Governmentality - Current Challenges and Future Issues

Governmentality Current Issues and Future Challenges

Edited by Ulrich Brockling, Susanne

Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

I~ ~~O~&t~~"~g~"P New York London

UNMRSITY LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROU"'''' AT CHAPEL Hill

Contents

First published 2011

by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

Simultaneously

published in the UK

by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon,

Oxon OX14 4RN

1 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

'L es at the College de From Foucault s ectur I. ,An Introduction di f Governmenta ity: France to Stu res 0 AND THOMAS LEMKE ULRICH BROCK LING, SUS ANNE KRASMANN

Š 2011 Taylor & Francis

2 The right of Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act] 988.

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Relocating the Modern State: G 0 vern mentality and the History of Political Ideas

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Constituting Another Foucau It Effect: Foucault on States and Statecraft

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Library of Congress Cata!ogillg-in-Publication

5

Data

Governmentaliry : current issues and future challenges / edited by Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke. p. cm.-{Routledge studies in social and political thought; Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. POlitical science-Philosophy.

1984-POlitical and social views.

III. Lemke, Thomas.

JA 71.G6737 2010 320.D1-de22 2010004575

. ' f the State: Rousseau's .

Govemrnentalizarion 0 . f Governmentahty h M Contribution to rne rvrodern HIstory 0 BALKE

The Security Dispositif Government U n limited: 1 . of Illiberal Governmentahty

93

SVENOPITZ

71)

2. Stare, The. 3. Foucaulr, Michel, 1926I. Brockling, Ulrich.

II. Krasrnann, Susanne.

74

6

The Right of Government: Torture a

nd the Rule of Law

115

SUSANNE KRASMANN

7

Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border

138

WILLIAM WALTERS

ISBNH 978-0-415-99920_5 ISBN13: 978-0-203-84647_6

Ihbk) (ebk}

8

h G vernment of Life Beyond Foucault: From Biopolitics to teo THOMAS LEMKE

165

Contents

VIII

9

Coming

Back to Life: An Anthropological

Reassessment

of Biopolitics

and Governmentality

185

DIDIER FA$SIN

10 The f LifBirth of Lifestyle Politics: The BiopoliriI rca 1M anagement o I estyle Diseases in The United States and Denmark LARS THORUP

E

the College de France to Studies of Governmentality 201

LARSEN

11 Biology, Citizenship

I'

h

and the Government

xp ormg t e Concept

of Biological

di rome tcme:

of B'

Citizenship

,

1 From Foucault's Lectures at

225

An Introduction Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

PETER WEHLING

12 Human Economy, Human Capital: A Critique

of Biopolitical

Economy

247

1. FOUCAULT

AND GOVERN MENTALITY

ULRICH BROCK LING

13 Decentering

the Economy:

Governmentality URS STA.HELI

Studies and Beyond'

269 .

14 The Economic Be d G Th L' . yon overnmentality: e muts of Conduct

285

UTE TELLMANN

the Socialized Self' M bili . in th "A' .' a I rzanon e cnve Socier " LESSENICH Y

15 Constructing and Control STEPHAN

Contributors Persons Index Subject Index

304

321 323 327

In Foucault's writings, the term "governmentality" (gouvernementalite) first surfaces in the College de France lectures of 1978 and 1979. The term is derived from the French adjecrive gouvememental, and already had some currency before Foucault made it into a central concepr in his work. In the 1950s, Roland Barthes used what he referred to as this "barbarous but unavoidable neologism" (1989: 130) to denore a mechanism inverting cause and effect and presenting the government as the author of social relations: as "the Government presented by the national press as the Essence of efficacy" (ibid.: 130). Foucault took up this "ugly word" (2007: 115), freeing it from its semiological context. For Foucault, governmenraliry thus does not stand for a mythic practice of signs depoliticizing and masking rhose relations, but rarher for a range of forms of action and fields of practice aimed in a complex way at steering individuals and collectives (2007: 122; 2000c: 295).

Foucault's interest in studying government signals a far-reaching correction and refinement of his analysis of power. Up through the publicarion of Discipline and Punish (1978), in order to investigate social relationships he had used "Nietzsche's hyporhesis" (2003: 14-19) against the juridical concept of power, approaching power above all in terms of struggle, war, and confrontation (see for example 1978: 26). Bur in the mid-1970s, it became clear that in its initially conceived form the "micro-physics of power" (ibid.: 26) had two serious problems. On the one hand, the analytic accent lay mainly on the individual body and its disciplinary formation, and rhere was no consideration of more comprehensive processes of subjectification. As a result, the analysis of power could nor do jusrice to the double characrer of this process as a practice of subjugation and a form of self-constiturion.

On the other hand, in the critique of state-centered approaches, focusing only on local practices and specific insriturions like rhe hospital and

2

Ulrich Brochling,

Susanne

Krasmann

and Thomas

An Introduction

Lemke

prison turned out to be insufficient. It was, it seemed, necessary to analyze the state's strategic role in the historical organization of power relationships and the establishment of global structures of domination.

What was needed, then, was a double expansion of the analytic apparatus, in order to appropriately account for both processes of subjectificarion and state formation (see Foucau It 2008: 358).

As a "guideline" (2007: 363) for Foucault's work over the coming years, the concept of government stood at the center of his new theoretical orientation,. With this concept, he introduced a new dimension into his power analysis, allowing him to examine power relations from the angle of the "conduct of conduct" (2000b: 341) in order to distance himself simultaneously from the paradigms of law and war. In this manner, the governmenraliry concept was introduced for the sake of a "necessary critique of the common conceptions of 'power" (1997a: 88). Its significance in Foucault's work lies 10 the mediating function he ascribes to it: in the first place, it mediates between power and subjectivity, making it possible to study how techniques of rule are tied to "technologies of the self" (Foucault 1988) and how forms of political government have recourse to "processes by which the individual acts upon himself" (1993: 203); in the second place, the problem of government allows systematic scrutiny of the close relationship-repeatedly underscored

by Foucault-between techniques of power and forms of knowledge, since governmental practices make use of specific types of rationality, regimes of representation, and interpretive models. , Foucault first presented his new "direction for research" (2000a: 3231 ~~ the framework of the above-mentioned lectures. Their subject was the genealogy of the modern state" (2007: 354)-Foucault being less interested theoretically 10 a hiIS t onca ' I' reconstrucnon . of the emergence an d transformation of politicI a I structures t h an 10 ' the long-term processes of co. evolution .. , ' h C II' of dmodern stareh 00 d an d mo d ern subjectivity, For that reason, In t;, 0 ebge e France lectures he uses the concept of govern mentality with ah dvery road meaning" (2000b 341) ki i he ei : , ta 109 up a range of meanings" ' a mtothe eighteenth century (Sellin 1984; Senellart 1995) Foucault now d rsunguis e s "th e po I"mea If' orm of government" from the "problematic of government 10 general" (2007: 89)_ The latter is concerned with leadership 10 sense' . s e If-government, . d a cornprebensive idi h head ..'

109 a family raistng chl-'I ren, gui341) 109 t e soul but als I d hi f 2000b.

W' hi '.

0 ea ers ip 0 a community or ' business (see . exarni forrnarion i . I It 10 this framewo r k , Foucaulr oucau t examines processes 0 f state 10 c ose connect' . h h d of subjectificari F hi Ion Wit t e evelopment and changing forms 'f" (2007' 109) , Ion. , or dt i 1$reason ,eth "governrnentalization 0 the state . invesugate 10 the Ie t " I f h subject" (ibid.: 184) Fo cures IS sirnu taneously a "history 0 t e of all as a ce t 1'_ d ucault does not understand the modern state first n ra ize structure b h . h same political st f'.' . ur rat cr as a "tricky combination ill t e procedures"

rucrures

(2000b:

0

332).

individuali:

iza

ti

IOn

hni

tee tuques and

0

f rota I"IzatiOn

3

In his lecture series, Foucault considers the "genesis of a political knowledge" (2007: 363) of governing humans from ancient Greek and Roman ideas on the subject (0 early modern reason of state and "police science," and onward to relevant liberal and neoliberal theories. In the process, he opens up the following historical argument for discussion. The modern (Western) state is the resulr of a complex linkage between "political" and "pastoral" power. Where the former is derived from the ancient polis and is organized around law, universality, the public, and so forth, the latter represents a Christian religious conception centered upon the comprehensive guidance of the individual. Pastoral power conceives the relationship between the shepherd and his flock and between leaders and those they lead along the lines of a government of souls: their individual instruction and guidance takes place in view of otherworldly salvation, pastoral authority thus complementing the authority of moral and religious law (2007: 115190; 2000a: 300-311).

Unlike the ancient Greek and Roman approach to government, that of the Christian pastorate is characterized by rhe development of analytic methods, techniques of reflection and supervision intended to secure the knowledge of the "inner truth" of the individuals. Alongside obedience to moral and legal norms appears the authority of a pastor, who permanently controls and cares for individuals in order to set them on rhe road to salvation (Foucault 2000b: 333; see Foucault 2007)_ Foucault observes that such pastoral guidance techniques experienced an expansion and secularization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The gradual dissolution of feudal structures and the development of large territories and colonial empires, together with the reformist and counterreformist movements, led to a broadening of pastoral power beyond its original ecclesiastical context. Foucault's analysis of government is thus based on the assumption that the pastoral techniques eventually produced forms of subjectification from which the modern state and capitalist society could in turn develop. The particular quality of this specifically modern form of government-of human beings rather than "souls"-lies, to begin with, in the need for reflection on its premises, object, and goals. "Political reason" represents an autonomous rationality derived neither from theological-cosmological principles nor from the person of the prince. At the same time, the earlier goals of happiness, salvation, and well-being are now secularized and re-articulated in the framework of the "political" problemaric of the state. Foucault speaks here of the modern state's simultaneous tendency towards totalization and individualization, this itself constituting both a legal-political structure and "a new distribution, a new organization of this kind of individualizing power," "a modern matrix of individualization, or a new form of pastoral power" (2000b: 334).

If we follow Foucault's interpretation, the innumerable treatises about the arts of government emerging at the srart of rhe Early Modern period indicate that political reflection was separating itself from the problem of

4

Ulrich Srocklil1g, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

sovereignty and exten di109 to all conceivabl

Standing

" , at the center of rh f e activities e art 0 government IS

An Introduction

and fields of action,

r.rness.,

fertility, and so on. 'Thin

tunes, famine, epidemics

5'

r e.rs, qu~ mes, .c1ima,te,

bi

g are men 10 their relationships It~, ways of actmg and thinking. Finally,

lo~sdtps ;:Ith things like accidents, , an eat.h (Foucault 2007: 96)

misfor-

Potentially, every human realm and activit ' . tary maneuvers, from guid f h y, from spiritual conflicts to milifalls within the purview fance 0 t e family to questions of wealth now 路 0 government ' Fo howe I'ess Interested . in di 1 ucau It IS,ver, . rea m of government as such th . id .la~nosmgan extension of the allowing an ordering of the ,an 10 I enufying the specific rationalities , h va rtous areas co db' :ng t em towards its different I vere y governing and orientgo a governmentality'" (2007' 108) F s. In the framework of this "history of me t '.

"

oucaulr

exam'

h

f

particular. reason of mes tree arms of governern I ' state police and lib I' menta rationalities do n t f 'h ' I era Ism. But these govon the 0, or t e most pa t , f way to a continuous "10 d " r ,mar k hiistorical stages e.rence and discontinuity bet 0 er mzatjon" of the state; rather the difd ISCIPme, 'I' ween a ra ng eo f tec h nologies of power-law ' security techniq I' ues-stand at th ' Fnterestmgly, departing from the 0" e center of Foucault's analysis. oucault here no longer [uxr p srnon he took 10 his previous work of discipli me b ut d emarcates aposes sovereign riIg h t wrtirh t h e mechanisms ' both fro" n

In

108). In his earlier work On di 'I m apparatuses of security" (2007' and delscnbed a process through 1~~PIO hed tlhe juridical model of power, h~ va idiry ,and" co Ionized" ' IC wi ISCiP mary . t ec h mques . law both have accrued mech~nlsms of legal norm-setting (21~~~n t;; inrerstices and against the argue , mstall hlerarchizing se ' .

-39). These techniques he nlormal and abnormal, function;nagr~ylons betfween the useful and useless, a. lzatlOO' ..'

In

orh er war d 5, procedu

way 0 a set

For his further

work,

Foucault

between the legal norm, disciplinary

" a sort 0 f complex of men and thin s Th ' concerned about [] ,gh : e thmgs government must be ' . .. are men 10 t err relationshi b d d p Iex Involvements with rhi lik IpS, on S, an commgs I e wealth reso f subsi renee, and of course rh . '. ' urces, means 0 subsisd ' ,e ter nrory with Its bo dersv oualiti with thmgs like custom h they are men in their r~~/

variations.

val ue an d Its ' operation-

md~v~dualhs to such predetermined r::a~~ e~tab(2Iished orienting and al igning e tec nology of securit ar s 007: 44-47路 56-57) ary sysr h y represents the ,. , em: were that system presu exact opposite of the discipl inPOdint 0df secumy technology is the mes a prescrIptive norm, the starting on I'-Or er norm an d a IIOWing furthe empIrically no rma, I serving as a seCd'ff r reality toward a previously defined sh Iiderbentiations. Instead of orienting rea Ity-as defi d b ou - e val . k ease b' h ne y the statistical distrib ' ue, It ta es that empirical of s~ Irt '"alnd death, and so forth-as ubtlonhof frequency, rates of discumy 2007. 7) d a enc mark TI" h ' the forbidd b' raw no absolute line b . le mec aOisms en, lit rather specify an .

I etween the permitted and optima med' lum Wit. h' 10 the range of

thus distinguishes

5

analytically

nonnatiou, and the normalization

of

security technology (2007: 56-79). , As Foucault sees it, the development of security mechanisms is closely ned to the emergence of liberal governmentality in the eighteenth century.

He understands liberalism not as an economic theory or political ideology, but as a specific art of government oriented toward the population as a new political figure and disposing over the political economy as a technique of

intervention.

Liberalism,

he indicates, introduced a rationality of govern-

ment unknown to either medieval notions of rule or Early Modern raison d'etat: the idea of a nature of society forming both the basis and limits of

governmental

action. For Foucault this idea was no remainder of tradition

(or premodern relic), but rather marked an important break in the history of political thought. In the Middle Ages, a good government was part of the God-willed natural order: an idea that integrated and limited political action within a cosmological continuum. Reason of state broke with the idea, replacing it with the artificiality of the "Leviathan," whicb earned it the reproach of atheism. With the physiocrats and political economy, nature resurfaced as an orientation point for political action-bur another, previously unknown nature, having nothing to do with a divine plan of creation or cosmological principles. This nature was the outcome of altered relations of production and conditions of living: the "second" nature of developing bourgeois society (2007: 87-110; Meurer 1988).

Foucault sees the distinctive feature of liberal forms of government as their replacement of external regulation by inner production.

Liberalism does not limit itself to a simple guarantee of freedoms (market freedom, private ownership, freedom of opinion, and so forth) existing independently of governmental praxis; it goes beyond that, and organizes the conditions under which individuals can make use of these freedoms. In this sense the subject's freedom does not stand opposed to liberal government but forms its necessary reference; it is no natural resource but an effect of governmental praxis (2008: 62-64; Bonnafous-Boucher 2001).

Freedom is an indispensable instrument of tbe liberal art of government.

This consists of a more or less systematized and calculated form of exercising power, not directly affecring individual and collective agents and their options for action, but rather intervening indirectly in order to structure fields of possibility: "it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less [ ... ] but it is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions" (Foucault 2000b: 341). Nevertheless, as a result of the "free play" of power, liberal government permanently endangers the same freedoms that it engenders, necessitating ever new "protective" or I'stabilizing" interventions to prevent power monopolization or concentration.

Mechanisms of security are both the flip side and existential precondition of liberal freedom. The

6

An Introduction

Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

problem of liberal government thus involves determining the "production costs" of freedom: to what degree does the pursuit of one's own interests pose a structural danger to the general interest?

With the extension of mechanisms of control and compulsion in response to rhis problem, something akin to Bentham's panopticon emerges as a central element of liberal policy. But the liberal relation between freedom and security is more complex than that image suggests. Liberal government not only produces a freedom threatened by its own dynamic, but the danger or permanent threat of "insecurity" (in the form of poverty, unemployment, disease, etc.) is an existential premise and basic element of that very freedom. For this reason, the danger needs to be subjected to an economic calculus that weighs its benefits against its costs: "[E]verywhere you see this stimulation of the fear of danger which is, as it were, the condition, the internal psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism. There is no liberalism without a culture of danger" (2008: 66-67). This culture of societal danger supplies the key to the "morals" of the liberal art of government. When exposed to such danger, individuals are expected to cope with them and their entrepreneurial activities and individual responsibility are what decide social ascent and descent. Consequently, social inequalities are not the result of a mistakenly organized society but an indispensable element of its well-arranged daily functioning.

At the end of the lecture series, Foucault discusses the further development of twentieth-century liberal positions, focusing on two forms of neoliberalism: German postwar liberalism ("ordoliberalism"'),and American human-capital theory as associated with the Chicago School.' Both approaches are opposed to state intervention and direction' in the name of economic freedom, both criticize an uncontrolled growth 'of bureaucratic apparatuses and the concomitant threat posed to individual liberties. Foucault nevertheless observes profound differences between the approaches, involving both conceptions of the social and proposals for political solutions. Ordohberahsm was grounded in the idea of a "social market economy," which is to say of a market permanently supported by political regulation and necessarily framed by social intervention (currency policies, unemp~oyment and health insurance, and so forth). In contrast, the Chicago School s program involves a systematic expansion of the economic sphere Into the SOCial, in order to eventually eliminate the difference between the two. Rational economic calculation serves here as a principle for grounding and limiting ' . h government Itself . 't a sor . governmental . action, Wit becornmg of enter prise Its task be' .

I' . , . k tlik ' Ing to umversa rze cornpetmon and Invent mar e I e systems for the actions of individuals, groups, 322-324; Burchell. 1993: 274; Senellart 2007).

and institutions

(2008:

The baSIS for this strategic operation is an epistemological displacement: t h e , systemanr; '., compreh" ensrve expansion . Ie of the economy from a slIlg SOCial realm With Its 0 I d . ' II h wn aws an mstrurncnrs into a process governing a urnan behavior (2008: 222-223; ordon 1991: 43). According to the

7

Chicago School, what characterizes human behavior is the allocation of scarce resources for competing goals. The central question the neohberals pose is that of the calculation that motivates people to invest their scarce resources in pursuir of one goal rather than another, a model generally grounded in a principle of individual maximization of benefits. Crucially, the calculation applies not only to the analysis of individual and social action but also to governmental practices: against the standard set by the market, these practices can be scrutinized for excess and mis~se, ~Itered through the interplay of supply and demand. Where, rhen, classical libera 1ism expects the government to respect the form of the marker, within this concept rhe market no longer serves as a principle of governmenral self-limitation but rather as a "principle turned against it: It is a sort of permanent economic tribunal confronting government" (Foucault 2008: 247).

Although in the context of this lecture Foucault is concerned above all with liberal and neoliberal theories, in one passage he comments on the question of socialist governmentality.

"Real" sociali.sm, he argues, ~as employed many elements that liberalism and the police state used Without being able to invent an autonomous for.m of governme~t: a pr,?ble~ revealed in all its acuity by the constant posing of the questions of true socialism and the significance of central texts (ibid.: 91-95)., .

Although Foucault's lectures on ancient and early Chflstlan-pasroral techniques of guidance and control, reason of state, police SCience, mercantilism and liberal and neoliberal forms of government are undoubtedly thought-provoking, rhey leave us with a number of unresolved problems.

One of the most serious of these is an indistinct and inconsistent use of central concepts-including, above all, the concept of governmentality itself, which Foucault applies in a double sense (see Lemke 1997: 188-194).

In the first place, it has the general sense of the emergence with raison d'etat of an independent art of government.

In the second place, Foucault uses the notion of governmentality in a more limited sense to refer to the em.ergence of liberal government in the eighteenth century. The demarcation from adjacent concepts also often remains unclear. ThIS IS the case, for instance with the concept of biopower (see Foucault 1990: 135-145) as situated within the framework of govern mentality: is modern biopower one of its aspects or elements, or is Foucault simply here using tWO words for the same thing (Garland

2. STUDIES

1997: 193-194)?3

OF GOVERNMENTALITY

Foucault was only able to carry out his ambitious project of a "history of governmentality" in rudimentary form. The lecrures are Inherently provisional and fragmentary, and were not meant for publication.

In the Context of his "history of sexuality" (a project that was also only partly realized), Foucault focused on the genealogy of the subject of desire and the

8

Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

transformations of ancient techniques of self-guidance.

But an empirical study of the relationship between technologies of the self and of domination largely remained an unfulfilled programmatic demand. Foucault died before his planned concretizing and deepening of the problems discussed in the lectures could be realized.

There was also an editorial problem. For a long time, the only relevant material Foucault authorized for publication was the talk of February 1, 1978 entitled "Govern mentality" (1991) and the summaries he prepared of his findings (1997b: 67-71; 1997c: 73-9). The lecture series from 1978 and 1979 at the College de France were only published in 2004; these have recently appeared in English.

Despite this difficult publishing situation and Foucault's sketchy development of the govern mentality concept, it has inspired a great deal of work in history and the social sciences since the 1970s. The first such work stemmed from Foucau It's fellow researchers, much of it emerging from research projects undertaken in connection with the 1978-79 College de France lectures and focusing on a historical period Foucault had largely neglected in his "genealogy of the modern state" (2007: 354): the alteration of governmental technologies in the nineteenth century and the constitution of the modern welfare state. Fran,ois Ewald (1996) thus reconstructed the use of insurance technology, initially developed and tested in the private realm, for societal regulation. Focusing on the problem of industrial accidents, he argued that the category of social risk increasingly suppressed the principle of individual responsibility, contributing to a transformation

of power relations within society and undermining the separation between law and morality

constitutive

for liberalism.

Daniel Deferr (1991) and Jacques Donzelot (1984) aimed to demonstrate that insurance technology was set in play against extant forms of solidarity within the workers' movement, leading eventually to a depoliticizing of collective struggles and class conflicts. Such social antagonisms were thus replaced by a homogenization of the social field, by way of probability cal-

culations, quantitative derivations, and variable risk distribution. The work of Giovanna Procacci (1991; 1993) on the origins of the social question and Pasquale Pasquino (1991) on the rise of the idea of defending society against the threat of "dangerous individuals" likewise stemmed from the context of the seminars that accompanied the lectures.

Foucault's interest in government was not limited to the lecture series of 1978 and 1979. In 1981 he delivered a series of talks at the Catholic University of Louvain, and in the accompanying research seminar he led an interdiSCiplinary study of the "genealogy of social defense in Belgium" concentratmg on the years leading up to the start of the twentieth century.

The results would later appear in book form (Tulkens 1988. 1986). The

"welfare state" a~d g~vernmentality meant to be exammed students and lecturers

in the early twentieth

~entury were

"' another book project Foucault proposed to some dUring a period of teaching at Berkeley in 1983. But

An Introduction

9

. d did lans for a research center working on went unrealize ,as I p K k i 1985) I pts (Gandal and rop 10 • modern governmenta conce I" attracted a great deal of In the 1990s, the question of gOlv~rndmenttasl~~ciates With the founding " b d h . Ie of Foucau t s irec associates.

I" mreresr eyon t e eire k i L don in 1989 and the pub rcaof the History of the Present ~et~or 111 G~:ernmentality (Burchell, Gortion of The Foucault Effect: tu tes marie articles the center don and Miller 1991), a collection °h prFogramphone to the Anglophone .. hif d from t e ranco of research In this area site "" A I" New Zealand the USA, .. . G eat Britain ustra ia, '

the project

I;'

world: in universities d

In

r

, b .

de of Foucault's concept

d more use was eing ma " d and Cana a, more an b . logically-histOrically oriente , of governrnentality.

Rather than emg genea alyze processes of conmost 0f t hiIS wor k u sed Foucault's mstruments to an temporary

,

social transformation.

'A

"

1 American mteresr was gr

ounded

in both

,

theory

"

ThiS growing ng 0-" I h d become increasingly dissatisand politics. Many radical mtellectua sd a I is In the 1970s and 1980s, " itique an ana ySI ' d fied with orthodox M arxist cn h ing from a simple base an .

I" I . approac es emerg " dogmatic po inca -econorruc ""d I ith false consciousness d equating I eo ogy WI " . h superstructure sc ema an Wh"1 me theorists tried to tie Marx, . 'ower I e so , " ' were losing their persuasive p ". h derstood their Interest III . list Ideas ot ers un " di rst concepts to poststructura ,I, ' f b'ectificatlOn, and iscurpnanon forms 0 su J II d processes of cu Itura I appro '., ration (Rose O'Ma eyan flecti ost Marxist orien , " I sive patterns as re ecnng a p . hid "ntellectual and rheoret ica Valverde 2006: 85-89). Alongside sue a tere t~lity concept also stemmed . . F ucault's govern men , . constellations, mreresr mo. lineal upheaval starung 10 " . of dramatic po I I " h from the collective experience II in the United Kingdom during t e the 1980s: the replacement, above a of (welfare) state tegulaing the Reagan era, If Thatcher era and the USA d un lib ral governmenta arms. . . ments by neo I e k tory models and steering mstru h h concept was now ta en up e reason w Y t e " Against that bac kd rop, on f" I transformation mtO an ecoes 0 socia h" was that it did not force process d on critiquing ideology. In t IS . I temp Ia t ed'or one centere nomic analytlca olutions and entrepreneu rial . d " f market- nven 5 "f manner the 111([0 uctlon 0 " . "h" g or reduction 0 state SO v-

, " d not as a dlmInIS In " Patterns could be Interprete I techniques, Anentlon was

" f governmenta (f ereignty but as a restructuring 0 I"' I strategies and programs or e of new po mca "d now directed at t h e emergenc "f self-organizalJon an empowms " "". instance the intra d uctlon a f mechams " " Otf'd ntities and su b"Jectlvltles.

0 I e etment strategies" ) an d t h e r e - articulatIOn ". I d intellectual world, f rom t h e 1990s

In the Anglo-American polmca an f d an independent research talrty have onTIe "d onward studies of govern men " . h . I and political sCiences an , " " I' IthlO t e SOCI3 h field in a series of dlsclp Ines w "I a coherent researc program " a t play here IS ess work of researc h"ers usmg the Cultural studies. Wh at IS h tha n a loose net " or a homogeneous approac h d" nt theoretical Interests. ." nd wit Iverge concept 111 varIOUSways a from criminology an d .. Policing" The disciplinary range here exten~~ and Valverde 2006; Simon 2007) (O'Malley 1992; Smandych 1999; Du er

]0

Ulrich Brcchling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

and education (Hunter ]994, Marshall ]996, Besley 2002; Masschelein et al. 2007; Peters er al. 2008) to organizational sociology and critical management studies (Krieken ]996; Miller and O'Leary ]987; Townley ]994), postcolonial theory (Gupta 1998; Inda 2005) and historical geography (Hannah 2000), and onward to research on spatiality and the city (Robins 2002). The concept has also made its way into cultural history (Shore and Wright ]997; Rimke 2000; Branch, Packer and McCarrhy 2003) and political ecology (Rutherford 1999; Luke ]999), and was drawn on in a critical study of international refugee policies (Lippert 1999); at the same time, it is manifest in the study of the historical conditions behind the ernergence of medical practice and its social implications (Osborne 1993; Greco 1993; Nadesan 2008). Additional fields and themes have included the role of psychology and psychiatry in both governmental steering and individual self-guidance (Rose ]989; 1996) and the establishment of empowerment strategies in state programs for combating poverty (Cruikshank 1999).'

At the end of the 1990s the govern mentality concept began to attract a great deal of interest outside the Anglophone world, especially in Germany, with the appearance of many books and collections (Lemke ]997; Brockling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000; 2004; Krasmann 2003; Pieper and Gutierrez Rodriguez 2003, Kah12004; Opitz 2004; Reichert 2004; Kess12005; Michel 2005; Brbckling 2007; Krasmann and Volkmer 2007; Lemke 2007a; Gertenbach 2007; Purtscherr, Meyer and Winter 2008) and a large number of articles. The disciplinary spectrum here extends from media studies (Stauff 2005; Holen 2008) to political science (WiihI2003; Lessenich 2003; Peripherie 2003), history (Finzsch 2002; Caruso 2003; Rudiger 2005; Bohlender 2007), education and social work (Rieken and Rieger-Ladich 2004; Weber and Maurer 2006; Dzierzbicka 2006; Anhorn, Bettinger and Stehr 2007), theology (Ruhstorfer 200]) and organizational sociology (Turk, Lemke and Bruch 2002; Weiskopf 2003; Bruch and Turk 2005).

Studies in this field have now spread to Scandinavia and to other countries on the Continent such as Belgium and the Netherlands (see for instance Koch 2002; Masschelein and Simons 2005). Even in France, where for a long time work on Foucault was extremely rare in the social sciences, increasing interest in this research perspective has been apparent in political science, sociology, and cultural anthropology Over recent years. For example, a working group directed by Jean-Fran,ois Bayan has studied the slgmficance of corporeal representation in political processes (Bayan and WarnJer 2004). Another group at the Ecole des Mines has used the govern mentality concept for organizational theory (Pesqueux and Bonnafous-Boucher 2000). A third group led by Didier Fassin and Dominique Memml has worked on contemporary forms of governing bodies (Fassin and Memml 2004). In addition, the concept has made its way into analyses of present-day security and immigration policies (Bigo ] 998; Bigo and Guild 2005) and has been applied to questions of state theory (Lascoumes 2004; Meyet 2005) and health policy (Va illy 2006).

An Introduction 3. GOVERNMENTALITY

AS AN ANALYTIC

1]

PERSPECTIVE

of governmentality are markedby diverse disciplinar y ~rih e ess diff enrarions and focus on I erent emp. irical objects ?. they are neverr he "art of informed b a common analytic perspective. They mqurre into t

Though

studies

S:~:I~:

govern men;" in Foucault's broad sense of t:~r'~fn;; i~~7~i~e~:I;,e:; taliry investigate mechanisms of the c 0)nd di gPfrom management of " (F It 2007路 102 120-12 2 , exren in groups oucau f children and daily control practices in company employees to t e raising o. al institutions such as the European public spaces to govemmg trans-nahtlon in f here is on the tech nolo, d h U ' d Nations T e main ocus Union an t e rute . , di ' t fields The knowl.

I" f ( If) governrnenr 111 isnnc . gies and ration a ines 0 sc .'

I ays practical knowledge. . d . ern mental practices 15 a w d e ge Incorporate In gOY I" centered on the question .

I f govemmenta rty are For this reason, ana yse~ o. hese ractices constitute themselves of how practices and thinking about riP . ach other ' I h they trans are into e . mutually, or more precise y: ow b th descriptive and prescripThe programs of (self-) govemm~nt a~e ~escribe and problematize on tive: they always presume a reality t at t ey ing to change or rransform ' hi h hey intervene-r-ttr y the one hand, an d In w IC t " f nted with forces removed ' h h h d At the same time, con ro It-on t e ot er an. , ' d fl ' ir or neutralizing it, these profrom their access or blocking It, eHencethe description and prescription grams also consistently go astray.

I d f government is always also an always involves elusion In that kno~de geAo Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose erring, inadequate, or failing know e ~e'f s ogrammer's dream. The 'real' " h 'realization 0 apr state: "Governing IS not teo mming; and the program, . , h f of resistance to progra , , , d always msists 10 t e arm . "nvention failure, cnuque an " f t nt expenment, 1, ~ mer's world IS one 0 cons a . 39' Malpas and Wickham ]9%). adjustment" (MIller and Rose 2008 路 k ' wl: d nd regimes of practice of , I I orders 0f now e ge a f ' In reconstruct1Og oca I' d onstruct the idea 0 Ul1lver, d' f emmenta Ity ec d varymg scope, stu les 0 gov . h f an optimized means-en _ l"zation In t e sense 0 . sal reason, or 0 f ratlona I .

I ror who arranges his actIons relation-but also rhe model of the ration a aC ' Unlike Max Weber or . h I I futility maXlmlza t on I . " , accordIllg to t e ca cu us 0 , I f rm of rarionality but IIlSlSt d or assume a slI1g eo.

I ]urgen Habermas, t h ey 0 n 'I" What is considered ration a , f mental ratlOna Itles. d I I on a plura Ity 0 govern . oints means an goa scan , ' ns abour starting P , b depends on which assumptlO. fI " cy and acceptability are esta ma claim plausibility; which crlterta 0, egm f knowledge are evoked to , h" and IIlventortes 0 , I lished' and which aur orttles. .

I Consequently, ration a _ , d practices as ranona .

I' k' define statements as true an R' lities are ways of r lin IIlg ' I' al terms atlona b ity is understoo d III re atlon ageable which is to say su that render reality conceivable and t uS mGan d 1980: 248). This means , d formation (see or on "d ject to calculatIOn an trans 'f nt modes of thIllkIllg an h logICS 0 govern me , d d that rationalities an tee no .

I' nee ted and co-pro uce one forms of intervention, are inextncab Y Intereon another (see Miller and Rose 2008: ]6).

h'"

0

h

12

Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

An Introduction

Five methodological principles follow from this analytical perspective: First studies of govern mentality do not operate with dichotomies such as pow~r and subjectivity, state and society, structure and actio~, id~as and practices, but look for the systematic ties between forms of rationality and technologies of government.

In this manner not only political programs, everyday practices, and modes of shaping the self come into view, but also the significance of knowledge production and its connection with rnechan isms of power.

Second, this analytical perspective follows the principle of an "ascending analysis" (Foucault 1980: 99) starting with local patterns of rationality and governmental practices, Globalizing theoretical concepts such as "risk society," "neoliberalism," and "state" do not form the opening but at most the endpoint of the analysis, The focus is on micropractices whose connection, systematization, and homogenization only allows for a description of macro-phenomena.

Hence there is no single, specific neoliberal govern mentality, but studies of govern mentality can show for example how the role-model of the enterprising self is connected with theory of human capital in an elementary way, and how this role-model is diffused and becomes hegemonic within present-day regimes of subjectificarion.

Third, studies of govern mentality open up an epistemological-political field that Foucault defined as "politics of truth." In contrast to the critique of ideology, they do not describe ideas or theories in terms of a true-false distinction and imply no opposition between power and knowledge, Rather, they investigate the discursive operations, speakers' positions, and institutional mechanisms through which truth claims are produced, and which power effects are tied to these truths, Studies of governmentality trace the contours of this productive power, which produces a specific (and always selective) knowledge and in this way generates definitions of problems and fields of governmental intervention in the first place.

Fourth, this research perspective emphasizes the technological aspect of government, The concept of technology here includes technical artifacts, strategies of social engineering, and technologies of the self; it refers to both arrangements of machines, medial networks, recording and visualization systems, and so forth, and to a range of procedural devices through which individuals and collectives shape the behavior of each other or themselves,

These involve sanctioning,

disciplining,

normalizing,

empowering,

insur-

ing, preventing, and so on, Studies of govern mentality do not understand such technologies as the expression of social relations; nor, inversely, is society seen as a result of determinant technological factors, Rather, what is at play here is a complex of practical processes, instruments, programs, calculations, measures, and apparatuses making it possible to form and control forms of action, structures of preference, and premises for decisions by societal agents in view of certain goals (see M iller and Rose 2008: 61-68; Inda 2005: 9-10),

13

, cen t er on.. an analyrics Fifth and finally studies of governmenta Itty . hof ' I·· I ' I gy or political science t the political. In contrast to a po mea SOCIO0,. . hi ath .. . h ncern here IS With the ways In W IC presumes Its objects as a given, t e cod. h f I e The focus is on the realm of the political is produce m t erst p ranee between public how divisions and distinctions are estabhbsh ed, for Idnsfined as pohtical and ' d he nri here' how pro lems are e mrerests an t e prrvate sp '" h bi t are invoked as aurono.

I' prualized; ow su jec s possible so utions are conce " .' " h logies of government, . d onsible crttzens m tec no mous, emancipate , resp "' h ally distinct fields of state, which unfold their effects straight across t e usu I' do not assume that d h Studies of governmenta ity society, an t e economy. ,. b olitical activities are also not reduceverything is a political acnvlty,. ur p , ible to the trinity

of politics,

policy, and pObhtdY'. t command and control. y irec Governmenra -the exercise of conh "1 more so Both t e pnnclp e 0 0 e I . k It seems more effective to straint are very costly and tied to greathns ,· f eedom " in other words . , " d II ' "throug ht elr r, , guide individuals an co ecuves . th m positive incentives to themselves to give e h to prompt t em to govern .h I s as free subjects. Govern. , d nderstand t emse ve act In a certain wayan u k tain forms of behavior more ing means creating lines of force that male cer f force does not mean askh M ring these mes 0 I. probable than ot ers. easu , h. h Studies of governmenta rty ing how people actually move Wit In t oked to move within these lines. are more interested in how people are invo e . of self-government and , I· s between regimes I The focus is on the mterre anon . h d ct of individuals and co _ , f II· d shaping t e con u d h technologies 0 contro ing an , d b these regimes an teenlecrives, not on what human beings governe ienrific policy advice, studies . d d In contrast to set . nologies actually sayan 0, .

I of good governance against , I· no Idea norm . h I of governmenta tty proc aim d I stead they investigare t e "" t to be measure . n, k which real practice IS mean d the arguments used to rna e .. bli h d f od governance an cnteria esta 1S e or go I est ion is thus not h ow e ff ecthem plausible (Lemke 2007b). Thedcehntra qhUyshould be optimized, but , . . e an ow t e f tive governmental acnvltles ar . k then are programs 0 (se If - ) · ff t What IS at sta e" . f d h how they un 01 t elr e ec s'. f II t· e histories nor diagnoses . !Ions 0 co ec IV h government, neither reconstruc h" 'n terms of an image: w at ., . I t re To express t IS I "fi d. of shifts m the socia struC u , d· g people in speci c Irec. dh the currents raW1I1 h is being scrutimze ere are his be drawn or how t ey use · they let t emse ve , . h d tions-and not t e Istance h hey try to evade them or sWim quickly or ow t I . the currents to a d vance more 'I. spective in no way resu ts II1 .

H ch an ana ytiC per . k against them. owever, SU. "f government regimes rna es g a normatively abbreviated reahty: ma,:m ~ modes of resistance provokvisible the conflicting forces, the breac es an

. arelyoperate I practices r f b dience and-even

ing governmental efforts. f ent that generate subjects in , , d etices 0 governm . " It is rationa I ltIes an pra " k" d legitimizing certalIl Images ' . . g by mvO mg an f I the first place su b Jectlvatln I h s addressed or examp e, , . h Peop e are t u , h of the self while excludmg ot ers, I.' I activists concerned about t e as citizens aware of their rights, as po l!lca

14

Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

societal future, or as artists who realize themselves through th.eir creativity' and they also articulate themselves as citizens, activists, arnsts, and s? forth. To become a subject always means actualizing certain subjecr-posirions and dispensing with others; it means being addressed in a certain way as a subject, understanding oneself as a subject, and working on oneself In alignment with this self-understanding, Studies of governmentality aVOId the hypothesis of an antecedent, autonomously acting subject, employing instead a minimalistic anthropology, They know nothing about the constitution of human beings going beyond the human capacity to be formed of about form itself (Rose 1996), But this dual capacity is what makes people governable in a fundamental way, Subjects are not merely effects of the exercise of power, but also possess self-will and agency-this is already at work conceptually in the copresence of power and freedom in the idea of government.

Terrorists being targeted by the security authorities, students being evaluated by professors, employees supervised by their superiors-all of them are not merely objects of government, nor are they fully determined by technologies of control.

Their manner of operating rather resembles a relay: in articulating themselves as subjects they take part in power relations, thus reproducing and rransforming them (Foucault 2003: 29-30), Processes of subjectification are always tied to a social a priori: subjects can only understand themselves and act within a historical field of possible experiences (see Macherey 1992: 181-182), They generate themselves performatively, but their performances are bound into orders of knowledge, lines of force, and power relations. Thus subjecrification designates a potential for action, but always a form of adherence as well-to ideas, and to manners of articulation and recognition, Subject-positions empower individuals, while subjecting them at the same time (Butler 1997), If the subject is only conceivable in terms of this double movement, then we have to dispense with the traditional opposition between liberation and domination-the basis for both Marxist and anarchist critiques of rule, as well as liberal movements toward freedom, But this does not mean abandoning the telos of freedom and the claim to self-determination and self-realization; it does, however, problematize these concepts. Movements for freedom and emancipation are not located outside or beyond power relations, but themselves produce regimes of subjectification (Cruikshank 1999), They not only place extant orders of truth in question but also inaugurate counter-truths centered on the question of how liberated, emancIpated subjects are to understand and to shape themselves and others, Stud'es of governmentality are aimed neither at a history of ideas nor at a vaflant of psychohistory or a historical-genetic psychology tracing the evolution of corporeality, emotions, conceptual worlds, cognitive schemas, and pathologies, They do not focus on individual life histories and selfimages, as is the case in biographically oriented social research, Instead, what is at stake here is a "genealogy of subjectilication" (Rose 1996: 23).

An Introduction

15

Studies of govern mentality do not retrace transformations of subjectivity, but the way in which the subject has become a problem at cert~m hlSt~flcal moments and which solutions have been arrived at. To put r IS abnor er subject is but which forms 0f su lectlv way' t h ey d 0 no t as k what the bili d 'tty have b een InVO ' k e d ,W hich modes of knowledge have been I idmoI ' I ize ro answer the question 0f t h e su bijeer, an d w hich procedures r ai d c haim to. ch The reception of Foucault's concept of governmenta uy an ht e reslebar I bi if ' "is linked ro t e neo I era program of a "genealogy 0f su [ecn cation , d i di id al free. .. f market Orientation an m IVI U restructuring of society m terms 0 , , If (B ock'II th figure of the enrerpnsmg se r dorn. In neoliberalism especia y, e ibl d dy for risk has ling 2007), defining itself as free, self-responSi e, an rea the self-caring , , hi olitical project ro promote figured as a protagonist in t IS Ph' vestment of . , mbers and to measure t e In f and self-provision 0 society s me h ivit lifelong learning hi d Concepts sue as creanvi y, ' state resources to t IS en . yrns for technologies ", d ment have become synon parncipauon, an empower "" d the state- the activarbli hi I' between the CItizen an . esta IS Ing a new re anon h logies of government ' he acti d bi ct Contemporary tee no Ing state, t e activate su Je ' I d t S if they are autonod d themse ves an ac a encourage people to un dsubi.

Thanks to the market's invisible hand, mous and self-determined su jeers. , " eant to promote not isk an d utiilitI y maxirmzanon areI m If the readiness f or flS only the individual's happiness but also the genera we are.

4. PROBLEMS

AND PERSPECTIVES

d even in the work of some of the proIn the reception of the concept, an , ' f (mis-) understood as a , , h Ii Id mentality IS 0 ten tagorusts In tee ,govern .. in this light studies of govern, " h Wh n It IS seen In t I, " social-scientific approacn. e I" comprehensively describe , ' h 'logy by c aiming to , mentality compete WIt SOCIO I hi If formed each of hIS ana, 'I h Foucau t rrnse and explain SOCIa p enornena. h'storical objects (madness, , , ith f e to concrete 1 lytic Instruments wit re erenc , h d veloping a general theory , I' d forth) wit out e , I delinquency, sexua ny, an so 1"" h fren served as a theoretlca Y from this; in contrast, "governmenta It adS째bJ'ects-without correction ' rch goa sI an 0 d passepartout for ar b Itrary resea h f e of such overload we nee h ept In t e ac f or further development 0 t e conc f' ltal'lty is not an attempt to , ' ' 0 governmel to emphaSIze that analySiS In terms d' d ot have a distinct method" I h ory an It oes n , h focmulate a sweepmg socia t e , "Ii research perspective III t e " ' d' osal It slgl1l es a " o IoglCal Inventory at Its ISp. f I k'ng a specific onentatlOI1, , If' rna nner 0 00 I , " literal sense: an ang e 0 View, a, fold rheir analytIC poten'f mentality can un , As such, studies 0 govern 'I h nd call theoretical certam, b h h SOCia t eory a d rial when they at poac on, "tl'cal corrective to them an " , h h function as a cn , ties IntO question-wen t ey , d' 'l'nary marginality, Takmg up activate the irritative potential of theldr IScl P I vern mentality would need , I' " Ise stu les 0 f go h Foucault's nomma IStlC Impu, h' wn answers and from t e , I I es from t elf 0 to repeatedly dIStance t lemse v

16

Ulrich Brochling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

An Introduction

mecha~isn:s

of power identified earlier. In other words: heuristic experiInstead of neat "how to" manuals, local cartography instead of general theory. Thomas Osborne (2004: 35) appeals in this sense for a use of the concept of governmentality:

menranon

"as a kind of soft, if not provocative, effective conceptual lever to develop new ways of thinking, leave behind familiar ways, dismantling some and renewmg others. Thus instead of establishing a new empire, this kind of research should very consciously remain provisional.

Here sense for the untimely, for anthropological interruption, is everything: what IS at . play IS speculative thi In kimg ab out govermng . . . our capacines and emotions and not production functioning of societies in general.:"

of didactic

statements

about

the

Pa rallel to the strengthened that res 0 govern mentality sket "the hi f

reception and academic grounding, two tendenare moving in opposite directions.

Either studh . . hi . c .10 a sweeping istorical narrative subjecting story 0 governmentahty to a veritable evolutionary logic rnechanica III'y a d vane 10g 10 a SOCIOogica . I . I manner from study of the Polizei to libera Ism and the welfare state to neoliberalism" (Osborne 2004: 35)' or in increasingly small-format empirical studies they distill th I idenri I rational t . d e a ways I ennca h hiles, strategies, an technologies of neoliberalism.

In both variants t· ey . h tel h id ea of where the argument h t direaren to become rcpetitilive, Wit IS ea 109 present so to speak b f h di what one alread k Thi e ore t e rea mg. What is discovered is not any possibility t: ~ows.

IS'h least of all, protects scholars against their approach ; ~ e~omena t ey are studying will force them to rethink because studie; or" t IS repres~nts a paradoxical development: precisely ofthe present th governmenta iry possess high potential for a diagnosis , ey encounter resonance' b h run a danger of di .. hi h ' ut to t e extent they do so, they ImITIlS mg t at di . . critique itself rather than what is blagnostlc potential by repetition. As the the gesture of critical '1· b emg criticized becomes common sense, I b h va ri unvei 109 ecornes obsolete. n or variants the regimes f sure and clarity sup'pre' h 0 government are characterized by a c10ssmg t e sirnultan ff f . tal lines of force-effe t hi. eo us e ects 0 varIOUS govern mencts r at Over ap With di f d nossi . each other. A homogene·t f .

I..' mo I y, an possibly contradict I yo rationa mes a d hnoloci on the one hand and f f f' n tee no ogles of government , 0 orms 0 sub if . . presumed both in the eff jecn catron on the other hand, IS ort to reconstruct . I d . ern mentality and in that t d fi a sing e mo ern history of gov· I. .

0 rni .

Its tara lzmg contemporar f e ne through an a lvses 'yses of 0 micro-regimeS, the constitutive hybridir yf dorm. . e result IS an inabiliry to account for .

I yo rscursrve patte d ha ni (Reckwirz 2008). rns an mec anIsms of power

cies cfan be discerned

Th

. Another [10ual

problem

rationalization

· . .

ItS critical

turn

.

to be noted is an im

and

'.

.

Optimization this fin I· , a Ism suggests

"

pilelt

. hnallsrn,

presuming

a cOO-

of g I . overnmenta technologies.

In . . an 111creaslng difficulty-or even

17

the impossibility-of evading or opposing governmental strategies. From this perspective, techniques of disciplining and mechanisms of sovereign power are simply of accidental and residual character and are replaced by more economic forms of exercising power. The history of governmentaliry then appears as an increasingly fateful correlation of mobilization and selfmobilization, optimization and self-optimization, control and self-control.

This account overlooks both the persistence of violence in power strategies and the systematic linkage between supposedly "rational" and "irrational" moments of government (Lemke 2000). In fact, separating what is rational qua capable of truth from what is not rational qua merely subjective or affective, and fixing the borders between the two spheres, is an elementary move in technologies of government.

Another aspect of the "rationalization problem" is that studies of governrnenraliry frequently scrutinize programs as if these were blueprints, thereby tending to mask the breaches, dislocations, and rejections emerging with their appropriation and execution. This neglect is due, in no small measure, to the specific perspective of the empirical analysis: studies of governmentality focus neither on the regularities and probabilities nor on the non-calculable moments of individual and collective behavior, but rather on atrempts to steer and affect them. The analysis only refers to actual behavior and "real life" to the extent these are catalysts, effects or resisting elements of governmental strategies. Examining syllabuses, school textbooks, or the architecture of classrooms is not the same as reconstructing individual learning processes. The focus is less on the "development of real governmental practice" than on "government's consciousness of itself" (Foucault 2008: 2), which is to say "the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing" (ibid.). To extend the school image further: studies of governmentality do not inquire into what pupils do or refrain from doing, but investigate which institutions and persons (including the pupils themselves) induce them to do something and refrain from other things-and in what way and with what intention.

The criticism that studies of governmentality simply duplicate neoliberal governmentality, misappropriating it in a kind of intellectual identification, points to a methodological quandary: regimes of government and self-government follow a more or less polished program, ofren documented and supported by scholarly research, giving rise to carefully planned procedures. It only makes sense to speak of regimes when patterns of governing become manifest. Studies of govern mentality are aimed above all at such programs and procedures. By contrast, the forms of resistance and counterconducts (Foucault 2007: 201) are contingent. They have to be accounted for, but they are not calculable. There is a science of government, but there cannot be one of the art of not being governed. To take up an elementary distinction made by Jacques Ranciere (1998): together with governmental regimes, science belongs to the order of police, executing the division of the

18

Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

sensible (Ie partage du sensible) and assigning things and people to certain positions. Resistance to this is political, markin~ an i.nterruptlon-a disturbance also affecting the order of scientific classification and explanatory models.

In this way every study of counter-action, and hence of the phenomenon of dissent, disobedience, rebellion, denial, or more simply, of agency, faces a threefold danger. Either it seeks out rules and regularities precisely where they are violated and transgressed-the perspective of criminology; or It aligns heterogeneous stories, without being able to say much more about them than that they exist-an ethnographic approach also present 10 broad areas of cultural studies; or it itself argues from the commander's vantage point, promising oppositional knowledge of government in order to lead united forces of resistance into battle-the Leninist position, still echo 109 in the post-operaist invocations of the "multitude" (Hardt and Negri 2000;

2004).

Are we left, then, with the aporia of either remaining silent about forms of resistance since speaking about them would mean making them accessible to governmental intervention, or speaking about them since silence would mean playing into the hands of those hoping to keep resistance invisible?

Obviously not. But how, then, are we to evade the traps of the criminological gaze, anecdotal narration, or the oxymoron of "revolutionary theory~?

Surely not with critique as a kind of science of warfare, exhausting itself In identification of the enemy, exposing his cunning, unmasking his disguised agents while bringing its own battalions into position and trying to present them with marching routes and operational plans. And not with critique as a celebration of obstinacy, revolt or indifference, as a hymn to Marcuse's "great refusal" (1964) or the small "I prefer not to" in the wake of Herman Melville's Bartleby (1853/1997).

Such critiques already know what they will discover, and so simply look for additional evidence. Because they only know antagonisms (or the one great antagonism) or absolute indistinction, they remain blind to ambivalence.

Their protagonists are certain that the critique's subject and object can be clearly distinguished-that in any event they themselves are in no way contaminated by what they abhor. an understanding of critique as probInstead of constructing either a single history of the process of rendering something governable or many histories of the process's failure, the emphasis would be on making a performative relation visible in which governmental strategies and patterns of resistance encounter and define each other. Both governmental and resistant practices have to be considered in terms of a complex of questions: how they define problems to which they respond; which subject positions and modes of subjectification they engender; which fields of intervention they constitute and which strategies they enact to make their interventions plausible; and finally, which promises they articulate and which goals they hope to achieve in this way.

In the face of such approaches,

lematization would need to be strengthened.

An Introduction a context,

t

of resistance signifies very disparate

the concep h d posed to governmental it efers to w at stan s op , " things. For one t mg, 1 r . f sistence or inaccessibility, 'I ' tion a capacity or per, h efforrs-i-passive y as mac '. . frontation. For anot er f e interrupnon or can I and active y as counter arc, , ..

I orders of government 'between opposinona thing, it refers to t h e tension tegies and tactics form, f ment-between st ra , h and a subversion 0 govern d practices articulating t e 'I' irnes of government an , 'I ing countervai tng regrrne h' h arne of those prmcrp es, will "not be governed like that" by t adt, In t emneans of such procedures, bi t e In min an d by , . h with such and suc an a lec IV h " (Foucault 1997: 28, emphasis In not like that, not for that, not by t em.

I strategies (or strategies of . , I' hi b tween govern menta ki original) The re anons ip e. di tory resistance mar ing ' ce IS thus contra IC, . d power in general) an resrstan , f government: "Resistance riturive moment 0 . d both a boundary an d a cons I .'

I that which direcrs an ke to power, It 1Sa so .' is not merely the counrerstro , I be seen as a certain rnaruinsof sistance can a so d' shapes power. But InSO ar as re , h b seen as itself serving to irecr festation of failure, so too can failure (Mal e nd Wickham 1995: 43) , "( apasa " and shape the process of governing. . t the contrad,ctory sigm if _ " h as a Iso drawn attention . a ith the question 'f 0 t Iie Jacques Ranciere . "."

In connection W icance of the word reSIstanCe, h ' t nee is referred to bot h '"10 , .' h bserves t at rests a f I inherent resistance 10 art, eo. ' bei "and "in the sense 0 peop e inu th eve res In ItS erng h d ig the sense of a thing t at pers , ."

(2008' 9) Resistance t us esia, . hei tuatlon .' f h . who refuse to rernarn in t err Sl "rhe persistence 0 w at IS to , f rnulate Ranclere, nates both the gwen, to re or hi elinquished-t hi'e calm to . . haoe i nd samet Ing reun qu-禄o _ everything trymg to r~s ape it, a . n This signification IS always norma change and the practice of negauo . of the impulse to no longer if . or abhotrence tively loaded-as a justl cation, 'proposed by nelt'h er F au'II thIrd meamng, h 'th accept the status quo. FIna y, a I" t play: resistance as t e WI .. 1 b' choana YSis 10 a ent cault nor Ranc1ere flngs psy 1 of consciousness-governm drawn as a force unavailable to the contra ompulsion or another form of the ~elf-but emerging as a slip, repetition c ,

.

In such

19

hi

of manifestation (Derrida 1998). f nted with resistances in the " IS co nstantly "con roh d and the WIt . hd rawn, govNot least because It , threefold meaning of t h路e gIven, the relIngulS " te always take account a f the . affaIr: ItI mus 'If" ernment is always a precanous " h s realizes Itse as cnSls P re, f vernabdlty. t t u . unforeseen and Cflses 0 go . ua! reinterpretations, P roduces erforms cantin vention and management, p 'f II hart of its own goa Is. This cleft unintended effects, and necess~nly s ~ n can cause regimes of governbetween the programs and their rea lZatllo to function as the catalyst for e ment to collapse or come to no thing ) or e s mental efforts. F or t h'ISre ason , intensified modified, or entirely neW gOfvern nd realizing a master plan but , ts to dra tIng a .. ' lignto govern by no means amoun, ' . n correction, CfitlCIsm, a , tatlon 'h II1ventio , demands constant expenmen f Ilow the fau It- I'Ines a f becom ment ere of' f ment. The adjustments 0 go~ern I the case for forms 0 reslstan ce l ,mg governed. ThIS., IS se If -e vldently a so, tance of a no, t h e sp ontaneous insofar as they move b eyon d the mere Ins

t

20

Ulrich Brochling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

moment of indignation, towards strategic or tactical io.tervention. T~e effort to force crises and use them to transform constellations of power IS itself a precarious enterprise; counter-regimes themselves fail to attain their goals and produce unintended effects.. . .

Until now, studies of govcrnrnenraliry have often faded to pay sufficient attention to such singularities, ruptures, and disturbances of government.

Describing the dislocations, translations, subversions, and collapses of power with as much meticulousness as their programs and strategic operations; that is a challenge they are only now beginning to address.

An Introduction

. ' n of how contemporary statehood can on the one hand, with the quesno I of technologies of governbe conceived if-as clearly IS the case- ana yses and "globalization" is d I, . d t the borders 0f nation-states ment are not inure Oft I rationality (Larner an . f b d d s a form a govern men a , itsel to e un erstoo a 2003) On the other hand, they examme Walters 2004; Perry and Maurer i nar effects of power characterize a the extent to which VIOlent and exclbus 0 y t ration of the social as by h by a neoli era 1restruc u d fi d present e ne as muc .' h name of security. . . . carried out In ( e far-reaching state mrervennon li h had an enormous, producFoucault's concept of governmenlta ItY has with the methodological ' "I ical and po mea I t eory,

rive 5. ABOUT THIS VOLUME

resonance

In SOC10

og

d

1 f

location

For this reason

it poses still needing a great ea 掳lex P ss as a g~nealogy of govhi f governmenta iryl e Martin Saar rea d s t h e isrory 0 f h dern concept of the state hi f the emergence ate mo di d ernment an a isror y a I' d research program nee IJ1g 'I -po litical ana yncs an .a Foucault's analysis, Witith than as a new hiistorica d ful By connecting , d d to be develope an rna e use ' , Gerhard Oestreich, Quentin

challenges

The present volume explores the analytical potential of studies of governmentality in terms of three thematic focal points, each of which rakes up ongoing social changes and more recenr theoretical discussions.

The contributors discuss transformations of statehood and security regimes and the biopolitical dimension of government, and finally critically consider the thesis of an "economization of the social" under the sign of neoliberal governmentality.

The volume offers a kind of interim critical assessment of the reception of Foucault's lectures on the history of govern mentality and of the studies of governmentality, At the same time, it is meant to open up new perspectives and both promote and deepen a critical analysis of palmcal and social processes.

The State and Mechanisms

21

of Security

Critiques leveled at the concept and studies of govern menta lity have often pointed to the neglect of mechanisms of state rule (Curtis 1995; Frankel 1997; Garland 1997; O'Malley, Weir and Shearing 1997; Brunnett and Graefe 2003; Schild 2003). With the complete publicarion of the lectures at the latest, it became clear that Foucault's talk of "state phobia" (2008: 187) was by no means a refiection of an avetsion to analyzing the state, To the contrary, Foucault indicates that "The problem of bringing under state control, of 'statification' [hatisation] is at the heart of the questions I have tried to address" (ibid.: 77). But he did object to the idea of developing an abstract and in his view generalizing theory of the state (see 2007: 144; Mitchell 1999; Lemke 2007b; Saar 2007), He rather understands the state's existence as involving an enduring process of formation, unfolding through an analysis of both forms of rationality and technologies of government.

However, in studies of governmentality the modern nation-state has usually been, implicitly or explicitly, the point of reference, with "sovereign power" often standing for an archaic and repressive form of exercising power. In contrast, the essays in this section of the volume are concerned,

similar, already established perspectives (e.g., h innovative potential of a . . h K II k) Saar brings out ted Skinner Rein art osse e , .

A critical underscan _ "' b d and wrrt ten anew. history of the present to e rea.. d f the political future-can ing of the history of political th1l1k1l1g:-:an he radical contingency, of the insizhr t 10 i to the historicity, t only emerge f rom insrg . g Western (late) modern self-understand1l1 路 ,.

I analysis of the modern ntours f0 a cnnca . k h h Bob Jessop s etc es t e co disti hing between varIOUS , lectures isnnguis d state as laid out in Foucau It s .

J' ees an Anglophone rea _ ibl I' f eceptlon. essop s , , actual and POSSI e ines 0 r I" fr" forms of exercising power f pparenr y so t d " use If ing as tending to ocus on a , If 'on Here free am IS I' orenna or acn .

I' d d that try to mobilize an exp oit p h ffects cannot be exp arne f power w ose e "I ' h I understood as a tee no ogy 0 . b the state and CIVI society, , , , d d rcatlons etween , within the classical bor er ema, . b t which is at the same time , nd liberatIOn, u , public and private, repression a t Jessop favors a perspective ' wer By conttas , , ' ich localizable "beyon d ' state po . 'fi' of central MarXist 1l1Slg t s , nd modi cation rendering Foucault's reception a state and present- d ay ru Ie. . 0 f the contemporary productive for an ana IYSIS ernmenrality an d ear I'er I 路 f the lectures on gov d' h ' d Through a close rea 1l1g 0 f power beyond IC otomles 路 'II a concept a state I h d texts by Foucau t, e ISti Stand economy, such as micropower an d macr opower or sta eF "edrich Balke un d efta k es a , . f F It's analyses, n d d iUS1l1g the pnsm 0 oucau J ques Rousseau-an ec ,' I h oty of Jean- ac , Th ' I fresh reading of the po mca t e h' f governmentaltty. e slg.. h odern Isrory 0 . f . d phers its contflbutlon to rem. . here comes IOtO ocus, an at. nificance of law for society's SOCIal formI' atl~~heory of Carl Schmitr and hiS h . h re ferenc e to the po. Itlca t e same time Wit h our contemporary per ception student Ernst 'Forsthoff, Balke sheds Itg t ~~ Under present-day neoliberal " o f a transformation'f" 0 so verelgn power., ' 'rale expenences 3 displace, R ousse au's volonte gene governmental regimes, individual acts 0 f WI'II ,a Ilow'I order rests on men! of meaning. Th e socIa nifesrations 0 f t h e se If's rule ., . n to become rna ing affiliation and partlclpatlo

22

Ulrich Brochling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

over itself. In this context

Forsthoff's distinction between the social-welfare the constitutional state-Rechtsstaat-is instructive: through the neoliberal subsurnption of services of general interest to the proviso of freedom, the latter becomes a productive element of powerat the expense of freedom as a right in the face of state power.

The interplay of the apparent oppositions of freedom and subjection, of mechanisms of activation and of intervention, of involvement in government and exclusion is also considered in Sven Opitz' essay. For, Opitz indicates, where studies' of govern mentality have been mainly concerned with indirect mechanisms of guiding the "conduct of conduct" as a characteristic of liberal regimes, in recent years it has become clear that they are not limited to such mechanisms, But under what condition, Opitz asks, does a liberal regime become illiberal? The contemporary perception of one form of catastrophic risk, he argues, has brought specific mechanisms of securitization into play; these render visible a systematic linkage, as it were inherent rn liberal government, with sovereign acts of direct violence and exclusion. In .an extension of Foucault's analytic perspective, Opitz observes that early liberalism consolidated itself through a promotion of governmental restraint: governments could not intervene, both because they promised to respect civil rights and because of the opacity of market mechanisms, In contrast, securitization poses an imperative of mandatory knowledge inverting the original relationship: liberal governments must intervene precisely because they do not know about catastrophic threats and in the end are thus not able to guarantee the citizen's right to freedom,

state-Sozialstaat-and

The essay by Susanne Krasmann likewise addresses the contemporary analysis of securitization mechanisms, in the course of demonstrating the productive potential of Foucault's concept of state formation for understanding the transformation of liberal democracies, Using the example of the ongoing debate over the legalization of torture and a practice of torture that arguably has found its place in liberal democratic societies, Krasmann analyzes the dynamic interactions between security and law. Government in the name of security unfolds a distinctive game of truth and produces specific forms of visibility, rendering not only an extension of state interventions acceptable.

Indeed, security mechanisms can embed themselves systematically within the law itself-thus undermining traditional constitutional principles, In his study of migration control, William Walters develops an analytics of the government of borders and frontiers, Foucault hardly touched on the theme of state border controls in his lectures On govern mentality and biopolitics, but this issue has played a significant role in the reception of these texts, for example in examinations of the political logic of new forms of border control at airports and the application of new technologies at inter-state borders, But for the most part, Walters argues, such a logic is read as a specific form of rationality, conceived as global and homogeneous, say of Neoliberalism or Sovereign Power. This contrasts with his Own focus on border regimes as hybrid, locally specific and extremely mutable configurations

An Introduction

23

b lit into forms of state control on whose way of taking effect cannot e sp h h hand Rather in the one hand and humanitarian engagement on t ;e~~lte~f re~ious pOlitiWalters' view, border regimes are conshlstently the border ~ Nevertheless, ' ,h h nee of a " umaruta rran . cal con fl ICtS, Wit t e emerge . h of surveillance rechnol. f I I gal regulanons t e use strategies 0 state control, e .'. tions together form an orgaruza I d h t f humanitarian ogy, an t e engagemen 0 . lways woven into the . h路 h liti al rounterstratcgtes are a h bl assem age m w IC po I IC " I h Ie helping to diminis .

I hi nee politica actors, W I control strategies, n trns man ib nwillingly and in an . haps also contri ure, U the suffering 0 f migrants, per . d f r of controls, unanticipated f as hi100, to an ex tension an re nemeo

Biopolitics

and the Government

of Life

. ,

. ' tons 0 f govern ment and of biopolltlcs The two central Foucau Inan no I .

A result studies of gov路 f recepnon, sa, have generated separate I ines 0 ion of how the government b ass the question 0 d ernrnenra liry have ten d e d to yp , h b'ological categories an 路 . teracts Wit 1 of individuals and popu Ianons m d di iormality and pathology, concepts of life and death, health an Ise~s:, leen questions of embodiThis section thus focuses on convergencehs e w h nd and an analytics of d life on t e one a ,. rnent and concepts 0 f nature an . d f e the ways in which biod eekmg to en, h h government on the or er an ,S . of for example, socia I , logical constructions. have c h ange d . the perception inequalities, identity, and citizenship, L mke distinguishes between " In his contribution to t he vo I=T~~s ume, . fe om Foucault's concept 0 f , . f tion emergIng r d b h two Important lines 0 recep . hil ophy sociology, an ot , h ' home In p I os , d biopolirics. The first Ime as Its . d d the question of the mo e d i nente , towar d what counterforces d oes social and political theory, an IS 0 . , d bi litics [unction, an f h of politics: how oes 10PO I , II nd historically rom ot er ... , . diff rent analyrica y a . . ' e It mobilize?

How IS It Ie. h . rarting POint In serene h ond line as Its s I T epochs and political forms? e sec. h history of science, cultura and technology studies, medical SOCiology, t e the substance of life: how .. anthropology, and feminist t h eory. Its focus ,. ISon life forms been a Irere d b y . f d nterventlOO In, I . ;. have the representation 0 ,an I h be read and rewritten . . , bodi textstatcan h the conception of living 0 res as t" yes more closely roger erearch per spec I ..

Lemke suggests tying ( h e twO res. . Foucault's wntlngs, was , "h htle present In , . d a theoretical combinatIOn tat, w d proJ"ect IS thus alme a[ a . d h The propose , never systematIcally explore t ere, , ,., and governmentaiity to an of blOPO Incs , systematic linkage of the conce~ts. manner illumina[ing [he connecuons analytics of biopolitics-and thiS In a I" I forms of existence, together between physical being and moral-po Itllca des of government and Ideas b etween IIbera mo with [he correspondences of biological self-regulation" h b th Foucault himself and, for 路d' F In argues t at a ec In the next essay, 01 lef ass bl f governmenta \..

Ity Hl conn. ' he pro em 0 . h I I the most part those exp OrIng t , d' 'duals and populanons W I e , tion with his work have concentra red all In IVl

24

Ulrich Brochling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

neglecting the dimension of life's substance-what Fassin, in reference to both Georges Canguilhem and Hannah Arendt, terms "life itself." Starting with Giorgio Agarnben's distinction between bios and zoe, he differentiates between the "meaning" of life and its "matter," exploring the relation between the two on the basis of empirical research on asylum applicants in France and the AIDS problem in South Africa. The outcome of this discussion is a moral anthropology tracing the social inequalities and normative values steering the politics of life in contemporary societies.

An effort to bring the concepts of biopolitics and governrnenraliry into dialogue is also at the center of Lars Thorup Larsen's contribution.

Larsen's focal point is the re-orientation of health policies in many Western states starting in the 1970s, with prevention playing an increasingly important role. Larsen compares changes in U.S. and Danish health programs over the past three decades. His main conclusions: in these programs, "lifestyle" and "lifestyle diseases" are understood as empirical problems consciously aimed at influencing state policy for the sake of motivating individuals to behave in health-promoting ways. But the concepts involved have been applied in different ways in the two states, while in both countries the specific connection between lifestyle and health-related behavior has increasingly receded in favor of general moralization.

The theoretical linkage between biopolitics and govern mentality proposed by Larsen allows the contours of a "lifestyle politics" to emerge clearly: an approach going beyond the traditional juxtaposition of individualistic and social lifestyle concepts, which always have to presuppose what is generated by political technologies in the first place.

Over recent years, the concept of "biological citizenship" has been introduced by a range of authors in order to describe a new step in the development of civil rights. As a rule, what is at issue here are claims to participation in social and political processes and a recognition of individual and collective identities constitutively grounded in certain biological and genetic features. Peter Wehling's essay draws attention to some problems and blind Spots in this debate. The concept of biological citizenship, he indicates, is often used one-sidedly or selectively; what needs to be observed is not only the emergence of new rights and possibilities for participation, but also the emergence of previously unknown normative obligations and possibly undesired side effects or consequences.

Beyond this, Wehling makes it clear that patient and self-help groups in the health sector, while representing an important catalyst for and articulation of biological citizenship, nevertheless reveal varying structures and interests and, frequently, tense relations with biomedical research. Wehling concludes by pointing to some basic problems and ambivalent effects that can surface when civil rights are tied to biological characteristics.

He argues that the concept of "biological citizenship" should not be understood normatively, but should be seen as a tool for analyzing present-day developments in the field of biomedicine and biopolitics.

An Introduction ..

E conormzanon

0 f the Social

and Decentering

25

of the Economy

. fa" olirical economy" as a starting point Foucault took up the formation 0 "p f ent with studies of gov" " f lib I practices 0 governm , . for his consideration 0 I era h . hei analyses of present neolib" d . the t erne 10 t elf " ern mentality accommo atmg d d h to neglect the question " h di h ve ten e owever, d eral reglmes. T ese stu ies a .' . nmental rationalities an f rrnanons II1 gover , of how to relate current trans 0 " " The contributions in this " h "the capitalist economy. technologies to c anges 111 d llels between contemporary . " h differences an para .

I section seek to examine tel di d t wards "decenrer ing t ie and efforts irecte 0 f " h " accounts ate economy d i h vernmentality literature. economy" (Walters 1999) put fotwar 111 tbedgo between the section on the " I . h B "" kl provid es a n ge " I In hIS essay, U tiC roc mg " I f omization of the sOCIa. fling ana yses 0 econ d h government of life an teo OWl" I' nd even more in Agam. .., gap 111 Foucau t s a I" " Brockling's starnng POInt IS a.

I d fforts to bring about po lll" . f bi I'" hich ana yze e ben's discussion 0 10PO ItlCS, w bi I . I entity but did not focus on cal regulation of the population as a" 10 °lglca The contribution highlights " .

I" t of biopo incs. hes to an economic" r Ileary the specific economic ration a I y . this dimension by studying two dlfferenthapprkoa~omie as formulated by the " fi h t of Mensc eno a . " I of human life: rst t e concep .

"R d If Goldscheld 111 t ie years " . I hil h nd SOCIOlogist u 0 h t Austrian SOCIa p I asap er a h f human capital, w OSt mos 0 before World War I and second the t eOih dore W. Schultz and Gary S. famous exponents are the US economists eo rationalization of life by mic heid II d for an econo d " d Becker. Where Gol sc ei ca e "I nned wayan increase . h n resources map a " I the state that would cu trvate uma" "I"" and mutual protecnon, . ffective uti rzatton , k them through preventive care, e" If I tion through the mar et, " I Ies on se -regu a I " the theory of human capita re I d eiving of their actions as . 0 f lifI e. modeling individuals as entrepre neurs " ' an I"fconeans and quality . their own I esp . . investments or disinvesrrnents in I" irh economic questions IS " f nrnenta ity WI fi d The concern in studies 0 gover , .

On the one hand, we n an "" of chatactetized by an I'd' iosync rotkam~gurt~ ion f h economic determll1lsm in d anon rom t e h insistence-not least m emarc . t an autonomous sp ere, an d Marxist orthodoxy-that the economy IS no d to be analyzed as a bun/" b t rather nee s certainly represents no tota Ity," u f so that it is always seen as h die of truth claims an d mec al1l sms 0 power, d" of governmenta I"Ity d"lagnos e " Political economy. On t h e ot h er hand 'h"stu les how contemporary regimes " I" S OWll1g " an ÂŤeconomization of the SOCia, I" he demand to act III an ent genera Ize t "" II h of government and self-governm U S '"heli focuses cntlca yon t IS entrepreneurial manner. The essay by rS ~~ deconstruction and systems . "" k' ncepts from b0 "esses and mdeclslveness. Ta mg up eo f-referentiality of econ~mlc proe . . " theory, Staheli underscores the sel "f "govermng economic life. "k es rna d e by .strategies or the constitutive I111sta "f "logic of the mar k"et an d trace " "f tality Ident! ya "h to t e self-dlSWhere studies 0 govern men S ""heli pOInts ta markets an d t h e In . herent its translation into govern men tal f programs, If latory . t$ a se -regu embedding, excessive momen f h trepreneur. . .

