alienation of mentally ill people from society.

Stigmatization of Mental Illness as Cause of Homelessness Despite the prevalence of mental illness in the general population, individuals with mental illness or addiction face multiple discriminatory obstacles, both individual and institutional, that prevent full participation in society (Human Rights Mental Health Strategy, 2009).

People can be embarrassed and scared of the socially inappropriate behaviour displayed by individuals with mental illness. Additionally, the stigma that is attachted discourages people from seeking help for psychiatric or addiction problems (Baum & Burnes, 1993). That is, it is seen as a weakness to seek help for problems relating to mental illness, and people often think these problems can be solved simply by using willpower.

Stigmatization also creates distance between those with mental illness and those without, thus instilling “ …a pattern of disaffiliation, the very condition that is the hallmark of homelessness” (Baum & Burnes, 1993, p. 154). Discrimination and stigma make it harder for mentally ill individuals to find a job, health insurance, or even a house. Health insurance companies, for example, usually prefer to avoid the “high risk” patients with a history of mental illness, because they are too likely to generate heavy health care costs. Anxiety due to discrimination can further exacerbate mental illness. Ashamed and rejected, the individuals may feel as though they have to or they are forced to withdraw from society. Left untreated and severely impaired in social, occupational, health, and

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PSI other aspects of life, they can fall into a downward spiral of isolation that can result in homelessness.

Political and Social Developments of the Past Century as Cause of Homelessness Deinstitutionalization is a phenomenon that took place through the late 1960s and 1970s when many long-stay psychiatric hospitals closed and psychiatric patients were released into the community. This movement was initiated because of legal and financial reasons, as well as growing concerns about some methods employed in psychiatry and long-stay psychiatric hospitals in particular. The population size of mental institutions was decreased, the average length stay shortened and admission rates were reduced (Sealy & Whitehead, 2004). It is estimated that the number of beds in Canadian mental hospitals fell from 47 633 in 1960 to 15 011 in 1976, a decrease of 68% (Riordan & Dewing, 2004). In fact, while great savings were attained from the closing of those costly institutions, there are tremendous variations among provinces with regard to whether this money was reinvested into community care or absorbed by the government (Sealy & Whitehead, 2004). In some places, mentally disabled individuals were integrated into the community without follow up or supervision by health care workers. No assurance was made that those discharged were taking or even had access to the treatment they needed. Many of these individuals, untreated and without help, were left to their own devices and ended up in the streets. It has been estimated that deinstitutionalization has affected approximately 2 million seriously mentally ill in the US (Kemp, 2007). Nevertheless, the direct contribution of deinstitutionalization to homelessness is disputed. In Toronto, by the late 1990s only 6% of homeless persons had been in a psychiatric facility in the 12 months prior to their homelessness (Riordan & Dewing, 2004). It seems more reasonable to conclude that the release of psychiatric patients from institutions was not directly responsible for the increase in homeless people – especially the significant increase in the 1990s - but that the lowering of welfare rates following deinstitutionalization, especially a cut in health and social services, was. As Richard Lamb puts it: “[Homelessness] is not the result of deinstitutionalization per se but of the way deinstitutionalization has been carried out. The lack of planning for structured living arrangements and for adequate treatment and rehabilitative services in the community has led to many unforeseen consequences such as homelessness” (Lamb, 1984)

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Whatever the reasons that exist to explain why a person ended up on the streets with an untreated mental illness, be it trauma, stigmatization, deinstitutionalization, one’s need for medical help and assistance is as important, if not more important, than the issue of one’s housing status. Unfortunately, current policies toward homeless people are disproportionately directed towards providing them with a roof over their head than providing them with mental health care.

Often times, homeless individuals remain in their situation because there are few resources invested in psychiatric facilities and other mental health services, resulting in a homeless population with very limited nearly access to these beneficial institutions.

Lack of Resources for Clinical Care as Cause of Homelessness According to Thomas Nees “homeless people are divided in three categories: in the first one are the 10 to 15 percent least dysfunctional, in the second one are the 70 to 80 percent with serious problems of substance abuse and/or mental illness. The attention is focused on the 10 to 15 top percent. And 85 to 90 percent of the homeless cannot benefit from most transitional service programs without first participating in appropriate treatment” (Baum & Burnes, 1993, p. 81). In other words, Nees is denouncing a society that fails to offer appropriate measures to aid the homeless population.

By transitional service programs, Nees is referring to education, job and budget trainings, transitional and low-income housing such as shelters, which provide temporary housing for homeless people (American Heritage Dictionary). Shelters can also provide food, and some day-shelters provide a real sense of community that is important in the lives of these individuals. Nonetheless, most shelters do not provide rehabilitative services such as substance abuse treatment and mental health care (Hurtubise & Babin, 2009). Even worse, some shelters refuse to receive severely mentally ill homeless individuals and/or drug addicts. In turn, some mentally ill homeless people purposely refuse to frequent shelters, fearful that they will be stigmatized and rejected because of their mental disability (Spitzer, 2013, personal interview). Baum and Burnes ( 1993) describe shelters as a “band aid” solution because they do not address the real problem of some homeless individuals and have little or no long-term benefits.

But why is society failing to offer mental health service provisions for people in need? It has been estimated that at any given time there are far more people with untreated psychiatric illnesses living on McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI But why is society failing to offer mental health service provisions for people in need? It has been estimated that at any given time there are far more people with untreated psychiatric illnesses living on America’s streets than are receiving care in hospitals (Center, 2009), which reveals a true problem with the government’s allocation of resources to psychiatric and community mental health care centers. One reason why the provision of mental health care is not as automatic as the provision of health and medical care in general is that there are ethical considerations with respect to the development of psychiatry.

Psychiatry is a recent and controversial field. Prior to 1839 there was no policy in Canada for dealing with the mentally disabled (Ernst, 2013). Since the birth of psychiatry in the nineteenth century, the field has been subject to several scandals, and has been judged guilty of using many unethical approaches to mental illness.

The eugenics and sterilization movement1 in the 1920s and 1930s, the insulin shock therapy2 to treat schizophrenia in the 1940s and 1950s and the lobotomies3 performed in 1950s are striking examples of these unethical issues. One disputable area of psychiatry is the diagnosis and treatment of mental illnesses. While there is no doubt about whether to treat or how to treat tuberculosis for example, there is significant controversy about whether and how schizophrenia should be treated. Some of the arguments put forward in the controversy about diagnosis are that psychiatric symptoms are not specific and that they can occur in normal individuals.

Labelling an individual as “sick” is detrimental for their self-image and can lead to social isolation and auto -stigmatization; for example, diagnosing a mental illness can encourage the patient to think that he is no longer responsible for his behaviour. Arguments advanced in the controversy about treatment say that medication changes the way the brain functions and can thus change the self, that they have considerable side effects, and that they can induce some form of dependence (Debruille, 2013). In short, not all mentally ill patients, or homeless people for that matter, need to be treated and not all of them need to be treated in the same way.

Another ethical principle that is important to take into consideration before deciding to treat all homeless people with mental illness is the principle of autonomy.

What degree of autonomy does a person affected by a severe mental illness like schizophrenia possess? It is difficult to decide if caregivers ought to treat a person Issue IV  March 2014

refusing to be treated. In theory, the principle of autonomy states that the patients can refuse treatment and that their choice must be respected. In practice, it is not so easy to assess the degree of reasoning capacities the patient possesses in order to determine if they are capable of making decisions for him or herself. What does one do with a homeless individual suffering from schizophrenia that refuses to be treated because “voices” advised him or her against it? The debate is important and the issue is not yet settled. To some, the homeless individual’s freedom and autonomy must be respected at all costs. For others, such as Lamb (1992), it is not a choice that they can make: “Should chronically mentally ill individuals have a right to ‘choose’ a life on the streets without a consideration for their physical health or the extent of their competence to make such a ‘decision’?. We think not.” (p.3) Even if those ethical considerations have to be kept in mind by all practitioners in psychiatry, not providing care for mentally ill people that request it is an even greater violation of the core ethic principle of justice in provision of health care. Even for those people, the health care system fails to provide them with what they need.

As mentioned in our discussion of the deinstitutionalization movement, health and social services in North America have diminished since the 1990s. It is especially true now in 2013, in a time of global recession. The National Mental Health Association Project found that in 2004, at least 29 U.S states cut funding for mental health services while dealing with budget difficulties and rising health care costs (Kemp, 2007,). In Canada, the government has also cut funds. The Canadian Psychiatric Association (2012) has publicly voiced its concern in May 2012 with regard to recent cuts in mental health in areas of federal responsibility. According to the Canadian Psychiatric Association (2013), “demand for psychiatrist in Canada continues to exceed the supply. Many areas of the country lack adequate psychiatric services where shortages are especially acute in rural and northern areas like Ontario. Public health care insurance only covers basic psychiatric services, and much of the more elaborate services are paid by private insurance. In the US, more than half of mental health costs are paid by private insurance (Kemp, 2007). All of those facts taken together have three main negative consequences for mentally ill homeless individuals. The first is that mental health care is almost inaccessible for those in low to noincome standing, unable to pay for private health insurance and failing to benefit from public health insurance. As a matter of fact, most homeless people

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PSI don’t even take advantage of the social benefits for which they are eligible because they fail to collect all the required documents and go through the lengthy administrative process of getting insurance or a financial aid (Baum & Burnes, 1993). The second is that services are neglected. When a homeless person is able to see a psychiatrist for their condition, it is for a maximum of an hour a week. This allows enough time to prescribe the medications, but not enough time to ensure the building of a trusting relationship between the psychiatrist and the patient, or for careful follow up, which are important steps to an optimum recovery of the mentally ill individual (Spitzer, 2013, personal interview). The third negative consequence is that even if homeless people are admitted for a longer period of time because they have undergone a serious breakdown due to their illness, they are often discharged before they are ready to live independently and, without connections or follow up care, they can fall into repetitive cycles of re-admission and discharge in and out of the psychiatric facility and the streets (Center, 2009).

Not only are mental health services out of reach to many mentally ill homeless people but they are also discriminatory, and knowingly exclude them from these services. The first example of unfair exclusion is that mental health clinics often refuse to treat alcoholics and addiction detoxification centers frequently refuse those who appear to be mentally ill (Baum & Burnes, 1993)).

As mentioned previously, almost half of the mentally ill also suffer from substance abuse. These are the most vulnerable, and yet they are denied treatment. The dually diagnosed homeless individuals – those with both a mental illness and a substance abuse problem, as well as other severely impaired homeless, are often considered beyond help and helping them is perceived as too difficult and too expensive.. Or as Baum and Burns( 1993) argue, the severely impaired homeless individuals are often seen as America’s throwaways.) and investing in them is not profitable since they are not participating in the economic productivity of the country.

Alain Spitzer strongly rejects this view and is convinced of the contrary: stating: “You’ll be surprised to see how willing they are to give back when they are helped,” referring to the shelter’s main cook who had recently recovered from a long history of alcoholism (Spitzer, 2013, personal interview). Even mental health practitioners are reluctant to treat homeless individuals with chronic mental illness because they don’t fit the “usual program model” (Levine & Kennedy as cited in

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Baum & Burnes, 1993, p. 87). By this, Levine and Kennedy mean that “because so many homeless people are change resistant, let alone unmotivated, so unattractive, so seemingly helpless…serving them is not appealing.” (as cited in Baum & Burnes, 1993, p.87).

Most healthcare professionals prefer to cure more “desirable” patients with fewer, less complex problems and with a quick and predictable recovery process and are also more likely to cater to those who have medical insurance.. A study in 1987 reported that professionals who treat chronic patients experience “feelings of hopelessness, helplessness, dislike or disgust and discomfort,” further demonstrating that treating the chronically mentally ill homeless is not an automatically gratifying practice for caregivers (Baum & Burnes, 1993, p. 164). All in all, individuals who are mentally ill and homeless suffer from discrimination even in hospitals and other mental health service centers. Their rejection from treatments is a profound violation of the principle of justice in health care that states that all groups are deserving of equal and adequate access to health care.

Besides the low budget invested in psychiatric services by North American governments, there are other obstacles that hinder the development of mental health facilities. Aside from the stigma associated with mental illness within the mental health institutions,,. physical illness and mental illness do not share the same attention and concern by the healthcare system. It is estimated that only 25 percent of people with a mental disorder receive treatment in the American health care system compared to 60 80 percent for heart disease.

Compared to physical health services, mental health services have been provided in an unsystematic fashion, issued by third party payment, and have been stigmatized (Brown, 1989). If problems of mental health are not given enough attention, there exists no incentive from the government or from the people to ameliorate the provision of mental health services. Far from encouraging this improvement, the greater public often opposes it. The “Not in My Backyard” phenomenon depicts how residents often oppose proposals for new developments in their neighbourhoods. They often believe that the proposed development is needed but should take place further away, an opinion that is especially evident for mental health services. The greater public is often opposed to the construction of mental health institutions, community centres for the mentally ill, or homeless shelters in their residential area. They think that it will render the area dangerous, although there exists no statistical evidence that the proportion of dangerous people in the mentally ill population is greater than that McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI of dangerous people in the general population.

Furthermore, the public fears that a community centre for individuals with mentally illness will render their neighbourhood unattractive or that it will decrease the market value of the area (Kemp, 2007, p. 53). These concerns, while understandable, ultimately create a real hindrance to creating new, productive mental health facilities.

Looking Into the Future: What Can Be Done?

This essay outlined social, political and ethical issues in the case of homeless and mentally ill individuals. The implications of this discussion are numerous, most prominently including prevention policies and advocacy for a better-designed mental health care system. Those two implications combined could prevent isolated people with mental illness from becoming homeless, as well as improving homeless individuals’ mental health conditions through providing access to fair and adequate treatment.

As previously mentioned, stigma and discrimination alienate individuals from society and create barriers to providing and receiving competent treatment, which can lead to untreated illness and homelessness. The elimination of this stigma would encourage more individuals to seek mental health services and prevent the mentally ill from suffering discrimination and consequent rejection from society. An achievable program of reducing stigma may include raising public awareness of the real conditions and origins of homelessness – that most homeless people suffer from untreated mental illness and/or substance abuse – as well as of evidence that mental disorders are legitimate and responsive to appropriate treatment (Kemp, 2007).

In addition, resources devoted to psychiatry and other mental health services are very scarce and inaccessible for the most vulnerable groups. The resources are secondary to physical health care. I advocate parity for physical and mental health care, in both the private and public sectors. Health care needs to adopt an integrated approach to these two aspects of health. Echoing the concern I raised in my discussion about the development of psychiatry and the mistakes it has made in the past, it has to be made clear that resources do not have to translate into just more psychiatric services and more diagnosis but psychiatric services with improved quality (more careful diagnosis, non-automatic medication, privileged contact with psychiatrist, follow-up of the patient, etc.). In order to Issue IV  March 2014

meet the needs of the individual with chronic mental illness, a vast expansion of community housing and other services for the homeless people must be coupled with a redesign of mental health system, which entails allocating more funds to mental health services. By mental health services, I do not mean only psychiatric services, but also alternative kinds of mental health care, therapies and psychosocial approaches to treating mental illness. Those programs need to be made accessible to the most vulnerable groups in society and reach out to them, as homeless people tend to be too troubled to find or make use of those beneficial programs. In addition, mental health professionals must maintain a non-discriminatory approach and respond to their ethical duty of justice in healthcare, regardless of the diagnosis or difficulty of the patient. Finally, they must accept the full extent of the dependency needs of many homeless individuals with chronic mental illness.

The government also needs to invest in evidencebased projects that offer help and effective solutions to individuals who are homeless and mentally ill. In Canada, the “Housing First” project was designed to offer homeless people lodging and assign them with an interdisciplinary team of nurses, social workers, psychiatrists and other supports. After a pilot project of 3 years, $110 Million invested by The Mental Health Commission of Canada and relatively successful reports, the funds for Montreal’s project were abruptly cut on March 31, 2013. The project has thus ended and won’t be able to be implemented in Montreal. Evidence-based projects similar to this one must be supported by the community and the government in the given context.

Concluding Remarks It has been shown that the political and social developments of the past century, including the lack of resources for mental health care and community-based projects, as well as the stigma on mental illness are factors that have contributed to both homelessness and its perpetuation. In order to respect the principle of justice in health care, the system needs to be restructured. De-stigmatization, the reshaping of the mental health system, and investment in evidencebased projects can help us gain an ethical approach to healthcare and benefit the lives of homeless individuals living with a mental illness.

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PSI Baum, A., & Burnes, D. (1993). A Nation In Denial (W. Press Ed.).

Brown, V. B., Ridgely, M. S., Peppe, B., Levine, I. S., & Ry glewicz, H. (1989). The dual crisis:Mental illness and substance abuse: Present and future direct ions. American Psychologist, 44(3), 565.

Canadian Homelessness Research Net work. (2012). Cana dian Definition of Homelessness.

Canadian Psychiatric Assocation. (2012). Canadian Psychiatrists Concerned About Trend in Federal Cutbacks to Mental Health. CommuniquĂŠ.

Canadian Psychiatric Association. (2013).

How many psychiatrists are there In Canada?

Debruille, B. (2013, March 12). Social and ethical issues in psychiatry. Lecture given in NSCI 300 and conducted from McGill University, Montreal.

Echenberg, H., & Jensen, H. (2008). Defining and enu merating homelessness in Canada. Parliamentary Information and Research Service.

Franskish, C., Hwang, S., & Quantz, D. (2005). Home lessness and health in Canada: Research lessons and priorities. Canadian Journal of Public Health, 96(2).

Gillon, R. (1994). Medical ethics: four principles plus attention to scope. BMJ: British Medical Journal, 309( 6948), 184.

Human Rights Mental Health Strat egy. (2009) Public Consultation Paper: Ontario Human Rights Com mis sion.

Hurtubise, R., & Babin, P. (2009). Shelters for the Homeless: Learning from Research. Finding Home: Policy Options for Addressing Homelessness in Canada. revised edn. Toronto: Cities Centre, University of Toronto, pp.

1-24.

Kemp, D. R. (2007). Mental Health in America: a refer ence handbook. ABC-CLIO. Lamb, R. (1984). Deinstitutionalization and the homeless mentally ill. Hosp Community psychiatry, 35(9), 899907.

Lamb, R. H, Bachrach, L. L. & Kass, F. I. (1992). Treating the homeless mentally ill: a Task Force Report of the American Psychiatric Association.Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association.

Riordan, T. & Dewing, M. (2004). Exploring the circle: Mental Illness, Homelessness and The Criminal Justice System in Canada. Library of Parliament, Political and Social Affairs Division, Parliamentary Information and Research Service.

Roy, L., & Crocker, A. (2012). Homelessness and mental health. Douglas Institute, Mental Health Info.

Sealy, P., & Whitehead, P. (2004). Forty Years of Deinstitutionalization of Psychiatric Services in Canada: An Empirical Assessment. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 49, 249-257.

Spitzer, A. (2013, April 8). Personal interview.

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The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Retrieved March 8, 2014, from. http:// ahdictionary.com/ Human Rights Mental Health Strategy. (2009) Public Consultation Paper: Ontario Human Rights Commission.

Hurtubise, R., & Babin, P. (2009). Shelters for the Homeless: Learning from Research. Finding Home: Policy Options for Addressing Homelessness in Canada. revised edn. Toronto: Cities Centre, University of Toronto, pp. 1-24.

Kemp, D. R. (2007). Mental Health in America: a refer ence handbook. ABC-CLIO. Lamb, R. (1984). Deinstitutionalization and the homeless mentally ill. Hosp Community psychiatry, 35(9), 899907.

Lamb, R. H, Bachrach, L. L. & Kass, F. I. (1992). Treating the homeless mentally ill: a Task Force Report of the American Psychiatric Association.Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association.

Riordan, T. & Dewing, M. (2004). Exploring the circle: Mental Illness, Homelessness and The Criminal Justice System in Canada. Library of Parliament, Political and Social Affairs Division, Parliamentary Information and Research Service.

Roy, L., & Crocker, A. (2012). Homelessness and mental health. Douglas Institute, Mental Health Info.

Sealy, P., & Whitehead, P. (2004). Forty Years of Deinstitutionalization of Psychiatric Services in Canada: An Empirical Assessment. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 49, 249-257.The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Retrieved March 8, 2014, from. http://ahdictionary.com/ Spitzer, A. (2013, April 8). Personal interview.

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Retrieved March 8, 2014, from. http:// ahdictionary.com/

McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI LITERATURE REVIEW

Ontology and Therapeutic Intervention Amongst the James Bay Cree: Towards A Culturally Competent Psychology Mark Saffran April 15th, 2013

Keywords cross-cultural therapy, psychological interventions, ontology, James Bay Cree

Abstract What is it that has been missing from the psychological literature that continues to restrict the field from ethnic minorities, or more poignantly, kept it among the ethnic elite? The present article attempts to answer this question in regards to the James Bay Cree. Drawing upon two primary aspects of the Cree animistic ontology: reciprocity and dynamism, Western psychological interventions and their incongruence with Cree beliefs are highlighted. Taking heed from mental health practices amongst animist groups in Senegal, a refocusing of interventions towards community healing and youth empowerment is proposed as more representative of the Cree ontology. Future directions for a truly culturally competent psychology are discussed.

