Excerpt of Value and Vulnerability

VALUE AND VULNERABILITY An Interfaith Dialogue on Human Dignity

EDITED BY

Matthew R. Petrusek and Jonathan Rothchild

University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana

University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 undpress.nd.edu Copyright Š 2020 by the University of Notre Dame All Rights Reserved Published in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data to come

Contents

P A RT I

Acknowledgments

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Introduction Matthew R. Petrusek and Jonathan Rothchild

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Traditions Introduction to Part I

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Dignity: A Catholic Perspective Darlene Fozard Weaver

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Dignity: A Buddhist Perspective Kristin Scheible

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Catholic and Buddhist Perspectives on Dignity: A Response Karen B. Enriquez

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Dignity: A Jewish Perspective Elliot N. Dor and Daniel Nevins

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Dignity: A Hindu Perspective Christopher Key Chapple

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Jewish and Hindu Perspectives on Dignity: Responses Christopher Key Chapple and Elliot N. Dor

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Dignity: A Protestant Perspective David P. Gushee

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Dignity: An Orthodox Perspective Aristotle Papanikolaou

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Protestant and Orthodox Perspectives on Dignity: A Response Matthew R. Petrusek

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Dignity: An Islamic Perspective Zeki Saritoprak

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Dignity: A Humanist Perspective William Schweiker

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Islamic and Humanist Perspectives on Dignity: A Response Jonathan Rothchild

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C on ten ts

P A RT II

Case Studies Introduction to Part II

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Dignity and Conflict: Gendered Violence Hille Haker

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Dignity and Conflict: Religious Violence Nicholas Denysenko

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Dignity and Conflict: Racial Violence Terrence L. Johnson

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Dignity and Conflict: Criminal Justice William O’Neill

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s eve n teen Dignity and Conflict: Immigration

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Victor Carmona ei g hte en

Dignity and Conflict: Ecology Dawn M. Nothwehr, OSF

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Dignity and Conflict: Religious Peacemaking Ellen Ott Marshall

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Afterword Matthew R. Petrusek and Jonathan Rothchild

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List of Contributors

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Index

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INT ROD U C TIO N Matthew R. Petrusek and Jonathan Rothchild

The word “dignity” is frequently invoked in courtrooms, hospital rooms, places of worship, and on battlefields. Laws are designed to protect and promote dignity in terms of prohibitions, such as against torture and genocide, and in terms of positive freedoms, such as the right to work and to exercise conscience. There may be general consensus about the importance of dignity as a basis for modern human rights, but the complexities of individual, communal, institutional, and global contexts and competing and conflicting goods, values, and interests often problematize straightforward implementation of policies and practices rooted in human dignity. Dimensions of power, oppressive social structures (social sin), and various forms of injustice further exacerbate violations of human rights, which are necessary for the full realization of human dignity. In the face of dehumanizing systems and forces, can theological, philosophical, and legal frameworks provide conceptual clarity regarding universally accepted meanings of dignity and encourage practical strategies that address contexts and lived experiences of diminished dignity?

In response to these issues, contemporary scholarship on human dignity has appeared to reach two firm, if problematic, conclusions: (1) the appeal to dignity as a foundational moral principle is widespread in moral discourse in a vast number of fields (e.g., law, medicine, education, politics) and on numerous issues (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, torture, immigration, marriage equality), and it does not show any signs of abating; (2) there is nothing close to a widespread consensus on how to define dignity or on what specific actions dignity prohibits or requires. Like “equality,” “freedom,” or “fairness,” “dignity” appears to be one of those ideas that most everybody agrees on until someone starts making claims about what it might mean and asserts it as a warrant for specific ethical judgments.

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The fact that advocates on both sides of hotly contested issues frequently draw on dignity in order to demonstrate the error, if not moral depravity, of the opposing side—as we see, for example, in debates on assisted suicide, abortion, and, more recently, religious freedom—raises the question of whether dignity has any fixed meaning at all. Add to this the complexity of the philosophical and theological disagreement lying beneath the different conceptions of dignity and the question becomes even sharper: Is dignity destined to fail as a coherent and useful moral principle? Is there any unity to dignity’s diversity beyond an appeal to the same word? Or, as Christopher McCrudden, editor of Understanding Human Dignity, has put it, “Are we all singing from the same hymn sheet when we use the concept of human dignity, and is it a problem if we are not?”1 Given dignity’s prevalence in theological and secular discourse and the many contexts in which it appears as the basis for moral judgment, these questions have more than theoretical importance. If dignity is going to continue to function as more than an evocative but otherwise vacuously malleable principle in contemporary moral discourse, more work needs to be done both to identify and analyze dignity’s meaning in different religious and secular traditions, and to demonstrate how these meanings can help address concrete moral problems. Despite a growing scholarly interest in the definition and application of dignity,2 this interpretive, comparative, and normative work on the problem of human worth still stands as one of the most important tasks in contemporary ethics. And it is precisely this task to which this book seeks to make a fresh contribution.