ContradictOriness 0 f t h e fi gure 0 teen

26

Ulrich Brochling,

Susanne

Krasmann

and Thomas

Lemke

Ute Tellmann likewise critically examines a basic category in studies of governmentality, demonstrating that Foucault's repeatedly cited definition of government as the "conduct of conduct" falls short of describing the complexity of economic processes (and theories). Tellmann argues that Foucault's reinterpretation of the economic as governmental rationality and the alignment in the "conduct of conduct" formula with concepts of indirect management remain within the horizon of liberal economic discourse and, in particular, are unable to adequately scrutinize the significance of money.

Hence, as an alternative to simply applying that general interpretative key, she appeals for its historical localization. She argues that work on governmentality, like research in actor-network-theory, which is concerned with the socio-technical arrangements through which, for instance, markets are created, needs to provide a historical-conceptual analysis of the technologies of power constituting the economic field.

In the volume's closing contribution, Stephan Lessenich examines the "liberal paradox" of a welfare state located between an economic logic of commodification and a political logic of inclusion. On the one hand, individuals are liberated from traditional ties and mobilized for the capitalist production process; on the other hand, they are immobilized in institutions for risk protection and control organized within the nation-state.

In the present transformation of the welfare state into an activating state, this paradox is displaced into that of a simultaneous self-mobilization and self-control.

Policies of activation are flanked by generalized strategies of prevention. Both are accompanied by a process rendering individuals responsible: they are addressed, Lessenich observes, equally as active, innovative, and flexible market subjects, ready for risk, and as "social selves" civically engaged for the common good. Instead of concentrating, like a majority of studies in governmentality, on the "political power beyond the state" (Miller and Rose 2008: 53), Lessenich finally calls for an analysis of political power within the (welfare) state.

This book has emerged from a conference on "The State of Governmentality" held in Leipzig on September 14-15,2007.

It was organized by the Research Center on Cultural Theory and Theory of the Political Imaginary at the University of Constance, the Institute for Political Science at the University of Leipzig, the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, and the Institute for Criminological Research at the University of Hamburg. Both the conference and the realization of this volume were made possible by generous support from the Research Center on Cultural Theory and Theory of the Political Imaginary, to which the editors express their warm thanks. Joel Golb translated the essays by Friedrich Balke, Ulrich Br6ckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke from German, together with this introduction; Gerard Holden was responsible for correcting the essays; Julia Eckert, Robert Feustel, Jonas Helbig, Ulrike Spohn, Ulrike Wagner, and particularly Kristina Parzelt helped with preparing both the manuscript and the index. We extend heartfelt thanks to all of them.

An Introduction

27

NOTES .' .

I Ordo where most of the relevant 1. The source of this. term iJe~ In Ithe~~u~~a Walrer'Eucken, Franz Bohm, Alex-

authors were published. Wd~e m Aop 'k ere among the ordoliberals. ander Riistow and Alfred Muller- (mac W d himself with other thinkers 2. Although in his lectures Foucau~~bas%n~e~~eMises Hayek Simons, Schultz from among the ranks of US neo- I era h15mh V he of Gary s. Becker, whom he u and Stigler), he focused above all on ; ~ r ~~ement (see 2008: 269). felt to be the most radical exponent? t ~ t I b y Th omas Lemke. In this vo 3. See the chapter I . he ume. collections edited by Bure Ire II, .

4. For a goo d overview, see the artie bes In r d R se 1996. Dean an d H·III d ess Gordon and Miller 1991; Barry, O~Oo~~e~n a ;eneral d~scriprion see Dean 1998· see also Dean and Henman . or 1999; Rose 1999; Lemke 2000:. d sociologization of this research 5. In order to avoid an onrologization han "studies of governmentality" perspective, Osborne (20?4) pre!ers"t e term instead of "governmenrality studies.

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It Power and the EthICS of SubjecBes Iey, T·lOa.. (2'002) Counseling Youth. l i h Foucau , .. tivity. Westport, CT: Praeger P~b IS. ers.. . Vers une gouvernementahte par ' ., t Immigration.

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Bohlender, M~tthias. (.2007): lv!eta;~r~p~:~',l1tU~~ Weilerswist: Velbruck'''l"b _ I Politische Okonomle, ~o/tzel un Ul;;iberalisme sans liberte. Du tenne I era Bonnafous-Boucher, Mana. (2001).

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Susanne

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Relocating the Modern State

2

Relocating the Modern State Governmentality and the History of Political Ideas!

Martin Saar

1. INTRODUCTION:

HI5TORICIZING

POLITICS

There is nothing predictable about the direction the reception of a major thinker will take, and the huge success of the work of Michel Foucault is no exception, It would have been utterly impossible to foresee, at the time of their publication, which of his writings would catch the attention of his readers for years to come and which of his projects and concepts would become major references in a variety of disciplines. The fate of the notion of governmentality is particularly instructive, It is undeniable by now that Foucault's two lecture courses at the College de France on the overall project that he himself called "the history of 'governrnentality" (Foucault 2007: 108) have produced an enormous echo in sociology, political theory, and even in cultural anthropology,' But the challenge his suggestions pose to the historiography of politics and history of political thought has hardly been the object of any comparable debate, This is surprising, especially given the fact that Foucault's original project at the end of the 1970s was mainly a historical enterprise. The 1977-1978 lectures, Security, Territory, Population, and the 1978-1979 lectures, The Birth of Biopolitics, are both devoted to a genuinely historiographical task, namely the rewriting of the history of the (European, modern) state and of the arts and technologies of

35

very same subject, namely the history of theFchangiln ~ conOclee:rt:~~so~~~~ye Western state an d po I"incs. S een 1 n this way , oucau t s pr . f I" I ' ' , a toolbox for contemporary crrticisms 0 f t h e s t a te or variants fi 0 po d mea f _ ' , h I b also (and maybe rst an ore sociology or political ant ropo ogy, ut ith nd refutes ' ' hi ' h that competes Wit a most) a form of political isronograp f t 1" I history and the history of traditional and more dominant forms 0 po 1[ICa 1 political ideas. iburi 0 such a discussion on id limi y contn unon t In order to provi e a pte rrmnar di f followed by a general " 'I h d I '11 procee in our steps, historiographica met 0 , WI , fF It's-not toO explicit, 'II f ' b ef su r vey 0 oucau conclusion. I WI rst give a, n. a ear in the governmentalgeneral methodological clarificarions, aslthey PhPdological programs (2), ' d I h to hIS ear rer met 0 Ity lectures, an re ate t em t the methodological and ' if II tty to reconstruc I will then, more speer ca y, I' rhodox history of Western " hi I' I' ' of Foucau t s unor historiograp rca Imp icauons 'II I historiography of the state politics and political thought and esf~~:c~~I;~s historiographical practice and statehood (3). The specificity 0 f h e established perspectives can then be usefully compared to some 0 I'~ e mor of the history of politi, fi h "t aditiona verston . in the same field, rst to t e r so hist icared versions of It (5) cal ideas (4) and then to more recent, more ,P rtanr not to say "hege.

.

t

the most

tmpo

,

which might be said to consntu e f h history of political thought. monic" perspectives in the methodology 0 tde markedly different, and b h wn to provi e a d h Foucault's approac can e s 0 f lysis of state formation an 'or type 0 ana , for some purposes even superior, ich h less shares many telling , f h d whic nevert e , the transformations 0 state 00 Th history of governmentalJty features Wit ith t h ese compeun g accounts, . I f elf' tion or replacement 0 lore-I d radica re uta I , 6 b should, in sum, not e rea as a di I thodological challenge to ir ] ). lectual political history, but as a ra the me tions and ideas of the state , , f h nd t e concep I Telling the history 0 testate a h dolo ical stakes of such an enter"after Foucault" means to raise the met 0 g

prise and to revise its very form.

government.

The current debate on governmentality has, for good reasons, focused on the diagnostic and conceptual value of Foucault's project for contemporary social and political analysis and has therefore mainly given priority to the relationship between government, security, and power and to the problem of "liberalism" in its various forms, This discussion has helped to clarify how Foucault's historical analysis might bear on the question of how contemporary societies (and their subjects) are governed.]

But It has overshadowed the methodological and historical presuppositions of hIS approach, 50, given that the full version of this material is now available, it might be fruitful to start again from the question of what function the project of a "history of govern mentality" was meant to play, and how It relates to more established theoretical and empirical perspectives on the

2. FROM THE ANALYTIC5 OF POWER ~O THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTALIT

have come ro read as a major Ie w nudi inue Foucau It star ts the ecrures is that he WI'II conrmu .'" k b uring hIS au renee I turning POInt In hIS wor y ass " (Foucault 2007: 1), name y orne years ago " h' b an analysis "that we egan S han isms. As he inSists, r IS , 'I an analysis and hlStonca sur vey of power mec I h ory of power " (I'b'd) I ., b ut 5 urprisingly "

"genera

t

e

.

perspective does not amount to any d h' 'al studies of power, what In " al an IStone f rather consists in a set 0 emplflc h d II dan "analytics 0 f"power , H I 1 he a ca e f'"

the History (Foucault (Foucault

of Sexualzty:

vO

"~:~e .'.

of choice or statements

0

\nrc.nr

1978: 109), The five IndicatIOns h' g less than methodologlCal , way not m , I 2007: 1) he offers are, In a , h mechanisms and histonca conclusions derived f rom h'IS ear her work on t e

36

Martin Saar

forms of power. Power is, first, not to be seen as a "substance" but as an umbrella term for specific mechanisms. It is, second, not an autonomous entity but "an intrinsic part of" other social relations (Foucault 2007: 2).

Power is, third, a proper object of philosophical analysis in the sense of a "politics of truth" (ibid.: 3) that is concerned with the "knowledge effects" (ibid.) of power' The analysis of power, fourth, is committed to a "tactical" but not to an "imperative" (one might say "normative") implication: the study of power cannot step back to any neutral ground from which to judge or assess power as such. And fifth and finally, undoubtedly scarred from a series of theoretical confrontations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Foucault warns against the engagement in polemics within and instead of theoretical discourses.

This rather elliptic list of opening remarks presupposes quite a lot of knowledge on the part of Foucault's audience, because he is doing nothing less here than invoking the basic principles of his earlier research, starting with "The Order of Discourse," his inaugural lecture at the College de France in ] 970. It can be argued that all of his subsequent work, from his early College de France lectures on the "Will to Knowledge" (1970-197]), "Penal Theories and Institutions" (]971-]972), "The Punitive Society" (I 972-] 973) or "Psychiatric Power" (1973-]974) up to Discipline and Punish (1975) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality (1976) followed these basic principles and interests: an interest in a nominalist conception of power; a theoretical attention to the implications and interwoven ness of power with other spheres of the social; an elaboration of the intrinsic connection between power and knowledge; a serious attempt to develop a form of historical inquiry that makes it possible to describe and critically analyze the normative elements in a given discourse; the intention not to intervene polemically into the theoretical and political debate but rather to develop perspectives that permit a redescription and transformation of existing self-understandings and an opening up of new ways of thinking.'

To this list one might add two more elements not explicitly mentioned in Foucault's opening remarks in] 978, but implied in them: an interest in discontinuity and historical breaks as a major heuristic orientation (Foucaulr ]998a; ]998b),' and finally the deliberate use of unusual stylistic devices and rhetorical features that allow him to produce the very effect of defamiliarization and creative redescription, many of which can be traced back to Nietzsche's genealogical writings.'

Approaching the bulk of historical material and its systematic elaboration in the lectures on the history of governmenrality with these principles in mind, it will come as no surprise to see that Foucault, despite the many new and innovative material elements he is about to elaborate, presents his new work mainly as a continuation along the chosen path, leading to an extension and modification of the basic methodological conceptS (Saar 2007b). In most of the generally rather few methodological passages, Foucault insists on his adherence to the fundamental guidelines that have

Relocating the Modern State

37

guided his research so far. Bur, of c~~rse, rhe hi~to,~ical objects are .new ones. The term "apparatuses tdispositifsi of securuy ,(Foucault 2007., rn is introduced and explained in contrast to the mechanisms an~ lnDst.lt~t1I~ns , " of sovereignty and discipline, w hiIC h were malinly elaborated In /Sop S .tne and Punish, History of Sexuality: Volume] and the lecture c~urse OCl~t;, Must Be Defended (]975-1976).

Similarly, like the notion of bin-power, I' d i the two works Immediatelyd which was also introduced an e Ia b orate d in ' h " .". a new rna de following Discipline and Punish, secunt y IS used to ,refer to . hi' egularc society Wit a ogre an or historical form of power, a new way to r . its th 'I f rrnularion in the liberalism and ItS t eorenca 0 ions of h be the discursive expressions a science of political economy are s own to h b ing's "freedom" h . . ts on every uman el this new form of power, one r at lnS1S. f coliti I authorities to acts and "naturalness" and restrains the acnons 0 p.o I[lca. . his reasocieties. For t is rea Ifaws a se If- regulating that respect the autonomous ," t exacrly fundamenlib I . of government IS no , son, the early 1 era conception.

II and above all it is a technology tally, or primarily an Ideology. First of a h ractical texts like edicts on of power" (Foucault 2007: 49). ThiS is w ::. h siocrats, and programf trade and commerce, the political tracts a hI' bYst material from which . fi d economists are tee marie statements a jurists an , f hi thinking and the new to draw conclusions about the specifics a .t is new the population as the . ib I t The prominence a f practice of Ii era govern men .

I b established against the main target of the new form of power can on y o~ ower" (ibid.) than rhe background of "a completely different ec)ono~Ydre:Sage of individual bodone centered on the law (i.e., sovereignty or t e effectiveness of its own.'

Early eighteenth-century

ies (i.e., discipline). .' d d by Foucault before the I' "IS not mrro uce The term "governmenta iry d b hen speaking on the level t fourth session of his lectures, but alrea y Yh more or less in line with f that his approac is f h h d a met a a Iogy, one can say d d refine the results ate what he has done before. He tries to expan an hy of the seventeenrh and . I I· f for the hlstonograp , ' rstor ica ana yucs 0 power . historical configuratIon In h . b inrroducmg a new ear Iy eig h reent centurtes y . ge that conform to a new . regulation erner w hiich new practices a f po lirical II . d by new theoretlca, I (diis· s are accompaOle Iogic of power. T hese practice "I ) and they relare to new . , ' (I·b I' m polltica economy, d "b' CurSive) articulatIons I era is, ' h h· rorical object, calle 10( . b' h I tIon) T e new is , " matenal) a Jects (t e popu a ., II d "apparatus of security ' I' ark IS nOW ca e d d f h politics" in some a IS ear ler w , h h' t rm is also droppe an . and t en I. t IS e in the first lectures of the new sefles, , b I f governmenra Ity. I' is replaced by the voca u ary a h' k that the project of a lIstory . h Fault does not t In , It ISeasy to see t at oue . h dological innovatlon except · d d any major met a , d' o f governmenta IIty eman s . logical in relatlI1g Iscourse h h remains genea f a change of focus. T e approac 'I Th' '5 why the history a governand history, the textual and the socia. I I ,is king about government. While '. h' of polinca t lIn If' mentality IS no mere Istory h' lIectual history 0 certall1 it has some symptomatIc , va Iue to rrace t e lI1te

hi

38

Martin

Saar

Relocating

philosophical motives like the various theories about the "art of government" and the furious rejection of Machiavelli (d. Foucault 2007: 87-108), his main interest lies in the fact that a conception like "economy," "through a series of complex processes that are absolutely crucial for our history," can acquire the status of "a level of reality and a field of intervention for government" (ibid.: 95).

Submitting the theme of the Christian pastorate to the perspective of a history of power "enables us," Foucault explains, "to take up these things and analyze them, no longer in the form of reflection and transcription, but in the form of strategies and tactics" (Foucault 2007: 216). What this requires us to do is to see that intellectual and social changes are not to be seen apart from each other, as two different realms of social reality, but as parts of a conglomerate.

A mere history of ideas, on the one hand, would decouple these two levels completely; a reductive history of ideology, on the other hand, would collapse the one into the other. Foucault's own approach tries to assess the tactical value of intellectual and theoretical moves, but does not reduce the discursive elements to their non-discursive "base." It sees both spheres as sides of social reality' Such a history of power is less concerned with what there is in the realm of supposedly neutral historical "facts," and more interested in the processes and procedures that "make" and produce facticity and norrnativity in a given historical, epistemological and social field." The "history of governmentality" is therefore neither history of politics (or of political institutions) nor history of political ideas (or of ideologies), but history of politics-as-reality, a historical tracing of the many ways in which what people can do effectively as political agents and what people can actually think about politics is shaped by institutional and episremic conditions.

3. DE-INSTlTUTIONALIZING

THE STATE

If the preceding reconstruction is plausible, Foucault can be said to follow in the "history of govern mentality" a similar path as in his historiographies of the penal system, the early psychiatric institutions, or certain juridical concepts and their administrative functions.

In comparison to these rather limited projects, however, the "history of govern mentality" seems rather broad in scope. Because in this case, Foucault not only presents alternative historical accounts of the nature and functions of certatn institutions, concepts and practices, but also offers a complete redescription of a whole field that also covers "governmental reason," as he calls it (Foucault 2007: 287).11 But this is more than a history of political ideas, because It reAects on the concrete and material form of political rule, I.e., the acts of governing.

Foucaul~'s introduction of the neologism '~gouvernemel1talite" in ~he fourth session of Security, Territory, Population is meant to refer to nothing

the Modern

State

39

other than this unusual level of analysis. Semantically, rhe term alms at the whole sphere that can be said to be "gouvernementa~," i.e., relating. to t~e instance and the act of government as it was conceived and exercized 10 early modern Europe. The three-fold quasi-definition Foucault offers (Fou cault 2007: 108-109) should be read cum grana salis. It is definitely an a hoc definition since it is hard to see how something can meanIngfuldly bhe , said to be an "ensemble" of something, a tempora I" ten dency "an I· t de "result of a process" at the same time, the last of these only exp aline.

IS with the help of the term to b e d e fi ne d . But the main Intention .. b c .ear. f asis 0 I govern mentality structura IIy re fers to t h e material and epistermc f

d

state action

and it historically

' activity in question

places the specific formdo

gloverlnmenta

f . if c contex t , namely the gra '"ua evo unon 10 a speci h b 0'

the administrative state in which "governing the populatdlon fOln t e asis of new forms of knowledge became t h e f un d ame ntal mo e 0 t te exercise of political power. h d of this perspecdi I fl h t he sees as tea vantage I· Foucau t irnme rare y ags w a id " I ing the problem . u uve: the focus on governmenta I·rty ca n help a VOl overva h "state" This is because t e very term , 109) 07 of the state" (Foucault 20: .

I f n assumed entity . histori I d h r" I accounts re ers to a In most istorrca an t eore rca .'

Th idea of governI d . t question e very I and identity that is to b e ca I e Ino. d 'bl . first by dissolving · d his enti /identity In a ou e way. , menta Itty ecenters t ISentity I I . I· ity of "institutions . f h te into the mu lip ICI , the assumed fixed entity 0 testa I I . d tactics" (ibid.: fl ctions ca cu anons, an procedures, ana Iyses an d re e nnd b y t h orou ghly historicizing the .. . . nd secon 10 h 8) t at secure ItS ac nvmes; a, , I ., hese formulations that t IS In t are meant to react to assumed transtempora I Iid enti ir y of the state ,', it becomes most explicit that Foucault s sufggeslionhs that had emerged dorni . nts 0 state teary and replace the then orrunant varia 960 d 70s His comment on · d ring the 1 s an .

Out 0 f French Neo- M arxisrn u d. f the relations of produch . f h "the repro ucnon 0 d d t e re ucnon ate state to . . f his former teacher an tion" (ibid.: 109) explicitly refers to the pos~tl~n ~.deological state apparafriend Louis Althusser and his conception 0 tel he need "to do without H' ted insistence on t ) tuses" (Althusser 1971.

IS repea 76) firms this double stance: a theory of the state" (Foucault 2008:. conons_centered approach to h fines of the insntun h t e nee d to transgress t h e con iff I the questions the "r eory government and the need to address di erent y ,

12

of the state" was meant to answer. f h t into the processes that ition 0 testa e I d The decenrering or ecornpost I har i is not a natural given, but . bili . his to see t at It I constitute and sta I ize It e ps u b . n" (Foucault 2007: 109) . . 0 f· Irse If a " composite. rea I·Ity an d a my thicized .a srractio died on the baSIS T ·f· was bemg eve op h here is no "state-thing as I It 'f b taneous automatic mec a. .. . d··d I SlY a spon, f and Imposmg Itself on 111 IVI ua sa, ," it is "inseparable rom . h "Th state IS a praClice, . nlsm" (ibid.: 277). Rat er: e II became a way of governIng, the set of practices by which the state achtua il h·s a radical political con. h· "(·b·d) One mig t ca t I a way 0 f dOing t Ings I I .. . . tive on the state. structivism, a radical constrUCtiVIst perspec

40

Martin Saar

Such a constructivist account of the state treats it not as an eternal identity but as an ever-changing [ormation, done and redone by the multiplicity of "institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics" (Foucault 2007: 108). In short, it treats it as an "effect" (Foucault 2008: 77) within a hisror y of multiple causes and influences. The enormous mass of historical knowledge about the ancient idea of government as pastoral (d. Foucault 2007: 123-226) and about the early modern reconception of government as art of governing and raison d'etat (d. ibid.: 237-312) is put together by Foucault in order to give plausibility to one major historical claim: there is a decisive break during the sixteenth century when the former conception of "pastoral government," justified in a theological fashion, gives way to a more immanent conception of "sovereignty over men" (ibid.: 237) that corresponds to different laws and needs.

It is only here, Foucault claims, that "the new problernatization" in the form of "the res publica, the public domain or state" (Foucault 2007: 237) can emerge. So the historical claim is twofold. The modern state of statehood is only intelligible on the basis of its emergence out of Christian pastoral power. But one must also grasp the radical transformation the idea of government undergoes, after this breaking away of pastoral power and new techniques and practices of governing and of administering societies have emerged. It is only with these new forms of governmental knowledge and practice that the modern territorial nation state, governing its population by means of political economy or other forms of knowledge, will become possible during the COurse of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The historian of governmentality can therefore account for the emergence of modern statehood itself, and must refrain from reifying the state form into some historical invariant. This form-of-state, the state of governmentalir y, was not the only one and it might prove not to have been the lasr. One might call this approach a radical political historicism, a radical historicist perspective on the state.

Compared to state history and state theory on the methodological level, Foucault's project of a "history of governmentality" therefore proves to be an inquiry sui generis. It disassembles the assumed ideality of the state and historicizes its form at the same time. And both procedures, dissolving the entity/identity of the state into practices and into historical processes, transfigure the object of political inquiry. The originality of the "history of governmentality" therefore lies in the specific level on which it operates: neither exclusively on the level of ideas and conceptions of the state (as in intellectual history), nor on that of the mere techniques and procedures of government and the exercise of political power (as in some sort of social or political Realgeschichte). For this kind of historiography, the state is first and foremost a solution to a problem, the problem of government; or, to put it in the words of the later works of Foucault, this history is in itself the tracking of how something became a problem, it is therefore a history of a "problema ti zation."

Relocating the Modern State

41

4. THE HISTORY OF GOVERN MENTALITY V5. THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS Having

outlined

the methodological

profile of Foucault's

approach,

it;s

now possible to more clearly assess its relationship to othe~ persl~e~:,~e~der~ already indicated, Foucault's "history of governmentahtyhcou f the state " ." h F nch Neo-Marxisr t eory 0 stood as his critical response to t e re " k Prominent in his days and intellectual context." As his manyhremardson 7 191) how he accuses t IStra mon "state phobia" (Foucault 2008: 76, 1,8 S I" ' db" Ilya-historical · an essenna 1St an asica c (not always correct Iy) 0f re Iylng on ". hough historiciza. d hi onse consists In a t or conception of the state, an IS resp . f the (modern, liberal) state. This tion of the assumed entity and Identity 0 I " I" it y of forms concep" . I I"· b ings to light a mu tiP ICI , historica contextua izanon n hi f course brings his " . I·· f t tehood But t IS move, 0 , uons and rnateria izanons 0 5 a.. h . rersection of pol itidemic discourse at t e In h h I h approac rat er c ose to t e aca d h "hi of political ideas" or hi nly calle t e istory I h ca t eory an d istor y commo "" similar to Foucault'S, , I"" I" II I hi " This 15 where concerns "po mea inte ectua istory. f d Western statehood are d d elopment 0 mo ern , b h a out t e emergence an ev inn of h the modern conception on the agenda. This is where the question ~ o~ is Foucault's "history and reality of the state emerged finds ItS p aChe. 0 ~ion of the history of "" not hiing m are than anot er ver o f governmenta Iity ideas, and if not, why not? f h (1984' 61) call the tradi. h f II " R ry's use ate term ., , One mig t, 0 owing or ." l id "doxographic": it descnbes "I ". h hi t y of polmca leas " tiona conception in t e IS or " f diff theories and conceptions the history of the state as a history °h II erefnthought Doing the history f h ib d thors or sc 00 sot. "" h o testate attn ute to au "h"ng more than wntmg r e " h f rk consists in not I f h o testate 10 sue a ramewo , f h te without or only occahi . h' ceptlons 0 testa , . rstor y of different aut ors con I f ocial and political history. sionally asking about irs relation to the rea mi.°h sl caricatured-conception " " for such a-S Ig t Y " O ne might trace t hee imsprranon E" Voegelin Ernst Cassirer b k Leo Strauss or nc , 0 k ac to such gran d aut h ors as I iah Berlin or Michael a e"" ineck B ederto Croce sara . I " h Or Fnednch Memec e, to en f the:e odfathers varies Wide y 111 t e g shott; and obviously the Slgmficance 0 d H sher-Monk 2003)_ But the different national contexts (Castiglione afn amp the academic institution" " " d I fe 0 Its own m """ h traditional conception has game a.. ademic sub-disClplme Wit alization of the history of political Ideas as an ac "I d of great texts. " " textbooks, curncu a an a canon, . to such an enterprIse, SInce caulnan reaction I " It is easy to construe t h e F ou , f·d 'n his "archaeo oglca I" . " . f the history 0 I eas I " It is implicit in the rejection 0 I f Knowledge,14 an d a Iso m "I " the Archaeo ogy WOrk s most promment y 10 'f 0 wer" and the "h·Istory 0 f h ' k the "analytlcs 0 po f "d is methodological remar son d" ssed The history 0 leas, " h· h h Iready been ISCU· " govern mentality," w Ie ave add cuments rather than mon~Foucault claims, remains tOO fixate ~n 0 t for essential meaning. It IS ments" (Foucault 2002: 153), and ont e f~es ourse It remains tied to the therefore unable to grasp the mareriality 0 ISC . political

42

Martin Saar

Relocating the Modern State

idea of continuity and development, and misses out on the discontinuity and amorphic quality of emerging fields of knowledge. It remains obsessed with the identity-conferring categories of "work" and "author" and omits the other and far more formative "types and rules for discursive practices" (ibid.: 156). And, finally, the history of ideas remains within the realm of restitution or recovery: it seeks to "bring back, in all its purity, the distant, precarious, almost effaced light of the origin" (ibid.). It is: in other words, an ideological enterprise, powered by a desire for tradition and identity, and is unwilling to confront the heterogeneity and strangeness of history.

These general objections to the intellectual history approach as such are bolstered by Foucault's methodological remarks on the historical theory of the state. The whole emphasis on the state as an "effect" and "practice" as discussed previously, and the concern with the two sides of statehood: are right on target here. The state, Foucault claims, can be reduced to neither its conceptual or ideological shape nor its material form, i.e., the acts, arts and techniques of government.

On the contrary, it is the intertwining and intersection of these two realms that constitute the state-as-reality, discursive and material at the same time. The traditional history of political ideas, criticized from such a perspective, will never be able to grasp this reality, because it will never fully articulate the practical side, the material element of the state or government. The exclusive focus on what is said and thought about the state, on the discourse on the state, fails to see that the very state in question is at the same time e((ective and an e((ect of a great many processes in the political field. This discourse o( the state, as one might call it, cannot be reduced to its explicit formulation in theories, it is equally embodied in political programmatics, administrative structures and patterns of very concrete governmental practices. The history of political ideas in its traditional version therefore lacks the methodological orientation to even contribute to what Foucault's project of a "history of governmentaliry " is trying to achieve.

5. THE "NEW"

HISTORY

OF POLITICAL

IDEAS

It would be grossly unfair, however, to reduce the history of political ideas to the scarecrow here dismissively called its "traditional version", On the contrary, it was precisely this sub-field of academic work that was undergoing major methodological reformulations around more or less the same time as Foucault was envisioning-and rather soon letting go again-hiS version of a historicized account of modern statehood.

One could even argue that some of the scholars involved, working quite independently from his approach, were responding to the same methodological predicament: how to relate the history of the state, or how to write political history, nondoxographically and non-idealistically?

43

At least three tendencies, arguably the most influential and methodologically innovative versions of a "new" history of political Ideas, should be mentioned here: variants of intellectual history that are mtegranng social history, as practiced by political theorists and historians such as Gerhard Oestreich Herfried Munkler, and Maurizio Vitali, to name but a few' the "Cambridge School" approach to political history, mostly and methodological texts of Quentin connecte d' to t h e materia 'I stu dies 1 Skinner John Pocock and others; and conceptual history (in the sense , " of the German Begrittsgescbicbtet, associate d WIirh the work of Reinhart Koselleck and his colleagues. IS , , f' The turn from a "pure" intellectual history of politics to a formbo d,nte, a movement t h at h as h app ened within the su970- ISClgrated approach IS ' id 'itse If . At least from the I'late 1ibl son, pline of the history of po I"inca I leas , A d 'I history IS clear a rapprochement of inte IIecrua I an d socra , ' y VISI e. In ' , that t hernari it will come as no sur prise ernanc conee. r ns SImilar to Foucau . t s L t us take Just rwo prominent contributed to the call for sue h a move. e hid t In his researe on ear y rna examples, mainly from t h e G erman contex . he noti f "social ern political regimes Ger h a r d 0 estreic' h developed t e notion a f 'I ' , d ib h then new concepts 0 socra disciplining [Sozialdisziplm]" to esen e t e hi b ' onrributed ,' I I tion and on r IS asis c or d er and new forms 0 f po Iinca regu a , , f I dern soverdi d' f h ' rer nal logic 0 ear Y rno to a ifferenr understa n ing 0 rem 'I' I ol't'lcal history , ir-al lv.Yhi tegratlng c assrca p I ergmy, Methodologically, t IS meanr 111 d reai I developmenrs d i I hi ' h h on local an regrona, an mte lectual istory WIt researc f social hisby a whole generation 0 an d everyday life, This was ta k en uP, f arch rhat could , , d b fruitful area a rese rona ns m the 1980s, an ecame a, I' , d olirical concepts ' hi 'I 'on social po ines an P cam b me isrorica perspectives alike (SachfSe and Tennsredt 1986). , he " 1 of state" (rai' working on r e reasor S'imi Iar Iy, most 0 f t h e hiistorrans 'I e of early modern son d'etat) doctrine fully realize rhar this cruClaTrhrop fore tracing "rea', I h b d d to a theory, ere , po Iinca t ought cannot e re uce h id fifteenth to the sev, , 'I d I rs from t e nu son of state" In historica eve opmen detecti g its effectiveness enreent h and eighteent h cenruri ceneunes also meansI etecnn f reason of state" " bur oracri d The "e emenrs 0 h Were It IS not named ut practice , h I gely vanished since 'ts discourse as ar 'I h f f are t ere ore presenr even a rer I , ' f the new politica "h f ' ' h rural compOSItIOn a t ey ound their way Into t e struc , The stud of the main conorder" (Munkler 1987: 299, my translation b)' f omYrhe concrete basis ' , V' I" 1992) cannot a srracr r ceptua I InnovatIOns ( lro I , h h them, One mighr sumof political action that becomes rhInkableht roug I discussion as follows: 'h ' f h" ortanr IStotlca f manze t e main theSIS a t IS Imp ., I d' se has become one 0 f polltlca Iscour , h t e reason of state as an e Iement 0 ," (Munklet 1987: 328), It th e most e ff'ectlve mo d ern po I'ltl'cal "imperatives ' w way of justl 'f ylng ' h rred out as a ne 'f h as become a practlcal schema e at sea . raetical orientation 0 governmental action but has now become a major P most modern state action ,16

44

Martin Saar

This approach helps to reformulate the efficacy of discourses about the state in a new way that is not unlike Foucault's insistence on the material side of the state. It urges us to incorporate all the social and institutional factors that accompany, and sometimes produce, new discursive solutions and new patterns of action. Seen in this way, "the state" ceases to be a historical given; it can now be seen as a mobile point of intersection between ideas and practices (Chartier 1982). To fully achieve such a form of "double vision," intellectual and social history not only have to become friendly neighbors but must also work hand in hand (Munkler 2003).

A quite similar impulse to relate intellectual history to social and institutional history might be said to be one of the aims of the many authors working within the tradition of the so-called "Cambridge School." Their shared methodological imperative, the project of placing political ideas in their historical context, has immunized them against any temptation to folIowa pure or primarily textualist approach to political ideas (Pocock 1962; Tully 1993; Skinner 2002a). In their perspective, every theoretical position can only be adequately understood when it is situated in the field of historical, political and ideological controversy. Any proper historical reconstruction of a political theory will therefore presuppose a thorough assessment of these contextual factors, many of which are the proper objects of social and instirutional history. If this form of comprehensive historical contextealis~ IS stili called an approach "centered [ ... ] on the history of ideologies (Skinner 1978: XI), this IS meant to indicate that "context" here is used to explain and to help make intelligible the "text" in question and not for Its own

sake.

This formof historiography is a far cry from the "traditional" approach earlier. The individual authors, as well as the individual texts, have lost their autonomy and become elements of a wider contextual historical picture. Political history, as it appears in the searchlight of this "new" history of political thought, will be readable on different levels which intersect on the level of political struggle and conflict, fought with the sword and the pen at the same nrne (Tully 1988; Skinner 2002b: 177; Bevir 1999). It IS In respect of this deeply conflictual or antagonistic view of history that ~,any authors belon~ing to or close to the "Cambridge School" conform a many of Foucault s historical suggestions, as some of them have openly acknowledged (Tully 2002) . F or t h em, too, as for Foucault, the reality . 0f h

outlined

t fe stlate calnnot be a neutral given, it is in itself an element and a product a po And thi s ca IIs for a ra dirca I methodological.' revrsion . 0f . . inca . struggle .'

I po itical histor-iography.

The approach of conceptual history or Begriffsgeschichte has only recently been . . .. recogniz ,ed' In t h'e international discussion as a major methodological Innovation (d. Richter 1995: 5; Skinner 2002b: 177-180).

Or-iginally In th e f ramewor k a f material studies on conceptua I h ddeveloped hi c ange an istorical semantics in the early 1970s most prominently in the handbook Ceschichtliche Crundbegriffe (Historical Keywords) and

Relocating the Modern State

45

the Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie (Historical Lexicon of Philosophical Concepts), Reinhart Koselleck and his colleagues have searched for a new way to approach social reality via conceptual history and to treat language as the reservoir of political and historical experiences. In his many methodological reflections, Koselleck has convincingly argued that such an approach cannot be reduced either to hermeneutics, with which it shares some basic principles, or to linguistic history (Wortgeschichte)-" The realm of the concept is rather the history of meaning and self-understanding in a given historical time, one that can be traced by tracking frequency and modifications in usage and by mapping the transformation of entire semantic fields. But to do so requires not only seeing concepts in their theoretical Context or intellectual history. It also means treating the formation and modification of abstract terms as a site of the elaboration and expression of lived historical and political experience, something that only becomes visible when the extra-theoretical context is taken into account.'"

It is this convergence of social history and conceptual history (Koselleck 2004a) which gives this historical methodology its distinctive form. Unsurprisingly, it has proven its productivity for the historiography of political ~oncepts (such as sovereignty, constitution, revolution, the people erc.], It IS non-idealististic in that it never hypostatizes the reality of concepts and ideas, but places them firmly on the ground of political and social history.

In asking what kind of political self-understanding was madepossible and expressible by conceptual change or innovation, conceptual history explicitly acknowledges that political ideas (like certain doctrines about the legitirnacy of the state) only gained their sustainability and pIauSibillty agumst the background of certain social and institutional realilles. Processes of conceptual innovation and transformation have in themselves a political dimension, and they document developments in the political realm. Political institutions are therefore not external to political theories, but their very ~nvironment.Starting from this assumption about the intertwining, ~f politIcallanguage and political reality, conceptual historians of the political are Immune to the "state phobia" and state fetishization Foucault accused hIS Contemporaries (from the Left and the Right) of; for conceptual hIStorIans, the state is always already part of historical teality and expenence.And the hIStory of political terms and doctrines is, for them, the best matenal trace, the connection between the conceptual and the institutional dimension.

But none of these general similarities and convergences can overs.ha?ow the serious differences that remain between these approaches within a " " hi ..' d F I' ception of a "history of new istory of political Ideas an oucau t s con . . governmentality."

Of course, even the most sophISticated models of intellectual history open to assistance from social history remam primarily focused on ideas and will never travel all the way along the road leading to a history of discourses and practices, where authors .and te~ts are not the primary referent any more. On the one hand, there stili remams a tendency to follow a certain "heroism" and to continue to wrtte about great authors

46

Martin Saar

of great texts in difficult times. This is sometimes even accompanied by a certain urge to revitalize or recuperate the original motives of these great think.ers.'9 On the.~ther. hand, one can see a certain tendency to reinterpret the history of politica l Ideas teleologically and to give the impression that modern statehood is best understood not as a contingent product, but as the outcome of a quasi-rational historical process;" Both tendencies however, seem utterly incompatible with Foucault's historical nominalis;" and post-Nietzschean emphasis on historical contingency. . The emphasis on the historical and strategic-ideological context of politica l theories found In authors like Skinner, Pocock and Tully should also not obscure the fact that for them, this does not mean retreating from the project of a history of theories. Knowledge and data about the material forces and administrative causes that have led to a certain type of statehood are, for them, mostly relevant as elements of a interpretative story; the ~aJn enterprise remains an intellectual or hermeneutic approach, and the history of the modern state remains mainly a history of an idea of the state that can be traced back to the controversies surrounding absolutism In ~~e seventeenth century (Skinner 1989). The "history of governmentalrry, however,. seems to be far more "materialist" on this point in taking a comprehensive perspective that includes theoretical and social developments and which therefore shares many features with historiographies of the state inspired by Neo-Marxist theorizing (Tilly 1990). It is only the convergence and mutual reinforcement of the theoretical discourse on the state and the practi ca I,a d rrurustratrve ., ive diiscourse of the state that gave rise to the process of "governmentalization" (Foucault 2007: 109) that ended up In the modern, late liberal state as we know it. Foucault's strategy of historical contextualization, in other words, seems to go much further than that of most authors from the "Cambridge School".

A Similar reservation should be made with respect to the approach of conceptual history. While some commentators have convincingly argued for the comparability of Koselleck's and Foucault's methodology regarding the historicity of discourse and meaning (Busse 1987路 Akerstmm Andersen 20?3; and Rosanvallon 2003), the most obvious difference remains the latter s irnplicir msistence on the need to refrain from subjective (and hermeneutical) . categories such' as expenence, expectation , , . or horizon, notions dear to practitioners of conceptual history (Koselleck 2004b). Both approaches msist on the need to ' .. . serious] y war k on t h e d"iscursive surface of a given bein Without reducing the complexity and ambivalence of meaning that is ' 'I'amy consists " .. , elng circulated , ' But whil,I e th e simi In thoroughly histonct> Ing n~tlons and conceptions of the political, there seems to be no obvious way, or conceptual historians to incorporate Foucault's theses about biopolitics, the role of statistics and political economy, arguments which refer adr to the self-understanding of political actors but to the institutional and a rmmsrranve facts about the transformation of European societies, There remains a tendency on the Sl'd eo f conceptua I hiisrory to remain enclosed In '

Relocating the Modern State a mostly archival mode of historiography, for realities are mere references in the process of intelligible. The "history of govern mentality," close and give more weight to other realms ones conceptual

6. CONCLUSION:

history

47

which the dynamics of social making linguistic expression in other words, seems to disof historical reality than the

tends to explore.

POLITICIZING HISTORY

The aim of this essay has been to clarify the methodological stakes of Foucault's "history of govern mentality."

For this reason, the two College de France lecture courses were treated less as substantial contributions to a history of the emergence of the modern state and more as a programmatic statement and methodological promise. Foucault offers a new form of historical-political inquiry, and provides the methodological outline of a research agenda he himself had only started to follow. Such a methodological reading cannot, of course, explain, let alone exhaust, the potential this perspective holds for contemporary discussions of the state and the concept of politics, But it can shed some light on the fact that the very form of telling the history of the state can vary widely, and this might motivate us to apply the governmentality framework more directly to the history of political thought than is commonly practiced.

Ihave tried to argue for the specificity and attractiveness of such a nonstandard way of doing the history of the state, and I have suggested Imagining a controversy on method between this approach and various forms of the history of political ideas. Foucault's program, I have claimed, can be seen as a crucial alternative to a traditionalist form of Intellectual history. There is no reason however to overstate the differences between his approach and more rec~nt and m~thodologically sophisticated versions of a "new" history of political ideas. These new forms of political intellectual history integrate the insights of social history, and account for the tactical and ideological context of political theories and for the interrelation between political concepts and socio-historical realit y. Many profoun?, differences in method notwithstanding, the "hIstory of govern mentality as well as these approaches might be said to be contributing to a highly Innovative history of political thought and practice and therefore should be taken as a major challenge for anyone interested In the future of the study of the history of political ideas. But still, from a strictly Foucaultlan perspective all of the three competing approaches referred to here might be criticized for remaining toO firmly in the grip of the "ideational" approach to politics that implicitly or explicitly ptesupposes some essence or essential Gestalt of the state which only has to be conceived In the fight way.

Needless to say, many open questions remain for this attempt to draw up a comprehensive historical research agenda on modern statehood and state ideas. Two omissions are obvious and have been noted repeatedly, but

48

Martin

Saar

they should not be taken to be internally linked to Foucault's approach.

The absence of any perspective on the gender-specificity of political conceptions and actions is surprising; and interestingly enough, some of the best work on contemporary govern mentality has highlighted exactly this aspect (Cruikshank 1999), which Foucault evidently did not consider relevant at the time. Similarly, it seems impossible to even grasp the formation of the modern European state and its biopolitical dimension without accounting for its colonial dimension.

But this aspect also remains largely absent from Foucault's discussion (Stoler 1995). Once again, though, as some of the most interesting work in the contemporary anthropology of the state has shown, statehood in itself can materialize in various forms and functions, ~nd the illt.cr.-national and inter-state distribution of power is a major factor 10 determining which pattern of state action will prevail (Randeria 2007). There is no need to faithfully follow Foucault's own exclusive focus o.n modern European or Western governmentality.

Many current discussions on the variety of statehood and the variability of the relationship between populations, more or less sovereign political bodies and the law have successfully proven the point that the idea that there is just one historical trajectory of political modernization is nothing more than a eurocentric fiction." But this just underlines the fact that Foucault's suggestions and his fragmentary "history of govern mentality" are less a sacred ground than a methodologlcal point of departure, from which one can move in many directions he himself never imagined.

While the need to diverge from Foucault's own original concerns applies to all so;ts of projects that try to remain faithful to a certain legacy of Foucault s work, this IS especially true for the kind of work that has been rhe focus of my discussion here, the historiography of political ideas and political practice. It is evident that Foucault, in his courses on liberalism, secunry, biopolirics and neo-liberalism never even toyed with the ambition to be ex.haust~ve. Wha,t he was providing, however, was a perspective, a schema 10 which the history of Western politics could be told and re-told and which might provide a novel view of the emergence of political modernJty. It IS only just now beginning to become clear what such a perspective could Imply for the narratives in which the history of Western political thought. IS..commonly told , "t ra dimona II"y or at h erwise. .

Just how far poI'itt-. cal . historiography guided b y th e perspective.

0 f a "hi rstory of govern menralit y " ..can go has bee n convmcing ..

Iy I'11 ustrated by the many h,stonca . . I works inspired by Foucault's example. While the work of his original col~borators 10 Paris in the 19705, scholars such as Francois Ewald, Pasquale asqumo, Ciova nna Procacci and Jacques Oonzelot on the history of the welfare state : security ' 0 r poverty . h as .In .irse If' Influenced n ' a whole range a f research projects, more recent work on the history of political ideas has also benefited from this perspective."

Brilliant studies have roven that the rransmon . . from medie va I po I"rttca I t h oug hI'路 t to early modern conceptions of the political can be productively rethought with the help of Foucault's

Relocating

the Modern

State

49

suggestions (Senellarr 1995), and that the founding texts of liberalism and the famous eighteenth-century debates on civil society appear in a radically new light when placed in the context of new policies to govern the poor (Bohlender 2007). One can only imagine what might be brought to light by studies that, to use Michel Senellart's phrase, "put" other chapters of the Western canon "to the test of governmentality" (Senellart 2001).

One could imagine readings of Hobbes, Rousseau or Kant, and also of the

many "minor" figures, that seriously relate their respective political theories to the context of actual political regulation in their time. This would not denigrate the importance of these authors, but it would contextualize them in the political rationality of their time. Bur treating rhese theorists (and their theories) as part of a larger picture of the political conditions of

a given period, reducible neither to mere epistemic nor

to

mere institutional

factors, would contribute to understanding history differently. One might even say that only such a reading would provide a real political view of the history of political thought, since it insists on the internal relation between theory and practice, between the ideality of concepts and the reality of the state. Bringing governmentality as a methodological framework to bear on the history of political thought would therefore provide a systematic way to politicize intellectual history and to historicize the concept of politics.

For all of such (past and future) studies, Foucault's main contribution lies m providing a point of departure for new and original perspectives on politics and political thinking: the state (and rhe political in general) is not a given, but the product and effect of discursive and practical negotiation.

The modern state has neither a single origin nor a single fixed identiry; it is constantly made and remade. This unsettling, dislocating gesture enables us to gain a form of critical distance we can only have towards something which is neither natural nor necessary. Recognizing the radical historicity and radical contingency of "our" (late modern, Western) form of statehood may give rise to a new and critical understanding of irs future.

NOTES 1. Discussions with Mark Bevir, Thomas Biebricher, the students of a course on govemmentaliry, the participants in the Leipzig ~orkshop ~nd, on several occasions,

with Thomas

Lemke were major inspIrations for (.hls chapter. I am also grateful to David Owen and Frieder Vogel mann for their comments and to Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke for many very

helpful written suggestions. .

2. See Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996, Lemke 1997; Dean 1999; Brockling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000; Brauch, Packer and McCarrhy 2003; and lnda 2005.

3. See particularly Rose 1999 and Dean 2007. .

4. On the topos of a "history of truth" see Foucault 1978: 60; Foucault 1985: introduction; Lemke 1997: 327-339; Davidson 2002; and Saar 2007a: 217-220.

5. For an exposition of several of these elementary methodologlca~ pflnclples, see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, for "power/knowledge" and SCience Rouse

I.

:I

I

50

Martin

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

Saar

1987, for excellent discussions of Foucault on power in general Patton 1998 and Nealon 2008: 24-53.

For more on historical nominalism and Foucault's historical metbodtsl, see Veyne 1997; Veyne 2008; Davidson 2002; and Hacking 2002.

For the profound relationship between Nietzsche's and Foucaui,t's w~rk, see Mahon 1992; Visker 1995; Saar 2007a; and Saar 2008; for discussions of Foucault's and Nietzsche's genealogical method and style, see Mahon 2002; Saar 2002; Owen 2007: 45-59; and Biebricber 2008.

See Lemke 1997: 134-143; Dean 1999: 98-112; and Lemke 2007a: 47-70.

For different readings of Foucault's rejection of the orthodox version of the Marxist theory of ideology, see Barrett 1991; Veyne 2008: 22-27; and Nealon 2008.

For interpretations of Foucault's historiographical method along these lines, see Davidson 2002 and Veyne 2008. .

For discussions of the concept of "governmental reason" or "political rationality", see Gordon 1991; Dean 1999: 31-32; Rose 1999: 24-28; and Brockling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000: 20-24.

See also the remarks Foucault included in the manuscript but did not read on "de-institutionalizing and de-functionalizing relations of power" (Fouc~ult 2007: 119-120).

These correspond closely to Foucault's methodological statemenr in the first two sessions of Society Must Be Defended, his lecture course given one year earlier (Foucault 2003: sessions of January 7 an.d 14, 1976). To be clear, Foucault's pejorative reference to the critique of Ideology amounts to nothing more than a caricature.

It is far from obvious that the more refined and non-reductivist theories of ideology put forward by Althusser or Poulanrzas would fit his description; for discussions of Feucault's own indebtedness to and departure from the Marxist tradition, see Barrett 1991 and Hoy 1994. , See Lemke 2007h; Biehricher 2007; and Jessop 2007: ch. 6. For Foucau1t s relationship to Althusser see Eribon 1994: ch. 10; and for a current version of a critical and historical theory of the state Bartelson 200l.

See the section on "Archaeology and the History of Ideas" in the Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 2002: 151-156).

This list is far from complete, of course. One could also include variants of neo-instirurionalism, historical functionalism and certain strands of Ne~· Parson ian political sociology among the important alternatives; for a classic discussion see Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985. The methodologically most ambitious project is obviously Niklas Luhmann's program of. a sociological-historical semantics, which covers many of the traditional political concepts (Luhmann 1990, 1993) and is a direct counter-project to th.e intellectual history perspective (see especially Luhmann 2008). However, It has so far arguably been less influential in the methodological discussions on the concept and history of the state. For comparisons to Foucault's approach, see Akerstf0m Andersen 2003 and Staheli 2004.

For this discussion see Oestreich 1969; Munkler 1987; and Virali 1992. For methodological issues and the French case, see Chartier 1982.

For this program, see the preface (Ritter 1971) and the entry on Begriffsgeschichte (Meier 1971) in the Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie. .

Melvin Richter (1995: 15) rightly points to the fact that this description IS more accurate as a characterization of the Geschichtliche Grzmdbegrlf(e than of the Historisches Worterbuch der Philosoph ie, in which a more philosophical form of conceptual history was practiced.

For symptOms of this "heroic" tendency, see Viroli 2002 and Munkler 2003.

Relocating

the Modern

State

51

20 In one of the most prominent recent contributions from this sch~ol of . thought, Klaus Roth refers to Foucault's genealogical method .even.ln the . Ie 0 f hiIS Impress .IVe book • However , he goes on to tlt .. characterize . f h. hIS own project in a quasi-Hegelian, teleological as well as Idealistic as .lon a~ an "attempt to grasp and illustrate the emergence, the change a~d dl~seml~ation of the idea of the state as rational" or as the ':recon~tru.ctl~n 0 a rea III of ideas [Vorste/lungswelt] that was materialized In the msnrunons of 2mod. er n states and that has reached its limits only today" (Roth 2003: 7 ,my translation). f d i ssions in 21 These and related issues have been at the center 0 recent ISHcu d h . political anthropology; see H ansen an d 5teppu tat 2001' , Kro n- ansen an Nustad

2005;

and Steinmetz 1999.

In Burchell, Gordon

22. See their contributions

and

M'1l 1991 I er .

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Barry, Andrew, Thomas Os~orne

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Cruikshank, Barbara. (1999). The Will to Empower: Technologies of Citizenship a~/d other Subiects. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Davidson, Arnold I. (2002). On Epistemology and Archeology: From Canguilhem to Foucault, pp. 1~2-206in The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and th~Formation of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Constituting Another Foucault Effect

3

Constituting Another Foucault Effect Foucault on States and Statecraft' Bob Jessop In the two volumes of his lectures of 1978 and 1979, we see Michel Foucault making a major intellectual change of direction, moving aw~y ~r~m an analysis of power as the formation and production ?f individuals towards an analysis of governmenraliry, a concept Invented to denote the 'conduct of conducts' of men and women working thro.ugh their autonomy rather than through coercion eve~ of ~ .subtle kind. Out of this concept and the extended analysis of political economy which provides the material for its elaboration, Foucault never produced a published work. [ ... ] This however did not prev~nr this concept of governmentality from meeting with great success I~ the English-speaking world, in many ways stimulating there an intellectual dynamic more intense than in the case of his published works, which rapidly became classics and were treated as suc~ and with the deference that status entailed, but not with the excrremenr which met the lectures on governmenrality.

In 1991 [ ... ] The Foucault Effect (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991) set off this dynamic by centring the 'effect' in question precisely on this notion of governm.entality.

But in France Foucault's lectures on the subject were

not published until 2004 an d WIt . hout at fi rsr arousmg .

(Donzelot and Gordon 2008: 48)

. great Interest.

different readings and appropriations of the French scholar's work on govern mentality in various countries (for work within this broader field, see, for example Agrawal 2006; Brockling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000; Dean 1999; Krasmann and Volkmer 2007; Meyet, Naves and Ribmonr 2006; Opitz 2004; Sanyal 2007; Walters and Lamer 2004; and the many conrributions to Foucault Studies).

This chaprer offers another version of the Foucault effect based on closer attention to his later work on the state, statecraft, and the macro-physics of social power (for a first major conrribution in this regard, see Lemke 1997; for an anticipation of some of these results, see Jessop 1990: 220-247).

Such work reveals another Foucault effect in the broad field of governmentality studies but one that is interested in his significant contributions to the reconstruction of state theory and not merely to its deconstruction (see, for example, Corbridge et al. 2005; Dean 1999; Frauley 2007; Lemke 1997; Mitchell 1988, 1991,2002; Walters and Haahr 2004). Accordingly my chapter first summarizes some key features of the Anglo-Foucauldian approach and the theoretical and political conjuncture in which it formed and notes that one of its effects has been to justify rejecting Marxist political economy and, more generally, to invalidate any "state theory" that takes the state for granred as its theoretical object. While there is some limited basis for this in some of Foucaulr's work, this interpretation overlooks Foucault's continued, if often unstated, adoption of key Marxian insights and his concern with the state as a (if not the) crucial site for the "institutional integration" of power relations (cf. Foucault 1979b: 96; on Foucault and Marx, see Jessop 2007; Marsden 1999; Nigro 2008; Paolucci 2003; Scharer 2008)] I then locate this more state-theoretical Foucaulr effect In his work on the role of the state in different periods in the strategic codification and institutional integration of power relations and on his insights into the art of government considered as srarecrafr and show how they can be integrated into critical but non-essentialist accountS of the state as a site of political practice (1980: 122; 1979b: 96; 2003b: 30-31, 88; 2008a: 108-109;

As Jacques Donzelot, a one-time collaborator of Foucault notes the Fouchault effect has been particularly strong in the Anglo-pho~e world. Indeed t e Impact of hIS work 0 n governmenta liuy In . this specific context mig . ht more properly be termed the "A nglo- Foucauldian effect" in order to distinguish It from the rna h .. d . F h . ny or er ways III which the work of Foucault an h IS renc assocrarss has H a ecte d p h·l· I osophy, history geography and ot her b ranc h es of the arts h . . d . .' , d .' urnarnties, an SOCIal scrences at many times an I A s such this eHe t paces. f· . d ..' c re ers to a particular mode of reception an appropriation of Foucault' k .. . h . I· s wor on governmentality to generate a distinCnve t eorettca cpisternol . 1 d .. di b'· ogica , an methodological approach' to emplf1· I ca stu. res ' . oth histor:rica I an d contemporary of various technologies. an d practices Oriented to "the d f', . hi .con uct 0 conduct.'

Even in rega rd to rhis one aspect 0 f IS work , howeve r, th ere are Ot h er \'FOLlC3ult effecrs" grounde d·In

57

2008b:

passim).

1. THE ANGLO-FOUCAULDIAN

EFFECT

AND ITS CONJUNCTURE The self-described Foucault effect identified by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (1991 b) is associated with scholars from Australia Canada and rhe USA as well as the United Kingdom who have been described' as forming an "Anglo-Foucauldian school.". Nik,?las Rose and Peter Miller two of its key figures, write t har It compnses an Informal thoughr co~munity that seeks to crafr some tools through which to understand how our presenr had been assembled" (2008:. 8). ~ngloFoucauldians do not aim to be Foucault scholars but selectively apply

58

Bob Jessop

on governmentality to new areas. They draw on Disci1977) and the lecture on government from his 1977-1978 course at the College de France, which appeared in English in 1979 (Foucault 1979a; also 1991). This shared Anglophone appreciation is reflected in the rise of a distinctive academic field: governmentality studies. The coherence of this field in the Anglophone world rests on its narrow understanding of govern mentality and resulting neglect of its place in Foucault's intellectual and political reflections.

Elsewhere even this field has a somewhat broader scope.

In particular, the pioneers of the Anglo-Foucauldian effect approved of Foucault's apparent rejection of the state as a decisive political agent and interpreted governmentality as a decentered rather than centered process (d. O'Malley, Weir, and Shearing 1997: 501). This is reflected in Rose and Miller's claim that the governmcntaliry perspective focuses empirically on "forms of power without a centre, or rather with multiple centres, power that was productive of meanings, of interventions, of entities, of processes, of objects, of written traces and of lives" (2008: 9). This involves a principled refusal to equate government with the state, understood as a centralized locus of rule, and focuses instead on how programmes and practices of rule are applied in micro-settings, including at the level of individual subjects. In short, government is the decent red but "calculated administration of life" (Rose and Valverde 1998). Thus adherents of the AngloFoucauldian approach seek to decompose power into political rationalities, governmental programmes, technologies and techniques of government (Miller and Rose 1990; O'Malley 1992; Rose 1999). This is consistent with Foucault's critique of theoretical and political concern with the State as an originary, central institution in the exercise of political power (see subsequent text) and led the Anglo-Foucauldians to call for studies of the art and techniques of governmentality (for two good overviews, see Rose, O'Malley and Valverde 2006; Rose and Miller 2008).

These concerns reflect the specific theoretical and political conjuncture in which the Anglo-Foucauldian school formed. Theoretically, this was marked by the general turn against the "structural Marxism" associated with Althusser, Balibar, Pecheux and Poulantzas: and with the srrucrura! semiotics derived from Saussure, Bakhtin and Barrhes (Rose and Miller 2008: 2-4). The former was criticized for its economic reductionism, its functionalist aCcount of "ideological state appararuses", its neglect of the relative autonomy of the many institutional orders and fields that shape political and social life, and its neglect of the specific modalities of ideological struggle and identity formation (Rose and Miller 2008; Rose, O'Malley and Valverde 2006). In general, then, according to their own accountS, the early Anglo-Foucauldian authors shared Foucault's disillusion with the "Marx effect", i.e., the institutions and practices associated with official Marxism, and also explicitly rejected structural Marxism and other struCturalist approaches (e.g., in the field of semiotics and Ideologiekritik). It his initial

insights

pline and Punish (Foucault

Constituting Another Foucault Effect

59

seemed to them that Marxism, if it had ever been useful, was certainly now obsolete, because it could not address the new forms of liberal govern mentality, their associated technologies of power, and new forms of subjectivation.!

Politically, the "Anglo-Foucauldian" conjuncture was marked by the crisis of the post-war institutional settlement and class cOmpr?ml~ebased on the mass-production-mass-consumption economic dynamics III ~es~ern Europe, Canada and the USA, Australia and New Zealand. TIllS Crisis was associated with a proliferation of new social movements that w,ere irreducible to class politics and that engaged in struggles on ,many sires . prisons , umversrues of resistance (hosni ospua Is, housi ousing, socra'larkw, , " racial segregation, nuclear power, war, and the en~i:onmellt) and, just as 111lPO~~ tantly, by rhe first stirrings of nco-liberal cnnques of big government, big unions, collectivism, bureaucracy, self-regarding profes~l?nal monop.olles, , paterna IIsm, an d so on (Rose and Miller 1992) ..These cnuques were linked f ' d i di 'd I freedom and autonomy In all spheres a SOCIII to ca s to expan In IVI ua . .' "h ety, A Californian slogan expresses the political climate well,; get testate off our backs out of our pockets, and away from our beds. ThlShwaUsstAhe , ' the nse . 0 f Th ate heri UK ReagaJ11sm In t "e f , period that saw ensm 'the In, .

"R ' '" N w Zealand rhe "Common Sense Revolution a the ogernorrucs 111 e, "0' the neo-liberal regime shift of Progressive Conservative Party III ntarro, . ' IE It the Australia Labor Party, and nco-liberal turns in Contment~, . uCrope. I was also a time of cha IIenge to t h e cen rralized "party states In h entra ' f (ibid.: 172). These same trends, notably r e nse a d E E an astern urope I ..

A led Foucaulr himself ro neo-liberalism in France, Germany, and the US , , ' d its transrefocus his 1978-1979 lecrures from biopolitics to liberalism an formation into neo-liberalism. lib I .' e of the social While Anglo-Foucauldians shared the neo- I era cnflqhu b . f d olitical practices rhar soug t to create su state, i.e., the state orms an P .'

I 'tate that were . " al terfltona sovereign s Jects with social claims on a nation d rhey rejected f i divid I freedom an autonomy, exercised at the expense 0 III IVI ua I' d me preferred ro ish: k t fundamenta 15m an so f neo-liberalism's ens IS(IC mar e .' id e of governmental g talk of "advanced liberalism" to Signify the wt e ran ed governing the , di b d b th marker an d srare mvol v practices exten mg eyon a 'I' A dingly they invest i' of the peop I'e 111 t hiIS vanan . t of libera ISm. ccor h ablts gated neo-liberalism

in terms of

.

Id enable the stare to divest itself of the range of techmques that wou h si autonomous entities many of its obligations, devolving t bose ro qua dgets audits stanf u d distance Y means 0 , , that waul d b e governe ar a I . h t were borh autonomizdards, benchmarks, and other rechno ~tes t daValverde 2006: 91) ing and responsibilizing.

(Rose, O'Ma eyan

b

d benefirs of those rationalities They aimed to show the complex costS an h e of freedom rather and technologies that soug ht to govern H1 t e nam

60

Bob Jessop

than in the name of collective social rights to be upheld by the state's discretionary authority (Rose 1999: 176; Rose 1996; Rose, O'Malley and Valverde 2006: 93).

2. BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN Foucault's analyses of disciplinary power and governrnentality represent one step in an evolving intellectual project. Yet Anglo-Foucauldians tend to interpret them as a defin itive statement of his opposition to macro-theorization and, relatedly, to any concern with how micro-powers were assembled into bigger programmes and projects (d. Kempa and Singh 2008: 340). Yet Foucault (2008b: 2) himself noted: I have not studied and do not want to study the development of real governmental practice by determining the particular siruations it deals with, the problems raised, the tactics chosen, the instruments employed, forged, or remodelled, and so forth. I wanted to study the art of governing, that is to say, the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing. That is to say, I have tried to grasp the level of reflection in the practice of government and on the practice of government. [ ... ] to grasp the way in which this practice that consists in governing was conceptualized both within and outside government, and anyway as close as possible to governmental practice. l ' ,.] In short, we could call this the study of the rationalization of government practice in the exercise of political sovereignty.

This comment from 1978 seems to indicate that Foucault was unwittingly distancing himself in advance from governmentality studies, especially as he also linked the emergence of governmentality or governmental practices to the macroscopic organization of the state and reflection on the government of government.

He also argued for a combination of micro- and macro-analyses, presenting his later work on liberalism as a scaling up of his previous micro-analytics of power to macro-level questions about the state and political economy (2008b: 186). For good or ill, the Anglo-Foucauldian approach took shape in the early 1990s when many of Foucault's later texts on govern mentality were unavailable in English, encouraging its early adherents to adopt a mare micro-focus in their development of Foucauldian insights than might seem justified in the light of a broader understanding of his work in this area.

Foucault himself explored not only the generalization of the conduct of conduct across diverse spheres of society but also studied how specific gOVernmental practices and regimes were articulated into broader economic and political projects, Thus he continued to argue into the late 1970s that

Constituting Another Foucault Effect

61

capitalism had penetrated deeply into our existence, especially as it,required diverse techniques of power to enable capital to exploit people s bodies and their time, transforming them into labor power and labor time respectively to create surplus profit (see, for example, 1977: 163-164,174-175, 218-223; 1979b: 37, 120-124, 140-141; 2003b: 32-37; 2008a: 338, 347; 2008b: 220-222).

On this basis, one might expect Foucault to differ from Anglo-Foucauldian work on the import of changes in governmenrality In terms of the logic of capital accumulation as well as on the nature of polirical domination as exercised in and through the state. This is exactly what _find. , I' Thus as Foucault's theoretical interests shifted from the rrucro-p 'YSICS of the disciplinary society and its anatomo-politics of the body to the more , ificari f I lit f discourses general strategic codi cation 0 a p ura I yo I , practices . ' technol, , ' 'I bl ound a specific governmental ogles of power, and msntunona ensem es ar . . " h sOCIa ' I b 0 dy (bio-power) In a consolidated rationality concerne d Witith tne . '" ing up capitalist society, we can f n d a space openmg u for Foucauldian analyses II b ' " ia I state h 00 d ,an d state power and for less we -su I of sovereignty ter ntor srantiared

claims

about their articulation

rion." As Kelly (2009:

61-62)

to the logic of capital accu mu a-

notes:

The concept

of government appears in Foucault's thoughlt as anhat d tempt to deal with w h at hiIS ear I'rer a nalysis of power re athIonski ad I er as well as the at er In deliberately bracketed, name y state pow , , d hs of power which can be called governmental ( . , .J Havmgremhove Ir e f lirical thought In IS ear rer state's status as the centra I concern 0 po I . h

work Foucault now moves towards understanding the state cific role that it actually does have in networks of power,

10 t

e spe-

f reignry statehood, and stare the stu d y a save, harv : f he II Foucault's announcement t at, I power is reinforced w hen we reca 8 h would no longer e could alter the title and theme of his 1977-197 chou,;sh , e y of govern men" I tion" but to t e istor f re er to "security, terntory, popu a I rion political econ, "government popu a I , I ta ity." He would concentrate on , , I not been dismantled amy" which "form a solid senes that has certain y , d t the ' . 'tory-secunty move 0 even today" (2008a: 108). Thus sovereignty-tern h h he acknowledged ins of I' h 'cal concerns even t oug rnargms 0 Foucau t s t eoreu . h nrierh century. It is the Continued importance of this complex into t e twlyenew and certainly , () ment as a re lanve replaced by interest In: a govern h ereignty discipline, etc.; , d f ' ing power t an sov , more Important mo eo exerCISI I ractices (in contrast I h if bject of governmenta p (b) popu arion as t e speer co, ' biecr of disciplinary power);' and (c) to the body as the anatolTlo-polttlcal a J, f i iry and reference point ,, h ching object a inqurr po Iitica l economy as t e overar I' liry in the transition from '" h f ern menta ratlona I h f Or veridicrion t at rames gOY d si rh centuries towards t e ' h fif th an sixteen t h e administrative state In t e teen h iah enth century and beyond. , " se If- IImltlOg governmenta I'lze d 5tate in t e erg re The scope

for integrating

62

Bob Jessop

Foucault then suggests that, while the state has been overvalued as a cold monster and/or as a unified, singular, and rigorously functional entity, it should remain an important object of study. Accordingly, it should be approached as a "composite reality" and "mythicized abstraction" that has survived into the present because it has been governmentalized.

He then elaborates this claim: it is likely that if the state is what it is today, it is precisely thanks to this govern mentality that is at the same time both external and internal to the state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state's domain, what is public and what private, what is and what is not within the state's competence, and so 00. So, if you like, the survival and limits of the state should be understood on the basis of the general tactics of govern mentality. (Foucault 2008a: 109) Foucault's interest here and in related work is different from that imputed to him by Anglo-Foucauldian scholars. He insisted in the so-called "lecture on governmentality," in earlier work, such as the first volume of the History of Sexuality (1979b), and in the three courses that directly or indirectly address the governmentalization of the state (Society Must be Defended, Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics) (2003b; 2008a; 2008b), not only that the state apparatus had a continuing importance as part of the general economy of power but also that its overall form, its specific organization, and its activities were shaped by the distinctive combination and the relative primacy of different forms of exercising power within and beyond the state. In this regard he argues that the intelligibility of a given social phenomenon does not depend on rhe search for a cause but on the study of "the constitution or composition of effects." Thus we should ask "[h]ow are overall, cumulative effects composed? [ ... ] How is the state effect constituted on the basis of a thousand diverse processes?"

(2008a: 239; d. ibid. 247-248, 287; 2003b: 45; and, on the Napoleonic state, 1977: 169,217).

In short, Foucault was concerned with the "state effect." He wanted to explain how the state can act as if it were unified, as if it had a head even though it is headless (Dean 1994: 156; d. Kerr 1999).

In contrast, governmentality studies tend to focus on the logic, rationalities, and practices of government or governmentality in isolation from th is broader concern with the state's role as a major site for the institutional integration of power relations within the more general economy of power (Foucault 1979b). At issue here is not the value of specific studies of governmentality but their capacity to grasp the bigger picture that guided Foucault's work when he realized the limits of his earlier concern with disciplinary techniqucs, anatomo-politics, and the micro-analytics of power. In short, whereas Foucault was increasingly concerned to put the statc in its place with in a genera I economy of power and went on to explore

Constituting Another Foucault Effect

63

how government is superimposed on preceding forms of state, including sovereignty over territory as well as disciplinary power and biopolitics (2003b: 36-39), governmentalists have been more concerned to take It off the agenda entirely in favor of specific questions about specific techniques of power and, at best, their position within successive or at least, different forms of liberalism (d. Curtis 1995; Deacon 2002; Dean 1994: 153-159; Lemke 2007; Meyer In his 1977-1978 of liberalism required macro-analyses.

He with power relations

2006). . .. lecture course, Foucault argues that the mvesnganon movement beyond the microphysics of power to more · hift In i re Ia tion to his earlier concern exp Iains t hiIS Sit I as follows:

What

I wanted to do-and this was what was at stake in the analysis-was to see the extent to w hitc h we cou Id accept ., that the analysis of micro-powers, or of procedures of governmentality, IS not confined . d orna m . d ererrrune . d by. a sector of the fscale, by definition to a precise d . but should

be considered simply as a point of View, a method 0 eCIhi h be valid for the whole scale, whatever IrS Size. In p h erment w IC may . f scale other words the analysis of micro-powers is not a questl?n Of . ' and it is not , a question a f sectorv sector, iIt IS a qu est ion of a POint a view.

(2008b: 186)

1" d the art of government In other words the srudy of governmenta uy an ld rni h ' . hvsi f ver nor shall rrucrop ysneed not be confined to rhe rrucrop YSlcs 0 pm fl d hi concern · be privileged. .. . inma . ., I mteres . t in micro-powers re ecte IS ICS HIS I . .' id I de alternative entry points mro with anatorno-politics and di nor exc u h . / ble and approac IS sea a other topics (d. Gordon 2001: xxv. ) Fit's oucau. y .

'1 society or srare-econorn can be applied to the stare, sratecra f t, state-Cf,vI d ' th level of inter'· . f II h nduct 0 con uct at e re Ianons lust as fr uit u y as to t e co . ivid I· . . ns Thus The ., ndivi ua II1StltUtlO . personal interactions, organIzations, or I . h . isrirutional issues . ....

I ed Wit macro-n Bmh of Biopolitics IS marn y concern if mental practices. . h h n speer c govern and questions of government rat er t a. d h general economic Foucault traces rhe development of stateprolects an t e problematic of nes noting h ow the f agendas of government over our centu , diff t problems at each . . hi . d and poses I eren government shifts during t IS peno II b t rhe rationales and .. f as we as a au turn about the limits a state power F I ores for example, · . .

Thus oucau r n , mechanisms of such (sel f-) Iirmranon. . rion in the economy h . .

I d to non-mterven t at, whereas political economy ea s f Ordnungspolitik, totalitarianbut strong legal intervention In the field 0 I· f the party (2008b: · h ernmenta rt y 0 ISm subordinates the state to t e gov .

Senellar t (2008: 382) h· h·f in perspectIve, 106-117). Commentmg. on r IS Sit , rried out in the 1978 , 't 'government ca argues that "the shift from power 0 I· I f amework being called thodo oglca r ..

Iectures does not result f rom t h e me b· the state which did ·lOto question .' to a new 0 Jeer, ' but from Its extenSion ." not have a pl~ce in the analysis of the disciplmes.

I

il

64

Bob Jessop

In contrast to the warm embrace by Anglo-Foucauldians of a decentred account of the state, Foucault proclaimed "the problem of bringing under state control, of 'statification' (etatisation} is at the heart of the questions I have tried to address" (2008b: 77, my emphasis). In practice this translated into concern with the statification of government and the governmentalization of the state (2008a: 109). Foucault initially argued that the study of power should begin from below, in the heterogeneous and dispersed microphysics of power, explore specific forms of its exercise in different institutional sites, and then move on to consider how, if at all, these were linked to produce broader and more persistent societal configurations.

One should study power where it is exercised over individuals rather than legitimated at the centre; explore the actual practices of subjugation rather than the intentions that guide attempts at domination; and recognize that power circulates through networks rather than being applied at particular points (Foucault 1979b: 92-102; 2003b: 27-34). All of these microphysical themes are repeated by the Anglo-Foucauldian school. However, after this initial move, Foucault argued that, whilst starting at the bottom with the micro-diversity of power relations across a multiplicity of dispersed sites, three further interrelated issues required attention.