In 2009, an article in the Annual Review of Psychology titled, ‘The Case for Cultural Competency in Psychotherapeutic Interventions, (Sue, Zane, Hall & Berger, 2009) opened with the claim that “[t]he notion that culturally competent services should be available to members of ethnic minority groups has been articulated for at least four decades” (Sue et al., 2009, p. 1); yet, after four decades, the article simply concludes that “more research is needed” (Sue et al., 2009, p. 17). This begs the questions: what is it that has been missing from the psychological literature that continues to restrict the field from ethnic minorities, or more poignantly, kept it among the ethnic elite? In the following, I will attempt to answer this question in regards to the James Bay Cree, arguing that true cultural competency lies at the intersection of anthropology and psychology and that only through an understanding of ontology can psychology truly become competent.

I feel it is necessary to discuss my own history with the subject before delving into the body of this work. I came to study both psychology and anthropology as a result of my interest in people, specifically motivation and what guides choice. To say that I have always harboured this passion would be untrue, yet coming into university I found myself Issue IV  March 2014

captivated by the potential routes these inquires could take. As my education has progressed I’ve found myself torn between two distinct paths, with psychological science whispering its message of staunch metrics in one ear, while anthropology touts the ethnographic approach in the other. I continue to wrestle with these concepts and the following, I believe, stands as a testament to this. Nevertheless, I remain confident that the two fields can work together and that psychology and anthropology need not be mutually exclusive; a relationship illustrated by the James Bay Cree.

The use of the James Bay Cree to elucidate this synergy stems from their unique position in Canadian History. The James Bay Cree, as of 1999 have a population of approximately 13,500 in nine communities spread across northwestern Quebec, representing a quarter of Quebec’s Aboriginal population (Kirmayer, Boothroyd, Tanner, Adelson & Robinson, 2000). What makes the Cree particularly illuminating for the purposes of this discussion is their distinct ontology in comparison with mainstream Canadian culture. As anthropologist Colin Scott (1989) notes, within the “standard Euro-North American perception of human/animal relations, culture/nature dualism is fundamental [...] The Cree trajectory seems

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PSI rather the opposite: to assume fundamental similarity while exploring the differences between humans and animals,” (p. 195). The divergence between such ontologies is especially brought to light when the two cultures interact, such as in the form of mainstream Canadian culture’s therapeutic interventions. A brief historical sampling emphasizes this.

In 1933, the Reverend J. E. Saindon (1933) wrote of the James Bay Cree that “The Indian has quite a liking for these abnormal mental experiences and states.” (p. 2). He continues, stating the primary ‘cure’ of these ‘abnormal mental experiences’ was simply direct instruction to stop (Saindon, 1933). Jumping forward nearly a century, the remnants of such blatant colonialism remain to this day. Institutions such as the residential school system stand as a testament to the imposition of Western ‘solutions’ to Aboriginal ‘problems’ - in the case of residential schools, the solution being complete assimilation. Though the residential school system is no longer in place, the imposition of such Western ‘solutions’ remains implicitly within much of the intervention discourse. In 2007, an article in Psychological Bulletin flaunted a newly created integrated model that “considers the distinction between factors that influence mean levels of American Indian problem drinking and factors that influence individual differences in American Indian drinking” (Spillane & Smith, 2007, p. 395) based upon alcohol use contingencies. The paper concludes that “if this model proves valid, there may be important implications for ways in which American Indian reservation contexts can, in theory, be restructured to provide greater disincentives for alcohol consumption.” (p. 412). While the article briefly discusses historical antecedents to Aboriginal alcohol abuse, the authors at no point question the current reservation system and its implications in the issue, instead taking the continuation of such a system as a given. While I – perhaps naively – am assuming that the article’s authors did not set out to uphold the colonialist discourse, such an ‘integrated model’ fails to integrate the ontology of the individuals they are seeking to help, and instead imposes another Western ‘solution’, indicative of the implicit bias in much of the psychological literature (Ehlers & Wilhelmsen, 2005; Spillane , Smith & Kahler, 2013). Thus the questions becomes, what is the ontology of the James Bay Cree and how can it be used to inform mental health practices?

I should note that the following in no ways aims to essentialize the nuance and richness of the Cree ontology. Instead, my goal is to sketch the ethos of the Cree relevant to the discussion of ontology and

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psychology. The James Bay Cree are, in short, an animistic culture. Within such an ontology, no spiritual differences are recognized between humans and nonhuman others. However, it should be noted that “a good deal of the current literature on animism deals with the metaphoric extension of personhood or animacy to the world at large. But this notion of metaphoric extension presumes a Western ontology of the animate and inanimate” (Scott, 2006, p. 61). Instead of ‘extending’ personhood upon non-human others, within the Cree ontology (and in other animistic cultures’), the non-human others are, and always have been, persons and thus ‘extending’ personhood becomes redundant. Such a worldview is captured within the James Bay Cree idiom: “You and I have the same flesh or bodily covering; you and I have the same soul or spirit”. In sum, the basis of the Cree ontology is formed by the “idea that [...] other-than-human aspects of the environment constitute ‘personhood’, [which] is fundamental both ontologically and epistemologically” (Scott, 2006, p. 57). In conjunction with this broader definition of personhood are two facets of the Cree ontology relevant to therapeutic interventions: reciprocity and dynamism.

A question arises from such an ontological framework: how does one justify killing an animal for food if they too are a person? The answer lies in fostering positive reciprocity with all persons, human or otherwise. Such reciprocity is characterized by “innate realization of a conventional social order of reciprocity” (Scott, 1989, p. 196) through which a harmony is maintained. A poignant example of this is the Cree symbolic personification of reciprocity in the black bear (Scott, 2007) in which one must strike a balance with “the bear, and by extension, to all for whom the bear has responsibility, including less powerful animals and, of course, properly behaving humans” (Scott, 2006, p. 60). The bear metaphor of reciprocity informs much of Cree hunting practices. This reciprocity, however, is not endemic to humannonhuman interactions, and such pan-species relationships powerfully shape the Cree attributional process for events ranging from a poor hunt to a fatal accident. For example, if a hunter is to “take too much when the animal is signalling a growing avoidance of, or anger towards hunters is to undermine the relationship, to disrespect the animal,” (Scott, 2006, p. 64) and the hunter may suffer fatally as a result. It is important to stress that these reciprocal relationships are not static, but rather in a constant state of flux.

The constant flux of Cree reciprocal relationships make up the ontology’s dynamism. As Scott (2006) notes: McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI “For my Cree interlocutors, the world is a place of deep vitality, sometimes restful, sometimes dynamic; pregnant with possibility; a place of emergent, often orderly, sometimes surprising phenomena.

Life in this sense, pimaatsiiwin, was translated to me as ‘the continuous birthing of the world,’” (p. 61) This ‘continuous birthing of the world’ produces a constantly shifting worldview with practical results. For example “[t]o make fixed plans on the basis of predictions about the future, [...] may presume too much. Someone (human, animal, or spirit) could reciprocate by frustrating hunters' intentions,” (Scott, 1989; p. 195). Such contingencies differ significantly from the Western materialist ontology in which relationships are fixed; a difference, which we shall see, carries significant ramifications for treatment. The next question therefore becomes: what exactly is being ‘treated’ by current therapeutic interventions, and how?

In relation to other Aboriginal groups across North America, the James Bay Cree fare closer to mainstream Canadian culture. The Cree have “a suicide rate no higher than that among non-aboriginal Canadians” (Kirmayer et al., 2000, p. 38) and researchers have noted that “psychiatric disorders among the Cree are quite similar in form to those of the European populations of the south” (Prince, 1993, p.

28). An interesting caveat, however, is the noted difference in attribution demonstrated within Cree cases. As one psychiatrist within the Cree community notes: “the manner in which patients explain their illnesses sometimes adds a special colouring to their illness descriptions,” (Prince, 1993, p. 39) with the unique presence of ghosts and sorcery attributed as the causes of one’s grief (Prince, 1993). Such supernatural references speak to the influence that ontology can have on psychology, and more specifically, psychopathology. Though in a Western context the attribution of grief to sorcery would be indicative of possible psychosis, within the Cree’s larger relational ontology, “[m]ention of supernatural influences involving sorcery or witchcraft may not indicate psychosis but merely that patients are cultured Crees who have not lost contact with their roots” (Prince, 1993, p. 40).

However similar the James Bay Cree and mainstream Canadian culture may be in regards to psychopathological epidemiology, significant differences lie in the increased incidences of substance abuse and related domestic issues amongst the Cree (Gone & Alcántara, 2007; Kirmayer, 1989; Kirmayer et al. 2000; Issue IV  March 2014

Kirmayer et al 2003; Prince, 1993; Robinson, 1988) A 1983-84 survey found that between 25 % in one village to 66% in another had consumed alcohol in the past month (Robinson, 1988). Coupled with this were increased “family violence including wife beating, and male violence against other male” (Robinson, 1988, p.

1610) as well as “39% of Aboriginal adults report[ing] that family violence is a problem in their community, 25% report[ing] sexual abuse and 15% report[ing] rape” (Kirmayer et al., 2003, p. 16). Stemming from these high prevalence rates and the related domestic issues, it has been the substance abuse that has been targeted as the focus of the majority of interventions in James Bay, with drastically mixed results.

As discussed above, one common theme across many substance abuse interventions has been the colonial legacy of the implicit insertion of Western ‘solutions’ to issues within Cree communities. Though such methodology may be successful in a Euro-Canadian population, such imposition onto ontologically distinct groups such as the James Bay Cree have failed to elicit any ameliorating effects and may even exacerbate current problems within these groups. One such case of a wrong fitting ‘solution’ is the implementation of individual-based treatment for substance abuse. These interventions conform to the “the Euro–American notion of the person [as being] characterized as egocentric or individualistic” (Kirmayer et al., 2003, p.

18), a drastically different ontology than the pan-species relational model held by the Cree. A clear example of this is the push to create and facilitate Western institutions of healing that individuals must seek out themselves, such as social service centres. It should come as no surprise when the opening of these centres does not result in the expected benefits, as it presupposes an individual locality of illness endemic to the materialist ontology of the West and ignores the larger network of reciprocity of the Cree ontology.

Further divergence between Western materialism and James Bay Cree animism is demonstrated in the different concepts of disease and illness at play. The materialist view is captured by “the search for discrete disorders whose diagnosis can be specified by operational criteria,” (Kirmayer, 1989, p. 327) in which illnesses, and those who have them, are restricted in their form by definition. The search for such discrete disorders will always come up empty against the Cree ontology of ‘the continuous birthing of the world’ wherein the attribution of illness may stem from ghosts, sorcery, disrespecting the non-human other or other localities that Western psychological science has deemed deviant. Such a flux in pathology is demonstrated by psychological research which has

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PSI found the powerful healing effects of returning to the bush; in which “an alcoholic husband who has completed a Montreal rehabilitation program has a better chance of remaining sober if he can spend several months in the bush before resuming village life” (Prince, 1993, p. 23). Though these findings have been deemed ‘remarkable’ by the psychological community, when viewed from within the Cree ontology, it is simply the continuous rebirth of the self in different environments, a difference which stresses the shortfalls of interventions focusing on a Western view of the fixed individual.

Thus far, I have been perhaps unfair to the discipline of psychology, focusing only on its shortcomings. However, in recent years psychological interventions have arisen which, albeit implicitly, have begun to address the ontological differences in James Bay. Such interventions center upon “emphasiz[ing] youth and community empowerment” (Kirmayer et al., 2003, p. 15). Within such a model of intervention, it is this implicit promotion of Cree ontological values been identified as having the most ameliorating effect.

Turning back to Reverend J. E. Saindon’s (1933) account of Cree mental health, such a method was initially dismissed under the premise that “the blind cannot lead the blind” (p. 2). Yet, after four decades of debate on cultural competency, it is the interventions most congruent with Cree ontology that have emerged as the most beneficial. An example of this can be found in a reframing of interventions away from the individual and towards the community.

Within an ontology in which “[t]he idea that relationships of sharing and mutual responsiveness between human and other-than-human aspects of the environment constitute ‘personhood,’” (Scott, 2006, p.

57); the implementation of interventions targeting only a single entity within a larger relational network seems hopeless from the start. As discussed above, such interventions ignore the fundamental Cree notion of positive reciprocity and thereby cut-off all other panspecies persons within this network. It is here that community based initiatives excel, an example of which being the empowerment of a Cree identity.

This approach of “recuperating these traditions [...] reconnects contemporary Aboriginal peoples to their historical traditions and mobilizes rituals and practices that may promote community solidarity” (Kirmayer et al., 2003, p. 16). Such a group based intervention identifies the issues at a macro level, targeting the larger relational network through fostering a positive Aboriginal identity. As research has noted, “knowledge of living on the land, community, connectedness, and historical consciousness all provide

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sources of resilience” (Kirmayer et. al, 2003, p. 21), as well as foster positive reciprocity within the persons of the Cree larger relational model. The revival of practices such as talking circles, healing circles, and spiritual circles (Kirmayer et al., 2003) likewise promote such positive reciprocity by having “people speak openly and listen to others’ stories to begin to become aware of original hurts; [...] in which people develop trust in their own experiences of spirituality as a source of comfort and guidance” (Kirmayer et al., 2003, p. 20). These acts strengthen the bonds within the community while not imposing the colonial legacy of individual interventions.

Thus the ‘solution’ comes from within the James Bay Cree ontology, a method more literally found in youthtargeted intervention strategies.

To say that ‘children are the future’ has become so clichéd that some forget the truth within the statement, for it is only through them that ontologies persist. As Scott (2006) notes,“the boy is preequipped by stories and instruction to know that the bear is more significant, before ever meeting one” (p. 54), yet, therapeutic interventions have thus far neglected the youth in their attempted ‘solutions’. Such neglect is even more misdirected in a community in which “35% of the James Bay Cree are under 15 years compared with 16% of the Quebec population, and the median age among the Cree is 20.8 (versus 34.2 for Quebec)” (Kirmayer et al., 2000, p. 37). Interventions overlooking youth forget that “like all cultural identities, Aboriginality is not ‘in the blood’ but rooted in forms of life that exist at the confluence of historical currents and contemporary forces,” (Kirmayer et al., 2003, p. 19) and that the continuation and empowerment of Cree communities is, and will be, shaped by the contemporary force of youth driven renewal, a concept resonating with the ‘continuous birthing of the world’ facet of Cree ontology.

An implicit assumption amongst the majority of interventions has been that when one is found that ‘works’ than no others need try; yet, such assumptions neglect that the dynamism of Cree ontology requires dynamic ‘solutions’.

Through youth-targeted interventions, such dynamism can be achieved through “giving youth an active role in designing and implementing programs that meet their needs,” (Kirmayer et al., 2003, p. 21). In doing so, future solutions can be generated, not only from within the Cree ontology, but from the Cree themselves. As has been noted, “non-Aboriginal mental health professionals usually approach these problems as outsiders [...] [n]o matter how open and unbiased practitioners try to be, they work against a backdrop of McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI structural violence, racism and marginalisation,” (Kirmayer et al., 2003, p. 21). Through the empowerment of youth, mental health issues can be continuously re-evaluated and readdressed in a method that rings true with the dynamism of animistic ontology, a congruency also found in Senegalese animist mental health practices.

The ontology of the Senegalese shares a similar animistic profile to that of the James Bay Cree with “the belief in supernatural beings exist[ing] universally across all ethnicities and areas of Senegal” (McKinley, 2012, p.

7). Such a model demonstrates a suitable parallel for the intersection of ontology and psychology, as in both cultures, animism informs Western mental health interventions. In Senegal, there are “several reasons why someone might have a mental illness: it could be due to stress, evil spirits, drugs, or perhaps maraboutages [type of African witch doctor] or evil curses” (McKinley, 2012, p. 12), an attributional process similar to the Crees. Yet, unlike the James Bay Cree, modern healing practices are, comparably, less colonial in their approach, instead focusing “more on communal healing and acceptance of mental illness than western societies” (McKinley, 2012 p. 14). As such, the Senegalese example provides a potential model for a more ontologically informed therapeutic intervention method in James Bay. The Senegalese animistic ‘solution’ takes its cues from symptoms suggesting that “supernatural forces are angry at either the individual or at the entire community in which case the individual is a signal to the rest of the community that the supernatural force is angry” (McKinley, 2012, p. 14). This focus on the community as the target of any intervention is inherent within the ontology of Senegal; yet, has only recently been recognized by mental health practitioners based within the Western ontology (Kirmayer et al., 2003). In Senegal, the primary response to an individual’s mental illness is a communal ceremony known a Ndëpp, with the goal being to “re-establish the malade [sick] into the community and restore normalcy” (McKinley, 2012, p.

14). For the Senegalese, By admitting that many health disorders should be understood as psychosomatic disorders, they admitted that they are inseparable from their socio-cultural environment. It is in this environment that it is necessary to understand the fundamentals of spiritual and supernatural beliefs of the patient, as is understanding the collective worldview [ontology] in which he has Issue IV  March 2014

been raised. Taking the patients beliefs into consideration during therapy can have a profound impact on psyche of the individual” (McKinley, 2012, p. 18) .

Such practices, within the Senegalese animistic framework strengthen the positive reciprocity within the community and provide an example of animistic ontology co-existing and informing psychological interventions.

Where does that leave the James Bay Cree? Scott (2007), in reference to ecological co-management, posits that “sacred and purposive knowledge are complementary” (p. 62) a relationship which I believe is equally applicable to psychological knowledge. Within this newly elaborated discourse, the “emic constructs may lead to models of wider applicability and so themselves become etic constructs” (Gone & Kirmayer, 2010, p. 90) resulting in more than a modification of Western ‘solutions’, but to the promotion and empowerment of solutions that are truly Cree. While “sacred and rational-empirical aspects of knowledge intensify and reinforce hunters’ attention to the world,” (Scott, 2007, p. 65) I believe they also intensify and reinforce attention to mental illness and health; a practice that returns us to the notion of cultural competency.

The present essay has attempted to demonstrate how key facets of the James Bay Cree’s animistic ontology, reciprocity and dynamism, have been missing from current Western intervention methods and, how a refocusing of interventions towards community healing and youth empowerment is more representative of such an ontology, much like the current practices found in Senegal. Yet the question still stands: should Western psychological practices be used at all? I opened by questioning what is it that has been missing from the psychological literature that continues to restrict the field to the ethnic elite. Perhaps that question is misleading; instead it may be more informative to ask if psychological science should be imposed on minorities groups in the first place.The shadow of colonialism predominates much of Aboriginal epidemiology, and as I’ve illustrated, the most salutatory interventions are those that reject these roots and stem from the ontology of the people they are aiming to help. It is at the junction of psychology and anthropology that, I believe, psychology as a discipline can come to recognize this, and a truly cultural competent psychologist is one who recognizes their own colonialist legacy. Until this is done, however, I fear that the two disciplines will remain disjunctive; limiting their

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PSI potential for mutually informed aid and prolonging Western colonialist manipulation over the James Bay Cree.

References Ehlers, C., & Wilhelmsen, K. (2005). Genomic scan for alcohol craving in Mission Indians. Psychiatric genetics, 15(1), 71.

Gone, J., & Alcántara, C. (2007). Identifying effective mental health interventions for American Indians and Alaska Natives: A review of the literature. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 13(4), 356.

Gone, J., & Kirmayer, L. (2010). On the wisdom of considering culture and context in psychopathology. Contemporary directions in psychopathology: Scientific foundations of the DSM-V and ICD-11, 72-96.

Kirmayer, L.. (1989). Cultural variations in the response to psychiatric disorders and emotional distress. Social Science & Medicine, 29(3), 327-339.

Kirmayer, L., Boothroyd, L.J., Tanner,A. , Adelson, N. & Robinson, E. (2000). Psychological distress among the Cree of James Bay. Transcultural Psychiatry, 37(1), 35-56.

Kirmayer, L., Simpson, C., & Cargo, M. (2003). Healing traditions: Culture, community and mental health promotion with Canadian Aboriginal peoples. Australasian Psychiatry, 11 (s1), S15-S23.

McKinley, C. (2012). Treating the Spirit: An Ethnographic Portrait of Senegalese Animist Mental Health Practices and Practitioners in Dakar and the Surrounding Area. .

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, 1403.Retrieved from http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/1403 Prince, R. (1993). Psychiatry among the James Bay Cree: A focus on pathological grief reactions. Transcultural Psychiatry, 30 (1), 3-50.

Robinson, E. (1988). The health of the James Bay Cree. Canadian Family Physician, 34, 1606.

Saindon, J. (1933). Mental disorders among the James Bay Cree.

Primitive Man, 6(1), 1-12.

Scott, C. (1989). Knowledge construction among the Cree hunters: metaphors and literal understanding. Journal de la Société des Américanistes, 75(1), 193-208.

Scott, C. (2006). Spirit and practical knowledge in the person of the bear among Wemindji Cree hunters. Ethnos, 71(1), 51-66.