The collection of essays in this volume approaches the question of dignity from three interrelated perspectives: systematically, comparatively, and practically. First, the chapters in part I offer a sustained and nuanced conceptual examination of the definition of dignity from diverse religious and philosophical traditions. We have already noted that there has been some important theological and philosophical work on defining dignity recently. However, despite the growing prevalence of dignity in popular and academic discourses, scholarly literature on the topic has still not sufficiently examined dignity’s normative meaning and its grounding from a systematic perspective, especially in relation to these kinds of fundamental questions: What is dignity and on what grounds do humans possess it? Does dignity require being ontologically grounded in the transcendent in order to provide a coherent explanation for its existence?

What, if anything, is unique about dignity? Is it universal and equal? Is it inherent or attained? Can it be lost or diminished, that is, is it vulnerable to harm?

Introduction

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Epistemologically, how can one know that humans have dignity, particularly if one seeks to make appeals to sacred texts to establish its existence and moral relevance? Part I addresses these and related questions from the perspectives of eight distinct traditions: Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and humanism.

Second, and related, the book places these perspectives in constructive comparison. In addition to its systematic analysis of dignity, part I also provides responses that critically analyze two traditions from a different viewpoint, highlighting similarities, differences, and points of interest and concern (so, for example, there is a Catholic response to the chapters on Judaism and Orthodoxy; Jewish and Hindu responses to each other’s chapters, etc.). These responses seek to expand and deepen each tradition’s respective conception of dignity while also serving the mutually illuminating purpose of demonstrating where there is—and is not—substantive agreement or overlapping consensus. The respective systematic conceptions of dignity thus do not stand in isolation; placed in constructive comparison, they provide a framework for interreligious and ecumenical conversation on the normative understanding and application of dignity.

Third, the book demonstrates how dignity can be applied in practice in different contexts, particularly in situations of conflict broadly defined. In part I, many chapters identify central themes and also differing strands of thought within a tradition shaped by contexts and conflicts of interpretations. These chapters conclude by reflecting on the ways that understandings of dignity can be applied to contested contemporary moral issues. Moreover, part II provides a more sustained case study analysis of the role dignity can and should play in adjudicating diverse situations of conflict, including gendered violence, religiously based disputes, race and racism, immigration, peacebuilding, ecology, and criminal justice. In short, the chapters in both parts I and II seek to demonstrate how the otherwise potentially abstract conceptions of human worth can provide concrete norms for protecting and advancing individual and communal flourishing amidst violence and other forms or moral harm.

Ultimately, our overriding goal is to provide greater illumination on what has emerged as an indispensable, if still unclearly defined, concept in contemporary theological and philosophical moral discourse. In the process, without collapsing differences between and within traditions, the contributors also seek to identify and establish common ground among differing conceptions of God and the human good.

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A COMPAR AT IV E ANALYS IS: CONCEPTUA L S IMILARIT IES AN D DIF FERENC ES IN RESPONSE T O SEV EN INT ER RELATED Q UEST IONS

A common theme that emerges from the chapters herein comes in the form of a response to the question, posed above, of whether there is any unity to the diversity of dignity’s respective formulations and applications. In short, yes: although dignity may not be “universal” in an empirical sense, meaning that we can point to some conception of it in every theological and philosophical tradition, the sustained analysis of dignity in these pages demonstrates that there is, indeed, some foundational conception of human worth within many of the world’s major traditions. That, by itself, is a vitally important conclusion: dignity may be flexible, but it does not appear to be formless. The book confirms that there is, indeed, a “there” there after all, one that we have good reason to draw on in order to address local and global issues. Dignity provides an important bridge concept for interfaith dialogue.

Yet given the different moral systems the traditions affirm, each based on a different conception of ultimate reality and shaped by unique historical, cultural, and sociopolitical factors, how can we speak about these similarities cogently while also identifying and understanding their relevant differences?