First, whilst he did once celebrate the infinite dispersion of scattered resistances and micro-revolts, he later conceded the need for resistances to be readjusted, reinforced, and transformed by global strategies of transformation (Foucault 1979b: 96; d. 1980: 143, 159, 195,203; 1979c: 60). Fou· cault noted that resistances needed co-ordination in the same way that the dominant class organized its strategies to secure its political preponderance in diverse power relations (ibid.). And he criticized the French socialists for their failure to develop a coherent account of socialist govern mentality (2008b: 91f.).

Second, Foucault

suggests that the overall unity of a system of domination must be explained in terms of the strategic codification and institutional integration of power relations. This process is both intentional and nonsubjective. It is intentional because no power is exercised without a series of aims and objectives, which are often highly explicit at the limited level of their inscription in local sites of power (Foucault 1979b: 94). He refers here to explicit programmes for reorganizing institutions, rearranging spaces, and regulating behavior (1980: 9). But it is also non-subjective because the over' all outcome of the clash of micro-powers cannot be understood as resulting from the choice or decision of an individual, group, or class subject (d. Foucault 1979b: 94f.). Things never work out as planned because there are different strategies which are mutually opposed, composed, and superposed so as to produce permanent and solid effects which can perfectly well be understood in terms of their rationality, even though they don't conform to the initial programming; this is what gives the resulting apparatus (disposilif) its solidity and suppleness. (Foucault 1980: 10)

Constituting Another Foucault Effecl

65

Or, as Foucault (1979b: 95) expressed it elsewhere: "the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one lS"there to have invented them and few can be said to have formulated them.

And, third, Foucault will suggest that power can be exercised at different scales and that the question of whether one focuses on mlcro-po~ers or the organization of the state as a whole is a qu.esri?n of per,spec(lve.

Thus The Birth of Biopolitics applies the same nominalisr ana lyrics to the succession of forms of state and forms of the limitation or self-limitation of state power. This course explores the import of political economy and the emergence of the notion of homo economicus as an active entrepreneurial subject rather than as the bearer of exchange relations (Foucault 2008b: 225-294).

3. WlTH

FOUCAULT

BEYOND

FOUCAULT

. .. analyses h Some of the ambiguities an d con fusi usions surr ounding Foucault's .... . .. . .

II·f be resolved If we disringuis of power and ItS significance In SOCIa I e can . .

These are I· uariationf three moments in the development 0f power re Ia tions I. . the objects subjects, purposes, an d tee hno I0 g.Ies of power' , se 0 in . ection f ' . h h thers: and retention 0 some some technologies and practices rat er t an 0, bl . d into . b roa der and more sta e sn-areof these in turn as they are Integrate · of state and/or class (or nanona .

I or racia. I) po wer . These three moments gies . . b h eive more or less attent ron at overlap and interact in real time ut r ey rec k I . these · . di·ff erent texts 111 . Foucault's wOt . gnonng differer« times and 111 h. · t the three moments to IS dlffetences for the moment, we can connee . iation) then on the . . d i novation (varianon), genealogical remarks on mvenuon an m. f d I· eate general . emergent convergence of various tee h no I0gies 0 power to e .in litica l have economIC or po I conditions of domination as they are seen to d fi II the strategic . b ourgeoisie . . (se lecrion) ,) an na y, on UtI'1·Ity for an emerging d . of government to pro uce a codification and retention of these practIces. fi d bi . (etention and global strategy oriented to a more or Iess u m e a jccnve r institutionalization) (Foucault 2003a: 270). h f ·1· orion of geneal. . . . d es t e ami lar n The first step 111 this trajectory 111[[0 uc h eventalization This . of t e evenr or . ogy and can also be related to t Iie notion I t so that the analy. . f h . cial deve opmen refers to the Irruption 0 c ance 111 so ...

I ) but on Erfindung · ( igin iruna source SIS must focus not on Ursprung on 'Herkunft (provenance, descent) (Invention, innovation) and dlscontmuous I s how elements that (cf. Kelly 2009: 13f., 22). In this sense Fohucau tdnotestate often emerged ·1 f . of t e mo ern WI I prove central to the ormation of power Thus fol. . f thecenrres ., through separate mnovations away rom I' .

COllOtS of social events, .

I ., f tota Izmg ac IOWing his more genera rejection 0 d.'

I· rechniques had a preISCiP mary .

Foucault noted that the mo d ern sta te's . rticular needs in dls· . . .'

111 response to pa .. h IStOty: they ongll1ated as Inventions ·n rhe Ancien Regime petsed local sites far from the centers 0 f stare power I

66

Bob Jessop

and emerging sites of capitalist production and had their own distinctive disciplinary logics (ef. 1977: 137-138,224).

In this sense they could also be seen as pre-adaptive, i.e., as prior inventions that can be mobilized, instrumentalized, extended, and intensified in response to crises, challenges, or needs that emerge at a later date. Thus disciplinary normalization initially focused on the conduct of persons who were not directly involved in capitalist production (e.g., in asylums, prisons, schools, barracks). Such innovations can be seen as sources of local variation (each with its own forms of contestation and resistance) and would only later be selected and combined in trial-and-error experimentation to produce more global ensembles of power (Foucault 1977).

The second step re-introduces social classes, capital, and the state after the micro-analytics of power had dismissed them as significant social forces.

Foucault recognized that some technologies and practices were selected and integrated into other sites of power. Not all new technologies succeed in inserting themselves into the network of power relations (Kelly 2009: 44).

On the contrary, some techniques are "doomed to immediate failure and abandonment" (Foucault 1977: 123). As Foucault (1977: 131) asked in Dis-

cipline and Punish: The problem, then, is the following: how is it that, in the end, it was the third [technology of power] that was adopted? How did the coercive, corporal, solitary, secret model of the power to punish replace the representative, scenic, signifying, public, collective model? Why did the physical exercise of punishment (which is not torture) replace, with the prison that is its institutional support, the social play of the signs of punishment and the prolix festival that circulated them?

In short, why do some technologies of power, some governmental practices, tend ro disappear and others get selected? This has something to do with tactics that turn everything to account (1977: 139), ro practices that accelerate some innovations, rescale them, and given them more precise instruments (ibid.: 139, 144). Thus Foucault notes that the state intervenes, directly or indirectly, to annex operations of disciplinary power rhrough "selection, normalization, hierarchicalization, and [pyramidal] centralization" (2003b: 181). He also showed how, for example, how the disciplinary techniques first developed on the margins of the economy and the state later came to be deployed closer to the centres of power. Thus disciplinary techniques that were invented elsewhere were introduced in factories to control the division of labor and aspects of the new anatomo-politics were deployed to bind men to the productive appa rarus and facilitate a capitalist political economy of time based on abstract lahar.' Foucault also observed that the rise of the modern state was bound up with the problem of "population" in its relation ro territory and wealth as reflected in the new science of "political economy" (ef. 1980: 161; 1989: 217-219; 2008b).

Constituting Another Foucault E((ect

67

The shift of attention from variation to selection can be seen in the transition between Discipline and Punish (1977) and the first volume of the History o( Sexuality (1979b). Whereas the former mostly emphasized the dispersion of power mechanisms (whilst still noting the correlation between forms of punishment and modes of production)," the latter began to explore more explicitly how different mechanisms were combined to produce social order through a strategic codification and instirutiona l integration that made them more coherent and complementary.

In partrcular, when addressing the problem of selection, Foucault notes the role of interest in influencing the adoption of some inventions rath~r than others. At this stage, it seems, "the interesting thing is to ascerta I~, nor wha~ overall project presides over all these developments, but, how, III terms a strategy the different pieces were set in place" (1980: 62). Foucault often , I " "I remarks that the perceived interests of an emerging bourgeois c ass III socia cohesion or the anarchic, profit-oriented, marker-mediated logic of capital accumulation guide the selection of some forms of sovereign, discipli nar y, or governmental power in preference ro others, But he never regards the boutgeoisie capital or the state as pre-consrituted forces, treating them .Instead as emergent ' ,effects 0 f rnulri mu tip I"e projects, pra crices I , and attempts to institutionalize political power relations. """ . .

The third step concerns the retention and Ins(ltutlOn~IJza~lOn of some " oroi Into broader practices programmes, an d projects an d t h elir integration . . , "F I " ally rejected any a p rtort ensembles of power relations. oucau t typic assumption"" that different forms a f power wer e connected to produce " an ." overall pattern of class dam illation an d argue d that any post hoc mte. "h f " I needs of the economy granon cannot be derived from t e uncnona h hor . hi But this did not mean t explained in terms of forma I isornorp ISm. " I f at e " f h goa I b I con figurations as termma rejected the possibility 0 sue h . armsk o f domination.

Quite how t hiIS war k s rernai "ned unclear . T us, III see " "I" erges Foucault resorts ro 109 to explain how a general srraregrc IDe em '." "h " " I d" . I hegemonies egernoruc a wide range of terms: these IOC u e SOCIa " ,: dom ina. . "" ta power class omlna effects" "hegemony of the hou rgecrste, me , " "( a ' . . ""sur-pouvOlr or tion ," "polymorphous rechniques of subJugation, I "d so "I I I s value) "globa strategy, an Surp us power" ana ogous to surp u , . 9 80 223. 1979c: 60). forth (l979b' 92-94' 1980: 122,156,188; 1977. 2, , '1 Th ., d h . d"cates that Foucau twas sr ruge range of metaphors deploye ere III I. ." hi h d " I . f what 1S occurrlOg In t IS t ir g IIng to find an adequate exp ananon or h I highlighted lations He nonet e ess stage in the development a f power re " .". fI I路 deed infi niresi" h " t ultlpllcltyo oca, In In general rerms how t e irnmanen mi' d ed inflected I I d hni f ower are "co oruze ,us , ' rna , re ations an tee ruques 0 P b increasingly general transformed, displaced, extended, and so or y Jillnd above all, how mechanisms and forms of overall domination .. , d how more general th . d db global phenomena an ey are investe or annexe y h I f hese technologies of powers Or economic benefits can slip into t e ~d08a' 239).

POwer" (2003b: 30-31; ef. 1977: 223; 1980:, .

~;I.

68

Bob Jessop

Heterogeneous elements with their own pre-histories are thereby reworked and readjusted to produce "phenomena of coagulation, support, reciprocal reinforcement, cohesion, and integration" (2008a: 239; see also 2003b: 14). For example, in the first volume of History of Sexuality and the roughly contemporary lecture course, Society Must be Defended, Foucault links the retention of particular forms of disciplinary and governmental power explicitly to bourgeois recognition of their economic profitability and political utility (1979b: 114, 125, 141; 1980: 41; 2003b: 30-33). Similar ideas were presented earlier in Discipline and Punish (1977: 174f., 206207,218-223; see also Marsden 1999: 157f., 190f.).

Foucault did identify one key factor in this complex process of consolidation, and institutionalization.

He gave a privileged role to the state as the point of strategic codification of tbe multitude of power relations and as the apparatus in which the general line formed meta-power (e.g., 2003b: 27f., 31-35; d. 1979b: 92-96; 1980: 122, 156, 189f., 199f.; 1982: 224; 2008a: 238f., 338). Foucault argues, for example, it was the rise of the populanon-remrorv-wealth nexus in political economy and police that ereated the space for the revalorization and re-articulation of disciplines that had emerged in seventeenth and eighteenth century, i.e., schools, rnanufactories, armies, etc. (2008a: 217-219). Likewise, in discussing the development of Ordo-liberalism, the Chicago School, and neo-liberalism, the state once again figures prominently both as a site of struggle for hegemony (even including efforts to limit the role of the state itself vis-a-vis the market and society) and as the central apparatus in and through which codified prac· tices are rolled out in the wider society (2008b: passim). It is in this way that the "state effect" is produced and in turn has its own "state effects."

In short, the State invests and colonizes other power relations in a condi· tioning-condirioned relationship to generate a kind of "meta-power" that renders its own functioning possible (2008b: 122f.).

Constituting Another Foucault Effect

as limited and inadequate (Deacon 2002). The challenge is to show how they might, in some circumstances, in some contexts, and ~or sO~le p~riods of time, be linked. The idea of government as strategic codification and institutional integration of power relations provides a bridge between micro-diversity and macro-necessity and, as Foucault ~rgues, a foclls, on micro-powers is determined by one's choice of scale but Involves analytical insights that can be applied across all scales. It is a perspecnve, not a reality delimited to one scale (Foucault 2008b: 186; d. 1977: 222; 2003b: 28-31).

Foucault srill argued for the dispersion of powers, insisted rhat the stare, for all its omnipotence, does not occupy rhe whole field of power relations, and claimed that the state can only operate on the baSIS of other, already existing power relations. Indeed, "power relations have been progressl,vely governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, ratl?na~IZe?, 3?,d ~e.ntraiJzed in the form of or under the auspices of, state msntunons (ibid.: 345).

This is why Ba;ret-Kriegel (1992: 192) could note that "Foucaulr,:s thought opened the way to a return to the study of the State and the law. , The difference between the Foucauldian and Anglo-Foucauldlan approaches to the state and govemmentality can be explained In part m " . b etween "th of power as Strateterms of Foucault's distinction t e reIarionships I . .,' rh r result in the facr that glc games between lIberties-strategic games a , some " people try to determine the con d ucr 0 f or h ers-an d the states of domination, W hirc h

are w h at we or dimarl'I yea II power " (1997' . 299) . He adds that:

between the two, between games 0 f power and rhe states of, dominaf h ies ] ... ] The ana lysis 0 tion you have governmenta I tee h no Iogles h r' ese , . . ften through such rec Illques techniques is necessary because It IS very 0 .' " bli h d There aref that states of domination are esta IS ea. nd maintained. . ' f t ic relations techniques 0 three levels to my analysis 0 power: sua eg , ' ion (Foucault 1997: 299) government, and states 0 f d ominanon.

F

4. CONCLUSION In approaching Foucault's work in these terms, we can escape the dichot· omy of micro- and macro·power, the antinomy of an analytics of micro' powers and a theory of sovereignty, and the problematic relation between micro-diversity and macro-necessity in power relations (d. Jessop 1990; Kerr] 999: ] 76). This is something that Foucault himself indicated was both possible in principle (because micro-powers have no ontological primacy) and necessary in practice (to understand the successive but subsequently overlapping arts of government in the exercise of state power beyond the state) (2008a: 15, 109; 2008b: 186,313; cf. 2003b: 36-39, 173, 242,250), For Foucault's insistence on the complexity, diversity and relative autonom~ of local, everyday relations of power overturns neither Marxist accountS a the state nor liberal theories of popular sovereignty; it only exposes them

69

Idians are uninterested

in

In these terms, it seems that the A ng I0- oucau fd ' rion (i n ' Interpersonal power games an d I'Itt I"e mre resred in states . 0 ornma I" I" . . d . f eco norruc or po rttca interpart because they reject essentialize notton S 0 . f menr ," I I' of techlllques 0 govern , ests) and seem to prefer an empmca ana YSiS ib I' Th s they focus . u types of governmental practice, an d for ms of" era. Ism. . I ral technologieS. more or less exclusive yon govemmen idenrif d i b the "AngloI hi II d F It effecr identi e m Y ntis sense, the so-ca e oucau f h . ided reading of h h '" h oducr 0 a rat er one Sl h P one community of t oug r IS t e pr, ' hF It operated bur with . e 10 whlC Ducau h"ISwork shaped by the same conJuncrur Id d 'Y thar the Anglo· d'ff I"' I ences 0 nor el I erent theoretical and po mca consequ . d d ' Bur there are ful an pro uet1ve.

F oucauldian paradigm has prove d power h mentality This can h .

F I' pproac to govern .

Ot er ways of developmg oucau t sam his arallel critiques of rhe be seen in his contributions to polItical econo Yd'h P d ction of the "stare h . f' f te power an t e pro u c angtng forms and unctions 0 sta '. f alternative Foucault effect" (d. Dean 1994; Mitchell 1991). In argumg or an

,I ,

70

Bob Jessop Constituting

effect, I do not pretend to have revealed the true essence of Foucault's interest in governmemality but to offer an alternative reading to "governrnenralisr"

accounts of his work. For one can also see his work on govern mentality as a contribution to a "critical and effective history" of the state considered not as a universal or as a self-identical political formation but as the site of practices that produce different forms of state, each with their own historical specificities, agendas and typical forms of governmental practice.

Barret-Kriegel, Armstrong,

Blandine.

(1992).

result. Nonetheless I remain responsible for the final form of the analysis and its claims about the Anglo-Foucauldian school and Foucault.

2. For an insider's view on the heterogeneity of the Anglo-Foucauldian school,

see Donzelor and Gordon (2008: 51-52).

3. In referring to the state's role in the institutional

integration of power relationships, Foucault draws an analogy with the "strategic codification" of points of resistance than enable a revolution to occur (1979b: 96).

4. Rose and Miller declare themselves "pickers and choosers" rather than Fou-

cault scholars (2008: 8).

5. Recalling their views during the rise of the new perspective, Rose and Miller note that it was felt essential, at a minimum, to go beyond the accumularion and distribution of capital to explore, in addition, the accumulation and distribution of persons and their capacities (2008: 2; d. Foucault 1977:

220-221,

1979b: 140-141).

.

6. One source of Foucault's difficulties in linking capital and the state is hIS tendency to reduce the economy to exchange relations in line with liberal thought: this rendered invisible the contradictions and substantive inequalities In the capital relation. Likewise, when he introduces the logic of capitalism, he does not ground it in a detailed account of the social relations of production as opposed to transferable techniques or technologies or both for

the conduct of conduct (Fellman 2009; d. Marsden 7. On the emergent

properties

of population

1999).

as an object

of government,

see

a Iso Foucau It (1979b: 24-26, 139-146; 2003b: 242-251, 255-256; 2008" 67-79,109-110,352-357).

8. Cf. Foucault, 1977: 222-223; 1979b: 99-100; 2003b: 32, 32-34 9. Discipline was also used to control workers' bodies: "it was not just a matter of a~propriati"ng, trolling, shaping,

extracting valorizing

the maximum quantity of time but also o~ conthe individual's body according to a particular

system" (Foucault 2001: 82). in relation

to the work of Rusche

and Kirchheimer

name (Foucault 1977: 24-26, 77, 84,122-123,163-164).

then in his own

'

Arun. (~006). Envirollmentality.

Tecfmologies of Government Maklllg of 5ub,ec's. New Delhi: Oxford UniverSity Press.

and the

and the Pol!ce State, trans. ;).

Srivastra

and Rene Vero~. (2

in India. Cambridge:

S " . be~~ltg Cam fI ge

London: Sage.

G .

Liberal Societies-c-rbe Donzelot Jacques and Colin Gordon. (2008). o~ernIngl SI di 5. 48-62 ' f h E I· h k g World Foucau t ttl tes », .

Foucault Ef ecr in t e ng IS -spea In" . 'sh Th Birth of a Prison Foucaulr, Michel. (1977 [1975]). Discipline and PII/11S: e , trans. A. Sheridan. London: Allen Lane. d Ideo/o & COIIFoucault, Michel. (1979a). Covernmenrality, trans. C. Gar on. gy

sciousnes.s 6: 5-21." '" Foucault, Michel. (1979b). HIstory of Sexu a u y, R. Hurley.

London:

v:a lume

Allen Lane.

1: All Introduction,

d M

Foucault, Michel. (l979c). Power, Truth, Strategy, e. d

Sydney: Feral Publications.

Foucault, Michel. (1980). Power/Knowle views 1972-1977, trans. C. Gordon,

.

Morris

trans.

and P. Patton"

Sit d Writings and Other Interge~ e e~ ~I J Mepha m and K. Soper.

L.

ars a , .

Brighton: Wheatsheaf. . d? s L Sawyer pp.216-226 F I h I 982) H "P wer Exercise tran.. , I o~cau r, Mic e. (1 . ow IS 0" Mich~f Foucault: Beyond Struccura _ In Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow ism and Hermeneutics. Brighton: ~arve~ter. h Question of Power, trans.

Foucault, Michel. (1989 [19781)· Clarifications on('d) Foucault Live: Interviews J. Johnston, pp. 179-192 In Sylvete Lornnger e 1966-84. New York: Serniotextle). .

87-104 in Graham Burchell, Foucault, Michel. (1991 [1978]). Governmehnrajlty, PPi, Effect. Studies in GovernColin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds) T e outa~ mpstead' Harvester Wheatmental Rationality, trans. C. Gordon. Heme e . sheaf.

" of Care for the Self as a Prac[l~e of

Foucault, Michel. (1997 [1984]). The EthiC Freedom,

trans.

P. Aranov

and D. McGrawt

h

281-301 in Paul RabInow

, pp.

(ed) Michel Foucault: Ethics. London: ~/lle; ~a"l;e~ tranS. Foucault, Michel. (2001). Power: Essentla ntH g ,

Allen Lane.

Agrawa~,

71

University Press. d M·II Political Curtis, Bruce. (1995). Taking the State Back Out: Rose an I er on Power. Canadian Journal of Sociology 46(4): 575-~89d F I on Power as Deacon, Roger. (2002). Why the King has Kept HIS ea: oucau r Sovereignty. Politeia 21(3): 6-17. ... _ I'M I ds on d Dean, Mitchell. (1994). Critical and EffectIVe Histories: Foncan t s etno Historical Sociology. London: Routledge. " M dern Societ Dean, Mitchell.

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R. Hurley.

London:

t the College de France 1974Ab,lOrmal. L.ectures a 1975, trans. G. Burchell. Ne~ York: p,~ad;;fended. Lectures at the College de Foucault, Michel. (2003b). Society Mllst e Yotk' Picador. . w France 1975-1976, trans. D. ~acey. ~e pop~tlation. Lectures at the College Foucault, Michel. (2008a). Secllnty, Temio~Y'Basingstoke: Palgrave. de France, 1977-1978, trans, G. Burcle .

Foucault,

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Brockling, Ulrich, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke (eds). (2000). Gouuernernentalitat der Gegenwart. Studien ZUY Ckono.nisierung des Soziaien.

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Gordon, Colin. (2001). Introduction, pp. xi-x!ii in James D. Faubon (ed} Power: the Essential Writings. New York: New Press.

Jessop, Bob. (1990). Poula nrzas and Foucault on Power and Strategy, pp. 220-247 in State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place. Cambridge: Polity.

Jessop, Bob. (2007). State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach. Cambridge: Polity.

Kelly, Mark G.E. (2009). The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault. London: Routledge.

Kempa, Michael and Anne-Marie

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Kerr, Derek (1999) Beheading the King and Enthroning rhe Marker: A Critique of Foucauldia n Governmentality.

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Lemke,

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An Indigestible

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Sylvain. (2006). Les Trajectoires d'un Texte: La Couvernernentalire de Michel Foucault, pp. 13-36 in Sylvain Meyer, Marie-Cecile Naves and Thomas Ribemonr (eds) Travailler avec Foucault. Paris: Presses de Sciences po.

Meyet, Silvain, Marie-Cecile Naves and Thomas Ribrnont (eds). (2006). Travailler avec Foucault: Ret ours sur Ie Politique. Paris: Presses de Sciences po.

M iller, Peter and Nikolas Rose. (1990). Governing Economic Life. Economy and Society 19(1): 1-27.

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Meyer,

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Mitchell, Timothy J. (2002). Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity.

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Roberto

(2008) Foucault,

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in Sebas-

Budgen and Stathis Kouvelakis (cds} Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism. Leiden: Brill.

Opitz, St~fan. (2004). Gouvernemelltalitiit im Postfordismus.

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O'Malley,

Pat. (1992). Risk, Power and Crime Prevention.

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O'Malley; Pat, Lorna Weir and Clifford Shearing. (1997). Governmel1tality, CritiCISm, J olltlcs. Ecol/omy al/d Society 26(4): 501-517. .

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Rose Nikolas Pat O'Malley and Mariana Valverde. (2006). Covemmenralir y.

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Walters William P. and jens Henrik Haahr. (2004). Couerning urope: ncourse, Gov;rnmentality and European Integration. London: Routledge. li Walters, William P. and Wendy Larner (eds). (2004). Clobal Cooernrnenta tty: Governing International Spaces. London: Routledge.

Governmentalization

4

Governmentalization of the State Rousseau's Contribution to the Modern History of Governmentality Friedrich Balke

~n the clourse of his exploration of the concept of governmentality Michel i oucau t comes to speak of Rousseau's role-and this at an especially mportant point, In that Foucault here poses the question of what remains ofbsoverelgnhty after the art of government has a new political subject. This tsu kjeerf IS td e popu lation ' wh ose gui id ance an d management is the central as 0 mo ern power' the sort of phi of death b _ ._ _ ower w ose goa IS not m an imposition f Rut an inrensificarion and elevation of vital force. Foucault here re ers to ousseau's article on "Political Economy" 31m t "d f . ' wher e th e p h-II asap h er sa e OIng an art of government" . He the n continues: .

Then helwrites The Social Contract in which the problem is how with notions ike_ those of "nat ure, " ""contract, and "general will" one, can . gldve algeneral principle of government that will allow for b~th the [LlrI rca principle of so vereIgnty an d t h e elements rhrough which an art o f government. _can be defi ne d an d d escn ibed. So sovereignty is absoIute Iy not e Ieirninated by rh emergence 0 f a new art of government that - I Sctettce. . h_as crosse _ d the _ threshold _ 0 f po I-mea The problem of sovereignty IS not eliminared: ' 0 n th e contrary, It- 1$ - made more acute than ever. (Foucault 2007: 107) Foucault's rema rks on the - I offering a place for both th~a:tlcu a my of Rousseau's theory-a theory ereignty-are II rt of government and the principle of sova too scattered and Th excellent sta r tin f h cursory. ey nevertheless offer an g pornt or t e foil ff mine rhe fo hi . owmg e orr to more precisely deterrm t IS cornprorruse b - idi I ower takes I-1 I' , di erween JUri ica l and governmenta I vousseau 5 iscourse d h P plary for the conce tua l a I _ _' an w y It can be considered exemtalit y.' To this end -II fi nc Instltutlon".l hisrory of modern govermenthe field in hi h h WI rst move past Foucault's comments to describe w IC t e explosion of an art of government can be observed

t

of the State

75

in Rousseau's writing, together with the conclusions he draws into the rendering governable of individual subjects, as applied to the connected political field of the government of a people. In the second section, I will discuss what Foucaulr may have meant in arguing that in signifying "the emergence of a new sort of art of governing," Rousseau's discourse nevertheless not only fails to eliminate the problem of sovereignty but even increases its virulence. In Rousseau, Foucault indicates, the problem of sovereignty, being no longer centered around the prince bur rather rhe collective subject, the people, "is made more acute than ever."! Finally, in the third section 1 will scrutinize Foucault's claim that "[w]e live in rhe era of a governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century" (Foucault 2007: 109) against the example of what Ernst Forsrhoff has termed the "new-style social orders": those prevalent since 1945 and rowa rd s which Foucault steers his history of governmentaliry in the framework of his preoccupation with "model Germany." When Foucault asserts that "rhis governmentalization of the state" is the phenomenon that "allowed the state to survive," govern mentality here being defined as something "at the same time both external and internal to the state," (ibid.) what he is suggesting-and what needs to be shown-is that with Rousseau's rheory of government, the entire ambivalence of its relationship to the sovereign

uolonte generale can be described

for the first time.

1. THE AMPHIBOLY OF GOVERNMENT As Rousseau argues in the Contrat social, republics are cornpar ible with any number of forms of government because the "acts of rhe general will" to which they owe their political emergence are distinguishable in a basic way from acts of governing. The legislative power "belongs ro the people, and can belong to it alone"; but this means "that the executive power cannot belong to the generality as legislature or sovereign," "because this power consists only of particular acts falling outside the competency of the law, and consequently of rhe sovereign, all of whose acts can only be laws" (Rousseau 1979a: 395-396). For Rousseau's polirical theory, what is decisive is that the government not be confused with the sovereign, being "only its minister" (ibid.). Since sovereignty is not transferable and always rests with the people, the government can only act under "contract" to the sovereign; but the sovereign nonetheless also depends on the government, because in irs absence it would be behaving like a will actually lacking rhe means to realize itself: "When I walk towards an object, it is first necessary that I want to move towards it; and second that my feet carry me there" (ibid.). Nothing in the body poliric can take place wirhout rhe regulared "cooperation" (concours) of "force" (force) and "will" (volonte), or "executive" and "legislative." At first glance everything seems to suggest that Rousseau's polirical rheory is played out berween rhe poles of sovereignty

76

Friedrich Balke

and government, will and strength; and that everything has been said about this relationship when we designate the government as the instrument of the sovereign or of the uolonte genera/e. But importantly, Rousseau aims all of his suspicion at the prince, who as the bearer of executive authority IS always Inclined to usurp the general will, always wishes "to draw forth some absolute and independent act from himself" (ibid.: 399).

Everything depends, then, on neither the government nor the sovereignboth designated "artificial bodies"-transgressing the borders of their particular spheres. The government should never be more than the "agent" of "~,ublic force"; as such it "brings into play the directives of the general WIll. But readers of the SOCIal Contract may quickly begin to doubt that such "directives" really involve directives of the general will-since, so it s~ems, for the latter silence is essential, rather than pursuing representative discourse. In the course of further argumentation Rousseau comes to the conclusion that the sovereign manifestly not only 'lacks feet but eyes, and, beyond that, language as well, hence the very "organ" allowing him to share or promulgate his will: Does the body politic have an organ to declare its wishes? Who will give it the foresight necessary to formulate and announce its acts in advance, or how will it announce them at the moment he needs to? How is a blind multitude, which often does not known what it wants because it rarely knows what is good for it, to carry out an enterprise as great and difficult as a ,legislative system? On its own, the people always wants good, but on Its own It does not always see it. The general will is always righr, but the Judgment guiding it is not always enlightened.

One needs to have It see things as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear to It; one needs to show it the correct path it seeks, protected from the seductions of the particular will. (ibid.: 380)

The" pun .tv" f h general y an d rid I ea I' ity " ate

will evidently demands supplementmg by authorities that Rousseau has previously banished from its sphere.' This supplementation's outcome is nothing less than the introduction of a specific governmental activity that does not simply amount to the government as the Simple executive authority of the will. It is clear that Rousseau models this activity in terms of pedagogic intervention; placed alongside the v~lonte generate, its role is to organize the preliminary process of the will s for marion or education-for Rousseau the indissoluble reference-point of his argumentation, but at the same time an object of unceasing problematization.

Despite its sovereignty, the uolonte generale IS subject educatl~mal and protective interventions whose agents Rous;,cau has dlsa~pear m~,o the anonymity of a "one needs" (an il (aut). The general will, albeit always right,' still needs both guidance by enlightened Judgment and an attentive leadership that makes use of demonstrative technique: the "correct path" needs to be "shown" to that will , it needs to

t?

Governmentalization

o( the State

77

be "protected" from "seduction" by the powerful particular will, the organized interests of bourgeois society; but above all, it has to be brought to see things "as they are": this because-and I will return to this point-in respect to the sovereign's will, objects can by no means be postulated as if they were limitlessly plastic. Since the absolutistic politics that Rousseau opposes was grounded "within the relationship of the sovereign's will to the subjected will of the people" (Foucault 2007: 70) democratic politics cannot simply reproduce the relation between the sovereign will and the people's submissiveness.

Rousseau wrote the Social Contract in the historical moment when "the population no longer appears as a collection of subjects of right, as a collection of subject wills who must obey the sovereign's will through the intermediary of regulations, laws, edicts, and so on." The population now appears in its specific physis or in its "naturalness" (ibid.); it no longer has the status of a mere "vis-a-vis the sovereign," (ibid.: 71) for whose actions it is by no means transparent. Consequently, presenting the general will with objects "as they are" means first of all opening its eyes to its own "naturality"-for the democratic sovereign is characterized by a confluence between the legal voluntarism to which the sovereign people Owes its formal-legal existence (social contract) and such natura lit y on the part of the population; this "depends on a series of variables" whose influence by the sovereign is preconditioned on a break With the logic of command and obedience. For "[I]f one says to a population 'do this,' there is not only no guarantee that it will do it, but also there is quite simply no guarantee that it can do it" (ibid.).

In the Discours sur l'economie politique, which first appeared in the Encyclopedic in 1755 and then in 1758 as a separate text, Rousseau, according to Foucault offered his definition of a specific art of government.

In this text we can observe a relation of mutual intensification between the general will and governmentality.

Rousseau here ascertains, as t~e "fir~t and most important maxim of legitimate or popular government, that It "wholly pursues the general will" (Rousseau 1979b: 247). The government, previously consistently tempted to realize a will set agamst the people, gains unimagined power by not limiting itself to "force" that "makes everyone tremble" but disposing over means encouraging them to "ad?re" the law (ibid.. 250). Namely, the capacity to rule does not consist of admmlStering laws" and certainly not of their incessant prollferatlon. The law, which bli I' 'I I dmire can unmtentlonally be repu ican Rousseau appears to irmt ess Y a '. . " . . . transformed into a means "for eluding law or escapmg pUnishment (Ibid ..

252; italics mine). The goal of "governmental" government-m contrabst . h forci ng of Simple obedience Y to so-called executive power-IS t us not a orci .' f , , , f ' 'I ws but a modification 0 Citizens, a securing of their can nrrrut y (0 Its a , " h ki of them "as they are, t e w h at they are or can be. Instead 0 f rna ing use b "A d government has to try to "form them into what one need~ them to e. . nto n Rousseau adds: "The most absolute authority is that which penetrates 'I h hi '11 no less than hIS actions. tIS t e person's very interior, and ef f ects IS WI

78

Friedrich Balke

Covernmentalization

certain that in the long term peoples are what government makes of them" (ibid.: 251). This last statement once aga in makes clear that what is at work In Rousseau is an amphiboly of the governmental concept: on the one hand, w~ ha~e the governme~t that is commissioned with "executing laws" and receives Its orders exclusively from a sovereign who can "limit, modify, and take back the government's power when it pleases" (Rousseau 1979a: 396); on the other hand the government, which in a sense is internal to the sO,vereign,4 he~ce does ~ot stand in an instrumental relation to the general wil l but. contributes to ItS ,production and direction. In this context, I can only POint to the pedagogic structure of this governmental art. In order to answer the question of how to govern a people, Rousseau first relocates it from the field of the body politic to that of education of the individual body.

With this srrategic shift, he inserts his political theory into the history of the art of government-of the techniques involved in rendering individuals and collectives governable. Importantly, the field of pedagogy does not only cover education of the individual (including privileged individuals such as kings and pnnces); the collective, moral constituency, and thus a politics no longer Identified With the state, is itself subjecr to a specific pedagogic problernatization.

Like the people in the political realm, in the pedagogic relationship children take the position of the sovereign and can only be brought to transfer their will to that of the educator, thus losing their own will, at the price of their own destruction.

But as in the case of politics, the interdiction of abandoning one's own will does not result in powerlessness on the part of those who have to govern. The government can dispose over everything not belonging to the will of the governed-and that is doubtless enough to bring about circumstantial changes heading in the direcnon of modifying the relevant environment.

The paradox of Rousseau's educational enter prise becomes clear in the concept of leadership or direction, playing a central role throughout the art of government.

This concept stands ,In a par.tlcu]ar, tense relationship with the law: "Young teacher, I am preaching a difficult art to you; this is to govern without precepts and do everything Without doing anything at all" (Rousseau 1969: 362).

2. CORSICA AND THE PROBLEM THE DOUBLE "CONSTITUTION"

OF

If the constituted political body as envisioned in the Social Contract constantly has to he on guard against usurpation by a government upon whose attentive steering the uolonte generate at the same time completely depends, then at least the act of original legislation itself hence the founding of the collective will moving towards a contract of all with all should not be troubled by any mixing with the government's singular acts. But now what emerges IS that Rousseau qualifies the very act of constitutional legislation to an extreme degree as a singular act, and this in a double sense: not the

of the State

79

people itself but only the person of the legislator is in a posirion to formulate the articles of the constitution, which in fact makes possible the establishment or founding of a people in the first place. Yet not only the subject of legislation but its object as well is bound in a striking way to a distincrive characteristic making it necessary to anchor the legislative act in something other than the will that will emanare from it. From this perspecrive ir is no coincidence that Rousseau ties the legislative process to the existence of exceptional individuals (the wise legislarors) and exceprional territories.

One such territory is the island of Corsica, for which, as is well known, Rousseau drafted a "Project of a Constitution" in 1763, its forward declaring that "The Corsican people is in the happy state [heureux etat] rendering a good institution rune bonne institution] possible," (Rousseau 1979c: 902) with the happy state enjoyed by the Corsican people here specified as the precondition for "a good institution," that term also pointing back, in French as in English, to the word "state."

The legislator's function goes beyond rhe sphere of legalistic voluntarism in two respects: on the one hand, in respect to religion, because a people will only ler itself be convinced of rhe legislative work's rationality as a resulr of the "divine pronouncement" ro which rhe legislaror lays claim; on rhe other hand, in respect to concrete, empirical knowledge concerning "land and people," which brings into play the specific dimension of a governmenral rationality that by no means only takes effecr following the people's successful institutionalization which is to say as an outcome of a constitutive act. It already becomes clear from the manner Rousseau formulates the logical paradox of the legislative work in the Social Contract rhar his problem is no longer rhe people, undersrood as a mass of legal subJectsas the problem was the prince and his rivals for MachiavellI-but rather the governability or rendering governable of a people possessll1g a specific "naturality" or "physis"? that can be differentIated 111拢0 a senes o,f historical, geographical, c1imaric, demographic, cultural, and orher variables (Foucault 2007: 70-71). Such variables, on which the population depend~, re I . " id bl r" from "the sovereign s su ts 1I1 Its removal "to a very consr era e exren voluntarist and direct action in the form of the law" (ibid.: 71). In order ro successfully conclude his work, the legislaror rhus has to abandon the ,~evel of I . . d ."' the people's "consttruttortaw 111. two respects ' mstea scrunruzu'f .' "constitutive . . . d rni ning ItS o give a people a constitution requlfeS eter I . .

T " " . f h I and If applicable when a 1 POint, 路 hence clarifying the questionk a h w erner I its own Rousseau paces '. ivned Popu Ianon is in the position to rna e r ese aws I the legislaror in the midst of the ambivalence of rhe rwo meamngs astgn~. the term "constitution" in the course of the seventeenth centu~y. n also " d . " I" f laws" and begll1s ro a so p.eno ,It ceases to exclusively mean a rota iry a signify a measurable "relationship of forces": . whicb has essentially been As long as in the hisrorical-Iegal literarure, " 11 ir the basic . 路,,路t rion" essentla y meal h t at a f the parliamentarians, constl u

80

Friedrich Balke

Gouernmentalization

laws of the kingdom, which is to say a legal apparatus, something in the order of a convention, it was clear that this return of the constitution could only mean the in a way decisionistic reestablishment of laws brought into the light of day. To the contrary, from the time when the constitution is no longer a legal scaffolding, an ensemble of laws, but a relationship of force, it is clear that this relationship cannot be reestablished from nothing; it can only reestablished when in any event something such as a circular movement of history exists, when something exists permirting its return to irs srarting point. (Foucault 2003: 193) The ambivalences of Rousseau's political discourse-this is my main argument-result from an overlapping of these two understandings of "constitution." The title of the Social Contract situates politics in a "realm of convention";

but Rousseau constantly

tries to reduce the arbitrariness

of the

foundational act by inquiring into the conditions of its possibility, defining this a priori as having an empirical and historical-cultural character. People pass from a state of nature to a civil state because at a certain point the for-

mer state becomes untenable (Rousseau 1979a: 359). The transition itself is a fundamentally ambivalent event: while under cerrain circumstances it is unavoidable, the body politic emerging from it neverrheless plunges into a historical movement making possible both an intensification and perfection of forces and an "abuse" meaning that human beings are "often" brought beneath the "condition" at which they started (ibid.: 364). For this reason, Rousseau

cannot

understand

the constitution

or institution"

simply as a

"legal scaffold" or "totality of laws"; rather, he poses the quesrion of rhe forces that have to be present for the laws to take hold. Jean Starobinski ignores the ambivalence of Rousseau's constitution when he argues that the social contract materializes "not along the evolutionary line described in the second Discourse

located starting required opposite

but in another

dimension,

purely normative

and

outside historical time. A legitimate beginning is once more rhe point, ex nihi/o, without the quesrion being posed of the conditions to realize the political ideal" (Starobinski 1971: 45). Precisely the is the case. The legislator's decisive work does not lie in compiling

a constitutional

text, because a constitution

cannot

be established

upon a

"bottomless foundarion." The "act through which a people is a people" (Rousseau 1979a: 359) cannot be reduced to the process of assent regarding the constitution framed by the legislators.' It also comprises the preliminary examination of the premises that are either present or absent with the existence of the population as a pre-legal or extra-legal entity: In the same way that before constructing a large building the architect observes and probes the ground to see if it can bear the weight, the wise instructor does not begin by compiling good laws for their own sake, but rather examines whether rhe people for whom they are meant is capable of bearing them. (Rousseau 1979a: 384f)

of the State

81

Against this backdrop we can understand why in 1764 Rousseau formulates a "Project of a Constitution

for Corsica" but, when asked by the Corsican

leader to help with "constructing the republic," retroactively gets hold of the information allowing him "to acquaint myself wirh the history of the people and the state of the counrry." The texrs he is delivered do nor render rhe Corsican trip superfluous, since the legislator is meanr to closely study "the people that is to be instituted" (Ie peuple a instituer) in the country itself (Rousseau 1976: 648). The legislator has to know the history of the people for whom he wishes ro compile laws because he needs to identi fy whar Foucault calls the "consriruting point," (Foucault 2003:192)7 which is to say the moment in that history when a people first becomes receptive to the rule of laws.

As conceived by Rousseau, the people owes its existence to a process that we can describe, with Foucault, as the entry of the human race into

the "field of the definition of all living species" (Foucault 2007: 75). This biopolirical anchoring of a people represents a hisrory of the evolurionary sort running below that of political and diplomatic events. If the body politic were meant to be understood

as the result of juridical genesis alone,

it would be hard to understand how Rousseau can write as follows at the start of Chapter 10, Book 2 of rhe Social Contract as follows: "A body politic can be measured in two ways: namely, according to territorial extension

and according to the number of people, and berween one and rhe orher of these measurements

there is a relationship

suitable for producing

the true

size of rhe stare" (Rousseau 1979a: 388). Bur how, we may ask, can a political body-which means, indeed, a moral body-in facr be measured? The two fundamental

variables

that Rousseau

introduces,

size of population

and territory, are removed from the will of those who come together ro found rhe body poliric. Hence proper measure does not become manifest to the state through the normative specifications of its formation, but through specific conditions that are rhe result of a development or "history." The legislator must become familiar with this history, because these conditions

are subject ro neither his will nor that of the individuals who decide ro found a body politic. Such a body, furnishing itself with a basic law and thus manifesting irs will ro have a single will, can only survive if it at rhe same time realizes "a maximum of force," (ibid., italics in original) which it cannot, however, produce and guarantee for the future through the act of constitutional grounding. In an intrinsic manner, the probl,em of the art of government is tied to the normative mechanism of the SOCial contract, for

the two fundamental variables that need to be brought inro a "suitable relationship" poinr to a number of factors and conditions, difficult to overlook, that simply cannot be transformed

into constants.

At first View,' the CIrcum-

stances at work here indeed seem clearly laid out: "Human being make rhe state and the land nourishes human beings: consequently, this relationship thus involves the land being sufficient ro maintain those dwelling on ir and there being as many inhabiranrs as rhe soil can nourish" (ibid.: 389). But

82

Friedrich

Balke

land and human beings are not simply objects or facts that can be placed in a stable relationship through sovereign decree; rather, they turn out to consist of a highly complex and dynamic conglomerate of factors: It is impossible to calculate a fixed relation berween the expanse of land and the number of mutually sufficient human beings, both on account of the differences that are found in the quality of the land, in its degrees of fertility, in the nature of its production, in the influence of climate, and of what can be observed in the temperament of the men who dwell on them [sic] among whom some consume a small amount in a fertile country while others a great deal on barren soil. (ibid.)

Concerning all these matters, the legislator "must not base his judgment on what he sees but on what he foresees" (ibid.). He has to reconstruct developmental processes and extrapolate them into the future. Writing the history of a people is anything but a peripheral activity-a diversion from the work of legislation: such work can only succeed when it takes account of the people's relation to its environment, hence to all the factors and circumstances that cannot be the object of contractual stipulations.

3. SOCIAL ORDERS

OF A NEW SORT

When Foucault indicates that "this governmentalization of the state"-a process "simultaneously internal and external to the state"-was the phenomenon making its survival possible, it becomes clear that with Rousseau's theory of government the entire ambivalence of its relationship to the sovereign uolonte generate can be formulated for the first time. Within European legal theory, consideration of the phenomenon of governmentality has unfolded under the rubric of "measures" and in particular-Ma(5nahmegesetze-the term that in German refers to legal measures created for specific occasions and singular cases. The particularity of the measure [die Ma/lnahme], states Carl Schmitt, "consists of the dependence of its aim on the concrete situation," (Schmitt 1978: 248) so that the process it designates "has no legal form of its own." For Schmitt sovereignty is no longer defined by the will to law but by a juridically unchecked "power of disposal" (Ver(iigungsgewalt).

In this way he locates his concept of the "measure" on the same level as does Foucault his concept of modern government, which, by citing La Per riere's own definition, he defines as "the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end" (Foucault 2007: 96). This formulation in fact does without any reference to legal concepts, replacing them with a determination of aims.

In the political situation of the European interwar period, Carl Schmitt and his student Ernst Forsthoff understood the formation of a "total state" to be the result of a definitive "turn to the administrative state," annulling

Gouernmentalization

o( the State

83

any legal provisos of a constitutional nature. Appearing in 1933, Forsthoff's book on the Total State was a juridical welcoming salutation to the Nazi regime; but on an analytic level, the concept encapsulated a diagnosis to the effect that a state's action was no longer reducible to punctual interventions in a society but was directed at "the life" of a population in its entirety. Forsthoff's work on administrative law merits special attention in research on govcrnmcntaliry, because from the juridical side it confirms Foucault's description of the development of modern biopower, its growing importance signified in a diminished role for both the law and constitutional guarantees: "We have entered a phase of juridical regression in comparison with the pre-seventeenth-century societies we are acquainted with" (Foucault1978: 144). For both Schmitt and Forsthoff, in twentieth-century conditions , the motto of the rule of law in a constitutional state is simply . an anachronism.

Forsthoff's response to this diagnosis involved developing a new concept of productive administration-a form of administration no longer limited to occasional societal interventions or police-work to counter threats.

In his reflections on the modern administrative state, Forsthoff's opening assumption is "the fact that since roughly the start of the previous ce~l~ury, individual Daseinsfubrung [management of life or existence] had decisively altered" (Forsthoff 1976a: 50). Even more than the concept of Daseinsvorsorge (provisions for existence, in the current EU cO,ntext "s~rvi~es of general economic interest"), for whose coinage and detailed applica.tlon ..to administrative law Forsrhoff became well known, the term Daseinsfuhrung (the German term could be translated literally as "conduct of existence") used here is of special interest: it reflects an an.al~sls of pres~n.t-.d,ay governrnentaliry as the result of an increasing exproprianon of posslbd~t1es for managing one's own "existence," Nineteenth-century hum.an beings emerge as persons "without a life space they control"; they are.1Il need of "organized provisions, extensive arrangements for sustenance, III order to be able to enjoy the necessities of life" (ibid.: 51). Although the knowledgebased analysis and administrative planning of both individual and collective facts of human life began long before the nineteenth century, political control of this life was strengthened by the loss of what Forsthoff named Daseinsreseruen "reserves for existence." Now Forsthoff's work III both the pre-1945 period and after the war is characterized by an understanding of modern administration, in its status as a cO~lpreh~nslve form, of Daseinsuorsorge, "provision for existence!".as sO,meth,ng allen to. constirutiona I law. Before 1945, he sees this administrative form as leading to the breakdown of the system of constitutional limitation on the state's executive authority; and he understands and justifies the total state as an adequate expression of a situation in which individuals are ever less, 11l a POSltl?11 . h vita . I goo d 5;8 a ft er 1945 a dualism of adrninto provide themselves Wit " , . istrative and constitutional law, maintained the totalitarian monism of the administrative

aga insr all Cfltl~U~, replaces state. Forsrhoff msists on the

84

Friedrich Balke

essential incompatibility

Governmentalization between

an administrative

law oriented around

facts and goals and a freedom-guaranteeing constitutional order, because he continues to see the latter as grounded in an idea of the legal subject as depending primarily or even exclusively on his or her accomplishments,

hence not "in need," and precisely in that way immune to what is either granted cussion

or imposed by public-service administration.

In the theoretical disof this approach, what has been stressed, alongside this refusal to derive administrative from constitutional law, is above all that the central concept of Dasemsuorsorge, however much it has meanwhile become an

integral concept in administrative

law," "only has functions in legal dogma

to a limited extent," rather designating a "political postulate" (Schutte 2006: 81). In any case, from the perspective of an analysis of the forms taken by present-day art of government on the level of state action, taking Forsthoff's reflections and terminology as a starting point would appear potentially productive: Forsthoff's ideas regarding the relevant governmental practices point to the difficulty of continuing to grasp them entirely in a legal framework.

This is the case, for instance, with plans and planning as a form for administrative action; and also with the so called "physical act,"

designating "non-official administrative action" (suggestions, instructions, preparatory administrative measures) that cannot be understood in terms of either contracts or planning.

With his study of The State in Industrial Society (1971), Forsthoff demonstrates the analytical productivity of an admittedly conservative doctrine of state, since he expressly inquires into the question of the "massive changes in human existential circumstances [Daseinsverhiiltnisse] to be expected through the coming decades' technological development."

As an example, Forsthoff chooses-alongside "protection of the environment from destruction by industry"-the threat posed to the "integrity of the human being himself, after he has become an object of genetic research" (Forsthoff 1971: 25). Forsthoff does not credit a state long-since developed into a complementary function of industrial society with the capacity to protect us from these new sorts of existential risks; at the same time he excludes the possibility of finding non-state actors for the task, meaning that his analysis turns out aporetic. Nevertheless the "Forsthoffian rule" (Neumann 1984: 95)-a rule in debt to a certain reading of Rousseau-to the effect that within corporate states the chances of an interest being realized decrease to the extent that the number of those who share the interest increase (Forsthoff 1971: 25) has been taken up by liberal and left-wing authors."

In general, then (and this is the problem I will be discussing below), Forsthoff is concerned with the legal-historical development of modern democracies as an increasing distancing from a conceptual matrix Rousseau laid out in exemplary fashion: a matrix within which, in the act of obedience to state directives, political subjects in the end only obey themselves.

From the beginning, Forsthoff's analysis of the precarious constitutional state stands under the sign of historical events Foucault paid great attention

of the State

85

in his lectures on the history of governmentality: events emerging from Germany's zero-hour of 1945 and its overcoming "without steering and authoritative participation by the state," (Forsthoff 1976b: 90) hence, to use Rousseau's terminology: the new foundation of a social order with circumvention of the constituting power. Conformed once again in this act of paradoxical new foundation is Rousseau's insight into the differance of the foundational event, which-corresponding to the significance of that term (Latin differre) as delay or detour, (Derrida 1982: 1-27) in a certain sense is postponed until later. In a Realanalyse of West Germany published in 1960, Forsthoff characterizes the object of his work as a "new style of social order" that although continuing to define itself as a state, owes

neither its existence

nor its stupendous

success to a genuinely sovereign

act of state (Forsthoff 1976c: 1). Instead of allowing themselves to be led by experiences from the Weimar Republic, in the 1945 zero-hour situa-

tion those involved in the timetable for reconstruction

had to refrain from

giving precedence to restoring the state, thus demonstrating the falsity of a particular dogma of constitutional law: "without an orderly state, no orderly economy" (ibid.: 3). Forsthoff summarizes the phenomenon of constitutional deferral with words highly similar to those Foucault will use at the end of the 1970s in his above-mentioned lectures, where he will subject the same phenomenon to a detailed analysis "Economic reconstruction did not follow that of the state but took place simultaneously with it; it even overrook the state's reintegration" (ibid.). For Foucault as for Forsthoff, after 1945 Germany again steps unto a special path, a Sonderweg, but this time one admired on all sides being based on the idea of the state's "real

foundation 2008:

in the existence and practice of economic freedom" (Foucault

85-86).

Because,

as Forsthoff

writes,

West Germany

"preceded

all

other states in its surrender to the exigencies of economic activity," (Forsthoff 1976d: 36) the country is a paradigmatic object of study for the historian of the neo-liberal art of government.

Forsthoff sees the specific constitutional history of the German Federal Republic as founded on a "capacity for self-direction and self-discipline; (Forsthoff 1976c: 3) the subject of this foundation is precisely not the stare but rather the entirety of the individuals and collective actors who know

how to govern or steer "themselves." Alongside the governmental dimension of this founding he also underscores the disciplinary dimension of the reconstruction, in the process reinforcing Foucault's thesis that governmental practices and tactics do not replace disciplinary authority, but together with it compensate

for the absence of the classical

state .. For Forsthoff,

the

economy's restoration "was by no means merely the fr-uit of freedom .and a free play of forces set inro motion with it, in the liberal sense; rather, It ~vas sustained by new sorts of collective discipline on a gr~nd scale [n.euartlgell kollektiven Disziplinierungen grof5en Stils!, upon which the survival of the economy

largely depends

tal techniques,

even today" (ibid.: 4). On the level of governmenForsthoff cites the "constant cooperanon between the stare

86

Friedrich Balke

Governmentalization

and society's arrayed forces," by which he means, alongside the parties, above all the associations; the cooperation renders itself concrete in "contracts, agreements to silence, understandings, recommendations, warn-

ings" (ibid.: 4f.), hence, in "para-legal" speech-acts, not bound to either the form or functional mode of the law, and arrangements with political effect. These cooperative forms "degrade" the state to one participating acror among others; in doing so they presage the debate about government and new society-wide negotiating mechanisms that will only emerge in the academy decades later. Alongside these forms, above all new scientific methods, developed through the "modern national economy," "make it possible

to already recognize

critical aberrations

at their starting

points,

when their regulation is still possible using limit defensive means" (ibid.: 13). This explains why West Germany needs to be understood as a polity that no longer anticipates

the state of exception,

understood

as a critical

escalation of mistaken developments leading to the collapse of a society or conjuring up civil war-"and this not from myopia or a fear of responsibility" (ibid.). Conceived according to the sovereign logic of the state of exception, the classical form of eminent political danger is replaced by the conception of a social susceptibility to risk that-as the present example of the financial crisis shows-brings moderator.

the state onto the scene as an economic

to conceive

the postwar

reality of modern

industrial

society

"in the categories of the Weimar period," both his notion of Daseinsvorsorge and the juridical instrument of the Ma(Jnahmegesetz are nonetheless characterized by adherence to a model entrusting the public authorities, now as before, with an ability to project itself above the totality of economic processes and prescribe their goals. Daseinsvorsorge is a concept pointing back to the tradition of the police state as reconstructed by Foucault: "The police state establishes an administrative continuum that, from the general law to the particular measure, makes the public authorities and the injunctions they give one and the same type of principle, according it one and the same type of coercive value" (Foucault 2008: 168f.). For Forsthoff the state as manifest in industrial society embodies this administrative continuum, in that it is based on an exchange between the social demand of discipline at work in the productive sphere and the guarantees offered by the welfare state's apparatus. Obedience in the economic sphere, to which the post-1945 Germa n model owes its success, is the precondition for a social stability that until the time of the "students' revolt," which Forsthoff nnly denigrates despite its politicizing power, excluded political experiments: "The factors assuring stability of the social whole are distributed

87

the state and industrial society but have the latter as their center

of gravity" (Forsthoff 1971: 163). Albeit only hesitatingly and with gritted teeth, Forsthoff accepts the disciplinary order of the economy as, in a sense, a formation replacing now absent sovereign authority. He thus sees the new

order as standing Ot falling with the "social redistribution that can only be realized with state means" (ibid.).

Forsthoff juxtaposes this social formation comprised of industrial society and administrative state with his ideal of a constitutional state, in the process fully ignoring the significance of the principle of the constitutional state "in the economic order," as underscored by Foucault (Foucault 2008: 171). In ordoliberal conceptions of an "individual social policy," (ibid.)" which Forsthoff basically neglects, law not only comes into playas a means for the state to intervene in the economy or as an instrument of protection against the dehumanizing effects of capitalism; its significance also lies in

the invention of ever-new rules generating and allowing the modification of the institutional framework for economic processes. For both the state and other participating actors, law transforms the economy into a game, a "regulated set of activities" (ibid.: 163). In contrast, Forsthoff's conception of the administrative state is along the lines of a plan pursuing specific economic goals. According to Forsthoff the plan is the form in which the state can still serve as an asymmetric

Forsthoff's analysis of the capacities of modern "industrial society" (lndustrie-Gesellschaft), of which West Germany is an "example", breaks off prematurely, because he can only conceive the subject's relation to this order in categories of subjugation and disciplining. Although he insists, very similarly to Foucault, that "nothing would be more mistaken" than "continuing

between

of the State

decision-maker-albeit

one acting

by proxy-in the conditions imposed by an industrial society. Within economic legislation, rule of law has the sense of treating all participating actors equally, whatever

their institutional

status or capacity

to mobilize

power-resources, and holding them to the game's commonly shared rules.

Through its goal of increasing the number of economic subjects and widening their scope for play, such law also increases the possible points of friction between the actors, thus producing an intensified demand for legislation. "To the extent that you free economic subjects and allow them to play their game, indicates

Foucault,

"the more you detach them from

their status as virtual functionaries of a plan" (ibid.: 175). Because Forsthoff locates the constitutional state's domain fundamentally outside the economic-social sphere, he ignores the extent to which this legal technology participates in transforming internal economic circumstances,and their institutional implementation: a transformation irrevocably breaklI1? down

the stabilizing connection between the disciplinary order of production and readiness for political obedience.. , .

At the same time Forsthoff's reflections confirm Foucault s thesis that govern mentality is "simultaneously internal and external to the state." In respect to Rousseau we can say that govern mentality is exter~al, t~ the state-understood as the institutional embodiment of the uolonte generale: the process through which a society becomes governable is aimed at a readiness to follow and in this sense at the subject's obedience, Rousseau making clear (0 the contrary that the sovereign can never promise to obey. ~u.( t~at such a process does not succeed through force, subjugation, or discipline

88

Friedrich Balke

Governmentalization

alone, that it is also "interior" to the uolonte generale, demonstrates precisely the manner in which govern mentality is aimed at nothing less than redemption of the idea of the state as a "phenomenon of will"-an idea Forsthoff sees as "anything but self-evident," but characteristic for Rousseau (Forst hoff 1976b: 95): The identity of those governing and the governed-the shortest formula for describing the democratic principle-was meant to be an identity of will. With this the citizen of the state, who obeyed the will of the state, was meant to be following his own will, which he encountered in the will of the state, the uolonte generale. Rousseau was the first to transform the simple object-relation of those subordinated to the state into a subject-relation. (ibid.: 96) It is interesting

to see that Forsthoff

understands

this basic idea of Rous-

seau-his famous-notorious identity-centered conception of democracyexclusively in terms of constitutional law, hence can only speak of it in the past tense. His conclusion is clear: "We find ourselves in a development that is on the point of changing this constitutional order, grounded everywhere in a genuine or fictitious act of will" (ibid.). And as an example, he offers the growing importance of experts in political decision-making: such experts, he indicates, although exercising no executive authority and standing outside the bureaucratic hierarchy, nevertheless take on a position that in legal respects as much as in other respects can hardly be challenged.

Now recent research on govern mentality has strongly suggested that the highly prominent position of experts in the process of political decisionmaking is by no means to the clear-cut detriment of the "subject's relationship" to the state. In accord with their pastoral origins, governing practices are focused precisely on the steering and conducting of individuals, just as originally they were aimed at the individual's conscience and personal salvation. When Rousseau's identity-centered vision is conceived-as often happens-merely as a pre-totalitarian vision of democracy sacrificing the individual's will to that of the generality, his theory's decisive point has been missed: the uolonte de taus is here only rejected when its effectiveness overlayers the "large number of small differences" with one "unique difference" (say that between rich and poor) that, as the generator of extreme social inequality, structurally hinders a common formation of will (Rousseau 1979a: 371). Over recent years, research on governmentality has convincingly mapped out the extent to which our present art of government has developed technologies through which "individuals in the most varied social realms are, as Althusser has put it, invoked "as active and free citizens, members of self-managing associations and organizations, autonomously acting persons who are Or should be in the position to rationally calculate their own life risks" (Brockling, Krasmann Lemke 2004: 13).

Current govern mentality actually models the political relationship on the

of the State

89

matrix developed by Rousseau: Whatever impositions and subjugations may be tied to the provision of certain state or public services, individual citizens need to consistently have the impression they are encountering their own will in the bureaucratically manifest volonte generate, of which each of them is also a part. And for their part, governmental practices and tactics are duty-bound, through the use of new means, to the project begun by Rousseau of transforming the citizen's simple object-relation to the authorities and institutions providing public service in the welfare state, as standing before Forsthoff, into a "subject relationship."

In this context, "activation," as a central concept in the new governmental technologies, refers to a "social model that tries to enforce the autonomous engagement of the population," (Kocyba 2004: 20) and is anchored in what Forsthoff terms the "problem of will." For Forsthoff, "freedom and particrpanon are the cardinal concepts today determining the relation of the individual to the state" (Forsrhoff 1976e: 75). Where, he argues, participation-Teilhabedesignates the state in its capacity to "offer services, lleisten[ apportion [zuteilen] deploy [verteilen], and divide [teilen[," freedom imposes limits on the state and leaves "the individual to his social situation." A govern mentality tying a guarantee of social services to a readiness of those receiving them not to surrender themselves to their situation, but rather to embrace and apply measures to change it, is breaking precisely with this clear-cut distinction between the welfare state and the constirurional state.

Hence if Forsthoff could still maintain that "In their intentions the constitutional state and the welfare state are thoroughly different, not to say opposites," (ibid.) then this assessment must itself be suppli:,d with a historical index to the extent that the welfare state renders Its guarantees" dependent on proof of freedom by those benefiting from it. What Forsthoff could not foresee was the emergence of a welfare-state culture appropriating the pathos of the constitutional state's concept of freedo,;, and transforming it into a criterion for guaranteeing services. Forsrhoff s concern was entirely focused on a welfare state that endangered the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitutiona.l st.ate, relativizing them into mere values and thus delivering them to a jumprudence relying on techniques of interpretation directly taken from the humanities.

However, neo-liberal govern mentality has dislocated the ~el.atlo.n between both "states" in such a way that a constitutionally or igmanng rese:ve of freedom is built into the principle of Daseinsvorsorge, thus advancing freedom from its negative, segregating function in the classical constJt~. IIy constltutlve.quan". .. riry 12 Under the. conditional state to a positive, socia tions of nee-liberal govern mentality, the social order In general IS newly grounded in "genuine or fictitious" acts of will. Both the economy and the authorities tied to Daseinsvorsorge are called on to organize ~abor an.d the distribution mechanism so that they together guarantee subjects tlh: freedom in that way rransforming-m the manner outlined previous ~ the citizen's object-relation to the institutions of the modern preventive

90

Friedrich Balke

state into a subject

Governmentalization relation.

ment, in which Rousseau's

The danger

of such a governmental

social contract

arrange-

has achieved undreamt

of

eminence, lies in the unfolding on a subtle level of what Forsthoff correctly defined as the conversion of social functions into functions of rule: "Whoever is cared for by the state feels dependent on it and is inclined to bow before it" (Forsthoff 1976a: 56). In our contemporary context, this statement can be reformulated as follows: Those cared for by the state can bow before it far more easily because they bow before themselves.

91

through which the individuals forming the contract transform themselves into a body politic on the way to "alienation totale"-a total transfer of goods and property. That "everything" has to be invested in this contract means precisely that the act of forming the contract does not leave the contracting parties unaltered but to the contrary alters their existence in a fundamental way. The "alienation totale" of which Althusser speaks in relation to Rousseau's contract is possible "because it is purely interior to the liberty of individuals: it is possible because human beings give themselves completely, yet to themselves."

This combination of an extreme degree of freedom and an unlimited readiness for self-renunciation or sel f-revelarion represents the paradoxical basic figure at work in Rousseau's pedagogic projecr. See Louis

Althusser (1966: 5-42). .

7. This constituting point does not belong to the realm of law and co:nventlonj

NOTES 1. For this reason the following discussion is indebted to Cassirer's observation that "for us [ ... I Rousseau's doctrine is no object of mere scholar's curiosity; no object of pure philological-historical consideration. Rather, it is manifest

of the State

[ ...

] as a thoroughly

contemporary

and living problematic.

The

questions Rousseau posed to his century-today as well these are not at all antiquated, for us, as well, they have not been simply 'taken care of'." See Ernst Cassirer (1989: 8).

2. Rousseau's "people" (peuple) oscillates between the two basic meanings of the German word Volk: on the one hand, in the framework of constitutional law it designates a democracy's constitutive political subject, who replaces the monarch as the constituent authorit y; on the other hand it designates the totality of poor and excluded "folk," members of the "lower classes," the "ordinary people" contrasting with the rich and noble and meriting "pity" by the revolutionaries, who act in their name. Hannah Arendt notes that "the very definition of the word was born out of compassion, and the term became the equivalent for misfortune and unhappiness-Ie peuple, les malheureux m'applaudissent, as Robespierre was wont to say" (Arendt 1963: 65). The term Ie peuple is a key to understanding both the French Revolution and Rousseau's political theory, which aims at transforming the immense class of the poor and unhappy into a new, democratic, and sovereign entity.

Hence, importantly, for Rousseau le peuple does not have a national or ethnic tenor, rather designating the political task of grounding the new political order in the "general interest" of those who have been excluded from that order. There is no argument in Rousseau restricting affiliation to the people to those of an identical "national" descent.

3. It is no coincidence that Jacques Derrida uses Rousseau to exemplify the grammarological dimension of supplementary logic, involving appendage to a thing in order to strengthen or protect it. See Derrida (1997[19671: 141-164).

4. On the "immanence of practices of government" see Foucault (2007: 93).

5. See Foucault (2007: 47): "Politics has to work in the element of a reality that the physiocrars called, precisely, [physis], when they said that economics is a lphysis ... I. Only ever situating oneself in this interplay of reality with itself is, I think, what the physiocrats, the economists, and eighteenth-century political thought understood when it said that we remain in the domain of

IIJhysisl." (Translation modified) 6. In his analysis of the theoretical "displacements" unfolding in the Social Contract, Louis Althusser already suggested that under the juridical title of J contract, in Rousseau's Case we are facing an extraordinary contract with a paradoxical structure: "Rousseau's contract docs not correspond to his concept. In fact his Social Contract is nor a contract but the act of constitution,"

Rousseau shows this with the example of Peter the Great's forcible modernization of the Russian Empire: Peter failed to see that his nation was not mature enough for civilized behavior (as Rousseau 'puts it, pour.fa police)

(Rousseau 1979a: 386). The czar ignored the phYS1S of the RUSSian population which he understood as "that kind of original datum, that kind of material on which the sovereign's action is to be exercised, that vis-a-vis of

the sovereign" (Foucault 2007: 71). . .

8. See Schutte (2006: 44): "The supply of services such as .wate:, gas, el.ectflCI~Y, and transportation tential provisions

make his existence possi.ble, espeCially, III "the city. EXIShave thus become a necesstt y of human .lIfe.

9. See (ibid.: 103): "Disregarding the difficulties of endowing the concept of Daseinsvorsorge with firm contours, it can demonstrate an extr~m.ely s~c路 cessful career, history."

hardly

comparable

to another

10. See for example Claus Offe (1973: 368fo..

term

in recent

..

.

administrative

.

11. "In short it does not involve providing individuals With a SOCIal cover for risks, but 'according everyone a sort of economic space within which they can

rake on and confront risks" (Foucault 2008: 144).

12. "The dismantling of forms of welfare-state interv~ntion

is accomp~nied by a reconstruction of techniques of government that displace,s ~h.e sreermg c7pacity of state apparatuses and authorities to 'resp~~slb}e, Circumspect, and 'rational' individuals" (Lemke, Krasmann and Brockling 2000: 30).

REFERENCES Louis. (1966). Sur Ie "contrar social" (Les deca lagesl. L'impellse de JeanJacques Rousseau. Cahiers pour l' Analyse 8: 5-42. ..

Arendt Hannah.

(1963). 011 Revolution. New York: The Viking Pre~s. , Brockling, Ulrich, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke. (2004). Einleirung, pp.

9-16 in (eds) G/ossar der Gegenu/art. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkarnp. .

Cassirer, Ernst. (1989). Das Problem Jean-Jacques Ro~sseau, pp. 7-78 In Ernst Cassirer, Jean Starobinsk i and Robert Da r nron Drei Vorschlage, Rousseau Zil Lesen, Frankfurt a.M: Fischer. .'

A Derrida, Jacques. (1982). Differance, p~. ]-28 in MarginS of Philosophy, trans. .

Boss. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. . Of Derrida, Jacques. (1997[1967J). That Dangerous Supplement, pp. 141-:164 In Grammatology trans. G. Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dargestellt all1 Forst h 0,ff E rnst.路 '(1971) Der Staat der tndustriegesellschoit. , B k Beispiel der Bundesrepubiik Deutschland. Munich: ec .

Alrhusser,

92

friedrich

Forst hoff,

Ernst.

Rechtsstaat Munich:

Balke (I 976a).

Verfassungsprobleme

irn Wandel.

des Sozialstaates,

Verfassungsrechtliche

Abhandlungen

pp. 50-64

in

1954-1973.

Beck.

Forst hoff, Ernsr. (1976b). Strukturwandlungen der Modernen Demokratie, pp.

90-104 in Rechtsstaat im Wandel. Verfassungsrechtliche Abhandlungen 19541973. Munich, Beck.

Forsthoff, Ernst. (1976c). Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

Umrisse einer Realanalyse, pp. 1-13 in Rechtsstaat irn \Vandel. Ver(assungsrechtliche Abhandlungen

1954-1973.

Forsthoff,

Ernst.

Munich, Beck.

(1976d).

Verfassung

und Verfassungswirklichkeit

der Bundesre-

5

Government Unlimited The Security Dispositif of Illiberal Governmentality Sven Opitz

publik, pp. 25-38 in Rechtsstaat im Wandel. Verfassungsrechtliche Abhandlungen 1954-1973. Munich, Beck.

Forsrhoff, Ernst. (1976e). Begriff und Wesen des Sozia!en Rechrssraates, pp. 65-89 in Rechtsstaat im Wandel. Verfassullgsrechtliche Abhandlungen 1954-1973.

Munich: Beck.

Foucault, Michel. (1978).

The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. R. Hurley. New York: Pantheon.

Foucault, Michel. (2003). Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, trans. D. Macey. New York: Picador.

Foucaulr, Michel. (2007). Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978, trans. G. Burchell. Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Foucault, Michel. (2008). The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979, trans. G. Burchell. New York/Hampshire Palgrave Macmillan.

Kocyba, Hermann. (2004). Aktivierung, pp. 17-22 in Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke (eds) Glossar der Cegenwart. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Lemke, Thomas, Susanne Krasrnann and Ulrich Brocklmg. (2000). Gouvernementaiitat, Neoliberalismus und Selbsttechnologien. Eine Einleitung, pp. 7-40 in Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke (eds) Gouvernement alit.at der Gegenwart. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Neumann, Volker. (1984). Der harte Weg zurn sanften Ziel. Ernst Forsrhoffs Rechrs- und Staarsrheorie als Paradigma konservativer Technikkritik, pp.

88-99 in Alexander RolSnagel and Peter Czajka (eds) Recht und Technik irn Spannungs(eld der Kernenergiekontroverse.

Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Offe, Claus. (1973). Das plu ralistische System von organisierren Interessen, pp.

368-371 in Heinz josef Vara in (ed): lnteressenverbande in Deutschland. Koln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch.

Rousseau, Jean-jacques (1969[1762J) Emile, ou de l'education, in Oeuvres completes, Volume 4. Paris: Gallimard.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (197611782)). Les Confessions, in Oeuvres Completes, Volume 1. Paris: Gallimard.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1979a(1762]). Du Conrrat Socia I, ou, Principes du Droit Politique, in Oeuvres Completes, Volume 3. Paris: Gallimard.

ROllsseau, Jean-Jacques. (1979b[17551). Discours sur L'Economie Politique, in Oeuvres Completes, Volume 3. Paris: Gallimard.

Rousseau, jean-Jacques. (1979c[17631). Projet de Constitution pour la Corse in Oeuvres Completes, Volume 3. Paris: Gallimard.

Sch m itt, Ca rl. (197811921)). Die DIktatur. Von den A nfiingell des Modernen Souveriinitatsgedankens his zum Prolelarischen Klassenkamp(. Berlin: Duncker & Humblor.

Schtitte, Christian. (2006). Progressive Verwaltul1gswissel1schafl auf konservaliver Grund/age. Zur Verwaltungsrechtslehre Ernst Forsthoffs. Schriften zur Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 128. Berlin, Duneker & Humblor.

Sta robinski, Jean. (197]). jean-jacques Rousseau. La Transparence et L·Obstacle.

Suivi de Se/Jts Essays sur Rosseau. Paris: Gallimard.