Scott, C. (2007). Bear metaphor: Spirit, ethics and ecology in Wemindji Cree Hunting. La Nature Des Esprits Dans Les Cosmologies Autochtones. Québec, Canada: Presses Université Laval.

Scott, C. (2013, January to 2013, April), Ecological Anthropology [ANTH 339]. Lectures conducted from McGill University, Montreal, QC. Spillane, N., & Smith, G. (2007). A theory of reservation-dwelling American Indian alcohol use risk. Psychological bulletin, 133(3), 395.

Spillane, N., Smith, G., & Kahler, C.. (2013). Perceived access to reinforcers as a function of alcohol consumption among one first nation group. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 37(s1), E314-E321.

Sue, S., Zane, N., Hall, G. C. N., & Berger, L. K. (2009). The case for cultural competency in psychotherapeutic interventions.

Annual review of psychology, 60, 525.

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McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI LITERATURE REVIEW

Le Rôle du Gène Récepteur de la Mélanocortine de Type 1 Dans la Médiation de la Douleur Khadidja Chougui

Résumé

Mots Clés: Méta-analyse, Douleur, Génétique, MC1R

La mélanocortine de type 1 est bien connue pour être à l’origine de la pigmentation de la peau et des poils. Des démonstrations récentes ont établies que le gène MC1R joue également un rôle dans la médiation de la douleur. Toutefois, la façon dont ce gène module la douleur n’a pas encore été clairement établie. Cet article vise donc à faire un survol de la littérature scientifique, en soulignant les différentes études qui ont été menées dans le but de comparer les résultats obtenus. Suite à cette meta-analyse, nous pouvons conclure que le récepteur MC1R joue effectivement un rôle dans la médiation de la douleur. Certains chercheurs ont trouvé que la mutation du gène mène à une meilleure tolérance de la douleur, et d’autres chercheurs ont trouvé les résultats contraire. Dans les deux cas, cette mutation semble être particulièrement présente chez les femmes et chez les roux. Par contre, il faudrait faire plus de recherches génotypiques sur les deux allèles du récepteur MC1R, pour différencier les mutations de un ou deux allèles.

Introduction Le gène qui fait l’objet de cet article est le récepteur de la mélanocortine de type 1, communément appelé MC1R. Chez l’humain, ce gène est situé sur le chromosome 16, locus 16q24 (Gantz et al., 1994). Plus précisément, il s’agit d’un récepteur couplé à la protéine G qui se lie à une classe d'hormones hypophysaires peptidiques dénommées mélanocortines. MC1R est l'une des protéines clé impliquées dans la pigmentation chez les mammifères, et donc chez les humains. Ce gène est situé sur la membrane plasmique des cellules spécialisées, nommées mélanocytes,. Celles ci sont responsables du processus de synthétisation de la mélanine, nommé mélanogènèse. Lors de ce processus, MC1R est activé par α-MSH, une des variantes de MSH, ce qui a pour effet d’entraîner la production de l’eumélanine brune ou noire (ce qui détermine la couleur des cheveux). En revanche, lorsque le nucléotide à la position 549 est supprimée dû à une mutation de déphasage du gène, ceci se traduit par un changement de cadre de lecture génétique de 12 acides aminés, où les mélanocytes se mettent à produire la phæomélanine jaune ou rouge, ce qui se traduit en la chevelure rousse (García-Borron, Sánchez-Laorden, & Jiménez-Cervantes, 2005).

Issue IV  March 2014

La pléotropie, est une qualification génétique, où un gène détermine plusieurs caractères phénotypiques.

MC1R est un de ces gènes, puisqu’il semble aussi jouer un rôle dans la médiation de la douleur. MC1R s’exprime majoritairement en périphérie du système nerveux central, mais peut également se trouver dans les cellules gliales et dans la substance grise périaqueducale. Cette dernière est une région liée à la nociception, responsable de l’intégration des messages nerveux associés à la douleur (Xia, Wikberg & Chhajlani 1995). Toutefois, le mécanisme biologique par lequel la tolérance est accrue ou diminuée à la nociception dûe au gène MC1R mutant n’est pas entièrement compris.

Les paragraphes suivants feront le point sur la littérature amassée à ce jour sur ce sujet.

Dans une étude de Mogil et al. (2003), il a été démontré, que les effets des analgésiques kappa opioïdes varient en fonction du gène MC1R. Les résultat démontrent que les souris mutantes femelles, ayant une variante du gène MC1R inactive, étaient plus sensibles à l’analgésique k-apioïde. Il faut noter que la sensibilité à la douleur a été mesurée, avant et après l’administration de l’analgésique, à l’aide du test «hotwater tail-withdrawal», qui consiste à tremper la queue de l’animal dans de l’eau chaude, ce qui induit une

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PSI douleur thermique aigüe pour mesurer la tolérance. En répétant une expérience de tolérance thermique auprès des humains, Mogil et ses collègues (2003) en sont venus à la conclusion que les participants qui étaient femelles et rousses, ayant hérité des deux allèles qui entraînent une inactivation du gène MC1R, sont plus réceptives au pentazocine . Ce dernier est un analgésique k-opioïde, pour réduire la douleur thermique et ischémique.

Une autre étude réalisée par Mogil et al. (2005) démontre qu’une altération de la sensibilité à la douleur des souris mutantes pour le gène MC1R, tous sexes confondus, mène à une tolérance accrue à la douleur thermique, provoquée par les tests « hargreaves », qui consiste à chauffer la patte de l’animal arrière pour mesurer la tolérance ainsi que le test« hot plate » qui consistent en à emprisonner l’animal sur une plaque chauffante pour mesurer la tolérance. Les résultats ont démontré que ces souris ont aussi une grande tolérance à la douleur engendrée par les tests « tail clip », où l’on pince la queue de l’animal ainsi que le test « abdominal constriction », où l’on injecte un substance irritante dans l’abdomen de l’animal, pour mesurer le niveau d’inconfort. Une telle variation dans la sensibilité a été trouvée chez les humains, résultant en une diminution de la sensibilité à un stimulus électrique chez ceux et celles ayant un gène MC1R non fonctionnel et, généralement, caractérisés par des cheveux roux et une peau claire. De plus, cette population, est d’avantage réceptive aux analgésiques mu-opioïdes, tels que la morphine. Ceux-ci sont communément utilisés en clinique pour soulager des douleurs de niveau modéré ou sévère.

Le projet de recherche de Mogil et ses collègues (2005) ne démontre pas de particularités liées au sexe, en ce qui a trait à la sensibilité à la douleur. Ceux et celles qui ont une mutation au gène MC1R sont plus tolérants à la douleur que ceux qui ont un gène fonctionnel. Par contre, dans un étude menée auparavant, Mogil et ses collègues (2003), ont démontrés que seuls les souris et les humains de sexe féminin étaient réceptifs à l’analgésique kappa opioïde,.

En se basant sur ces deux études, nous pouvons supposer que le gène MC1R produit des antianalgésiques puisque, lorsqu’il est actif chez les participants, une plus grande quantité d’analgésique est nécessaire pour obtenir une tolérance à la douleur similaires à celle chez les gens qui ont une mutation du gène. De plus amples recherches sont nécessaires afin d’élucider cette hypothèseSelon une étude de Delaney, Keighren, Fleetwood-Walker, & Jackson (2010), le récepteur de la mélanocortine de type 1 est impliqué

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dans la douleur aiguë et inflammatoire, mais pas dans la douleur neuropathique. En effet,les auteurs ont trouvé que les souris femelles, ayant une mutation au gène MC1R, tolèrent d’avantage les douleurs thermiques (« hargreaves test ») et inflammatoires (« formalin test ») et démontrent une aversion réduite à la capsaïcine. Ce dernier est un composé chimique qui provoque une sensation de brûlure dans la bouche lorsqu’on l’avale. La douleur est mesurée à l’aide du test de l'aversion orale. Toutefois, aucune variation entre ceux et celles ayant ou non un gène MC1R actif n’a pu être constatée lors du test d’autotomie, conçu pour provoquer une douleur neuropathique.

Andersen, Lunden, Drewes, et Arendt-Nielsn (2011) ont remarqué, suite à leur étude, que les femmes rousses, sont moins sensibles aux crèmes qui stimulent l’hypersensibilité que les femmes ayant une pigmentation capillaire qui tend vers le blond à noir.

Ceci signale un gène MC1R actif. Toutefois, les auteurs n’ont trouvé aucune différence significative en ce qui a trait à la sensibilité à la douleur thermique et celle due à la pression, chez les femmes rousses. Cela pourrait s’expliquer par la différence entre le phénotype (les cheveux roux), et le génotype (la mutation du gène).

Dans de futures recherches, il serait préférable faire des analyses génotypiques pour déterminé si les individus ont 1 seul allèle mutant, plutôt que 2.

L’étude de Delaney et al. (2010) confirme celle qui a été menée précédemment par Mogil et al. (2005) et va même encore plus loin en faisant une distinction entre les différentes modalités de la douleur et le gène d’intérêt. Afin de s’assurer que le gène MC1R est bel et bien responsable (ou du moins en partie) des variations en sensibilité, ils ont injecté une protéine Agouti, qui a pour but de bloquer le récepteur de la mélanocortine de type 1, dans les souris. Les auteurs en sont venus à des conclusions quasi similaires à celles de Mogil et al (2005), à l’exception de la sensibilité à la douleur thermique. Ils n’ont noté aucune différence sur cette modalité entre les souris au gène MC1R mutant et celles ayant un gène MC1R fonctionnel (Delaney et al. 2010).

Une série d’études sur ce même sujet démontrent des résultats contraires. Les recherches de Liem, Joiner, Tsueda, & Sessler (2005) démontrent que comparativement aux femmes aux cheveux foncés, les femmes rousses ont un seuil de tolérance plus basse à la douleur thermique. De plus, l’efficacité de la lidocaïne, un anesthésique local, était réduite auprès de ces femmes. Une autre étude de Liem et al. (2004), réalisée un an auparavant, indique des résultats similaires, soit que la dose d’anesthésiant chez les femmes rousses, ayant un ou deux allèles mutants du gène MC1R, a dû être augmentée de 19% pour qu’elles cessent tout McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI mouvement à la suite de stimulation électrique. Il est à noter que, contrairement à la première étude mentionnée de Liem et al. (2005), des analyses de l’ADN ont été effectuées afin d’identifier le génotype des participantes. De plus, puisque seules les femmes ont pris part à ces deux expériences, nous ne pouvons pas conclure s’il y a une différence en sensibilité entre les deux sexes.

Xing, Sonner, Eger II, Casclo & Sessler (2004) ont mené une étude concluant que les souris ayant deux allèles mutants du gène MC1R, entraînant son inactivation, ont besoin d’une plus grande concentration d’anesthésiant pour prévenir toute manifestation de comportements liés à la douleur durant le test « tail clip ». Ces résultats se sont produits dans 50% des cas. Toutefois, il y a une distinction importante à faire entre les études mentionnées ci-haut et celles réalisées par Mogil et ses collègues. Les analgésiques ont pour rôle de soulager la douleur alors que les anesthésiants engourdissent les sens. Étant donné que ces informations sont transmises par différents circuits neuronaux et traitées par différentes régions du cerveau, nous ne pouvons pas prétendre que ces études sont en contradiction. Tout ce que nous pouvons conclure, c’est que le gène MC1R semble effectivement jouer un rôle dans la modulation de la douleur.

Finalement, selon une étude de Binkley et al.

(2009), les femmes et les hommes ayant au moins un allèle mutant du gène MC1R ressentent d’avantage d’anxiété en prévision de leurs soins dentaires, et la douleur qui s’y accompagne, comparativement aux participants n’ayant aucune variante du gène. Ils sont également deux fois plus susceptibles d’éviter tous traitements dentaires. Considérant ce qui a été mentionné ci-haut, soit que ceux ayant un gène MC1R inactif sont plus sensibles à la douleur et que les anesthésiants s’avèrent moins efficaces auprès de ces derniers, cela va de soi que ces personnes appréhendent d’avantage leurs prochains rendez-vous chez le dentiste. Il serait donc recommandé que les spécialistes en soins dentaires ajustent leur approche afin de réduire le niveau d’anxiété chez cette population.

Conclusion Certains scientifiques avancent que ceux qui héritent d’allèles mutants récessifs, entraînant l’inactivation du gène MC1R et habituellement caractérisés, chez les humains, par des cheveux roux et un peau claire et, chez les rongeurs, et le poil jaune ont une sensibilité réduite à la douleur et sont plus réceptifs aux Issue IV  March 2014

analgésiques. D’autres arrivent à une tout autre conclusion, soit que la sensibilité à la douleur est accrue chez cette population et qu’elle a besoin d’une plus grande dose d’anesthésiant pour obtenir l’effet escompté. Ce qui fait l’unanimitéé au sein de la littérature scientifique est que le gène MC1R joue effectivement un rôle dans la modulation de la douleur.

Toutefois, de plus amples études sont nécessaires afin d’identifier clairement sa contribution et de déterminer s’il y a un mécanisme d’activation neuronale spécifique au sexe.

Références Andersen, T., Lunden, D., Drewes, A.M., & Arendt-Nielsen, L. (2011). Pain sensitivity and experimentally induced sensitisation in red haired females. Scandinavian Journal of Pain, 2(1), 3-6. doi :10.1016/ j.sjpain.2010.08.005 Binkley, C.J., Beacham, A., Neace, W., Gregg, R.G., Liem, E.B, & Sessler, D.I. (2009). Genetic variations associated with red hair color and fear of dental pain, anxiety regarding dental care and avoidance of dental care. The Journal of the American Dental Association, 140(7), 896-905.

Delaney, A., Keighren, M., Fleetwood-Walker, S.M, & Jackson, I.J. (2010).

Involvement of the melanocortin-1 receptor in acute pain and pain of inflammatory but not neuropatic origin. PLoS ONE, 5(9), e12498. doi :10.1371/journal.pone.0012498.

Gantz, I., Yamada, T., Tashiro, T., Konda, Y., Shimoto, Y., Miwa, H., & Trent, J.M. (1994). Mapping of the gene encoding the melanocortin1(alpha- melanocyte stimulating hormone) receptor (MC1R) to human chromosome 16q24.3 by fluorescence in situ hybridization. Genomics, 19(2), 394–395. doi :10.1006/ geno.1994.1080 Garcí-Borrón, J.C., Sánchez-Laorden, B.L., & Jiménez-Cervantes, C. (2005).

Melanocortin-1 receptor structure and function regulation.

Pigment Cell & Melanoma Research, 18(6), 393-410. doi :10.1111/ j.1600-0749.2005.00278.x Liem, E.B., Joiner, T.V., Tsueda, K., & Sessler, D.I. (2005). Increased sensitivity to thermal pain and reduced subcutaneous lidocaine efficacy in redheads. Anesthesiology, 102(3), 509-514.

Liem, E.B., Lin, C.-M., Suleman, M.I., Doufas, A.G., Gregg, R.G., Veauthier, J.M., Loyd, G., & Sessler, D.I. (2004). Anesthetic requirement is icreased in redheads. Anesthesiology, 101(2), 279-283.

Mogil, JS., Breese, N.M., Witty, M.F., Ritchie, J., Rainville, M.L., Ase, A., Abbadi, N., Stucky, C.L., & Séguéla, P. (2005). Transgenic expression of a dominant-negative ASIC3 subunit leads to increased sensitivity to mechanical and inflammatory stimuli. Journal of Neuroscience, 25 (43).

Mogil, J.S., Ritchie, J., Smith, S.B., Strasburg, K., Kaplan, L., Wallace, M.R., Romberg, R.R, Bijl, S, Starton, E.Y., Fillingim, R.B., & Dahan, A. (2013).

Melanocortin-1 receptor gene variants affect pain and mu-opioid analgesia in mice and humans. Journal of Medical Genetics, 42 (7),583-587.doi :10.1136/jmg.2004.027698 Mogil, J.S., Wilson, S.G., Chesler, E.J., Rankin, A.L., Nemmani, K.V.S., Lariviere, W.R., Groce, M.K., Wallace, M.R., Kaplan, L., Roland, S., Ness, T.J., Glover, T.L., Stankova, M., Mayorov, A., Hruby, V.J., Grisel, J.E., & Fillingim, R.B. (2003). The melanocortin-1 receptor gene mediates female-specific mechanisms of analgesia in mice and humans. Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 101(2), 279-283. doi :10.1073/ pnas.0730053100 Xia, Y., Wikberg, J.E., & Chhajlani, V. (1995). Expression of melanocortin 1 receptor in periaqueductal gray matter. Neuroreport, 6(16), 2193 –2196.

Xing, Y., Sonner, J.M., Eger II, E.I., Casclo, M., & Sessler, D.I. (2004). Mice with a melanocortin 1 receptor mutation have a slightly greater minimum alveolar concentration than control mice. Anesthesiology, 101(2), 544-546.

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PSI RESEARCH ARTICLE

Praise and Passion in Athletes: How Competition Influences This Relationship Tamaryn de Kock

Abstract

Keywords passion,praise, harmonious, obsessive

Passion is a “strong inclination toward an activity that people like, that they find important, and in which they invest time and energy” (Vallerand et al., 2003). This paper examines the effects of parental praise for effort or ability on the type of passion (harmonious or obsessive) a person develops towards a sporting activity. We proposed that praise for effort would lead to harmonious passion, while praise for ability would facilitate obsessive passion. This relationship was predicted to be mediated by self-monitoring, goal orientation and moderated by self-efficacy and the level of engagement in the sporting activity. No effects of self-monitoring, goal orientation or self-efficacy were found. The type of passion a person had towards their sporting activity was moderated by competition such that praise for either effort or ability was associated with lower obsessive passion in competitive athletes, while praise for ability was positively associated with harmonious passion in athletes who played at the recreational level. The study suggests that praise positively affects the type of passion athletes develop towards their sport.

The extent to which competition is present in an athlete’s environment influences this effect.

Introduction Dualistic Model of Passion While psychology has mainly focused on the study and conceptualization of mental illness and behavioral deviances in the past, a new domain in psychology, positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), has emerged. Positive psychology aims to understand what factors contribute to a meaningful and fulfilling life. Of interest in the domain is the concept of passion which is typically conceived as a positive quality that drives motivation and is quite often referred to in the romantic sense. While passionate love has been studied (Hatfield & Walster, 1978; Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986), passion is a concept that can be present in a number of other domains in a person’s life, namely towards a particular activity. In this sense, passion is a “strong inclination toward an activity that people like,

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that they find important, and in which they invest time and energy” (Vallerand (2003) p. 756; Vallerand et al.

(2008), p. 374). Vallerand et al.’s (2003) dualistic conception of passion distinguishes between two types of passion based on how an activity has been internalized or assimilated into a person’s sense of the self: their identity.

A person’s identity is an organized collection of characteristic features and experiences that serve social and regulatory functions (Schlenker, 1985). Consistent with self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), which suggests that individuals seek to fulfill psychological needs of autonomy, relatedness and competence, and the organismic integration principle (Ryan & Deci, 1985), whereby individuals become more complex by internalizing environmental aspects, a person’s engagement in a sporting activity may become McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI central to their identity if such an activity is highly valued (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Once a person internalizes an activity, he or she can become passionate towards that activity.

The extent to which an activity is internalized distinguishes the two types of passion: harmonious passion and obsessive passion. When an activity is autonomously internalized, such that the individual is

able to freely choose how and when to engage in the activity, and the person is unaffected by information about failure or success, they are able to develop harmonious passion towards the activity (Bélanger, Lafrenière, Vallerand, & Kruglanksi, 2013). On the other hand, passion characterized by controlled internalization of the activity into a person’s core self, and a sense of pressure to engage in that activity, along with fear of failure, is approached in an obsessively passionate way.

Contrary to our intuitions about the positive nature of passion, this second type of passion (obsessive passion) can come at a cost to a person well-being, while harmonious passion is more adaptive.

Mindset Theory Children’s mindsets are heavily influenced by the type of praise they received, such that those praised for their ability (e.g. “Wow, that’s a really great score. You must be smart at this”) tend to show fixed mindsets, while those praised for their effort (e.g. “Wow, that’s a really great score. You must have worked hard at this”) demonstrate growth mindsets. A fixed mindset can be characterized by a need to prove their capabilities, fear of failure, and preference for performance goals. An individual with a growth mindset prefers learning goals and focuses on continually improving their capabilities and learning from their failures (Muller & Dweck, 1998). In the long term, a growth mindset proves to be more adaptive. Given that parents and caregivers are extremely influential in a child’s development, the type of praise a parent Issue IV  March 2014

gives a child may influence the extent to which he or she internalizes an activity into their identity, and may thus affect the child’s passion towards that activity. This idea forms the basis of the present study, and aims to examine the mediating and moderating variables in the relationship.

Success and Goal Adoption An individual’s interpretation of success, based on their mindset, influences the type of goals they adopted for a particular activity (Dweck, 1999). Based on how an individual approaches the idea of competence, Nicholls’ (1984) achievement goal theory distinguishes between two major goal perspectives. Task goals are formed with a focus on developing competence in a particular domain, and thus emphasize mastery of a task. A second, independent goal perspective, ego goal orientation, concerns demonstrating competence. In an attempt to avoid being judged as incompetent, the focus of ego goals shifts from attempts to master a task, towards demonstrating adequate performance.