Within the discourse of dignity in the West, in particular, several key terms have emerged as central to defining and normatively applying dignity as a practical moral principle. These include “freedom,” “autonomy,” “rationality,” “personhood,” “individuality,” and “uniqueness,” among others. These and related terms remain important to the contemporary discussion of dignity, but the diversity of religious and philosophical perspectives in this book quickly reveals that they are not universal, nor do they have univocal meanings within the different traditions that employ them. For example, both Catholicism and humanism may describe human beings as “free” and even identify freedom as an essential characteristic of what it means to possess dignity. However, “freedom” from a Catholic perspective could be defined as the capacity to conform one’s whole being to Christ in and through living according to the natural law and the theological and moral teachings of the magisterium, but “freedom” from a humanistic perspective could be defined as a capacity to choose among morally licit but otherwise amoral ends (which may or may not include any conception of conforming one’s being to the divine) within a paradigm of dignity conceived of as “autonomy” (that is, being a law unto oneself ). In this case, stating that “both Catholicism and humanism locate freedom at the cen-

Introduction

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ter of their conceptions of dignity,” even if descriptively accurate, would obfuscate as much as it clarifies given the profoundly different definitions of freedom operating within each tradition.

Another example is the concept of personhood. The idea of the non-self of all conditioned beings in Buddhist traditions provides a basis for challenging the normativity implied by human dignity. Other traditions locate personhood within human nature, whereas still others describe personhood as freedom from nature. Seeking to establish fixed substantive meanings to key terms often associated with discourses on dignity is problematic in a comparative context, something that will become even more apparent in subsequent chapters.

However, recognizing this complexity does not mean that we cannot identify a shared foundation for comparison. Indeed, one answer to the question of how to speak cogently about the similarities and differences among the different traditions represented in this book takes the form of the concept of dignity itself. The recognition that each tradition contains something like the affirmation that human beings qua human beings have value provides the grounds for a coherent comparison. Each tradition provides distinctive accounts of what specifically defines the “human” and distinctive accounts of what, specifically, gives human beings “worth,” but each different conception answers the same basic questions about the existence and nature of dignity. Moreover, the answers the traditions provide to these questions tend to fall into another set of basic conceptual categories. These questions, and corresponding answers, provide the basis for comparison among the differing traditions (and strands within these traditions) while also helping to clarify each tradition’s internal understanding of its own conception of dignity.

Below we have posted seven basic conceptual questions, along with categories of possible answers, which define conceptions of dignity in this book.

In our introduction to part I, we provide brief summaries of the chapters, but here we use the seven conceptual questions as lenses for comparative analysis of the traditions. These questions, it is important to note, do not seek to capture the substantive nuances of each tradition’s conception of dignity, nor do they seek to provide an exhaustive descriptive account of each tradition (and its internal methodological debates and conflicts of interpretations) more broadly (e.g., a definition of “Catholicism,” “Judaism,” or “Hinduism,” as such), either in terms of how a tradition understands itself or how it may be understood by other traditions. The scope of consideration is deliberately limited to the conceptions of dignity as each contributor portrays them. Within that arena,

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however, we believe that the following questions and answers provide coherent and illuminating grounds for identifying and conceptually organizing each tradition’s conception of dignity, both individually and in relation to the other traditions, while also continuing to allow each tradition to speak for itself.

Question One: What sources justify dignity’s existence, nature, and purpose?

Each tradition’s conception of dignity not only makes claims about its distinctive understanding of why and how human beings have value as humans, but each also provides an account of why that is the case, including identifying and defending the source or sources of its particular conceptions. Again, there is substantive diversity among the traditions on the specific content of the sources each draws upon in constructing its account of dignity, but they all fall primarily into one or more of the four categories of sources we list below. Each source is followed by a brief definition: 1.

2.

Sacred Texts and Revelation. Conceptions of dignity in this category appeal to some form of sacred, canonical text in order to define why humans have dignity and what defines dignity. The basic defining feature of conceptions of dignity in this category is the implied epistemological and practical limitation on dignity’s existence and nature: one must recognize the authority of the sacred text and its particular interpretation in order to know both (a) what fully defines dignity and (b) why dignity ought to serve as morally obligatory guide for human action. Presumably, those who deny the authority of such texts, or are not otherwise aware of their content, would not have access to the unique claims about dignity that such texts affirm. Moreover, unlike the “Ecclesial Structure and Traditions” category (see no. 4, below), this category does not emphasize the necessity of an institutional authority to establish the normative interpretation of the sacred text.