1. THE STATE OF GOVERNMENTALITY In his lectures on govern mentality, Foucault repeatedly claims that the liberal governrnenrality that emerged at the end of the eighteenth century still defines the political rationalities of the present. Following Foucault, gouernmentality studies have dwelt upon this per-ststence of liberal governmental reason and the indirect, entrepreneunal forms of c?ndu~~ that . emp Ioys (B·· 2007· , Rose 1999). These (neo)libera! . rationalities of It roc kling 1 .. conduct have been explored in areas as diverse as economlc.orgamzatlons (Miller and Rose 1990; Opitz 2004), welfare programs (Cruikshank 1999; Dean 1995), health care (Greco 1993; Lemke 2006), and criminal policy (Smandych 1999· Krasmann 2003). With a few exceptions (Dean 2001; Valverde 1996), ;overnmentality studies have thereby prirna rily focused on the extent to which liberal practices are preoccupied with the li~l~a~~on of direct intervention.

This contribution, 10 contrast, takes a fsiIghtdY ~,(eFrenr . . ouapproach. Instead of invesnganng t hi'e oglC 0 f" con duct. . can . uct cault 1982) in a further societal domain, it focuses on ItS limlts·bMor~ precisely, this text examines how liberal rationality orga~.lz~s the ou~, aTies of the "powers of freedom" and establishes modes of illiberal rule. dHOW does governmentality, as a form of rule based on the logl~ of lim;t~ governmenr, allow for the unlimited and excessive ex~rclse.a power.. ow IS the exertion of direct and physical violence strategICally mtegrated mto ~he modern regime of governmenrality?

How ~oes liberal gove~nment SWltc to an illiberal mode in its own name and on Its own grounds. _ These are the questions that guide this contnbutlon.

It suggests r~work_

°

ing and strengthening rarus of governmenta

the notion ofsecutity wlthm tlide cobnetcteePrt~~o~P~~r · IIty stu d·les, 10 order . .to provi f e f The .. f I"b I nd illiberal orms 0 power. analyzing the intertwmlng 0 I era a I d modern politiI F cault's ectures an to notion of secunty IS centra to ou . II discussed within I b t it has not been systematlca y I h· ca t eory In genera,. u with the difficulty of explaining governmentalay studtes. Instead, faced I· I d· g schol. . I . h of governmenta ItY, ea In the exercise of dIrect VIO ence 10 t e age h f biopolitical racism ars in the field have hitherto resorted to t e concept a o'

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Government

out by Foucault in the last lecture of his course Society Must Be Defended (Foucault 2003a; d. Dean 2001; Lemke 2003). But, as will be shown, the notion and logics of security are indispensable if we wish to understand the contemporary forms of illiberal practices such as shoot-tokill policies or methods of interrogation involving torture. The concept of bio-racism alone does not render these political rationalities intelligible. As will be demonstrated, a careful reconstruction and discussion of security helps us to understand how it constitutes the decisive governmental hinge that translates between different types of intervention.

The argument proceeds in four steps. The chapter starts with an examination of the public discourses surrounding contemporary illiberal practices. It shows that the logics and claims of security, which undergird these practices, cannot be reduced to classical "reason of state" arguments (2).

Hence, it seems appropriate to inquire into the governmental rationality of these measures. In order to elucidate this rationality, a close reading of Foucault's lectures will demonstrate how Foucault, while accounting for the novel discourse on security, only sowed the seeds of an account of the logics of direct intervention fuelled by a liberal culture of fear (3). To further explore the tipping point between the "powers of freedom" and the coercive forms of liberalism prevalent today, this chapter suggests drawing on the securitization approach as developed by the Copenhagen School. According to this approach, extraordinary and exclusionary political measures are activated through the invocation of an existential threat. The contribution ties this specific rhetoric of security to a re-inscription of sovereign logics of power into govern mentality as liberal practice (4). The last section shows how such liberal-cum-sovereign governmental rule leads to a prominent reemergence of technologies of police. The example of preventive and potentially extra-legal interventions of police power within the logic of security makes it possible to show how liberal forms of rule are twisted into illiberal forms of knowledge collection, spatial regularion and de-subjectivation (5).

This chapter thus argues that illiberal govern mentality is an inherent potentiality of liberal reason-haunting ir, corrupting it and pushing it forward at the same time. sketched

2. CONTEMPORARY

INVOCATIONS

OF

SECURITY

As contemporary discourses and practices show, the notion of security allows for the problematizing of various political and social questions in quite specific ways. In general, invocations of security promote the implementation of novel measures of intervention.

However, a broad range of cases can be identified. The following cursory overview of exemplary appeals to the problem of security serves to illuminate the breadth and effects of the current transformations in political discourse.

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In December 2006 the German Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schauble, reintroduced a legislative proposal that allowed the shooting down of passenger flights by the German Air Force" in cases where these might be used as weapons by terrorists. The killing of innocent passengers IS Justified in the name of national security-even though earlier that year, the Federal Constitutional Court had already declared § 14 (3) of the 2005 German L w which was intended to provide the legal baSIS for such acts, A,· vianon a , ibili f to be unconstitutional.

Nevertheless, Schauble insisted on the pO.SSl I lty. a ordering pre-emptive strikes against civil aircraft in case of an lmpen.dlllg "elementary attack on community assets," such as n~c1ear power station:, The Minister of the Interior's legislative proposals fit Into the government s broader objective of deploying the armed forces within Germany. HIS proposals question the clear separation between the police and the armed forces, that is between the domestic or inrernationa! use of state Violence. .

Almost simultaneously, in early 2007, the US Department of the Interior submitted a handbook to Congress containing rules for trials by special tribunals These rules granted judges the power to recogrnze forced testunonies and hearsay as evidence. The handbook established the legal, gUidelines for the "enhanced interrogation techniques" outlined In the Military Commissions Act. Six months earlier, Karen Greenberg, the director of the C~nter on Law and Security at New York University, had already argue d t at the establishment of systematic "politics of torture" In the so-called w~r han terror was a proven fact. Togerher with Joshua Drarel, she supp~rt~ er claim with 1,200 pages of material entitled "The Torture Papers ( reenberg and Drarel 2005). Among other things, the docum,:nts disclose ho~ the politics of torture rely on "extraordinary rendmons -th e 'p~ac.tJce. 0 . h t apply torture 1 Such l egmmlzatJOI1 transferring prisoners to countries t a . . depri of the uses of interrogation techniques like waterboardlng, sleep epnvation or prolonged standing in "stress positions" in the na~e ~f secuflt~ re uirements is not a phenomenon restricted to US policy, . e . lrecror. 0 the German Federal Office for the Protection of the ConstitUtion, Heinz Fromm has declared that information from foreign sources must be us~d even if i'twas extracted by torture. Such arguments justify torture as a te~ nique of intelligence gathering that responds to a purportedly new secufl~y . t They seek to establish a difference between torture m t e envrronrnen ,. h d d torture as punishment or as a means name of security, on the one an , an L b 2006) of terrorizing people into submission on the other ( u on h .

The effects of security discourses are not limited to sue ehxtreme ca ses. f ia l sphere T ey trans arm Rather they disseminate into near Iy every SOCI . f . , d' d . centers In the name 0 secunry, train stations, football sta rums an city , . b tanders and become individuals are to abandon their stance as passive ys f ' d t k, "I t1y gathering In ormation an a part of a proactive commumty Vigi an .

I' I . . Id ers On the American on me porta ing measures againsr potentia ang: . forms' via the Internet , rea d y.gov, th e "war on terror" assumes uireracnve roru»

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Suen Opitz

citizens are interpellated as alert participants in a "war on terror" to be fought from their homes. They shall no longer be mere spectators of media coverage but are called upon to turn into soldiers stationed at their desks (Andrejevic 2006). The desk is not always a safe place, however, as a student at the University of California in Los Angeles experienced in 2006.

He was caught using a computer in the library without his student ID, and when he refused to vacate the building the security forces shot him repeatedly with a so-called "raser." In extreme cases, even the targeted killing of individuals in urban environments has become a permissible police measure. Traditionally limited to classical warfare, targeted or "extra juridical" killing has been established as a "limit case" of security management (Kessler and Werner 2007). Thus, in the aftermath of the terrorist bombings in London 2005, journalists discovered that the Anti-Terrorist Branch of London's Metropolitan Police deployed "shoot-to-kill" tactics under the code-name "Operation Kratos."

This enumeration of instances in which security concerns currently bear on policies could be continued. They indicate not only a quantitative proliferation of security discourse, but also a qualitative shift: the very notion of security starts to change meanings, episternic structures, and political effects. The cases point to the erosion of distinctions such as civil/military, legal/illegal, domestic/international, private/public and-above all-interna lIexternal security (Bigo 2001). The difficulties that traditional disciplines like International Relations or criminology have when trying to grasp these logics by applying their usual categories of security are symptomatic for the impending transformations of the meaning and implications of security. As the examples show, security no longer refers-as the neorealisr perspective in International Relations assumes (e.g., Walt 1991)-exclusively to questions of deterrence and the deployment and control of the armed forces of a state. But contemporary invocations of security fit neither the criminological understanding of security as obeying the law, nor controlled delinquency. The simple breach of a law by a subject does not circumscribe the issues raised by the invocations of security today-a development which is paradoxically accompanied by the extended use of categories like "criminal" and "rogue" on the international stage (Derrida 2004). Hence, the logic of the examples mentioned previously cannot be grasped within the boundaries of the two disciplines that have defined conventional notions of security up until now. The present calls for security reveal a simultaneous decentralization, de-limitation and multiplication of security strategies amongst sub-national, national and supranational players. Politics in the name of security spreads rhizomorphically, uses novel technologies and thus disperses its dynamics.

Faced with such prevalent and far-reaching invocations of security in the justification of illiberal measures, it seems worthwhile to analyze their underlying political rationale more closely. The question, therefore, is not how political or non-political actors make use of the notion of security

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within already existing institutional settings; rather, the ~uestion is h?w the domain and logics of the political ate shaped by invocations of security.

In short: how are specific power relations and institutional forms established through mechanisms of security?

3. RATIONALlT1ES SOVERE1GNTY

OF SECURITY: FROM TO GOVERNMENTALlTY

For an understanding of the political rationalities centered ~n securi~y, it is important to recognize that references (0 q~est.ions o~ security .are neither a peripheral nor a recent phenomenon.

Security IS not just a subject of popular discourse, but poinrs us to the core of the modern political tradition.

In the opening section of his seminal work, Politics of Security, Michael Dillon (1996: 12) notes: "Security [ ... ] saturates the language of modern politics. Our political vocabularies reek of it and our pollticalll11agmatlon is confined by it." This is an accurate statement indeed: modern politics IS preoccupied by the question of how to provide security. The question of whether to provide security is not posed-It lies outside the paramerers of the debate. Thus, security determines the polltlcallmagmatlon of modern times; but, pace Dillon, it does so in a variety of ways, as the following few paragraphs will demonstrate. " . ' Early modern rheories of sovereignty, for which Hobbes Leviathan IS paradigmatic, place the relation between p.OiJ~1CS an~ secu~lty at cent~r stage. For Hobbes, security is a founding principle as It provides the basis of sovereignty. Secunty,. IS everyt himg a t on.ceo cause ,: aim and legItimation . of the modern state. The "security of a mans person (Hobbes 1985 [1651].

192) is "lastly the motive, and end" (ibid.) for the erecnon of the Leviathan rhe "Mortall God" (ibid.: 227). In this respect, securuy functions as the lever that makes the "transcendental apparatus" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 83) of sovereign power work. According to Foucault, the emergence of governmental power in the eighteenth century cons.tltu.tes a break .111 this political order of sovereignty. While the problematlzatlon of secu nr y continues to define the rationality of this new form of power, I,t changes irs form' liberal security differs fundamentally from a soverelg~ s rt~atlO;' to secur路ity. In his lectures, Foucault stresses time and again It at. 1 el~a, " h t of governmenta rat rona it y. ism places the logic of Iimitation at t e cen er , f Taking Foucault's analyrics of liberalism seriously provokes the que;tlon or how liberal govern mentality can selectively un-limit ItS exefClsefio p~w:s and or anize a direct, domineering and Violent gra~p all. sp.ecl. cs.

?

Foucau1t provide the conceptual instruments where the illiberal power of the sovereign

IS

tdot~eor~ze ~~~srt;~~I~~-t~~:~':; ep oye u

conditions of governmenral rationality? .

I' lik its historiFoucault shows that liberal governmental ratl掳fnadlfY'dun II e hirs for the warving 0 111 IVI ua fig cal predecessors, does not d ernan d the

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Suen Opitz

purpose of transforming an anarchic state of nature into political order.

Instead, it discovers natural processes whose immanent logic generates order. "This sudden emergence of the 'naturalness' of the species within rhe political artifice of a power relation" (Foucault 2007: 22) manifests itself in the birth of population and political economy. The population is a physical entity whose immanent regularities-such as birth rates, illnesses or accidents-are rendered visible through statistical apparatuses.

In order to increase the strength of the population, governmental activity must not hinder these natural processes. Rather, it has to ally itself with them: it has to take into account their inherent dynamics and allow them to become productive. In this respect, population assumes decisive features of economy, which in the eighteenth century appeared as a field of reality functioning according to "natural" laws. While population forms the government's sphere of intervention, economy provides for the rationalization of the exercise of power. "To exercise power in the form, and according to the model, of economy" (Foucault 2007: 95), hence, means more than simply weighing costs against benefits. It means recognizing the immanent logic of economy and bringing to bear its dynamics. A case in point is the mechanism of interest: interest is nothing that has to be restrained or relinquished. On the contrary, interest has to be given free reign for it to generate order. Confidence in the liberal play of interest, rherefore, amounts to a critique of intervention and of sovereign knowledge of the whole. Individual interests act blindly towards the totality; they must unfold within the boundaries of selfishness to promote the common good. Consequently no position of sovereign transcendence, from which everything can be seen, known and reacted to, exists. Political economy is an "atheistic discipline, I .. ·1 a discipline without God" (Foucault 2008: 282). It replaces the centered perspective of an economic sovereign with the "natural" market, as a mechanism of verification and falsification of governmental action (Tellmann 2003; 2009).

But does this assumption of a self-organizing social reality offer points of intervention at all? Why does self-generation require a governmental rationality? The previously mentioned points seem to indicate only a limi-

tation and a critique of intervention in the name of a laisser-faire attitude.

Again, how is the necessity of regulation (Foucault 2007: 47) argued for, given such an understanding of reality? According to my reading of Foucault's lectures, the condition of possibility for regulation is established by a calculation of security that organizes new forms of exercising power: problematizing the security of self-regulating spheres marks the tippingPOint that makes it possible to navigate the paradoxical relation of nonIntervention and intervention within liberal rule. It is instructive to have a closer look at this paradoxical relation and its mediation through calculations of secllrity. In order to do so, it is helpful to recall how Foucault himself has neshed out both the intervening and non-intervening logiCS of liberal rule.

Government On the structures consumes " It . must It,

Unlimited

99

one hand, Foucault explains, liberal government shapes speci,~c of contingency in which it acts as a manag.er of freedom: It freedom, which means that it must produce It. It must produce . Iit" (Foucault 2008· ".63) As indicated before, studies of organize . d h

govern mentality have investigated these forms of liberal power In" ept .

Seen through this lens, liberal government avoids destructive relations of violence and direct coercion. Instead, "it incites, it induces, It sedu~es, It "or more difficult" (Foucault 1982: 220). Correspondingly, ma k es easier hi' "(F It 2008· security technologies are "environmental tec, n~ ?gles oucau .

261) that function indirectly and ensure that individuals make use of specific freedoms. On the other hand, security technologies also address prac. d bi hi h do not fit into the play of transactional freedom. trees an su jeers w IC d d f They focus on heterogeneous practices, forms of conduct an. 0:0 CdS0 " f f eedom" from within. I enbeing that threaten to corrupt t h e powers 0 r " Id tifying these elements, technologies of government det~mlne a ~hr~ho raws beyond which governmental power ceases to Induce al ' II1 clte, lut h d d ctive use a f f ree am e sew ere. on compulsory measures to secure t h e pro u. . . hi isnif " . "the logic of intervention manifests Itself clearly T IS sigru cant va nation In lib I in the historical treatment of poverty. In the nineteenth century, era government bracketed the continuum of poverty into vanouS .m.ora se~ments.

i

It strove to establish

subsidiary plays of freedom ~hProvldl~gt~:r~~~:ons~ incentive schemes for the good, able-bodied podar.

IS sefrveterests At the ibl h pr-oductive yn anucs 0 In . of extending as f ar as POSSI e t e "d b . ., d h d identified hun as a angerous Sit same time, It Isolate t e pauper an if d to the level of social danger" [ect: "Pauperism IS [ •.• J poverty mtensi e " . . I of calculation for . 1991) In this respect secunty IS the prmcrp e (P rocacci . . ' " ucault 2008: 65). The "dangerthe cost of manufacrunng freedom (Fo d through the ous subject" pays the price for not being able to be goveHrne b di the rion of freedom e em 0 res d simultaneous production an consurnp I '. d h "" id f 'de field of liberally governable subjects an t us constitutive outSI e 0 a WI . . · . di . r en authontanan treatment. reqUlres special, ISCIPmary, or ev . 1 h . calculations mediate In order to understand more preclse.y liberal security, it is the relation between these tWO operatlona I hi If does-the paradox i. h . ethan Foucau t Imse Important to emp aSlze-mor. .

I' doxical as the security cal and unstable character ~frhis rel~tlOn. t IS ~ara n_interv'ention: governdispositif justifies intervention only In terms a no . hich it must ." beca use the processes In W mental intervennon IS necessary d A h me time intervention · ntly rhrearene. t t e sa , not Intervene ate permane . ossible and feasible. According to only intends to make non-Interventlo n P I defers back to non-inter. terventlon la ways a rea y r 1 governmenra reason, in . .' h hi paradox is not an error · d z» The crucial POint IS t at t IS vennon an vIce versa. k f h ern mental functioning. or a flaw to be dispelled for the sa ~ 0 . sm~~tlib~~:1 govern mentality. Metm Quite the opposire, It IS the key mec fams " tion works as a kind of " h paradox 0 (non-)lI1terven ap h otica IIy spea k lng, t e "f t I powet· it demands to " d"IsqUiet ",," tn t h e fabnc 0 govern men a . "generative

°lw~~~~:I~

100

Sven Opitz

be reproduced time and again, without ever being dissolved. One governs always already too much, and has to continue governing in order not to govern too much. Governmental power is therefore never fixed, but in a constant process of calibration mediated through calculations of security.

Against this background, it is the constant problematization of security thar transforms liberal reason into an unstable and wavering rationale of government. Calculations of security mark the tipping-point that navigates between intervention and non-intervention, negotiating the conditions and subjects of both. To specify this crucial governmental tipping-point, one might qualify the aporia at the centre of governmental reason as a social mechanism of immunization.

As Roberto Esposito (2009) has pointed out at length, this immunization works in the same way as its biological model: it reproduces the evil from which it is supposed to protect, adding a smaller ill in order to ward off a greater danger of the same kind. Hence, via the problematization of security interventions are not simply excluded from the governmental scene-in this case there would be no governmental scene at all-but they are included in order to be excluded. The phdrmakon (Derrida 1981: 61 et seq.) of security measures is induced on the basis of a permanent calculation: which practices of freedom are desirable, despite possible negative consequences, what kind of intervention may be conducted, to what extent and with which secondary effects? What are the sources of potential dangers? In what form and to what degree can danger be tolerated, and how can it be neutralized?

Governmentality faces the challenge of securing a circulation of interests, goods, and information against dangers without halting this circulation.

But in his analysis, Esposito also shows that social mechanisms of immunization may develop an excessive drive-with ruinous effects. They tend to accelerate, increasing the means designed to protect against their own ends in ever shorter time-spans.

Not surprisingly, Esposito sees the contemporary security apparatus as paradigmatic for such a hypertrophic dynamic in which a heightened perception of insecurity goes hand in hand with the implementation of more draconic measures against perceived threats. Pushed forward by its own affect production of fear and anxiety (Massumi 2005), the security dispositif is liable to expand its illiberal mode and to be turned over by this expansion.

In the last consequence, it dissolves its constitutive aporia and inverts into a sovereign machine.

Foucault does not completely neglect this potential for escalation in his analysis of the modern security dispositif. While emphasizing liberal restraint, he realizes at the same time that governmentality-as the political rationality that limits direct intervention-does not lead to an overall reduction in political interference.

On the contrary, the calculation of security guarantees the "conditions for the creation of a formidable body of legislation and an incredible range of governmental interventions" (Foucault 2008: 64 et seq.). The liberal art of governing is not "the suppression, obliteration, abolition, or I ... I Aufhebung of the raison d'Etat" but rather

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constitutes the "principle for maintaining it, developing it more fully'; (ibi~ ..: 28) But what explanation does he himself offer In order to account dor t dis . . d'E't a t th a t exceeds bounds an ten s liberal ability to encompass raison d . ) towards such a hypertrophic ynarruc: F It identifies at least two Althou h this IS not his mam concern, oucau I " g I limit rion The inclusion of consIderatIOns moments of governmenta un- urn a, .

I' rovides rhe first entry of utility in the interior of the secunty calcu anon p . f inalienable oint for overnmental excess. While the legal conception 0 I . .

P .g I li . 0 the exercise of power, the cntenon human fights sets an ext.erllla ,~mltlt 't" the exercise of power from the f ilit has the potentia to un- rrru f h o uti I y .. " I 2008. 43) that is freed rom t e inside. A "radicalism of Util.lty (Foucau r "" e ard to its effectiveness, criterion of legiti~acy, and IS evaluatedE:~II~I~~r;Jecisive, however, is rhe looms on the horizon of governfimen~e shows that on the flipside of secusecond moment Foucault identi es.

Whether in relation to public riry calculations, a culture of dangehremerges. this stimulation of the fear .

'11 '. "everyw ere you see I services, I ness or crime: di . he internal psychological and hi h i ir ere the con mon, t f o danger w IC IS, as I. W : " ibid.: 66 et seq.). This culrure of danger cultural correlative of lIberalIsm If .. I d to accept external control. . bi t . e after se -contro an d acnvates su jeers to s nv f d defines boundaries beyon Simultaneously, the determin.ation o. hanger authoritarian mode, into "a , t ventrons SWItc to an which governmenta I 111 er . best i t of those who cannot act th t acts 111 the est mreres I f mode 0 gove~nment "a 02. 48) In extreme cases, governmeota in their own Interests (Dean 20 . dr d s" (Foucault 2007: 263) . h be "unjust an mur erou power bases t h e rig t to h h . bl caring pastorate rums into on the dangers it has identified. T e c anra" e(:b.d ) f selecti nd exclusion I I .. a "pastoral [ ... Jose ecnon a h. . n of "danger" Jn order to do I now want to elaborate further t IS questI掳 uritizatio路n. As the subse. . d ces the concept 0f sec h so the next section intro u , f to a specific moment in t e ' h '11 e this concept re ers . I quent paragrap WI argu,. 'fie discursive-rheroflca . . f ity It deSignates a speCl . problernatization 0 secun '. f . direct regulation to a direct . the SWitch rom an In f structure t h at orgnruzes ..' ders rhe illiberal moment 0 , . 'on SecurItizatlon ren " h. mode of VIOlent InterventI .' d h f ctions as rhe deCISive Inge , ' .f d nant an r us un the security dlsposltJ oml 'b' I nd sovereign modes of power. thar allows the inrersectIon of II era a

4 THE RHETORIC

OF SECURITIZATION DlSPOSITIF

AND

THE ILLIBERAL SECURITY

... been developed by Ole Wxver, Barry of seCUritizatIOn has (B Wxver and de Wilde 'Id . the 1990s uzan, Buzan and jaap de WI e Since h aradigm known as the Copel11998). Today it stands for a major researc dP . mostly used in srudles of E 2006) ThiS para Igm IS .. h hagen School (C.A.S. . . I . h ttracted the attention of nelg 路 b t recent y It as a . d路 international re Iatlons, U . ' I y and migration stu les. bouring branches 0f researe h such as cnmInO og

The concepr

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Suen Opitz

It furnishes a perspective on security that departs from purely military and state-centered definitions of the term. Discussing phenomena such as international crime, financial crises and environmental pollution since the 19805, the (inter-)discipline of security studies was faced with a need to adapt its notion of security. The Copenhagen School met this challenge by offering a "nominalist approach" to security (Wxver 1995: 57). This directs attention to socially scattered acts of securitization and thus performs a methodological shift towards a genuinely sociological analysis. In order to understand how the theory of securitization can amend an analytics of governrnenraliry, the following brief outline of the approach is helpful.

The Copenhagen School effects epistemological and theoretical changes in respect to the study of security on two main levels. Most importantly, it abandons a scientifically predetermined notion of what security "really is" and which problems "really" belong to the security agenda. Security is not regarded as an objective factor, independent of context, but refers to a specific discursive operation whose context-specific social applications render problems first and foremost into problems of security. Accordingly, security becomes a question of performatiue acts of securitization and their respective success or failure. Epistemologically the Copenhagen School promotes a constructivist approach, informed by current theories of communication: as second-order observers-that is, as observers observing other observers (Luhmann 1993)-scholars have to map discursive operations of securitization in their respective contingency.

Since a security situation does not exist a priori but is constituted through the discursive treatment of a theme within a "security mode," Buzan, Wrever and de Wilde find themselves confronted with the further task of defining the act of securitization more precisely. According to these authors, the mere use of the terminology of security is not enough to identify the discursive operation as securitization. In their view, the term by itself is too unspecific and multifaceted to transform social facts into security concerns. Only speech acts which exhibit the following rhetorical structure are capable of this: speech acts that present an issue as an existential threat to a designated referent object (e.g., the state, the well-being of the population, certain constitutional principles) which therefore has to be protected by resorting to extraordinary means. Thus, the authors of the Copenhagen School do not focus on security solely as a signifier-however "thick" (Huysmans 1998) or "empty" (Laclau 1996) it may be. Rather, the act of securitization is always already distinguished by a certain dramatization of the relationship between a threat, its referent object and the measures taken. In this sense, securitization remains tied to the language of military warfare. The designation of an existential threat postulates an urgency that tends to suspend daily routines and pushes politics beyond normal procedures.

How can the theory of securitization contribute to an understanding of present invocations of security within the framework of governmentality studies' Even though the speech act theory of securitization does not

Government

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103

. diisposar,I first, to reflect upon the . historical have the analytical means at ItS ti ate conditions of possibility for securitization acts Of, second, to inves g _ . . . ff important complementary perspec their social materialization, It a ers an II on illiberal modes of tive on how security dlsc~urse func~o~~1t~ t~are-~~scribethe question of governing. Importantly, this approac p practices of governmental-

~overeignty into th~ and~~~~teOd ~nov:tset~~~i~:~he transformation of soverity, In fact, Foucau t a I. mechanisms instead of merely . h h governmenta securrty , . . elgn power t roug . f ower-from sovereignty via discipline maintaining that various forms a p d d another However to all hronolozi lly succee e one . , to governance-c rono ogica I b t also the majority of studies intents and purposes not only Foucau t, I u. f power simply as a foil. . hi e the sovereign ogre a applying IS concepts, us . f illiberal governmentality are much less Consequently, the mechanisms a I II . f the self (Rose 1999) or conwell explored than neo-liberal tech:c~~~el~ 0 and Starkey 1998). Mariana duct In postfordisr orgamzauons (f Y h to the silent substitution of ib t s this klac 0 researc Valverde (2 007) attn u e" lity" in the course of Fou" ." by the term goverllmenta I f the term secunry . bsri . has erased connotations 0 iew this su sntunon ..

I h caulr's lectures. n er VI, . I I' The concept of sec unttza. horitari a nd SOCia exc USlOn. police, aut oruanarnsrn, dvi hi It draws attention to a floattion provides for a way of reme fYIn~tiS '. terventions which ignore the ing rhetorical structure that calls or irect In to liberal rule. Under cond .

II ereign exception . bounds of law an insra a sov. the concept targets the point at which dirions of modern governmentalitfYI'.b I. becomes illiberal. As will be · . the name a I era Ityhi h Iibera I regu Iatron-r-rm .1 . k the threshold at w lC gov· d b tl in greater detai ,It mar s I out me su sequen y . he classi terms of sovereign power. ·· t culared In t e c assic .. f. ern menta I uy IS rear 1 . f the liberal security dispositi In conReading the Foucauldian account o. ves to be fruitful in at least . . . h t of secunnzanon pro Junction With t e concep . his to understand how govern· d foremost It e ps u I three respects. F irst an , . acts of exception, name y . If t resort to sovereign II mental rule a ows itse 0 .. tion takes over the govern.. . n When securltlza I , h. through acts of secur mzatio .

I'· f Iberal government. In t IS .

I I fleets on the rrmrs 0 I . . f mental security ca Cll us re . I ment in the prablematlzatlon a .. . marks a partlcu ar rna .

I s view securItlzatIon . h far securitization a way , W underestimates ow .. . security. However, rever .

I d' ·tif. he takes seCUfltlZatiOn as 'b'I' . h' the libera !SPOSI .

W ' remains a POSSI I Ity Wit In .."

1995' 54 et seq.). xver s " al politics (Wxver. . simply detache d from norm fl· eech actS chosen by partlcu. f .. t" as free- oatlng sp f conception a secuntlza Ion.. d f the regime 0 governmen.. tlon Indepen ent 0 . lar actors renders securltiza b I "desecuritizatlon "(·b·d) I I . 0f . e that an a so ute I. tality' it leads him to assum .. h pective of governmenta ,ty, , .., ·bl B t Within t e pers . h h liberal politics IS POSSI e. u I f h I·beral dispositif that welg s t e .. . . t and parce 0 tel h" nroeot secunUzatlOn IS par (2006' 94) has noted, t e gover . costs of freedom. As Jef Huysmans .. h· hich practical freedom IS r . he sphere Wit In w . .bl of excessive freedom de lmltS t.. . d the line that makes It POSSI e ." t of securitization raw I realized. Hence, ac s b b d governmental ru e. to exclude those considered to e eyon

104

Sven Opitz

Secondly,

conjoining

Government a Foucauldian

analytics

of government

with

the The existential threat figured by the overheated and impassioned rhetoric of securitization determines how those who are taken to be outside of the game of liberal conduct will be treated. Securitization stages an antagonistic drama between a threatened object and its inimical subject. Almost anything can take the position of the threatened object: the population, the infrastructure, even the "liberal way of life" or the "civilized world" itself. Accordingly, the position of the threatening subject might be occupied by a variety of dangers.

But more often than not it refers to a personalized enemy. Within acts of securitization the inimical subject is denied the standing of a person, someone who would be capable of acting reasonably. Securitization sets up a boundary between the "level of the interplay of differential normalities" (Foucault 2007: 63) and the dangerous abnormal (Foucault 1978). The latter cannot be normalized and needs to be confronted illiberally. Thus the erection of a barrier, beyond which government can grant no latitude for freedom, correlates with a discrimination of possible and impossible subject positions. Via the act of securitization, govern mentality effects a rupture in the continuum of subjecrivarion by separating the realm of intelligible subjects from the field of impossible, fundamentally excluded, deconsrirured, subjects.

Finally, combining an analytics of government with the concept of securitization makes it possible to tie the latter to a political rationality and its technological apparatus. While proponents of the Copenhagen School are only able to see isolated speech acts, the governmentality perspective traces these acts to their horizon of intelligibility.

They treat them as belonging to a more encompassing rationalization of conduct which includes rules of judgment, legitimate goals, and elaborate procedures for reaching rhese goals. The means, objects and agents of intervention are thus not considered as a-historical entities but refer back to an episrernic regime set up by specific problernarizarions of security. This politico-episternic regime determines the subsidiary justifications, the qualifications and the conditions of possibility for securitization. Moreover, situating processes of securitization within governmental regimes makes it possible to understand their material foundation in technologies of power.' Governmental technologies assemble scientific knowledge, technical apparatuses, anthropological assumptions, and architectural forms in strategic ways to configure relations of conduct.

The implementation of illiberal governmental measures depends on material devices such as passports (Torpey 2000), databases (A moore and de Goede 2005), and checkpoints (Weizman 2007: 139 et seq.). Securitization either reconfigures the logic of how these devices are used, or introduces or adapts previously banned forms of intervention-the acceptance of torture as a "technology of intelligence gathering" in the "war on terror" is a case in point (Krasmann 2007).

Copenhagen School sheds more light on processes of desubjectivation.

Hence, although acts of securitization acrual implementation of illiberal measures

are nor synonymous and their technologies,

with the they are

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105

constitutively involved in their material exercise. But how are we to spe~ify the mode of this power? Where does it fit in Foucault's menu of sovereign, disciplinary and liberal power? As the following will show, illiberal governmentality consists of folding these modes of power into a new constellation.

5. ILLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY AND SOVEREIGN POWER Securitization opens the political space for the exertion of illiberal power within liberalism. But if we want to understand the specific rationales of illiberal power, it is necessary to re-visit the notion of sovereignty as p~rts of govern mentality. The remainder of this chapter shows how a re-arnculated notion of sovereignty provides the clues needed for an understanding of illiberal governrnentality.

Introducing the notion of sovereignty into the frame of governmentality qualifies Foucault's own accounts of sovereignty. Although sovereign power figures prominently in Discipline and PUnish (Foucault 1977: 3 et seq.), in The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1990 (1978]: 133 et seq.), and in Society Must be Defended (Foucault 2003a: 239 et seq.), Foucaulr con' a hiisronca 'II y au td a ted form of power '..Ir rernams under-rbeor izedd Slid ers It in his work, compared to disciplinary power and hiopowcr (Singer an Weir 2006). To put it polemically, Foucault's analysis of sovereignty has " of LOUIS never decapitated the Imaginary 0 f t h e kiIng. The countenance , XIV flickers through Foucault's characterization of sovereignty as a power which emanates from a center, celebrates its greatness 111 publ.lc spect~~les and acts through decree. This figure of rhe sovereign as a urutary so. lect which represents possesses, and exercises power from a unique poslt1?n '" 'I I dds with conremporary socra l in a universally binding way IS c ear y at 0 ," f diff iared , d multIpItclry 0 I erennare theory with its stress on the comp Iexuy an b power al usr , e to ana yze ItS f h 0 power t at , disrupts liberal practices an d norms fun d arne ntally , Without resorting to an omnipotent subject in possession of rhar power? . l tion of security creates a veeFoucault recognized that t h e pro b ernanza , ' 'I f libism tth at potentia' lIy Violates tor at the center of liberaItsm "d the pnncip es ba I f , h I f the irnpnsone mem ers 0 erality. When Klaus Croissant, t e awyer 0 'F '1977 Fouf d asylum, JI1 ."ranee JI1 t , German Red Army faction, was re use dessus "D' mars la secunre es aucault (2001a: 367) tersely remar ke:d esor hiM res of security . . bove t e aw. easu des lois"-From now on, securtty IS a b .dinary measures I . ts out to e extract frequently claim, Foucau Irapt y porn . ' clue one might T k' this statemenr as a , b I that are not bound yaw. a mg I rice offegal exemp... . governmenta prac I s~y that securitization oorg~n1ze~ a doubt a classical prerogative of lion, And legal exemption IS, Without any ,

social

logics.

Therefore,

Foucault's

theory

of decentered

'power In order used against his own account a f sovereign .

'II aunt for a logic mechanisms. How can one t h eorenca y ace 0

0

o

0

106

Sven Opitz

Government

sovereignty: as Carl Schmitt (] 934) famously put it, sovereign is "he who decides on the exception." An unorthodox interpretation of Schmitt's defi-

nition can be used here to reformulate the relationship between sovereignty, the subject of power, and the law.

The characterization of sovereignty

as a "Grenzbegriff" (Schmitt ]934: 11) or "limit concept," emphasizes that sovereignty, while heterogeneous to

the legal norm, still refers to the law, even in transgressing it. As a relation of power, sovereignty is neither inside nor outside the legal realm-it confuses the boundaries of law by occupying a zone of indistinction (Agamben ]998). In other words, the sovereign breaches the law by legal means. It is essential for him to claim proto-legal authority in suspending rhe law.

Otherwise, the sovereign would just be an outlaw. At the same time, the figure of the sovereign subject remains remarkably undetermined in Schmitt's famous formula, as Friedrich Balke (2005: 77) has noted. Whoever decides on the exception is sovereign. Extrapolating this indeterminacy, one can say that sovereignty is the governmental function of transgressing the bounds of law from within the law. In principle anyone, irrespective of qualification, can occupy this function. Therefore, sovereignty is not tied to a singular subject that occupies a center of power. Instead, it is a type of power relation characterized by an empowerment to act beyond normal legality.

The extraordinary measures instantiated through acts of securitization (torture, hyper-surveillance, "shoot-to-kill" policies) rest upon this paralegal detachment from law. And it is precisely the governmental security calculus that determines the threshold beyond which this sovereign detachment can usurp liberal forms of power at multi-various points within the social body. Ultimately, this means that sovereign subjects are constituted

in relation to a certain governmental

rationality, just like the "desrituted"

subjects who are submitted to a sovereign power. Judith Butler's (2004: 50 et seq.) analysis of "indefinite detention" shows this proliferation of sovereign acts vis-a-vis the "precarious," i.e., legally abjected life. Corroborating the perspective developed here, she locates the exercise of prerogative power within the field of modern govern mentality. She depicts the military tribunals appointed by the US government as part of its "War on Terror" as "petty sovereigns" (ibid.: 56). As administrative agencies, they are part of a thoroughly governmental executive function that applies the law in an instrumental and tactical fashion: "The result is a production of a paralegal universe that goes by the name of law" (ibid.: 61).

The transgression of legally bounded rule from within the law has been problematized

by Walter Benjamin (] 965) as the logic of the police. Within the logic of modern pol ice, two forms of power coincide that liberal political theory sees as separate: the power of making laws (rechtsetzende Cewalt) and the power of maintaining the law by executing it (rechtserhaltende Gewalt). While the intellectual architects of modern democracy since Mon-

tcsquieu attribute these powers to different institutional ing to Benjamin

the logic of the police criss-crosses

branches, accord·

this neat separation

as

it creates law by enforcing

Unlimited

it. Hence, the police is a limit-figure

107

actualizin~

t:~el;;~~n~~o~_

a sovereign relation: it is a spectral force t~at contafmlna~e/ dane governmental practice. Correspondingly, a orm . g

I

the name

lows the logic of police if It transcends the ~awdbY:dP;~~~~~th t~is act, reof public order and securtt y the law IS VIOate a, alread that the established.

Police Science in thehseve;teenth

~:~~~:~ ~nhea~ to use:ub-Iegal

police was not an extension of ~ e lila 1C~~~~~ate into the narrowest gaps of techniques like decrees and edlctls t p. h olice an instrument for the . I C tly Foucau t sees m t e p h t e SOCla. onsequen , . ." I' is the direct govern men. f" " states of exception. po Ice h d pro ucnon 0 petty .

0 . let's say that police is t e tality of the sovereign qua sovehrelgn. r ag~':~d functions in the name of permanent coup d'Etat [ ... ] t at ISexercise lity without having to mold . . les of ItS own ratton a I , f h and in terms 0 t e prmcrp .. les of i stice" (Foucault 2007: · If h rherwise given ru es 0 IU . or mode I use on teo d d the law at the same time.

339). This approach complements a~. exce~ :he present day and is based 0 Moreover, it has characterized the po IC~u~ 1 de 2006) First it acts as a on two structural attributes (Dubber, an a vert"ces of p'reven~ion that lie h f oncentratmg on prac I technology 0 f t e uture,C ulatin the prosecution of offenders. g beyond the codified criminal laws ref k I d e that is not legally codified g Second, it applies a kind of situanona no,,;, e present following Giorgio At . . d .. of "discretion, . and culminates In eCISlons . . he i ntroduction of sovereignty e are witnessing tel . .

000 : 104) , w.

Agamben (2 ifests i If in an "almost constitutive f 1 li which maru ests use into the gure 0 po ICe, . hr." The form of government that comes exchange between VIOlence and ng '. . b teen sovereignty and police h a relati f contiguity e w b into being throug a re anon 0 h 1m of possibilities created y can, thus, be termed illiberal. It uses t de ach d from the law to waver as acts of securitization [0 allow powers erac e "forces 01 law" (Agamben

2005: 32 et seq·)I·· -however cursorily-how The following paragrap hs seek to . out I'me night make it posS!ibl e to II . f sovereign po Ice I h this legal/extra-Iega ogre 0 d. f illiberal governmentality. The tec capture the current modus operon 10h I I stitutively rest upon the "petty ·11·b I mentality t at con . nologies of I I era govern I d i terms of three aspects: ItS · ill be exp ore m d f I sovereignty" 0 f t h e po Ice w if ·11t knowledge and its or er 0 . . . f irs speci c WI 0 , rationalization 0 space, I subjectiuities. .. e: As recent border studies suggest, Illiberal RationalizatIOns of Spac '. . I· . g vector but also moves ..

I h·b·ts a de-termona Izm .

I' b t liberalism not on y ex I I. I at enabling c"CU atlon, u . I' .

It alms not on y d N I towards re-territona IzatlOn. b·l· (f Mezzadra an el son . d I t'ng such mo Iity C . ·b 1 h also at secunng an regu.a I ablin of circulation. LI era I~m, e 2008). Foucault has descnbed the en . g f mercantilism With the ted economiC space 0 fib I argues, confronts t h e segmen I.' It marks "a neW type 0 g a a idea of the world as a mar k e t without ." . .

I ractlce

mllts.

I 2008: 56). LI·b era I gove,,- 1 (Foucau t I 2007.

calculation 111 governmenta p. .

I" disciplines (Foucau t . . I "centrlpeta d h s ment, in contrast to the IllC uSI~e, . s ever more elements, an t u . radiUS lIltegrate 44), constantly expan d SitS l

108

Sven Opitz

appears "cenrrifuga!" (ibid.: 45). However, the liberal problernatization of security also entails substantial re-territorialization, as recent works on the mechanisms of control show (Walters 2006). Foucault (2001 b: 385) prematurely assumed that the problem of borders in "security socieries" will disappear over time. A theoretical understanding of sovereignty as a power that is inscribed into the field of govern mentality serves as a corrective here, as it directs the theoretical focus towards the production of territorial barriers and thresholds dedicated to the deployment of police forces.

Despite all the hollowing out of the territorial logic of the national state, national borders still serve as important regulators within the global calculation of (neo)liberal governrnentaliry (Andreas 2003). In addition to this, spatial boundaries are drawn both "above" and "below" this level.

The flexible multiplication of spatial thresholds multiplies the occasions for rhe spatial inclusion and exclusion of bodies: "Borders are no longer by definirion the limits between national sovereignties; rather they are erected wherever there is a need to solve and to organize social space and political governance" (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2007: 152). The Schengen Agreement, as depicted by William Walters and [ens Henrik Haahr (2005: 91 et seq.), is a case in point. EU borders have shifted far beyond the continent of Europe toward the Mediterranean and North Africa, as well as to the interior of the territories of the member states. The problernatization of security goes hand in hand with the project of "rezoning sovereignty" (Perry and Maurer 2003: XIII), in which global policing follows the model of a city whose traffic flows have to be regulated. Governmental calculations of security create a continuum of inclusion and exclusion by granting or denying various strata of the population access to different areas at various times. The detention camp, as the spatial embodiment of a state of emergency (Agamben 1998: 166 et seq.), forms the end point of this continuum. Beyond the manifold caesuras of the present security dispositif, the detention camp corresponds to a "pure" securitization, which is being implemented by applying policing instruments such as protective custody (Schutzhaft) or preventive detention.

Will to Knowledge: Illiberal governmentality does not only operate by parcelling out spaces of liberal and illiberal power. The problematization of security affects governmental rationality in its entirety. An "encyclopaedic will to knowledge" animates a boundless logic of suspicion that covers the whole population.

A good example is the Data Retention Directive passed by the EU parliament in March 2006 (Leistert 2008). This instructs member states to pass laws that obligate each provider of telecommunication services to store the telephone and internet data of all 450 million EU citizens for at least six months. An all-encompassing, total archive of traffic and location data is to be created "for the purpose of the investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious crime" (EU directive 2006/24/EC: 56). This data is to be collected and reassembled irrespective of whether an individual is under investigation.

In the same way, routine practices

Government

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109

nk transfers can be condensed into data profiles such as road usage and ba "T II s stems bonus programs and g that ate potentially useful for pohcfln . a Yfncti;n as parts of a modu' to account 10 ormation u laws a IIowing access d Eri son 2000) that connects bl " (Haggerty an nc lar "surveillant assem age .

Not least it cuts across the . ws for security reasons., d I seeming y remote purvle" d " . everal investigations have faun S old division between publIc an Plnvate. h anagement has already been . f sterner re anons ip m ) f that in orrnanon rom cu " ( Cameron 2005: 115 er seq .. . the "war on terror e.g., . use d as a source in , a e of rho. digital code, technologies can On the basis of the umversallangu g f t i rial capacities enhance each be potentially linked so that rheir m orma 10 other on an event-driven baSIS. bl ization of security shifts the emphaary pro emattza I . d Because t h e contempor h h e already been comnlltte . f criminal acts t at av . ' I sis from the prosecution a " ibl f t re dangers the constItutlOna . agamst POSSI e u u , . d to preventive measures idd I inc 'pie every citizen IS un er ' . overr id en . n prm I'd b assumption 0 f innocence IS ibl has to be collecre a out h k owledge as POSSI e , II suspicion. Thus, as muc ~ ive o] the past occurrence of potentia y hem Irrespective 0 .

I ' ' each an d everyone 0 f t , "" f the epistemologlCa capacities hi I" a reactiVatlOD 0 II illegal deeds. T IS resu tS In , for which the insta anon a f of all-seeing

and all-knowing

sovereign

pOI'lvedr'drones during

the European . surveillance nly emblematic. This process hi 2008 In SWItzer an IS a bi Soccer Champions ip 'f' lar unified sovereign su jeer estoratlon 0 a singu , " I h does not amount to t erR h the epistemologlca pretenf the term at er, h diiverse in the early mo dern sense a .' achieved throug , d II-knOWing power are I sions of an all-seeing an a It'ple sites. Consequent y, on a .

I deployed across mu I d technologic a means " no longer sun an eag Ie, but he si f sovereign power are di I symbolic level, t e signs 0 d b d canners. Correspon ing y, on the small icons of video cameras an a y s f the polIce state" (Foucault a practicalleve!, the "unlimited Pftesum~t(loFnOu~ault1977: 213) by means of hi" ert, 2008 17) is to gather t h e "d us t a events b'le artention evet on tea , f d everywhere mo I f re "thousands a eyes poste. " (ibid.: 214). The creation a a comp authoring an "immense police text h' lIation of CCTV systems, and r mining t e msta h' h to be hensive data ban k for d a a , f "te computers, w IC are h powers or pnva bl" the projected on IlOe searc . 2009 seem to re-esta ISh the n government 10, d implemented by t h e G erma lit urportedly replace. . logic of police that libetal governme~ra y: 5 operandi of technologies of Order of Subiectivities: Fmally, t e mO 'h' how the organization of . f recognltlon sows b" """ control such as automatic ace , . I" k d to an ordet of su Jectlvltles. knowledge and space by the pO:lce ii~icla~c~mmunication afret the artack~ According to a tecent analysIs a po, especially in the USA-was can of 9/11 the problematization of secutlty-. 'dentification technology, In , k blOrnetrlC I I ducted in such a way as to ma e I' (Gates 2006). This techno ogy 'k propflate so Utlon , I d agamst particular, seem II e an ap " ra hed with a camera, ISOate ."

. remote-contra e tee hno Iogy In. ' I d i

operates as follows: a face IS phot~g Pnsfonned into a digital "face ptlnt the background of the plctur~ an t;a rchived photographs.

The goal IS an that can be run through data ases a a

11 0

Government

Suen Opitz

immediate identification that does not hinder the circulation of mobile subjects. Although biometric technology is also included in passports (Bonditti 2004), technologies like automated face recognition promise to render the time~consuming process of checking an identity document against its referent, i.e., the "real person," unnecessary. Instead, it purports to read bodies directly from a distance. In this way, the technology aims to identify threats and r~move t~e~ from circulation in real-time, according to previously established cnten a and margins of risk. Face recognition embodies the promi.se. of a~signing a clear identity to a new, opaque and fleeting enemy.

This Identified enemy is potentially to be excluded from the liberal order of subje~tivity. It is an extremely moralized, demonized enemy-or, to put it in Schrnitrcan terms, an "absolute" enemy (Prozorov 2006: 79 et seq.). Maybe th~ term "e~e~y" is even misleading in itself, because the figure at stake is n,elth,er a criminal nor an enemy in the legal sense. The process of securitJzat1o~ turns it into an existential threat or danger that cannot be fought according to the rules of criminal law or the laws of war. Foucault's (1978) genealogy of the dangerous individual contributes to a better understanding of rhis form of subjectivity. He points to the emergence of a specific type of c~lmJnal In mneteenth-century forensic medicine, who was convicted not for hIS deeds but for his whole mode of being which was, at least at the beginning of the century, considered to be monstrous (Foucault 2003b: 53 et seq.). In terms of subjecrivation, this monstrous figure is best characterized as bound to a paradoxical subject-position.

It is forced to occupy a discursive "nonposition" that captures the subject completely and, at the same time, denies it the status of an intelligibly speaking subject. In the words of classical political theory, the deconstitured subject possesses only phone, not logos. But under governmental rule, this de-subjectivation process also includes an economically coded dimension. Whereas the subject of liberalism has to follow his interests by taking reasonable risks, the deconstitured, dangerous subject is portrayed as a deeply uneconomic subject. It is a subject overwhelmed by an excess of interest that cannot be normalized. Confronted with the dangerous subject, govern mentality encounters an interest that consumes the rational subject en~irely-and turns it into an irrational, unintelligible, destructive :gent o~tSlde the bounds of humanity. Consequently, the subject marked as abject cannot be governed by granting it freedom. It finds itself placed in a governmental

relation beyond the conduct

of conduct.

111

adequacy get inverted. The problematization of security, which culminates in the martial logic of securitization, is rooted in the tradition of modern politics. At the same time, my elaborations point to a specific mutation of the modern "onrotheology" (Der Derian 1995: 25) of security. One can dramatize this mutation by adding a scene to a theatrical governmental scenario found in Foucault (2007b: 282-283).

In this scenario, the legal subject says to the sovereign: "You must not, because I have rights and you must not touch them." The economic subject, however, says to the sovereign: "You must not because you cannot. And you cannot because you do not know, and you do not know because yOLIcannot know." In the field of current security politics, the second critique has become hushed.

Instead, there seems to be a readiness for an authorization: "You must, because nobody knows. You must, because air hough nobody knows, you are most likely to have the means to know and you are capable of acting." This authorization can be extended to the point of saying: "You are a!lowed, although we have rights." At that stage the limits of liberality have been reached,

without

any doubt.

NOTES 1. In her article for New Yorker in February 2005, journalist Jane Mayer coined the now infamous term "Outsourcing Torture."

2. The disturbing scene can be seen on You Tube (accessed May 10, 2009): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AyvrqcxNIFs. A "raser" belongs to a group of supposedly non-lethal weapons that incapacitates the victim with a charge of 50,000 volts, without leaving any marks on the body. Although a number of people have died after being shot with a "taser," these devices continue to be used to fill the strategic gap between a warning cry and the use of firearms.

3. For the distinction

between

technologies

and techniques

of power, see Fou-

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6

The Right of Government Torture and the Rule of Law Susanne Krasmann In the search for a liberal technology of government, it emerged that the juridical form was a far more effective instrument of regulation than the wisdom or moderation of governors. l ... ] Regulation has not been sought in the "law" because of the supposedly natu rallegalism of liberalism, but because the law defines forms of general intervention excluding particular, individual, and exceptional measures, and because participation of the governed in drawing up the law in a parliamentary system is the most effective system of governmental

economy. (Foucaulr 2008, 321)

Since the Enlightenment, the legal and moral ban on torture has been part of the self-understanding of Western societies. Following World War II, the ban was legally anchored in many international treaties and legislatively updated. Its inviolability is presently considered an international norm.'

But in reality, as the literary scholar and researcher on violence Jan Philipp Reemtsma has indicated (1991: 256), torture "was never abolished."

Torture and mistreatment surface repeatedly, both in crisis situations like the Algerian and Northern Ireland conflicts and in constellations of "total institutions" (Goffman 1961) such as police custody, the prison, and military training.

Most

recently,

there

has even been talk

of

torture's

"return"

(Beesrer moller and Brunkhorst 2006)-of that practice as something that since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 has again become evident and discussible. Photos from the Abu Ghraib prison, surfacing in 2004, thus not only presented people with the human potential for ugly behavior but also the functioning of a "chain of command" (Hersh 2004; Sands 2008) authorizing torture and mistreatment in the name of combating terrorisrn (Danner 2004; Greenberg and Dratel 2005; Mayer 2008). Apparently unaffected by these revelations, a debate has simultaneously been unfolding concerning the legitimacy and even legalization of torture in certain circumstances.

It has occupied both literary supplements and scholarly publications and has donned an honorable cloak, articulating itself in the name of saving

lives.'

.

Concern about this development, equally manifest in the debate, is nor only focused on the victims of torture; on a more abstract level the question of the validity of the principle of rhe rule of law and the endurance of the

116

Susanne Krasmann

The Right of Government

constitutional state itself has moved to the forefront. For an absolute ban on torture is such a basic element in the constitutional order of liberal-democratic societies that its revocation would in a sense be the same as their selfdissolution. In the words of David Luban (2006: 38): "The self-conscious aim of torture is to turn its victim into someone who is isolated, overwhelmed, terrorized, and humiliated. Torture aims, in other words, to strip away from its victims all the qualities of human dignity that liberalism prizes." From such a perspective, any discussion of the use of torture would not only have ro be forbidden but would actually be superfluous (see Levinson 2004a: 23).

How, then, are we to explain the apparent inconsistency between torture's persistence, even its open legitimation, and a system of law that contradicts this in an absolute sense? To answer this question, a look at "progressive" international legislation and jurisprudence reinforcing and differentiating the categorical prohibition of torture over recent years would be insufficienr. Despite a widespread justificatory strategy, the concrete episodes at issue here have by no means been exceptional cases-the notorious rotten apples (Brown 2005). Rather, within the conceptual framework of governmentality, it becomes clear that torture can become a rationale of power even against established law and in a sense make itself acceptable. In this chapter I will thus argue that in the context of certain security imperatives, torture is rationalizable and can even inscribe itself into law.

Unlike other, relatively conventional theories of state and law emerging from the social sciences and legal theory, the perspective of governmentality can account for the interplay between torture and the constitutional state (section 1). This can be exemplified through the ongoing debate concerning the legitimacy and legality of torture (section 2). Importantly, rhe promise of security evident in this debate does not take merely rhetorical form. Rather, torture rationalizes itself performatively in the construction of a specific security imperative (section 3).

1. THE RATIONALITY

OF TORTURE

Proragonists of a legalization of torture press their claim in terms of special threats that require extraordinary measures.

Here a common foundational figure is the so-called ticking-bomb scenario: a person in police custody knows the hiding place of a ticking bomb that directly threatens many lives-and remains stubbornly silent. Would you not (this is the overt moral message) yourself torture this person if it were necessary to save these lives?' As the argumentation has it, the emergency law implemented in such cases would in no way lead to a normalization of the exception.

To the contrary: it would serve to keep the established legal system intacr.

Within this reading law itself offers the mechanism for preventing a hollowing out of the principle of the rule of law. The democratic constitutional state is its own guaranree.

117

According to Giorgio Agamben (1998), such assurances are doubtful.

The "state of exception," he argues (his starting point being Carl Schmitt), " " al element of law It is not the response to a chaotic situation IS an Integr .

If" preceding the juridical order but, conversely, the resu t 0 a ~u~pen~~n of the rule to which it remains tied-law IS abrogated thr~ug II a;"fi "~ state of exception does not mark a zone beyond law but adega y e ne .. vereign power I recr access to zone where the rule is suspen d e d ,glvmg s~ . . . "b life." However Agamben de-histonclzes the state of exception In de~~~n~ ~his potency 'of sovereign power as the political realm's ongmar y element and in deciphering the .st~te sof exce~tJOn as ha~: :vere:r:r~~:l:~ feature of liberal democratic soctene s. Guantan amfa t modernity" if h enon but as a resul t a a logos a II a historica y speer c p enom . "dispositi f" of power " I" " d " n power here merge Into one BJOpo incs an soverel~ . tion-in contrast to Foucault's eventually reduced to ItS repressive func lif s a distinct historical

Pi

perspective (1978) on produ~tlve p~w;~eos~::e 10~:xceptiOn as something feature. In that Agamben u n er:tan ~al sis de rives itself of the possibillike a structural element of law, h~s a Y d ~ law as a political insrruit y of thinking in terms of social orces, an 0 ment (Huysrnans 2008).

I" Ilows us to provisionally y In contrast, the concept of governmenta It a f om a logic of law-and lity r " f law and constItutiona separate an ana 1YSlS0 . h ralysis to the exigencies " ay of relating sue an at o f t h e exceptIon---:as a ,';' 07) Unlike Agamben, this perspective of "governmg SOCIeties (Dean. 20 f路 . wer obtaining access to cnce 0 sovereign po I does not see torture as a pra . f law and constitution a " " lif h ent of the suspension a biological I eat t e mom ivon of liberal government ope ratitv.Rath faces in the horizon a a I ity. Rat er, torture sur d I along this path. Torture ing in the name of security-and pro uches aw mises to protect the life " " f bi I"" al power t at pro IS the rationale 0 a IOpO inc """ If the right to dispose over of the population, in the process assignmg use human life. lit perspective actually be proovernmenta IY " f But to w h at extent can a g h e elided the question 0 it himself seems to av " ductive here w h en F oucau 7 h he furthermore conceIves " f h t of government, w en f Violence rom t e concep hi f govern mentality, as a type 0 " in hi I s on the istory a II d sovereignty, in IS ecture . . . I mode of law (a owe " "" " If to binary operation a " I juridical power Iirninng Itse 8 d h finally he accuses socia I 2007" 4-6) an wen" 08 vs. forbidden; see Foucau t ""' d" the state (see Foucault 20 : " phobia regar lt1g b I scientific theory a f h avlt1g a " lothing else but the rna Ie 187), while for his part describing the statelats s:, (Foucault 2008: 77)? For " f I" Ie governmenta I Ie " d f effect of a regime 0 mu tip Iy has a very limite array a "" h" I sis of power not on f I Foucault's CfltICS, IS ana y .' h societal significance 0 aw, " I f r examlOing t e "" instruments at its d Isposa 0 . h路 pect. Foucault, the Crltlque but also contains distinct dangers In t IS res ;ion of law" he lacks due . the protective f unc , I ze would have it, fails to recogOl d "ty and finally of a rea m f freedom an secun , respect for law as guarantor a of the political (see Wickham 2006: 598).

118

Susanne Krasmann

This critique, though, has itself been shown to have weaknesses: for instance, Foucault does not identify juridical power with law, but recognizes in it a specific, prohibitive form of power.' And with his distinction between sovereignty, discipline, and govern mentality as three types of power, Foucault is not trying to show that law has historically lost significance but rather that it has taken on a new significance as an instrument for effectuating norms and normalization (Foucault 1977; 2003; see Biebricher 2006; Ewald 1990; Friedrich and Niehaus 1999; Rose and Valverde 1998).

For Foucault (2003: 38-39; 1978: 144; see also Valverde 2003), law begins to itself operate as a norm; it produces forms of subjection and subjectification. It takes on no power-limiting function bur-s-and this will need to be clarified-functions as an instrument of government in the name of security (see Foucault 2008: 64-65). A first question that needs to be posed is thus whether, in the framework of security policies understood in this sense, law can actually guarantee constitutional principles and with them the civilizing self-understanding of democratic societies. To this extent, under the auspices of security imperatives, torture exemplarily marks the vulnerable borders of democratic constitutionality.

"Torture is reason," declared Foucault (2003c) in an interview-but without any cynical undertone. His use of "reason" here was not an allusion to the German ethical concept of Vernunft, but to the traditional Western idea of a rule of reason-and the reason of rule, in the sense that regimes and techniques of rule shaped by violence can unfold a specific rationality.

In Foucault's words (2005: 49; see 1991: 79; 1981), "the most dangerous thing about violence is precisely its rationality. Naturally violence per se is horrible. But violence receives its firm basis and endurance from the type of rationality we insert in it. It has been said that if we lived in a rational world we could free ourselves of violence. That is completely false. Violence and reason are not irreconcilable." The question thus emerges of how torture can integrate itself into a rationality of power and consequently surface systematically (see Foucault 1991: 75). In regards to the theme of torture in liberal democratic societies, the framework of govern mentality emerges as helpful in relation to three topics:

1). The question of the significance of law-security stands "above the law" (Foucault 2003a). In the social sciences and legal theory, a normative understanding prevails of the modern constitutional state as a guarantor of its own principles and quite often as a historically necessary figure.

In contrast, Foucault presents the modern state's formation as above all a contingent and precarious process (see Jessop and Saar in this volume); the constitutional state's way of functioning is to be understood in such terms as well.

In this manner the history of governmentality is not markedly stamped by tbe idea of a continuous movement towards eitber ever-strengthening statc structurcs or juridification.

In fact, the contrary is the case: the

The Right of Government

119

路 ' f the state" (Foucault 2007: 109) describes a pro"governmenta Iizauon 0 d d h which a broad range of apparatuses, laws, an "proce ures h cess t roug 1 if d entity the state lli . thi nking and action into a more or ess urn e '" crysta ize 111 I . d f It here becomes an mrerthus first taking on its speCifically m~'t~:n ~;m;se of the state" (Foucault pretive principle, and a principle of p p ld become a 2007. 277) As a result the modern constitutional state cou di norm'ative figure-not ~neexisting once and for all, but rather nee ing to be repeatedly produced anew. , . f the startF I (2007' 276) identifies the cnSIS of the reason 0 state as bi . ou.cau t . ,: . " With the rise of liberalism, a new 0 jecmg point for this reflexive event.

I fi ld: the population becomes the tive domain appears In thebgovelrnmetta n~m~ of power oriented towards organizing principle of a IOpO inca eco , the advancement of both life and general prospe~:r;s a continuous formaithi hi di the modern state emerg , Wlt 1O t IS rea ing, f h icencies of governing soc let, d ioh ble in terms ate exige . hi non-process ecip era ic nif of classical concepts wit In . d I fi d a shift in the sigru cance , d res, an we a so n d d cur it y are not only conceive the theory of the state. Hence free om an se lIy complimentary elements , . h h by necessity mutua , as antagonistic t oug '. ' d h lineal function of freedom IS . . nonaliry: an t e po I I of functioning consntu I 'atber for liberal government freedom not reduced to a legal guarantee;:1999) that for its part demands that becomes a power resource (Ro, I' freedom is to be secured as security mechanisms be brought into p aiB tl r 2008) and for the sake both a central value of Western sOC1:t;~\b;'a~ government has asserted of the unfolding of productive force '. governmental restraint, then itself historically through an exhortatIon to f ' tervention (see Foucault l e 0 10 . e Its pr mctp . security is at t he same urn " " for freedom and vice S rity is consnrunve , ' 2007: 48-49; 200: 8 65) . ecu , 1 the basis for the pol itifreedom IS consequent y b ' versa. On t h e one h an d , h mer hand it is the asis . ~ . h state' on teo cal rights of citizens Vis-a-VIS tel' , t mentalize the law. These ha ni that themse ves ins ru d for security rnec arusrns h b ate but rather pro uce ts of a law t ey a rag , k mechanisms are not e Iemen . cis can successively rna e law. In the form of security laws, secur rty nee their way into the law. he soci I contract-society does not . f ent is not t e socta " Here the basis 0 governm Ewald 1990). Instead a kind of "security conconstitute Itself by way of law ( b. 504) that, understood in both a biopolititract" takes effect (Foucault 2003. h duces a relationship between f democracy t eory, pro ' h d cal framework an t at 0 I 2008' 63). In this way security governors and the governed (see Foucau t " lode in which political h'erarchaloperatIona m , policy no longer represents a I f the top down. Goverl11ng II themselves out rom f interests and state power spe ... the generation a consensus . ts on parflClpatiOn, on .

I in the name a f secuflty res. h basis of exclUSIOn:name y, time It operates on ted and assent; but at t he same , h' h xplains the tendency towar s . the populatIon w IC e 'd the of dangers threatenlllg 'b d' b ders of state interventIon an d hilly prescrl e or stepping beyon t e ega d Reid 2001: 41-42; Dean 2001). use of violence (see Dillon an

120

The Right of Government

Susanne K rasmann

Although liberal government no longer articulates itself in the language of reason of state, it can nevertheless evoke its logic: at the moment when protection of individual freedom a nd the life of the population self-evidently calls for state intervention-and mutates into a kind of security imperative.

And this represents the precise point where torture is rationalized and the conditions are present for its acceptance, a point that remains inconceivable as long as this relationality is dismissed and the constitutional state simply postulated as a normative reference point for analysis.

2). The rationalization of government both enables and limits specific forms of visibility. Analyses of governrnenra lity do not focus on the classi-

cal question of the foundations of governmental practice-that would be the question of legitimacy, or of which means are suitable for which endsthat would amount to postulating a substantial concept of rationality in Max Weber's sense and, juridically, to normatively assessing the legitimacy of various measures according to a principle of proportionality. In contrast, the question being posed here is how objects and goals, means and ends, themselves vary within different rationalities.

Analyses of goverrnenrality center on how ways of thinking shape the perception of problems, how appropriate definitions for solving problems are attached to their definition, and how tied to this, in turn, are certain techniques and procedures that for their part produce entirely new objects and subjects. Rationalities of government mark specific forms of epistemic access to reality that renders certain measures and ways of governing plausible in the first place. In other words, they produce specific regimes of visibility and articulation.

Wirhin this perspective, what needs to be examined is not only whether and how the illegal practice of torture is justified and legitimized, but also whether and how it becomes manifest in society in the first place. A central question of legal sociology, that of the relationship between the law's receptivity and stability (Fitzpatrick and Joyce 2007), here comes into focus. On the one hand law, we are informed, has to be open to social changes and hence adaptable to what points beyond itself; on the other hand, it has to offer dependability in that-speaking in terms of systems theory-it follows its own procedural logic and rules of codification and thus itself determines what law is. If we start with the presumption that a rigid, as it were autistic law that blinds itself to social developments will at some point sink into meaninglessness (see ibid.: 69-70), then the question of the difference between "book law" and "real law," i.e., law as it is practiced-as if law embodied objectivized norms for measuring reality,-turns out to be relatively unimportant.

Rather, the salient problem becomes that of what constitutes "the social" forming the law. What reality, or more precisely what kind of perceptions, constructions, and forms of reality, determine law?

The thesis of rationalization in the name of security can be further concretized as follows: present-day discourse on torture fits into the calculation of a basically continuous development of criminal and security policies

12]

in which rhe terror attacks of 911], rather than presenting themselves as an exception, mainly take on a catalyzing function. ~ence ~n many Wes;~~l countries over recent decades, terrorism, or orgalllzed cnrne, or the p. lems of sexual crime and juvenile delinquency, have been served up to JUStifya preemption-oriented expansion of the state's capacity for Inter~ent1?n (Ericson 2007' Hornqvist 2004). Within this movement, the ongcmg dIScourse concer~ing dissolution of the constitutional state by th~ preem~t"lve 2008) marks a shift from the classical policing state (H uster an d R u dolph "b" k concept of danger tied to concrete action or disturbance, to a st~acltris s and diffuse sirua;ional threats that must be counrered preemptive (s;e Le sius 2004: 454-455). This abstraction from concrete dangers an 111 1P " h h inciples connccted to the rule of vidualizable actions IS w at t rea tens pn II' " A d law such as determinability, proportionaliry, and not least a Justice. "n " " h II solidation of secunty Imperatives the same abstraction is w at a ows a con" f Th . d " II operung the way or torture.

IS within rhe law-s-in the en potentia Y " "d d I I t immediately be cons: ere ega, does not have ro mean r h at rorrure h as a h B h d " .

I di t" nal law and as t e us a 111111against prevailing natrona an mterna 10 . " I " . d d 10 It can also mean that torture IS simp y istration's legal adVISors inten e. .

I " "the practice of the in th f t ona securuy as 10 implicitly accepted 10 t e name a na Ih" d states where it is assumed they illegal delivery of terror suspects to t ir

J.

will be rortured." ""

3). Canstitutianalzty

J IS

"

a per/armatwe

actiee With his critique of state pr.

I' f tate theory but for a

ealing for a neg ect a s phobia, Foucau It was not ap P F 1 2008' 187-189' 2003 " ., f h t of the state ( oucau r zuve: " differentiation ate concep histori I d locally specific ratiolecture of January 14, 1976). Wirh the IstohflCa raanrting point his analysis "" d hi" of government as IS s ' f nalities an tee no ogles " " hi to icit y and mutability. I h n of the state In IfS IS r focuses on t e p h en omena I I d ial constirution of Western . f n place rhe ega an SOCI t h e practice a torture ca "W speak of a fundamen""" hold at what point can e f h d ernocranc soctettes on, h "b " tr crural features 0 t ese tal transformation, one that affects t e asrc 5 u states" (Steinmetz ]999a: 8)? . "fficient to raise serious doubts It is the case that Isolated mCidents are mSU . uch doubts require I lidity of the ban on torture, s d about the ongoing genera va "" N m lIy this is first measure fi rernatic apphcatlon. or a " an appearance a ItS sys" d f I I rinciples and then, against juridically in terms of a dlsregar or ~ga p ber of incidents) or strUCthis backdrop, fixed quantitativelyd(as t e nU~ished by total institutions. " I' h f h abling con Itlons esta "I d tura IIy In Ig tot e en " I dy existing norm is mls ea " red against an a rea " But a perspective measu h legal interpretation posI 't fails to see t at every f 1 fi ing. In the rst p ace, I " ated and that every application 0 a ru e sesses an IOstanCe when law IS cre. ' d deferral (Derrida 1990). Law potentially contains both a repetltlon an a eadable as an "effect" of a " f' Iy and IS ht us on lY r d h" IS generated per ormatlVe, ] 995' 2004) that for their part-:-an t IS series of pronouncements (Butler " t"ces Strictly speaklllg, then, is decisive-are always bound up Wit prac I .

h

]22

Susanne

Krasm ann

there is only "real law," and "book law" in the end consistently revealing itself as a practice meant to be examined on the surface of its historical and locally specific emergence (Foucault 1991; Rose and Valverde 1998). Law needs to be enforced," becoming relevant and effective at the moment of its societal negotiation (Hunt and Wickham 1994; Walby 2007). Hence it not only reproduces itself along its own rules of codification, but as the case of the practice of torture suggests can be understood, inversely, as an element of legal practice materializing in legislation and jurisprudence, and also in actions of the executive-in brief, in interactive processes. And this element in turn forms and deforms the constitutional state; the (de)forming itself must be measured recursively, in relation to previously posited constitutional principles.

Let us now connect this governmentality-oriented reading more concretely to the debate over the legitimacy and legalization of torture."

2. THE ABSOLUTE AND LIMITLESS

BAN ON TORTURE SECURITY

Classical, normatively focused sociology of law sees its main task as gauging the difference between "book law" and "real law," and between universal standards on the one hand and injustice or lack of rights on the other hand. But in fact the difference between "book law" and "real law" is not per se a problem, the former being able to live very nicely with a markedly different manifestation of the latter. A look at the theory of penal law makes this very clear: such law exists precisely on account of the difference between an interdiction and real actions, its function being to render the norm apparent. As already maintained by sociologists working in the tradition of Emile Durkheim and-in particular-within systems theory, law operates with a symbolic generalization of expectations, the symbolic validity of norms, not "real law," here being the decisive factor.

In the debate on torture, defenders of an absolute interdiction of the practice recite this argument when they recognize the danger of a deviation from the interdiction.

What COunts for them are thus not so much actual incidents and the factual existence of the practice as the discourse itself.

They are concerned with the symbolic validity of the norms that have their expression in the law. But if we understand the emergence of torture in Foucault's sense, as a question of the rationalization of techniques of government, then this normative focus is necessarily inadequate.

One of the most prominent defenders of the legalization of torture under certain circumstances, Alan Dershowitz (20041, has in fact altered the normative argument.

Since torture is in any event practiced in extreme situations, bringing it under control through a "torture warrant" is called for.

The legal regulating promises a de facto limitation of the practice. The philosopher Slavoj Zizek (2002) has argued against what he terms "liberal

The Right of Government Dershowitz's

123

honesty"

and in favor of "apparen~ 'hypocriShY"': in afn ernerider fight but t e use 0 torture , ' , I' 'pie" gency situation we should do w h at we cons d " nto a umversa prmcr .