Individuals with growth mindsets strive to increase their competence by working hard and mastering a task (task goals). Individuals who have fixed mindsets become preoccupied with demonstrating their competence and avoiding situations of failure (ego goals). Based on the relationships between goal orientation and mindset (as developed via praise), goal orientation may mediate the relationships between a parent’s praise and the type of passion a child develops.

If a child adopts ego goals in an attempt to prove themselves to their parents, he or she may feel controlled in their pursuit of the activity, which can hinder complete and adaptive internalization.

Self-Monitoring Self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) is a theory that deals with an individual’s sensitivity to cues in the environment, such that they are able to modify their behavior given the situational needs. It also notes an individual’s ability to modify their self-presentation.

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PSI The type of mindset an individual develops, based on the type of praise they received, may influence the extent to which an individual can engage in self-monitoring behavior. It seems likely that individuals who have fixed mindsets may be unable to focus on aspects of a situation other than their competence in the given activity. It then follows that such an individual, who is preoccupied in their own abilities and self-presentation, may develop an obsessive type passion, and may only introject an activity into their self-identity. Such individuals would engage in activities to “put on a show” more than for its own sake. An individual who is praised for effort on the other hand, may not develop self-monitoring mechanisms concerned with self-presentation, and may thus develop harmonious passion.

Perceptions of Self-Efficacy Praise is a positive construct that usually aims to increase motivation. It does so by satisfying an individual’s need for competence. Praise from coaches affects a sports player’s perception of their competence (Horn, 1985), and children who receive praise and positive encouragement from people with whom they have significant relationships with, demonstrate enhanced perceptions of competence (Harter, 1985; Klint & Weiss, 1987).Self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000) suggests that individuals engage in activities to fulfill their needs for autonomy, relatedness and competence. If such needs are not fulfilled, an individual may disengage from the activity. For an individual to integrate an activity into their identity, and continue engaging in the activity, Vallerand (2010) suggests the individual must feel competent at the activity. Given that praise may enhance perceptions of competence, and feelings of competence may be necessary for continued engagement in an activity, it is possible that only individuals who demonstrate high levels of selfefficacy will become passionate to their sporting activity.

Competition based on Level of Sporting Engagement Accordingly, self-efficacy may act as a moderating variable in the relationships between praise and passion. Like self-efficacy, competition may affect the psychological need for competence. Competition can act as a threat to an individual’s identity, particularly when an individual feels competent in their activity. If

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an individual receives praise for their ability, their perception of success depends on demonstrating competence. In such a case, a competitive situation may enhance their defensive tendencies, and it thus follows that the activity will be internalized in a way that may foster obsessive passion.

Participating in a non-competitive activity alleviates the threats that accompany competition, and thus does not encourage a defensive reaction. Such an environment does not threaten an individual’s perceived competence, but rather supports it in an autonomy supportive way. Self-determination theory suggests that autonomy support encourages the development of harmonious passion (Mageau et al., 2009). Given that praise for effort is more adaptive, it would be likely that such individuals who engage in noncompetitive activity may develop harmonious passion.

Overall, the amount of competition involved in an activity could moderate the effects of praise on passion; introducing competition into an activity may motivate individuals with fixed mindsets to develop obsessive passion, while recreational conditions encourage the development of harmonious passion, especially for individuals with growth mindsets.

The goals of the present study were threefold.

Firstly, we sought to establish a relationship between praise and passion for a sporting activity such that harmonious passion would be facilitated by effort praise, while obsessive passion would be facilitated by ability praise. Secondly, we predicted the relationship between praise and passion would be mediated by selfmonitoring and goal orientation. An individual high in self-monitoring is a person who is highly sensitive to environmental cues, such that they are able to modify their behavior as needed. We predict that praise for ability would lead to higher self-monitoring within an individual thus demonstrating a more obsessive type of passion. Furthermore, we predicted that praise for effort would lead to a person who was more task (mastery) oriented, thus would display more harmonious passion, while a person praised for ability would develop ego (performance) orientation which would facilitate obsessive passion.

McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI Finally, we predicted that the level of engagement in a sporting activity (competitive or noncompetitive/recreational), and perception of selfefficacy would moderate the relations between praise and passion. Recreational athletes engage in sporting activities because they enjoy the activity and have incorporated the sport into their identity, and do not feel constrained by the sport or experience excessive competition. Given their free engagement with the activity, we predicted that the effects of effort praise on obsessive passion would be more pronounced in recreational athletes, while the competitive athletes would be more obsessively passionate towards their activity, as a result of ability praise. We furthermore suggest that the relationship between praise and passion would only hold when a person is highly selfefficacious. Individuals who do not perceive themselves as competent in a sport would not establish passion towards an activity, thus no relationship would exist.

Method Participants One hundred and thirteen athletes (25 females, 35 males) who played at a recreational or competitive level participated in the study. Participants who failed to complete all the questionnaires were excluded from the study. The final sample size was reduced to 60 participants (53 % attrition), who were included in the subsequent analysis of the data. Participants were aged between 16 and 26 years of age (M=20.37, SD=1.58).

Twenty-seven participants played at a competitive level (university varsity, regional, or national level), and thirty three (33) participants played at a recreational level. A variety of sports were reported as passionate sporting activities. Team activities included rugby, softball, field or ice hockey, basketball, soccer, baseball, lacrosse, rowing, water polo, ultimate Frisbee and badminton.

Individual activities included track and field, alpine skiing, martial arts, swimming, squash, horseback riding, triathlon, boxing, and fencing. Due to the small sample size, results were collapsed across gender.

Issue IV  March 2014

Participants were recruited via postings on social media platforms such as Facebook.

Advertisements were also posted on McGill Classifieds.

A number of participants were contacted via email by the researchers, using a standard email template.

Instruments Participants completed a battery of online questionnaires assessing the type of praise participants received from their parents as a child, their passion towards their chosen sport, goal orientation, selfmonitoring and perceived self-efficacy. A demographic questionnaire measured participant’s age, preferred sport, and the highest level at which participants play (ed) their sport. Responses were collected via Survey Monkey, and analyzed using Statistical Product and Service Solutions (SPSS).

In all previous studies exploring the effects of praise, praise was a manipulated variable. As a result, there was no pre-existing measure of praise. We constructed a 15-item praise scale. Items were synonyms of “ability” (e.g. talent and giftedness), and “effort” (e.g. perseverance and hard work). Neutral words such as good humor and politeness were included in the measures to ensure that participants would not be suspicious of our hypothesis. Participants rated how often (never to very frequently) they were praised for each of the items, on a 6-point Likert scale. Considering it was likely that participants were praised for all the items (effort and ability) equally, a 6-point instead of 7– point Likert scale was used in order to avoid participants choosing neutral options.

Vallerand et al.’s (2003) Passion Scale, consisting of six harmonious items (e.g. “This activity is in harmony with the other activities in my life” and “This activity is part of who I am”) and seven obsessive items (“I have difficulties controlling my urge to do my activity” and “I have almost an obsessive feeling for this activity”), was used to measure the type of passion an athlete has towards their sport. Participants were asked to think of their sporting experience, and rate how strongly they agreed with each statement, on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all agree) to 7 (very strongly agree).

Internal consistency of the scale, as measured by Chronbach’s Alpha (Chronbach, 1951), was .739 and .806 for the obsessive passion and harmonious passion items, respectively. This is fairly consistent with previously demonstrated reliability of the obsessive

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PSI passion (α = .89) and harmonious passion (α = .79) items (Vallerand et al., 2003).

The 13-item Task and Ego Orientation in Sport Questionnaire (TEOSQ) (Duda, 1989) was used to measure task and ego goal orientation in athletes. On a 5-point Likert scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), participants rated how strongly they agreed with statements concerning the conditions they feel most successful in their sports (e.g. “I feel most successful in sport when I learn a new skill and it makes me want to practice more” and “I feel most successful in sport when I can do better than my friends”). Internal consistency of the scale, as measured by Chronbach’s Alpha (Chronbach, 1951), was .798 and .861 for the task orientation scale and ego orientation scale, respectively.

This is consistent with previously demonstrated reliability of the task orientation scale (alpha between .71 and .77) and the ego orientation scale (alpha between .80 and .87) (Chi & Duda, 1996).

Self-monitoring was measured using Lennox & Wolfe’s (1984)13-item Revised Self-Monitoring Scale.

Participants were asked to rate how strongly they agreed with statements concerning their perceptions about themselves in a variety of situations on a 5-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree (e.g. “In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for” and “I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in”). Internal consistency of the scale, as measured by Chronbach’s Alpha (Chronbach, 1951), was .779, which is consistent with previously demonstrated reliability (α = .75) (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984).

The Carolina Sport Confidence Inventory (CSCI) (Manzo, Silva, & Mink, 2001) is used to determine athlete’s perception of self-efficacy in their sport.

Participants rated 13 items on a four-choice structured alternative format; participants were presented with 13 pairs of opposing statements (e.g. “I feel that if something can go wrong for me during sports activities, it will” vs. “I feel that if something can go right for me during sports activities, it will”). Participants were instructed to choose which of the two statements better reflected them, and then to rate to what extent the chosen statement was true for them (somewhat true or very true). Internal consistency of the scale, as measured by Chronbach’s Alpha (Chronbach, 1951), was .752, which is slightly lower that previously demonstrated reliability (α = .92) (Manzo, Silva, & Mink, 2001), but still relatively high.

Results

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Reliability of the Praise Scale The internal structure of the praise scale demonstrated high internal consistency, as measured by Chronbach’s Alpha (α = .922 ). Inter-item correlation was high for effort (α = .893), ability (α = .885), and neutral constructs (α = .782). Correlations between the praise “subscales” were moderate (between effort and ability, r(58) = .675, p< .01, between effort and neutral, r(58) = .566, p<0.01, and between ability and neutral, r(58) = .643, p< .01).

The results of this analysis imply that the three subscales, to some extent, probe the same construct.

An overall analysis of the results study suggests that the questionnaire is, in fact, a reliable measure of praise from parents.

Praise and Passion Contrary to our predictions, correlation analysis revealed a partially significant and weak relationship between ability praise and harmonious passion, r(58) = .231, p< .10. No other significant correlations were found between praise and passion.

Mediators Partial correlational analysis was carried out in order to determine mediating variables. None of the predicted mediating variables (goal orientation and selfmonitoring) significantly affected the relationship between praise and passion. A correlate was found between task orientation and harmonious passion, r(58) = .335, p< .05, however, but not between effort praise and task orientation. Although self-efficacy was a predicted moderator, exploratory analysis revealed no mediating effects of self-efficacy.

Moderators Self-efficacy demonstrated no moderating effects. After splitting participants into competitive and recreational groups, a moderating effect of level of engagement/ competition in sporting activity was found. Praise for effort was significantly negatively correlated with obsessive passion in competitive athletes, r(25) = -.519, p< .01. A marginally significant negative correlation was found between praise for ability and obsessive passion in competitive athletes, r(25) = -.354, p< .10. No significant effect of praise on harmonious passion appeared in the case of competitive athletes. Partial correlational analysis revealed no significant mediating

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PSI effect of self-monitoring or achievement orientation (task or ego) in the competitive environment.

In recreational athletes, a significant correlation was found between praise for ability and harmonious passion, r(25) = .372, p< .05. No other significant relationships were found. Partial correlational analysis revealed no significant mediating effect of selfmonitoring or achievement orientation (task or ego) in the recreational environment.

An independent samples t-test was performed to determine whether the competitive or recreational group received differing amounts of praise. Competitive athletes (M = 66.67) did not receive any more praise than recreational athletes (M = 63.79), t = .834, p > .05.

An independent samples t-test was also performed to determine the effects of the level of competition on the type of praise an athlete received as a child. A marginally significant effect of effort praise was found such that participants who play their sport at a competitive level (M = 4.78) received more effort praise than participants who play at the recreational level (M = 4.48), t = 1.094, p < .01. This effect did not appear for ability praise.

Discussion Praise appears to have a positive effect on the type of passion that an athlete develops towards their sport, however, the level of competition appears to impact the particulars of this positive effect. Athletes who play a sport at a competitive level benefit from both types of praise (effort and ability), such that any sort of praise decreases their tendency to develop obsessive passion towards their sport. In this way, competitive athletes benefit from a reduced likelihood to be affected by the less adaptive tendencies that are associated with obsessive passion. Recreational athletes on the other hand, benefit most from ability praise, which affects harmonious passion positively. Praising children who play non-competitively for their ability promotes healthy integration of the sport into their identity.

The fact that participants in the competitive condition received more effort praise than those in the recreational condition suggests a fundamental difference between the two populations in terms of the type of praise they receive. Extrapolating from Muller and Dweck’s work (1998), it is possible that the participants in the competitive condition have more of a growth mindset, which could be the distinguishing factor between someone who decided to pursue a sport at a more competitive level, and someone who chooses Issue IV  March 2014

to engage in a sport on a more recreational basis. If someone receives more praise for effort, they may pursue a competitive path, while those praised less for effort may choose to pursue recreational sports. Given that this is only a single (and to our awareness, sole) instance demonstrating this effect, further investigation is necessary to replicate and strengthen this explication.

Although the findings point to an interesting effect of competition on the relationships between praise and passion, this study has its drawbacks. The largest limitation of the current research stems from the fact that a praise questionnaire was devised by the researchers themselves, without previously establishing reliability or validity. In an ideal situation, one would construct a questionnaire that would undergo vigorous testing with large representative samples of athletes to ensure its reliability and validity, and one would carry out factor analysis in order to determine its factor structure. Due to the constraints of this study, this was not possible. In theory, the scale measures the type of praise a child received. Practically, the scale proved to be very reliable. There was fairly high correlations between the three praise “factors” (effort, ability and neutral), however, suggesting that the questionnaire itself measured some global praise construct, and may not quite have tapped into the specific modes of praise a person received as a child.

Moreover, as is the case with most correlational studies, there is the potential for reverse causality, whereby a hypothesized relationship exists in reverse.

We speculated that the type of praise would influence the type of passion a person develops toward a sport. It is possible for passion to influence the type of praise a child receives. Upon realizing that a child is harmoniously passionate, a parent may be more inclined to praise ability. Illuminating the true direction of the relationship requires a prospective longitudinal study on the relationships between praise and passion.

In such a case, researchers could interview parents regarding the type of praise they give, as well as children, on the type of praise they receive. A longitudinal study may also help to reduce the recall biases. The present study is retrospective in nature, and relies heavily upon self-report surveys. Although self-

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PSI report measures are common place in social psychological research, the fact that this study relies heavily upon participant’s memories may present as a source of error. Of particular note is the praise questionnaire in which participant were instructed to think back to their childhood, and reflect upon instances in which their parents praised them for the sport they played. Children receive praise in varying amounts, in varying circumstances, and for various reasons. Having a participant recall a particular time in which they were praised for their sport can be confused with other instances when they were praised, but not for their effort or ability towards their sport. Although the questionnaire specifically instructed participants to reflect on sporting instances, differentiating these instances from other praised instances may prove to be difficult, as parents praise their children for a variety of things.

Considering this, the current questionnaire may prove more beneficial with regards to the type of praise received from a coach (as opposed to a parent). It is much less likely for a coach to praise a child with respect to non-sporting domains, and thus a participant’s recollection of praise from a coach should more accurately reflect the type of praise they received as a child. Future research may focus on the effects of praise from a coach, and its relationships with passion.

Finally, the present study was limited to verbal praise. While verbal praise appears to affect passion, teachers’ expectations have been shown to affect their non-verbal behaviors (Chiakin, Gillen, Derlega, Heinen, & Wilson, 1978), and students use non-verbal behaviors such as nodding and smiling as a source of information about their performance (Marshal & Weinstein, 1984; Woolfolk & Brooks, 1985). Given that children notice and interpret body language, non-verbal praise in the form of hand clapping and pats on the back may affect the relationships between praise and passion. In illuminating the relationships between praise and passion in competitive and recreational athletes, future research should focus on the role of verbal and nonverbal praise.

38

References Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in the self scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 596–612. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596 Bélanger, J. J., Lafrenière, M-A. K., Vallerand, R. J., & Kruglanksi, A. W. (2013). Driven by fear: The effect of success and failure information on passionate individuals’ performance.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(1), 180195. doi: 10.1037/a0029585 Chi, L., & Duda, J. L. (1995). Multi-sample confirmatory factor analysis of the task and ego orientation in sport questionnaire. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 66(2), 91-. 98. Retrieved fromhttp://go.galegroup.com/ps/ i.do?id=GALE%7CA17312914&v=2 .1&u=crepuq_mcgill&it=r&p=EAIM&sw=w&asid=ce82d2a0 16798a653519e1e979c5 45e5.

Chiakin, A. L., Gillen, B., Derlega, V. J., Heinen, J. R. K., & Wilson, M. (1978). Students' reactions to teachers' physical attractiveness and nonverbal behavior: Two exploratory studies. Psychology in the Schools, 15(4), 588-595. doi: 10.1002/1520-6807(197810)1 5:4<588::AID-PITS2310150425>3.0.CO;2-# Chronbach, L. J. (1951). Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 16(3), 297-334. Retrieved from http://psych.colorado.edu/~carey/courses/psyc5112/ readings/alpha_cronbach.pdf.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). The general causality orientations scale: Self-determination in personality. Journal of Research in Personality, 19(2), 109-134. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org.proxy2.library.mcgill.ca/10.1016/00926566(85)90023-6.

Duda, J. L. (1989). The relationship between task and ego orientation and the perceived purpose of sport among male and female high school athletes. Journal of Sport and Exercise Phycology, 11(3), 318-335.

Dweck, C. S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and development. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Harter, S. (1985). Effectance motivation reconsidered: Toward a developmental model. Human Development, 21(1), 34-64. doi:10.1159/000271574 Hatfield, E. & Sprecher, S. (1986). Measuring passionate love in intimate relationships. Journal of Adolescence, 9(4), 383410.

Retrieved from http:// dx.doi.org.proxy1.library.mcgill.ca/10.1016/S0140-1971 (86)80043-4 .

Hatfield, E., & Walster, G. W. (1978). A new look at love. Reading.

Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.

Horn, T. S. (1985). Coaches' feedback and changes in children's perceptions of their physical competence. Journal of

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PSI Educational Psychology, 77(2), 174-186. doi: 10.1037/0022 -0663.77.2.174 Klint, K. A., & Weiss, M. R. (1987). Perceived competence and motives for participating in youth sports: A test of Harter's competence motivation theory. Journal of Sport Psychology, 9(1). 55-65.

Lennox, R. D. & Wolfe, R. N. (1984). Revision of the self-monitoring scale. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46(6), 1349-1364. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.46.6.1349 Mageau, G. A., Vallerand, R. J., Charest, J., Salvy, S-J., Lacaille, N., Bouffard, T., & Koestner, R. (2009). On the development of harmonious and obsessive passion: The role of autonomy support, activity specialization, and identification with the activity. Journal of Personality, 77(3), 601-646. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2009.00559.x Marshal, H. H., & Weinstein, R. S. (1984). Classroom factors affecting students' self-evaluations: An interactional model. Review of Educational Research, 54(3), 301-325. doi: 10.3102/00346543054003301 Manzo, L. G., Ilva III, J. M., & Mink, R. (2001). The Carolina sport confidence inventory. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 13(3), 260-274. doi:10.1080/104132001753144400 Muller, C. M. & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Praise for intelligence can undermine children’s motivation and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1), 33-52. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.33 Nicholls, J. G. (1984). Achievement motivation: Conceptions of ability, subjective experience, task choice, and performance. Psychological Review, 91(3), 328-346. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.91.3.328 Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68-78. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68 Schlenker, B. R. (1985). Identity and self-identification. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), The self and social life. New York: McGrawHill.

Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. .(2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. American Psychologist, 55(1), 5-14. doi: 10.1037//0003-066X.55.1.5 Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behaviour. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30(4), 526-537. doi: 10.1037/h0037039 Vallerand, R. J. (2010). Chapter 3- On passion for life activities: The dualistic model of passion. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 42,97-193. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S00652601(10)42003-1 Vallerand, R. J., Blanchard, C., Mageau, G. A., Koestner, R., Ratelle, C., Léonard, M., & Gagné, M. (2003). Les passions de l’âme: On obsessive and harmonious passion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(4), 756-767. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.4.756 Vallerand, R. J., Mageau, G. A., Elliot, A. J., Dumais, A., Demers, M.A., & Rousseau, F. L. (2008). Passion and performance attainment in sport.

Psychology of Sport & Exercise, 9(3), 373–392. doi:10.1016/j.psychsport.2007.05.003 Woolfolk, A. E., & Brooks, D. M. (1985). The influence of teachers' nonverbal behaviors on students' perceptions and performance. The Elementary School Journal, 85(4), 513528. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1001153.