Reason and Empirical Observation. Conceptions of dignity in this category seek to locate the grounds of human worth within some claim or set of claims that is accessible to all human beings otherwise identified as “rational.” Unlike appeals to sacred texts or revelation, rational conceptions of dignity do not presume the authority of revealed truth in order to demonstrate the validity of its conception of dignity. Also, unlike the following two categories (3 and 4, below), it also does not presuppose any specific kind of personal or cultural experience or the mediating presence of

Introduction

3.

4.

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an institution or intellectual tradition. Dignity from this perspective seeks to be understood as “self-evident,” meaning, in this context, that all rational persons, doing an authentic analysis of existence, including human existence, should be able to identify the same conception of dignity and the moral obligations that emanate from it without the aid of revelation or an ecclesial structure.

Personal/Interpersonal Experience and Culture. Conceptions of dignity in this category locate dignity within some kind of personal and/or interpersonal experience, including socialized and normatized experiences in the form of culture. In this category, the locus for understanding the existence and nature of dignity is not the observation of some “objective” phenomena or state of affairs, which would place it more in the “rational” category (no. 2, above); rather, it is a focus on the lived experiences of individuals and groups—including experiences of the divine—that may or may not be presumed to be universally applicable to all human beings. The experience of “shame,” for example, is prominent in this category—dignity, from this perspective, is related to avoiding actions that cause shame, and in order to know what constitutes such possible shameful actions, one must consult cultural norms and/or individual experience.

Ecclesial Structures and Tradition. Conceptions of dignity in this category rely on some kind of mediating institution, such as the teaching authority of a church, to provide an account for dignity’s existence and purpose. This category is distinct from the “Sacred Texts and Revelation” category because it presumes that such texts cannot and do not interpret themselves on the question of dignity; there must be some kind of authoritative body, in the form a church hierarchy and/or church councils, that provides the fullest and most authentic interpretation of the text’s meaning.

Rationality, experience, and culture may be included as part of the theological deliberation of the authoritative body from this point of view, but ultimately this category maintains that the full truth about dignity is not only revealed but revealed through an institutional structure, and, therefore, one must accept the authority of the institution in order to fully comprehend and apply its teachings on human dignity.

To be sure, one could argue that each tradition discussed in this book, depending on its specific interpretation, falls into more than one of the above categories. Yet it remains the case that each tradition is defined within the contours of primarily one of the categories. For example, the Jewish, Protestant,

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and Islamic conceptions of dignity, notwithstanding their profound substantive differences even with their shared Abrahamic lineage, fall primarily into the “Sacred Text and Revelation” category: though they appeal to different sacred texts, it is primarily the content and authority of the texts themselves that identify the existence, nature, and purpose of human worth. The Hindu conception, in turn, primarily falls into the “Personal/Interpersonal Experience and Culture” category insofar as cultural norms (which are related, but not reducible to, sacred texts) and the experience of individuals within culture dictate the nature and application of dignity. In turn, both the Buddhist and humanistic understandings of dignity fall into the “Reason and Empirical Observation” category: although they appeal to profoundly different understandings of rationality, both identify conceptions of dignity that seek to be independent of any sacred text or membership in a particular cultural group. Instead, each bases its claims on forms of knowing that are presumably available to all human beings otherwise considered “rational.” The Catholic and Orthodox conceptions, in turn, fall primarily into the “Ecclesial Structures and Tradition” category. Like the other traditions, both Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy contain elements from the other categories, but they ultimately recognize that it is the teaching authority of the Church—the magisterium in the case of Catholicism, and authoritative Church councils in the case of Orthodoxy— that have final authority over the meaning and normative use of dignity as a moral principle.

In short, each tradition privileges one of the four sources of dignity. In making this observation, we can establish both similarities and differences among the traditions at the conceptual level. Despite caveats and provisos, we can point to general conclusions. For example, with regard to the question of what kind of sources justify dignity’s existence and purpose, Buddhism appears to be closer to humanism than to any of the “religious” traditions, and Judaism seems closer to Islam and Protestantism than to Catholicism or Eastern Orthodoxy. Hinduism, in contrast, appears to stand apart from all the other traditions, at least in the sense that it privileges interpersonal experience and culture as the primary interpretative lens. Overall, these categories help demonstrate in this context that traditions—that otherwise have very different substantive content (e.g., different names and definitions for the divine) and have been influenced by unique historical, cultural, and political contexts—nevertheless tend to draw on the same kinds of sources in order to explain their respective conceptions of dignity.