I be e evate should under no circumstances " I f the "sense of guilt t ie awareness 0 , , O n Iy .Its .Inter diIC t'10n preserves our " Th b lie order has to remam inadmissibility of what we have done. d hessyom10a~ already sets in with f , Th h II . a t of norms an t u, , intact. e 0 owmg u f ' legitimate topic for diSCUSSIOn the acceptance of the use 0 torture as a (ibid.: 103). h di 'softening of the ban on torture is Zizek's concern about t e Iscurslve the first place the foundational l n understandable for two rnam reasons. d d into the t~rrure debate, and " b . aredly mtr O uce I ticking-born scenano repe II' both extremely suggesrive and profirs invoked by Dershowltz as we. ~ IS I . h t scenario involves an ernerfrom a high degree of recognition va ~e'b~ an such a clear-cut way, bur is gency situation that is extremely ImPfro a et' experiences and expecra.' e and trans er to 0 her I extreme y easy to lmag.m. bi uous In this manner, torture becomes rions precisely

because It IS una m g . bl instrument The persuasive ivabl . e and an accepta e I . , , both a conceiva e pracuc . he i .nary construction's anncipaforce at work here already unfolds in ~ e ,~agl Iy proper and possible solution of the desired solution as, alr~a .y, t eon res a promise of rationality . h scena no lI1corpora tion. At the same time, t e . t to irs historical predecessors, " I re For 111 contras Into Its conceptua str uctu . . f onfession nor to torment, rher to orce a c in this case torture serves nei b ' R rher it is meant to produce bi d b se human emgs. a , , ' punish, su Jugate, or e a, f knowledge legal pr-ovrsrorts . . h e as an lI1strument a '.. h information, ence to serv d . to the structure: "it IS a rig tin this way being already incorporateh m { ation obtained by rort ure ..' t at tn/orm . . based [usrificat ion, which recognizes "(H Ivorsen 2009: 244; Italics 'denee In court a . I d can never be presente as eVI . b resented as an "erh ica , ,. hi the scenano can e p di ' in original}. For t IS reason, "11'f situations" (ibid.). In ad inon, thought-experiment" applicable ro rea I e x'istential: saving lives. In its . honor a bl e as It IS e f ' it is guided by a rnonve as d secur: ith the promise 0 rano, ' f lity an secunty WI linkage of Imperaflves a mora I , borh a legirimaring tempi are , ' b b nafiO funCtIons as , f nality the flckmg- om sce 11for it and a bluepnnr or , h h . rcumstances ca . for legalizing torture w en t e C1 Ie makes normalizatIon posThe exrreme examp "T taking concrete measures. . t of liberal government: 0 . f the very lI1strumen . . sible by becomlllg part 0 d ' I way liberalism's insIStence d para OXlca , I speak in a somewhat perverse an. h' rs only for instrumenta . . h t exerCise t elf powe .. _ on i1mlted governments t a 路b'I' f seeing torture as a CIVI the POSSI I Iry 0 . and pragmatic purposes creates 'd d h r 'Irs sole purpose is preVenfing " ctlce provl eta lized not an ataVistiC, pra , furu:e harms" (Luban 2006: 42)., b I s of the ban on rorture h atlve a so utenes In the second place, t e norm D showitz's suggestion, law can also seems called for because contrary riO etr as clean as the ricking-bomb , h ch IS SImp y no never tame the practice, wid路 t a license to torture means scenario implies (McCoy 2005). Han Ing ou Irure" (Luban 2006: 48). bl' hing a "torture cu attracting torturers and est a IS

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Furthermore, inscribing torture into law for the ostensible sake of saving lives would nonetheless still involve abandonment of a basic civilizational norm, arguing in favor of torture thus undermining the "specific status that the ban on torture has struggled to establish" (Blumenrath 2007: 321); it ignores the complex evaluative processes grounding the ban on torture in the relevant normative documents, from the Declaration of Human Rights to various authoritative national constitutions.

As the constitutional specialist Ernst-Wolfgang B6ckenf6rde (2006: 416) has observed, recourse "to the pre-positive fundament" of such documents is "nothing else than a necessary part of an appraisal of the contents" of "positive law." Taking the latter seriously by no means implies isolating it from "its historical-political context." In view of this reality, it would appear that the absolute interdiction on torture actually marks an absolute boundary-line to the discussion (WetSlau 2004).

Nonetheless, the arguments in favor of torture will not be silenced; rather, we may expect that under the sign of existential peril, it will repeatedly beckon, moving forward a conceptual matrix of "them or us" that renders the unthinkable thinkable in the name of self-defense. This is another source of the imaginative force of the ticking-bomb scenario, varying a historical figure of argumentation: if in Hobbes the violence of a state of emergency already serves to ground the state as Leviathan, legally legitimizing itself through it as the guarantor of security, this highly real figure by no means limits itself to a foundational act. Rather, it became a symbolic element within an enduring process of state formation (see Steinmetz 1999a: 9), inscribed in the history and constitution of the modern state.

Carl Schmitt (1963: 32) accurately defined the state of emergency as a "real possibility"-as a threat that is present and absent at once. Inserting this formulation into the perspective of governmentality, we can say that security laws do not originate in a sovereign's act of decision but rather need to be understood as the effect of a rationalization of threats-as a response to such threats through a body of security measures.

But the ticking-bomb scenario's performative force unfolds on more than a symbolic level. The interplay between government and the governed not only results from rhetorical truth-games but is already interwoven into specific forms of rationality representing and actively producing empirical reality. This epistemic access to the world develops equally from ways of thinking and acting that have become historical and are context-dependent and institutionally anchored; these in turn generate specific modes of visibility and articulation.

In this way the implementation of laws itself does not amount to a simple double game of staged insecurity and guaranteed security, the interest-led generation of anxiety on the one hand, fearful submission on the other hand (Bigo 2008b). Rather, the conditions for accepting exceptional security measures should be examined on the epistemological level of implicit forms of knowledge inscribed into practice and capable of eluding political discourse.

The Right of Government

125

the roblem of the state of exception According to Agamben (20 05), f h P ception becoming a rule but of . , the first pace d 1 0 t e ex does not consist In . h" I' " The norm not only oes havi thi ng to do Wit rea uy. the norm aving no I,.

S mbolic abstraction subtracted from any not stipulate Its application. as ; y h lir but exists as it were indepenrea reality it cannot be harmomze wdlt h I Y'se is true as well. Within the t e rever isrence aof denrly from it It ]see IibidI ... 40)-an , touched by the existence the ban on torture IS un h present context, ten, ice of by the ban.

0' I the practice a torture d torture; an converse y. firmin with the legal theorist ierer g We can respond to this by con, I , tate is an illusion"-also an Simon (2008), that "the constltbutiOnFa sSl'mon law does not operate . " ' t Agam en. or , , h implicit argument aga ms .'

I of constitutionality.

Hence t e es the way it is sketched by the prm:,IPb fliers before the legislator , " I d k decisions a out con I. . [udiciar y a rea y ma es did" The pr inciple of separation pe has even noticed that they have evelo . he executive by the legislative , indi tes of contra over t , 'I of powers Simon 111 ICa , . ." . ely an abstract prmctp e , ' b "illusion -precIs .

I branch, has always een an d his i cial-this insight IS not a afl.",I (ibid 5 6) But-an t IS IS cru f h ely not rea it y I I .: -.

'II' I as the opposite a t r ut , narn d the I usion ess I ' I d iog once we un ersran .' h liry in an onto ogrca sense. , h contrast 109 Wit rea I , . . as a deception, t an as . "" itself." but it exists In OUt .

'I does not exrst 10 I, .'

The corrst rt utron a state,. . h k s the state's realizatIOn posimagination and it is this illusion t at ma e " s if" Legal validity and , h K ian prmcrp l e 0 f teah . . I sible according to t e antra bi set in play performatlve y . 109 to su jeers are perception of law as per-tam ..

2004) The difference between a and "verified" in this manner (Ranicller:, is not'overcome here-Agamben . d "rea aw I symbolic norm and perceive, b But only an appeal to norms , h t this cannot e so. h t is correct in arguing t a " "F ucault 2003: 28)-to t at exren , 0 can allow them to become real I(1 " 1 h "rea aw strictly speaking we on y ave, (2005' 129) that "we are what we Reemtsma's observation in. his essay d" has clear implications for the ormse never to a 'I Iy do and we are w h at we pr I d the constitutlona state on , h . iah that aw an , ' debate on torture. T e mSlg t b t'on An exclUSive onenta, . ' n of that a serva I., f exist in practice IS an extenslO f fails to see that either as part 0 tion towards the symbolic force 0 n:r:':~warts the law, the use of torture the practice of law or as a practice t a k of the force of law. Hence as an has to be accounted for in the fram~~~~), torture places a q~estion mark "extralegal" practice (Gross 2003, , f "outsourcing (see Mayer , ' I te even 111 cases a I I la over the constltutlona sta, I "I where "14 as do ega regu. . take pace e se, fl' Ith 2008路 101-138) seemmg to , 'hich are in can Ict w . ", d k oSSlble practices w tions that legitimize an ma e p international legal guidelll1es. ould need to focus not only on ew In line with this reasoning, the ~fneas . torture" will be incorporated f' ce "li e-savlOg , . her the possibiliry that, or lnstan b l'ttle place for a sense of ease In elt into law. To be sure, there wou e I hat could block such efforts (Denlaw or the deliberations of higher cO:::~~ing urgent would be how torture , 2008) . 15 The questions now nlOger

Id

] 26

Susanne

Krasmann

The Right of Government ever becomes to be rational.

a perceprible

praxis,

and againsr

what

backdrop

] 27

it appears

In light of the images from Abu Ghraib, the American journalist Mark Danner (2004: 9) has posed the following question: "Is what has changed only what we know, or what we are willing to accept?" Is what we see precisely whar we have already accepted? This could be the question understood within an epistemological perspective on the forms of torture's rationalization. Its acceptance would rest here less on legitimation and conscions decision, rather being the result of inscribed and also, just so, 000discursive procedures.

Until now, the observation that executing security measures rests, in a very essential way, on a specific form of problematization of security managing without special legitimation-oriented rhetorical expenditure has above all been put forward in discussions by political scientists (Buzan, Wrever and Wilde 1998; Wrever 1995). With the concept of "securitization," the theory taking its name from this concept describes a process in which existential threats are intersubjectively identified, with extraordinary measures seeming inevitable as a consequence. Securitization tends to exclude political disagreement, since the measures appear inherently justified. Events such as 9/1] can thus directly catalyze security measures; but they can also become a horizon for the reading of a permanent threat limiting, as if it were self-evident, the space of political discussion. But securitization theory fails to appreciate that such depoliticizing mechanisms are not only manifest in a rhetorical structure.

In fact, they only reveal themselves through a pursuit of the implicit logic-including the non-discursive logic-playing a deciding role in security-centered government.

Such governing thus consistently mobilizes a mechanism of division. In actualizing the implicit, historically authenticated promise of security, it establishes a relationship between governors and the governed, in this way also producing an inside and an outside. It distinguishes between those meant to be protected and the threat Or danger meant to be banished or eradicated. Securitization is excluding, and thus exclusive.

At present a specific rationality of preemption is unfolding that renders talk of a preventive state deceptive (Eckert 2008). For what is being debated here is neither prevention in the welfare-state sense of solving social problems nor the management of calculable risks in the sense of an actuarial justice that intervenes preventatively and, when needed, compensates for incurred damages (Feeley and Simon 1994). Rather, in play are threats and risks that are incalculable and that, on account of their expected magnitude, appear intolerable, hence the need to neutralize them in advance. For that reason, what is characteristic of the preemptive state is not a rationality of prevention but a rationality of precaution (Ewald 2002)," which can be directly tied to mechanisms of exelusion and repression.

These mechanisms can be observed above all in present anti-terrorism strategies, which approach international terrorism as a flexible organization

. . II affiliated or scattere d networks with shifting 004 national E k t of terrrtorra y un I" . ffiliations (Lepsius 2 ; c er but pronouncedly ascribable re igrous a f r instance in Germany in 2008). Where the earlier fight against terrokr, a " which is to say with d ith "known un nowns, the 1970s, was concerne .":1 in s and their political aims, today g knowledge of specific political group d Oliver Kessler (2007) put it, on Ch . t pher Daase an d I f Id' A it is focuse ,as ns a . forrnulati f Donald Rums e s. s a " ithy orrnu anon a "unknown unknowns -a p I hi hi ctua l and highly diffuse, terrorPhenomenon that is simultaneous y fig ya I ulable and no longer insurh rival 0 a non-ca c f ism seems to represent tear. . . b th stable empirical re erence able catastrophe, for whose Identlfi~::~~~ (~ougen 2003). And this is the points and suitable Instruments are . g " comes into play, "established . h "th logic of preemption di f Precise pomt were t e . . as something IStlJ1Ct rom . f d ling with uncertainty, . 2007) as a new paradigm or ea I . 45. Bi a 2008b; Massumi . quantifiable risks" (Halvorsen 2009' 2 'a I;gic of pressing risk that can . f pnon thus unf as.1d . and The paradigm a preem f lation It contains options . f four stages a escaianon. f e be described In terms 0 f the rationalization a tartur. imperatives for action that offer space or

3. SECURITY

AND TRUTH

.

. d , "[n]othing IS a h famously ernp h astze As Francois Ewald (199]: ]99) as risk' it all depends on how one ana. k i . If" but "anything can be a . '.. ..

I) Technologies of f1S In rtse , . t" (Italics 10 onglna.. .

Iyzes the danger, considers the even f arive. In anticipating undesired risk operate liik e program,. S' they are perI' arm h t they simu Iraneous Iy manube a rea iry t a . d d events, they profess to escn are rendered apparent in thl~ wayan facture. They define problems that d ]980' 248). At the same time, these whose solution they call for (see Gore ~:ch ev~nts calculable-although m a technologies do not necessarily mak bl For the calculation of risk not certain way they do make them mana:e;es eknowledge, identifying releva~t only rests on knowledge but also p;o rd fields of intervention (for examp e subject areas (combating terronsmdan . of biometric passports). . . securing borders t h roug. h the Intra d ucuonfields of intervention, t h u s opening h In this way identifying risks pro udceMsnsrer 2007; O'Malley 2004). Suc I . for acno. n (Aradau an 1 ulation of risk. .

H ence the e mptrtca certain. options . options objectify themselves In the ca merion with expected future events, . that. '. In. conjun rra l: that someone b uys a one-way. data-past expenenceoffers a basis for prognoses IS Il1I~Se~rn~~s co'ntacts with Islamist g~oup~~s flight ticket, pays his rent Il1 cas n'derstand such phenomena as Indlcadtua1 f . hg t e 10 IVl. "d not per se dangerous. But I we U " isk factors p Iacm risk when taken together they serve as f ~ourse be extended to all indivi u,; , d . 'on . Th,s can a ubsumable IntO . concerned un er SUSPICI a "h' 19..h-nsk group,de II

als engaged in such actions; tdheya re ISledfor-momentouS declslOdns rna 5' f with measures then ta k en. an -1 ca deal plans of t h e suspe ere partie. regardless of t h e concre re actions an r

128

Susanne Krasm ann The Right of Government

The justification for these measures is offered by the applied risk schema itself, the prognosis thus manufacturing its Own evidence (Harcourt 2007; Simon 1998). In this manner, however, what is objectified is not only the suspicion being aimed at a specific social group (see Castel 1991: 288; Bigo 2008a) but the question of security itself, which is thus removed from the field of political negotiation.

Becoming an empirically receptive dimension, security loses the binding force of a norm meant to be weighed against freedom (see Lepsius 2004: 459).

In the framework of preemption, threat, functioning as a real possibility, is simultaneously impalpable and enormous: it can manifest itself-this is the "ontological premise"-at any time, without notice, under an entirely new signature (Massumi 2007); and as anticipated catastrophe, it is intolerable. But for just this reason, it is open to explanation as an incontrovertible fact: existential menace defines the need for extraordinary measures as irrefutable (Buzan, W""ver and Wilde 1998). The rationality of preemption thus circulates as a SOrt of "realism" that, in Jacques Ranciere's (1998: 132) words, absorbs "all reality and all truth in the category of the only thing possible.""

But law loses its delimiting function to the extent that it is characterized by uncertainty and insecurity. Inversely, security becomes the measure for producing lnws.'"

Because the rationality of preemption dispenses with both solid empirical evidence and suitable analytic instruments in identifying potential catastrophes, it must rely On anticipation_on imagining encounters with "the worst possible" scenarios (Ewald 2002: 286). But because no certainty can be gained in this way, an absolute will to know has to be activated. Consequently the shift from danger and prevention to preemption is accompanied not only by a temporal moving forward of the threshold for intervention and a spatial extension of the fields of intervention, but also by a displacement of the object itself. The clarifying of suspicion manifest in averting danger becomes creation of suspicion within the rationality of preemption (Putter, Narr and Busch 2005). "Enacting catastrophe" (Collier 2008) means confronting this dystopic vision preemptively.

What is here at work is a form of knowledge generation no longer justifying its expectation of a crime through concrete evidence Or moments of suspicion and that, in its basic tendencies, knows no boundaries. Because the concrete threat is unknown, enormous, and intolerable, the failed search for evidence amounts to a call to COntinue the search all the mOre urgently and absolutely.

Sven Opitz (Chapter 5, this volume) has identified the transition point at which a liheral government becomes intervenistic.

Briefly put: because heneath the imperative of defense aga inst catastrophe, not knowing and the obligation to know are interlinked, intervention becomes an absolute right annulling the subject's right to freedom. Ar issue here is first of all the right to freedom of those "Other" individuals who see themselves placed under suspicion of terrorism and identified as a menace: one that, such is the premise, very definitely can be presumed (Cole 2002; Krasmann 2007)."

129

itself h I ' of torture a strange analogy here suggests , f he In respect to t e ogle b . recisely because in view 0 t h icki ng bam scene no, p b icer that anticipates t e tiC I I or elf as unimpressed y any ill _ Perceived existential threat it rev:a 5.1 5 ctu red by an absolute will to he i rogation IS stru is th I_ tainty: in torture, t e inter he " h" What is decisive here IS t e res~ ( know aimed a~ forcing o~t t ~ tr~t e~t the early coercive pr~ctice lea.dln~ ing statement Itself, and in rhis re P f that producing "Information. to "confession" shows little difference ro~'has to follow certain performaIn order to appear plausible, the state;;;ure produces its own truth (Rejali .

1 A erformative pracnce 0 nve ru es. sap firrni d justifying itself.

2007b)-thus con rrnmg an

4. CONCLUSION: GOVERNMENT

THHE:~:~E06F IN T

SECURITY

, e to liberal democratic ' f urse not uruqu dh The reemergence of torture 15 0 C~ut recent events have undersc,ore ow societies of the twenty-first centu;~ pective of governmentahty allows easily it can find its place here. e pers into a rationality of preemption, lf us to show how torture inco~porates I;~~reats it becomes a ratio no long~r and how through the identn cation a erformative schema instead. In t e g needing to justify itself, fittm mlto a Preven enter into a pact with 1[. It can ide rh e awo process, torture can Qvern. .' onal states. , also embed itself in democratic consutun ed shows, in Karen Greenberg s The fact that judicial torture has retu~n ther than eradicated, that law words (2006a: 6), that it "was rePdreasns~e~:tween good and evil." In thde a Institute exists together Witith tohrture d In ' isrration politically an dillyega Th isolawake of 9/11, the Bus a rmru or less blatant fashion. e, ' t tn a more .' torture and rrusrreauneÂť , r ticu lar detainees m Guantanamo . tion and public exhibition of, In pa as 'well as somerhing almedda~ sure may be read as a disclpltnanan mBea a be sure the adrninistranon I . ut ' t , itz'ss arg demonstrating sovereign pow..er With Dershowltz ar u menta. not really act here like a soverelg'b' Pow~r.that "rhe act of torture requires .

'S arry has a serve else) whereas tion in mmd, Elame ~ . holl borne by somea~e , vere no caura e (the averslveness IS W ~ that some portion of th~ se , the forfei~ of one's future

liberty

~':;:~:"

(2004: 283). The secunt

h f~o:eu~::di[::e~~;~ri~g

~O;I~

adver;it~ b~:;hd~~:i~rS:;:ti~C~~~st~matica~IY ~ther cles 0 t e (2006a' 6-7), thIS s ou k do with a law agree with Greenberg I' flected a reluctance to ma e d in cases than a sign of uncertainty. t re nd that found for rhe accuse d the . , g exhaustive proceedings a h' h t "the J'udiCial system an reqUirm I d from t IS t a '0 to trust of doubt. If we are to con~ u \liC will need to learn oncel;gal any event American government ~~rtainty" (ibid.: 7), this w~u :"instrument itself even in the face a un, Iy an appropriate po mca 'g' . law IS on also mean the fo IIOWlI1

at

under

that condition.

130

Susanne

As Claude

The Right of Government

Krasmann Lefort's

(1988:

17) famous

dictum

would

have it, in mod-

ern democracies the locus of power circumscribes "an empty place." For unlike under the ancien regime, no one may exclusively represent and possess power. Rather, in principle power is equally accessible to everyone, its distribution a question of political argument.

If law can here be understood as a central instrument for keeping this democratic void free and allowing political space to emerge (see Fitzpatrick and Joyce 2007: 73), this also means only enjoying any appearance of absolute truth with

caution. "The power of the correct interpretation-something true and accurate that torture is always waiting to grasp-that is what we need to fear," is the way the historian Rainer it. "As long as this and that opinion

duces precarious

Maria Kiesow (2003: 108) has put holds, as long as science only pro-

truths, as long as the fixing of meaning does not govern,

as long as law remains law, neither truth nor law will have become a horrible, violent instrument."

Acknowledging this insight, in the prism of a

govern mentality perspective we can understand can assert

themselves

as a practicable,

as a truth

and acceptable,

within

whose

how security imperatives logic torture

asserts

itself

tool.

NOTES l . At the same time, adhering to the ban on torrure is often shaped by secondary considerations such as the political or economic advantages it offers states in the context of international relations (Hathaway 2004).

2. On the continuity of the practice of torture into the present see for example Peters (1985); Rejali (2007a); Robin (2005); regarding the CIA in particular McCoy (2005); on the analysis of "the conditions for the possibility" of torture see Deutsches lnsrirur fur Menschenrechte (2007).

3. See especially the collection edited by Levinson (2004); Greenberg (2006); for the German debate see for example Beesrer moller and Brunkhorst (2006).

4. See for example Dershowitz (2002; 2004); Brugger (1996; 2000). The ticking-bomb scenario is itself not new, but already surfaces as an argumentative figure in Jeremy Bentham (1973 [1777-1779]; see Morgan 2000).

5. "Not simple na turallife, but life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element." (Agamben 1998: 55) Within the logic of the modern nation-state, sovereign power over bare life receives a biopolitical twist: "Declarations of rights represent the originary figure of the inscription of natural life in the juridico-political order of the nation-state." (ibid.: 75) In this way every living being is potentially bare life {ibid.: S1}.

6. According to Butler (2004: 60), "Agamben, in a different vein, argues that contemporary forms of sovereignty exist in a structurally inverse relation to the rule of law, emerging precisely at that moment when the rule of law is suspended and withdrawn."

7. "A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities. Its opposite pole can only be passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance, it has no other option but to try to minimize it. In contrast a power relationship can only he articulated on the basis of twO elements I ... I: thor 'the other' (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly

131

recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up" (Fou~ault 1982: 789).

8. On the critique of an "irnperativistic legal concept" In Foucault that narro~s law to criminal law and conceives of it in Austin's sense as an avowal of will or "order of the sovereign," resulting in negative sanctions in the case of nonadherence": Biebricher (2006: 141); Hunt (1992); Keenan (1987) ..

9. Tadros (1988), for instance, makes clear that for Fou.cault juridica l power denotes a specific arrangement, form, and representation .of p~wer. Not all law has to be "juridical," and juridical power does not manifest Itself through law alone (ibid.: 76). Every form of power that uses the threa~ of.a ~an.ct.lOn (either legal or social) for the sake of preven~ing a way of ~c.tlng IS juridica] (ibid.: 78), but modern law does not operate to that mode (ibid.: 80). .

10. The position of these advisors had momentous consequences: they denl~d the applicability of the Geneva Convention in the. case .of men captured 10 Afghanistan defined as members of a l Qaeda and Its allies; and th~y ~Ished to see the definition of torture limited to extreme forms of the application of violence and infliction of pain (U.S. Deportment of justice, Office of Legal Council, memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, August 1, 2002j memorandum for James B. Corney, December 30, 2004). . . ." .

11. On the involvement of EU member states JO rendition on the baSISof diplomatic assurances" see Human Rights Watch (2005), the report of the Committee on Legal 'Affairs and Human Rights (2007), and that of Amnesty International (2008). . . .. .

12. Police action confronted with legally uncertatn situatIOnS ISnot only .mall1tenance of the law but also creation of law, as Derrida (1990) argues 10 reference to Benjamin (1996). It thus acrual.ize~ t.he violen~e of lawmaklOg. 13. In their analyses of "indefinite detention. 1I1 Guantana.mo: Ara?au (2007) and Buder (2004) argue similarly, showing ho,,:, constltutlonal.lty changes through administrative practices and performa~lve acts abrogating .the law.

My own argument is not so much aimed at speCific ~ealms of exceptlon id at . f h bli h d I I s stem 10 general. In my un erthe transformatlon 0 t e esta IS e ega Y f f . standing of the emergence of forms of state from a process ~, per orm~tlve generation, I draw on studies of the "ethnography ?f the .state f(Krohn- atsen and Nustadr 2005; Steinmetz 1999). Whe~ discusstons 0 . torture re e~ to Foucault this is usually in relation to 5urveJIler et pu.mr, with some c~n , . liti ( M', r 2007) In order to examine sidering the concept of biopo ItICS see uti me . '. d hi' aI the shift in significance of sovereign po~e.r. For a dlfferentlate tee no ogre genealogy drawing on Foucault see Rejali (2003; 2007a). .h 14 When it comes to "rendition," European states have thus bee.n co(nhten~,wlt 路 . f f b h the ban on deportatlon t e nondiplomatic assurances mace 0 at hai .' ' refoulement obligation") in the case of likely torture and aRlr~rahlslnWg eVlh" " hi d tates" (see Human Ig ts atC dence of the practice in re Ievant t Ir s ld f' 2005: 16ff.; Grey 2006). In fact international law clearly ho s trans erflng

states responsible for ensuing torture. . . f h' 1a between 15 D 'd L ban (2006: 51) even concludes, 111 view 0 t ~ .I~terp.y . 路 ju~~:ts a~d the Bush government after 9111, rhat;IIP]ol~~~la~sn~;c::~~~=:~ and if the politicians accept torture, the Judges WI\ as.\ d . s will provide a a torture culture only the naive would suppose t lat J~ ,~e 16 ~~~gt~:;)~~~~~p~fon~~, ~~~~~~li; ~~~~~~.;;~ri::~ye~~::;ext; it is ~or~~~e~ 路 cise in that emphasizes the ~OI~ent of anti.cipatory.~~t~,~:~~t~~~:~\e; avoid 2004) and not, like "precautlon , an assoCiation WI danger." Nevertheless, I treat the termS as synonyms here.

ft

132

Susanne

Krasmann

17. "Ind.efinite detenti~~m," as practiced in Cua ntanarno or in incommunicado fashion elsewhere. In the world as a result of "extraordinary rendition" (see Bfftler ~005; Mutlme: 2007), has been rationalized in this way, with those a ecre granted no right to take legal countermeasures. As late as Au ust 20,08, rentago.n spoke~man Geoff Morrell emphasized that Osama bin taden s f~rmer drlve.r,. Salim Hamdan, who was pronounced guilty of assisting ter~?rlsm by a mlhtarr, court at Guantcinamo, was to be indefinitely held as an enemy combatant after serving his sentence.

18. ~Y/ethus fi.nd consti.tutional-Iegal guidelines regarding the state's authority to Intervene In a securlt.y context regularly converted inro legal regulations with?ut. any effort ro c1a~lfy the vague concepts in play. The measures' political aim IS simply translated Into a rhetoric of law ' into "1路f. .. then" .

I causes I (P" en can dimona utter., Nan and ~usch 2.0~,5: 10).' thus being delivered to the discretionary authority of the p~lJ~e. ThIS practice of the 'constitutionality check-up' is not la- n;uch the subml?slon of the legislative and the executive" to the law, but the .aw.: accomm~~atlon ro ~he sta~e> r~quirements and the potential underminIng of the political pracncc of litigation" {Ranciere 1998: 109).

19. Ac~ordlng to Julia Eckert. (200~)~ in the present-day struggle against terrorism t,he focus. ?n certain religious groups is marked by a tendency to ~ulturalJze, ethnicize, and thus al~o socially externalize what is considered angerou? We can understan~ rhis as a condition for the social acceptance or toleration o.f a .border-crosslng extension of the state's authority to intervene. On ~he significance of the construction of the other and a closed world as a premise for the exercise of torture, see Crelinsten (2003).

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Mutimer, David. (2007). Sovereign Contradictions: Maher Arar and the Indefinite Future, pp. 159~179 in Elizabeth Dauphinee and Cristiana Masters (eds) The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

0' Ma Iley, Pat. (2004). Risk, U'lcertainty and Government. London: Glasshouse.

Peters, Edward. (1985). Torture. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Putter, Norbert, Wolf-Dieter Narr and Heiner Busch. (2005). Bekiimpfungsrecht lind Rechtsstaar.

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Politics and Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

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(2007a).

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University Press. .' und die Erzwingung von lnformaRejali, Darius. (2007b). Wahrhelt, ErlOn;:~ng s Macho and Burkhard Wolf (eds) tion pp. 295-315 in Karin Harrasser, omMa . h. FI'nk

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Foucault and Frontiers

7

Foucault and Frontiers Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border William Walters r .. '. I a re Instruments, . utensils, . weapons. Iwould like my,;b~oks to be a kind of toolbox in which others could dig around t(~ n a rool tha~ they can use however they wish in their own area. oucault J 994: .)23; my translation)

What I produce

1. INTRODUCTION The single word "border" conceals a multiplicity and implies a constanc where genea logical Investigation uncovers mutation and descent. Historic~ re~earch reveals that dIverse political rationalities have framed the politi~ ~eans and objectives of state frontiers and borders, just as the difficult or of making borders actual has drawn upon a great variety of rechnologIes and heterogeneous administrative practices, ranging from maps of the ;ern~ry,. the creatlo~ of specialized border officials, and architectures of -eill cation to today s expenmentation with bio-digitalized forms of survel hance. ThIS chapter argues that we are witnessing a novel development Wit In this history of borders and border-making, what I want to call the emergence of the humanitarian border. While a great deal has been written about the militarization, securitization and fortification of borders today there IS far less consideration of the humanitarianization of borders. But If the Investment of border regimes by biometric technologies rightly warrants being treated as an event Within the history of the making and rerna kIng of borders (A moore 2006), then arguably so too does the reinvention of the border as a space of humanitarian government.

Under what conditions are we seeing the rise of humanitarian borders) The emergence of the humanitarian border goes hand in hand with the move which has made state frontiers into privileged symbolic and regulatory I~struments within strategies of migration control. It is part of a much Wider trend thar has been dubbed the "rebordering" of political and rerriroria l space (Andreas and Biersteker 2003). The huma nitarIan horder emerges once it becomes established rhat border crossing has become, for th.ous~nds of migrants seeking, for a variety of reasons, to access the rer rrtorres of the global North, a matter of life and death. It crystallizes as a way of governing this novel and disturbing situation,

and compensaring

for rhe social

violence

embodied

in the regime

139 of

migration control.

The idea of a humanitarian border might sound at first counterintuitive or even oxymoronic.

After all, we often think of conremporary humanitarianism as a force that, operating in the name of the universal but endangered subject of humaniry, transcends the walled space of the internarional system. This is, of course, quire valid. Yet it would be a misrake to draw any simple equation between humanitarian projects and what Deleuze and Guattari would call logics of dererritoralization.

While humanitarian programmes might unsettle certain norms of statehood, it is important to recognize the ways in which the exercise of humanitarian power is connected to the actualization of new spaces. Wherher by its redefinirion of certain locales as humanitarian "zones" and crises as "emergencies" (Calhoun 2004), the authority it confers on certain experts to move rapidly across nerworks of aid and intervention, or its will to designate those populating rhese zones as "victims," it seems justified to follow Debrix's (1998) observation that humanitarianism implies reterritorialization on rap of dererrirorialization.

Humanitarian zones can materialize in various situations-in conflict zones, amidst the relief of famine, and againsr the backdrop of state failure. But the case that interests me in whar follows is a specific one: a siruation where the actual borders of states and gateways to the rerritory become themselves zones of humanirarian government. Undersranding the consequences of this is paramount, since it has an important bearing on what is often termed the securitization of borders and citizenship.

The chapter offers a preliminary survey of the humanirarian border. I focus on two aspects in particular: the materialization of the humanitarian border within particular regimes of knowledge, and the constitutive role which politics plays in making and changing humanitarian borders. But rhe chapter has a second purpose in addition to rhis mapping exercise. This is to examine more broadly the contribution which Foucauldian studies, and especially srudies in governmenraliry, have made ro rhe critical and genealogical invesrigarion of borders and frontiers. Here I observe that Foucault actually had relarively little to say about the relationship of state borders to modern regimes of power. However, this is not the case for many of those who have explored the possibiliries for polirical analysis that he opened up: border studies has been a significant area of interest for govern mentality studies. In the first part of this chapter, and as a prelude to my discussion of humanitarianization, I argue that for all its important insights, Foucauldian writing about borders has often stuck rather rigidly to the concepts which Foucault left us. Bur is this Foucauldian vocabulary of power adequate ro rhe mapping of emergenr and unusual formations of power-In border studies or elsewhere? I don't rhink so. The chaprer argues It IS not a matter of dispensing with conceptS like neoliberalism, biopolitics, sov~reign power, and so on. But there is a need to supplement these terms with new concepts. One challenge for future studies in governmenraltry, then, IS

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that of over,coming the attitude that all the tools we need are already there, m Foucault s toolbox. It IS with this aim of adding to the toolbox that I take up the question of the humanitarian border.

2. FOUCAULT

AND FRONTIERS

It is probably fair to say that the theme of frontiers is largely absent from ;,he two cours~s ~hat are today read together as Foucault's lectures on governmentality.

(Foucault .1991; 2007; 2008). This is not to suggest that frontiers r~celve no mention at all. Within these lectures we certainly encoun,ter pa~smg rem.ar.ks o~ the theme. For instance, Foucault speaks at one POlO: of. the administrative state, born in the territoriality of national boundaries 10 the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding to a society of regulation and discipline" (Foucault 1991: 104).' Elsewhere, he notes how the calculation and demarcation of new frontiers served as one of the practical elements of military-diplomatic technology, a machine he associares With the government of Europe in the image of a balance of power and accord 109 to the governmental logic of raison d'etat. "When the diplomats, the ambassadors who negotiated the treaty of Westphalia, received msr ructions from their government, they were explicitly advised to ensure that the new frontiers, the distribution of states, the new relationships to be established between the German states and the Empire, and the zones of influence of France, Sweden, and Austria be established in terms of a principle: to maintain a balance between the different European states" (Foucault 2007: 297). . But these are only hints of what significance the question of frontiers might have within the different technologies of power which Foucault sought to analyze. They are only fragmentary reflections on the place borders and frontiers might occupy within the genealogy of the modern state which Foucault outlines with his research into governmenralirv.'

Why was Foucault apparently not particularly interested in borders when he composed these lectures? One possible answer is suggested by Elden's careful and important work on power-knowledge and territory.

Elden takes issue with Foucault for the way in which he discusses territorial rule largely as a foil which allows him to provide a more fully-worked out account of govern mentality and its administration of population.

Despite the fact that the term appears prominently in the title of Foucault's lectures, "the issue of territory continually emerges only to be repeatedly marginalized, eclipsed, and underplayed" (Elden 2007: 1).

Because Foucault fails to reckon more fully with the many ways in which the production of territory-and most crucially its demarcation by practices of frontier marking and control-serves as a precondition for the government of population, it is not surprising that the question of frontiers occupies

little space in his narrative."

Foucault and Frontiers

141

But there is another explanation for the relative absence of questions of frontiers in Foucault's writing on governmentality.

And here we have to acknowledge that, framed as ir is previously, this is a problematic question.

For it risks the kind of retrospective fallacy which projects a set of very contemporary issues and concerns onto Foucault's time. It is probably fair to speculate that frontiers and border security was not a political issue during the 1970s in the way that it is today in many western states. "Borders" had yet to be constituted as a sort of meta-issue, capable of condensi ng a whole complex of political fears and concerns, including globalization, the loss of sovereignty, terrorism, trafficking and unchecked immigration.

The question of the welfare state certainly was an issue, perhaps even a metaissue, when Foucault was lecturing, and it is perhaps not coincidental that he should devote so much space to the examination of pastoralism.

But not the border. The point is not to suggest that Foucault's work evolved in close, unmediated correspondence with shifts in the political issues of his day. But it is to observe that any genealogy of the state will inevitably bear the traces of its political time.

Foucault may have lacked the inclination or the political motivation to offer anything like a systematic analysis of frontiers and their relationship to modern rationalities and technologies of rule. Nevertheless, this has not inhibited the emergence of a sizeable body of work which has begun ro ponder the government of borders, and found in Foucault's work, and subsequent studies in governmentality, a series of concepts and analytics to advance this theoretical project." Not the least significant accomplishment of this work has been to advance current debates about the securitization of borders, and the governance of migrations and mobilities more generally. Securitization has typically been understood in terms of the social construction of threat, and the legitimation of exceptional administrative measures (e.g., Buonfino 2004). Foucauldian and governmentality-inspired research has opened up a different angle. It has done this largely by examining the particular rationalities, technologies and strategies which currently rationalize and invest the space of borders in western states.

Yet a glance over this impressive body of work reveals that its accomplishments are somewhat uneven. There are two things in particular which stand out. The first concerns the temporal scope of many of these investigations. It is overwhelmingly the case that studies in the governmentality of borders and bordering have trained their attention on the immediate present. While investigations of biometrics, smart cards, and detention abound, we know very little about, say, historical practices of quarantine in portS or the techniques of partitioning that were used in the demarcation of colonial and postcolonial territories (but see Crampton 2007). Perhaps a certain "9/11" effect has been at work here, drawing research into the orbit of very contemporary and highly visible concerns ar the expense of those that seem more remote. But whatever the specific causes, the outcome ISthat thinking about borders has yet to profit from historical and genealogical framing 10

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the way that studies in the governance of, say, poverty (Dean 1991; Procacci 1991), certainly have. Of course, this obsession with the immediate present IS ,hardly mconsrstent with main currents in the social science where a cert~In present ism is the norm. But it is at odds with the tenor of much work In ?overnmentality studies where a commitment to historical work has been Important. . Nevert~eless, it is not this point but a second criticism of Foucauldian studies of borders that will form the basis for the remainder of this chapter. ThIS concerns what I take to be a somewhat restricted analytical Imagination at play in this body of work. If they have been overwhelmIngly confined to the immediate present, these studies have also been at times conserv.ative in the. range of concepts they have employed to make sense of practices and logics of power. To develop this point I want to turn to the quote with which I started. Here we find Foucault musing, somewhat modestly perhaps, that he would prefer his work to be treated like a toolbox. Rather than a philosophical relationship where his works would operate within, games of. i.nte~pretation and explication he proposes a far more pragmatic, .even ~t"ltana~ relationship. Not concepts that might be debated as to their precise meaning, as many would in the world of professional political theory, but tools (others can use them "however they wish") to be put to work In the study of different phenomena.

In a vaguely Nietzschean sense, whatever value they might possess would follow from their application and effects.

Now it could be said that the literature on borders has been quite faithful to Foucault in this regard. If anything, it could be accused of being too faithful. For it has sometimes proceded as though the only tools necessary or even available for the Job of investigating borders were already at hand.

It IS as though most of the necessary concepts were already there-in the toolbox. It is lust a matter of reaching in and taking a few. It is perhaps this attitude which explains why so many studies have rather similar and fa~i~iar conceptual coordinates such as discipline, sovereign power, biopolitics and governmentality.

This is not to say there have been no attempts to connect Foucault with other strains of thought. Indeed, there have been creative fusions and dialogues.

The use of Agamben to make sense of the exceptional character of detentions and controls springs to mind (Butler 2004; Isin and Rygiel 2006). Nevertheless, it remains the case that on the whole this literature has proceeded as though most of the concepts needed to do the work of a genealogy of bordering were already in existence.

Given the fact that Foucault commenced the critical investigation of neoliberalism long before it had become a theoretical concern for most leftists, it could be argued that he offers a more than passable guide to themes that continue to frame our politics today. At the same time, it has to be said that the world we inhabit has changed in countless and profound ways from the world that Foucault confronted up until his untimely passing. While we should avoid the epochalist stance which posits the birth of an entirely new

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order, we can nevertheless not adequately capture new forms identities and power relationships if we work with the unexamined assu~1ption th~t all the terms we n.e~d are ~Iready in existence. This is of course true in a gen~ral.sen.se, but It IS particularly true in the area of borders and migration, an institutional domain that has undergone rapid expansion, experimenration and complex transformations in recent years. As such, there is a strong case to be ~ade that future research in the area of borders, territory, security, etc. might start with a question about its relationship to Foucault's toolbox.

In short, we can only get so far with the contenrs of Foucault's toolbox. It is not a matter of throwing out the toolbox, but of recognizing its limits.

Since it was never assembled with the intention of being an all-purpose ser of 1I1.struments, it seems prudent to consider more explicitly in what ways ~nd I.nwhat circumstances it is necessary to craft new tools. With this poinr m mind I turn to the question of borders and humanitarianism.

3. HUMANITARIAN

GOVERNMENT

Before I address the question of the humanitarian border, it is necessary to explain what I understand by the humanitarian.

Here my thinking has been shaped by recent work that engages the humanitarian not as a ser of ideas and ideologies, nor simply as the activity of certain nongovernmental actors and organizations, but as a complex domain possessing specific forms of governmental reason. Fassin's work on this theme is particularly important.

Fassin demonstrates that humanitarianism can be fruitfully connected to the broader field of government which Foucault ourlined, where government is not a necessary attribute of states but a rationalized activity that can be carried out by all sortS of agents, in various contexts, and towards multiple ends. At its core, "Humanitarian government can be defined as the administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle which sees the preservation of life and the alleviarion of suffering as the highest value of action" (Fassin 2007: 151). As he goes on to srress, the value of such a definition is that we do not see a particular state, or a non-state form such as a nongovernmental organization, as the necessary agent of humanitarian action. Instead, it becomes possible to think in terms of a complex assemblage, comprising particular forms of humanitarian reason, specific forms of authority (medical, legal, spiritual) but also certain technologies of government-such as mechanisms for raising funds and training volunteers, administering aid and shelter, documenting injustice, and publicizing abuse. Seen from this angle humanitarianism appears as a much more supple, protean thing. Crucially, it opens up our ability to perceive "a broader political and moral logic at work borh within and ourside state forms" (ibid.).

I! the humanitarian can be situated in relation to the analyrics of government, it can also be contextualized in relation to the biopolitical. "Not

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Foucault and Frontiers

onlydid the last century see the emergence of regimes committed to the physical destruction of populations" observes Redfield "b t If' . d ..' , u a so 0 ennnes . evote~ to morutor mg ,and assis~ing populations in maintaining their physical existence, even while protesting the necessity of such an action and the failure of a"nyone to do much more than this bare minimum" (2005: 329). It IS this minimalist biopolitics," as Redfield puts it, that will be so chara~tert.stlc"of ,th,ehu~~~~tarian.

And here the accent should be placed on the .3?J.eCtive rninirnalisr If we are not to commit the kind of move which I criticized previously, namely collapsing everything new into existing Fou~auldJan categories. r~is important to regard contemporary humanitarianIsm as a novel formation and a site of ambivalence and undecideability, and not JUs~,as one more Instance of what Hardt and Negri (2000) might call global biopolitical production."

4. THE BIRTH

OF THE HUMANITARIAN

BORDER

In a press release issued on June 29, 2007, the International Organization for Migration (10M) publicized a visit which its then Director General Brunson McKinley, was about to make to a "reception centre for migrants" on the Mediterranean island of Lampedusa (10M 2007). The Director General is quoted as saying: "Many more boats will probably arrive on Lampedusa over the summer with their desperate human cargo and we have to ensure we can adequately respond to their immediate needs ....

This is why 10M will continue to work closely with the Italian government, the Italian Red Cross, UNHCR and other partners to provide appropriate humanitarian responses to irregular migrants and asylum seekers reaching the island."

The same press release observes that 10M's work with its "partners" was part of a wider effort to improve the administration of the "reception" (the word "detention" is conspicuously absent) and "repatriation" of "irregular migrants" in Italy. Reception centers were being expanded, and problems of overcrowding alleviated. The statement goes on to observe that 10M had opened its office on Lampedusa in April 2006. Since that time "Forced returns from Lampedusa [had] stopped."

Lampedusa is a small Italian island located some 200 km south of Sicily and 300 km to the north of Libya. Its geographical location provides a clue as to how it is that in 2004 this Italian outpost first entered the spotlight of European and even world public attention, becoming a potent signifier for anxieties about an international migration crisis (Andrijasevic 2006).

For it was then that this Italian holiday destination became the main point of arrival for boats carrying migrants from Libya to Italy. That year more than 10,000 migrants were reported to have passed through the "temporary stay and assistance centre" (CPTA) the Italian state maintains on the ivland. The vast majority had arrived in overcrowded, makeshift boats after a perilous sea journey lasting up to several weeks. Usually these boats are

145

intercepted in Italian waters by the Italian border guards and the migrants transferred to the holding center on the island. Following detention, which can last for more than a month, they are either rransferred to or her CPTAs in Sicily and southern Italy, or expelled to Libya.

A particularly notorious instance of these expulsions occurred during the first week of October 2004. Using military airplanes to move more than 1,000 migrants from l.arnpedusa to Libya, Italy undertook what many critics have labeled an illegal act of collective expulsion. This expulsion remains one of the mosr notable fruits to be born from a bilateral readmission agreement signed between the Italian and Libyan governments, an accord aimed at fostering collaboration in matters of irregular migration. It came in the context of an improvement in political relations between Libya, Italy and Europe. It is perhaps no coincidence that, as Human Rights Watch (HRW) has reported, very shortly after the expulsion, the EU's eighteen-year long arms embargo on Libya was lifted (HRW 2007: 107).

But there is, as one might expect, another side to the story which the 10M press release does not communicate.

Ever since Lampedusa first became a new front in the EU's "fight against illegal immigration," the practices of the Italian government had been the subject of sustained scrutiny and outcry from a range of NGOs, delegations and inquiries. In addition to protesting the expulsions, these interventions also condemned the conditions suffered by migrants in the center and expressed alarm at the difficulties they faced in regisrering claims for asylum. The 10M presents its expansion of services as a matter of providing "humanitarian assistance for many exhausted migrants who arrive after perilous journeys on unseaworthy vessels." As such, it reproduces key elements of a humanitarian script in which intervention is mobilized as an act of charity and protection (Aradau 2004). A more politically conscious reading would see it as, at least in part, a response to negative publicity generated by the NGOs. It would perhaps regard the enhanced presence of the 10M, along with other humanitarian agencies, not simply as a gesture of care, but as an Instance where humanitarianism was being operationalized in an attempt to manage a political crisis and neutralize some of the controversies which Europe's ongoing confrontation with mass migration is now facing (Albahari 2006; Aradau 2004). One might even say that the outcome of 10M's interventIOn was a certain normalization of this border practice.

Holding together in an uneasy alliance a politics of alienation wirh a politics of care and a racric of abjection and one of reception, the case of Lampedusa 'offers in microcosm a series of elements, co.ntr~dictory processes and events that I am calling the birth of the humamtanan border. Larnpedusa is of course not an isolated case. While it exhibits cer tatn unique features, it also contains many elements that are being repeated at other sites and on other scales.

Much has recently been written concerning the securitizatio~ of borders.

Among other things, this has highlighted their renewed function as nodes

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which filter and distribute (im)mobility, sorting population in terms of risk profiles (Sparke 2006). Highlighting the extensive bureaucratic investments which have been made in digital technology and surveillance, Amoore (2006) identifies such developments with the appearance of a new kind of frontier, an event she calls the biometric border. Bonditti (2004) goes further, suggesting that the advent of new surveillance systems, coupled WIth ~ata-shanng between national security agencies, points us away from a regime of borders based on territorial space to an order of "pixellared" borders actualtzed in digital networks.

In speaking of humanitarian bor~ers r:ny pomr IS not to rak.e iss~e with the tendencies which such arguments identify. On the contrary, It strikes me that biometric and other surveillance technologies are extremely imporrant and troubling, even if the nature of the relationship of this biodigiral technology to the Foucauldian idea of biopower requires further theoretical attention (Epstein 2007). My point IS a different ~ne. It IS. to regisrer a note of caution. To focus only on new developments in surveillance and control risks a rather linear and development~llst narrative about borders, an argument in which we go from lines to POints, from contiguous territories to distributed networks from the material to the immaterial, etc. If I speak of a humanitarian border it is not just to insist on the emergence of a domain which deserves to be taken seriously in its own ri?ht. It is also to complicate the linear narrative; to suggest that at the same time that borders seem to become more like this, they are also raking other forms, materializing along other lines whose trajectory is difficult to predict.

It is for the aforementioned reasons we need to think more carefully about the humanitarian border. With this end in mind, I want to make four points which are intended to clarify my understanding of the humanitarian border.

First, the humanitarian border does not present us with a general process that is acting to transform all borders. It is not something universal but quite specific. The humanitarian border is materializing only in certain places under quite specific circumstances.

It is tempting to speculate that geography is an important factor here. The humanitarian government of migration is becoming common at what Freudenstein (2000) calls the world's "frontiers of poverty." These are the zones like the US-Mexico borderlands (Dory 2006), or the complex space formed by the Mediterranean, North Africa and the southern European states of the EU (Pugh 2004).

These spaces can be likened to faultlines in the smooth space of globalization where it seems that the worlds designated by the terms Global North and Global South confront one another in a very concrete, abrasive way, and where gradients of wealth and poverty, citizenship and non-citizenship appear especially sharply. Yet it would be wrong to treat the humanitarian border as merely a second order phenomenon determined by this primary reality because there are all sorts of other elements that are critical in accounting for the emergence and the variation in the humanitarianization

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of borders. One is, of course, the political agency of NGOs. As important studies are beginning to show, there is a political and a moral economy to the NGO world (Dezalay and Garth 2006; Ron, et al. 2005). Possessing scarce resources, NGOs have to make strategic decisions as to which issues they will publicize, which situations of injustice they will politicize, and which experiences of human suffering they will seek to aid. For such reas~ns it is fair to say that the humanitarian border is a complex, overdetermined phenomenon.

Second, the humanitarian border is the effect of a particular governmental strategy, but one that can only be undersrood when situated alongside other ongoing strategies. If certain border zones are becoming spaces of humanitarian engagement, this is only because border crossing has been made, for certain segments of the world's migrarory population, into a matter of life and death (Albahari 2006). And if border crossing has become a matter of life and death, this is because we have a situarion where military tactics, advanced surveillance technology, naval patrols, armed guards and guard dogs, watchtowers, razor wire, and much else are all deemed politically necessary and legitimare elements in the "defense" of the borders of the Global Norrh faced with an "invasion" of migrants and asylum seekers. As research in migration consistently shows (Sassen 2003), it is the need to circumnavigate rhis vasr, costly and ofren brutal apparatus of control that drives migrants to risk their lives, taking their chances with an underground economy which sells false identity, or a place on a rickery boat.

But if humanitarian government operates on a space that appears to be already securitized, militarized, fortified, etc., it should not be understood as a simple two-step process, a matter of action and response-as though first there is securitization and then humanitarianization, which comes along to sweep up the human collateral damage. While such a view is not without justification, it fails to capture the way in which tactics and counter-tactics play themselves out at a more molecular level. For instance, there are frequently occasions on which security practices and effects materialize within the institutions and practices of humanitarian government.

For example, Albahari (in press) documents the way in which there was a politics of "reception" concerning irregular migrants arriving on Italy's southeastern shores from nearby Albania. The Catholic diocese of Otranro and the local branch of the charity Caritas had offered ro hosr migrants with families in the region. However, the local police prefect of Leece rejected this offer because it implied a dispersal of the migrants. Instead, he welcomed the offer of the diocese of Leece which proposed to assemble the migrants 011 a single site, a former seaside resort for children called the "Regina Pacis." Here it would be much easier to manage and ~ol1ltor ~hls population. In this way we see that the humanitarian. ~ector IS certa.IDly not a monolithic space but one traversed by its own politICS and ev~n .flv~lries. But we see also how security practices and effects can matenaltze In

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di~fe~enht ways-more intense here, less so there-depending on the ways in W Ie. umarntarran assistance IS structured. border is not a fixed borde r b ut somet hiIng hiThird, h fl the humanitarian of ic ucruares. Its geography is determined in part by the shifting routes o . migrants . themselves.

It has to be remembered that their mo vements conduci . stitute an rrre ucible socra I element in making and unmaking global borders (Mezzadra and Neilson 2003: ~ 8). To return to the case of Lampedusa if the. hum~~ltaflan border appears here, it is in part because migrants and their facilitaror s have targeted this outlying fragment of Italian/El.I territory not least because of ItS geographical proximity to the Libyan coast.

Bur If the ~uma.n1.tan~n bord.er is not fixed, then neither is it contiguous.

Rather than ImagInIng It as a line resembling the political borders of cartographic space, It might be more useful to liken it to the distributed space B~,rry has called a technological zone. One form of the technological zone is a zone of qualification."

This exists when "the qualities of objects or practices .are. a,~sessed In order that they meet more or less common standards or cnrerra (Barry 2006: 240). Zones of qualification have been discussed In relation to the governance of environmental standards and food products circulating within, and at the margins, of a European economic space (Dunn 2005): But there is an element of the zone of qualification at stake In the formation. of humanitarian space, and in my case, the humanitarian border. As we will see, one of the primary modes of action of humanitarian N~c.)s 1$ to investigate ~articular sites such as detention centers, airport waiting zones and reception practices in order to reveal precisely the extent to which they fail to meet more or less commonly recognized, and sometimes legally encoded standards and norms for the treatment of migrants and refugees. Like other zones of qualification, it becomes apparent that the humanlt,aflan bord~r IS contentious for it "generates active and passive forms of resistance to [its] construction" (Barry 2006: 241).

Finally, there is a point to be made about humanitarianism, power and order. Those looking to locate contemporary humanitarianism within a bigger picture would perhaps follow the lead of Hardt and Negri. As these theorists of "Empire" see things, NGOs like Amnesty International and Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) are, contrary to their own best intentions implicated in global order. As agents of "moral intervention" who because they p~rticipate in the construction of emergency, "prefigure th~ state of exception from below," these actors serve as the preeminent "frontline force of imperial intervention." As such, Hardt and Negri see humanitarianism as "completely immersed in the biopolitical context of the constitution of Empire" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 36).

There is certainly no shortage of evidence for the view that hurnanita ria n ism is susceptible to co-option and captu re by official strategies of policing and control. However, it would be rash to assume this is always the ca vc. Here it might be better to rethink the relationship between humanitarianism and the stare, much as earlier Foucauldian research examined the

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government of the social (e.g., many of the essays in Burchell, Gordon and Miller er al. 1991). This literature revealed how social knowledges, techn"ques and strategies were invented across a great variety of institutional sires-e-wherher by trade unionists, industrialists, cooperatives, amateur surveyors and moral reformers, etc.-and for multiple ends. Certainly the crystallization of this social field would offer a set of rationalities and technologies by which the state would, at the start of the last century, reinvent Itself as a welfare stare. But such acts of colonization and appropriation did not exhaust the social field, if for no other reason than the fact that social knowledges would continue to provide a standard by which the state could be criticized and reformed. Perhaps it would be more insighrfulto approach humanitarianism in this way as well-as a field which exists in a permanent state of co-option, infiltration but also provocation with the state (but also with other supranational and international entities as well).

5. BORDERS,

HUMANITARIANISM,

KNOWLEDGE

Certainly there exist a number of excellent studies exploring the idea and the transformation of frontiers in history (Anderson 1996; Febvre 1973; Maier 2002). Yet the genealogy of the border, understood as a technology of power, remains largely unwritten.

Such a genealogy would surely accord a central place to the study of the changing regimes of knowledge in terms of which borders have been marked out and accorded particular aims and functions, and which projects to govern (through) borders have been pursued, For instance, it is known that what we understand as a modern frontier-that is, "not a disputed region or a zone of control, but a line" (Hirst 2005: 37)-only became widely established in the eighteenth century. The fact that it became a common and defining feature of statehood and modern territoriality might be attributed to the inceprion of a "Westphalian" system of international relations. But more concretely the linear frontier was only able to emerge once states began to acquire particular forms of knowledge, and adminisrrarive capacity which allowed them to survey, map and mark their fronriers (Hirst 2005: 37; d. Black 1997: ch.

5). Perhaps it comes as no surprise that the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel was quick to claim the invention of this new kind of frontier as yet one more mark of European civilizarional superiority, made possible by its mastery of sciences like cartography and geodesy (Cutritta 2006: 34).

Particular knowledges also play an integral and constitutive role in making up the humanitarian border. What are these knowledges? What kind of territory do they mark out and how do they populate it? What plane of reality do they help to constitute? A quick survey of the vast output of reports and inquiries generated by human rights groupS and humanltar~an agencies offers some answers to these questions. Clearly we are dealing not with knowledges which aim at drawing borderlines themselves, as did

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earlier cartographic practices. Nor are these knowledges which, as in the case of risk management approaches, make it their aim to optimize the movement of population across borders while securing against the mobility of dangerous agents. Instead, they are knowledges which problernatize the border as a site of suffering, violence and death, and a political zone of injustice and oppression.

As we noted previously, Redfield uses the term "minimalist biopolitics" to describe the kind of medical humanitarianism associated with MSF operating in disaster zones. There are certainly grounds for seeing aspects

of a similar minimalist

biopolitics

in operation at the humanitarian

border

as well. This significantly attenuated biopolitics perhaps finds its saddest and starkest expression in those projects that make it their sober task to document the death of each border crosser and its circumstances."

It is here, in this grim reckoning of loss, rhat the theme of the border as a threshold of life and death is given hard empirical form, borh quantitatively and qualitatively. If certain governments now regard deportation ratios as a privileged index of the effectiveness of their border control strategies (Fekete 2005: 66), the death rate has emerged as the number which is frequently used in criticism of such projects. As with rhe current wars of occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan one sees the counting of the nameless, the faceless, the collateral damage of the game of security, as emergent within a politics which aspires to call political government to account for its actions.'

However minimalist, this biopolirics nevertheless does in fact, extend some way beyond the grim empirics of fatality because there is also a concerted attempt to document the medical condition of the migratory space.

This is both for the purposes of rationalizing the provision of medical aid, and protesting the political regime which, whether intentionally or unintentionally, visits such suffering on the individual and collective migratory body. In certain circumstances this knowledge offers clues about shifting tactics of border transgression.

For instance, there is the case of those particular physicians who tend to migrants on the coastguard jetty, immediately as they disembark the boats that have ferried them from North Africa to Europe's shores. An International Red Cross bulletin cites the case of one such physician working on the island of Lampedusa who keeps a careful record, and notes how he hasn't had to use an intravenous drip for months.

He speculates that the absence of dehydration amongst migrants may be a sign that people-smugglers are using larger vessels to cover the bulk of the distance from Libya, then transferring migrants to smaller boats which are too frogile to be turned back by the Italian authorities (Red Cross 2006).

Yet it i, not only the shadowy world of people-smuggling which IS glimpsed by the medical gaze. It is not just the shifting tactics of border rransgressron which arc being diagnosed from the migrant body. Perhaps more S1gmficant i, the way in which the documentation of physical and psychologICal trauma will be mobilized as medical evidence of systemic Violence perpetrated against migrants by various agencies of border control, migrant detention,

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and deportation.

For instance, a recent MSF (2005) report documents rhe situation in Morocco. Focusing on "illegal sub-Saharan immigrants" who have tended to see this country as a transit stage en route to Europe, this report itemizes not just the various forms of illness suffered, often resulting from poor living conditions and exposure during epic trans-Saharan journeys. Crucially it also serves as a record, including many personal testimonies, regarding the violence inflicted on migrants by Moroccan and Spanish security forces. In the case of the former it is alleged that violence is in facr a strategic and systematic component in its policing activity.

If medical expertise provides one axis for knowing the humanitarian border, a second axis is constitured by certain forms of legal know-how. This is manifested in the numerous ways in which the border is documented as a regime which is violating certain norms of treatment and denying certain rights to migrants; a regime where political authorities fail to exercise or even recognize their legal and/or moral responsibilities.

This might rake rhe form of observations rhat parricular immigration officials and [usnces of the peace, responsible for authorizing expulsions, are not proper!y traine? or qualified in the relevant human righrs situation of the countries of Origin/destination of certain deportees (HRW 2006: 108). Ir might rake rhe form of observations that interpretation and translation services at a given reception centre are not "in conformity with international and regional standards," thereby undermining the ability of migrants and asylum se~kers to register claims for protection (HRW 2002: 4). And it mlghr a so find expression in the work of undercover journalism when this finds, for instance that the phone booth in a particular detention center was frequently out of order; that, contrary to rhe relevant Charrer for detained migrants rhe authorities had failed to provide detainees with a relephone card worth five euros every ren days; and that a clandestine market whereby such cards were sold ar inflated prices was operaring in the center-all of which obviously hinders the detainee in her abiliry to remain in touch with relatives and legal assisrance (Catri 2005; cited In Andrijasevic 2006: 5).

These are but a few of the ways in which the humamtanan border IS configured as a sociolegal space, and its subjecrs governed if not as, rhen . . . f . h b . . di idua ls Two pomts should be certainly In the Image 0 fig ts- eanng In IVI . made in this respecr. First, these few examples reveal that although human . . d hil hical issue rhey also take a rights are frequently discusse as a p IOSOP I , his i h b famed as a matter of eleva red governmentalized form. If t IS Issue as een r . h ..

I fi . If around what might seem r e Ideals It will nevertheless a so con gure itse . . fi d S most :nundane details of institutional life. This governmentalJ~a[Jon n d . . . of abuse and denial. I nore expression in the meticulous anatomlzatlOn . .. der i d .' n the sense that It moves before that the humamranan bar er IS ynamlc I b h . . d .' tI er sense' one can 0 serve ow geographically.

But It IS ynamlc In ana 1 . . . . . hori . f documenting facdJties, aut OrJknowledge spreads out across ItS sur aces, ... d h d . . terri g a certain discursive ept an ties, procedures, and practices; con errm volume to the border.

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Second, these few examples suggest that it would be insufficient to treat the birth of the humanitarian border as but one more instance of an everwidening regime of biopower. As we have seen, there certainly is a concern with the migrant as a living subject/population.

But if terms like biopolitics and biopower are to have any critical purchase, we should also note all those instances where they combine with other forms of power and other specifications of the subject. Foucault once noted how the "welfare state problem" involved the "tricky adjustment" between a pastoral power exercised over living individuals and a political power wielded over legal subjects (1988: 67). This tricky adjustment between different powers and subjectivirics is not confined to the welfare state; it is also evident in the humanitarian border. The overall thrust of humanitarian intervention is certainly towards the protection of subjects understood as vulnerable groups. But as the seemingly minor case of the phone cards makes evident, this move is also cross-cut with the presumption of subjects who are able, or are ro be capacitated, ro mobilize for themselves. To suppose that the humanitarian border is configured only around the identity of the victim, as some have for humanitarianism more generally, is perhaps too simple (Debri x 1998).'

In discussing the ways in which the humanitarian border is constituted as a field of knowledge, as a positive domain, I have been at pains ro stress that we need to avoid the reflex action that treats contemporary forms of border regime as one more expression of a given repertoire of powers. Indeed, my use of the term humanitarian border is designed in part to emphasize that we are dealing here with a singularity, something new. This is not to suggest that the kinds of analytics which have proven so useful in studies of power and governmentality have no place. Clearly they do. Instead, the task is always one of specifying how they might combine, mutate, transform in specific circumstances.

With this point in mind, I want to raise one more point concerning the relationship of knowledges to borders. This concerns what we might call its dominant modes and styles of truth production.

As we have already seen, the inscription of the humanitarian border into discourse involves a specific production of truth. Not unlike the production of truth in other domains, it is buttressed by various forms of modern expertise, principally medical, legal, and social, as we have seen, but also psychological and spiritual.'

But our case is qualitatively different from the production of truth concerning, say, industrial productivity or unemployment. For one thing, the production of humanitarian knowledge takes place in highly-situated ways, structured by the temporality of unfolding crises, moving in fits and starts which shadow the shifting geography of migratory control strategies. This is not the systematic gaze within which sociu l and economic fields are mapped, on the basis of permanent sratisrica] apparatuses and routinized reporting procedures. instead" it is a knowledge which depends much more upon the work of ad hoc rmssrons, delegations, and vivirs who," task it is ro gather data and testimony in the field. In rhis

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respect, it is interesting to note how the practice of missions and visits to places of detention, or islands and coastlines of migrant arrival, comes to be a site of careful governance in its own right, whether in the form of manuals advising on methods of visiting detained refugees (Gallagher, ireland and Muchopa 2006) or the documentation of the levels and degrees of "transparency" which surround specific border control practices."

But it is different in another sense for we are dealing here with projects whose aims are more complex than merely expanding the realm of social knowledge.

What is at stake here is the making visible of a world that is understood as being hidden, a "space of nonexistence" (Coutin 2003) where the very fact of opacity is deemed a constitutive and integral element in the perpetuation of injustice and suffering." It is this condition that requires that any attempt to know this sphere acquires a high degree of ethicality. It entails a labor of bearing witness, and its style is typically that of a "motivated truth" (Redfield 2006) forged in the heat of polirics.!' As one of their epistemic strategies, humanitarian inquiries frequently incorpora~e personal testimony and eyewitness accounts from migrants. The move IS significant both in that it accords "voice" to subjects who are presumed to have no place as political subjects in official debates (Nyers 2003), and that it acts as a tactic of empathy. But it could be said that humanitarian reporting of borders is also an act of testimony in its own right. As such It could profitably be situated in terms of the wider "witnessing fever [that] has taken hold in a variety of fields of intellectual endeavour" (Kurasawa 2007: 24).

6. HUMANITARIANISM,

BORDERS,

POLITICS

Foucauldian writing about borders has mirrored the wider field of governmentality studies in at least one respect. While it has produced some faSCInating and insightful accounts of contemporary strategies and technologies of border-making and border policing, it has tended to confine ItS at~el~ tion to official and often state-sanctioned projects. political dyna rrucs n , . ' I b ' d But little atrentlon has been political acts have certain y not een Ignore . . . , ' d ist nce operate not Just 111 an I paid to the possibility that po ItiCS an reSIS a d .. . . . TIes but within them. I! To ate exrnnsic relationship to contemporary regll, . .' il d .

I' ' s as something constitutive this literature has largely fai e to view po inc , here i and productive of border regimes and technologies. That IS to say, t ehre IS , ' hi h nts of OPPOSitiOn, an d t ose little appreciation of the ways In W IC moveme d " , ' h F I lis "counter con uct, can particular kinds of reSistance whic oucau t ca f " f deri but by means 0 a series 0 operate not externally to modes 0 f b or enng 'I " (Foucault 2007: 355). exchanges" and "reCiproca supports . 1 The humanitarian border is interesting because it prese~ts us wtt 1 a , I h vern mental practices emanate domain where it is especially c ear t at.go. t fcontestation ff 'I h ry but 111 contex so not from a given centre a f 0 IICI3 aut on

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and politicization. Political contestation and governmental invention frequently proceed hand in hand. It offers a promising site where the observer can follow what O'Malley has called-in a somewhat different context"indigenous governance" (O'Malley 1996). This is to say that the policing of borders today cannot be understood solely on the basis of the study of official schemes and inventions, be these emergent technologies like biometrics or novel institutions like Homeland Security. For humanitarianism, insofar as it operates as a source of governmental innovation, has made the policing of borders a much more complex, polymorphous and heterogeneous affair. Fassin has written of a militaro-humanitarian moment (Fassin 2007: 155), a term succinctly expressing the fact that at a certain point one sees war and humanitarian action, typically presumed to be forces opposed to one another, enter into a tense but mutually supportive relationship.

My point is that the humanitarian border involves similar transactions and imbrications between official governance and certain moves which contest it.

Let us examine a particular case. One area where this emerging imbrication can be studied quite clearly is in the management of detention and reception centers for migrants. The field of NGO activity is quite diverse, with different agencies specializing in different areas. In this context the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) has made the question of the conduct of detention and the condition of the detainee into one of its specialist domains.

For instance, it has initiated and/or participated in a series of major crossnational research projects examining detention practices and conditions.

These studies are notable for the way they combine strong criticism of particular national practices with highly specific recommendations for improvement. So, in one report on detention in Belgium, the Belgian government is taken to task for such things as the lack of transparency in its detention and deportation practices, and the lack of autonomy of doctors working in the detention system (JRS 2006). And yet the overall thrust of JRS's intervention in this area is not to condemn the practice of detention and deportation as such, as might be the case with radical activism. Instead, it is a more reformatory end which aspires to "provide essential services to this population [detainees], raise awareness of their plight and lobby for improved treatment in line with human rights standards" (JRS 2007: 1). A series of practical steps as to the latter are offered in one report on detention in the new member states of the EU (JRS 2007). The instrument of "best practice" may have originated within business management circles, but here we see it transposed to the world of the management of human suffering.

Here we encounter the itemization of various detention "b.est practices": these range from encouragement for monitoring and repor tmg activities by "civil society actors" to the free provision of psychological care where needed. Elsewhere, JRS is involved in training social workers to better equip rhcrn for work with asylum seekers and irregular migrants in dcrcnrion. For instance, with funding from the EU's own European Refugee

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Fund, its Reception and Detention Centre Training Project has run training sessions in such places as Bucharest, London, .V.aletta and R?me. It has also published a specialist handbook targeted at vrstrors and SOCIal workers in detention centers (Gallagher et al. 2006). In these and no doubt other ways, it can be said that ]RS constitutes a source of expertise on r:nigrant detention. While it is critical of existing practices, it is at the same time not outside the institutional matrix of the contemporary border regime. On the contrary, insofar as it subjects the latter to critical and te.c~nical scrutin~, receives funding from the EU, and participates in the trammg of authorities, it is a partner, however uneasily, in this state of affairs. . .

Of course NGOs and humanitarians occupy a range of pol it ica] and ethical positions. Many would refuse to take state funding, or participate in matters of day to day administrarion.

With that said, many others do participate. As a consequence, we cannot understand conremp.or~ry border regimes without recognizing their ag?oistic character. This IS partly due to the irreducible subjectivity of the migrants themselves, as those who write of migration as an autonomous moven:e~t and a "struggle for the border" rightly insist (Rodriguez 1996). But It IS also due to the presence of the NGOs and others. Border regimes are composed not Just at the level of strategies and technologies of control,. but also at the level of strategies which combine elements of protest and visibilizarion With practices of pastoral care, aid and assistance. Politics is therefore immanent to t.he bord~r regime and not sorner hi109 w hilC h mere Iy co mes to it from outside.. Calm .

Gordon has clarified what is at stake in Foucault's argument that liberalism is founded on "a notion of society as a 'transactional reality', a mobd~ surface of engagement between the practices of government and the uruversc h . " (Donzelor of the governed which constantly tends to escape t err grasp . f and Gordon 2008: 51; see also Foucault 2008: 297). It IS Just this sense a hi h i . h and which future explorations a transactional reality w lC IS at Issue ere, .

I of the governmentality of borders would do well to take more serrous ~ The theme of politics is important to the srudy of rhe humamtanan ~rder because of the fact that politics is generative and Immanent bto If. ut . d."t erves to define the very oun d arpolitics is important 10 a secon sense. ISh " eded as though t e rnearu ng ies of the humanitarian.

Thus far we h ave proce " . fh .. " I I d the Identity a umamtanan of humanitarianism were re Ianve y c ear, an . h I hi " f f m always being t e case. n my actors relatively settled. But t IS IS ar ro h h itar-ia n border, I want to suggest final comment on the theme atef uman. d . d by political " f h h tartan are ererrrune that the very boundaries 0 t e umaru .."

I s a h h hurnamtaflan exists on Y a struggles. We should not assume t at tel路 I ssible to speak of settled terrain on which politics takes place. dt IhsalSOtpsOofthe humanitar. h d I' . h scope an t e urn political struggles whic e urut t e .. h " . b f nt confliCts whic are ongomg. ian. This is evident 111 a nun: e: 0 rece n drawn in very minor and perThe limits of the humamtarlan are ofte h auld be said to be .bl I some respects r ey c haps barely percept: e ways. n f II' flection on the problem ., set from within.

Ta k e t h e case 0 f the a owing re

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of providing aid offered in a recent International Red Cross bulletin. It notes that while there is an urgent need to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants crossing the Mediterranean and the Atlantic in their quest to reach Spanish territory, "no one wants to create a 'pull factor' that attracts more irregular migrants into making deadly voyages" (Red Cross 2006).

For this reason, it observes, "National societies-especially

Red Crescent

Societies in the Maghreb-have to think carefully before doing anything beyond providing basic humanitarian services to migrants." Humanitarian reason may embody a critique of the existing border regime, a critique it will level in the name of its commitment to protecting all human life.

Yet this little remark reveals the way in which this universalist ambition is cross-cut by a logic of liberal government.

In this little expression "pull factor," it is just possible to detect the distant echo of those older debates about the poor law and charity which so dominated the nineteenth century's encounter with poverty (Dean 1991; Procacci 1991): how to offer aid without creating a regime that would "demoralize" the poor. If humanitarianism practices a minimalist biopolitics, confining itself to the provision of bare necessities, this is not solely out of expedience, or a reflection of the scarcity of resources. As the Red Cross seems to suggest, it is also out of liberal political calculation.

In other circumstances the delimitation of the humanitarian by politics is more visible and pronounced.