Issue IV  March 2014

39

PSI RESEARCH ARTICLE

Are Multiword Sequences Directly Retrieved or Compositionally Built?Evidence From a Cross-Modal Semantic Judgment Task of Idiomatic Expressions Caleb Harrison Abstract

Keywords idioms, compositionality, multiword, sequences, psycholinguistics

An important question within psycholinguistics is whether people represent and process multiword sequences in a normal word-by-word fashion or as larger multiword chunks. The study of idioms (e.g., kick the bucket) is relevant to this question because, like the larger class of multiword sequences to which they belong, idioms can be potentially understood through a word-by-word compositional analysis or through direct retrieval of their unitary form from memory. One concern with the results by Libben and Titone (2008) is that participants were never prompted to interpret idiomatic sequences in any specific way (i.e., figuratively or literally), making it unclear whether their results extend to comprehension situations where a particular interpretation of a multiword sequence is intended. Thus, the present study seeks to assesses whether participants display an immediate preference for figuratively versus literally related probe words following idiomatic stimuli, using a cross-modal priming, semantic judgement task. The results for nine preliminary participants align with the conclusions of Libben and Titone (2008) regarding the particular importance of direct retrieval over word-by-word compositional processing.

phrases. This led them to conclude that multi-word Introduction Before we begin our discussion on idioms, let’s first look at the broader problem of multiword sequence retrieval versus compositional construction. For this, we turn to Arnon and Snider (2010), who were interested in whether the frequency ef-

phrases ought to be regarded as part of “…the distributional information that people have access to during language processing” (Arnon & Snider, 2010, p.

79), or in other words,that people process multiword sequences as chunks especially when they are high in frequency.

fects of multi-word sequences affected processing time. They used a phrasal-decision task which in-

Now we turn the discussion to idioms, which

volved the participants making a decision as to

are relevant given their characterization as being

whether phrases were possible English sequences,

processed either compositionally, noncompositional-

and manipulated the stimuli according to the level of

ly, or a combination of both (Titone & Connine,

phrase frequency (low versus high). They found that

1999). Using evidence garnered by Arnon and Snider

phrase frequency elicited an effect: high frequency

(2010) as an analogy drawn to idiomatic expressions,

phrases led to quicker responses than low frequency

we can explore the extent to which they act the same

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McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI with regards to processing (i.e., is it a compositional

and “bucket” are not related to dying, nor is it intui-

operation or one that involves “chunking”?) But how

tive that the action of kicking a bucket would be

do we define or characterize idiomatic expressions?.

somehow related to dying. Examples such as this are

In the literature surrounding this linguistic phenome-

the basis for the noncompositional view—an analysis

non, there are three dominant perspectives regarding

of the component parts does not give rise to the fig-

idioms: the noncompositional perspective (e.g., Swin-

urative meaning of the phrase.

ney & Cutler, 1979), the compositional perspective (e.g., Gibbs, 1984), and a hybrid of the two (e.g., Cacciari & Tabossi, 1988).

Swinney and Cutler (1979), early proponents of the noncompositional perspective, put forth the “lexical representation hypothesis”, essentially sug-

Compositionality, according to Glucksberg, is

gesting that idioms are stored (in the mind) as lexical

the extent to which “…the meaning of an idiom can be

items and are thus processed as long words

derived

constitu-

(Glucksberg, 2001, p. 69). However, there are several

ents…” (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 69). More simply put,

problems with this account. First, “some idioms are

compositionality involves how the individual words

syntactically flexible… (e.g., “Who let the cat out of the

in a phrase make up the meaning of the whole phrase

bag? It was let out by old George, of course.”)

and thus compositional perspective on idioms con-

(Glucksberg, 2001, p. 69). That is, the phrasal struc-

tends that the meaning of the phrase is derived from

tures of some idioms can be shifted while maintain-

its components. With this in mind it should be clear

ing the figurative meaning. If the idiom is nothing

that the noncompositional perspective maintains the

more than a “long word”, its structure, intuitively,

opposite: the meaning of the phrase cannot be de-

should be fixed. Second, phrases in some idioms can

rived from its components.

be replaced with anaphoric expressions (same exam-

from

the

meanings

of

its

A common example that reinforces the noncompositional view is the idiom “kick the bucket” (literally: to die) (Glucksberg, 2001; Libben & Titone, 2008; Titone & Connine, 1999). Here, the meaning of the idiom (to die) cannot be derived from its components. That is, “kick”, the definite article “the”, Issue IV  March 2014

ple as above: “the cat” is replaced by “it”) (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 69). This should not be possible in the noncompositional account since the individual components are said to not have meaning themselves (in the context of the phrase). That the meaning of the whole can be maintained even when one of the con-

41

PSI stituents is replaced by an anaphoric expression sug-

“familiarity” is clearly related to frequency, since fa-

gests that the components do indeed carry individual

miliarity intuitively arises as a product of frequency

meaning, otherwise the phrase or, “long word”, would

(Titone & Connine, 1999).

be meaningless. Finally, some idioms can undergo internal modification: “…he kicked the proverbial bucket, or he didn’t spill a single bean.” (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 69). Again, idioms, under the noncompositional view, should be fixed and not modifiable if they

The third perspective is a hybrid of the compositional and noncompositional views. (Cacciari & Tabossi, 1988; Titone & Connine, 1999) Libben and Titone (2008) characterize this view in the following way:

are considered analogical to long words.

In contrast, the compositional view suggests that, “…an idiom’s internal semantic structure is necessary

for

understanding

idiomatic

mean-

“…[I]dioms have unitary representations that may be directly retrieved when idioms are familiar or predictable, but they may also be compositionally analyzed during comprehension, especially in the case of unfamiliar or unpredictable idioms.” (p. 1103)

ing…” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1103). Simply put, the meaning of the individual words in the phrase

Let’s break this summary down so we can pin-

make up the meaning of the phrase as a whole. The

point exactly what each element indicates. First of all,

prediction of this view is that processing for idiomat-

“unitary representations” suggests a characterization

ic expressions should resemble that of literal expres-

similar to that of the noncompositional view. Howev-

sions, however, this does not seem to be the case as

er, the difference lies in the individual’s experience

there exists “…differences in retrieval of idiomatic

with the idiomatic expression in question (“when idi-

meanings…” (Titone & Connine, 1999, p. 1665). It has

oms are familiar or predictable”). These two facets of

been reasoned that these results are caused not only

idiom comprehension, familiarity and predictability,

by the character of the idioms themselves, but also by

suggest a continuum of idiomatic recognition (i.e.,

factors such as familiarity which “…plays a large role

given “degrees” of familiarity). The latter part of the

in how quickly idiomatic meanings are apprehended

description, which says idioms “may be composition-

during comprehension (e.g., Cronk & Schweigert,

ally analyze, especially in the case of unfamiliar or

1992; Gibbs, 1980; Swinney & Cutler, 1979)” (Titone

unpredictable idioms,” hinges upon this notion of the

& Connine, 1999, p. 1665). This dimension of

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McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI individual’s experience with the idioms in question.

in a temporally dynamic way” (Libben & Titone,

This also relates to multiword sequences in general.

2008, p. 1117). This is a potentially useful characteri-

In order to show that the character of idioms, as well as individuals’ experience with them, have an effect on the manner in which the expression is processed, Titone and Connine (1994b) collected information based on several subjective attributes of idioms that were thought to influence idiom processing.

These included familiarity, compositionality, predictability, and literality. Libben and Titone (2008) collected similar information, but included more dimensions, such as meaningfulness and global decomposability. One result of an experiment conducted by Libben and Titone (2008) suggested that (at least) “… increased familiarity, literal plausibility, and global decomposability

facilitate

idiom

pro-

cessing…” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1112). The task in this experiment was to judge the meaningfulness of sentences (some idiomatic, some literal, and some nonsensical). The sentences being judged were distinguished according to the factors listed above (e.g., familiarity).

zation given the notion that idioms are “represented and retrieved as units,” which suggests that they are constructions not unlike words. But this, in accordance with the above discussion of the noncompositionality perspective, is balanced by the statement that idioms “can interact with an ongoing compositional analysis”, suggesting that although idioms are represented as units, they can be analyzed in a manner similar to compositional expressions. Of course, this characterization would be lacking unless we had some idea as to what the constraints are that motivate idiomatic analysis. This is what is meant by “relevant constraints”—the dimensions such as familiarity, decomposability, literal plausibility, etc. Finally, the idea that a speaker’s analysis of idioms is “temporally dynamic” indicates that speakers rely on a complex system of relevant constraints ( the dimensions of familiarity, decomposability etc.) and factors that are sensitive to temporal sequences of idiom exposure. That is, there exists a timeline of idiom recognition. Surely this is also the case for multiword se-

Given this evidence regarding idiom processing and the dimensions that affect it, Libben and Titone

quences in general as well, given recent findings concerning frequency effects Arnon & Snider, 2010).

(2008) characterized idioms as “…represented and retrieved as units that can interact with an ongoing compositional analysis and other relevant constraints Issue IV  March 2014

The components of idiom processing that are of particular interest in the current study include global

43

PSI decomposability—a dimension of idiom processing

In order to correct for this potential shortcom-

that describes the character of the idiom itself (i.e., to

ing, the experimenters manipulated the design so

what extent is an idiom decomposable?—see above,

that participants were exposed (visually) to one word

footnote 1), and familiarity—a dimension that de-

at a time. The presentation was again followed by a

scribes the speaker’s experience with the idiom (i.e.,

judgment based on meaningfulness (yes/no). The

to what extent is the speaker familiar with the idi-

results of this experiment show that “…increased fa-

om?). Libben and Titone (2008) define familiarity as

miliarity…and global decomposability facilitate idiom

“…the subjective frequency with which comprehend-

processing…” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1112). But

ers encounter an idiom in its written or spoken

there arises another problem. “…[T]he fixed rate

form…” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1106). They exam-

presentation may not generalize to normal read-

ined the impact of familiarity on comprehension ex-

ing…” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1112). The design

perimentally by surveying a number of native English

was modified again to allow readers to read the

speakers regarding several dimensions of idioms

words, one at a time, at their own pace. Then the par-

(including

information

ticipant was asked a comprehension question based

(collected in an off-line manner) was used as the ba-

on the figurative interpretation of the idiom (the idi-

sis for a series of experiments that tested online idi-

oms were counterbalanced with literal sentences

om processing. Both accuracy and speed of judgment

where both contained the same final word—e.g., She

were measured. It was found that “Familiarity facili-

told a lie (literal) and She lived a lie (idiomatic)).

tated semantic judgment responses significantly in all

“Increases in idiom familiarity were associated with a

model and none of the interactions between familiari-

greater benefit in reading rate for the last word of

ty and decomposability was significant” (Libben &

idiom-bearing sentences than for the last word of lit-

Titone, 2008, p. 1110). A limitation that the authors

eral sentences” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1114).

familiarity,

etc.).

This

point out is that perhaps the participants had too

Table 1

much time to consider the phrases before responding, thus “…it [the test] may still be relatively insensitive to online processing…” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p.

1111).

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McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI rating survey. Ultimately, this study’s results suggest Familiarity Global De- Global Decomp. comp. × Familthe following: iarity

Experiment

Measurement

1: Offline Ratings

Meaningfulness

Positive

Predictability

Positive

2: Whole-Sentence Speed- Error proportion ed Meaningfulness JudgCorrect RT 3:

Fixed-Rate

Speeded Error proportion Correct RT

4: Moving-Window Read- Idiom facilitation ing

Positive

Positive Positive

- “…[G]lobal decomposability Positive exerts a facilita- tive influence - on comprehension when an exfocuses attention overtly on - perimental task phrase meaning, or when postaccess integration is necessary (see, e.g., Titone & Connine, 1999). In contrast…phrase familiarity…[is] related to initial retrieval of idiomatic config- urations as -lexicalized units.” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1117).

Positive

Positive

Positive

-

-

Given this summary (focusing on the two fac-

tors we’ve been discussing in the scope of the current discussion), we have a fairly compelling characterization of what goes on in idiom processing in the con“Note—Positive indicates that increases in the relevant dimension are associated with facilitated idiom processing…” (Table adapted from Table 13: Summary of the Results Across All Four Experiments for Regression Models, Including Global Decomposability As an Independent Variable, in Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1114)

The above table (Table 1) adapted from Libben and Titone (2008) shows the results across all four experiments they conducted in their study. As is

text of the experiments conducted. Increased familiarity facilitates processing of figurative interpretations of idioms (Libben & Titone, 2008). Decomposability, on the other hand, facilitates comprehension later on, likely because “…global decomposability at a phrase level cannot be determined definitively until the last word is encountered and integrated with previous words…” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1117).

clear, familiarity facilitates idiom processing in all

The results of Libben and Titone’s (2008)

observed contexts. Decomposability elicited an effect

study provide support for a hybrid view of idiom pro-

on participants’ reaction time in Experiment 3, during

cessing, what they alternatively refer to as the

which words were presented one at a time at a fixed

“multidetermined nature of idiom processing”. In

rate. The only interaction of decomposability and fa-

their experimental design, the participants were

miliarity is found in the first experiment, an offline

asked to make judgments based on meaningfulness

Issue IV  March 2014

45

PSI and comprehension concerning the expressions they were exposed to directly following their exposure. These two measurements (meaningfulness and comprehension) directly tap into speakersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; understanding of the phrases theyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;re exposed to. But to what extent can comprehenders, having been exposed to idiomatic stimuli, extend the information elicited from the provided linguistic cues to related or unrelated words, either in the figurative or literal sense given literally plausible idioms? Moreover, what happens when this extension must occur in an online, cross-modal context? The answer to these questions could potentially show whether a preference for idiomatic versus literal interpretations for literally plausible idioms in a cross-modal context is dependent upon dimensions that have been established as relevant to idiom processing (Titone & Connine, 1994; Titone & Connine, 1999; Libben & Titone, 2008).

The current study, instead of asking participants to make meaningfulness judgments of idiomatic stimuli, had participants judge the relatedness of figuratively or literally related words to literally plausible idioms using a cross-modal semantic judgment task. Idioms were paired with both figuratively and literally related probes so as to support one interpretation or the other. The measurements taken were based on participantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; responses and reaction times to the figuratively related versus literally related probes. The task was cross-modal in nature, exposing the participants first to a spoken expression and then to a visually presented word about which the participant made his/her judgment concerning relatedness (related or unrelated). These responses were compared using the dimensions of decomposability and familiarity.

Ultimately, the current study is an extension of that conducted by Libben and Titone (2008), exploring modalities for idiom processing with a different design. The purpose of the study is to explore the extent to which the dimensions of familiarity and decomposability affect online idiom processing in the context of cross-modal semantic judgments (based on responses regarding relatedness). The results will then be analogized to those of Arnon and Snider (2010) in order to observe similarities or differences in the degrees to which frequency (the foundation for familiarity) affects idiom processing (see above discussion on compositional construction versus chunking).

The hypothesis of the current study, based on previous work done on idiom processing (Titone & Connine, 1994; Titone & Connine, 1999; Libben & Titone, 2008), is that idioms with higher familiarity ratings will elicit more figurative interpretations, while exposure to idioms with lower familiarity ratings will elicit no preference

46

McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI for literal versus figurative interpretations. This prediction is based on the following argument: “…[I]f an idiom is highly familiar, and thus more configured in memory, activation of the idiom representation accrues sooner and with greater strength than if the idiom is not familiar. This is evidenced by the many observations of robust familiarity on idiom comprehension (Cronk & Schweigert, 1992; Gibbs, 1980; Nippold & Taylor, 2002; Schweigert, 1986; Titone & Connine, 1994b).” (Libben & Titone, 2008, p. 1117).

Method Participants Nine McGill University undergraduate students participated for monetary compensation of CAD $10/hour. This is a preliminary sample, and ultimately the study will include approximately 40 total participants. All of the participants included in the

In other words,given higher familiarity, figurative interpretations should be more readily accessible.

study were native speakers of English, had normal or corrected vision, and had normal hearing.

Thus,frequency of input leads to familiarity with the construction, which leads to greater configuration in the speaker’s memory, which leads to facilitated processing of the idiom. Also given this argument, highly familiar idioms should be processed quicker than idi-

Stimuli

oms given low familiarity ratings.

The experimental stimuli included 24 idioms, It is also predicted that idioms rated as highly decomposable will elicit fewer figurative interpretations given their characterization as inducing pieceby-piece comprehension in processing. On the other hand, idioms given low decomposability ratings should elicit more figurative interpretations, as these are more likely to be configured in memory as whole phrases as opposed to constituent parts making up the whole phrase (e.g., kick the bucket—see discus-

each paired with a figuratively related probe and a literally related probe (e.g., idiom: He hit the books, fig. probe: “studied”, lit. probe: “punched”); 24 control items, which were non-idiomatic expressions paired with literally related probes (e.g., expression: She chose the dates, probe: “selected”); and 16 filler items, which included 8 idiomatic items and 8 non-idiomatic items designed to explicitly elicit “no” responses regarding relatedness (e.g., idiom: She got the picture at

sion above).

Issue IV  March 2014

47

PSI last, probe: “tackled”; non-idiom: She ate the sandwich

ed). Participants heard, using headphones set at a

at last, probe: “fractured”). All experimental stimuli

comfortable volume level, a sentence while a fixation

were matched for length (all comprised of monosyl-

cross was presented on a computer screen. When the

labic words) and structure (subject(he/she)-verb(ed)

audio stimulus was finished, a word would appear

-object). All idioms were literally plausible (e.g., idi-

where the fixation cross was, and participants re-

om: He hit the books, figurative: “He studied”, literal:

sponded. Each participant heard all 24 idioms.

“He struck the books”). The probes (words presented visually following spoken stimulus) were all chosen by two native speakers of English. The spoken utterances were all recorded by a native speaker of English. The audio files were digitized at 44.1 kHz.

The experimental task was divided into two blocks separated by a number of executive function tasks and an attentional blink task. In one block, 50% of the idioms were paired with an unrelated control probe; in the other block, the same 50% of idioms were presented with the same unrelated control

Procedure

probes, but the other 50%, though still the same stimuli, were paired with literal probes. That is, for each

Participants were told that they would hear a

idiom, the participants heard it in one block with a

sentence and then see a word on the computer

figuratively related probe and in the other block with

screen. They were then told they had to make a deci-

a literally related probe (e.g., block 1: stimulus: He hit

sion about whether the word they saw was related to

the books, probe: “studied”; block 2: stimulus: He hit

the sentence they heard. They were asked to respond

the books, probe: “punched”). The block order was

as quickly and as accurately as possible. The stimuli

counterbalanced across participants. The separating

were presented using E-prime software version 1.

tasks between the two blocks were conducted for the

Participants made responses on a response box using

purposes of another study and so the information

the index fingers of either hand on numbers 1 or 5 on

collected is excluded from the current discussion. For

the box. Responses were balanced amongst partici-

the purposes of this study, they aided in changing the

pants according to hand (50 % of participants had a

participants’ focus so as to avoid artifactual respons-

link coded as right hand = related, left hand = unrelat-

es (i.e., responses that are driven by previous experi-

ed, 50 % had right hand = unrelated, left hand = relat-

ence with the same stimuli).

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McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI familiarity and probe type facilitate “related” responses. Of note, the fixed effect of global decomposability never exerted any significant influence on relatResults

edness proportions. See Table 2 below for further

The proportion of “related” responses, and correct reaction times of related responses were examined as dependent variables. Independent variables

statistical information regarding all of the factors of interest concerning relatedness. See Figures 1 and 2 for a graphical depiction of the data.

included probe type, familiarity, and decomposability. Probe type included either figuratively related or literally related probes. Familiarity and decomposability ratings were the same as those elicited and used by Libben and Titone (2008). Participants in the survey conducted by Libben and Titone (2008) rated idioms on familiarity and decomposability (1 = low

Table 2 Effect sizes (bs), standard errors (SEs), and Z values for linear mixed effect models of relatedness

familiarity/decomposability, 5 = high familiarity/

Relatedness b

decomposability). Items and participants were ranFixed Effects

(Intercept)

dom factors, and familiarity, decomposability, and

Probe Type

probe type were fixed factors.

Familiarity Global Decomp.

ProbeType × Familiarity

Probe Type × Global Deco

Familiarity × Global Decom

Relatedness Proportion

Probe Type × Familiarity ×

A main effect of familiarity was observed (b = .87096, SE = .32821, Pr(> z

meaning

Random Effects Item

that familiarity facilitated all “related” responses

Subject

overall. An interaction between familiarity and probe

Residual

type was also observed (b = -1.83706, SE = .40636, Pr z

6.16e-06) indicating that, when combined,

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PSI Significance codes: 0 ‘***’, 0.001 ‘**’ Figure 1 Proportion “Related” Response (Familiarity)

Insert short blurb about graph Figure 2 Proportion “Related” Response (Decomposability)

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Correct Reaction Time A main effect of probe type was observed (b = 131.92, SE = 42.11, pMCMC < .01), suggesting that a difference in reaction time based on probe type exists. A main effect of familiarity was also observed (b = -92.33, SE = 32.30, pMCMC < .01), suggesting again that familiarity facilitates correct reaction time overall. Finally, an interaction between probe type and familiarity was again observed (b = 188.65, SE = 45.51, pMCMC < .001), indicating that, when combined, familiarity and probe type are implicated in a difference in reaction times. Again, of note, the fixed effect of global decomposability never exerted a significant effect on the latency of correct relatedness proportions.