Such is the situation with ongoing legal cases which see the captains and crews of ships being prosecuted under Italian law on charges of assisting illegal immigration or even human trafficking.

In some cases these are vessels operating under the auspices of humanitarian movements like Cap Anamur (Sratewarch 2007). In others they are Tunisian fishermen who picked up shipwrecked migrants and landed them in Italian harbors (No Racism 2007). While the circumstances may vary, the common thread is that the practice of humanitarian intervention is revealed to be contestable.

It is conrested under law, where the prosecution seeks ro redefine humanitarian acrion as "trafficking."

It is contested in political and media realms when, for instance, reputable German newspapers allege that Cap Anamur's activities are not so much rescue missions as publicity stunts undertaken to raise the organization's profile and attract donations (K reickenbau m 2004). In the latter instance, one sees the attempt tu neutralize the moral and political charge of humanitarian action: by emphasizing its immersion within the grubby world of commercial selfinterest and organizational self-promotion, the humanitarian claim to be acting according to "higher moral purpose" is undermined.

A recurring theme in my discussion has been the fluidity of the humanirarian border. It is not fixed or given once and for all. But the aforementioned cases reveal a different aspect of this fluidity. If the humanitarian border can he said to be an assemblage, it is J precarious one. In these instances logics of security, policing and law seek to eclipse and neutralize its presence. They seek to deactivate its elements, and contest their field of operation.

157

My last point concerns the question of the contested identity of humanitarian agents. If the status of particular acts as "humanitarian" is not beyond politics then neither is the identity of parricular agents. In orher words, there is the question of who can act in the name of the humanJtar~an and how. One place such disputes have come inro view is with the ongoing conflict between HRW and 10M. The latter is convenrionally defined as an intergovernmental organization which sp~cialize~ in the ,manageme~t of migration. Yet as we saw in earlier diSCUSSions of It~growing ~r~~le ~n Lampedusa, 10M has come to describe key aspects of Its own acnvmes 10 the language of humanitarian assistance. Yet HRW has challenged such attempts to reposition and rebrand the 10M. For mstance, it alleges rhar "10M has no formal mandate to monitor human nghrs abuses or to protect the rights of migrants and other persons, even rhough literally million,; of people worldwide participate in 10M-sponsored schemes and projects (HRW 2003: 1). Not only is the 10M charged With lack 109 such a mandate, it is accused of participating in activities which actually violate the human rights of migrants. These range from its participation 10 the asylum determination process "imposed" on Haitian asylum seekers (HRW 2003: . faCI-I'itanon - 0 f "voluntary-assisted returns" from closed detention 1) to its h h b I II d centers returns which are a ege to e ess "Ivo un rary" t an t e name

2003: 7). Elsewhere, 10M pressure has seen HRW move . ., .

F'or mstanc e , I-none report on the siruation to retract some of Irs cntIclsms. , . krai HRW 11 d that 10M was receiving funds facing migrants In U rame, a ege .

sugges;s

(HRW

from the EU to develop migrant detention centers 10 the north of the country despite the weakness of Ukrainian law in rhis field (No Border 2006).

But following complaints the original report was removed and a revised ' I d - January 2007. In the latversion, acknowledging certarn erro~s, re ease 111 rer the section on 10M has been eXCISed (HRW 2007). _ Such controversies can no doubt have a basis in cert~ln entre~ched pat- .

I - I B t the bigger po mt here IS that, to terns of inrer-organrzanona nva ry. u, ' .f . return to a remark made in an earlier section, like the zones of ~ua1J cation - . b d IS a contertwhich Barr (2006) has rheorized, the humarurar ran or er _ _ y Id d b h manirarianism as a kind of annrious space. Some wou no au t see u, .'

While politics which obscures the reality of social and global mequaht hd there is no doubt whatsoever that the humanitarian .c~ystalll~~s1I 1te flll?l ~t If f eurralizing polltlca 1can let It of complex relations of mequa ity, ar ro~.n . ' ' should be seen as an emergent zone of polmcs 10 Irs own nght.

7. CONCLUSION I d hen we speak of Foucault and fronThere is a certain paradox II1VO ve W id h F Ir is one of our most , , .

Id be sal t at oucau I tiers. In certarn key respects It cou _ F h I arr of one of his _ - - I h of bordering. or ar r e te eminent and ongma r eorrsrs _ li d P H11l'sb whar does one CIP me an Iy 0 IS most widely read works-name

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Foucault and Frontiers

Walters

find if not the question of power and how its modalities should be studied by focusing on practices of partitionment, segmentation, division, enclosure; practices that will underpin the ordering and policing of ever more aspects of the life of populations from the nineteenth century onwards. But while Foucault is interested in a range of practices which clearly pertain to the question of bordering understood in a somewhat general sense, one thing the reading of his lectures on security, governmentality and biopolitics reveals is that he had little to say explicitly about the specific forms of bordering associated with the government of the state. To put it differently, Foucault dealt at length with what we might call the microphysics of bordering, but much less with the place of borders considered at the level of tactics and strategies of governmentality.

Recent literature has begun to address this imbalance, demonstrating that many of Foucault's concepts are useful and important for understanding what kinds of power relarions and governmental regimes are at stake in contemporary projects which are re-making state borders amidst renewed political concerns over things like terrorism and illegal immigration.

However, the overarching theme of this chapter has been the need for caution when linking Foucault's concepts to the study of borders and frontiers today. While analytics like biopolitics, discipline and neoliberalism offer all manner of insights, we need to avoid the trap which sees Foucault's toolbox as something ready-made for any given situation. The challenge of understanding the emergent requires the development of new theoretical tools, not to mention the sharpening of older, well-used implements. With this end in mind the chapter has proposed the idea of the humanitarian border as a way of registering an event within the genealogy of the frontier, but also, although I have not developed it here, within the genealogy of

citizenship.

What I have presented previously is only a very cursory overview of certain features of the humanitarianization of borders, most notably its inscription within regimes of knowledge, and its constitutive relationship to politics. In future research it would be interesting to undertake a fuller mapping of the humanitarian border in relation to certain trajectories of government.

While we saw how themes of biopolitical and neoliberal government are pertinent in understanding the contemporary management of spaces like the detention center, it would seem especially relevant to consider the salience of pastoralism.

Pastoral power has received far less attention within studies of govern mentality than, say, discipline or liberal government (but see Dean 1999; Golder 2007; Hindess 1996; Lippert 2004). But here again, I suspect, it will be important to revise our concepts in the light of emergent practices and rationalities.

For the ways m which NCOs and humanitarians engage in the governance of migrants and refugees today have changed quite significantly from the kinds of networks of care self-examination and salvation which Foucault Identified With pastoralism.

For instance, and to take but one example, the pastoral care of

159

migrants, whether in situations of sanctuary or detention, is not organized as a life-encompassing, permanent activity as it was for the church, or later, in a secular version, the welfare state. Instead, it is a temporary and ad hoc intervention. Just as Foucault's notion of neo-liberalism was intended to register important transformations within the genealogy of liberal government, it may prove useful to think in terms of the neo-pastoral when we try to make better sense of the phenomenon of humanitarian government at/of borders, and of many other situations as well.

NOTES 1. In the more recent English translation of this lecture Burchell om.irs the reference to national boundaries (see Foucault 2007: 110). For std,l ano,~her translation of this passage, see Elden (2007: 567) who phrases It as the administrative state, born in the frontier [de type (ron tailer] (and no longer feudal) territoriality ... " , ,.' h 2. But see Foucault's comments on military ports In DI~clph~1e and Funis (1977: 144), which could be read as pertaining, to the disciplina r y po~er of borders. He describes a special space characterized by the quest fo~ clrcula,: tion and the danger of "smuggling, contagion ... land] dangerous mixtures.

As such, the port, and especially the military port, wO,uld become a key nod~ in the development of disciplinary spaces and techniques.

Not ,the leaft 0 these was the invention of the naval hospital, as at Rochefort In nort tern France.

f

3. Foucault may have written little that explicitly addresses the matter 0 s,tate frontiers and more broadly, as Elden suggests, does not explore ~uestlO,ns of rerritor y with anything like the attention he would devote to t e tactics of govern mentality and biopower. That said, F?uc~ul,t does offer us s0?"l~ intriguing observations about the history ~f rer ritorialit y, and more SpeC\h cally the function of knowledge and expertise I,n making space. For examp ~~ hi k about "the technicians or engmeers of the three great van see IS remar s " d" (Foucault 1984' 244). These ables-territory commUOIcatlOn, and spee, ds and . d tS If '. h buil ·1 ays hridges roa s an via uc . experts are the engmeers W 0 UI t rat w, ' he ci f d i the political drea~ of governing the sta~e i~~,~~/~tl~~e~:t g~:~~~moe~~alil:; exemplary

was

figure

111

the architect , then t e p . J , f irs most Important experts.

afkfirm the enlgldneeBr aoso(1n;9~.12002' 2006) who skillfully combines a h InC u e Ig ere , ' .' dieu' 1 of concern with technologies ~~secu~l.tYh WIth:i~~r t~~U;o~~;~o~nce exa socio-institutiona l fields; a series of stu I'l~S W /c, k d regulation (Epstein of borde.rs in terms of neoliber~l rat;fen/21~~~.oS r~~k:~006); research which 2007;. Gilbert 2007; Inda 2006, Mu h as air ~rts (Salter 2007) and places exarrunes particular sites of control sue Ph' 11 oriented work explorof sanctuary (Lippert ~O~4); and mores g:I~Jr:~ul~i~y y~ractices(Barry 2006; ing the changing sp~n~ltty o~ bO~~ee:s2002; 2006). Mention should also be Arnoore 2006; Bondirri 2004, W~ ich d itly uses the Foucauldian concepto

4 Key wor s . Foucauldian

made of Huspek's (2001) study W 11C. a rfl nventional tion of strategy to challenge the st3f1sm 0 co

accounts

of border

control. 'k fUNITED for Intercultural Action, 5. Amongst the most extensive IS the wkor ? t natl·onalism racism fascism and . descn ·b·es Itse If as an" "etwar agaInS " it documents t he which A f 6 May 2008 . f· migrants an d refugees. s0 In support

°

160

William

srag!?eri.ng number of ~1,]05 persons (it identifies all of them as "refugees").

The incidents of death Include those who commit suicide while awaiting refugee he~rings, those who perish .during se~ crossings, and those who die in detention due to a lack of medical attention.

See http://www.uniredagain-

st racism. org/pd fslactu a IJ istofdea th. pd f.

6. E.g., see hrrp:/lwww.iraqbodycount.org.

7. One reason to question the assumption that the subjects of humanitarian government are powerless victims is that such a view entirely neglects those circumstances and occasions when these subjects generate what Ranciere (2004) calls "dissensus", when they act as subjects "who have not the rights

that they have and have the rights that they have not" (2004: 302). On the dissensus of refugees see Nyers (2006). r am grateful to the editors for alerting me to this connection to Ranciere. see the work of the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People. This is the arm of the Vatican tasked with providing "pastoral care to 'people on the rnove'" a constituency which embraces a wide assortment of subjects including fishermen, circus people, pilgrims and refugees. The exercise of pastoral care within detention centers and airport waiting zones is identified as one of its particular challenges. See http://www. va rica n. va /roma n., cu r ia/ponti fica '- cou nci ls/migra nts/index. hrm.

9. For example, note how the Jesuit Refugee Service documents the highly discretionary way in which Cypriot police regulate the access of NGOs to detention facilities. But note also how JRS will mobilize the principle of the EU's European Transparency Initiative as a norm to contest such practices;

8. For example,

see JRS (2007: 168-169).

10. But see the history of governing

poverty, which is marked by episodes where the investigation of the poor displays many of these features, whether at the end of the nineteenth century or with the "rediscovery" of poverty in the midst of the postwar boom (e.g., with the publication of Harrington's The

Other America).

11. On the place of witnessing and spectacle within humanitarian politics, see Boltanski (1999: ch.3), Chakrabarty (2000), and Kurasawa 2007 (ch.2).

12. On the problematic place of politics within governmenrality studies, see Hindess (1997) and O'Malley, Weir and Shearing (1997).

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The conce t of biopolitics has had a remarkable career. Until recently only a small num~er of specialists were familiar with it, but ar presentf!t ISenJofYlng f its uses now extends rom re ugee ever-greater resonance. T he spectrum 0 I . . ulaolicies to AIDS prevention and onward to questions regardll1g pop, Phi Th concept has become a universal Cipher for encapsulating non growt. e , hni , 'I kid and bio-tec mea I' mnova ( Ion' , It the general results of biologica nowe ge I lineal challenges, designates a diffuse mix composed of erhica Cconhcernds'2POOOI4)1 , , (A d on 1987' er ar t . and economic mterests see n ers . '. well known It r y That the concept has a century-old hlsto IS not sOl'nitially in org~n, h fi h If of the rwenner h century, already surfaces In t erst a. . R b 1938) and later in Nazi istic concepts of rhe state (Kjellen 1920 , 0 er ts k 'ominent role (von , ich th I' of life and race roo a pr texts In which t e regu anon h fi Id called "biopoliKohl 1933; Reiter 1939).2 In the 1960s,a nlew researc baesl'ctenet being that , 'I A ican polltlca SCience, Its tics" emerged In Ang 0- menca h rly need to be taken bi I . I I ws ( at consequen political action rests on 10 ogica a 'I ' ' For this approach the " I ' ' nd socia sCientists. ' account of by politlca sCientistS add application of knowl, "I and processes eman S analysis of politica structures , I bi I nd evolutionary theory edge from the behavioral SCiences, soc~l' ~~f~~d'a~d Hibbing 2008).

(Somit and Peterson 1998; Mastersh;~ Fo~cault proposed a relational and In face of this naturalism, Mic I hi k the term in fact denotes " f "bi lines." n IS wor , concept 0 IOPO I I . i processes and , , k wi h h effort to er rve po I an explicit brea wit t e T h ntrary Foucault analyzes , 'I d 'ants 0 t e co , tures from biologic a etermln iCh "life" emerges as the "object" of the historical process Within wh , riginary and timeless laws, "I .

I d of presuming 0 . I politlca strategies. nstea d' r'nuity of political praxIS. n he diagnoses a histOrical cae~ura-a IS,cfion I dern form of the exercise .

'I'" fies a speci C mo thIS respect, blOpo !tICS SlgnI I ' 11 Foucault distinguished between of power. Historically and ana ytlca y'd wer' on the one hand, the po . h' "I I fe "onente two dimensions 0 f [IS histor

ica!

der

lirical

st

r

uc-

166

Beyond Foucault

Thomas Lemke

disciplining of the individual body; on the other hand, regulation of the populace (1990a: 139; 141-145).

Foucault viewed the combination of these two dimensions as the essential premise for establishing capitalism and constituting the national state. That combinatory process, he argued, allowed the creation of economically productive, militarily useful, and politically obedient bodies, a separation of the "birth of biopolitics" from the emergence of capitalism thus being impossible (Foucault 2000: 137). Within this biopolitical constellation, modern racism is of central significance. It establishes an analytic grid distinguishing "what must live" from "what must die," good, higher, and ascending races from those deemed bad, inferior, and descending, thus allowing a hierarchization and fragmentation of the social sphere (2003: 254)-' Foucault's concept of biopolitics is complex and has been assessed in highly varied ways. Very schematically, two central lines of reception can be distinguished. The first has its home in philosophy and social and political theory; it focuses on the mode of politics. How does biopolitics function and what counterforces does it mobilize? How is it to be distinguished historically and analytically from "classical" forms of political representation and articulation? The extreme poles of the relevant debate represent its most prominent contributions: the writings of Giorgio Agamben on the one side, those of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri on the other. The second line of reception has its starting point in the sociology of science and technology, the history of science and medicine, and cultural anthropology, together with feminist theory and gender srudies. Its main interest is the substance of life. If as a result of biorechnical developments the living body is now understood as a readable and rewritable text, then the question of biopolitics is posed in a new way: what is the meaning of life within such a political-technical constellation?

In the first two sections of this contribution, I will trace revisions and refinements of the concept of biopolitics that have been formulated in these two lines of reception. In the third section, I suggest tying the two research perspectives closer together-an approach already embedded in Foucault's work but not systematically developed. My main argument is that Foucault pursues the question of biopolitics further within a "grid of governmentaliry" (Foucault 2008: 186). Initially, his analysis of biopolitical mechanisms in Discipline and Punish and the Will to Knowledge fell short, since it concentrated on disciplinary processes and ways of regulating the populace, thus being broadly reduced to a kind of body politics. In contrast, the concept of government directs our attention to the relation between forms of self-direction and government by others, allowing an investigation of moral-political modes of existence.

In total, the project outlined here is aimed at a systematic linkage between rwocentral concepts from Foucault's work-biopol itics a nd govern menta lity-a nd an a nalytics of biopolitics whose dimensions will be described m the last section of this article. Such an analytics will make it possible to formulate a series of questions that usually remain outside the pertinent academic and political discussions; it

also allows an exploration government

and biopolitical

of the systematic

ties between

liberal

167

forms of

problems.

1. BARE LIFE OR LIVING MULTITUDE:

WHAT IS POLITICS?

Giorgio Agamben (1998) has outlined one of the most important revisions of the concept of biopolitics. Agamben, in fact, presumes that all Western politics since antiquity should be characterized as biopolitics. In order to JUStify this thesis, he takes up ideas from Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, and Georges Baraille, along with Foucault.

According to Agamben, the main difference within the realm of the political is not that between friend and enemy (pace Schmitt) but that between "bare life" (zoe) and political existence (bios), natural being and a human being's legal existence. In this light, the inclusion into a political community seems only possible by the sumultaneous exclusion of some human beings who are not allowed to become full legal subjects. According to Agamben, we find at the beginning of all politics the establishment of a borderline and the inauguration of a space that is deprived of the protection of the law: "The onglllal juridico-polirical relationship is the ban" (ibid.: 189).. .

In this manner, for Agamben the present period IS the catastrophiC endpoint of a political tradition that originated in Greek antiquity and led to the death camps. In Homo Sacer and subsequent work, Agamben declared rhe camps to be the "biopolitical paradigm of the West" (1998: 181), since they were the locus of a disappearance of the border between rule and exception.

However his discussion of the camps is not primarily related to past horror but to present sites marked by the state of exception: places where law and fact rule and exception indistinguishably intermesh. Here not legal subjects but "bare life" can be encountered; the state of exception is p,ermanently In play. Alongside death camp inmates, the examples Agamben introduces are stateless people, refugees, and coma rose patients. Howeve,r, Agam~en ISless . d i lif h . its "nakedness'" at the center of hIS reflections stand tntereste In let an in I' . not drills and discipline, life's normalization and endowm~n~ ~Ith norms, but rather the threat of death as the establishment and matenallZlng of a border. For Agamben, biopolitics is thus above all "thanatopolitlc~" (1998: 122; 1999: 84-86; see Fitzpatrick 2001: 263-265; Mbembe 2003).. .

In their work, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri ar nve at entirely differ: ent conclusions. They try to give the concept of blOpolitics po~mve mean . .. h I I' movement for workers autonomy, mg tying their arguments to t e ta Ian , ' . , ..

I d I I h y poststructuralist cntlques ideas from classical politlca an ega t eor , . . .

Wh . . d h bi nd the MarXISt tradmon. ere centered on Identity an t e su ject, a 路1' that modern biIOpOI'路 ItlCS rests Agamben criticizes Foucault for fa, ing to see d d N . on the solid foundation of a premodern sovereign power, Har tan f egn . f h . f iled to recogmze rhe trans orrnacriticize the French thlllker or aving at tion of modern into postmodern biopolitics.

168

Thomas Lemke

For Hardt and Negri, biopolitics does not involve an intermeshing of rule and exception but rather a dissolution of the boundaries between economics and politics, reproduction and production, thus marking nothing less than a new stage of capitalism. Here, in their view, the creation of "life" is no longer something both limited to the realm of reproduction and subordinated to the labor process; to the contrary, "life" now determines production itself, With biopolirics, they designate the constitution of a political regime that in the end embraces the totality of the individual's existence, rhus preparing the way for a new revolutionary subject: a creative and living entity, the "multitude," Hence the biopolitical order that Hardt and Negri delineate possesses the material requirements for forms of associative cooperation potentially going beyond the structural constraints of capitalist production: "Empire creates a greater potential for revolution than did the modern regimes of power because it presents us, alongside the machine of command, with an alternative: the set of all the exploited and subjugated, a multitude that is directly opposed to Empire, with no mediation between them" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 392), For these two authors, "biopolitics" stands for an entire series of fractures and border displacements, It signifies the transition from modernity to postmoderniry, imperialism to empire, and also marks a new relation between nature and culture (ibid: 187), It signifies a "civilization of nature," nature here meaning everything previously external to the production process, This diagnosis is the basis for the immanent perspective defining the analysis of Hardt and Negri, Once economics and politics, societal production and ideological legitimation become more or less conflated, we no longer have an external standpoint of life or truth to be set against Empire, Empire creates the world in which it lives: "Biopower is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an effe,ctive command over the entire life of the population only when it becomes an integral, vital function that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her own accord" (ibid: 23-24), According to Hardt and Negri all of society is subsumed under capitalism, but these authors tie this seemingly gloomy diagnosis to a revolutionary promise, If biopower represents power over life, this very life forms the terrain upon which counterforces and modes of resistance are constituted. The same competences, affects, and forms of cooperation promoted by the new order of production and rule undermine that order by barricading themselves against cooption and exploitation, while awakening the desire for autonomous and egalitarian forms of life, In this way biopower reacts to a living and creative biopolitical force external to it, which it regulates and forms without, however, being able to completely control and rule it. From this per,peerive, biopolitie; stands opposed to biopower and points to the possibility of new a;sociative forms emerging from the body and its own powers,'

Beyond Foucault

169

b E 'to has developed his own conThe Italian philosopherRo erto spoSlm both A amben's project and cept of biopohtlcs at a crit ica l dlsta,nce fro I·' gd Philosophv (2008) ' f H dt d Negri BIOS Biopo itics an I I the ana ysis 0 ar an " 'd developing ideas from the two is the last part of a trilogy taking th. an, h t is that modern Western 'to'S marn t esis IS tal k 6 E previous boo s.

SPOSI "riaradi of immunization" (2008: 45), " I hi k i . led by the para Igm polit ica t m mg ISru, ,.

I hear since Hobbes, he argues that Through a reconstruction of politlca t eedom can only be properly modern concepts of security, .proper~y, an I r· characterized by an inner . hi I gic of ImmUnIty: a ogi c d understoo d Wit mao I'" hich immunity preserves an ion b life and po ItlCS In w I connection etween I . . ' d oductive force. At the center lif b I· iring Its ex pa nstve an pr . f deve Iops ley irm . d h feguarding and protection 0 ·, I'd thinkmg stan s t e sa T h of po Iinca action an , d d ( elf-)desrructive effects, 0 t e life: an objective that 1D ~he en ,pro. uces .rects and preserves, it negates i' of i m rnu ntz.attott pro . degree t h at t h e ogre d . th m to biological eXistenCe, .

I· f life processes re ucing e f the singu anty 0 I, ."

008' 56) leads, Esposito argues, rom a The "imrnumtar y dialectic (2 . 'f of protecting life, and onward project to preserve life, to a negative or rn

if

to its negation, 'II nderstanding of the opposing an u The para diIgm 0 f iunmuruty a , ows . . and development 0 [1'[I e di ' f biopolmcs-promotlOn aspects and imensions o. h h two constitutive moments · d cnon on teat er, as h d on the one han ,ItS estru . . h Nazi racial program as t e .

Esposito views t e . h [if of a shared pro bl ematlc.. " ationality in whic a I e. I . of an "Immunatory r [ d h ( most radica expression d ' . gative a politics 0 eat a ., b ' verte Into ItS oe, . . centered politics ecomes 10 dAb he insists that Nazism IS am "thanatopolitics"), Like Foucault an I gh ~;'but unlike them he locates , f modern politlca t oug , , h . part of a cootmuum 0 .' . I of sovereignty nor 111 t e pn.' e'ther m a pflnClp e d its specific charactenstlCs n I , (2008' 137-138) un erscores 'Rather Esposlro, 'fi· macy of a state 0f exception. , . h ogrammatic sigOl cance It , . of NaZism t e pr the medical-therapeutic alIl:s, d' eneration and death. ascribes to the struggle agamst I~nes';, ~lg2008) see; this "thanatopolitlcs" Esposito (2008: 3-7; see also amPde f Nazi Germany, but contlnu' .

With the ef eat 0 ffi . as by no means d Isappeanng d I he presents an a rmauve As a counter-mo e) I d ing to shape t h e present. . I d h ·dea of a non-comp ete , . f ference 111CU e tel 'fi ' "biopolitics'" its POlIltS a re . y efforts at UOI catIon . , ' I' e body that resists an . d open individual and col ectIv t· I·ty of life standll1g oppose f . manent norma IV , . f ffi _ and closure, and that 0 an 1m f life rocesses. This VISion a an a.. r to the project of anexternal conrr~1 0 bl Pof overturning the Nazi polmcs mative biopolitics IS meant to be capa e I'f but oflife" (2008: 11; Italics ·· ht'snolongeroverlc . (sa of death in a po Imcs t a I . l 'c of immunity, It prescn in original), In place of a self-destruetlve ~;~ognizing the individual/colt p new concept of comm~nahty-a C.O,nce en ness and finitude as the v.ery lective body's constitutive vulnerab"lt~ penna:,ently struggling against foundation for the commul1Ity, lOstea. . , as a percel ·ved threat to It. such qualttles

~r

170

Thomas Lemke

2. MOLECULAR POLITICS, ANTHROPOPOLITICS, THANATOPOLITICS: WHAT IS LIFE? The second line of reception tied to Foucault's concept of biopolitics addresses recent research in the biosciences, analyzing technological developments that allow access to "life itself" (Franklin 2000). It starts with the observation that as a result of biotechnological practices, the idea of a natural orgin of all living beings is beginning to be replaced by the idea of an artificial plurality of living beings that are more technical artifacts than natural entities. Various technological innovations such as-to name only a few-the redefinition by molecular biology of life as a text, biomedical progress involving new techniques extending from brain scans to DNA analysis, and transplantation medicine and technologies of reproduction, have broken with the idea of an integral body. The body is increasingly viewed not as an organic substrate but as a kind of molecular software that can, as suggested, be both read and rewritten.

Sarah Franklin and Margaret Lock succinctly describe this transformation of bios as follows: "Genealogical succession is to the new biology what a live orchestra is to digital recording" (Franklin and Lock 2003: 14).

Molecula rization and digitalization mark a "recombinant biopolitics" (Dillon and Reid 2001: 44; see also Dillon and Reid 2009) operating both inside and outside the human body's boundaries.

It opens a new level of intervention within that body, at the same time allowing new combinations of heterogeneous elements into previously unknown life forms. The art of molecular engineering differs in a distinct way from traditional forms of biological and medical intervention in that it is aimed not only at modifying metabolic processes but at reprogramming them as well. No longer control of outer nature, but a transformation of inner nature stands at the center of rhis political epistemology of life. As a consequence biology can no longer be defined as a discovery-based science registering and documenting life processes; rather, it operates as a transformational science that creates life and alters living beings (Rheinberger 2000; Rabinow 2001; Clarke et al.

2003; Rose 2007).

This instrumentalization of life cannot be separated from its capitalization. Instead of functioning as a supplier of raw material for production, in the age of genetic diversity "nature" can be understood as a source and creator of values. The reproduction and transformation of life processes can create what Catherine Waldby (2000) has called "biovalue," which forms the basis for developing new products and services within a capitalist economy. Biological knowledge and life forms can be patented and marketed. In that way a political economy of life emerges in whieh biological life-value and capitalist exploitatioll estahlish an organic connection (Andrews and Nelkin 2001; Sunder Rajan 2005; Cooper 2008).

When it comes to the Foucaultian concept of bioethics, these alterations 8 of hios suggest Ih ree lines of criticism and suggestions for improvement.

Beyond Foucault

171

In the first place, it is clear that the Foucaultian concept largely adheres to the idea of an integral body; Foucault's analysis of techniques of power aimed at forming and dividing up the body itself postulates a self-contained and enclosable body. Today, biotechnologies allow a dismantling and recombination of the body that Foucault could not have foreseen' The body no longer appears as a self-evident starting point and organic substrate to which technologies attach themselves In order to form rt, but as the effect of techniques of embodiment (de Lauretis 1987; Haraway 1995; Butler 1993).10 The new level of intervention established by the aforementioned techno-scientific advances is located beneath the classical biOpolmcal oles of "individual" and "population."

Anatomo-politics and population p. db" I I politics" whose regard for regulation are complemente y a rna ecu ar ." . individual persons is no longer anatomical or physiological but genetic, . hin a " 01" (Flower and and which simultaneously locates them Wit m a gene po Heath 1993; Lemke 2004).

In the second place, this expanded grip on the body has led to a new rela. hi b lif nd death Although in his Birth of the Clinic (1973) nons lp etween I ea· d dici h Foucault treats death as an integral aspect of mo er~ me IC.lne, I.n.or er texts he seems to see it as the outer border or other Side of blopolmcs.

At .

I I d systematically mterconnected present living and dying are more c ose yan d h hi "h man material" rranscen s t e than Foucault assume d. For one t ing, U '" II" dead living human being. Humans who die are often no longer rea Y , w with portions of their bodies, their cells or organs, blood, marrlo , afnldfs?, . f h h "a ity 0 I e forth, continuing to exist in the bodies 0 ot ers, W o~e "qu , life i I d Life matenalls not subject to is thus improved or whose I e IS pro onge . d . f . body-it can be store as m orthe same biological rhyr h ms as t h e organic .. . II mation in DNA databases and in blood banks or cultivated in potentia y A d h d h f one person can guarantee rhe immortal stem-cell lines. n t e eat 0 I I b 2001· Franklin life and survival of another, in a productive cyc e ( acu d d d and Lock 2003). Furthermore, death has been both broken up an ren ere . h" d h gence of reanllnanon flexible. The definition of "brain deat an t. e erner . . _ . h b lining of death mto va rrous cor techniques together With t e su sequent sp I d , ... h allowed a development an expanporeal regions and points 10 time, ave . b t ather . d ici N t so much state sovereignty, u r sion of rransplantation me icme.

0 . . b If d . hori . w make decisions a out I e an medical-administrative aut onnes, no . . d h . d I life i h t begins an w en It en s. n death: they define what (human) I e IS, w en I f bi I·· I"" h become a parr 0 IOPO incs. an entirely new way, thanatopO ItICS. as f h "death of man" (Foucault And finally' despite his diagnoSIS 0 t e . d· id . . . . . ted toward human 111 IVI u1970) for Foucault biopolitlcs remains or ten h h d this , . h results i roblems On t e one an , als and populations, wh ic resu ts rn two Phi'· I management and ·11· h ys In whic eco ogica approach fails to I urmnate t e wa I . h (e) production of rhe .

I di insert themse ves mto t e r envlronmenta lscourse I d h ept of biopoliries to . ry to exten t e conc human species. It seems necessa f h d· . ns of life in general. .. ' and control 0 t e can mo ta ke in the a d ministration ."

I d·d t adequately deal with As Rutherford (1999: 45) has put It, Foucau t I no

172

Beyond

Thomas Lemke

the way in which the political and ecological problematization of populations also gave rise, in more recent times, to a similar problematization of nature and environment."

On the other hand, the reconfiguration of bodies as texts tends to also dissolve the epistemological and normative borderline between humans and non-humans.

If life can be reduced to genetic structures, then the differences between humans and nonhumans are gradual, not categorical.

The human being aimed at by bio-medical optimization strategies, less frequently ill and living longer, is at the same time an animal-otherwise the biological discourse about "model organisms" would make no sense, since it is mice and cats, apes and other animals upon which human diseases are researched and pharmaceutical substances tried our. In this light, being human no longer presents itself as the solid result of evolutionary-natural processes, but rather as the precarious product of technology and the object of both social negotiation and patterns of cultural interpretation: biopolitics as anthropopolitics (Rabinow 1996; Haraway 1997; Calarco 2008)."

3. VITAL POLITICS:

THE GOVERNMENT

OF LIFE

This brief overview points to the various lines of reception of Foucault's concept of biopolitics as having been deepened and further developed in important respects. A new biopoliticallevel is clearly present both beyond and beneath the levels of the individual and the populace; it is grounded in an expanded knowledge of the body and biological processes. Within this altered representational regime, the body is less a physical substrate or anatomical machine than an informational network. At the same time, in analyzing biopolitical mechanisms a range of modes of subjectification need to be considered, in order to understand the impact of the control and direction of life processes on individual and collective actors, resulting in new forms of identity. Over recent years, the Foucaultian notion of biopolitics has served as a starting point for a focus on the significance of knowledge production and processes of subjecrification.

Important and necessary though such an expansion of the analytical horizon is, it is important to keep in mind that for the most part the two lines of reception have developed their problems independenrly and hardly touch on each other. This leads not only to a danger of mutual blindness, but also to the risk of reproducing and renewing an outdated division of labor. Where one side is interested in the political sphere or macro-level, formulating questions of power and resistance, subjecrification and subjugation, the other side investigates technologies on a micro-level, often at a distance or even cut off from political questions. Here the first line tends to analyze political processes without considering material technologies, and the second concentrates on technological developments while often isolating them from political

strategies."

Foucault

173

In this light, I would now like to propose a third perspective, focusing neither on processes of subjectification nor on forms of knowl.edge, but rather resituating the biopolitical problematic within an a nalytics of government.

Biopolitics is here meant to be understood as an "art of government" (Foucault 2008: 1) that takes account of the relational network of power processes, practices of knowledge, and forms of subjectification.

This suggestion is tied to the project that Foucault formulated while summarizing his lecture of 1979 on "the birth of biopolitics" as follows: The theme was to have been "biopolitics," by which I meant the attempt, starting from the eighteenth century, to rationalize ~he.problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characrer isnc of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy,

race ....

(Foucault

2008: 317)

There is a widespread view that in rhe framework of his analyrics of government Foucault did not concern himself further With the theme of biopolitics. 'I believe this view is misraken: the theme was not abandoned but experienced a "theoretical shift" (Foucault 1990b: 6). Foucault places the question of biopolitics in a more general theoretical framework meant to allow a systematic linkage between processes of power, knowledge practices, and forms of subjectification compnsmg the relational network referred to previously. .' . .' f Within this perspective blOpohtlcs has more to do With rechniques 0 (self-)government, going beyond practices aimed at c,?rporeal dlsClphne and 路 hIe The "birth of biopolltlcs IS closely tied to the regu Ianng t e popu ac . ib I" emergence of liberal forms of government. Foucault understands h era IS~ as a s ecific art of leading human beings which IS oriented toward the pop p ..

I fi d di sing over the pohtlcal economy ulation as a new politjca gure, an ISPO 1 .' f as a technique of intervention,u Liberalism introduces a ratlonal1ty 0 ~OVernment that differs from both medieval concepts of rule and earl~ rna er~ raison d'etat: the idea of a "nature" of society forming both the asis an boundaries of governmental action.

The eighteenth century emergence

d f h O of polirical economy, an b It e PLoPbtirution of modern 10 ogy.

1ulation cannot be separate d f rom t h e cons I d bi I . I , d f d re closely connecre to 10 ogica eral concepts of autonomy an ree om a "I . d If gularion that came to preva i over concepts of self-preservation an se ore f'路 . the . I chanistic model or investigating the previously dominant p h YSlca -me b d organizational body. Originating around 1800, biology was ase I路fon anemerging essen. h . ibl henomena 0 f I e as principle understandmg t e VISI e PI' rion thus replaced . dorru wi h t plan lnterna orgamza I rially at ran om, Wit out a se . lans of a hi her aurhority beyond an exrernal order corresponding to the p d d g ic principle equally life, with "life" functioning as an ~bstracht an Ifynamselrvation reproduc. .

C es sue as se -pre Inherent in all organisms. ategori .

I'路 g bodies placed at to charactenze IVlIl , tion, and development now cam e 1

174

Beyond Foucault

Thomas Lemke

a greater distance from artificial creations than had been the case before (Foucault 1971).

When in the lectures of 1978 and 1979 Foucault defines "liberalism as rhe general framework of biopolirics" (2008: 22), this signals a shift of accent from his previous work, resulting not least from self-critical insight: to the effect that his previous analyses of forms of biopolitical power were one-sided and unsatisfactory, since they focused mainly on processes involving population regulation and corporeal disciplining.

Foucault's analytics of government forms a contrast to this, expanding body politics with the perspective of "vital politics." This concept stems from Alexander Rusrow, one of the most important representatives of postwar German liberalism, whom Foucault briefly touches on in the 1979 leeture (ibid.: 148; 157). By "vital politics," Riistow means a form of politics "that considers all factors upon which happiness, well-being, and satisfaction in reality depend" (1955: 70). This politics is, he indicates, by no means limited to action by the state, but "is politics in the broadest possible sense ... , all social measures and experimental arrangements" (1957: 235); it relies on social ties and spiritual cohesion and reactivates moral values and cultural traditions, its goal being to insert an "ever more dense net and weave of living ties [Iebendiger Bindungeni into the entire social realm" (ibid.: 238). This is a task of integration and innovation needing to take in all societal elements and levels while simultaneously acknowledging their self-directing competencies.

Foucault's ana lyrics of government takes account of these vital-political ambitions of (neo-) liberal governmental practice, tying the analysis of physical-biological being to an examination of subjectification processes and moral-political modes of existence. Following a suggestion by Lars Thorup Larsen (2003), not only two subject forms of biopolitics-individual and populace-can here be distinguished, but also, taking up Agamben's own distinction, two forms of life: zoe and bios. This analytic distinction makes it possible to scrutinize the ways the two biopolitical dimensions are intertwined. In Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge, Foucau lr's concept of biopolirics remains centered on individual disciplining and regulation of the populace; the analysis of subjectification processes essentially limits itself to subjugation and corporeal dressage, hence to the dimension of zoe, with techniques of self-constitution receiving little notice." With the problematic of government, the perspective broadens, with the question of moral and political existence now also emerging: the problem, then, of bios. Analysis of disciplinary and regulatory processes is now supplemented with analysis of another form of power, a form that "categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him" (Foucault 2000: 331).

Beyond technologies of bodily disciplining and the regulation of the 1'01'ularion, attention is now also focused on the self-constitution of individual

Table 8.1

Different Biopolitical

175

Technologies" Collective

Individual Life form zoe (physical being)

Technologies of the Body Technologies of the

bios (moral and political being)

Technologies of the Self

Population

Technologies of the Social

and collective subjects. Accordingly, Foucault now distinguishes between "political technologies of individuals" and "technologies of the self." The first of these leads us "to recognize ourselves as a society, as a parr of a social entity, as a part of a nation or of a state" (Foucault 2000: 404). Such technologies can be designated more generally, and perhaps more precisely, as "technologies of the social," a phrase here not meant to suggest here that technologies have social applications but rather referring to practices that generate society as an imaginary totality and fictive collective body III the first place." . " In distinction to "technologies of the social," "technologies of the self allow individuals "to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own thoughts, th~lr own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transfo~m (hems~lves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfe.ctiOo, happmes~, purrry, supernatural power" (Foucault 1997: 177). In this manner four Interconnected biopohtical dimensions can be analytically differentiated; they are presented

in the Table 8.1.

4. GOVERNMENTALITY

AND BIOPOLIT1CS

The linkage of these four dimensions allows to treat the problem of biopolitics in a more complex theoretical framework. For Foucault, modern biopolitics is a historical form of articulation of a much more general problem: the linkage between pastoral and political power extendlllg back mto Christian antiquity."

With the advent of liberal government, rhis problem took on a specific form. For one particular question first surfaces With lib eralism: how are free subjects-subjects of law-governed when they obsimultaneously understood as living beings? Foucault focuses on th~S pro lem when he insists that the issue of blOpohtlcs cannot be separate from the framework

of political

rationality

within which they appeared

and took on their intensity. This means "'liberalism," lation to liberalism the

p h enomena

0

Since It

was

lJ1

re-

that they assumed the form of a challenge. How can with its specific effects and problems,

f " opulation" P

,

176

Thomas Lemke be taken into account In a system concerned about respect for legal subjects and individual free enterprise?

In the name of what and according to what rules can it be managed? (Foucault 2008: 317)

Liberal government, Foucault observes, developed a specific political knowledge and made use of disciplines like statistics, demography, epidemiology, and biology, analyzing life processes at the level of population groups in order to "govern" individuals through correcting, excluding, normalizing, disciplining, and optimizing measures. Foucault emphasizes that in the framework of the government of living beings, nature represents no autonomous realm in principle free of intervention, but itself depends on governmental action: no material substrate upon which governmental practices might be applied, but rather their constant correlative. The peculiar subject-object status of the political figure of the "population" plays an important role here. On the one hand, that figure stands for a collective reality essentially independent of political intervention and distinguished, as outlined previously, by its own dynamic and self-directing competency; on the other hand, this autonomy does not represent any absolute boundary for political intervention, but rather its privileged reference. The discovery of a population's "nature" (for instance through birth rates, death rates, and rates of disease) is the precondition for the possibility of its deliberate direction.

But with liberal governmentality, not only does biological life emerge as an object and reference of government, but "political life" does so as well.

Liberalism is ried to the constitution of a bourgeois society and a public sphere that reflects about governmental practices, inquires into their pros and cons, and criticizes their possible excesses." For this reason Foucault understands liberalism not only as a political theory or an economic doctrine, but also as a form of critical reflection on governmental practice ... The question of liberalism, understood as a question of "too much government," has been one of the constant dimensions of that recent European phenomenon which seems to have emerged first of all in England, namely: "political life." It is even one of its constituent elements, if it is true that political life exists when the possible excess of governmental practice is limited by the fact that it is the object of public debate regarding its "good or bad," its "too much or too little." (Foucault

2008: 321-322) Beyond Foucault, the various correctives and refinements of the concept of hiopohtics allow us to sketch in an "analytics of biopolitics" taking account of the interplay between power relations, knowledge practices and forms of ~lIbjcctif1cati()n.

In turn, we can differentiate three dimensions of this analytic perspective (see also Rabinow and Rose 2006: 197-198)."

Beyond Foucault

177

First, biopolitics requires systematic knowledge of "life" and "living beings." Systems of knowledge provide cognitive and normative maps that allow an opening of biopolitical spaces in rhe first place and specify objects for intervention.

They render rhe reality of life understandable and calculable so thar it can be shaped and transformed.

We thus firsr need to understand the regime of truth forming the backdrop of biopolitical practice (and we need to understand the selectivity inscribed in chis regime): what knowledge of bodies and life processes is considered especially relevant and which alternative interpretations of reality are demoted or marginalized?

Which scientific experts and disciplines dispose over legitimate aurhority ro tell the truth regarding life, health, the populace, and so forth? Which cognitive and intellectual instruments and which technological procedures are available for the production of truth? What proposals and definitions of problems and objectives regarding processes of life obtain social recognition?

Second, as the problem of the truth regime cannot be separated from that of power the question arises of how power strategies mobilize knowledge about life (and how power processes produce and disseminate forms of knowledge). This perspective enables us to rake Into account structures of inequality, hierarchies of value and asymmetnesthat are (re)produced by biopolirical practices: which forms of life are considered valuable, which "unworthy of life"? Which existential plights, which forms of physical and psychological suffering receive political, medical, SCientific, and SOCial attention and are understood as intolerable, relevant to research, and In need of therapy-and which are ignored or neglected? How are forms of domination and exclusion, and experiences of racism and sexism, inscribed in the body and how do rhey transform it (in respect to state of "health, . d f th)' The "economy of the life expectancy, physical appearance, an so or . . n politics of life also comes under scrutiny: who profits from the reg ulario and optimization of life processes (through financia! ga m, polItical influ. .'

I . nd so forth) and In what form, ence, scientific reputation, socia prestige, a . and who bears rhe cosrs and suffers as a result (through poverty, disease, premature death, and so forth)? What forms of explOltar;on and commercialization of human and non-human life can we observe. .

Third an analytics of biopolirics also has to take account of the varhiOus , . h bi brought to work on t emforms of subjectificatlon-t e way su jeers are h .' selves guided by scientific, medical, moral, religious an~ other aut o~t~~; and on the basis of socially accepted arrangements of bodies and sexes.. f . s by way of a cross-section a f I as well we can identi fy a comp ex a question . f (. di d I , Hilled on III the name 0 In IVI ua the relevant themes: ow are peop e cuueu ou, f h f '1 and collective) life and healrh (one's own healrh and that are ami y, nation, "race" and so forth), in view of defined goals (health Improvement: lif . h' h r quality of life amelioration of the gene pool, popula I e extension, ig e .'. (i trerne cases even tion increase and so forth) to act In a certain way 10 ~x hei I' b ought to expcflence t err ives as to die for such goals)' How are t hey r

178

Beyond Foucault

Thomas Lemke

"worthy" or "unworthy" of living? How are they called on as members of a "higher" or "lower" "race," a "stronger" or "weaker" sex, an "ascendant" or "degenerate" people? How do subjects take over and modify scientific interpretations of life for their own conduct and conceive of themselves for , ' Instance, as gene-steered organisms, neuro-biological machines, assembled bodies whose organic elements are in principle exchangeable?

How do we comprehend this process as an active appropriation and precisely not as one of passive-receptive acceptance?

The reformulation of the concept of biopolitics within an analytics of government has a number of theoretical advantages.

Such a perspective allows us, in the first place, to break with biologistic concepts and confront a still enduring tendency in the social sciences to treat bodies, biology, and nature as pre-social objects (Benton 1991; Dickens 2001). Bodies of human beings or the nature of the population are not external or ontological premises for (political) government; to the contrary, the art of government represents a "sudden emergence of the naturalness of the [human] species within the political artifice of a power relation" (Foucault 2007: 22).19 Beyond this, such a research perspective allows us to explore the connections between physical being and moral-political existence: how do certain objects of knowledge and corporeal experiences become a moral, political, or legal problem? This is the theme of the last volumes of Foucault's History of Sexuality, at its center stands moral problematizations of physical experiences and forms of self-constitution (Foucault 1986; 1989), Contemporary examples are the figure of the human being and the legal construct of human dignity, both of which are coming under increasing pressure as a result of biotechnical innovation (Rabinow 1999: 14-17). The problem has thus emerged, for example, of whether embryos possess human dignity and can claim human rights, Furthermore, which biological presumptions and prejudices stamp ongoing conceptions of citizenship, in that they implicitly or explicitly determine membership rules, premises of participation, and criteria for entry, in this way determining who can even become a candidate for citizen status, on the basis of what biological features-sex, ethnic origins, "racial" affiliation, and so forth (Rose and Novas 2005)?

Finally, this perspective focuses our attention on the relation between technologies and governmental practices: how do liberal forms of government make use of corporeal techniques and forms of self-guidance, how do they form interests, needs, and structures of preference? How do present technologies model individuals as active and free citizens, as members of self-managing communities and organizations, as autonomous actors who arc in the position-or at least should be-to rationally calculate their own life risks' In neoliberal theories, what is the relationship between the 'concept of the responsible end rational subject and that of human life as

human capital? !"cHlCoult's writing did not so much systemetically pursue as offer promi,ing ,uggestions for this anelytie perspective.

He never concretized his

179

remarks on the relation between biopolitics and liberalism-something meant to stand at the center of the 1979 lecture (see 2008: 21-22; 78), Regrettably, what we have is the "intention," as Fouc~u~t concede? selfcritically in the course of the lecture (ibid.: 185-186), Filling out this program, developing it, and making it useful for contemporary theoretical debates and political struggles, is the challenge facing current research on the concept

of biopolitics.

NOTES 1. See, for instance,

(Brandimarte

et

the essays

in the Italian

al. 2006).

Encyclopaedia "

of Biopolitics

2 A brief survey of the concept's history can be found 10 Esposito 2008: 16-24, For a more detailed look at Foucault's analysis of racism see Stoler 1995j

3:

f bi

Forti 2006.

4. Karia Gene! (2006) offers an instructive ccmparison of th.e concep~ ~ 10power in Foucault and Agamben. For an extensive analysis and critique of

Agamben's theses, see Lemke 2005, 5. Such reflections

,

can find support in Foucault's assessment

",

of blOpolttlcs

con-

Hicrual field (Foucault 1990a: 172-174; 187), For a further development of the distinction

between

biopolitics

and blopower

laid down by Foucault, see

Lazzarato 2000, ' d h' ' 1998' 2002, On the place of Roberto Esposiro an IS concept 6 , See E SPOSito, , h C b II 2008 and the of biopolitics within contemporar.y P~I~OSOP y, see amp e articles in the special edition of DlQcntl~s (20?6). . . if d 7, "My term biovalue ... specifies ways In wh.,ch ~echl1\cs can mrensi yanu_ multiply force and forms of vitality of ordering It as an eco~om~, a cal\ lable and hierarchical system of value. Biovalue is gene~~te w ebre~ert e , duct! fl" entities can e msrrugenerative and transformatlve pro ucttvtt y a IVlOg .' mentalized along lines which make them useful for hUfmanhP~oJelcrsu-ltuS~~di ' 'I 0 other arenas a tee ruca c . ence , industry , me icme, agncu r ' ive f rure f bi I erge f rom t h e ca lib I ration Currently the most productive orms 0 lO.va.ue e.m . . . f , . .

II' h ithin blo-lOformatlC economies 0 of living entities as code; en ro I.ng t em w. "(Waldby 2000: 33j see also value which converge with capital economies

Waldby and Mitchell 2006), "

rnke 2007: 120-123),

8. For a m~re comprehens.,ve dIS.CUsro~l~e~ ;~d Rerd (2001: 56): "Biohistory 9. See, for 1l1stance, the dJagnosl~ 째d fl 01 It's concern with bodies and with seems to have very mu~h ext.en e ouc~u d inro the structure of the the social since the life SCIences, delving eeP I b d i d " This critique , . . h t It means to be em 0 Ie . soma itself, are reconsnrutrt'B W a I I" it d his critical analysis to the points to a more basic problem Foucau Il~~v:aled respect for the logical ci "dubious" human S~lences an. repea~l"Y f the natural sciences (see Fourigor and sharp "epistemological P~~t:ou~ault underestimated the social cault 2000: 111). The result ~as. t the natural sciences. However, Joseph power of knowledge prodUCt,lO~ 10 d that the Foucaultian perspec1 ~ouse (1987; 1993) has convlnclO~ Y a~~~~nditions for the emergence and tlve can also be drawn on to examl11e t acceptance of such knowledge.

H (1991'163)' "No objects, spaces, 10. See also the observation of Donna araway on~nr c;n be interfaced with or bodies are sacred in themselvdeS;hany comPcode call be constructed for any other if the proper standar , t e proper ,

II

180

Thomas

Lemke

Beyond

processing signals in a common language ....

The cyborg is not subject to Foucault's biopolitics; the cyborg simulates politics, a much more potent field of operations."

11. Gesa Lindemann (2003: 27) criticizes Foucault from the perspective of a reflexive anthropology.

She argues that Foucault's theoretical ami-humanism displays an inherent weakness: since for him the only relevant social bodies are those of human beings, he remains "naively anthropocentric."

See also Lindemann 2002, 24-25. Referring to work of Bruno Latour, Paul Rutherford (2000: 2]0-213) for his part argues that Foucault remained attached to the idea that human beings alone are endowed with the capacity for action, while objects are passive.

12. Compare the observation of Andrew Barry (2001: ]2): "Science and technology studies have tended to be dominated by the study of cases which become the objects of theoretical arguments about the character of the scientific and technical, but whose significance for the study of politics is obscure. In this way, the connections between science, technology and politics are not interrogated but reproduced."

For a similar critique, see Gottweis (1998: 11). This critique is aimed at mainstream work; much of this work should in any case be appreciated for its rigorous inquiry into the difference between micro- and macro-levels, politics and technology.

See in this respect the classical text of

Calion and Latour (1981).

13. Not only Foucault's concept of biopolitics changes after The Will to Knowledge; his view of liberalism also undergoes a shift of emphasis. Whereas in a text of 1977 he still understands political economy rather traditionally as an external limitation on power by law, in the lecture on governmentality it stands for an inner self-limitation on power (Senellart 2004).

14. Michel Pecheu x criticizes Foucault's work from this period for not being able to "work out a coherent and consistent distinction between processes of material subjugation of human individuals and the process of domesticating animals," and for engaging in a "hidden biologism of Bakunin's sort" [Pech-

eu x 1984,64-65; similarly McNay 1994, 100-104; Barrett 1991, 145-155; see also Lemke 1997, 112-117).

15. In this

regard compare, for instance, Barbara Cruikshank's concept of "technologies of citizenship" (1994; 1999) and Benedict Anderson's work on nations as "imagined communities" (1983).

16. The table is a slightly altered version of one appearing in a published lecture

by Lars Thorup Larsen (2003: 5). Larsen correctly indicates that an analytic rather than an ontological differentiation is at play here: the individual and society, body and population, exist as an instrument/effect of biopolitical strategies and are nor external [Q them.

17. "We can say that Christian pasrorship has introduced a game that neither the Greeks nor the Hebrews imagined.

It is a strange game whose elements are life, death, truth, obedience, individuals, self-identity-a game that seems to have nothing to do with the game of the city surviving through the sacrifice of the citizens. Our societies proved to be really demonic since they happened to combine those two games-the cir y-citizen game and the shepherd-flock g8me-in what we call the modern states" (Foucault 2000: 311). .

18. See Habcrmas' analysis of the development of a bourgeois public sphere 111 the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in The Structural Transforma-

tion o( the Public Sphere (1989).

19. The following con~iderations are based on Lemke (2007: 149-151).

20. With their cOllcept of a "government of bodies" (gouvernement des corps), Didier Fassin and Dominique Mcrnmi (2004: 22) propose a similar analytIC perspective:

"Multiplicity

of forms of both the exercise

of power

and places

181

Foucault

of its application, diversity of paths of production of subjects thr~)Ugh m.ul路 tiple procedures of population regulatio~: these are the elements mreresung us in the heritage of the later work of M,che.1 Foucault (much more than the work generally invoked in the literature on biopower] when we speak of government of the body."

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Entry of ~f·· D f h e Into0 Hammer. tsror y pp 37 62· E· 0 . iscourses 0 t e Environment. Oxford' Bl kwe . ~ In ric a ner (ed) Rutherford, Paul. (2000). The P bl f· ac ~eli.

PhD Th esis), . Research Schoolro ofem In Conte S 0 . Nature IS' mporary S·ocia I Theory ( sity, Canberra. cera ctences, Australian National UniverSenellarr, Michel. (2004) . L a Question 435: 55-57.

., . du Liberalisme.

9

Coming Back to Life An Anthropological Reassessment of Biopolitics and Governmentality Didier Fassin Forming concepts is a way of living and not a way of killing life; it is a way to live in a relative mobility and not a way to immobilize life; it is to show, among those billions of living beings that inform their environment and inform themselves on the basis of it, an innovation that can be judged as one likes, tiny or substantial: a very special type of informarion.Tfoucault 2003: 14-15)

Le Magazine Litteraire

Sene.llan, Mi.chel. (2007). Course Context _'. nty, Territory, Population. Lectures 36~ 14?1 In MiChel Foucault Secutrans. G. Burchell. Basingsroke. Palg M' e Mal liege de France, 1977-1978 S . Alb . rave ac I an ' orrut, err and Steven A. Peterson. (1998) R .' . . . , Three Decades-a Balance Sheet B 'ti hi· eVllew Ar,tI.c1e:Biopolirics after 571. . rt IS ourna of Political Science 28: 559-

~iPh

Stoler, Ann Laura. (1995). Race and the Educati . of S~xuality and the Colonial Order of~:.tlon of Desire. Foucault's History versny Press. mgs. Durham/London: Duke UniSunder Rajan, Kaushik. (2006). Bioca ital Th ..

Durham/London' Duke Unive . Pp . e Constitution of Postgenomic Lite rstty ress /' . a dby, Catherine. (2000) The Visible H· . an Posthuman Medicine L~ndon/N Y kumR Plro/eet. lnformatic Bodies and W Idb C h . . ew or: our edge a y, at eflneand Robert Mitchell (2006) T . ue . and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism h : OlSsk Ec.ono,,!l1es:Blood, Organs . ur am. u e Umverslty Press.

WI'

6

The idea I wish to develop here is that in putting forward the concept of biopolitics, Michel Foucault opened up a major area of study, founded on a brilliant intuition, but that paradoxically, he perhaps failed to address the core of the issue-life itself. This was not for lack of time, his own untimely death depriving him of the space to take it on, but through a form of avoidance-for no sooner had he opened up this arena than he turned quickly away from it to address himself to other questions and produce other concepts, notably that of govern mentality. This concept forms the substance of what we might consider his third intellectual phase, after archaeology and genealogy: the "government of the self and others," to cite the title of his penultimate course at the College de France (Foucault 2008).

What the author of The History of Sexuality did was effectively to shift "biopolirics," in the sense that it is-literally, or at least erymologically-a politics of life, that is to say a politics which takes existence as its object and the living as its subject, turning it into what is in essence a politics of populations, a politics which measures and regulates, constructs and produces human collectivities through death rates and family planning programs, health regulations and migration controls (Foucault 1979). With "anatomopolitics," conceived as the set of disciplines practiced on the body, which constrain and encompass behavior, design and determine a social "order of things," biopolirics constitutes biopower-in other words, a normalizing power over life, which Foucault fleetingly but decisively theorized around 1976, notably in the last chapter of The Will to Knowledge.

Let us return to the text of that famous lecture, given in 1976 at the University of Bahia, and entitled "The Meshes of Power." In this lecture, Foucault asserts: "Life has now become an object of power. Once, there were only subjects, juridical subjects from whom one could take goods, life toO,

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moreover. Now, there are bodies and populations" (Foucault 2007: 161).

Thus life dissolves into these two objects, bodies and populations. In terms of an analysis of power, these translate into discipline and regulation, anaro-

mopolitics and biopolitics. The question of life itself, as form and as value, as that which constitutes the substance of existence and that which forms the experience of the living-life sense understanding-seems

in its scientific significance and its commonto disappear as we enter into what Foucault

starts out by calling "normalizing he reserves a Marxian

power" (Foucault 1979: 144), for which

critique, and later transforms

into the more positive

"political technology" (Foucault 1988: 145) in order to encompass both the reason of state and the care of the self, the restrictive and the productive forces of power. To some extent we could say that, rather than life qua life, Foucault's interest at this time was in the social practices operating on

bodies and populations, lives and collective

which of course influence the course of individual

histories:

in short, he was focusing

on the government

of bodies and the government of populations, rather than the government of life-of existence and of the living. In fact, from then on, his interest in govern mentality

even concentrated

almost exclusively on populations.

Hav-

ing announced in his] 975-] 976 course that "one of the most fundamental phenomena of the nineteenth century was the consideration given to life" (Foucault] 997: 213), he admitted at the beginning of his 1977-1978 course that he should have entitled it "a history of governmentality," by which he meant the "set of institutions,

procedures,

analyses

and reflections

which

make it possible to exert th is specific form of power the main target of which is the population" (Foucault 2004a: 111). He thus moved from the idea of "sraticization of the biological" (1997: 213) to the "governmentalization of the state" (2004a: 112). In the meantime, life had disappeared from his thinking and would never appear again. Contrary to what is often believed, governmentality is not about life but only about populations.

However, the perspective opened up on biopower and governmentality was certainly a fertile one for the social sciences, particularly for sociology, paving the way for investigations into medicalization (Pinell 1996, Conrad 1992), psychologization (Castel 1981, Rose] 989), risk management (Ewald 1986, Beck 1992), the management of the poor (Donzelor 1984, Dean 1991), the control of bodies (Vigarello 1978, Tu mer 1992), and practices around birth and death (Memmi 2003, Lock 2002). My hypothesis is that, amidst this great collective enterprise, we may have been letting the substance of life slip away. And the proposition I draw from this is that a different politics of life is possible (Fassin 2009). The present contribution discusses this hypothesis and this proposition.

J. ABSENCES Countering the representation made of his work at the time, Foucault offered hi, famous statement: "It is not power, but the subject, which is the

Back to Life

]87

general theme of my research" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 209). However the question may be raised of a third term, present just beneath the surface, always there but never fully addressed-that IS, life. In fact he gave this concept sufficient importance to make it the subject of the last text he completed before his death-" La vie: experience et ~~ience," published 111 the Revue de metaphvsique et de morale a year later ( Life: Expenence and Science" in Foucault 1998). Admittedly, he wrote this text as a contribution to a collective homage to his teacher Georges Canguilhem, to be published 111 a philosophical journal. But this article offers at least Cltcul1lstantla~ evidence of an ongoing concern to which he cOlltlnu.ally returned With out ever devoting himself entirely to it. In this last ar~lCle, he recon,structS

the thought of his time around a distinction he ascnbes to}WO different readings of Husserlian phenomenology: on the one hand, a philosophy of experience, of sense and of subject" represented by Sart~e an? Merleau-Ponty; on the other, "a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality and of concept" developed by Cavai lles and Bachelard, for example (Foucault 1989: 8). Although he does not say so explicitly, and despite the fact that he openly declares his human and political affilllty With the latter rather than the former, Foucault's work can be read as an attempt to bnng the two sides together: the "archaeology of knowledge" (1972:', which lI1c1ude~ life sciences

falls into the rationalist

tradition,

wh.de the

hermeneutics a

the subject" (2005), which proposes an ethics of life, forms part of a sub. ".

I" The fact that he was unable to create a synthesis between [ectivrsr lI1eage. " "" bl d h the two (which is perhaps in any case impossible) IS proba y "ue to t e intellectual-not just chronological-distance separating The Birth of the Clinic (first published in 1963) from The Use of Pleasure (first published '~ 1984). It is nevertheless the case that throughout his work, the questl7 ~e the constitution of the subject is indisSOCiable from his II1vestlgatlono t hi hile one may concur Witl1 th e construction of knowle d ge. I n trus sense, wI' subtitle Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow gave to the Fren~h tr;n~ atl~n of their exegesis of Foucault's work-"Au-dela de l'objecrivite et de a Isub" ." d S bi ti "ty")-It must irnrne late y e jectivite" ("Beyond ObjectiVity an u jec 'VI b " I" h added that Foucault's thought is driven by the dual concern to nng to Ig t the technologies of both objectification and scbjecrivauon, ~ndnot just t~ move be ond them. Life, being simultaneously rhe product 0 exisrence an the expr~ssion of the living, is located on the dividing IlI1ebetwelen the two.

Foucault brushes against it and moves around it rather than tr u y engaging b h es the risks of such a course. with it, perhaps ecause esens hi If f am two philosophers whose In doing this, he also distances .uld be more strongly manifest in his thought everything might sugge:~ wou ons of personal acquaintance work-the first, Georges Cangui em, for reas h Arendt because of and also intellectual heritage, and the ~e~~~dh~a;r~~ving infl~ence at the the apparent closeness of their theme h itings Foucault of course time. On the one hand, Canguilbem. w ~se w : intentionally and caret re, I k new we II-saylllg. 0 f his work that, It 'wasI aus hi tory of sciences" (Foucau r fully limited to a particular domain In t re IS

188

Didier Passin

Coming Back to Life

1989: 7-8)~focused all his energies, particularly in The Normal and the Pathological (1989) and above all in Etudes d'bistoire et de philosophie des

189

life articulated within a social space, which is the property of the human as political animal. It is a shadowy path, one that is followed by MIChael Taussig (1987) on his journey to the Amazonian heart of darkness and by Achilie Mbembe (2003) in his antonymic exploration of African necropolitics, and which I have myself explored (Fassin 2008a) in South African society caught between the apartheid past and the present-day reality of AIDS. However, a marked slippage very guickly saw Foucault's subseguent lectures return to the themes of government of popujat ions (and goods)security, liberalism-and then to government of bo~:es (and souls)-:-sexuality, pleasure. The journey ultimately arrives at the care of the self as an ethical arena in which politics becomes absorbed (Foucault 1986): indeed, when questioned about this relationship between ethics and politics, Foucault replied that it is the government of the self that ultimately becomes the model for the government of others-not through a transposition of Ident;cal procedures, but by creating the prrrna r y prerequisite for It (2005). LI e is subsumed in living ethically, as politics is subsUI11~d 10 e.thlcs, a reduction that Foucault never moved beyond. To pur it in Aristorelian terms, we are

sciences concernant les vivants et fa vie (1968), on studying what constitutes the materiality of life, i.e., life as biological existence, and what links that existence to the experience of life, i.e., life as it is lived. As Rabinow (1996) notes, Canguilhem's view is that existence (expressed in French as Ie vivant, using the present participle of the verb "to live") controls experience (expressed by the past participle, Ie vticu). On the other hand Arendt, whose work Foucault must have known, but whom he never quotes (asked about her work on one occasion, he carefully distanced himself from a theory of power and domination that he deemed "somewhat verbal") also placed life at the center of her work, from her typology of the three forms of the "vita activa'' in The Human Condition (1958) to her critical analysis of the "life process" in On Revolution (1962). And indeed, it was on the basis of his recognition of this unrealized encounter between the two thinkers, and their essential complementarity, that Giorgio Agamben (1998) built his own theory of "homo saeer" and "bare life."

The absence of these two philosophers in Foucault's work is thus remarkable, given that for both life was central-in Canguilhem's case to an epistemological reflection, in Arendt's to a moral theory. Foucault drew on neither when he constructed his concept of biopolitics, Moreover, despite the distance between them, there are surprising convergences between Canguilhem and Arendt. Firstly in their wording: both heighten the signifying intensity of the word by adding a strengthening pronoun, speaking of "life itself" (Canguilhem 1989, Arendt 1962). Secondly in their references: both derive the substance of their theory from Aristotle, Canguilhem in order to link the concept to life (Canguilhem 1968), Arendt to reflect on meaning and life (Arendt 1958). Foucault barely ventures onto either of the paths they opened up-Canguilhem's science of existence, or Arendt's politics of the living. Given the crucial role that biology has played in the construction of the human subject since the nineteenth century and the radicalization of a form of what we could call a "biohisrory" during the twentieth century, this fact is remarkable.

But there is one exception to this amnesia: Foucault's course at the College de France entitled "Society Must Be Defended" (2002). The only phase of his work which could be considered tragic, this cycle of lectures brings together the biological and the political around the theme of "race war."

For a brief moment, hiopolirics as Foucault posits it acknowledges violence, eugenics and genocide, the biology of racism and the politics of Nazism, the exclusion and the extermination of others on the grounds of essenrialization of their difference in both the Western and the colonial worlds; in other words, it addresses the inscription of the zoe at the heart of the bios. This is a di,tinction which Aristotle (1905) merely implies, but which Arendt and later Agamben would rencler explicit and above all heuristic: zoe, the physical life of the living being, whether human or animal, is opposed to bIOS,

here in the arena of the good life.

2. POSITIONS

zte

What I would like to return to here is that inirial tension betwe~n and bios between bare life and social life, that Foucault grasped m iShamous , .' al whose politICS places 15 extsassertion that "modern mao IS an arum . .. ."

(1998. 143) What we must st nve ro tenee as a living be109 In quesnon .... comprehend is the continuing relevance of rhis questlon b hi ·t·r l Since Foucault himself moved away from this Issue a rer frohac mgtl. 'n . I' cast the terms 0 t e ques 10 . is perhaps a necessity for socra SCience to re .

i

For both sociology and anthro~ol~gYt~IS e:ou;~b~~a~~i~I;;~~:'r;"fi:~s~~~~~ to the criticism of these SCient! c ISClP 10 d wer in our own time that Foucault formulated it-:-that they daddresse p~ the law and in h . I which conflate power wit , societies t h roug a socto ogy I I· ki er to prohibition· I have other societies via an ethnology of ru e IJ1 r'~~:n~~ olitical anthro'pology attempted to reconstruct the trajectory 0 ~oucault strove to repfrom a similar point of view (Fassin 2008b). Judst as eproblematize biopoliblernati I g e that today we nee to r ro lernatize power, ar u .. the olitics of life-a formula tics, or more precisely and more expliCItly, ~ b Nikolas Rose (2001), which is obviously close to that recently propose Y who speaks of "the politics of life itself." . I what is the f har i . e here;' Or more precise y, But what is the li e t at is at ISSU red b the term "politics of life" extent of the territory that might be cl~~~ed toY reviously, we can say that If we return to the dual tradition I a .

P xamined by Canguilhem, ·· d f am the life 0 f eXIStence e . h t IS terrttory exten sr.. . h the representations and practICeS as a biological and matenal given, wit

.

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Coming

Passin

associated with it, to the life of the living analyzed by Arendt, a social and experiential reality, together with the representations and practices this concept generates (Fassin 2000). The field on one side is the laboratory and bioinforrnarics, clinical immunology and genetic sequencing, medically assisted reproduction and cancer treatment, as studied by Paul Rabinow (1999), David Napier (2003), Rayna Rapp (2000) and I1ana Lowy (1996); on the other it is the housing estate and the refugee camp, asylum seekers and displaced persons, social protection and security programs, as analyzed by Giorgio Agamben (2003), Zygmunt Bauman (1998), Liisa Malkki (1995) and Didier Bigo (2007). A vast, heterogeneous landscape, which extends, in short, from zoe to bios. The identification of this distinct territory of the politics of life is justified not by the dual etymology and the founding ambiguity of life that it reveals, but much more directly by empirical observations which call for a theoretical formulation of the sort of politics which is involved around life.

Cleatly, the "politics of life" has been understood by most social scientists who have utilized the expression as being related to the "biosciences."

For Nikolas Rose (2007), who significantly opens his book with a discussion of Canguilhem, the politics of life has to do with the discovery of DNA and the reinvention of race, the development of genomics and neurochemistry, disputes around stem cells and the practices of eugenics. It is about what other authors have phrased in terms of biosociality (Rabinow 1996), biovalues (Waldby 2002) and biocapital (Franklin 2003). This perspective has opened up innovative fields of research on the new subjecrivities.

My point is that it is restricted to only one aspect of life, life as biology, thus neglecting another dimension-life as biography. If, as Hannah Arendt writes, what differentiates man from other animals is not life as a phenomenon which starts with birth and ends with death but life as a lapse of time full of events that can be narrated, then an anthropology of the politics of life must account not only for the former but also for the latter. And even as far as the biological reality of life is concerned, it is not just about cells and genes, it is also about the wearing away of bodies, which is closely linked to

inequalities

of living conditions.

r will try to defend and illustrate

Life as matter and life as meaning is what

here.

However, it is important to underline that the domains defined by this polarization arc far from being hermetically separated-in fact, they are perhaps less so than ever. We could even say that life is never more fully grasped than when the two aspects, existence and the living, come together.

This is revealed in a range of recent writings, particularly in anthropology, constructed on the basis of shifting between the sites of biomedical science and the spaces of everyday life. Adriana Perryna's study of the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, significantly entitled Life Exposed (2002), reveals, through the c1ifferential social attitude towards individuals depending on their level of exposure (0 toxic radiation, the constitution of a "biological citi zens hip." JO"O Biehl's research on a marginal district of Porto Alegre,

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191

with the equally resonant title of Vita (2005), uncovers the conditions of diagnosis and care for a hereditary degenerative disease between "gene expression and social abandonment."

These works, in their linking of biologicallife and social life, their shift berween zoe and bios, sit at the heart of contemporary politics of life, the place where it is continually being redefined. Both studies reveal the central role of biomedicine in the articulation of the different dimensions of life.

It is from this perspective that I have developed my own work on the management of foreigners in France (Fassin 2005a), moving between restncnons on legal immigration and the development of humanitarian reason, between cutbacks in political asylum and the demand for medical expert oprruon, and on the AIDS epidemic in South Africa (Fassin 2007a), oscillating between the international polemic on the viral origins of the disease and the suffering of victims relegated to the former homelands, between th~ battle ovc.r treatment and the violence of the townships, between research Into a vaccine and accusations of genocide. Such an investigation, on the.border between .b~re life and social life existence and experience, where biology meets politics, perhaps calls for anew orientation in the exploration of biopolitics. I would term this a moral orientation, not in the sense of defining norms and value.s, distinguishing good and evil, justice and injustice, t~uth .and untruth, but 1~ the sense of examining how, within a particular historical and geographical context, these norms and values, these divisions between .good and eVI.I, justice and injustice, truth and untruth are constituted (Fassin 2008c). It IS worth noting, moreover, that the project of a moral anthropology thus proposed remains profoundly coherent with Foucault's thinking, particularly III the way it extends Nietzsche's critical reflection on the genealogy of morals, " far away f rom t hee mora moral diiscoursc a f philosophy (Nietzsche 1996).. movmg .

But let us make no mistake: the restoration of a moral reflection does not In . .. f liti I alysis-on the contrary the any way Imply a renunCiatIOn 0 a po inca an ' former completes and enriches the latter. ". ."

So what are the norms and values underlying the politics of life III contemporary societies? How do they inform the production and reproduction of the category of "humanity" as it was ~onst'tu~ed In the eighteenth ce.n~ rury both as species (a biological collective sharing rhe same characterlS tics)' and as sentiment (the political recognition of a common belongl~g to the world)? I would like to offer elements of a response to these quesnons, a response which I believe extends Foucault's thought toward ter nrory IO to h his i wecantakete which it seems reluctant to venture. An d on t IS Journey . same two philosophers,

Canguilhem

and Arendt,

as our compamons.