See Table 3 below for further statistical information regarding all of the factors of interest concerning correct reaction time. Figures 3 and 4 depict the data graphically.

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Table 3 Effect sizes (bs), standard errors (SEs), t values, and pMCMC values for linear mixed effect models of correct reaction time

Figure 3 Correct Reaction Time

Fixed Effects

Correct Reaction Time in ms (Familiarity)

b

SE

t value

pMCMC

(Intercept)

704.39

63.07

11.168

0.00

Probe Type

131.92

42.11

3.133

0.00

Familiarity

-92.33

32.30

-2.867

0.00

Global Decomp.

27.46

30.21

0.909

0.33

ProbeType × Familiarity

188.65

45.51

4.146

0.00

Probe Type × Global Decomp.

-25.64

40.85

-0.628

0.47

Familiarity × Global Decomp.

12.92

31.33

0.412

0.67

Probe Type × Familiarity × Global Decomp.

23.68

46.45

0.510

0.62

Variance

St. Dev.

Item

5228.4

72.308

Subject

27296.1

165.215

Residual

57166.9

239.096

Random Effects

Figure 4 Correct Reaction (Decomposability) *pMCMC < .05 ***pMCMC < .001

Time

in

ms

**pMCMC < .01

As can be seen from the table, there were no significant effects or interactions regarding decomposability.

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Discussion That familiarity displays a significant facilitative effect on both relatedness responses and correct reaction times is unsurprising given previous literature that have produced similar findings (e.g., Cronk & Schweigert, 1992; Gibbs, 1980; Titone & Connine, 1994b; Libben & Titone, 2008). Interestingly, the interactions between familiarity and probe type distinguish the current study from that conducted by Libben and Titone (2008) in an important way: participants were exposed to probe types of either a literally or figuratively related nature and thus were tested in a scenario that would potentially give rise to context-dependent preferences for one or the other (see above design). . Figurative targets are identified as related more often when the idiom is highly familiar. The reverse is true for literal targets which are identified as related less often when the idiom is rated as highly familiar. The control is presented as a baseline against which we compared the experimental conditions. There seems to be no significant difference between probe type in the low familiar condition, but there most certainly is one in the high familiar condition. The large disparity between probe type in the high familiar condition is the basis for the interaction of probe type and familiarity.

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PSI In accordance with our significant main effects of familiarity, probe type, and our significant interaction between the two, the graph (and results) ultimately shows that figurative probes, when paired with highly familiar idioms, are identified more quickly as related than are literal probes with the same stimuli. ( see figure 3).

The results regarding familiarity are intuitive. Highly familiar idioms become highly familiar given frequency of occurrence in the speakerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s language experience (Libben & Titone, 2008). If the figurative interpretation is readily available, the figuratively related probe should be more easily recognized as related. Logically, it seems that literal probes would force the speaker to reevaluate his/her initial (figurative) interpretation of the idiomatic expression in a literal manner, thus requiring more time to make a decision regarding relatedness of the stimuli.

Figures 2 and 4 are presented to display the lacking effects of decomposability but also to show that there is a tendency for figurative probes to be recognized as related slightly more so than literal probes (and to be recognized slightly faster than them) in the context of both high and low decomposable stimuli. It might be the case that decomposability will have significant effects (or a significant interaction with probe type) when further testing is conducted. As of yet, however, there is little to be said for this factor.

Conclusion In conclusion, the results on familiarity support our hypothesis that idioms with higher familiarity ratings are more likely to elicit figurative interpretations, while idioms with lower familiarity ratings will elicit no preference for literal versus figurative interpretations. This conclusion revolves around preferred interpretations demonstrated by probe-relatedness decisions discussed above. Decomposability did not seem to play a significant role in our study, but this is likely due to the fact that the current study is preliminary in nature; increasing the number of participants may demonstrate a significant effect of decomposability. Ultimately, the current study supports previous work that has demonstrated the importance of familiarity in idiom processing (Cronk & Schweigert, 1992; Gibbs, 1980; Titone & Connine, 1994b; Libben & Titone, 2008), extending the scope of this importance to measures of preference as shown in our cross-modal semantic judgment task design. Thus it seems that speakersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; experience with language, the foundation for the factor of familiarity, plays an extremely important

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PSI role in language processing, whereas the character of the expressions speakers are exposed to, here discussed as decomposability, appear to play less of a role.

These results carry implications for the bigger question at hand,.which asks whether multiword sequences/ phrases are analyzed piece-by-piece or in chunks. According to Arnon and Snider (2010), increased frequency (and thus familiarity) leads to facilitated processing, which is essentially what our results indicate as well. Thus, the results of our study support the view that language processing, dependent upon the dimension of familiarity (a “byproduct” of frequency), involves “chunking” supported by configuration in memory (Libben & Titone, 2008). These chunks, which arise as a function of familiarity, are analogous to the unitary character of figuratively interpreted idioms. When the speaker processes these familiar multiword phrases, their recognition of the figuratively related probe is bolstered given the most readily available interpretation, which, as evidenced by the current study’s results, is the figurative one.

Limitations One potential problem may include the fundamental basis for our conclusion: the problem of chunking. If, as a result of familiarity, multiword phrases are more likely to be configured in memory and thus more readily available, the smaller sequences that comprise the phrases used as experimental stimuli should be controlled for by frequency. Alternatively, they may be tested post hoc to determine whether there exist systematic differences dependent upon the individual phrases themselves.

The current study used a very small sample size—a fraction of the proposed sample size submitted for the study out of which this one arose. In order to further investigate the significant effects observed,more participants should be tested. Furthermore, other factors related to general multiword sequence processing and idiom processing should be taken into account in future studies to determine what other dimensions are relevant to this processing. It remains to be seen whether the current design can demonstrate similar effects concerning other dimensions such as literal plausibility (Libben & Titone, 2008).

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PSI Language, 28(5), 576-593.

Glucksberg, S. (2001). Understanding figurative lanReferences

guage: From metaphors to idioms.

Oxford University Press.

Arnon, I., & Snider, N. (2010). More than words: frequency effects for multi-word phrases. Journal of Memory and Language, 61 (1), 67-82.

Cacciari, C., & Tabossi, P. (1988). The comprehension of idioms. Journal of Memory

Harley, T. A. (2008) The Psychology of Language: From data to theory. 3rd Edition. New York, NY. Psychology Press.

Libben, M. R., & Titone, D. A. (2008). The multidetermined nature of idiom

and Language, 27(6), 668-683.

processing. Memory & Cognition, 36(6), 11031121.

Cronk, B. C., & Schweigert, W. A. (1992). The comprehension of idioms: The effects of familiarity, literalness, and usage. Applied Psycholinguistics, 13, 131-146.

Gibbs, R. W., Jr. (1980). Spilling the beans on understanding and memory for idioms in conversation. Memory & Cognition, 8, 149156.

Gibbs, R. W. (1984). Literal meaning and psychological theory. Cognitive Science, 8(3), 275-304.

Gibbs, R. W., Nayak, N. P., & Cutting, C. (1989). How to kick the bucket and not

Nunberg, G. (1978). The pragmatics of reference.

Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Linguistics Club.

Schweigert, W. A. (1986). The comprehension of familiar and less familiar idioms.

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 15, 33-45.

Swinney, D. A., & Cutler, A. (1979). The access and processing of idiomatic expressions. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18(5), 523-534.

Titone, D. A., & Connine, C. M. (1994). Descriptive norms for 171 idiomatic

decompose: Analyzability and idiom processing. Journal of Memory and

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PSI expressions: Familiarity, compositionality, predictability, and literality. Metaphor and Symbol, 9(4), 247-270.

Titone, D. A., & Connine, C. M. (1994). Comprehension of idiomatic expressions: Effects of predictability and literality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20(5), 1126.

Titone, D. A., & Connine, C. M. (1999). On the compositional and noncompositional nature of idiomatic expressions. Journal of Pragmatics,31(12), 1655-1674.

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PSI RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Effect of A Priori Mood State on Preference Background Music Sara Florence

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music can be used to induce suspense during a seemingly innocuous scene. Playing stressful horror music during a scene can lead to significant increases in physiological activity, suggesting that music alters the level of internal arousal within viewers (Thayer and Levenson, 1983). This finding inspired Boltz (2001) to test whether Keywords: college students, music, mood, mood state, short ambiguous film clips could be interpretfilm clips are interpreted as positive when paired with positive background music, and ed as either positive or negative after being he intent in the present study was to investigate whether this effect can be reversed by paired with positive or negative music. The criteria for positive and negative music as indiwill lead him or her to interpret an ambiguous video clip as positive or negative, and subcated by Boltz (2001) was based on previous ing the clip is seen by the participant as being more suitable when paired with the video. literature portraying negative music as displaying a minor mode, atonality, and irregular mood states using the Profile of Mood States and State Trait Anxiety Inventory, and askrhythm, and positive music displaying and a Subsequently, participants viewed each clip with positive and negative music, and were major mode, consistent tonality scheme, and predictable rhythm. Boltz found that the presach clip. Results revealed no significant correlation between subjects’ a priori mood state ence of positive music led participants to make significantly more positive ratings, and of background music. These findings are discussed in comparison to additional studies negative music led to more negative ratings. asks.

The purpose of the present experiment was to discover if the participant's a priori mood might influence their performance in the Boltz task. To video, clip accomplish this, we reversed Boltz’s 2001 experiment.

Instead of using positive or negative music to elicit an emotional response from participants, we instead asIntroduction sessed each participant’s a priori mood state, asked them to provide an interpretation of each video clip, Hollywood films and television programming and subsequently to judge whether positive or negative provide an immense contribution to the financial sysmusic accompanying the clip was more appropriate. tem of the United States (Motion Picture Association of Previous research has shown that positive and negative America, Inc., 2013), and American President Barack mood projects onto decision-making, resulting in moodObama was recently quoted identifying the entertaincongruent judgments (de Vries et al., 2012). It was hyment industry as “one of the bright spots of [the US] pothesized that higher a priori mood states would lead economy” (Verrier and Linthicum, 2013). Americans to more positive perceptions of an ambiguous film clip, spend 34 hours a week watching their favourite televiand consequently a choice of positive music to accomsion shows (Hinckley, 2012), and over two-thirds of the pany it.

U.S./Canada population aged 2+ (68%) – or 225 million people – went to a movie at the cinema at least once in 2012 (MPAA, 2012). Although the main attraction in these activities is the visual image on the screen, it is common for films and television programs to include an accompanying musical soundtrack to the dialogue and action (Boltz, 2004). The choice of the particular music used can help to establish the context and setting of a story, or what particular era it occurs in (Boltz, 2001). In addition, music may be used in some instances because it conveys a particular affect; this can be useful to exert different emotional effects upon a viewing audience and contribute to the story in a way that is not inherent to the scene (Boltz, 2004). While music can be helpful in enhancing the inherent emotional nature of a film scene, it can also be used to induce a specific mood in the audience that is not intrinsic in the scene. For example,

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Method Participants The experimental design was a 3x3 mixed factorial. The within subject factors were film clip (with three levels for three different film clips) and accompanying music (with three levels: positive, negative, or none).

The between-subjects variable was the particular type of music paired with a given film, and this varied across three different sets. Subjects were 17 student participants who answered an ad on the McGill University Classifieds website: seven male and ten female. Ages ranged from 18 to 55 years (M=25.65, SD=10.63 years).

McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI All subjects completed the experiment and received $10 payment in return. Three subjects were excluded from data analysis for various reasons. One subject recognized two of the actors, and was excluded on the basis of potential predetermined positive or negative feelings associated with the actors. Another subject recognized one of the film clips, making it no longer ambiguous, which was a requirement for the stimuli materials. The third excluded subject displayed behaviours consistent with a psychological disorder, and it is unclear whether the perceptive abilities of this individual were favourable to the variables tested in this experiment. The experiment took approximately an hour.

Materials and Stimuli The film clips used in this experiment were taken from various motion picture movies and television programs: Cat People, Vertigo, and The Hitchhiker.

These three clips were chosen for this experiment because they were all used in the Boltz (2001) study that that is being replicated and extended on. According to her study, these videos were initially selected because they were each approximately five minutes in duration; ambiguous, meaning the actions and intentions of the main characters could be interpreted in either a positive or negative fashion; were relatively unfamiliar to most college students; displayed a clear beginning and end; and lacked any preexisting music within the background of a character’s dialogue.

The first scene was from the movie Cat People (Fries & Schrader, l982) and shows a sister and brother entering a home after a long separation. The brother’s housekeeper makes them dinner, and the siblings become reacquainted while examining various photographs and items from their childhood. Without having seen the rest of the movie, the intentions of the brother toward his sister are very unclear.

The second scene was taken from the movie Vertigo (Hitchcock, l958) in which a man follows a woman through the streets of San Francisco, stopping at various locations along the way, eventually ending at a cemetery. From this clip alone, the intentions of the two characters are ambiguous.

The third and final scene was from an episode of the television show, “The Hitchhiker,” which was called Split Decisions (Chesler, 1984). In this clip, a realestate agent meets identical female twins at their home, which contains many odd items that they have received from their magician father. The sisters’ behaviour is very unconventional and strange, and it is not clear in the video whether the nature of their actions toward the real estate agent is sexual or menacing.

These three film clips were given new titles so that the participants could easily remember and sepaIssue IV  March 2014

rate the content of each, and to ensure that if any of the participants had heard of the original titles, the experimental results would not be biased accordingly. Following Boltz (2001), Cat People was renamed The Reunion, Vertigo was renamed The Drive, and Split Decisions was renamed The Sale. More detailed information about the video stimuli can be found in Appendix A. Each of the three films was paired with one positive and one negative song based on the description given by Boltz (2001). Boltz chose the background music according to the following criteria: it had to be considered relatively obscure to most college students, and its structural parameters conveyed it as positive or negative music based on past literature (Hevner, l936; Levi, l982; Rigg, l964; Scherer, l979). According to Boltz, the negative music used a minor mode, atonality, and an irregular rhythm, and the positive music used a major mode, a consistent tonality scheme, and a very predictable rhythm. All melodies were instrumental with no lyrics. Each piece of music was approximately 5 min in duration and was edited so that it played through the entire film clip. A description of these six melodies is presented in Appendix B. Apparatus Sony Vegas video-editing software (Version 12, Middleton, WI) was used to edit and format the videos to the proper length according to descriptions in Boltz (2001). Steinberg Nuendo software (Version 4.3, Hamburg, Germany) was used to edit each audio clip to the appropriate length. The volume of the music was adjusted to be equal in all videos.

During the actual experiment, participants viewed the set of video clips on a 30 inch Apple Cinema Display monitor (Cupertino, CA). The questionnaires were given on paper and are included in Appendix C. Procedure The 17 participants first completed the Profile of Mood States (POMS; Spielberger et al., 1983) and State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; McNair et al., 1971) tests in counterbalanced order so as to determine the mood state of each participant prior to beginning the experiment. The order of the video clips was counterbalanced. The music was also counterbalanced so that the effect of either the positive or negative music appearing first or second did not affect the experimental results.

Participants first watched one of the videos with no music, and then filled out an Adjective Rating form, which indicated whether they judged the video as innately positive or negative. The participants then viewed the same video with positive music in the background, and with negative music in the background, in counterbalanced order. Each participant then indicated on their form whether they felt that the first or second music better suited the video. No original background music or dia-

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PSI logue was included in the stimulus video clips. This was then repeated for the two remaining videos. This session lasted approximately one hour.

RESULTS For the Adjective ratings, participants were asked to rate the actions and feelings of the characters in each film on four 11-point bipolar adjective scales. After converting all of the negative adjectives to negative numbers and the positive adjectives to positive numbers, each participantâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s total score over all three questionnaires was added up as a Total Emotional Valence. Additionally, the total number of positive music choices over the three videos was scored for each participant, ranging from zero to three.

First, a correlation was computed in order to determine the relation between the participantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ratings of the film's emotional valence, and their choice of background music. This correlation, shown in Figure 1, revealed a fairly low correlation that was not significant (r = 0.27, p = 0.18).

Figure 1. Non-significant regression line using Pearson's correlation comparing each subjectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s total Adjective Rating of the silent videos to their total number of positive music choices.

An analysis was then conducted testing the correlation between the POMS score of each participant and their mean Adjective Rating score. The analysis, shown in Figure 2, revealed a moderate correlation of r = 0.4, and the value approached significance (p = 0.08).

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Figure 2. Non-significant regression line using Pearson's correlation comparing each subjectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s POMS score to their total Adjective Rating of the silent videos.

Next, a test was done investigating the correlation between the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) score of each participant and their mean Adjective Rating score. This analysis, shown in Figure 3, revealed a moderate correlation of r = 0.36, but the value was not significant (p = 0.10).

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Figure 3. Non-significant regression line uisng Pearson's correlation comparing each subjectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s STAI score to their total Adjective Rating of the silent videos.

A correlation was then conducted in order to determine the relationship between the participantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; POMS scores and the sum of their positive background music choices. These statistics, shown in Figure 4, revealed a weak correlation that was not significant (r = 0.18, p = 0.27).

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PSI Figure 4. Non-significant regression line from the Pearson's correlation comparing each subject’s POMS score to their total number of positive music choices.

An analysis was then conducted testing the correlation between the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) score of each participant and the sum of their positive background music choices. This analysis, shown in Figure 5, revealed a very weak negative correlation of r = -0.08, but the value was not significant (p = 0.40).

study was 24.4 (SD=8.6). A t-test (p = 0.77) on the two samples showed no significant difference between the range of POMS scores, which suggests that the range of mood scores in the subject population of the present study is consistent with previous published studies and is not restricted. Research suggests that another reason that mood may not impact judgment is if clear and strong preferences already exist with respect to the judgment (de Vries et al., 2012). It is possible that in attempting to model our study after Boltz’s 2001 study, the formatting of video scenes could have altered to be viewed as innately positive or negative, causing them to associate unambiguously with certain music. An additional possibility is that participants may have subconsciously felt that their mood states were irrelevant to the task they were completing. Past research has shown that feelings and emotions only influence judgment when they seem relevant to the task at hand (Schwarz & Clore, 2007), and the influence of mood state can be eliminated when an individual, correctly or incorrectly, assumes that their emotions are insignificant to the task they are completing (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Any single factor or a combination of these factors could have affected the data in this experiment to cause a null result.

The results of this study are able to provide guidance for future research on mood and musical decisionmaking. It may be beneficial in the future to repeat this study with new stimuli tested that is pre-tested as ambiguous, in order to eliminate errors in attempting to model stimuli after those of previous studies. In addition, before administering mood questionnaires, it may be advantageous in the future to induce mood states in participants by reading a story, or by some other means that does not include audio or video clips. Inducing mood states may be favorable when reproducing this study in order to better manipulate the analyzed variables.

Figure 5. Non-significant regression line from the Pearson's correlation comparing each subject’s STAI score to their total number of positive music choices.

DISCUSSION The results of this research did not agree with our hypothesis that higher a priori mood states would lead to more positive perceptions of an ambiguous film clip, and consequently a choice of positive music to accompany it. Though inconsistent with our hypothesis, multiple suggested explanations have been documented in the literature. One possible explanation as to why the results of this experiment did not support the hypothesis is that the range of mood scores in the present subject population was somewhat restricted. However, a different study conducted by Bruce et al., (2009) found their POMS Elated/Depression score was 23.8 (SD=4.8), whereas the mean score of the participants in the present Issue IV  March 2014

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PSI Reference Boltz, M. G. (2001). Musical soundtracks as a schematic influence on the cognitive processing of filmed events. Music Perception, 18, 427-454. doi:10.1525/mp.2001.18.4.427 Boltz, M. G. (2004). The cognitive processing of film and musical soundtracks. Memory & Cognition, 32, 1194-1205. doi:10.3758/BF03196892 Boltz, M. G., Schulkind, M., & Kantra, S. (1991). Effects of background music on the remembering of filmed events. Memory & Cognition, 19, 593606. doi:10.3758/BF03197154 de Vries, M., Holland, R. W., Corneille, O., Rondeel, E. and Witteman, C. L.M. (2012), Mood effects on dominated choices: Positive mood induces departures from logical rules. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25, 74–81. doi: 10.1002/bdm.716 Hevner, K. (1936). Experimental studies of the elements of expression in music. American Journal of Psychology, 57, 243-259.

Hinckley, D. (September 19, 2012). Americans spend 34 hours a week watching TV, according to Nielsen numbers. New York Daily News Retrieved from http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tv-movies/americans-spend-34-hours-week-watching-tv-nielsen-numbersarticle-1.1162285 Levi, D. (1982). The structural determinants of melodic expressive properties. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 13, 19-40.

McNair, D. M., Lorr, M., & Droppleman, L. F. (1971). Manual for the Profile of Mood States. San Diego, CA: Educational and Industrial Testing Services.

Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (2013). U.S. Government Releases New Report Showing Positive Impact of Arts and Culture on U.S. Economy [Press Release]. Retrieved from http://www.mpaa.org/resources/e71210bf-bc78-4b48-a515-489e4e4cf4f3.pdf Rigg, M. G. (1964). The mood effects of music: A comparison of data from four investigators. The Journal of Psychology, 58, 427-438.