3. MATTER e taken up Canguilhem draws attention to a paradox In a remar k few hav , I" " f lif "E thing which I think is crucial to the analysis of the po incs 0 I e: very

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Didier Fassin

happens as if a society had 'the mortality that suits it,' the number of the dead and their distribution into different age groups expressing the importance which the society does or does not give to the protraction of life. In short, the techniques of collective hygiene which tend to prolong human life, or the habits of negligence which result in shortening it, depending on the value attached to life in a given society, are in the end a value judgment expressed in the abstract number which is the average human life span. The average life span is not the biologically normal, but in a sense the socially normative, life span" (Canguilhem 1989: 161). This reflection articulates the essential fact that the measured quantity of life, as a demographic reality, indicated by life expectancy, implies and exposes an estimated quality of life as social production, in other words, a quality dependent on the choices made by society in relation to the preservation of life. From this point of view, to adapt an expression-"statistique mora/e"-forged in the nineteenth century but abandoned in the twentieth, statistics always involves morality.

From this point of view too, the question of life can never

be considered separately from the question of inequality.

This argument was made, with the rhetorical talent and ideological position he is renowned for, by then South African president Thabo Mbeki in his famous speech at the opening of the international AIDS conference in Durban in July 2000, when he offered this powerful image: "In the space of a day passengers flying from Japan to Uganda leave the country with the world's highest life expectancy-almost 79 years-and land in one with the world's lowest-barely 42 years. A day away by plane, but half a lifetime difference on the ground" (Fassin 2002: 317). Such distances are apparent not just between countries: they can be observed between different social categories within the same country. Thus in France, where life expectancy is one of the lowest in Western Europe, a 35-year-old unskilled laborer has on average nine years less left to live than an engineer or a teacher of the same age. This has little to do with inadequate medical care, since France has one of the best-performing health care systems, but is rather the result of the politics of social justice, France being one of the Western countries wirh rhe widest disparity in incomes (Leclerc et al. 2000). Both on the global level and within a given society, the length of life of the living is largely determined by collective choices.

These choices are usually implicit, and it is rare today for a democratic government to declare publicly that it has decided to allow some to live less long than others, or even to sacrifice some to save others. But such decisions are occasionally made explicit. This is increasingly the case in war situations. As Michaellgnatieff (2000) showed in relation to the NATOeffectively US-intervention in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, in order to safeguard the lives of the American pilots, the decision was taken to have them fly high enough to be protected from enemy anti-aircraft fire. The result was that the bomhing of the chosen targets was much less accurate: there

Coming

Back to Life

193

were no NATO casualries, but 500 civilians were killed. To adopr rhe military terms in use at the time, the "zero death" doctrine inevitably implied "collateral damage." During borh Gulf Wars rhe same principles-and the same language-were put into operation, with much more serious consequences, although the total number of deaths was never precisely known because nobody was interested in counting them. .'

It will perhaps be objected that these are extreme, and specific, situations. But it would not be difficult to show rhar even m a pacified Western world, governing means-through a multitude of decisions, small and large, on employment and social securiry policy, on healrh care and education, on immigration control and humanitarian aid-mak.lOg c~oICes wh.lch could be described as "tragic" in the sense used by SOCiologists studying organ transplants (Calabresi and Bobbit 1978): choices about the allocation of scarce resources, the distribution of which directly or indirect ly influences the length and qualiry of life of individuals. Thus I have shown (Fassin 2003a) how administrative agents of the French state found rhemselves in rhe posirion of having to evaluate nor only what they called the "minimum living expenses," the difference between resources a.nd Irreducible expenses, but also the "life needs" in terms of food, heating, erc., of unemployed people seeking emergency financial ald. Consider ing that mosr families had a negative economic balance when expenses were subtracred from resources, the politics of life of rhe state was nothing more than a politics of survival. h heti I ., IS not a cymca . I appreciation or. a ypot etrca COI1And this. expression struction posited by a remote social-scientific gaze. It ISthe every~ay experience lived by, or at least expressed in the discourse of, refug:es 111 Fra.nce and people with AIDS in South Africa, those who observe daily how value their life has for the society m which they are living. The fact rh Foucaulr who was so aware of the way in which power IS expressed mlfthe , f I" bei d so committed hirnse m technologies of governance 0 IV 109 erngs, an . d h h id f h d . ated never recognIze t e r eosocial struggle to the Sl e 0 t e omlO , . . f . f . lit to his concepruahzatlon a rerical relevance of the question a mequau y . di hi ft -expressed desire to istance biopolirics probably says muc h a b out IS a en ..' . .

I f b oader theoretical issue rs ar himself from Marxist rhink ing. n act, a r . f h I' . f stake: the introduction of materialism into the analysis 0 t e po .dav 0 . di hi h we would rarher see to ay as life, where Foucault gives a rea mg W IC .

M' that . . lism i . ply 10 the ar xran sense, constructivist. This materia Ism IS not sun , . h diof the structural conditions which effecrively largely derermme t e ilhe: : . '. it is also 10 Cangui em s tions of life of the members of a given society, I' . 'I' it longevity xistence ItS materia ity, IS, sense that of the very su b stance 0 f exrsteuc-c, .'

I' . '. . . .' it To accept rhis materia ISUC and the inequalities that society Imposes on . f life i t a merely thee. f nu r j nvest i of the politics 0 . I e IIS nothe matter of life orientarion 0 our IIlvestlgaoon retical issue. It is also an ethical one. It recogl1lzes t tar

Iltt~:

does matter.

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Didier Fassin

4. MEANING But there is another moral dimension to the politics of life, an approach which no longer distinguishes between lives-between the lives of the poor and rich, the dominated and the dominant, the weak and the powerful-on the basis of quantity and quality. This approach distinguishes between the different meanings of life itself. Thus Arendt (1958) emphasizes the shift from life as a biological reality to life as biographical reality: "Limited by a beginning and an end, it follows a strictly linear movement whose very motion nevertheless is driven by the motor of biological life which man shares with other living beings and which forever retains the cyclical movement of nature. The chief characteristic of this specifically human life, whose appearance and disappearance constitute worldly events which ultimately can be told as a story, establish a biography, it is of this life, bios as distinguished from mere zoe, that Aristotle said that it 'somehow is a kind of praxis," Therefore life as one just lives it is distinguished from the life one can truly say one has lived. Between the two lie both language, which is what makes the human, and the polis, the space of politics. In Arendt's view, the danger of both totalitarianism and imperialism was that the other-the enemy, the colonized, the immigrant, the Jew-was reduced from bios to zoe, from social life to biological life. Camps, from the Nazi extermination camps to contemporary refugee camps, would thus represent the end-point of this process of reduction, not because they share the same aims, but because they have in common that they recognize only the bare life of the individual-in one case in order to kill them, in the other to save them.

However, in contrast to Agamben (1997: 144), who speaks of "the separation of politics and humanitarianism that we are witnessing today," I would argue that humanitarianism has become the supreme form of the contemporary politics of life. Indeed, "humanitarianism" is not limited to the field self-defined by the agents of large non-governmental organizations, but has become a category resting on the principle of an ethical approach to human life which is placed above other values and is the object of arguments between actors who seek to appropriate the symbolic benefits associated with it (Fassin 2007b). The evolution of French immigration control practices is revealing in this respect. During the 19905, two concomitant phenomena emerged: on the one hand, the number of asylum seekers awarded refugee status fell to one-sixth of its former level, owing partly to a drop in the number of applications submitted but particularly to a reduction in the proportion granted asylum; on the other, the number of foreigners seeking residence on the grounds of serious illness which could not be treated in their country of origin increased sevenfold (Fassin 2001).

This dual development, which is of course interdependent, since some of those whose applications for asylum were rejected were able to obtain residence on the basis of a medical expert opinion, clearly marks a shift of

Back to Life

195

legitimacy in the politics of life. It has moved from recognition of the life of a citizen who has suffered the ordeal of violence, often as a result of campaigning activit y, to recognition of the life of a patient Sick m bodyin other words, from political to biological life, from a life recounted by a refugee to attest to a history of persecution, to a life testified by a doctor to demonstrate a pathology. It is worth noting that the procedure for granting residence on health grounds, introduced in practice and subsequentl:, mt~ the law in the last decade, was first termed "humaOitafl.an reason, an thus won the consensual support of all members of parliament, from all parties. There is no shortage of examples of this penetration of human ira rianism into politics.

The extent to which

I this reconfiguration

of the mora

h space was t e

central issue in the controversies which tore apart South Afncan /~;~~' pitting the government against actrvtsts around the question 0 'I ' has probably not been sufficiently understood (Fassin 2003b). The ViO en~ d polemic that opposed the government and the activists over a pe;lo I 째h e several years with the patients as hostages, has been seendas adslmP k c aS ' , ( ses AIDS) an me rca I now Ibetween unorthodox rheones poverty cau , d ' if 'I I ' f AIDS) between heretical error an scienn c edge (the vira exp anatron 0, hil h ' truth between bad faith and good science. In reality, w let e Issfue whas , . d id I it was even more one 0 et ICS indeed one of epistemology an I eo ogy, ions of the best and politics. The confrontation was between two conce~tlons ~ even the approach to life. On one side, activists, doctors, resear~ e.rs an h ' . hi' h d h isk of transmission 0f t e virus pharmaceutical industry hig Ig. te t h r.

Ie owerful idea that drugs from mother to child and champiOned t e simp ,p he mi ' f , .' f b b bies. On the other, t e mimsrers 0 could prevent infection 0 new orn a . I" ' blic health and social health and of social development, spccra ~ts in ~u huge disparities and work, but also dissident SCientists pomdte out t etheid and stressed the from apar inad ies j n th system inherite , ina equacles 10 t e care . traduction of antiret" liry through premature m danger 0f increasing inequa I lif d was of value in and he vi f the former every l e save roviral drugs. I n t e view 0 , "to make the health of itself. For the latter, the issue wafisto endsure lustlC ~~ provide social supt f . bl d ffi ient and rst an oremos system equita e an e CI, . ' f d I" fe upheld by the fordi (' ms The politiCS a sacre I port f or the nee lest VIC I .

I' ' f ' sr life espoused by the h claimed The po ItlCS 0 IU mer was everyw ere ac . I ' I humanitarian reason won out latter was largely condemned.

U tlmathe y, ent had been instructed ity but once t e governm over t he concern f or equity, dd 1" ed to what extent access to distribute treatment, activists an actors rea IZ I ' d difficult and unequa . to antiretroviral drugs rema me 'F d the management of AIDS " . of refugees In ranee an f Th e a d ministration , fl I d bring into play politics 0 , S I Af ' hi h I have bne y ana yze , h b m out 1 nca, w IC ious diff b tween the nature of t e pro life which, beyond the obVIOUS f' lerences e ral configuration, in which me rno I Iems and contexts, f or111 Pa rt 0 , t le sa I d h manitarian reason as [le enor va ue an LI 'd physical life emerges as a su P . ciefy invites uS to conSI er ethical ideal. Thus the study of contemporary so

196

Didier Fassin

Coming Back to Life

not biopower, which is power over life, bur biolegitimacy (Fassin 2004), which would be the legitimacy of life-in other words the recognition of being alive as rhe supreme good. This shifr from biopower to biolegitimacy indicates a new "problematization" of life, understood not only as the way society constitutes and treats the problem of life-this is the sense Foucault (1994: 544) gives to the word-but also as the way we may interpret and formulate it: problematization is both a social and a conceptual move.

Within this new problemarizarion, the issue is not to grasp how life is fashioned, regulated and normalized-what governmentality is about. It is to comprehend, through a very different and almost inverse approach, the

complex, uncertain and ambiguous articulation of life at the heart of our systems of values and actions, of

OUf

moral and political economies.

5. CONCLUSION My intention here was to clear up what I would call a heuristic misunderstanding. In 1976, in the last lectures of "Society Must Be Defended" and in the final chapter of The Will to Knowledge, Foucault opens a theoretical black box which he names "biopower" and, as a part of it, "biopolirics." He prophetically announces that "a society's 'threshold of modernity' has been reached when life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies" and that "modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question" (1979: 143). This idea that life is linked to our modernity has given rise to a new field of research within the social sciences, mainly around life sciences and biomedicine, but also about public health and social engineering, both in the Western and, to a lesser degree, the Third World. However, interestingly, Foucault himself abandoned this promising track. When one reads the summaries of his courses at the College de France (1989b), it is noticeable that the word "life" does not even appear in the 1975-1976 lectures (as if the questions of power and war were much more relevant for him), and that after a suspension of his teaching for one year he returns with a new intellectual project on govern mentality developed in the 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 lectures. Here, "life" is completely absent-even from the exhaustive thematic indexes (2004a; 2004b). At the beginning of Securite, Territoire, Population (2004a) he seems to give life a last chance, in an unnecessarily modest way: "This year I would like to begin the study of something that I have called, in an idle way, biopower." In fact, he rapidly moves toward something else: governmentality. Two years later, he concludes the summary of Naissance de la Biopolitique (2004b) by saying: "What should be studied now is the way in which the specific problems of life and population have been posed within the technology of government."

However, in the following courses, he will never come back to life, so to speak. Even Le Gouvernement des Vivants in 1979-1980 is nOt, contrary to what the title suggests, about life and living

197

beings but about confession and regimes of truth. So the intellectuall~ov~ from biopower to governmentality is not only a shift centra IZ~ conception of power to a fragmented vision of technologies, It ISalso a shift

~ron:~

from life to populations. . d One could thus say that a whole tradition of works on biopower an bio olitics is based if not on an erroneous, at least on a divergent reading of $oucaulr's proje~t. This is probably what is meant "by the recent change f di f "biopolitics" to "politics of life itself (Rose 2007). Under war mg ro~ " end is toward the life sciences this new heading, however, the mam tr ., a ds cells (Franklin 2000) and thus life as "Ie vivant,"lIl Canguilhem s w Ir -(D . .

I My point here IS that governmenta rty ean and genes, to put It simp y. ... differ1999) could help us revisit the politics of life by Introduclnghtdwfofvery f .

What 'ISbeing done to living beings throug I erenr orms ent questions: f d i th s proof government? Whar sort of life is imPhlichitlytaken ~;:n:~dl~mp;ies an C "has to do Wit t e matter a , Th cess? e nrst question d tion has to do with the meaninterrogation on inequality. The secon que~l I itirnacy Prolonging Caning of life, and involves an interrogation o~d ;~:sg~~y tha; the explorations guilhem's syntactic invesnganonvone C~U(I路路 b ings) on the one hand, 11 "les vivants IVlJ1g ei , I suggest actua y concern . h h h nd Both meanings cannot and "I'etre en vie" (being alive), ~In t ~e~; (~i~e; ex~erience)-at least if we be separated from the last term: ,: vecu" (Das 2007) of the people whose do not renounce listening to the VOices

掳

0;

life we study.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . d d version of an earlier paper published by This text is a revised and a apte . . of Montreal as "La Biopolithe Department of Sociology at rh~i~~I~~:i~rOgie et Societes, 2006, 38(2): rique n'esr pas une Polirique de la Otero and the editors of the journal for 32-47. I am grateful to Marcelo.

I irh extensive modifications, ... bli ton m this va urne, WI authorizing Its repu rca I. di f their suggestions. and to Thomas Lemke and his co-e itors or

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I e Itself, Theory,

Culture

From the 1970s onwards, most Western countries began to amend their health care policies to give a much higher priority to preventive efforts.

Although this preventive turn initially aimed to limit the need for medical treatment technology, whose advance was thought to have stopped, most countries have now developed public health policy into a parallel field of intervention alongside the medical system. This major shift from treatment to prevention is typically referred to as the "New Public Health" (Petersen and Lupton 1996), and includes a whole new range of targets, approaches, knowledge forms and professions involved in health care provision. Constant across these multiple policies and contexts, however, is the overall goal. Practically all contemporary public health policies target the connection between the rise in lifestyle diseases, primarily cancer and coronary heart disease, and forms of human behavior, i.e., smoking, drinking, poor

and Society

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diet and a lack of physical exercise.

The objective in this chapter is to characterize how lifestyle diseases have COme to be seen as a political problem, which is more than a simple reRection of the underlying epidemiological phenomenon.

Instead of looking at the statistical prevalence of various diseases, the chapter focuses on the political interpretation by which governments attempt to make the problem manageable.

Most countries struggle to turn the problem of lifestyle diseases into specific policies, and in order to document the implicit rationalization of this process the contribution looks at how the category of lifestyle is conceptualized in the relevant policy documents. The article focuses on Denmark and the United States, because rheir health care systems are sufficiently different to produce an inreresting comparison in the field of public health. The main question is: how do Danish and American public health programs choose to conceptualize the essential category of lifestyle? How do these documents define what lifestyle is in terms of health, and how do the different conceptions of lifestyle interact with technologies designed to

....

202

Lars Thorup

Larsen

The Birth of Lifestyle

influence individual lifestyle behavior? Answering these empirical questions should give us an indication of what I tentatively term "lifestyle politics," which can be defined as the strategies employed by political authorities to COunter the rise in lifestyle diseases, including their understanding of the lifestyle category and the technologies employed.

Another reason for focusing on lifestyle conceptions is theoretical.

The category of lifestyle in public health policy provides a good entry into some of the essential conceptual debates surrounding the work of Michel Foucault, in particular regarding biopolitics and governmentality.

This chapter draws upon both concepts, and explains how they can be analyzed and understood today. Borh concepts are extremely broad, not only in Foucault's various treatments but also in the complex bodies of literature they have given rise to. Instead of trying to tie all the loose ends together, it is necessary to indicate their specific association with the chapter's main argument about the political management of lifestyle.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section presents the theoretical concepts of biopolitics and govern mentality, though it does not attempt to provide a thorough account of their historical backgrounds and dedicated bodies of literature. The question is rather how biopolitics and govern mentality have related to the problem of managing lifestyle diseases since the 1970s. The theoretical section ends with a shorr discussion on the concept of lifestyle and with a few methodological rellections on what guides the empirical study. The empirical section is broken into three successive phases, corresponding to the intervals at which the public health programs were published. The Danish documents date from 1977, 1989 and 1999, while their American counterparts are from 1979, 1990 and 2000 respectively. Both Countries reveal a similar development of a more sophisticated conception of lifestyle. As the analysis will demonstrate, the development of elaborate conceptions of lifestyle and the techniques to regulate lifestyles often come at the expense of a dedicated focus on health matters. In both countries, the more comprehensive lifestyle conceptions in the later stages tend to become more and more detached from the question of health and instead turn into moral issues around general problems concerning the conduct of life.

1. BlOrOLITICS,

CaVERN

MENTALITY

AND LIFESTYLE

While they originate in the same period of Foucault's work and even in some of the same books (Foucault 2007; 2008a), the concepts of biopolitics and governmentality are rarely used directly together for empirical purposes.

They also have slightly different functions in this contribution.

Biopolitics is a descriptive term for policies and technologies aiming to optimize the biological life of the population, whereas govern mentality takes aim not at the population as such but at the modes of governing including forms of

Politics

203

form of biopolitics , hi ay that t h ere .IS on lone y subjectivarion.

T IS IS not to s I' but rather that even if they share y and only one type of governmenta llt , d i Foucault's 1978 and 1979 leeealogy as out me In f h ' f some parts 0 t err gen ., h 'I perspectives. One ocuses rt h less distinct t eorettca tures they are nevert e I' and the other ret leers on ' h bi I ' I life of the popu anon, I on optimizing t e iotogica .' h lth matters but in genera. bjects not Just In ea b d the best way to govern su , ' " d rnmentality are oun to " I Ieve"I bJOpolltJcs an f gove d At the ernpmca pie the so-ca IIe d " rneo' This IS because, or exam, , ' Ib ' intersect at severa I points.

I t of both rationalltles-a eit ical police" was pivotal in the deve ehensr blic health programs such ' 'I I om pre ensive pu " I for different reasons. S rrru ar y, c b d to contain both biopolitica ared oun as those ana Iyze d i10 thisI chapter . ental rations I'ities for how , , ' of life an governm h Ih licy strategies of optimization rhier life. At the outset, public ea t po I to get individuals to live a heal h nalysis will demonsrrate, ItS is mainly a biopolitical regime, but as '. e a ecred by new governmental d h s been Inters 'I h ' development in recent d eca es a h ry little to do with hea t 111 h may ave ve h I technologies.

In rhernse ves, t ese h ay the welfare state regulates t e ' incipally abour t e w bi I other a strict sense, b eing pnn ff th responsibility of su jeers. n, behavior of individuals and a ects di e might not only refiect a biopowords, the politicization of lifestyle ~s:;~;~s of the population, but also a litical ambition to improve the h~:~t with the way individuals govern thel~ governmental technology concer k the form of critical normative reflec own lifestyle. The latter often ta e~ h racter should be governed, which tions on how society and its m.ora ca. with the biopolitical irnpera.

Inflict or renston mayor may not rnvo ve a co . tive to optimize life., ' e ulace individual lifestyles directly, g It is difficult, if not Impossible, to r h etical rension between the tWO and this complication illustrates the t iirical disconnect between lifestyle poles. One can perhaps explaIn the em~lic by looking at the connecnon diseases and lifestyle-onented health :ernn;ental technologies. Most of the between biopolitical strategies and ~o 'bing how the lifestyle conceptlon~ empirical section is thus dev:~~i~ ~ea~~r~rograms indicate the influence 0 in Danish and Amencan P I hnologies. , specific biopolitical or governmentt .tec of the tWO main theoretical If we look at the initial formu ath"on , 'ng the political nature of pu IC . . g pOint for t eonZI cepts, an obVIOUS startlO , f biopolitics, or b'IOpower as It was health policy is Foucault s concept 0 e t itself has now become a focus initially termed (Foucault 199 8 ),The2cOoOn~. tarsen 2007), not least bCeeause b' w an d R ose, d by 10rgJO of some debate (Ra InO h theoretical frameworks propose d A tonio of its uneasy adoption In t e k 2005) and Michael Hardt an n Agamben (1998; d. also Lem e , '

c~t~-

, 2000) d bl' health policy IS not NegrI ( h' ept of biopolitics to understan pu IC ds like a definition USing t e conc , ' 'I e t almost soun , a big leap in itself, since the ~nJtla co~cp;esentatiOn, biopolitics des'ratts of public health. In FOLlcaults ~r;g~na f the population has been rna e t ,e the way in which the blologlca leo

204

Lars Thorup Larsen

The Birth of Lifestyle Politics

object of power relations, beginning in the eighteenth century, and always with the objective of optimizing life in the physical or bodily sense of the term. In COntrast to sovereignty centered on the protection of territory and discipline aimed at the individual body, biopolitics targets the population of bodies at a macroscopic level and aims to optimize its biological properties. Foucault sometimes also characterizes discipline as one pole of a biopolitical continuum between the individual body at the micro level and the population or species at the macro level (1998: 139).

Foucault's main historical claim is that modern welfare states have been pervaded by a vast array of biopolitical strategies, ranging from urban development and health care to working-class living conditions (Foucault 2000a). Since the concept was originally used to characterize the population-centered power mechanisms of governmental health administrations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a few qualifications will be needed in relation to its present lise.

First, a contemporary audience might conflate the term "biological properties" with more or less concrete entities such as genes, embryos or neurotransmitters. What defines biopolitics, however, are biological properties on a statistical level such as fertility, mortality, demographics and sickness rates. Second, the objective of optimizing the life of the population should not only be understood in sheer quantitative terms, such as when the aim was only to create a large army or working population.

In the COurse of the twentieth century, the quantitative form of biopolitical optimization became balanced by concerns about the quality of the population such as in the various forms of eugenics (Schmidt and Kristensen 1986).

Parallel with his interest in biopolitics Foucault also developed the concept of governmentality, beginning in his 1978 and 1979 lectures at the College de France (2007, 2008a). While aiming to decenter the stale institutional categories of the period's state theories (Lemke 2007), he coined the term governmentality to characterize the various ways in which the process of governing

men has been rationalized

over time. In order not to

confuse this perspective with the actual institutions of government, Foucault defined the activity of governing as the "conduct of conduct" (2000b).

This indicates a fundamental homology between the government of the self and of others (Foucault 2008b), although both the specific ideas that have occupied these categories and their relative significance have varied considerably throughout the genealogy of governmentality.

Much has been written on the various historical stages in the long genealogy of modern govern mentality (Senellart 1995; Lemke 1997), but the concept has also led to a considerable body of literature on recent changes in govern mentality, in particular in analyses of neoliberal reforms of Western welfare states (Foucault 2008a; Rose 1999; Dean 1999; Barry et al.

1996). The most important aspect of govern mentality in this chapter is not neoliberalism, but rather the underlying crisis of govern mentality in the 1970s to which neoliberals also responded. Foucault used the term "state

205

. ..

Ia ttitude towards state regulation an,d phobia" to characterize the crmca . 76-78). He originally ascribed this 08 . . h ar period (20 a. . > . h. _ planning in [ e posrw . h roralitar ianism In t e rrn me . . h ociared the state wtt h I phobia to CfltICS w 0 ass b h h skipped forward to t e we diare aftermath of World War II, ut e t e: the decades in between, . . f the 1970s He th us ign red . lIy fare state cnnque 0 ..

I· f h welfare state was pracnca h h th and ranona ity 0 t e . I during whic t e grow 5 hobia is nevertheless an essenna undisputed across Western Europe: tabte p . g in the 1970s, and it is not > > f If ratIonalities egmnm > > h re characteristic 0 we are such but designates a situation w e identical to welfare retrenchment as I > > t or effective mode of governseen as a egmma e h ..

I state hierarchy is no anger. icall been framed as t e ens IS or ing. In a European context, this h:seltra~e sta~e (Oonzelot 1991; 1996), but even several different cnses of the d rnmentality is similarly applithe underlying critique of state-basle> . gove f Ametican po ItICS. . this cable in the context 0 . . s ever "real" is less important In Whether the welfare state cnsis wa . h ublic health policies have . . r is to notice ow P context because the rnam pOlO 1 tall"deas about how to govern , f h e govern men been influenced by some 0 t es > uments about how not to gov· as well as the by the crit.iques .mvo.l~l~~i:~~ntexrthat tensions can Decll,r ern (Foucault 1996). It IS mainly I > ize life and governmental err>· I' erative to optmu h f their between the biopo IItlca. Imp. d overnmentality share muc 0 tiques of paternalism.

BlOpolitics an g >1 in conflict with each other. In d are not necessafl Y 1 h d en govgenealogy, however, an h 19791ecrures Foucault said t at mo; d fact, in both the 1978 and t e com lex interplay between> ree om ernmentalities are charactenzed by ~ > ~o the problem of scarcity In the and security, which he discusse:~~ ;~;~~~:5-66).

This dynamic stil! e~:~~s eighteenth century (2007: 48-: ' he 1970s) but rather than scarcity, . h in the period analyzed here (since t osire problem of affluence, whic _ style diseases are now related ro the op~ security a different edge. It ere gives the interplay between freed:m a; -phobic affinities of contemporary ates a potential tension between It e stla e bitions of public health programs >. d the blOPO Itlca am governrnentaliries an . d "\ . to regulate individuallifestylesIn eta~~nce t of lifestyle, which IS the subIt is finally necessary to c1anfy the.

Pan analytical term like blopolidddt function as h tan ject of the chapter an oes no h· torical background to t e concep k tics or governmentality.

There IS abllshealth which is also part of thhedbac > > h field 0f pu IC , > bl· healt ocuits integratIOn

IntO t e

r festyle

conceptions

In

pu

,Ie

1

pt

ground to the present focus o~:nltified the invention of the lifesty e cho::~;hY ments. Although some have I of lifestyle diseases and un> wirh the epidemiological phebnom enodnl11classical sociological teactlons to f ., 's to e oun I I by economiC behavior, its real ongln ~ I·fe atterns are determined so e y> he birth the Marxian assertlon t at I p) ., ue of Marx on thiS pomt, t d q ..

I Partly based on Veblen s cntl d Weber's theory of clas.s an pOSItion. ..

I! attfl b ute to I ' yof of the lifestyle concept IS typlca does have an impact upon peop e s w~ou status. Economic class POSition their belonging to a particular status g P life, Weber argues, but so does

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Lars Thorup

The Birth of Lifestyle

Larsen

that share valorizations of honor and social esteem partly based on education. By bringing together considerations of income, occupation, education and status, Weber formulated a holistic conception of lifestyle which was later developed into a broader sociology of education and social status, probably most clearly in the work of Pierre Bourdieu.

After the early conceptual development in sociology, a much more individualized concept of lifestyle emerged in the 1920s in the personality psychology of Alfred Adler, who understood it as the subjectively determined goal-directedness of a person's action. During the 1950s and 1960s both the psychological and the sociological concepts existed alongside each other, with the latter being applied descriptively to characterize specific social groups, as in "working-class lifestyle," "suburban lifestyle," and so on. Common ro all these lines of development is a more or less holistic conception of man, in the sense that the scholarly interest in lifestyle serves to reject a purely mechanical view in which human motivation plays no role.

It was not until the 1970s that the lifestyle concept entered the sociomedical field and became synonymous with individual risk factors such as smoking, drinking, indulgence and a sedentary way of life. During this relatively brief period, the meaning of the term was transformed from its holistic and social uses to designate instead certain forms of irresponsible individual behavior. Since then, the field of public health has been dominated by various types of individualistic conceptions of lifestyle as exemplified in the following analysis, but a more socially oriented counter-stream has persisted within the subdiscipline of social medicine. This tendency criticizes public health policies for reducing complex social patterns of lifestyle to an atomistic understanding of individual behavior in which everything is perfectly modifiable.'

It is worth specifying the added value of a Foucauldian analysis as something distinct from the juxtaposition between individualistic and social conceptions of lifestyle. Both of these camps seem to take for granted that lifestyle is a thing in itself which can be unambiguously defined, and they also share the identification of lifestyle with health and prevention.

Seen from the point of view of Nietzschean genealogy, however, historical concepts have no essence, which means that an analysis of the association between lifestyle and public health policy should focus on strategies employed to change lifestyles in a "healthy" direction. The dual Foucauldian perspective of biopolitics and govern mentality stresses the importance of political technologies in the formation of such lifestyles, which means that a whole layer of health-promoting technologies need to be dissected to extract their built-in conception of lifestyle and health. It is not only a question of choosing a position on a continuum between individualistic and social conceptions of lifestyle, but of demonstrating that the complexity of technologies employed to regulate lifestyle is much more informative that a simple continuum would suggest.

The ana lyrical strategy

Politics

that I will employ in the foll~wing

207

~nalY;~ of

public health programs draws on the general concept 0 ge~e: o~~uc:u~; f It 2000c) and specifically on its use in rhe history 0 sexua I y ( cau, " bi h pear to have a mate1998) Both sexuality and lifestyle are 0 jeers t at ap . . Id I rial f~undation, but as soon as you try to disse~t. the hlstor.lCa eve opf . b hind rhem their substance disintegrates Into a web of ment a meanings e .' h the e istemological point here social relation~ anhd rec~nol~711~;~s~:I:~~ health: or unhealthy, because it lS not to r~ve~ at a rea rhodolo ical question, then, is not If the is nor a thing In Itself. The key me g f a healthy lifestyle or how it

v:

documents usei ~ere revea~ rh~et:::r ~~:~r;e;resent conceptions of lifestyle can be achieve , rut mstea w N h t we should expect to find a t politics in a public health contexlt. °h t a e of these health documents. . I .f cept of lifesty e at t e cor . d. smg e, urn orm con . that ublic healrh policy in this perio IS The argument, on the contrary, lSI P d between different conceptions bursting with inner tensions and o~s~ en .~cation of lifestyle diseases and of lifestyle, which makes the genera I enn .

I· II the more conspicuous.

I preventive po ICy seem a ." between the lifestyle conceptions in t te In other words, the van.atlon hi' portant because its epistemodifferent policy documents IS per aps ess 1m. d dentity The same can be .. ti lIy to reject a perceive I . logical function IS essen ra "Th idea is not to uncover n h f country companso . e said about t e use 0 crossh h I h f Danes and Americans, but to any deeply hidden truths about t e ea tOt ms of health care system if tI different countnes m er I· argue that I two vas Y . . erience similar ideas of lifestyle po land demographical composinon e;p di t reflection of rhe actual health tics, these policies are unlikely to .e a Ihr~cchapter focuses on the concep. .

I' th adding that since t IS ibl Situation. t IS wor .f 1 h iologies it is not POSS! e to say tions and intended function of II es~ e rec lally work in practice. anything on this baSIS abour how t eyhactu . blic health programs in . I .ses all r e major pu The data materia compn d b th analysis mainly focuses hast three deca es, ut e Wh I each country over t e p he underlying lifesryle conception. ue on passages that clearly express t " Sl'milar in the twa counhli h lth programs IS very the chronology of pu IC ea . I h The American documents ery uneven In engt . tries, the documents are v" I their Danish counterparts, . lost ten times as ong as . are 10 some cases am. "he following presentations. which accounts for a slight Imbalance In t

2 LIFESTYLE

CHOICE AS THE ANTIDOTE TO AN AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1977-1988) the United States (like . .' 'd -I e 1970s, Denmar k an d .

Beglllmng m the ml -to at h d h· first policy programs to .) launc e r elf d other Western states / countnes I"· such as cancer an car. I'f I lated camp IcatlOnS . .. . counter the surge Jl1 I esty e-re ."" behind these initiatiVes " urce of inSpiration d' diovascular diseases. A major so . the Health of Cana wns .

I dAN PerspectIVe all was the document tit e ew

208

Lars Thortlp Larsen

authored by the Canadian Health Minister, Marc Lalonde, in 1974. This document argued that because the advance of medicine had come to a halt, governments needed to "get into the business of modifying human behavior" (Lalonde 1974: 36). Within the broader framework of what he called the "health field" approach, Lalonde urged health policy to focus on lifestyle defined as " ... the aggregation of decisions by individuals which affect their health and over which they have more or less contro!." At another point in the publication, lifestyle is also associated with "destructive habits" and especially the term "self-imposed risks" (Lalonde 1974: 16). lifestyle is thus seen as something falling under the choice, control or at least decision-making of the individual, but other than that, the category in itself is pretty vague.'

The belief in the potential of individual lifestyles also has a general funcrion in the broader biopolitical strategy of public health policy. Both Lalonde and almost all of the early public health documents from Denmark and the US express a diminished belief in the progress of science in general, and of course of medicine in particular. Instead, their hope is that any progress in the population's health will come from the healthy choices of individuals. They are remarkably optimistic about individual lifestyles, while at the same time they often mention how individuals lead "desrructive lifestyles" in practice.

The focus on individual choice should not be seen in isolation, since it clearly has a connection to the macroscopic statistical view of the population's health. There is a general belief that individuals will be able to bring about improvements in the nation's health, and the first American Healthy People program from 1979 directly praises the Lalonde report for bringing attention to the importance of individual lifestyle in that context (DHEW 1979a: Ch. 1: 9-10). It is not without significance that an American public health program gives direct credit to its Canadian counterpart, given that the latter country has a universal health care system while the US does not have an integrated national health care system for all its citizens. The political context for this homage might be that in the late 1970s, the US government was planning to introduce some version of universal health care. For example, the forward plans for health for the years 1976 and 1978 both contain major sections entitled "Preparing for National Health Insurance" and also mention that prevention is necessary for cost containment in the future (DHEW 1974: 1,7; 1978).

Apart from the brief associarion between prevention and the health care system, there are surprisingly few references to the political context in practically all the documents examined. In most cases, it is argued that the prevention of unhealthy lifestyles is "an idea whose time has come" (DHEW 1979a: Ch. 1: 5) Or something similarly vague. Much more attention is generally given to the "how" of lifestyle management than to the "why," not only on the individual but also on the population level. Like the Lalonde repOrt, the American Healthy Peal' Ie program says that it is in fact not the

The Birth of Lifestyle Politics

209

If b he " gation" of individual choices individual lifestyle choice itse , ut t e er ned ith Regulating the aggrethat ublic health policy should be concerne ,Wit . uires a gatiO~ of individual lifestyle choices is not a simple gestu re, but req n The ' f hi' n and ItS rnter na l composmc . thorough understanding ate popu auo h d d i Healthy People following passage indicates the general approac a ~pte I~regulation. as a way of making the lifestyles of Amencans an a lect a , I fS h day Adventists and moving to Simply by adopting the lIfest0~ a . e':sn~o~ld ensure for their children an the Rocky Mountain States, I' IC!tlZ~ethan half the national average, and incidence of cancer that was 1[[ e:o b b orning Mormons and migratthey could do almost as well as: ISel Ylt ~; perfectly reasonable for us to ing to Utah, or by migrating toldsra ,' much reduction of cancer by h e that we cou ach ieve as hi d assume, t ere f or , . di . r forebearers [sic] ac ieve . . reventlve me rcme as au , appropnate steps in p. ' bli health And the exercise IS reu for infectious diseases by ImprovmgdP I~ r e~vironment distinguish ally to find out exactly which ingre rents in 째UUth or the Jews and Arabs h Ad tists the Mormons in a, , the Sevent - d ay ,ven I, . C lifornia ll1inois, or Pennsylvania. in Israel, from their counterparts I~ (DHEW 1979b: 165; d. also DHE

:979a'

C'h. 10: 3) .

, ' at ani because it establishes a general conThis quotation IS remarkable, n y di b t also because it underlif I nd health con mons, u I ' , nection between I esty e a , fi 'I difiable. The popu anon s b' a I most rn rute y rna I bl l stands lifestyles as emg, . e rated statistical matrix that pu IC lifestyle appears almost like an mt g 'each individual character, ' analyze by extraCtIng h b health administrators can Thi ge does not say muc a out , , h they see fit.

IS passa 'h h IStiC and then c ange as f d "simply," indicates t at sue hi but the rst wor, I, h d II how to actua y 0 trns, . I one could even argue r at . hi h In rbeorenca terms, , changes are Wit m reac . h lif I s of Americans, this concepbi ' change tel esry e , h despite the am ItIOn to. tal rationality saying ow to tion of lifestyle lacks a substantial gO,vernmde: not address the basic ques, h h For examp e, It 0 s accomplish sue c anges.

I hoi f individuals tion of how to govern the [ifesry e c Olce so. that it is not an entirely , h' tta l passage IS c Another thing to note m t IS ess~n d d critique of public health polatomistic approach to lifestyle, as t e stba.n.ar nderstand or at least idenII resses the am l[lon to u d d g icy claims. It actua y ex~ S within the population~ epen In tify the lifestyles of vanous subgroup d . ['on While lifestyles are . d religiOUS enomllla I .

I Ih I on geographical ocatlon an "I a healthy or an un lea t y 'fi . I groupS haVing elt ler , d identified with speC! c SOCIa h I'festyles are solely onente , loyed to c ange I 'ff way of life the strategies emp h ts [0 change dl erences , I h People t us attemp , towards individuals.

Hea t y " d' 'd alized health promotion . , s by usmg m IVI u , d I in lifestyle among SOCia group h document goes IIltO more etal ,Instruments.

A Iater pa ssage m t e same "d I I'f ties It d 'nfluence indlVI ua I es y . about what technology might hbe lu~e t~ las a sort of dietetic regime that characterizes the desired healt y I esty e , f I Slm ' pie living tules: conSiSts 0 severa

210

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The Birth of Lifestyle

Larsen

A series of studies in Alameda County, California, showed substantial increases in the life spans of people who exercise vigorously and regularly, maintain normal weight, ear breakfast, do not snack between meals, avoid smoking, limit alcohol consumption, and sleep at least seven hours a night. A 45-year-old man who followed three or fewer of these seven health habits could, on the average, expect to live to age 67.

If he followed six or seven, he could expect to live to age 78. Women who had such habits also lived longer than women who didn't. (DHEW 1979b: 425-426) As this passage demonstrates, the Healthy People program approaches the management of lifestyles in the form of simple and healthy living rules.

These living rules should be seen in the context of their negative counterparts, i.e., the detrimental lifestyle characteristics said to have caused the rise in lifestyle diseases. The problematization of unhealthy lifestyles is sometimes spelled out in very specific forms of behavior, in particular smoking, drinking, overeating and a lack of physical exercise. In other contexts, such as a passage immediately following the one quoted previously, a broader, cultural dimension is blamed. The document lists the major obstacles of improving one's health, and in second place comes: " ... the affluent, self-indulgent, frequently violent American lifestyle" (DHEW 1979b: 426). Here, the term lifestyle is clearly used in a derogatory sense to critique "American" lifestyle as such, and this type of implicit cultural critique has also been the target of critical remarks in the public health literature due to its reductionist approach (Coreil, Levin and Gartley Jaco 1985: 428).

Although the reference to American lifestyle expands the perspective of lifestyle management beyond the individual, it does not provide much more in terms of what governmental technology can be applied to govern such aspects of the national lifestyle. For example, it does not really specify how the government should get individuals to move from self-indulgence to the simple living rules, nor for that matter does it say how individuals are supposed to live according to such rules.

The healthy living habits advocated here might not sound particularly demanding compared to many health philosophies that exist today and can be much more stringent, but consider how much it would take for them to be adopted by an entire population. For example, can any parent justifiably demand seven hours of sleep every night or forbid their children to ever eat between meals when they are really hungry? Even a short list of guidelines can be extremely difficult to uphold and monitor if everyone has to live by them all the time, and how do you design a public policy intervention to regulate sleep or snacking between meals? Apart from brief remarks about passing out information, lifestyle counseling and teaching the individual what is healthy, the lack of actual governmental technologies is quite remarkable; indeed, the public health programs of each country seem to recognize this (Sundhedsprioriteringsudvalget 1977: 30; DHEW 1979b: 431).

The Danish

public health program

Politics

211

from 1977 is even less concrete rhan to devising specific . mmanves, . h

.' Amencan Its

w h en it I comes

~~;tt~~:sr~~t:n~l:entive

approach

counterpart Part of this is due to the limited knowledge base on preventl:n~r~~~:~de Danish document mainly recognizes what IS known I~Ot to . .. d I t 1977· 277) Another reason IS that the program hedspnontenngsu va ge .. d f d on the overall onse to a parliamentary man ate ocuse . f d i d was fa te In resp h lif I d revennon was . .. f h h lth care sector. Althoug I esty e an p pnonnes 0 t e ea . d h document focuses absent from the original, parlIamentary man ate, r e k . . . on how rhe Danish health care sector can ta e a major (Sundh~dsprio;it~;;~~~::t:lgs~~;:;:~

11). The shift is mainly presentedas a nbewc ~Ice 0 :hat of the :est of rhe overall biopolitical strategy IS said to e SImi ar to health care secror: d I of the health care sector has The objective of the previous eve opment lation as much as posbeen to better the health condltlo~lof the :S°:r"aid to the individual in sible and to provide the best POSSI e mefa d ed medical or techni. f I by means a a vane case of illness, or examp e f hi . ion have no intention to .

Th osals 0 t IS comrrussr cal assistance. e prop di t of the means to continub ely suggest an a jusrmen h change tat, ut mer .. f h Harts of the health care secously realize this natur~l objective or t e. e 4 tor. (Sundhedspriorirenngsudvalget 1977. 52) . f lifesr Ie diseases is motivated by tWO The shift towards the preventlonho I Y efforts in the area of preven. h d ent says t at prevIous .h factors. First, t e ocum d d omewhat in contrast Wit . b h t 0 modest. Secon , an s non have een muc 0 .,,' ce" seems to suggest that no f ., I' that previous expenen h the rsr pomt, It calms . d h h treatment technology, althoug major health gams can be achieve t roug f (5 ndhedsprioriteringsudvalhi xpenence consists 0 u h Ih it is unclear w h at t IS e I " " that the greatest ea t .ssion mere Y assumes . get 1977: 51). Th e cornrru f . g lifestyle diseases, but despite hi d by means 0 pteventm . .

I . gains can b e ac reve . f id ce base this pnncip e IS . . . . . t to budd on a rm eVI en , .. h their initial com rmtrnen h t re of preventive action In t e subsequently abandoned due to t \ve:~d~:l u 1977: 26). et area of lifestyle (Sundhedsptlofltefl g gt mological problems related . . t discusses two epls e .

The comnusston repor .

I di nd health polIcy 111 gen. h to lifesty e rsea ses a to the preventive approac . " which is that no one can . "d ·Iemma of preventIOn, f li f I eral. First, t h ere IS a If' action in the area 0 I esry e h efficacy 0 preventive I ever fully documenr t e 77. 265). Intervention and resu ts are (Sundhedsprioritenngsudvalget 19.. . d hether changes in health hat it is impossible to JlI ge w d h often so f ar apart t at I h h form of prevention. Secon ,t .e status were actually caused by t e IC dos:n adox of prevention," which IS di s the so-ca Ie par document a Iso iscusse h ibilities of treatment seem to . f II ." ly when t e pOSSI I I h d . characterized as 0 ows. on. . ntion arise" (Sund e Spfl. g Il1terest 111 preve . have dried up does a growm d I· ·,n choosing a preemptive . . oflteflngsudvalget 197 7.. 264) . The para ox les

212

Lars Thorup

Larsen

strategy as the very last instance, hut the alleged paradox also appears to be in conflict with a later argument saying that" ... at all times, there has been agreement that it is better to prevent than to cure" (Sundhedsprioriteringsudvalget 1977: 272). One thing stands out clearly from this discussion, even if the connection to individual lifestyle changes is relatively remote. A general association is made between the general shift towards prevention and societal changes over time, which is also present in the contemporary American document-albeit in a slightly different fashion.

In the US, the officially stated reason for shifting health policy priorities from treatment to prevention was also the rise in lifestyle diseases. The rise in lifestyle diseases is understood as a descriptive characteristic of the average population's way of living after World War II. As we can see in both the long passages from the American program (on Seventh-day Adventists and on simple living rules), the distinction between lifestyles characterized as healthy and those deemed unhealthy corresponds to a difference in modernization.

The idealized subcultures are precisely the ones where the typical characteristics of middle-class post-industrial urban America have not yet undermined the simple life, i.e., a way of living with less convenience, affluence and self-indulgence than in the big cities and suburbia.

In a similar passage, Healthy People also says that lifestyle diseases are caused by the many "excesses" of American life ranging from overeating to driving too fast (DHEW 1979a: 2-3). We saw the same idealization of simple lifestyles in the descriptive view quoted previoulsy, but now it comes with a built-in choice. This gives the impression that the development of lifestyle diseases in the entire population can easily be reversed by means of a biopolitical strategy where individuals make healthy choices almost automatically.

The focus on simple living rules is underdeveloped technologically on another main point, because it gives the impression that a healthy lifestyle is chosen once and for all. Later and more comprehensive developments in lifestyle politics have underlined the importance of a continuous mode of health education where individuals ate brought to reevaluate a lot of elements in their life continuously, weigh healthy elements against unhealthy ones, and make healthy choices again and again. This is only vaguely recognized in the first Healthy People program, it seems, but becomes important later. One must not only live a healthy life and do so by choice, but the choice must be the result of a conscious and rigorous process where the individual weighs information and is able to express the healthy choices in a rational fashion. Leading a healthy lifestyle thus requires the individual to have a certain critical attitude toward his/her own actions, This passage from the first Danish public health program, the 1977 commission report on new priorities in health care, indicates this aspect more clearly than its American counterpart:

The Birth of Lifestyle It is remarkable

how poorly

Politics

most people are able to express

213 rhem-

selves and recognize that what happens to the~ ~1'~"h~l:e~~e~;I~ :~~~ res onse to something; [It IS likewise remar a :re a~le to make decisions and adjust to the chang~sthat seem:~ ~~ . h ros erous society. Such human qua rues ap~ear along Wit a p p . f health (Sundhedsprioritenngsudvaldecisive for the preservatIon get 1977: 275)

°

'

. din the content of a healthy While the ~reviousqu.ota.tlOnS fO~~;;ere:;~~~~tatiOn that focuses on cerlifestyle, this passage indicates a I. d f . dividual in order to achieve ·· een to be require 0 an In rain human qua Iities s .

I d formal conception . h I h I·f style It IS a more genera an and maintain a ea t y rrestvte. ". . nd the focus on choice, of lifestyle than both the simplehdescrhlPtivl ehVle:da what is not. Leading a . d t tell you w at IS ea t y a d because It Des no f f b' rivarion since it boils own lif I involves a orm 0 su lec, . healthy I esty e now I b ith the help of this policy. . f h re or can ecorne WI . d i to a question 0 . w 0 you a t ublic health policy in this early peno IS The main point here IS not tha Pd. Wh t is perhaps most significant split between entirely separate parla 19mhs. a public programs is how t of lifesry e In t ese ea rly h about t e managemen. he have about lifestyle and lifestyle manfew and underdeveloped Ideas t y. di the documents only contain ious passages In reate, h agement. A s t e previ h lif le is plus a strategy to counter n t' ns on w at I e5ty e I , . . very few genera I renee 10 , h to put these strategies into . . lif I di es Reflections on ow . if the rise In I esty e iseas '. d h this is the most sigm cant " l eXistent an per aps I . practice are a most nonN . h the Danish nor the American characteristic of these document'[or ~:,~rto govern the lifestyles of indiprogram develop any technology f few negative Ideas about · bgroups Apart rom a vi duals or popu Ianon su . b d ystern these documents diti I treatrnent- ase s, h the deficiencies of the tra mona .

I·· l id which says that healt . ltd biopo \tIca I ea . seem to build on an una r ncu a e d I . blem of lifestyle diseases . t s wi II follow .once Irnprovemen . the un er ymg pro has been identified in statistical terms.

ND THE LIMITS 3 INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILIT Y A TO GOVERNING LIFESTYLE (1989-1998) h xt set of major public health proa decade to t e n~ I developed into a more comgrams the field of preventive health po IcyT,has . a clear refinement in the , d mdICators. ere IS , b prehensive set of measures an . b h I Danish Regeringens ,are yg·f tyle m ot ne . conceptual approac h to II es ...

1989) and the Amencan . ._ 989 (SundhedsmlI1lstenet gelsesprogram from 1 . .

990 but they still display some mter Healthy People 2000 published m I h. ' t Ilotice first about the second .' s One t mg 0 I d nal tensions and comp IeXltle . , h ·OU5 documents ana yze h he build on t e previ generation is that althoug t Y

If we move forward

214

Lars Thorup Larsen

previously, it is not very clear what has been achieved in practice. Both second-generation documents claim that previous policies have failed and look to correct previous mistakes, but they do not specify the failures in much detail (Sundhedsministeriet 1989: 8; DHHS 1990: vii). In other words, the development of a more comprehensive technology of regulating lifestyle is not based on practical experience. It is rather a new interpretation of the lifestyle concept and its place within a regime of political regulation that is the context of lifestyle politics at the end of the 1980s" The American document Healthy People 2000 stresses the need for personal responsibility much more emphatically than irs predecessor. It sounds like a classic Enlightenment argument, saying that the individual should use knowledge to take control of his or her own "health destiny" (DHHS 1990: v). The subsequent chapter on "shared responsibilities" in public health emphasizes that the political management of lifestyle is the responsibility of the individual: The individual is both the starting point and the ultimate target of the campaign towards Healthy People 2000 ( " . " )" The first role we must all undertake is responsibiliry for Own personal health habits ( " " " ).

Measurable decreases in risks to healrh can result from changes in diet, exercise, tobacco use, alcohol and drug use, injury prevention behavior, and sexual habits, but each of us must choose to make these changes a personal priority"(DHHS 1990: 85) As in the previous passage about simple living rules, this text does not clarify what should be given a lower priority in order to give first priority to health, such as social relations or taking responsibility for others" There are sections on the responsibilities of family, community, professionals, media and government in the same chapter of the 1990 program, but these appear to be secondary to the responsibility of the individual (DHHS 1990: 85-88). The obvious paradox is of course that this form of lifestyle management depends so strongly on individual choice, but leaves little or nothing for the individual to decide since it is decided in advance what the outcome of the choice should be. The quoted passage not only obliges us ro consider healthy change, it requires us to make precisely these changes, which is in fact a very restricted definition of what constitures a healthy lifestyle.

Both the American Healthy People 2000 and its Danish counterpart draw inspirarion from the 1980s debates between liberalism and communitarianism, where social problems were associated with individual lack of commitment towards the community (cf. for example Bellah et a!. 1985)" As mentioned earlier, the overall strategy of the new public health policy is to get individuals to take more responsibility for their own health and wellbeing again after a period of excessive convenience and luxury" This experience of loss fits perfectly with some of the communitarian critiques of

The Birth of Lifestyle Politics

215

" di "dual and community, although the imbalance an imbalance between In IVI for example j the following statement: " derplayed or examp e In h is a Iso sornenrnes ~n" " h l' ith each of us, it also lies wit "While the responsibility for c ch st res w ve to make responsibility II f "(DHHS 1990: 58)" Sue statements ser d d fi a 0 us " tion but it is also rather vague an ena key aspect of the lifestyle concep fro h lrh matters in a strict sense" nitely removes the lifestyle category rom e~ "ncreasetheircommitment It is not clear how individuals are sup~ose t? I itizing their own health, " hil t the same time ptlor to the community w I e a " db" ng properly committed to the unless of course the latter IS define a~l:~ be responsible for one's comcommunity" Since it is techIllCallYllPohssl e h lrhy habits the conception " , t and sti ave un ea , muruty III some respe.c ,s" t have a more specific target. In order to of lifestyle as responsibility mus h h I h lues of rhe community, the realign individual lifestyles with t e ea f Yhva ter" among the most vul"culture 0 c arac f document thus ca IIs or a new Thi ld i dicate the advent of a more lation IS cou In I" nerable groups 0 f r h e popu ""b h realization of health po ICy " entaliry ecause ted comprehensive governm 'd d on a stricter moral can ucr "" IS presenre d as being epen ent up objectives of subjects. " "a way of thinking and being The culture of character IS defined -h .. ". d the adoption of lifestyles nsible be avior an f that actively promote [s] respo d h I h" (DHHS 1990: v). The ocus that are maximally conducive to goo d ~a t d ncy to break down the idea , h revIOUSdeca e s ten e "" ". on culture oontt nues t e P d I" "human qualities, i.e., to if I" eneral un er yll1g of a healthy II estyie mto g" ' h h he does in terms 0 f h ea It h son IS than w at e or s d di d focus more on w h 0 t h e per, the expense of a e reate biecti . ntatIOn comes at Th behavior. The su ject.rve one les will clearly illustrate. e h ever as a fewexamp lif I b h I h orientation to ea t ,ow, iorr b en culture and 1 esty e y " the connection erwe 1990 program exp Iains f "I ly pregnancy an d "lifI esty Ies h chool ai ure, ear referring to problems suc as s 8) conducive to violence" (DHHS 1990:"1 " h biopolitical optimization of , .t connection to t e While clearly 100seIllng I s I f s assigns blame to some poprhe population's health status , the cu ture ocu test danger to public health" h egrea ulation subgroups w h ose lifI es tyleposest the initial responsl ibili I Ity "I d of the 1990 program, 'bl k In the more detal e parrs I" health stagnation on ' " "" ac s, of "all of us" qUICkly turns to ~ amll~g f wer years of educarion" (DHHS blue-collar workers, and peop e wlr" e h rl"ler period ir is not exactly 94 605) As In t e ea '"" " 1990: 136; cf. also pp. 5 . h" an enrirely individualistic or "" h" ogram for aVIng I Iy accurate to critICize t IS pr" h hand the document c ear "f I ptlon On t e one, " I s even atomistic II estye conce . h I"f les with specific SOCia group of unhealt y I esty associates the preva Ience Th solutions to w h at I00 k s like d fic"enr character. e h her h who allegedly ave a e I " "I individualistic, on r e at a social problem of lifestyle are stili e~:~~~ Ythe public health community hand, and here rhe standard cntlque seems to apply. "revention program, it is no~ ~s elabora~e If we look ar the 1989 Danish p d" "d" "dual responsibillry, but thiS , as its American cQunterpar t regar lllg III IVI

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The Birth of Lifestyle

may Just reflect the briefness of the document itself. It does, however, retain a very similar communitarian argument blaming the poor state of health on an uneven moral balance between individual and community (Sundhedsministeriet 1989: 8).

As the document subsequently argues, prevention must proceed from the idea that society cannot solve health problems stemming from the lifestyle of the individual (Sundhedsministeriet 1989: 11). In this understand-

ing, individual responsibility

for one's

Own

lifestyle is not only a normative

but formulated as a necessity if prevention is to function. Echoing the American observations on responsibility, the Danish program begins by assigning blame for governmental failure to the individual, but then extends this into a simple principle of governmentality, albeit a negative one. It simply says that since society cannot solve individual lifestyle problems, it should refrain from even trying to do so. What makes this principle interesting theoretically is not that it is fully developed, but that it defines the reality of individual lifestyles as a barr ier to governmental regulation. This negative principle also raises a broader question regarding the overall purpose of the government's public health program if it neither can nor should try to make people healthy. In this situation, one could argue that the governmental critique of how issues like health and lifestyle can and should be governed Comes into conflict with the biopolitical ambition to optimize the population's health status. If lifestyle is conceived as falling outside the limits of governmental reach, it also sets limits to the exercise of biopolitical power and the prospects of using it to achieve a healthier population. obligation,

As these examples demonstrate, the concept of a healthy lifestyle is somewhat more elaborated in the middle period, particularly regarding the political function of lifestyle for integrating individual and community. Much attention is paid to the moral side of lifestyle in this period,

for instance

in the strong focus on promoting

individual

responsibility,

character and a moral balance hetween individual and community.

Lirrie, however, is said about the actual content of a healthy lifestyle and even less about the process of realizing such a healthy state.

There seems to be a general tension in this period between, on the one hand, a set of critical governmental principles urging health authorities to let communities improve their own health and, on the other hand, a continued biopolitical ambition to improve the general health status dramatically. It is remarkable that the documents are most concrete on the issues of Culture and moral character, while these have only a vague relationship with the inirial problem of lifestyle-related diseases. In other situations, the focus on lifestyle diseases is intact, but with no clear ideas on how to improve anything. It is as if the "what" and the "how" are never really in perfect accordance, which again boils down to a mismatch between biopolitical ambitions and governmental techniques.

4. GOVERNING

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217

THE DETAILS OF EVERYDAY LIFE (SINCE 1999)

. bi ste in the creation of comprehensive The most recent penod marks a Ig p .' that such an approach is 1" t least In the recogmnon .

I lifestyle po icies, or a ious nubli health policies have expenneeded. It also indicates that previous pu adopt a healthy lifestyle, much 路 Is' n getting citizens to a h enced very IItt e succes I .

I di t the population level. at or ' h rise in lifesty e "eases a I less in countenng ted' h meantime such as a genera bvi sly been rna e In t e , d adjustments h ave 0 VIQll ntrjes and the slow intra uc. ass most Western cou b rise in CIgarette taxes,ac: h ain idea is still to improve health y tion of smoking restrlctlons, but t e m way of individual lifestyles.

I 2010 (DHHS 2002 and the conternporaBoth Amencan Healthy Peop e (S dh dsministeriet 1999) maintain neous Danish public health program, uTn e d so however, with a much hey 0, . . di id I responsIbilIty. . . di id I a hard line on In IVI ua .

I' f how to intervene In In IVl ua ental ranona ICy or .' d more elaborate governm . t individual motivation an , " II f h se techniques rarge lifestyles. Almost a 0 t e health issues directly, In a srrru. much as they concern I f decisiveness Just as . . . f "human qualities" and "ell ture a lar fashion to the earlier dISCUSSIOn0 d A key example is the ABC of character," but now In a more foc~se20~~Ydraws from the 2000 Dietary good nutrition that Healthy People I I tical model designed to help , It rs a simp e ana y I , II Guidelines for Americans. . h of a lifestyle change, especra y individuals focus on three successive ~ ases with regard to the prevention of obesity: g d 2 vears and older should follow " ... to stay healthy, persons a : r fit~ess Build a healthy base, and these ABCs for good health: Aim 0 , for a healthy weight and be ibl T '10 for fitness, aim p d Choose sensi y. 0 a, b ild h althy base let the yraml . h day To UI a e '.

II h I I physical y active eac . . of rains daily, especia Y woe guide food choices; choose a vanetY g tables daily; and keep food d d f t grains' choose a vane, ty of fruits an vege di t that is low in saturate a , h sibly choose a ie d f d safe ro eat. To c oose sen " l fat: choose beverages an 00 s and cholesterol and moderate I~ tota ad' prepare foods with less salt; to moderate intake of sugars; c oose and ' "(DHHS 2002: ch.19: . and if consuming a Ico h 0,I do so 10 mo eranon 3 emphasis in original). , h ro f od pyramid as , .

US and Denmark, use rne .

Several countries, mcludmg th~ut the uored passage extends the pyramid a general guide for nutrition, ~ s physical exercise. More irnporrationale ro other lifestyle factors suc ~he actual content of the pyramid, tantly, it adds a whole new dimensron rat ro ortions, etc. The model 101i.e., what should be consumed 10 ~:e:d p h:' comprehensive information tially assumes that the mdlvldual ~ ~ent of this information IS subject on health and nutrition, but since t decodn I to do something active with It. . I to g et to change, it is essentia

the

In

lVI

ua

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Lars Thorup

Larsen

The individual is supposed to analyze and evaluate a wide range of details in his or her daily nutrition, almost to the extent that a nutrition expert or counselor would do. Governing healthy lifestyles thus involves an attempt to improve the self-governing capacities of individuals dramarically, but since these are difficult to specify in detail, the ABC model falls back on general human qualities as a proxy for a healthy lifestyle.

As in the previous programs, it is still relatively unclear how individuals can really use this model to guide their normal daily life. Not only is it difficult for an individual to navigate between many types of fruit colors, fats and grains, but Healthy People 2010 is not very clear on how to reach its biopolitical goal on the macro level either. Instead, it breaks everything down into an endless list of partial goals with corresponding monitoring devices and indicators. It is clearly inspired by New Public Management or similar management instruments designed to monitor the goal-achievement of public policies, but here applied to the detailed living habits of the entire population.

Here are two typical examples of policy goals, of which there are literally hundreds: [Goal No.] 19-5. Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 years and older who consume at least two daily servings of fruit (target: 75 percent) [Goal No.] 19-6. Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 years and older who consume at least three daily servings of vegetables, with at least one-third being dark green or orange vegetables (target: 50 percent). (DHHS 2002 ch.19: 18-20) The content of these goals is not radically different from campaigns in other countries, such as the British "5 a day" or the Danish "6 om dagen", so rhe problem is not necessarily that the bar is set too high. It is just fundamentally unclear how the government is going to affect and later monitor each individual's daily choice of fruit color, not to mention what individual knowledge has gone into the process.

The development from the earliest descriptions of healthy lifestyle to Healthy People 2010 demonstrates the infinite possibilities for future refinements. Before it was less fat, more grains and all the fruit you could ear, but now you have to consider what type of fat, prepared how, what color of fruit to pick and avoid, etc., and still we have not even begun to consider the overall food intake against metabolism, or differences between individuals and between groups. Does it really make sense to argue that all individuals over the age of two have exactly rhe same needs and should be subject to identical guidelines?

Probably not, and this is rhe real problem of Healthy People 2010 in terms of how to govern healthy lifestyles: that it is too general and too specific at the same time. [t elaborates tons of specific details on both the "what" and the "how" of regulating lifestyle, bur the integration of all these aspects seems to get lost under rhe heavy load of endless indicators

and monitoring

devices.

The Birth of Lifestyle

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219

The Danish contemporary Regeringens fo{kesundhedsprogr~T fr~m 1999 takes its point of departure from a cririque of ~x~~tIng I e~ty Althou h he announces that he will stop moralizing an ammg t e VIC " g dh d "" iet 1999' 110) the Minister of Health, Carsren Koch, tim (Sun e srmrnsrene I'"f I e to blame" (Sundhedsministeriet openly declares rhat " ... our I esry es ar . f D ish d 1999: 5). What lifestyle is to blame for is the stagnation 0 "a~ls d me t~a: . ared with similar populations, especta y ue life expecrancy comp d I h I The Danish program takes a a higher consumption of tobacco a.n A co .oa路n counterpart because where I" hid" ff oach than Its menc , s Ig r y I erent appr if 1"' ristical detail, the former intends the latter tries to momror It esty deIn Iltfssta policy instrument. h di gs of every a y I e as a new to use t e surroun In b ic id f the international comrnuThe approach builds on two. asic I e:: rr~~rns to the identification of st niry of health promotion expertise. iubli h Irh policies should "make the lifestyle with choice and says that pu IC ea h WHO's Ottawa Charter , h ' hoice " an Idea from t e , healrhy choice r e easier c '" h had already menrioned this (WHO 1986). The previous Dams program The second new idea is the ambirion, but not really put It Idnt掳 Pdrawce'd'n the international health , h'' WI e yl iscusse I so-called "settmg approac 1998.47' Hajlund and Larsen 2001: 80). promotion literature (~arlsson ki he'alth choices easier, this involves g An offshoot from the Idea of ma fm k "y titurions in the individual's , bition to re arm ey rns f a more systematic am h : I a four-track strategy or lif T " lIy the approac mvo ves d h every d ay I e. yplCa , k I local communiries, an t e interventions in public schools, wor paces,

es:

healrh care sector. " I di ion ro rhe selection of precisely , ine rheorenca IgresslO h There is an mteresnng , h settings are identical to t e .

Apart from pnsons, t ese . d" id f these our sernngs. di "I" society," governing In IVl f h - lied" ISClP inary sociei r, " four cornerstones 0 t e so ca h the disciplinary precautions embedded In uals from cradle ro grave rhroug "F It 1977' Larsen 2002: 286). schools, hospitals, ciries and fact~nes (d ou~t~oucaul; in which he argues Deleuze has become famous for IS stu y fO[lTI~d themselves into a , ' , lations have now trans , . . thar disciplinary power re ., f ditiona] civil society msttrunons d the limits 0 tra I I h di new control farm b eyon e seems to suggest t at lS1995) The present cas (Deleuze 1995; Har d t .. " b r with a new purpose, because "" ."" are still irnporrant u d ive ciplinary mstttutrons "I . . 1setting more con UCI " d h indlvldua sma sOCIa . f they are being use to reac d that the surroundmgs 0 everyro behavioral change. One coul feven say ental rationaliry because of rhe " b the obJ"ect 0 governm . day life have ecome ."" in Iifesryle polincs. " I' d to these InstlrufIons pivotal ro e asslgne h D "sh approac h focuses less ' counterpart (e am I A Contrary (0 its meflcan, f h I' h hoices such as fruit co or or " h" I object 0 ea t y c, b dattention on eac slngu ar . . d" "dual lifestyles are em e fl . oes mto how m IVI . grain types. More re ectlon. g olic intervention.

It is Important n.ot ded within the selected setrlngs of P Yd" 'rh the question of SOCial h I hy surroun mgs WI " h 1999 to confuse the focus on ea t I distribution mentioned 10 t e living conditions, be~au~e the o~ ~;veantaged groupS with an "ac~umulaprogram is a normalization of diS "". r 1999: 21). Sometimes the rion of unhealrhy Ii'f esryesI" (Sundheds1Tllnlstene

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The Birth of Lifestyle

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221

critique of existing lifestyles is directed at Danish culture as such, e.g., for

allegations,

being too liberal in bringing up children, or by romanticizing about the time when alcohol was only served on rare occasions and never directly from the bottle, and women were not allowed to smoke in public (Sundhedsministerier 1999: 110-111).

individual and social aspects of lifestyle, "" Ie conrin The lifestyle conceptions analyzed here do not fit mro a Sl7,tbe read a;

The cultural critique is only a sideshow to the general lifestyle approach, however, which focuses on a long list of healthy surroundings" , , , whose coherence is governed by the realities of everyday life" (Sundhedsrninisteriet 1999: 28), The category of "reality" is paradoxical here, of course, because the whole effort aims to reform and reorganize every little detail in a health-promoting direction, It is the "reality" of using the social surroundings of everyday life as procedure for how to govern individuals that is at stake, and this also involves an effort to improve citizens' receptivity to future health knowledge, motivation and decisiveness (WHO 1986), The lifestyle policies of the most recent period are thus characterized by a duality between the health-conducive surroundings of everyday life on the one hand, and a more traditional apparatus of social intervention to handle unhealthy individuals and especially parents on the other. The unifying aspect of the Danish and American policies in this period is the rigorous and systematic approach to rarionalizing every little detail of the individual's life, There is no guarantee human conducr will foster a healthy life in this sense, because the development of much more comprehensive governmental rationalities in this period often comes at the expense of a clear focus on health, It easily turns into a generalized project of creating better people with the abiliry to make healthy choices themselves, but the association with the underlying problem of lifestyle diseases crumbles under the attempt to prescribe an overambitious reorganization of social life as such.

5, CONCLUSION Ir is quite easy to demonstrate that public health policy aimed at the individual's lifestyle is not a simple response to the statistical rise in lifestyle

diseases. An alternative way to study this dubious association between lifestyle politics and lifestyle diseases would have been to examine the epidemiological research on the actual incidence of these diseases. Given the multiplicity of lifestyle conceptions, however, it is difficult to imagine what coherent statistical risk profile this would correspond to, In the initial use of the term lifestyle as something related to health, it was a descriptive term designating whatever way-of-living was typical of either healthy or unhealthy people and regardless of whether it was based On a deliberate choice, Although they often romanticize the supposed healthiness of this imagined pre-modern life, all the documents examined also conceptualize lifestyle as something telated to individual choice, The typical critique of public health policy targets precisely this reduction of a social problem to individual choice, and while there is some truth to these

uum between

the documents

individual

in f~ct reveal a more complex

interaction

and social aspects, Insr~~~~~~e:i~~o~ifferent

of

tech-

v~rious attempts to assoClate a ~e:h~fel~~;n~~~:ments imagine a set of simmques to create chan~e, ~ome 掳of Iifestyl~ diseases, while other documents pie living rules to cur tense h selves about the way they , indi id I eflect and express t em require In IVI ua s to r . h f on strengthening individual ocus f Iea d t h eir' d ai'I y lifire. Later, " there "IIS mue f d the problematic lifestyles 0 responsibility, although It IS main y ocuse on d d " .. d . terms of class, race, an e ucatlon. . underprivilege groups 10 lif I oliries include a comprehensive ranoThe most recent va nations of I e~thYe p. t ies to reorganize the settings of , , f d life The Dams version n II h na Iizanon 0 every ay ure.

I hil the American plan puts ate everyday life to produce a healthy rmb t, w Ide tors and detailed recornrnendetails of individual lifestyle mto ndu,,:, ersb'llnhlcalth p'olicies include a mulrifac" ," th t to ay s pu IC ea dations. The main point IS a id if d rationalize individual lifestyles, eted political technology of how to I ffecti y an gulating lifestyle diseases, 'I that is very e ecnve 10 re f but not necessan y one hensive technology or govThe gradual development of a more cohmpre ense of something else, The " lif I to be emerging ar t e exp , he i di erOlng I esty e seems. in terms of rationalizlOg t e 10 1histi d h techmques we see In ter more sop isucate t e h lth in a strict sense. In many if h I h seem to concern ea . ' vidual's 11e, t e ess t ese, 1reflections on motivation ,路 t rn mto very genera I I cases public hea It h po icies u" " f what it means to regu ate , h h listie strategy or Id psychology rat er t an a rea "0 Id ask why policies shou " ' practice ne cou ibl individual healt h b e h avror In, 'h hi obviously a ver y fiexi e h" . t let sense w en t IS IS I ' even concern" hea It 1I1 a s r f d ., w strategies and techno ogles ' h ocess 0 evismg ne term, It is on Iy 10 t e pr h h ception of health becomes so for regulating healthy lifestyles t ,at; eu~~: health programs, on the other O broad however. The success cntena h p , ' I prevalence of lifestyle dls, d fi d ding to t e statIstIca If hand are still e ne accor the four behaviora acrors , h I t'on's performance on b eases as well as t e popu a I 'Th dual disconnect erween d' t and exerCise, e gra , h of smoking, a Ico h 0,I Ie, bl tic because it undermmes t e , , d h Ith IS thus pro ema , d" lifestyle po Imcs an ea h blem of lifestyle ISeases, , b" s to counter t e pro ., d documents own am ItlOn I h "I lens of biopolmcs an govd the dua t eoretlca " I d" This chapter h as use h lex problems mvO ve 10 'f and analyze t e comp I k t ernmentality to magnl y" b" l't'cal problems, If one 00 sa I techniques to 10pO I I f I h "ces assigning governmenta " d'"d I "th respect to Ii esty e c 01 , " of the In IVI ua WI bl fit the different conceptions I "ndividual could reasona Y "" ' bvious that no rea I h h b for example, It IS qUite 0 h 'me It is not so muc t at pu " ' t t e sa me tI ' " " I "II into these different categones a h" h' imagine that lI1dlVldua 5 WI lic health programs set the bar to~ Ig , tl;~~se individuals are expected to h become incredibly healthy, but rat le rt la t sovereignty while being highly "fi ble to retam a b so u e be infinite Iy rna d I a , d' s at the same time. embedded in healthy everyday surro~n" In~ ve not been able to establish a Three decades of public health P~,ICIe~ "I~struments aimed at improving clear connection between the blopo Itlca I

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Larsen

The Birth of Lifestyle

healthy lifestyles and the underlying problem of lifestyle diseases. However, the reason for the persistent mismatch between lifestyle diseases and lifestyle politics lies not only in the choice of biopolirical strategy, but perhaps even more in the government of healthy lifestyles. Although one cannot separate biopolitics from govern mentality completely, the biopolitical ambition to reduce the incidence of major lifestyle diseases seems to lack a clear idea about how to get individuals to conduct a healthy lifestyle. A possible reason for the mismatch is that biopolirics was invented to counter the problem of scarcity, although not exclusively, while considerable parts of Western populations are now troubled by the opposite problems of overeating, overconsumption and excess convenience. On the other hand, governmental rationalities have developed quite substantially during the past 50 years, especially in the various critiques of existing governmentaliries.