Scherer, K. (1979). Acoustical concomitants of emotional dimensions: Judging affect from synthesized tone sequences. In S. Weitz (Ed.), Nonverbal communication (pp. 249-253). New York: Oxford University Press.

Schwarz, N., and Clore, G. L. (2007). Feelings and phenomenal experiences. In E. T. Higgins , & A. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed., pp. 385– 407). New York: Guilford Press.

Spielberger, C.D., Gorssuch, R.L., Lushene, P.R., Vagg, P.R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1983). Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. Thayer, J., and Levenson, R. (1983). Effects of music on psychophysiological responses to a stressful film. Psychomusicology, 3, 44-54. doi: 10.1037/h0094256 Verrier, R., and Linthicum, K. (2013, November 26). Obama praises job growth in entertainment industry. The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved December 7, 2013, from http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-obama-speech-dwa20131126,0,5524464.story#ixzz2moZ6XdIf

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Implicit Theories of Goal Pursuit and University Studentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Adaptation Over A School Year Ignacio Valdes-Manzenedo Abstract Implicit theories have been the subject of much research in the areas of intelligence, personality, and relationships. Our study extended this research to goal pursuit ability, and investigated the effects of holding either entity or incremental theories on goal progress and changes in well-being. Entity goal theorists believe that they can do little to change their overall ability to pursue their personal goals and that successful goal pursuit is due to ability. Incremental goal theorists believe that their ability to pursue goals is something that is malleable, and that success is driven through effort. Students with incremental goal theories reported significantly greater goal progress, greater positive affect, and less negative affect over the academic year than those with entity goal theories. This study shows the importance of implicit theories of goal pursuit. Future research may consider creating experimental conditions to establish a causal link between goal theories and goal progress.

It is a fundamental human quality to set personal goals (Bandura, 1997). Personal goals meaningfully guide behaviour by specifying the requirements for personal success (Zimmerman, Bandura & Martinez-Ponz, 1992) and are a common way of motivating ourselves (Koestner et al., 2002).

Setting and pursuing personal goals provides a sense of autonomy, independence, and when successfully achieved, heightened levels of competence and positive affect (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). However, despite claims of high importance and commitment to our personal goals, there tends to be a high percentage of failure when pursuing our goals (Koestner, 2008). One possible reason for such goal failure involves the implicit theories individuals carry with them when pursuing goals. Past research has clearly shown that implicit theories can guide behaviour in meaningful ways and in a wide range of circumstances (Dweck, 1999). Carol Dweck has been at the forefront of research focusing on implicit theories of individuals, as being either fixed or malleable (entity theorists vs. incremental theorists) (Dweck, 1999). While the original model proposed by Dweck and Elliott (1988) and Dweck and Leggett (1988) is a motivational model within an academic context, and focusing on goal orientation (Dweck, Chiu, and Hong,

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1995), her work has been extended into other psychological domains, including intelligence, personality traits, and interpersonal relationships, amongst others (e.g. Dweck, 1986; Elliott & Dweck, 1988; Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995; Chiu, Hong & Dweck, 1997; Beer, 2002; Knee, 1998; Kammrath & Dweck, 2006).

The research on implicit theories of abilities can be further extended to the subject of personal goals, which are at the heart of human motivation. We set personal goals because it helps stimulate a universal action plan that guides people to focus attention on the goal, put forth effort, and persist in the face of failure and obstacle.(Locke & Latham, 1990). It is worth noting that there are different ways of measuring goals. For example, past research linking goals and implicit theories in an academic context has focused on the different types of goals that fixed theorists pursue versus their. incremental theorist counterparts, that is, the different types of goal orientation each theorist pursues (Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). One could also measure goals by looking at the extent to which people are successful in achieving their specific goals (Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001).

McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI The present study focuses on people’s implicit beliefs about their ability to succeed at the personal goals they set in their everyday life (i.e., implicit goal theories). We hypothesized that, as in other domains, individuals would vary in the extent to which they endorse an incremental versus entity theory of their goal pursuit ability, and that such variations would have important effects on their motivation, behaviour, and adjustment.

Implicit Theories Across Domains The majority of research has focused on implicit theories of intelligence and how they relate to academic achievement. Some individuals favour an incremental theory of intelligence, believing that intelligence is a changeable, flexible, malleable trait (Dweck & Leggett, 1988), while others endorse an entity theory of intelligence, believing that intelligence is a fixed or unchangeable trait (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Research has shown that entity and incremental theorists are oriented towards different goals, and differ in the way in which they respond to failure in achievement settings.

Entity theorists are oriented more towards performance goals, where they wish to display their abilities to others, gain positive judgements of competence, and avoid negative judgements by proving, validating, and documenting their ability; whereas incremental theorists more often pursue learning goals, in which they simply strive to increase their ability and focus on how much effort they put forth (Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliott & Dweck, 1988). Dweck’s research has been most relevant in its relation to everyday goal pursuits and the challenges and failures they may face.

Dweck’s research demonstrates that although incremental and entity theorists typically display equal amounts of academic ability (e.g., equal GPA), they are divided in terms of the goals they pursue, and how they cope and persist under circumstances that indicate low levels of self-efficacy in their present ability (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Incremental theorists, and their orientation towards mastery (learning) goals, tend to be interested in developing (not showcasing) their ability, in seeking challenge, in persisting in the face of obstacles, and in generating effective strategies in both success and failure situations (Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Dweck and others have coined this behaviour pattern as “mastery-oriented”, whereby incremental theorists seek challenge and focus on mediating factors that can improve performance and increase ability (e.g., effort, problem-solving strategies) (Dweck, 1986; Licht & Dweck, 1984; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Chiu, Hong & Dweck, 1997). However, the Issue IV  March 2014

behaviour pattern for entity theorists oriented towards performance goals differs, depending on their perceived ability. When their confidence is high, they too display the “master-oriented” behaviour pattern. However, when their perceived ability is low, they tend to respond in a “helpless” manner in the face of failure; attributing their failure to low ability, displaying negative affect, and showing deterioration in performance (Dweck, 1986; Elliott & Dweck, 1988; Dweck & Leggett, 1988).

When faced with challenges and failure experiences, those displaying the “helpless” pattern exhibit negative self-cognitions, negative affect, and decrements in performance, despite demonstrating adequate ability and coming up with effective strategies, demonstrated by those with high confidence (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).

Entity theorists first perceive any difficulties that arise as failures and representations of their low ability, and second, any amount of effort exerted by them is perceived as fruitless and further confirmation of their inadequate ability (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Entity theorists appear to view challenging problems as a threat to their self-esteem, while incremental theorists view them as opportunities to learn something new (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). In summary, implicit beliefs about intelligence and ability predict whether individuals will be oriented towards developing or displaying their ability, and as such, these theories may be at the root of adaptive and maladaptive learning patterns (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).

Research on implicit theories also has implications for Personality Psychology. It is important to note that Dweck, Chiu and Hong. (1995) found that implicit self-theories are domain-specific. In other words, an individual may hold an entity theory about intelligence, but an incremental theory about their personality. The research within Personality has largely looked at how implicit theories influence people’s attributions, judgments, and reactions about the self and others. Specifically, implicit theories influence attributions about ability and effort (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999), about trait judgments in the socialmoral domain (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995), about how one views their trait levels of shyness and whether traits such as shyness can be overcome (Beer, 2002), and the propensity to use lay dispositionism to guide our social perceptions (Chiu, Hong & Dweck, 1997).

Just as people hold either entity or incremental theories about intelligence, where intelligence is seen either as a fixed trait or a malleable one, people also hold implicit theories about their own and others’ personal attributes/traits. For example, individuals make judgments and attributions about the level of effort or ability one has in a certain task or situation.

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PSI During tasks assessing intelligence for example, incremental theorists tend to attribute more importance to effort, while entity theorists attribute more weight to ability (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999). As previously highlighted, implicit theories seem to have the greatest impact when individuals are faced with failure. For instance, a study conducted by Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin and Wan (1999) found that compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists were less likely to take remedial action when faced with unsatisfactory performance in a task assessing intelligence. Within an entity framework, individuals attribute their intelligence as being fixed, so taking any further action would be seen as worthless, and any effort put forth by taking remedial action would only be a confirmation of their low ability. In contrast, when incremental theorists were given failure feedback, they were more likely to part in remedial actions, most likely because they believe intelligence is a malleable trait (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999). In fact, attributions about effort were found to be a significant predictor of implicit theories on remedial action. In other words, given failure feedback, the effects of implicit theories on remedial action were mediated by effort attributions (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999).

Along with people’s attributions about effort and ability, people also unconsciously assess their own traits in terms of entity and incremental theories. For example, Jennifer Beer (2002) examined shy individuals, assessed their implicit theories of their own shyness, and looked at the social goals and social responses associated with each implicit theory. Just as there are individual differences involving implicit beliefs about intelligence, there are individual differences in how shy people perceive their ability to overcome their shyness. Shy individuals who hold entity theories about their shyness believe that their level of shyness is something about them they cannot change, whereas shy individuals with incremental theories about their shyness believe that their shyness can be improved and overcome with practice. Shy individuals with entity views and low levels of selfefficacy are oriented towards performance goals in social situations, and are more likely to use avoidant strategies in such situations (Beer, 2002). Entity theorists with low confidence tend to avoid social situations because they think they are being evaluated on their shyness, and since they believe this is something about them they cannot change, they assume the best safeguard strategy is to avoid social situations altogether. On the other hand, shy individuals with incremental views are oriented towards learning goals in social situations, and regardless of their social

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confidence, they are more approach-oriented (Beer, 2002). Thus, approach tendencies from shy people may arise from beliefs that shyness is malleable, whereas avoidance tendencies in shy people may stem from beliefs that shyness is a fixed trait (Beer, 2002).

More recently, the domain of interpersonal relationships has looked at how implicit theories can affect intimate relationships’ satisfaction, longevity, and conflict management, amongst other outcomes. Within a relationships context, Dweck’s concept of entity and incremental theories differs in two ways. First, implicit theories, rather than referring to attributes, refer to beliefs about the nature of relationships, that is, either destiny (entity) beliefs or growth (incremental) beliefs.

Specifically, individuals who endorse more destiny beliefs agree that people are either destined to be together or not, and emphasize initial compatibility when searching for a partner (Knee, 1998). Those who endorse more growth beliefs are interested in developing their relationship, and believe that, according to Knee, Patrick and Lonsbary (2003), ‘relationships grow not despite obstacles, but rather because of them’ (pg. 41). Second, the majority of Dweck’s research involving implicit theories conceptualizes entity and incremental theories as mutually exclusive constructs, typically as two ends on a continuum. In other words, if you strongly believe intelligence is a malleable trait, then you strongly disagree that intelligence is a fixed trait, and vice versa.

However, within this framework, work by Raymond Knee (1998) has shown that destiny and growth beliefs are uncorrelated (orthogonal), that is, unrelated, separate constructs. This suggests, in contrast to work within intelligence, personality, and social-moral contexts, that when judging and evaluating relationships, it is entirely possible, and even likely that people hold both growth and destiny beliefs simultaneously.

Like intelligence and personality, implicit theories in relationships have been shown to predict meaningful cognitive and behavioural outcomes.

Specifically, implicit theories impact relationship commitment, satisfaction and longevity, coping strategies amidst relationship stressors, and responses to arguments. For example, Knee (1998) found that belief in growth was associated with dating a person for a longer period of time and fewer one-night stands.

According to Knee, this suggests higher levels of relationship commitment, compared to those with destiny beliefs. In the same study, Knee’s central question looked at whether the relationship between initial satisfaction and relationship longevity would be strongest for those with destiny beliefs. As expected, McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI initial satisfaction in general was associated with longer relationships, but more importantly, initial satisfaction was more strongly associated with longevity for those with strong destiny beliefs (Knee, 1998). It is important to note however, that if initially dissatisfying, those with strong destiny beliefs terminated their relationships rather quickly (Knee, 1998). Thus, those with stronger destiny beliefs tend to make more extreme relationship decisions, such as termination decisions, based on information relevant to relationship potential.

Research by Franiuk, Cohen and Pomerantz (2002) extended such work about implicit theories of relationships and the link between relationship satisfaction and longevity. Past research has indicated that idealizing romantic relationships is related to greater satisfaction, love and commitment (Murray & Holmes, 1997; Sprecher & Metts, 1999). Franiuk et al. looked at the interaction between implicit theories of relationships and specific beliefs about one’s partner being an ideal partner in predicting relationship satisfaction and longevity. They found that believing one’s current partner is an ideal fit is essential for destiny believers in maintaining a satisfying relationship.

More specifically, when finding an ideal partner, those with strong destiny beliefs are more satisfied with their relationship, and have longer relationships than growth theorists. The problem however, occurs when a partner is not perceived as an ideal fit, which is bound to happen more often than not. Destiny theorists in this situation are less satisfied with the relationship and tend to leave the relationship more quickly compared to growth theorists. In short, those with growth beliefs are less influenced by first impressions in relationships.

They put less weight on the initial satisfaction of a relationship, and do not anchor on their perception of a partner as an ideal fit when evaluating a relationship.

This is likely the case because in a growth framework, relationships are made to grow and develop over time, thus initial information is not as important as information over time.

One novel domain in which this line of work can be extended involves goals. As previously mentioned, Dweck’s research only examined general goal orientations, ignoring people’s specific goal progress.

Importantly, the research has not yet examined whether people differ in their implicit theories about their own ability to succeed at their goals. First, it is important to note that, like intelligence or shyness, we (the researchers) treated goal pursuit tendencies as a trait. Just as some people have higher or lower levels of shyness for example, some individuals may be better goal achievers than others. Thus, we hypothesize that some people view themselves as effective goal Issue IV  March 2014

pursuers, whereas others do not. More importantly, we also expect some people to view their ability to pursue goals successfully as a malleable, incremental attribute, whereas others view it as fixed. As in other research, we expect that holding incremental beliefs about goal

pursuit ability will prove to be more adaptive than holding a fixed theory. The present study will

test this hypothesis in three ways: the quality of goal pursuit, success of goal pursuit, and changes in wellbeing.

Quality of goal pursuit will be examined by analyzing the motivation that underlies it. Specifically, we will assess both autonomous and controlled motivation for pursuing goals. Autonomous motivation concerns pursuing goals because they are interesting or personally meaningful, and such goal motivation has been reliably linked with greater goal success (Koestner, 2008). Controlled motivation concerns feeling pressured or coerced into pursuing a goal and it has been associated with negative affect (Deci & Ryan, 2012).

Success of goal pursuit will be assessed by tracking people’s self-reported progress on three important goals over the course of an entire school year. Many previous studies have adopted such a personal goal paradigm to study goal processes. Finally, a more general indicator of adjustment will be gleaned from reports of positive and negative affect over the school year.

A secondary focus of the present study is to examine the personality correlates of implicit theories of goal pursuit ability. We will thus assess the Big 5 personality traits (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness) which are thought to represent the most important dimensions on which individuals differ. We will also assess optimism and self-control because these dimensions have previously been associated with goal pursuit abilities (Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001).

Our hypotheses are as follows. First, we expect to show that implicit theories of goal pursuit ability (i.e., implicit goal theories) can be reliably assessed with selfreport items modelled after Dweck’s previous measures. Second, we expect that students who possess incremental rather than fixed goal theories will be more likely to succeed at their goals, to have autonomous motivation while pursuing their goals, and to experience more positive affect and less negative affect. Third, we expect that the theories of goal pursuit ability will only be moderately correlated (less than r = .30) with common measures of personality traits.

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PSI Methods Participants Participants were recruited for this study through the use of online advertisements, classroom announcements, and posters located on the McGill campus. The sample consisted of 240 participants, ranging from 17 years of age to 48 years of age, with a mean age of 20.45 years.

77% of the sample was female.

Procedure

The study lasted eight-months. Study participation consisted of completing an initial 45minute questionnaire, 5 follow-up 25-minute questionnaires, and 10 bi-weekly brief 3-minute questionnaires. Data used specifically for this thesis was collected during all assessments from September to April. Participants were compensated for their participation.

Measures Implicit Theories of Goal Pursuit. Items from the Implicit Theory of Intelligence Scale (Dweck, 1999) and Effort Beliefs Scale (Blackwell, 2002) were adapted to assess students’ implicit beliefs about effort in goal pursuit, with items corresponding to either the belief that effort or the belief that ability alone can lead to goal achievement. The scale can be seen below in the appendix, labelled ‘Figure 1’. An “entity theory of goal pursuit” score was obtained by combining the mean for each item, yielding a single index of entity theory of goal pursuit. Note that one item had to be reverse-coded (“the harder you work at something, the better you will be at it”) when calculating the mean entity theory score for this item. The internal consistency of this item was high (Cronbach’s alpha = .80).

Optimism. Optimism was measured during Time 2, using the Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R) developed by Scheier, Carver and Bridges (1994). It contains 10 items (e.g., “I’m always optimistic about my future”), each on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”. Only six of the items are relevant to measuring optimism, so the other items were intended as fillers to aid the purpose of the scale. Therefore, a mean of the 6 items were used as a measure of optimism. The internal consistency for this scale was very high (Cronbach’s alpha = .83).

Self-Control. Self-control was measured at Time 1 in September, using the 13-item Brief Self-Control Scale developed by Tangney, Baumeister and Boone (2004).

Items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from

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“Not at all typical of me” to “Very much typical of me”.

The items measured individuals’ level of self-

control by asking how much each statement reflects them (e.g. “I am good at resisting temptation”, “I wish I had more selfdiscipline”). The Brief Self-Control Scale correlated .92 with the Total Self-Control Scale and taps the same range of content as the Total Self-Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2004). Trait self-control was calculated by reversing negatively coded items, and then calculating the mean for the items.

Big Five Personality Traits. The Big Five Personality traits were assessed using the Big Five Inventory used by Oliver John and colleagues (1991, 2008). The scale consists of 11 items designed to assess the Big 5 traits – Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Extraversion and Neuroticism.

For each item, participants rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to them on a 5point Likert scale.

Goal Motivation. Goal motivation was assessed by a 4-item scale during the initial survey, using a method taken from Sheldon and Kasser (1995, 1998). Items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all for this reason” to “Completely for this reason”.

Items measured reasons for pursuing goals, some of which were autonomous (i.e., “because of the fun and enjoyment which the goal will provide you”, or “the primary reason is simply your interest in the experience itself”) and some that were controlled (i.e., “because somebody else wants you to”, or “because you’ll get something from somebody if you do”). As in previous research, mean motivation was calculated by subtracting the average controlled motivation from the average autonomous motivation (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). In line with the method used by Sheldon and Elliot (1998), the means of autonomy for all the goals was combined, yielding a single index of McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI motivation. The means for all other goal-specific measures were also combined.

End of Year Outcome Measures Total Goal Progress. Participants were asked to use a mouse-controlled sliding scale to rate total goal progress during the entire 8 months from 0 to 100, where 0 meant no goal progress since the initial assessment and 100 meant the goal was completely achieved.

Positive and Negative Affect. Positive and negative affect was measured with the Affect Scale taken from Emmons (1992), which includes nine adjectives pertaining to positive or negative affect.

Participants rated on a 7-point Likert scale to what extent they experienced those feelings over the past 3 weeks, where a score of 1 indicated “not at all” and a score of 7 indicated “extremely”. Adjectives representing positive affect were joyful, pleased, happy, and fun/enjoyment, and the adjectives for negative affect were depressed, worried/anxious, frustrated, and angry/hostile. The internal consistency was high for both positive affect (Cronbach’s alpha = .83) and for negative affect (Cronbach’s alpha = .82). Positive and negative affect were measured in September, to obtain a baseline, again in December and January, and finally in April.

Results . It can be seen that participants scored in the moderate range (r = .30) for all the Big Five personality traits, except Neuroticism, where the scores were somewhat lower. Trait Optimism and Self-Control were also in the moderate range. Participants reported greater autonomous motivation than controlled motivation for their personal goals. They also generally reported higher positive affect over the year than negative affect.

Finally, on our measure of implicit theories of goal pursuit, participants tended to endorse more malleable/ incremental theories, rather than fixed/entity theories.

Importantly, the standard deviation and distribution of this measure indicated adequate variability, despite being positively skewed. Given our large sample size however, the skewness did not need correcting.

Correlations of implicit theories of goal pursuit with the Big Five Personality Traits, Optimism and SelfControl: It can be seen that five of the seven relationships were significant. The most powerful associations with implicit theories of goal pursuit included optimism and openness to experience. That is, in general, incremental goal theorists tended to be more optimistic and open to experiences than entity goal theorists. Incremental theorists were also Issue IV  March 2014

somewhat more likely to be agreeable, conscientious, and to report higher levels of self-control, compared to entity theorists.

Correlations were also used to examine the associations of implicit theories of goal pursuit with goal motivation at the start of the academic year. Results showed that entity goal theorists were significantly more likely to endorse controlled motives for goal pursuit (r = .17, p < 0.01). They were also marginally less likely to express autonomous motives (r = -.12, p = .06).

To test our central prospective predictions, we performed three hierarchical multiple regression analyses with year-long goal progress, positive affect, and negative affect as the dependent variables. Time 1 levels of the outcome variable(s) were controlled together with gender and age as a first set. Implicit theories of goal pursuit were entered next.

The regression on goal progress yielded a nonsignificant multiple R of 0.13, F (3,223) = 1.37, p = 0.25.

However, implicit theories of goal pursuit were significantly related to goal progress across the year, beta = -.13, p = .05. That is, students with incremental goal theories reported significantly greater goal progress than those with entity goal theories.

The regression for both positive and negative affect were significant, F’s (4, 235). = 90.77, and 96.28, respectively. Although yearlong affect was highly related to affect at time 1 (beta = .76 for positive affect and 0.77 for negative affect), implicit theories were also significantly related to affect, (beta = -.11, p < .01) for positive affect and (beta = .12, p < .01) for negative affect. Thus, students with incremental goal theories showed a pattern of improving affect over the year, whereas the reverse was true for those holding entity goal theories.

Discussion

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PSI This work has taken previous research on implicit theories and extended it to the domain of motivation and goals. This particular study provides support for the importance of implicit theories we have about goal pursuit when looking to make progress and succeed in achieving our personal goals.

With regards to the central focus of this paper, our results confirmed that students with incremental goal theories reported significantly greater goal progress than those with entity goal theories. Also, incremental goal theorists showed a tendency to increase their positive affect and decrease their negative affect over the year, regardless of their initial levels of positive and negative affect at the beginning of the academic year. Finally, we found that entity goal theorists were more likely to endorse controlled motives for goal pursuit, and less likely to report autonomous motives than incremental goal theorists.

Thus, consistent with past research, holding incremental goal theories proved to be more adaptive than holding entity theories (Dweck, 1986; Knee, 1998; Beer, 2002).

With regards to personality correlates of implicit theories of goal pursuit, our results showed that incremental goal theorists tended to be more optimistic and open to experience than entity goal theorists, and were also somewhat more likely to be agreeable, conscientious, and to report higher levels of selfcontrol. However, none of the correlations were higher than .30, which suggests implicit goal theories are distinct from personality dimensions, a position advocated by Dweck regarding other implicit measures.

A second objective of this study was to assess the reliability of our implicit theories of goal pursuit measure. Adapted from Dweck’s Implicit Theory of Intelligence Scale (Dweck, 1999) and Effort Beliefs Scale (Blackwell, 2002), the distribution of scores, although positively skewed, were adequate. Also, the internal reliability as measured by Cronbach’s alpha, was .80.

Thus, we felt satisfied in using this scale moving forward.

One explanation as to why incremental goal theorists reported greater progress on their personal goals may be because of their autonomous goal motivation. In general, entity theorists tend to be oriented towards performance goals (Dweck, 1986), where effort is perceived as aversive, and the goal is to display their ability and receive positive judgments about their competence. It has been previously suggested by Dweck (1986) that this desire for ability confirmation overtakes any intrinsic motivation/interest individuals once had in a task (Dweck, 1986). Because the reasons (e.g., displaying ability, receiving positive judgement) for adopting performance goals can be

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coded as being ‘due to social pressures or expectations of what an individual “should do” ’ (Koestner, 2008), the performance goals which entity theorists pursue can be judged as controlled motivation. The results from our study help support Dweck’s claim, whereby entity goal theorists were more likely to report controlled goal motivation, and marginally less likely to report autonomous goal motivation. Incremental theorists on the other hand, tend to pursue learning goals, where their main objective is to increase their inherent competence. Incremental theorists pursuing learning goals can therefore be gauged as possessing more autonomous goal motivation, that is, whether the goal reflects ‘an individual’s interests and personal values’ (Koestner, 2008, pg. 61). In line with research showing that adopting autonomous motivation leads to greater goal progress (Koestner, 2008), our study showed that individuals holding incremental goal theories were more likely to report both greater autonomous goal motivation and greater goal progress.

Our study suggests that autonomous goal motivation is possibly mediating the effects of incremental goal theories on goal progress. Future research is needed to confirm this hypothesis.

Another possible explanation as to why incremental goal theorists made further progress in their goals may deal with the personality trait of conscientiousness. In our study, we found a significant, albeit small correlation between believing in incremental goal theories and being high in conscientiousness. Conscientiousness is related to work in one’s life, from schoolwork to job performance, and is best described in terms of working hard, being selfdisciplined, responsible, reliable, dutiful, well organized, and persevering (McAdams, 2009). Those high in Conscientiousness are described as well organized, persistent, efficient and dependable, whereas those on the low end tend to be disorganized, careless, inefficient and undependable (McAdams, 2009). As mentioned, incremental goal theorists were correlated with higher levels of conscientiousness. By setting organized, nonconflicting goals, monitoring their goal progress by being responsible and efficient, and by showing discipline and self-control, individuals high in conscientiousness showed characteristics predisposing them to successful goal pursuit, even before pursuing their goals. Thus, characteristics of highly conscientious individuals are one’s that promote greater goal progress, which may act as a mediator between incremental goal theorists and greater goal progress.

Personality factors may predispose individuals to adopt a certain implicit theory. In this case, our results found a powerful association between individuals with McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI incremental goal theories and being high in Openness to Experience. Openness to experience is part of the fivefactor model of personality and is, according to McCrae

establish a more causal link between goal theories and goal progress and to test whether our results replicate.

and Costa (1997) “related to the scope of a person’s awareness and the intensity of their consciousness”.. Individuals high in Openness to Experience are described as especially original, imaginative, creative, complex, curious,

Conclusion In summary, our work looked to further understand the role implicit theories play in our everyday lives. An area of implicit theories that has not been subject to academic research involves goal pursuit.

Our research suggests that individuals who believe their ability to pursue goals is something they can change and improve through hard work and effort are more adaptive in setting and pursuing personal goals.

independent, analytical, and have many interests (McAdams, 2009). Those low in Openness to Experience tend to hold on to rigid and traditional views of society, whereas those high in Openness to Experience tend to reject traditional views, showing more flexibility (McAdams, 2009). It may be for this reason that we found individuals who were highly open to experience adopting incremental goal theories, and individuals low in Openness to Experience adopting entity goal theories.

Another trait that was related to reporting incremental goal theories included optimism. According to Scheier and Carver (1985), some individuals are more optimistic than others, and they expect good things to happen to them; pessimists are people who expect bad things to happen to them. This simple individual difference among people relates to a number of processes underlying behaviour. That is, optimists and pessimists differ in significant ways, which largely impacts their lives (Scheier & Carver, 1985). These individuals differ in how they approach problems, in how, and how well they cope with adversity, and in their social relationships (Scheier & Carver, 1985).

Because incremental theorists and optimists both face adversity in similarly adaptive ways, this may be the underlying factor explaining the correlation between incremental goal theories and optimism. This may offer an explanation as to why optimistic individuals are more likely to possess incremental goal theories, and subsequently achieve greater goal progress.

Limitations Our study presents correlational data, which limits our ability to make causal inferences from our results. Despite such methods, we do look at goal progress and affect over time. That is, we correlate our measure of implicit goal theories with change over time, which is more reliable than correlating two variables at one moment in time. Studies in the past have randomly assigned participants into groups and experimentally manipulated them into adopting incremental or entity theories by having them read texts that highlight the relative importance of ability or effort. Future research could look at creating experimental conditions to Issue IV  March 2014

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PSI LITERATURE REVIEW

The Current Uses and Misuses of Neuroscience in the Courtroom Guido Guberman*

*Email: guido,guberman@mail.mcgill.ca Abstract

Keywords Neuroscience; Criminal Law; Neurolaw; Philosophy; Dualism

Due to the interdisciplinary nature of neuroscience, its recent exponential growth is leading to a diffusion of novel neuroscientific findings into other fields such as criminal law, leading to the emergence of novel, multifaceted disciplines such as neurolaw. Indeed, criminal courts have seen an increase in the number of defences appealing to neuroscientific data.

Unsurprisingly, neuroscience's application within criminal law has been met with substantial criticism from numerous scholars, both from the field of neuroscience and the field of law, outlining its limitations and negative consequences. However, such assertions are based on underlying, antiquated philosophies which, through their unsupported claims, cause general misconstructions of neuroscientific theories. This paper outlines certain issues surrounding the nature of science in general, the applicability of science to normative systems, the use of neuroscience in the court of law, as well as the problems with the underlying philosophies which media neuroscience's application to criminal court. In so doing, this paper will address the criticism directed towards neuroscience and will attempt to propose a solution that could potentially allow the criminal court to adequately accommodate the large growing body of neuroscientific knowledge.

Introduction The emergence of the interdisciplinary field known as “neurolaw” reveals the substantial ramifications that the rise of neuroscience and the advent of sophisticated neuroimaging techniques have had on the field of law.

Indeed, a study of more than 1500 judicial opinions from 2005 to 2012 revealed an increasing trend in the use of neuroscience in the courtroom (Farahany, 2013).

For instance, in 2009, an Italian woman named Stefania Albertani received a life sentence for the murder of her sister and the attempted murder of her parents.

However, in 2011, Judge Luisa lo Gatto reduced her sentence to twenty years after expert testimony asserted, through brain scans and genetic tests, that Albertani had abnormalities in her anterior cingulate gyrus, a brain area involved in impulsivity control (Sample, 2013). Far from being a novel set of elaborate strategical defences, as Nita Farahany, professor of law at Duke University and member of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues asserts, “the use of neuroscience in criminal law is having transformative effects on how we assign responsibility

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and punishment for criminal wrong-doing” (Farahany, 2013, p.217). A recent nationwide study performed on 181 U.S. State trial judges revealed that judges significantly reduced the criminal's sentences and listed more mitigating factors when presented with a hypothetical case of a criminal diagnosed with psychopathy, and where expert testimony described the neurobiological factors underlying their mental state (Aspinwall, 2012, p.846-849).

The emergence of neurolaw has elicited responses from various scholars from multiple disciplines. A substantial portion of the criticism pertaining to the use of neuroscience in the courtroom emerges from the claim that neuroscience undermines the notion of responsibility and accountability. As Farahany asserted, “what is novel is the use of criminal defendants to say, essentially, that my brain made me do it” (as cited in Sample, 2013). Accordingly, Martha Farah, director of the Center for Neuroscience and Society at the University of Pennsylvania, stated: “since everything I do results from my brain, and my brain is the product of my genes and my life experiences, then McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI how can you hold me responsible for anything? Isn't it always true that 'my brain made me do it?'” (as cited in Slalavitz, 2012). However, such claims rely on a misconstrued understanding of neuroscience, dictated by a dualistic framework inherent to the justice system.

I will support this claim by outlining the intrinsic limitations of the applicability of science to normative systems and by demonstrating how these limitations result from science's inherently descriptive, mechanistic, and amoral nature. I will argue that, given these limitations, when applied to normative systems, science must be understood through a mediating set of predefined schemas dictated by the system's underlying philosophy. In addition, I will delineate how the philosophy of mind/body dualism constitutes a key underlying aspect of a fundamental principle of criminal law, therefore serving as a mediator between criminal law and neuroscience. Lastly, I will demonstrate that mind/body dualism posits certain faculties that are unsupported by neuroscience and therefore inadequately mediates the application of neuroscience in criminal courts, thereby causing an erroneous, problematic, and potentially dangerous misuse of novel neuroscientific discoveries.

The Nature of Science Despite the various sociocultural contexts from which science can be understood, its constant inherently descriptive, mechanistic, and amoral nature restrains its applicability to normative frameworks such as the judicial system. Indeed, numerous philosophers established the inexorable links binding science with sociocultural and historical factors (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). Although a comprehensive comparison between objectivist and social constructivist theories of science is beyond the scope of this paper, it suffices to assert that the links between sociocultural factors and science do not nullify or negate all notions of scientific objectivity.

While considerable progress in specific scientific areas often results from the technological advancements engendered by societal shifts of focus towards these specific areas, such as the massive amounts of funding allocated towards space exploration during the Space Race against the USSR , despite such sociocultural factors, normative systems and scientific theories remain epistemically incongruous. Beyond the general epistemological issues ailing scientific theories, such as the problem of inferring causation from correlation, the aforementioned incongruities between science and normative systems arise from the fact that the scientific research from which novel scientific theories arise is Issue IV  March 2014

practiced with the aim of elucidating and describing the mechanisms underlying natural or consensual, widely recognized phenomena8. In consequence, science does not assert any normative claims nor does it attempt to address any normative concerns. Therefore, utilizing its claims at face value to establish normative systems can lead to calamitous consequences. For instance, Richard Dawkins notes that “a human society based simply on the gene's law of universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live (…) if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature,” (Dawkins, 2006, p.3). This apparent schism between science and normative frameworks arises from a fundamental difference in their precursory philosophies (Ackrill,1987). Indeed, “the fields that we would now call science were more usually called 'natural philosophy' (physics, astronomy, and other inquiries into the causes of things)” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.4). From Aristotelian times, this branch of philosophy, which aims to elucidate “how things are”, stands in contrast to practical philosophy (ethics, law, and politics) which studies “how things ought to be” (M. Deslauriers, personal communication, January 6, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the same problem of applicability is apparent within the field of neurolaw. As Nigel Eastman, professor of law and ethics in psychiatry at St George’s University of London states, “[l]aw asks questions that science can’t answer, and science answers questions that law doesn’t ask. You can’t leap from a dynamic brain scan to notions of responsibility” (as cited in Sample, 2013). Therefore, based on these fundamental differences and epistemic incongruities between descriptive science and applied normative systems, science's applicability into these systems is severely limited.

Underlying Philosophies Given these limitations, when applied to normative systems, science must be understood through a set of pre-defined schemas dictated by the underlying philosophies of the systems. These philosophies do not serve as a simple buffer between the scientific theories and the systems. Rather, they actively influence the way science is understood by those systems. These underlying philosophies can also be fraught with sociocultural interests and historical factors. For instance, Darwinism is a set of theories delineating the processes through which traits observed in a population might be selected and and may increase in complexity.

In itself, Darwinism does not dictate any social mores; it

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PSI does not ascribe any connotations to the differential aptitude of different populations, nor any laudability to organisms possessing emerging traits. However, within Social Darwinism, Evolutionary Theory is employed through an underlying colonialist philosophy and is therefore taken to justify the superiority of the colonizing population. Such concepts of superiority are understood from Darwinism by colonial philosophies due to the schemas dictated by these philosophies.

Hence, given the limitations of the applicability of science to normative systems, science must be understood through pre-defined schemas contained within these systems, dictated by the systems' underlying philosophies.

Mind/Body Dualism Mind/body dualism, a philosophy which dissociates the concept of the mind from the nervous system, is inherent to a fundamental component of the criminal judicial system and therefore serves as a mediator between criminal law and neuroscience. For an act to be deemed punishable in the court of criminal law, two necessary elements must be demonstrated, beyond reasonable doubt, to be present: actus reus (“guilty act”) and mens rea (“guilty mind”). Although these definitions vary among scholars and sociocultural contexts, several defences used in criminal court reveal that the concept of mens rea is established upon fundamental dualist contentions. For instance, the mental insanity plea and all impaired volition defences “excuse individuals whose mental disease or defect causes a loss of control over their actions at the time of their offences” (Melton, Petrila, Pythress, & Slobogin, 2007). Through such defences, defendants assert that mens rea was not present in the crime because their brains, and not themselves, were responsible for their actions. However, the inherently dualistic dichotomy implied by these assertions posits the existence of a schism between an individual's will and their brain. As the prominent neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga stated, “[m]ost dualists endorse the concept of free will and the notion that we are all practical reasoners driven by “free will” to make rational choices in our behavior. This way of thinking largely influences modern law” (2004, p.54).

Furthermore, the judicial system directs substantial criticism towards neuroscience based on the “selfincrimination analysis” (Brennan-Marquez, 2012-2013, p.217), which relies upon the discrepancy between “testimonial evidence”, composed of “statements of fact or value”, and “physical evidence”, which are “statements introduced merely to prove how [the facts]

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were made”, or to explain their mechanism (Mannheimer, 2007, p.1135). Whereas the former includes assertions of an individual's actions, the latter purportedly includes neuroscientific data. Since testimonial evidence is predominantly considered to supersede physical evidence, a substantial amount of scholars reject the capacity of neuroscientific data to override testimonial evidence (Brennan-Marquez, 2013). However, as Michael Freeman asserts in his book Neuroscience and Law, in the context of neuroscience in the courtroom, “the physical/testimonial distinction presupposes a flawed conception of mind/body dualism” (2011, p.336). Given its paramount importance in the mens rea, dualism is an essential component in the criminal judicial system and a mediator in the application of neuroscience in court. For instance, studies on certain areas of the frontal lobe (such as the anterior cingulate gyrus) revealed localized activation in tasks that require impulse control (Bechara, 2005, p.1460). These findings have been used in criminal cases, such as in the Albertani case, in order to reduce the sentences of individuals with aberrant anterior cingulate gyrus activity based on the inherently dualistic premise that the person cannot be held accountable for his or her actions given that they result from a brain abnormality instead of his or her own free will. Hence, this recent trend in the use of neuroscience in the courtroom exemplifies how the domain of criminal law understands and interprets neuroscientific findings through a dualist framework.

Problems in Neurolaw Mind/body dualism posits untenable structures and faculties unsupported by neuroscience, limiting its adequacy as a mediator between neuroscience and law and causing neuro-scientific advancements to have adverse effects and absurd conclusions in the courtroom. Michael Gazzaniga asserts, that “[e]ven though modern science finds the idea of dualism untenable, it reigns as the predominant perception of the self” Although an extensive analysis of the mind/ body problem is beyond the scope of this paper, it suffices to mention that the idea of an unconditional and undetermined volition, dissociable from bodily processes and factors, is unsupported by neuroscience.

For instance, the electrical activity in the brain caused by the opening of ion channels and the movement of ions through membranes of neurons describes the process eliciting neural activity such as thought and behaviour. This process reveals that the concept of volition has no possible basis, as such agency requires McGill Undergraduate Psychology Journal

PSI ion channels to spontaneously open in a goal-directed, sentient manner. From a neuroscientific standpoint, this claim is obscure, mystical, and utterly impossible. In fact, neuroscientific studies reveal the opposite, namely that neural processes precede the sensation of volition and challenge the idea that a person's awareness is the cause of their behaviour (Libet, 1985; Hallet & Matsuhashi, 2008)1. Furthermore, the current usage of neuroscientific findings, based on a dualistic viewpoint, leads to absurd conclusions, such as the interpretation of neuroscientific findings as indicative of mere bodily processes impinging on an individual's volition, consequently nullifying mens rea and thereby exonerating all criminals of their guilt. Therefore, mind/ body dualism posits untenable structures and faculties that are unsupported by neuroscience, limiting its adequacy as a mediator between neuroscience and law and causing neuroscientific advancements to have adverse effects in the court of law.

Conclusion Science faces intrinsic limitations in its application to normative systems given its inherently descriptive, mechanistic, and amoral nature. Considering these restrictions, upon application to normative systems, science must be understood in terms of the predefined schemas dictated by the systemâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s underlying philosophy. Moreover, mind/body dualism constitutes a key underlying aspect of a fundamental principle of criminal law, and therefore acts as a mediator between criminal law and neuroscience. Finally, mind/body dualism posits certain faculties that are unsupported by neuroscience, and therefore inadequately mediates the application of neuroscience in criminal courts, thereby causing an erroneous, problematic, and potentially dangerous misuse of novel neuroscientific discoveries.

Ergo, the debasing criticism concerning neuroscience's use in the court of law, consisting of assertions that the latter can lead to problematic conclusions by undermining the idea of responsibility and accountability, has been demonstrated to rely upon a misconstruction of neuroscience, dictated by a dualistic framework inherent to the criminal justice system.

Following these presuppositions, a critical analysis of 1.Through a dualist standpoint, these results have been said to propose the idea that the person's volition occurs unconsciously. Interestingly, Libet himself shared this opinion. See Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. The Behavioural and Brain Sciences. 8, 529-566.

2. For instance, 300 million dollars per year for ten years for the BRAIN initiative and a total of 38 million dollars for the Human Connectome Project

Ergo, the debasing criticism concerning neuroscience's Issue IV ď&#x201A;ˇ March 2014

use in the court of law, consisting of assertions that the latter can lead to problematic conclusions by undermining the idea of responsibility and accountability, has been demonstrated to rely upon a misconstruction of neuroscience, dictated by a dualistic framework inherent to the criminal justice system.

Following these presuppositions, a critical analysis of the applicability of neuroscience devoid of a reformulation of the underlying philosophy concludes with certainty that the diffusion of neuroscience into criminal courtrooms is limited, erroneous, and potentially dangerous, without acknowledging that the real problem is the current conception of volition and guilt and their dualistic basis.

Given the exponentially increasing rates of progression in neuroscience through massive amounts of resources versed into research2, and the multiple ramifications of the field rapidly diffusing into disciplines like economics and law, the most fundamental challenge for these disciplines will be to reformulate their underlying schemas to ensure an adequate accommodation of the growing body of neuroscientific knowledge.

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