It is mainly the state-phobic characteristics of contemporary governmentality that become an obstacle to improving lifestyle, because they force authorities to always drape their biopolitical interventions in the vocabulary of individual choice. The impact of governmental rationality on lifestyle policies appears to be almost exclusively negative. Health programs are clearly written against the backdrop of state-phobic critiques saying that state-based health policies have undermined the responsibility of both individuals and communities, but this generally leaves us in the dark about a positive alternative.

Returning to the broader question of governmentality, this case can be seen as testimony that state-phobic arts of government are not only found in the neoliberal attempts to implement market-like mechanisms in public management.

Common to both the neoliberal strategies and the use of governmental techniques in public health policy is a movement away from seeing the state as the general vehicle for regulating individuals.

It is quite paradoxical to lind such examples in what is in effect a set of highly centralized official government programs, but again this only underlines the analytical strength of the govern mentality perspective; it is able to see governing even where governments claim not to be able to do so. The statephobic turn of governmentalities since the 1970s makes it very diflicult to create a successful biopolitical government of lifestyle diseases, but perhaps it also makes it easier to hide the deficiencies of a governmental technology in the dense undergrowth of status indicators and monitoring devices.

NOTES I. The following

(1985).

2. For example,

argument

draws on the thorough

review by Coreil et al.

the editorial of the very first issue of the Journal of Public Health Policy was dedicated to the "Lifestyle Approach to Prevention," which is criticized for an ideology of blaming the victim and compared to the scapegoating of immigrants in the nineteenth century (1980). References such as these constitute a standard critique of lifestyle conceptions in the

ublic health community,

Politics

223

which critjciz~s ~?st publi~ health policies for

;educing lifestyle t%~~I~~:e::t~~~i~eywi~~~~~~v:d::;~7~~c~~ntroversial as he 3. In the .s~n:e dPerroblaming the victim, see previous note (}ot~ntal of Public was crtncize 0 . fl d i h policy documents Health Policy 1980: 6). This critique IS not re ecte In r e , however where his ideas are presented as matters of fact.

4. Quotations from Danish policy documents translated by author.

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I h d Human Services). (1990). Healthy People DHHS. (US Department of Hea t an 2000 Sudbury MA: jones and Bartlett.

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1954-1984,

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in Aes-

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Geneva: World Health Organization.

11 Biology, Citizenship an~ ~he Government of Biomedicme Exploring the Concept of Biological Citizenship Peter Wehling

cia I scientists that the rapidly evolving There is little controversy among so h wer to fundamemally transbi h logies possess r e po . , ' h. d biosciences an .lotec no. .. both collective and individual, WI~ 111 form social relations and Idenn.tles, . ses a number of questions ..

Y t this consensus rai bi I路 contemporary societies. ed' current debates on IOPO].

Iy answere In d which are being less unanimous f . ns 10 be adequately un er.

H these trans orrnauo b tics and biopower. aware .

I" I d cultural consequences e, , lik I ial po 11iCa an I stood what will their ley soc '. . of the new biotechno 0, f' the IInplementatlOl1 . and what regimes 0 govermng . ;:l W"th regard to such questions, gies and their social impacts wIl1Iem:~~e~lm~st simultaneously, begun ~o a number of scholars have fee.eot Y'. b en bioscience and SOCiety 111 . I ships et_ .. h. conceive of the dynarn ic re allan. . hi amely biological Citizens IP . ki d of ciuzens Ip, n F' terms of an emerging new In 05. Rose 2007a; Gibbon 2007; irzger(Perryna 2002; Rose and Novas 20 i ht 2009' Hughes 2009) or genetic Cit: aid 2008路 Flear 2008; Lora-WaInwr g d T "g 2004' Schaffer, Kuczynski , h R P an aUSSl , izensbip (Kerr 2003; Heat, ap ric way most of these concepand Skinner 2008). In a more or les~/:'~~~~:cialiry,'" which was introduced tual developments refer to the Idea h 1990s in order to denote new social

by Paul Rabinow (1996) during t ~ nature as culturally understood identities and practices refernng to umRan , 1999 2008; Gibbon and bl ( also a bInOW , .. and technically re-forma e see .. , enship is held to indICate new . I ' I genetiC cmz I Novas 2008).5ince blo oglCa or well as new relationships between ay forms of activism and SOCiality as d scientific experts, It IS Important social actors biomedical knowledge an lcepts might contribure to and , d 'I how these new COl d .. to explore in greater etal ernment of biome lCwe. 路 of the current gov d 'h med develop our understan 1O? enetic citizenship are use Wit so g rca While the concepts of blolog 1 or I thors in a very broad sense rhey . b h . dlVId ua au, .. . n what different meaOlngs Yt e I~ he articulation of claims to partlclp~t,lo are to be understood In. terms 0 t h ognition of certain IIldlvldua 5 or , . I d political iIfe and to t e rec 111 socIa an

226

Peter Wehling

groups' identities, expertise and specific needs based on their (supposedly) biological or genetic conditions. In particular, patient associations, mostly understood as biosocialities, are highlighted as important examples of the activities of biological and genetic citizens because they successfully challenge the demarcations between experts and lay people. While the novelty and importance of such phenomena are beyond doubt, what is surprising, still, is the emphasis placed on optimism and hope for better medical therapies and health care as key elements of biological/genetic citizenship: According to Deborah Heath et al. (2004: 152), genetic citizenship evolves in correspondence with an "ethics of care," whereas Nikolas Rose (2007a: 135) states that "contemporary biological citizenship operates within the field of hope." In addition, while they generally acknowledge that biological citizenship' is linked with responsibilities and obligations as well, many of the current accounts focus on the rights and opportunities presumably resulting from this new form of citizenship. However, since in this chapter I want to analyze the emergence of biological citizenship as a new element in the current governmental regime of biomedicine, it seems indispensable to explicitly address the obligations biological citizens confront (see also Kerr 2003) as well as the social contexts in which claims for biological citizenship are made and the potentially undesirable side-effects they might have. Thus, instead of straightforwardly taking biological citizenship as an evolving social reality, in this chapter Iwould like to ask a question similar to the one posed by Alan Irwin (2001: 4) with regard to the concept of scientific citizenship: how are "biological citizens" constructed within current social struggles, political debates and social science discourses? And how does the idea of biological citizenship contribute to contemporary forms of government?

In what follows, I focus on two closely related aspects of these issues. I point to some conceptual limitations and biases in current debates on biological citizenship, biosociality and biopolitics, and I argue that biological citizenship is not just another citizenship project promoting new rights for new categories of citizens but constitutes an arena in which both rights and obligations are negotiated and social identities reconfigured in often rather ambivalent ways. In the following section, I explore in greater detail how the concept of biological citizenship has emerged, how it has been understood in recent debates, and what conceptual ambiguities can be identified.

In section 2, I argue that biological citizenship and biosocialities are not simply based on "biology itself" but on scientific definitions of certain conditions as biological and genetic, with such definitions at least sometimes being keenly contested. Thus, the question arises of what is biological about biological citizenship. Given this background, I would like to demonstrate, mainly using the example of the Environmental Breast Cancer Movement in the USA, that the relations between patient groups and health movements on the one hand, and mainstream science, business firms and political institutions on the other hand are shaped by tensions and conAiets to a mueh greater extent than most accounts of biological citizenship suggest (section

Biology,

Citizenship

and the Government

of Biomedicine

227

3). Referring to recent debates around transplant medicine and orga~_rocurement, I would like to illustrate in section 4 ~ow new respon.sl I rues and moral duties of biological citizens emerge while at the same tune ne~ institutional arrangements such as markets for h~man or?ans are .propose within biopolitical and bioethical discourse. It IS sometlm ,:s claimed th~,t bi 1"' . entering an era 0 f optimiZatiOn, in the twenty-first century 10pO incs IS hi I d b This means that the or "enhancement" as it is termed III bioet rca e ates, . d use of biomedicine and biotechnologies no long~ Ste:e:: :~c~~~~~;:~t:r; -f . he therapy of diseases; IOstea , _ I It ever was, to t h h h body and its capaci. I I d. der to en ance t e uman increasing y emp oye m or d d" mal" or "natural." In h hi h t has been eeme nor d ties even beyon w at ~t er.o . . h ifc from therapy to enhancesection 5, I explore the ImpllcatlOn~ of this shi Does the latter "merely" ment for the concept of biologica t~lt:::~i~at;reatment for individuals or aim at unrestricted access to adequa d - - I de a more problem. f - diseases) Or oes It IOCU groups suffenng rom certain .

- - "healthy" bodies ib! oral duty-to opnrmze atic right-and POSSI Y even am_ I ar ue that we should understand and minds as well? In my conciuslOn'l _ gsa highly ambivalent key f h rive blOloglca CItizen a _ the emergence 0 t e ac IV I . e fostering and regulating element in the formation of a governmen~a regun the implementation of new biotechnologIes.

1. THE EMERGENCE

AND CONTOURS A NEW BIOPOLITICAL CONCEPT

OF

. sin the somewhat inAationary proliferIn recent years we have been witnes .g 2 Among these are, for instance, ation of citizenship concepts and proklects1'995) and "flexible cirizenship" -' h" (Kymhc a d bi I citizens "rnulticultura IP. f bi lirics biomedicine an 10(Ong 1999), or, closer to the ISsues ~_ ','~~~a~~e~feld 1992), "scientific technologies, "technological Cltlzens Ip I - hip" (Ecks 2008), and . . ." . 2001) " harmaceutlca cinzens . . . citizenship' (Irwin .,,' P Ido 2008). This pluralization of cinzen"therapeutic Citizenship (Cara - I f cr that claims to social h ncontrOVerSla a . . h ship concepts reflects t h e rat er u . . f social identities bot -- I - - ti nand recogl11tlon 0 d inclusion polirica parncrpa 10. d refer to citizens' nee s , d f the nation-state an d transgress the boun anes 0 f soci I heres (culture, science an iety 0 SOCIa sp __ I- and demands In a greater var d h "classic" triad of Civil, po 1f1I) beyon t e -d technology, health,sexua ity, erc' II 1950) Nevertheless, due to the rapl h cal and social citizenship (Mars a '. f the concept has become -h' I' s the meanlOg 0 hmultiplication of eltlzens Ip calm _ has recently remarked: "(C)itizens Ip "quite diffuse," as Andreas Fahrmelt h' . the nationality indicated by a h' g and not 109. has come to mean anyt III . bl' nd private contexts, entl_.

- hrs in vanous pu IC a - I d . lar political or SOCia or er, Passport , partiCIpatiOn fig .

1ttoapartiCU . " dement to benefits, COI11I11I_tmel II agues on univerSity campuses . tow a rcis one s co e even decent behaVior (Fahrmeir 2007: 1). l

228

Peter Wehling

Against this background, it is far from evident what the ideas of biological and genetic citizenship actually mean. Closer inspection of how and in what contexts these concepts have been used and defined therefore seems justified. According to Rose (2007a: 283-284, endnote 2), the notion of biological citizenship was introduced at the beginning of the twenty-first century almost simultaneously but with different accentuations by the anthropologist Adriana Petryna (2002) as well as by Carlos Novas and himself (Rose and Novas 2005). The related notion of genetic citizenship has been referred to by Anne Kerr (2003) in a rather critical perspective, and more systematically elaborated

by Heath et aJ. (2004). One can reasonably assume that the emergence of these novel concepts results from the growing importance of biomedical and genetic categories not only in medicine and health care, but also with respect to social identities and relations, to rights, responsibilities and claims for recognition. However, the question remains of how such a "biologization" and/or "geneticization" of social contexts is to be adequately understood and evaluated.

Petryna (2002), in her study of life politics in post-Soviet and postChemobyl Ukraine, understands biological citizenship in a historically, geographically and politically rather specific way. As she argues, the postsocialist Ukrainian state used the Chernobyl disaster and its consequences in order to support its claims to national autonomy and international political legitimacy by devaluing the former Soviet responses to the accident as insufficient and establishing new social welfare institutions for the affected population (Petryna 2002: 5). Given this background, she describes biological citizenship as "a massive demand for but selective access to a form of social welfare based on medical, scientific, and legal criteria that both acknowledge biological injury and compensate for it" (Petryna 2002: 6). Rose and Novas (2005) and Rose (2007a), by contrast, use the term in a wider sense in order "to highlight the ways that citizenship has been shaped by conceptions of specific vital characteristics of human beings, and has been the target of medical practices since at least the eighteenth century in the West" (Rose 2007a: 24).3 Given this long history of interrelations between politics, citizenship and biology, Rose identifies a recent shift in the social and political construction of biological citizenship (Rose 2007a: 131), arguing that the former obsession with eugenics and health of the national population has not simply come to an end but is increasingly being replaced by a concern with individual health and well-being within an "economy of hope" (Rose 2007a: 136). Thus we afe currently witnessing "the emergence of an innovative new ethics of biological citizenship and genetic responsibility.

Our somatic, corporeal, neurochemical individuality now becomes a field of choice, prudence, and responsibility" (Rose 2007a: 39-40).

Heath et al. (2004) link the emergence of genetic citizenship to the findings of the Human Genome Project and the subsequent "geneticization" of biomedical practices and popular perceptions.

As these authors argue,

Biology, Citizenship and the Government of Biomedicine

229

. . .' f" enetic governmentaliry" and "surely has genetic citizenship IS part 0 a g . t the individual level. Yet it the potential to call forth eugemc practlcfes a knowledge and em bod. . f new forms a power, ' is at the same time a site 0 d ibiliti "(Heath et al. . ..

I .h vel rights an responsl I Itles .' . ied discipline, a ong Wit no. .1 f the benefits of genetic cins 152). However, these authors pnman Y °dcu(Hon et al 158) remain rela. h d although mennone ea th . , .. d zenship; t e angers, h .... ecisely the breaching of divi es tively unexplored.'

They argu~ r ~t '~'S :~r scientific, medical and politibetween the genetically disor e~e a~.~ f 'genetic citizenship'" (Heath cal allies that beckons us to deve op .h e I rh 0 elves remark the examples h as the aut Drs t ems , et al. 156). F urt ermore,. .. shi the give in their paper "all concern Y of the emergence of genetic cJtJzen ~ (H th er al 165) and rhe acnvi. I e disor ders ea " h extremely rare sing e-gen I f s on supporting researc to . fOUpS consequent y DCU . .. ties 0 f sue h patient g h I 162). The notion of genetic ernfind "their" respective genes (Heat etha. pecific needs of a relatively f to refer to t every s zenship there ore appears d. d d" patients' and parenrs' groups small number of "genetically ,lsor ere . te medical treatment for all rather than to a universalist c1alm to appropn;s Nevertheless, Heath and humans affecred by diseases an d ImpaJ[metn en' ship for us all" (Heath er . f f "genetic CI IZ f her colleagues argue In avor 0 h id pread and chronic diseases 0 " h extent that t e WI es . b . al. 166), because to t e. . I d toed to have a genetic asis, 'advanced civilization' are increasing Y uhn ers 165-166) Heath and cols'" (Hear et al . . f we all have 'screena bl e uture he nri t be paid for such an extend snrnate t e pnce 0 . f leagues thus seem to un. er,e hi uestionable geneticizatlon 0 . hi h Id consist In a far-reac ing, q storr, w IC wou ."

5 . diseases, conditions and Identlt~~s4) biological citizenship is both individAccording to Rose (2007a. , h d individuals are increasmgly ualizing and collectivizing.

On the one an , Ith and illnesses, not only ib! f rheir own h ea . expected to be responsi e or d. b r Iso to their statistical genetic hei h . I bo. ies u a hip is seen as closely lin . k e d to with respect to r err p ysica I .. b'ologlca cmzens . I d h h risks. On the ot er an ,I. . . s) understood as socia . ., "( h s patient assoCiatlOn , , . new "biOSOClahtles sue ~ .' b dna shared somatiC or genetic . . d II t've Identities ase 0 ·d . "df eommunttles an co ec I . . I' biologization of I entity 1'bes b,osocJa Ity as a d e) status. Rabinow d eSCfl . f the West (gen er, age, rae ferent from the older biological caltegones °lable and re-formable" (Rabi., d d as inherent Y mampu . . espein that It IS un erstoo .' f t"ve biological CItIzens are now 1999: 13).' What is constitutive ~:.~ ;2007a: 144-147) emphasizes, cially such forms of bioSOCiahty, as .. h·p is put on a level With · I ' I or genetic citizens If· e b and frequently looglca db·· I community (see or Instanc .

I net base 10SOCIa participation to an nter . .

Schaffer et al. 2008: 155). . 10 ical or genetic citizenship differ In Although these accounrs of blO g "emphasis on rransformah y have In common an k . k f sterimportant respects, t e K critically rernar s, [IS S 0 tion" (Kerr 2003: 44) which, as An~e err The crucial point is not that ts ing a selective view of current deve.op~~~p~litiCS will simply return, but older forms of eugenics and coerCive I

230

Peter Wehling

Biology, Citizenship and the Government of Biomedicine

that, in line with biological

citizenship and biosocialiry, a new governmental regime is emerging in which biological identities might be ascribed to or imposed on individuals or groups, new forms of inequality and discrimination might develop, and freedom of choice might subtly be transformed into an obligation

to act as an active, responsible

and prudent

biological citizen."

2. WHAT IS BIOLOGICAL

ABOUT

BIOLOGICAL

CITIZENSHIP?

"biosocia lity" suggest that citizenship claims and emerging communities are based on Implicitly

at least, the terms

"biological

citizenship"

and

biological realities shared by certain individuals or groups, However, what often appears to be underestimated are the implications of the fact that such supposed biological or genetic realities are not uncontroversially given, but defined, constructed and ascribed by the biosciences and their specific "styles of thought". This holds true regardless of whether or not the affected individuals and groups themselves welcome such definitions and ascriptions (for instance, because they provide them with better therapies or exempt them from stigmatization). Of course, there are many instances where the biologizarion or geneticization of specific conditions is entirely uncontested and may have highly beneficial outcomes for those affected, An impressive example of such a process of social inclusion and recognition due to the specification of genetic disease causes is given by Michel Calion and Vololona Rabeharisoa (2008: 232-249), referring to the French association of patients with muscular dystrophy.

However, there are many other cases where bioscientific claims are highly ambiguous and questionable.

Consider the example of shyness. Should we understand it, as recent biomedical research suggests, as a biological and even congenital condition, resulting from a chemical imbalance in the individual brain which is hardly distinguishable from psychiatric disorders such as Social Anxiety Disorder and preferably to be treated with antidepressants (see for instance Bandelow 2007)? Or is shyness, by contrast, primarily a social role and identity emerging from and being negotiated in social interactions, as social scientists have argued (McDaniel 2003; Scott 2007)? Does biomedical research actually reveal the truth about shyness or is it part of a wider dynamics, driven not least by the economic interests of pharmaceutical companies in medicalizing a widespread and normal pat~ tern of human behavior (e.g., fear of speaking in public settings)? The latter view has convincingly been substantiated

by Ray Moynihan and Alan Cassels (2005) and Christopher Lane (2007), drawing on extensive evidence from the history of psychiatry as well as recent advertising campaigns blur~ ring the boundaries between shyness and Social Anxiety Disorder. Never~ theless, there are presumably a lot of shy people who welcome and accept biomedical explanations because these enable them "to accOunt for their

231

behavior in terms of illness rather than social deviance, which exonerate~ rhem from moral blame" (Scott 2007: 157): Others, however, oppose sue a medicalization of their behavior and feel mgs. They II1SISton th~ strtc~l~ social character of shyness, resist the moral pressure to overcl?,m(; t ness and "demand their right to be seen as dlfferenr but equa cott , 166) It would be mistaken, then, to understand shy people and s~lf~help grou~s straightforwardly as biosocial communities. By contr~s~,w at IS ~t issue is recisely the question of whether and to what extent It I: appropriate to re-define shyness in biological and medical terms, thus tacitly affirm-

el~~oj,

ing (and naturalizing) cultural norms of assertiveness and s~lf~~;j~eSss(~~I~ in neo-libera l Societies srnce t e t h at h ave b ecome dominant McDaniel 2003 for a cultural history of shyness). r ' , tty, A similar argument can b e rnade with regard to (male) homosexua d I tS C d (2007' 97-113) remarks, there are recent eveopmen , As Peter ,onra,' ir-h rni hr affect the demedicaliz ation of not least In genetic research, which m g , S' the early 1990s hi d I f w decades ago, mce , homosexuality ac ieve on y a e I ' f homosexuality have ' I d t' larly genetic exp anauons 0 I bio ogica an par ICU , h retended discovery of what was termed re-emerged, c,~lmmatmg ~ ~ s:i~nrificaIlY contested, attracted broad pubthe "gay gene which, tho g k 2001) Although the geneticizanon of lie attention (Conrad and Mar ens b : le "revival" of older medical homosexuality would of ~ourse not de a ~l~Pto some possible dangers in and psychiatric explanations, dConr~ b~om s or genes for sexual orientane the future: "Should a valid an vert ad e gbel ressure in some quarters for , be id if d h ight be cons: era e p (Jon e I enti e ,t ere m der i ed medicalization of homogenetic testing, which could engen er ~ncreasination of pregnancies or, if sexuality. Such testing might lead toht :dtermd ", (Conrad 2007: 109), ic th . s for C e isor er ever available, genetic t erapie d I bi mmunities that comprehend , h y gay an es Ian co . I ' I Again, t ere are man, ir and herefore welcome bio ogica , h r n inborn t ra rt an t . I ' I their omosexua ity as a, f hi is that reference to bio ogica ' 0 f the rnam reasons or r IS I b '/ exp 1ananons, ne 0 I' ' h Id to underline its ullchangea I ~ . .. f homosexua ICy IS e . an d genetic ongms 0 ..' .

II as resisting the conservative 'I" I nghts claims as we , ity, thus f aCI 'tatlng CIVI bl I disorder Indeed, as opm~ 路 .s a treara e menta .

IIty I belief that homosexua ", h b' 10g'Icai origins of hOl11o~ , d' 'd I b lIevll1g 10 t e 10 ion polls suggest, In 'VI ua s e , 'I rights claims (Conrad 2007: sexuality are more likely to support gdaYIClbVl communities there are also 'h' h yan es ,an f 110).' Nonerheless, Wit In t e ga , otivated nor leasr by fears 0 " b' I 'cal explanatIOns, m I ' strong objections to 10 ogl . . . of more genera Impor. t these ent1es stress is .

O ne POlO, remedicalization, 'I' stances biological and genetic . n hlstonca CIrCUm, . I d tanee: at least un er certal .' h foster precisely those essenna 't nd behaVior mIg t b'l' d f h models 0 uman tral sa 'd" that recent queer, disa I ny, an , , f' d fixed I entities f ' 1st notions a given ~n. sou ht to subvert (see, or II1stanCe, parrly also citizenship studies have g , Butler 1991 2006; Isin and Turner 2008). 'tl'cisI11s of geneticizatlon , " gumentrocfl .

There is a famIliar c?unter-ar da has mostly overcome genetic which claims rhat genetic research to y

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Peter Wehling

determinism and essentialism and increasingly accounts for complex interactions between genetic and environmental factors. While this might be true on a very general level, what can be observed in more concrete instances is rather what Adam Hedgecoe (2001) has termed the narrative of "enlightened geneticization."

Referring to the example of schizophrenia, he uses this term to describe an explanatory strategy which on the one hand stresses the multifactorial causation of diseases or disorders, yet on the other hand subtly prioritizes genetic causes over environmental ones by ascribing to the former the status of a "baseline," of the "only single necessary condition of causation" while non-genetic factors are considered non-specific and contingent (Hedgecoe 2001: 885)-" One consequence of this explanatory model is to focus further research primarily on the supposed genetic causes, particularly since these are held to be more accessible to scientific investigation than environmental and other factors. Thus, while conferring a central causal role to genes seems to facilitate the successful production of presumedly useful and exploitable knowledge (Rouvroy 2008: 41), it tacitly and unwarrantedly transforms diseases caused by a wide range of factors into "genetic diseases." Or, as Hans-jorg Rheinberger and Staffan MullerWille (2009: 29-30) have put it, the easier epistemological accessibility of genetic factors tends to be transformed into an ontological primacy. At the same time, the strategy of enlightened geneticizarion creates so-called "susceptibility genes" as well as individuals who are deemed "genetically at risk" and possibly faced with new responsibilities with regard to prevention, reproduction and life-style (Hallowell 1999; Shakespeare 2003; Lemke 2004). Making genetic citizenship claims or engaging in "biosocial" activities from such a starting point, however, seems to give too much credit to questionable biomedical explanatory models (see Lock 2008).

Obviously, there are no simple answers to the questions of what is biological about biological citizenship and what is genetic about genetic citizenship. These questions are contested and negotiated in both scientific and political arenas, and reference to biological factors may occasionally be motivated by mainly strategic concerns, as the example of homosexuality suggests. While explanations of certain conditions in biological and medical terms may often be helpful for the affected groups, there are other cases in which, by contrast, claims to citizenship rights are based on questioning and rejecting biomedical models.

3. PATIENT GROUPS: BIOSOCIAL OR POLITICAL MOVEMENTS?

COMMUNITIES

In an illuminating article, Phil Brown and colleagues have identified three types of health social movements: first, "Health Access Movements" which seek equitable access to health care; second, "Embodied Health Movements," which address disease, disability, or illness experience by

233

" "I di gnosis treatment, and prechallenging established sC1enc~ on ~t~ 掳rt~ ~~vemen~s" addressing health vention; third, "Constltuencyase ea" ch as race ethnicity gender, " d" iry based on categortes su , ' I inequa Iity an inequi n et al. 2008: 522-523).'1 While al class or sexuality differences b(BtOW d as claiming citizenship rights d f merits can e un ersroo h t ese types 0 move. . h care it remains unclear to what extent in the realms of medicine and healt , . d whether these rather dif. I' b ilr on biology or genetics an . I their c alms are til " d in terms of emerging biosocia equally be inrerprete I Ih ferent movements can . d h these different types of hea t ..

0 n assume mstea ,t at "" communities. ne ca " I" to science and biomedicine. . ather different re atlons . movements engage In r or opposing associations In . I b died health movements, . f In particu ar, em 0 1 , ear to be critical of the definitions 0 Rabeharisoa and Calion s terms, app B onrrast health access move. db ainstream science Yc , disease promote y m .' f quently though of course not .,. / r aSSOCiatiOns) re, I ments (ot auxi iary partne . . hi blished biomedical researcn k t attention Wit In esra I d' necessarily, see to artrac d. h apies for hitherto neglected ISparadigms, for instance by deman fil~J ;'t~:ir" genes (d. Heath er al. 2004: eases or by supporting research to

162-164).

f biological citizenship and biosoMost of the contemp?rar~tc~~u~;~l~haccess movements; yet, in order ciality seem to focus pnman Y I. hi s between patient groups and h h omplex re anons 'P . b d to fully com pre en d t e c I look at constltuencyase ... di sable to have a c oser . biomedicine, It IS In ispen II embodied health movements. Constltuhealth movements and, above fa II' . hree characteristics (Brown et al. hi I ate the 0 OWing t . tive 0 f t IS atter type . h biolo ical body to social movements, 2008: 524): First, they Introduce t e g. of people who have the . . f he embodied expenence . . Ik I particularly In terms 0 t ablished scientific and biornedica nowdisease; second, they challenge e;t (2006) and Brown (2007) have termed al edge and pr-actice or, as Brown e . d. ". nd third they often Involve id iologica! para igrn j anu, " it the "dominant epi em: .' "treatment prevention, , . ith scientists in pursumg , h activists collaborating WI. b di d health movements seem to s are di 12 While em 0 Ie .' h f d research, an un mg. .' ith h er health movements, It ISt e secthe first and third charactensticS Wit ot d h . es the terms "biological hem different an t at glv . k ond aspect that rna es t fl 've and critical mean 109. citizenship"

and "biosociality" a more rehex.1 haps the most significant looking at w at IS pet C d b This can be illustrate Y . h Environmental Breast and路 d h Ith movement. t e . I . example of an embo Ie ea d during recent decades, main Y 10 cer Movement (EBCM) that has emerge I 2006' Brown 2007: 43-99) . . k I 2003' Brown et a ., f I the USA (McCormlc et a . , . "works towards our goa s: 007 44) thiS movement fb According to Brown (2 :, f "al environmental causes 0 reast o 1) to broaden public awareness potentl I causes of breast cancer; " h IOto envlronmenra cancer 2) to mcrease researc "ntal causes of breast can, . I revent envlronme h' h 3) to create policy that mig 1t p.. .. rch" Pointing to Ig er"" t clpanon 111 resea " h eer路 4) to increase aCtlVlst par I " certain US regions sue as , . 'dence rates In ( f than-average breast cance~ mCI nd Cape Cod, Massachusetts c .

Long Island, the San FranCISCO Bay Area, a

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Peter Wehling

McCormick er al. 2003: 551-563), the EBCM has contested the dominant biomedical model in cancer research that focuses on "individual-level factors such as diet, exercise, age at first parity, and genetic make-up" (Brown 2007: 47).13 This movement explicitly challenges the priority given to genetic factors in recent cancer research (Brown 2007: 65-67), and stresses instead the influences on human organisms of environmental factors such as industrial chemicals or pesticides in food. The EBCM thus transforms the ideas of genetic or biological citizenship insofar as it grounds political action and demands for focused research not simply on "the biology" of affected women, not on assumed genetic baselines "inside" the women's bodies, but on their "toxic exposures" (Brown 2007) to a harmful environment as the primary cause of disease. We can understand such movements as "biosocialities" only in a modified, extended way, since they link the bodily experience of disease with external social and environmental influences; thus, their sociality does not result from a shared internal biological factor such as the BRCA 1 or 2 genes or the "chromosome 17, locus 16,256, site 654,376 allele variant with a guanine substitution" Rabinow (1996: 102) refers to in his definition of biosociality. To put it differently, citizenship claims as made by the EBCM and similar movements are indeed based on the biological body and on demands for participation in research and research policies; yet, at the same time, they oppose and resist the dominant "biologizarion" and "geneticization" of both research priorities and conceptions of disease. And insofar as new individual or collective identities arise out of embodied health movements, these are political rather than biological or genetic identities (McCormick er al. 2003).

Nevertheless, in many cases, in particular with regard to supposedly single-gene orphan diseases, it seems entirely justified that patient associations focus on genetics and demands for targeted research. One should not, however, underestimate the problematic side-effects which such a focus might still have. First, even if the "gene for ... " is identified, this does not necessarily mean that successful prevention or therapies can be developed. This is the case, for instance, with the "mono-genetic" Huntington's Disease, let alone more complex diseases such as breast cancer or Alzheimer's Disease.

With regard to therapies for the latter, Margaret Lock (2008: 62) sums up the situation by saying that for the near future "no straightforward solution is in sight," and dismisses the optimism propagated by genetic research. In such cases an exclusive research focus on genetics seems to be not very producrive, but simultaneously, by offering testing for "susceptibility genes," ir expands the number of the "pre-symptomatic ill" who might be subject to social discrimination.

A second undesirable effect of "high-tech medicine" focusing on genetics has been pointed out by Tom Shakespeare.

As he argues, "investment in genetics may not be the most cost-effective way to improve overall quality of life" for disabled people, particularly not On a global level (Shakespeare 2005: 93-94). Instead, "(b)etter social support, housing and education may contribute more to the quality of life

Biology, Citizenship and the Government of Biomedicine

235

(Shakespeare 2005: 92).14 Recently: BiIl Hughes there is a bifurcation within d,s~bIlltJ ,~~[I~1Sm model stalwarts" on the o~e han ,an 100glgroups" on the other: while the former support f . I d' ' , ti not an iIIness but a resuhlt 0 soclla d,scre'dm'clnaal ~~~ " mbrace t e specia rzc m I b the latter, y contra~t, e "' diti '" nd "assume that

than medical rrearments" (2009) even argued that into what he terms "social ., " "bl'osocl'al ca I citizens or the view that disability is and exclusion,

s~ientifie" kno~ledge as~o~ia~:~o;\~e~~i~~ a~~ne~~;~~\ivea action" (Hughes biology IS an irnporran as ",. s for ado ting a quesdi I' " 2009路 679) Hughes criticizes the biological citizen . . f f h I y and me rca SCIence tionable "optimism about rhe bene ,IS 0 rec no og (H hes 2009. 680). which is not common among all disability actlvlst~e o~;rstated H'ughes' While the opposition

between

the rwo ca~~se~:;

argument rightly jPofindtstob.tlhe te;~~~t biomedical mode 0 isa I ity a

:s ~erween

between

a so~ial and a

the different

forms of

activism

arising from these models. eneral problemaric aspect id ' t uch upon a more g , These consi eranons 0 bi I ' I irizenship and biosociality: ItS within the current discourse on 10 ?gIC abcI,l of human nature, or "life" . .' of the mampu aI I I ty , potential overestimation . b . R for instance emphasizes I I genetIC asis. ose, ' in genera, I on a rna eeu ar,.

V' lit is understood as inhering in prethat biology "is no longer destiny.

I~a I y olecules capable of 'reverse cise, describable technical relations etween m ", (Rose 2007a: 40). But , d : "I of 're-englneerlng engineering an In ~nnclp e destin for some people, either because what if biology continues to be hei y ditions are I'usr nor ones rhar can . ies f 'I b cause t err can I I . genetic therapies ai or e I I P Against this background, claims be "re-engineered" on the molec~tr s~';;'uid be re-embedded within wider to biological or genetic cinzens ,P , eIl as of whar could be termed political contexts of glo~al SOCIal jusnce, port in everyday life. "health care citizenship including sOCIa P

t::

4. RIGHTS WITHOUT OBLIGATIONS? THE CASE OF ORGAN DONATION , say that biological citizenship On the basis of the previous sections, we ca~ f novel rights but rather ear less sranc set a . f d is not be understoo as a m~r d of Iinclusion and exclusion 0 ".

-I nke processes f as a set of open an d inter If' ing social identities, and 0 ere. '.

"K 2003路 45) 0 re-negotlatl b d individuals (err . '" b I new obligations. Even eyon , I orrurunes ut a so " b atIng not on y new opp ho have by genetic resting, een the responsibilities attributed to pers~ns w n'd heighrened risks, faridentified as "carriers" of suseeptIbl I~y ~ene.s 3 obligations of biologi, d erhaps InStitUllOn al , I reaching moral duties an , P , d' t future. In this section, , . rhe not-toO- Isran I d cal citizens might emerge In, d I t which has in part a rea y ble eve opmeo. , briefly illustrate suc h a pass I donation and procurement begun, with regar d to recen t debates on organ for transplant

medicine.

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Peter Wehling

The case of organ procurement is only one part of a broader tendency in current and future biopolirics to increasingly draw attention not only to the individual person and her or his "complete" body, but also to the collection and, indeed, commodification of isolated parts and elements of rhe human body such as cells, blood, DNA, tissues, organs, bones and so on. The human body is thus "depersonalized" (Sharp 2007) and transformed into what Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell (2006) have termed "biovalue", at present, the value on the US market of all parts of a human cadaver is an estimated $250,000 (Keller 2008: 11). Against this background, individuals are confronted with an ambiguous situation and role: while, on the one hand, their health and well-being is, perhaps even more than ever, the aim of biomedicine, their bodies are increasingly perceived as a sort of "container" of scarce and valuable biological materials.

This ambiguity and some of its possible consequences become sharply visible when we look at recent institutional efforts to increase the number of human organs available for transplant surgery. As is well known, the demand for such organs (kidneys, hearts, livers etc.) by far exceeds the supply. Thus, while this situation is dramatic for those in need of an organ to improve their quality of life or even to save their lives, on the other hand nobody should be forced to donate an organ, neither living nor after death, and of course nobody can claim a right to parts of another person's body.

Given this background, we can observe a remarkable shift in bioethical discourse away from individual rights and choices towards emphasizing the individuals' moral duties to collective goods and interests'S as well as various proposals for new institutional arrangements (among them regulated markets) aiming at an increase in organs for transplantation.

I would like to briefly illustrate these tendencies with reference to a recent statement on organ donation by the German National Ethics Council (Nationaler Ethikrat). The council considered the lack of human organs for transplant medicine a serious and urgent problem in Germany and, to remedy this situation, it argued for a new legal arrangement according to which every citizen would be requested to explicitly declare whether they agreed or disagreed with organ extraction from their bodies after death. While, of course, nobody would be forced to donate or deliver the requested statement, all those who, for whatever reasons, did not express their will, should in case of death be regarded and treated as if they had given theit consent to organ extraction.

Strikingly, the principle of informed consent, so far a kind of "sacred cow" of medical ethics, is substantially weakened by this proposal. Against the background of high rates of general agreement in public opinion polls with organ donation in Germany, the absence of explicit individual dissent is straightforwardly understood by the Council as "presumed consent" and eventually tteated as fully equivalent to active consent. It is illuminating to read the rationale the Council gives for its proposal: "In view of the possibility of helping a fellow human being in the extreme distress of a serious illness effectively and with good prospects

237

cannot be a matter left entirely to the refusal to donate organs _ - C '12007' 33). h - di id I" (German National Ethics cunei . f discretion 0 t e In IVI ua _. ral dut of any individual to What is establIshed by such claims ISha m 0 bYy making available to h h t tially all ot er umans, help other umans, po en _ I' body And at least in hi d enc or even IVlOg . them part~ ,of ?er or. IS ca .av ifies weakening the principle of informed the Council S View, this duty Just h the Council's recommendation consent. It has to be added, h~w~~;~atn atolitical actors, who argued that was rejected by the rnajorrty 0 . PII be interpreted as agreement. di t may not automatlca Y -f lac k 0 f Isagreemen at least as yet a shi t III -I' h s appears [0 express, '. .

The Counci s statement t U h h - political and institutional bi h' I discourse rat er t an In f mainstream ioet lea h . s however the principle 0 G I some or er cou ntr te , ' practices In ermany. n . d ,,- I ally establIShed. "presume consent IS ,eg ber of bioerhicisrs argue for an even more An apparently growing num har " he majority of organs that would contentious solution to the ptoblem t at \ ted" (Cohen 1995: 137), be suitable fot transplantation arke not alrve~ by the individual nationh . f organ mar ets regu arc h namely t e creation 0 1995' Ta lor 2005). Proponents of sue a states (see fO,r msta~ce ,Cohen an~ial rncentives for potential donors or market solution maintain that fin Id b more effective and efficient than the relatives of deceased persons wou e f h man organs." Apart from l .

- asing the supp yOu alternative options 10 mere .' orally permissible or even f whether or not It IS m the fundamenta I question 0 b d and to sell and buy its parts, imperative to commodify theffhuman h 0 Yard to biological citizenship and ortant e ect Wit reg .

I f there wou Id b e an Imp Id b -mposed on SOCIal re anons 0 . . k t model wou e supen - I biosociality: a mar e "sense Iin that every donor IS a so a if . M I Mauss sense I f reciprocity and gl t 10 arce __ ddressed as potential vendors 0 - I ., ) biological CitiZens, a k t potentia reCipient; f d .nto participants In a mar e . kid Id be trans orme I . d I one of the.lr I ~eys, wou d to follow an economic logic; an mora where their choices are expecte f d - t economic freedom to sell Id be trans or me 10 0 _ I I or political autonomy wou I ble social groups, partlCu ar y In omically vu nera h or not. As a resu It, econ f d by poverty to forego t elf - h b t d or even orce poor countries, mig ~ e temp e ibl tonomous decision, undergo a surbodily integrity and, 10 an osten St IYIau _ al progress remains risky, and . h' h despite a med lC , gical interventlon w IC , es 2006)Y sell an organ (d. Scheper-Hugh . der to demonstrate that, once or I use the example of otgan donation IOh . ht be followed by novel . h b sed on biology, t ey mig b d citizenship ng ts .are a "sim le" fact that every humal: 0 Y conobligations resultlOg from the _ I t~at mi ht help to save the life of others tains valuable biologICal matena s f g h -ndividual's will and chOice I-t of life Inso arast el G or to improve their qua I y . . h h- obligation as the erman . b par Wit t IS , . is held to be unlikely to e on a _ t-tutional arrangements 10 gov-I suspects new Ins I . d- -d I's National Ethics C ounCI 'hh -ther restrict the 10 IVI ua 路 . ht emerge w IC el -' h eening human bo d les mig d t") or transform It 111(0 t e f "presu me consen h . autonomy (as in t h e case 0 . .

T be sure, the point ere IS ambiguous freedom of market participants.

0

of success,

1

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Peter Wehling

Biology, Citizenship and the Government of Biomedicine

not that it is entirely unjustified or unnecessary to increase the number of organ donations; what deserves critical scrutiny, however, is how this task is addressed and what institutional forms and power relations will be esrablished by such efforts.

5. BIOLOGICAL

CITIZENSHIP

IN AN ERA OF ENHANCEMENT

As Rose (2007a: 6) rightly points out, in the twenty-first century biomedicine and biopolirics will no longer be confined to the preservation of health but will increasingly address the objective of optimizing and enhancing the human body. In a way, this tendency towards enhancement has always been Jnheren~ In Foucault's notions of biopolitics and biopower; but in the near future, It seems, biopolirics will be able to mobilize more powerful scientific and technological means than ever before, such as genetics, brain research, neuropharmacology, nanotechnology etc., to achieve the goal of Improving the capacities of the human body and mind. In this section, I would like to sketch the effects on the meaning of biological citizenship and on the rights and duties of biological citizens that the move from therapy to enhancement is likely to have. Since this shift is blurring supposedly clear-cut demarcations between health and illness, therapy and enhancement, the question arises of whether the future rights (and obligations) of biological CItizens can be, and should be, restricted to therapeutic aims or exp.a.nded ~~ the 0.ÂŁ optimization. In Rose's view, any attempts at a politics of e~~ugh, which hopes to call a halt to the perfectioning of the human body. IS both histor icajiy naive and ethically wistful, yearning for a past that exists only In the imagination" (Rose 2007a: 21). . This rather harsh verdict is itself not without problems; this applies especially to ItS Inherent consequence that biological citizenship should also e~1tad claims ~nd rights to the improvement of one's body that are, in princip]e, unrestricted.

Although the boundaries between health and illness therapy and optimization have, of course, never been drawn unarnbiguously, the question remains of whether we should completely abandon such demarcations even as regulative ideas, admittedly provisional and fuzzy, but helpful for discriminating between different types of biomedical intervennon with different legitimations and legitimacies. First there are ethical considerations, in a Foucauldian sense rather than in the sense of mainstream bioethics, that oppose such a complete abandonment: would it be a t~uly promising ~uture perspective to enter an "enhancement society" which would be driven by quasi-religious, "transhurnanisr" demands for the relentless perfectioning of human physical Or mental capacities? Secon~, a ,CitIzenship right to enhancement may quickly turn into a moral obligation and a more or less direct social pressure: if everybody enhances their performance, for instance in order to improve their employability on labor markets, how can an individual resist and refrain from such practices

re~!m

239

without running the risk of falling behind? And, with regard to the moral responsibilities the individuals might confront in an enha~cemen,r sOC1,e~y, consider the following statement recently made by the prominent bioethicisr Julian Savulescu: "Once technology affords us the power to enhance our own and out children's lives, to fail to do so would be to be responsible for the consequences. ( ... ) To fail to improve [the children's] physical, rnusical, psychological, and other capacities is to wrong them, Just as It would be to harm them if we gave them a toxic substance that stunted or reduced these capacities" (Savulescu 2007: 529). If such moral standards were to become generally accepted, then biological citizens' autonomy and freedom of choice would turn out to be an empty promise. A third objection to a right to enhancement comes from considerations of global social justice.

Even today, health care and biomedical research appear to be focused moi e on life-style phenomena such as the pharmaceutical therapy of erectile dysfunction than on providing simple cures for those dlsease~ fr?m ~hlCh,a large number of people in poor countries die every day. This disparity will increase in the near future, as the market for life-style medicine and profitable enhancement technologies continues to expand in Western countnes.

Given the apparently growing support for the use of enhancement technologies (sec for instance Greely et al. 2008), a more critical and reflective view of these issues seems appropriate (see Wehling 2008). Although It IS true that neither enhancement nor the will to enhancement are new (Rose 2007a: 20), this does not mean that they are simply a natural phenomenon; in fact both are constructed and shaped by discursive, political and tech. I d . . I ding the qualification of certain human conditions, mea ynamrcs, inc u " fie: " dm i traits and behaviors (such as aging, shyness or sleep) as de cient :n h need of biomedical improvemenr.18 It is therefore lmpor:a,nt to as w at kind of society will emerge as both the result and the driving force of the continuous management and enhancement of one's health and capa~Jt1e~; even beyond what we have been used to consider "natural" and "sufficlen~~_ Against this backdrop the question of limits to the dynamics of enhan , . . past and It IS not ment is neither naive nor simply a return to an Imaginary ,, I" . .

I' b II a political one Ultimate y, It IS a purely normative question. t IS, a ave a , . " d I . f h ther and to what ends we should believe In an comp y h t e question 0 w e 1'ÂŁ b h bout by with powerful and seductive promises of a "better Ie roug r a medical and pharmaceutical interventions.

II

6. CONCLUSION:

BIOLOGICAL

CITIZENSHIP

AND GOVERNMENTALITY In the revious sections, I have argued that biological citizenship is a bot~ hi hi Pambivalent and flexible element within the contemporary govern_ g y hi hi' an element which Slmultane menr of biomedicine and iotec no ogres, .'

I' rs of ously encompasses individuals' rights and obhgatlons, t reir prospec

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Peter Wehling

improving their quality of life and the risk that they will become subject to social pressure and discrimination.

Constituted by heterogeneous discourses and practices, the idea of biological citizenship is socially constructed and negotiated in quite different, contested ways. While in many instances making biological citizenship claims may have beneficial effects for previously marginalized or excluded individuals or groups, in some cases the biologization or geneticization of rights, responsibilities, conditions, social identities and communities may lead to undesirable consequences and new forms of stigmatization or even exclusion.

By critically reviewing the current debates on biological citizenship and biosociality, one becomes aware that these debates have so far primarily concentrated on health access movements and single-gene disorders. This focus seems to be closely connected with the rather optimistic hope that biomedical research will not only be able to identify the genetic causes of most diseases, but will at the same time develop effective therapies so that biology would indeed no longer be destiny. As Rabinow recently remarked in a rather sceptical account of the (short) history of the concept of biosociality, such expectations were shaped by the enthusiastic climate of the 1990s which he retrospectively terms the "Golden Age of Molecular Biosociality", "There was hope, there was progress, there was a reason to be urgent even stridentthere were reasons to want to be biosocial" (Rabinow 2008: 190). Obviously, the hopes pinned on biomedicine and biosocialiry have only partly been realized; as Rabinow admits, "the hopes and hype of the genomic decade have failed to provide adequate diagnostic or risk assessment tools or treatments based on them" (Rabinow 2008: 192). Thus, some of the limits of the concepr of biosociality can now be seen "with more clarity" (Rabinow 2008: 191). Biosociality is therefore to be understood, Rabinow argues, as a heuristic concept rather than as "an epochal designation meant to characterize an age or era" (Rabinow 2008: 191). The same characterization might apply to the concepts of biological and genetic citizenship (at least in the way they are used in current debates): although coined several years later than biosociality, they still seem to be influenced by the optimistic attitudes and expectations symptomatic of the "genomic decade."

One important conclusion to be drawn from this historization is that we should refrain from normative understandings of biological and genetic citizenship as inherently emancipatory concepts. Instead, these concepts are better used as tools within an analytics of government.

Particularly in an era of biotechnological optimization, the (self-)definition of conditions and identities in biological terms and the active management of genetic risks and susceptibilities appear to be governmental rationalities (Dean 1999: 176) more or less subtly acting on the conduct of individuals or social communities. It is important therefore to bear in mind that citizenship claims have a significant political dimension insofar as they are intended to challenge dominant forms and technologies of power and exclusion. In the case of biological citizenship, to express this political dimension may frequently,

Biology, Citizenship and the Government of Biomedicine and seemingly problems

paradoxically,

imply resisting

the biologization

241

of social

and identities.

NOTES 2007 136) I will use biological citizenship as 1. Hereafter, following Ros~ ( 1 di a: '" itizenship and employ the latter the more general concept inc u l.n? genetic Cl .

Y ~;:~~~~s.see (sin and Turner 2002; term only when the fOficulsdis efxI:JI.lcItIh<?pn 2. For overviews of the e 0 cmzens I ,

Isin, Nyers and Tu.rner ~008.. . .' ose (2007a) is a modified and 3. The chapter on biological citizenship ~7tt~n b Rose and Novas (200S); ( extended version of an earlier paper W R Y2007 131 154) refer prim.arily t? the m,?re r~centuve:~~~~"{(';as~sSig,~~pp a~d H~ath 2003), 4. In an earlier article on f1exlbld:ta~led account of the ambiguit.ies and conthe same authors ga~e a mo~e Id d the related practices. In rbeir tradicrions inherent In genetIC knolw e Agean. " (LPA) a self-help organizaf . d f "L' Ie Peop e 0 menca, f ethnographic stu, y a Itt I ia a form of heritable, single-gene "dwar rion of people with achondrop has b' d mong the LPA members fears of . " T . R and Heat 0 serve a f Ism , . ausstg,. app, h I·Imll1a . tion of dwarf fetuses a rer genencd ( . By of tee I eugenic practtces especia h h h es for genetic treatment. l nsrea testing had become possible) .r~t er ~. a~ i~~his article the authors speak of of using th~ ter~ ')e?,etlc cltl.zens ~P'2003: 66), for instance with regard to "resistant biosocialiry {TaussI? dr a . n throughout the LPA. lr would aspirations for having dwarfhchl!, re~ com mboosociality"is understood by the .

I her er resistan t I . diff be interesting to earn w f . itizenship or as something I erif sion 0 genetic CI I authors as a speer c expres I, ent from or even opposed to It.. 's Disease (AD) Margaret Lock (2008: 5 Referring to the example of Alzhfelmer s . I,'y" resulti~g from efforts to iden. . d he " ve 0 uncer tam . I 64) has pointe to t e .wa . f this widespread and complex, non-sing etify the supposed genetic baSIS.<? enetic screening does not make much gene disease. Un~er su~h con~1tlon~, ~ genetic citizenship with regard to AD sense and it remams qUite unc ear.w 1a re broadly in sections 2 and 3. would mean. I will address these ISSU~S~dOntl·t·lesare different from race or ., orary genetic Ie. .. d 6. However, whl ~ contemp . 'on to what extent those Identities an. gender, it remall1s open for llscu~t G' en the fact that direct therapeutlc their gen~tic .basi~ m~~ be re orm~es e~of~vrhas not succeeded and .only a few interve~tlon IOto individual ~e~fe so far, having a certain gene variant or not preventive measures are aval ~ able identity may still result in a fixed and .1l1escap h . d rh'at the norms of prudence h ghtly emp aSIZe 7. In another paper, Rose as n' '£1 t"on of those who do not act pru~ d and responsibility ':enable the I hent~r~abliologicallY irresponsi?le and who dencly and responSibly, those w o. ctl·ons ranging from dIsapproval to d to ceream san 8) may, there fore, b e expose. result" (Rose 2007b: 14 . . disenticlement to health services as a rty was removed from the "psychl8. It was only in the 197?s that h~~os~x~a lociation's Diagnostic alld Statistiatric bible," rhe American Psyc latr~cM StConrad 2007: 99-100). . cal Manual of Mental Disorders (DmeJicalizing homosexuality dunn~ [he 9. Remarkably, the first atte~ptsd~t ted against oppressive legal s~nctlo~s, nineteenth century were a so Ir.ec d of unishment. This highlight.s t 1e arguing for therape~tic treat~e;1C 1~1~tt~xpla~ations, which often contribute ambiguities of medical a.nd b.lo og;c. atized groups but are, nevertheless, co improving the social situation 0 sngm -

242

Peter Wehling

Biology,

based on scientific assumptions which are highly questionable and sometimes discriminating in themselves.

10. Similar objections to such "enlightened" forms of preformationist genetic essentialism have been raised, for instance, by Lock 2005, 2008; Rehmann-

Sutter 2006; Grace 2008; Rouvroy 2008.

11. Using a partly similar typology, Rabeharisoa

Citizenship

and the Government

of Biomedicine

Brown Phil, Sabrina McCormick, Brian Mayer, Stephe? Zavesros~!, Mo;eHo-Frosch, Rebecca Gasior Airman and Laura Senier. (2006).

A Our Own": Environmental Causation of Breast Cancer and Challenges Dominant Epidemological Paradigm, Science, Technology & Human

243 Rach~} Lab I to r re

values

31(5),499-536. ki Sabrina McCormick, Brian Mayer, Rachel Brown, Phil, Srephen Zav~stos ~l (2008) Embodied Health Movement" Morello-Frosch, and Re. ecca rman ..

H '1 h 521-538 in Phil Brown

and Calion (2002, 60) bave

discerned the "auxiliary association," the "partner association," and the "opposing association."

For an overview of the great variety of patient groups and health movements, see also Epstein 2008.

12. As a result "citizen-science alliances" (McCormick, Brown and Zavestoski 2003, Brown 2007) emerge, but since they are based on critical examinations of established biomedical models of disease, etiology and therapy, they primarily include non-mainstream scientists.

13. As Brown (2007: 64) argues, the biomedical model is one in which disease is held to be "purely a biologic phenomenon that can be understood through positivist, value-free research. Further, this model assumes that diseases are best addressed through treatment and through mitigation against individuallevel risk factors ( ... )."

14. Paolo Palladino has raised similar objections to Rabinow's explanation in French DNA (1999) of the concept of biosociality, referring to the example of the acitivities of the French Association against Muscular Dystrophy.

As Palladino (2002: 158, endnote 23) emphasizes, "many victims of the disease survive into advanced age, and some of them have actively campaigned for the improvement of social facilities that make their life easier, rather than for research to treat or even prevent the disease by selective reproduction.

Such groups do not appear anywhere in Rabinow's narrative."

15. Two eminent bioethicists, Bartha Maria Knoppers and Ruth Chadwick (2005: 76), for instance, explicitly stated and welcomed a move away from "the paramount position of individualism and autonomy" in bioethics and argued that more emphasis should be placed on ethical principles such as reciprocity, mutuality, solidarity, citizenry and universality.

16. Although this is a highly questionable claim, I cannot go into a detailed discussion in this chapter. For a critical view, see Schneider 2007.

17. In an illuminating article, Kaushik Sunder Rajan has also touched on the dark side of current global biocapitalisrn.

Using the example of participants in clinical drug testing in India, he explores the constitution of the "experimental subject" as an indispensable element for the emergence of globalized biosociality: "These experimental subjects provide the conditions of possibility for the neo-liberal consumer subjects who generate surplus health, or for the neo-liberal biosocial subjects who form social identifications in the cause

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12 Human Economy, Human Capital A Critique of Biopolitical Economy Ulrich Brockling

1. INTRODUCTION:

THE ECONOMY OF BIOPOWER

Michel Foucault's observation that we live in the age of biopolitics has now become a truism. Hardly any newspaper article about stem cell resea rch, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, or therapeutic cloning fails to broach the topic; hardly any critique of the applied life sciences fails to warn of their biopolitical consequences-usually to call in the next sentence for legal regulation, which is to say for even more biopolitics. Although in the concept's inflationary usage its genealogy is seldom considered, Foucault's dictum that the modern human being is "an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question" is certainly one of the most cited in his work, For Foucault, biopolitics "brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicir calculations and made knowledge-powet an agent of transformation of human life." He located the "thteshold of biological modernity" in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when the population-that collective subject-surfaced as an object of political intetventions (Foucault 1978, 143). Together with the historically older disciplinatY institutions, which establish an "anatomo-politics of the human body" and ptoduce individuals who are as economically productive as they ate militarily and politically reliable, the biopolitics of population constitutes one of the tWO poles of a "life-administering power" (Foucault 1978, 136, 139).

But for Foucault, the emergence of biopolincs in no way marks the end of sovereign power. Rather, this now takes a new form, developing into state racism. As soon as the state functions in the mode of biopower, that is, as soon as all political action is calibrated according to the relos of a maximization of life, the sovereign right to "to take life or let live" can only be exercised through the introduction of hierarchizing caesurae in the continuum of the human species. That right is transformed into "the power to make live and to let die" (Foucault 2004: 241). State racism "justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary and living plurality"

(Foucault

2004: 258).

248

Human Economy, Human Capital

Ulrich Brockling

On the one hand, Foucault studies this "economy of biopower" in relation to strategies of statistical registration and normalizing regulation, as first formulated In a systematic program in eighteenth-century German Polizeiwissenschaft (Foucault 1981; 1988).1 On the other hand, in his lectures on the history of governrnentaliry, he analyzes how with discovery of the population "as a given, as a field of intervention, and as the end of government techniques," the economy was isolated "as a specific domain of reality, with political economy as both a science and a technique of intervention in this field of reality" (Foucault 2007a: 143). Not the legitimacy of the exercise of power, but calculating its costs and effects, now takes center stage. For Foucault, political economy "is a sort of general reflection on the organization, distribution, and limitation of power in a society," offering a guiding principle for the "self-limitation of governmental reason" (Foucault 2008: 13).

When it comes to the way in which the calculations of political economy are manifest in the governance of both individuals and the populace as living beings, neither Foucault's lectures on governmentality nor the rest of his work offers more than scattered, fragmentary remarks. Foucault did not establish a connection to his early epistemological studies centered on the discourse of political economy (Foucault 1970), and he did not work out the specific biopolitical dimension of the liberal and neoliberal rationalities of government in his analyses of it. The title of the second part of his lecture cycle, The Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault 2008), thus raises expectations that the lectures do not really live up to. He emphasizes the constitutive connection between the biopolirical regulation of life and an "economical government," that is, an art of government exercising "power in the form, and according to the model, of the economy" (Foucault 2008: 134), but he never makes this connection an object of systematic reflection.

In a further development and reinterpretation of Foucault's reflections, Giorgio Agamben has radicalized biopolitics into the essential constituent of the political realm in general. The juridical-institutional order, he argues, is inconceivable without the sovereign exception that suspends the law, and that in the form of excommunication, produces "naked life": homines sacri reduced, because killable with impunity, to a pure biological existence. From this perspective, modernism marks no break with the Occidental tradition but simply generalizes what was already at work in its origins. In Agamben's view, sovereign power has always determined what forms of human life will be excluded from the body politic as part of the same act that makes human beings into legal subjects:

Every society sets this limit; every society-even

the most modern-

decides who its "sacred men" will be. It is even possible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceplio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself ill the history of the West and has now-in the new biopolitical horizon of

249

" ' t -moved inside every human life and states with national sovereign y c. d to a particular place or a . ' B life is no longer conulle , , every citizen. are II' h biological body of every living definite category. It now dwe s I1l t e being. (Agamben 1998: 81) ,

I

does not see any contrast between biopolib rher wishes to reveal the forpower ut ra he latt~r dehistoricizing it in the pro.cess, mer as the most inward core of t h 'd rands to be the foundational . ke vi sible what e un ers f his intention IS to rna e VI . "" anring "to put the rceid I litics ThIS consists I1l w f' I aporia of OCC! enta po I. in th lace-'bare Ii e -t iar , f n into play m t every P h dom and happiness 0 me 1998' 13) With reference to Hanna marked their subjection" (Agamben ',' between the Declaration . ively for a connection h f Arendt he argues Impressive .' d I' ' tion of "life unwort y 0 d h d fi non an e imma of Human Rights an tee ru . f h principle of the nation state living," between the global realtzatlOn 0 ~ e m this point he arrives at the and the worldlessness of stateless refugebes. ro democracy and totalitari, "id f . ner solldaflty etween 'I h h unsettling I ea 0 an in 'II (bio)politics direct y Wit t e anism" (Agamben 1998: 13). Connectmga I lineal relation" (Agamben , f hi is "the ongina po I I sovereign ban, which or irn hat bio olitical programs by no means 1998路 102) he has to elide the fact t P " between inclUSion and ., " ing the opposition l exhaust themselves m process , I . I ntinuum and subjugate human t ct a bio ogica co " I' h ly exclusion but a Iso cons ru , f dd d lue To put this mas Ig t . I' nve 0 a e vatue. , ' II life to the econOffilCa irnpera . h t biopolitics ISessentIa y a not recogmze t a different way: Agam b en d oes political economy of popu lattoufrom a double blank space: FouThe following reflections thus stalrtoult management of life, and Agarn.

I the hiopo inca " g of cault's failure to ana yze h' h follows from hIS narrowm ben's blindness to political economy, w IC fl' are meant then, as an . h These re ecoons ,". biopolitics to sovereignty t eory. h liticization and economlZatl~n inquiry into the conjuncture between; e p~ improving and optimizing Itfe f human life and into how the postu ate 0 'f amework. Instead of tryO , "\" d' n economiC r na is legitimized and operaoo Ize ~~ a of economic thought, I will present

If Agamben-unltke Foucau t, 'of tics and the sove~elgn exercise

ing to offer a cross-section of the I~ory h ffort formulated in the years , ode1s' IIrst tee , my two exemplary economiC m 'd' foundational human econo before and after the Great War'f t~ l~vlS~ ~ a noW largely forgotten Aus(Menschenokonomie) by Rudol, o. s~ ~e~ the theory of human capital, trian social philosopher and SOCiologist, t the Nobel Prize-winning Ameflwhose most prominent representatives adre S Becker, These tWOmodels Gary.

W Schultz an h'd II d can economists Theo d ore '.

I" I overnmentality: Goldsc el ca e . f ms of blopo Iflca g E' I P ovidence represent opposmg or " I" through an la r f "orgamc capIta h . tS for a socialist management, 0 ("on and social security; the t eons state relymg on preven I bOt-maximizing self-entre(Ewald 1986)-a h h n bel1lgs as eneu 'd of human capital approac "u;~ ical condition as an asset t,Ob~Invest~f . preneurs who even treat their 10 Ogf the systematic economlzatiOn of It e.

The twO models meet as a progtam or

250

Human Economy, Human Capital

Ulrich Brockling

2. ECONOMY

OF HUMAN

BEINGS

work Entwicklungswerttheorie, Entwicklungsokonomie, Menschenokonomie (Theory of Developmental Value, Developmental Economy, Economy of Human Beings), published in 1908, with a clarion call: "This book is a protest against the unheard-of squandering of human beings that is being pursued even in our day. It is an indictment of all those who represent and promulgate the delusional belief that the human being is an asset present in excess-an asset no one need hesitate to approach in a thrifty manner" (Gold scheid 1908: IX).

Where wastage is lamented, a call for order-or more precisely: for economic order-cannot be far behind, and Goldscheid in fact advocated nothing other than a systematic steering of human productive powers and conditions for reproduction. The "business of life" could only flourish most fully if science took over the "ledger of culture" "each smallest fragment of available means" thus being administered "with the care of a proper merchant" (Goldscheid 1911: 595). The cost-value of human beings, in other words the means expended on their rearing, training, and maintenance, and their earning-value, hence what they bring in through their working capacity, needed to be measured as precisely as possible and adjusted to produce a maximum of added value. What was as stake was solving the problem of "how through working time of less than twenty-four hours the human being can eke out his life over twenty-four hours; how he is placed in the position, through less than twenty-four hours of work, where he can manage not only to sustain himself, his not yet working children, and parents who can no longer work, but also the higher development of the human typus, the elevation of the power of the organic over nature" (Goldscheid 1908: 66).

It was Goldscheid's conviction that such a "vital optimum" (Goldscheid 1911: 499) did not come about either as the result of a struggle for existence, as it were naturally, or through a eugenic radicalization of natural seleetion, as postulated by Social Darwinists and champions of racial hygiene on the basis of the Malthusian law of population ecology. Rather, what was called for was an "active formation of evolutionism" (Goldscheid 1908: 89) in the sense of a rational administration of "organic capital": Rudolf Goldscheid

opened his programmatic

o d su porter of the suffragette moveAs a pacifist, hum.an rights ~CtlVlst, an ac P founding member of, among a ment with close ties to SOCIal OemSocr y'the German Sociological Assothe MaOist octety, O id d other organizations, f V 2 Goldscheid cons: ere Ol ical Society 0 ienna, h ciation, an d t h e S OCIOog. h more important than t e f . 1 environment as muc 1 the improvement a socia Id h id 1911: 164). Consequent y, "primitive regulator" of selectl.on .(G?, sC doctrine of degeneration d the struggle against the "selectloOistTS abn re he basically had no obiec. h'swrltlng 0 esu , d d takes up muc h space In I .h ff g of the gifted an ecrease "" ease of teo spnn I " f tion to the call or an mer d by the completely use ess o tion of repro uctton I in the offspnng or preven . . t "racial damage" "racia SUIo 1 322) d warnmgs agams f I (Goldscheld 191 : ; an. f h try with immigrants 0 owcide,' and a looming "floodIng 0 t e co'~:re found in his work as well li n racial elements id d f t I standing cu Iture an d a te.

20). Nevertheless, he consr ~re a a , 0

•

•

0

0

:~eir

0

0

0

0

0

(Goldscheid 1908: 112; 1911. 425,4 'd I arion that "preventive repro. h selectioIllstS ec ar . h ebecause unecononuc- ted h lack of interest in t C i mprov ." nacea an t elf f' " s ducrive hygiene was a pa did "the idea 0 eugeOics a lif stances He I see d ment of material I e Clfcum. . " he si ificance of organic an o ff d "insight Into t e SIgn h "d I welcome in that It a ere I" B t what he termed t e eve op, namely generative tee hnicue rnqu m genera . . b u d ced to "merely nee diing to his view not e re u d Id mental problem" cou 10 , ber of geniuses an raise o d am both a great num sort individuals In or er to g . 319). Like many of his contemporanes, the median level" (Goldscheld 1911.. , rheor of species origin to human Goldscheid tried to transfer DarWIn So y ts he called the aXiom of a o f the SOCIal arwmls , I d _ society' but unltke most 0 . hasizing envlronmenta a ap emp was itself grounded in this Pitiles; "struggle for life" °d'intof questiOn, h n progress hO tat ion instead. Goldschel s alIt I I theory and even more so m IS . f bO I . 'deve opmenta , 10 oglca d that a SOCiaI sCIence u nderPacification a . e' he was conVince h to sense of the power 0 f sClenc .

I omy could show t e way d developmenta econ stood as both human an ement of the world.' promotion of progress and Improv d human beings to the" mhented biOWhere the raCial hygienistS reduce h Oreconomic value (Wemgart, 'd duced them to t el h h On h Id logical traits Go sc el re d h could never anc or t e pn Kroll and B;yertz 1988: 254). To that en 'h' e d at the same time he could u ciple of utility maximization deeply ehno ; h:~eclared the economic realm o h h On the one an , rrectly In never set It hlg enoug . '" the final analysts, or more co . to be the "ur- a priori." Because In d d g" were "an economiC funcb h life and un erstan m "am isms" the last synthesIs. .. at 0 riately be described as econ tion," organisms could mos,t app~ P, of this "biological utdltanaOlsm dOom in the theory of (G Id h °d 1915: 82). In hIS denvatlon. o sc el Id h °d antiCIpate an aXI " If 1911: 102) Go sc el presented a se (G o Id sc hOd el '1' d it every orgamsm re h b'l autopoietic systems: as he exp alOe ggregate distinguished by tea I. h'" "blOchemlca a . lb' function preservation mac me, ~ f f I stimuli promoting t 1e asK f Off endy In ace 0 ne I "The essence a ity to be h ave d I ~r hreatening to annu It. ,,' we call life than JJ1 face of those tho st of its maintenance, with "conomy In t e Imere this system waS t hus e 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Menschenokonomie is the effort ro acquire our cultural qualities with an ever smaller consumption of human material, an ever smaller wastage of human life, the effort at a more economic exploitation, a more economic exhaustion of human working capacity as well as human life in general. ... Menschenokonomie presses towards technology of the organic, it studies the constitution, volume, and breakdown of working capacities, teaches us to economize on organic capital and how to exercise economic efficiency in our dealings with the most valuable natural treasure a country possesses: economic viability with human working capacity. (GoJdscheid 1912: 22-23, emphasis in original)

251

0

0

0

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o

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252

Human Economy, Human Capital

Ulrich Brochling

living defined as being of benefit to oneself (Goldscheid 1911: 96-99), the category of the economic thus being even older than that of the logical, although human thinking itself functioned according to the principle of economizing on expenditure and optimizing returns: "A maximum of cognition with a minimum of contradiction, that is the goal of our thinking as cognitive will" (Goldscheid 1915: 85, 90).

On the other hand, Goldscheid elevated utility maximization to the

highest ethical maxim. Neither Kant's categorical imperative nor Christian caritas

could offer morality

a secure foundation;

only its "developmental-

economic necessity" could do this. In his view, only "what is justified in terms of developmental economy, hence not what merely serves our aims in general but only what furthers our goals in the economic manner," could be considered "objectively ethical" (Gold scheid 1908: 127, 131). In 1914, of all years, he saw grounds for an optimistic prognosis: "As things now stand, it cannot be very long before the recognition breaks through that the deepest meaning of humanity lies in its economic productivity" (Goldscheid 1914a: 525). If the good and the useful came together, ethics would be transformed into "ethotechnics," "a kind of psychological technology that examines how human psychic machinery has to be shaped in order for it to function according to the postulates of developmental economy" (Gold scheid 1908: 13l).

With the category of Entwicklungswert, "developmental value," Goldscheid was trying to determine an objective "qualitative measure of value," which he juxtaposed with the quantitative measure of labor-value doctrine and the subjective measure of value of marginal-utility theory (Gold scheid 1921: 8-9). In the framework of Entwicklungswert, the value of a good was measured not only in terms of the social working time needed for its production, but also in terms of the "socially necessary needs" it satisfiedor railed to satisfy. For Goldscheid what was "socially necessary" was only "human wishes that are desirable in the interest of higher development," hence those "preconditions for flourishing social development ... that need

to be created and that must be taken account of if a society is to maintain and fulfill itself" (Goldscheid

cal perspective

anticipating

1908: 23,5-6).

This resulted

in an ecologi-

the current emphasis on sustainability.

The

reference-point at work here was not the single individual but rather the "generic subject," developmental value applying "not only to each generation that momentarily represents the human species but to the human spe-

cies in its total development."

Developmental

economy was thus "economy

considered in view of the long term" (Gold scheid 1908: 22, 94).

Goldscheid's methodological procedure corresponded to the model

planning-economy

rationalization,

founded

being granted

sociology,"

with science,

especially

the role of highest planning

of

an "exactly authority:

From the relationship of aUf intersubjective valuation to our objective energetic position in nature, the science of sociology determines what is

253

to be understood as higher development in view of the pre~en\ sta~e~: , if k ledge in general. After the ideal of higher eve opt , scient: c now. ." nd in order for a coordlOatlOn has been ascertamedbmntghtlhSamtaa~;~~~g\ having only a relative characsystem to come IOta erna tnai , . b rer, isbclapable of functi~7yin:e;~:~~~:~~~I;~esist~~~d~(~~~tr~~:gl:c~~~: POSSl eta approxlma "" d in this way to obpoint on the basis of this coordl~atIon ?S;~:i;:Ch~id 1908: 109) rain a systematically arranged va ue sea e. , d h an bein s themselves: forming, as workAt the head of this scale sroo urn f g eraring developmental value, . he i di ble means or gen ing capacity, t e 10 Ispensa. h I in whose interest all devel. b d ng t e one va ue I

but at the same orne em

0

yl nd thus not only constituting

a means but

opmenta! values are created, a , ' 'If t that developmental econI I ThIS 10 itse mean also the developmenta goa. .'k 'For Goldscheid its "centra I 路 . Menscheno anomie. f omy woul d cu Irmnate 10 di d UIJbringing of which type 0 I . "the bree 109 an )" problem" was as f0 I ows: . s of developmental economy. . ff h best return 10 term , h ' human being 0 ers t e , di I offered the answer, whic 111 (Goldscheid 1908: 154). He Imme"IT~y Werkbund has distributed the essence was quality not quantity:.

It; efinement of the rnater iall-r-it lovely motto: loyalty to the matena an h r t be applied above all to the must not be doubted that this posrul ate as 0 1914a: 528). emg hiirn self" (Coldscheid h urnan bei , een fashioned expensively and solidly The human being who has b from the cheap human being. A solreveals quite different qu aj itjes h h s grown from healthy . d h being IS one w 0 a h idly fashione uman d d b healthy fathets, and were maternal soil and been engen ere y d training upon which at the youthful individual recelv:s care at~e case in animal breeding. least as much care has been t a en as IS (Goldscheid

1911: 495)

.

G Id cheid maintained, lived longer and also Human beings of quality, 0 s d h tS I'nvested in them were more ' I路路 n the en t e cos , . f worked more pro d ucnve y, I . int f Goldscheid's cnnque 0 , Thi the starting potnt or than paid back.

IS was di d hich he accused of over-usage . I'1Steconomicic order or ited isor h er, w working capacity .rv b ut cou Id the capita 0 , . I' it xplOite uman . f of organic capita, Since 1 e. f d I ental needs" and creation a " . f etlan 0 eve opm . not care less about ~,"tlS a id 1908: 86-87). His accusation concern"organic added value (Goldsche, f he proletariat was dlfected at the . d I' . gcondltJons 0 t 'I' d ing the working an IVII1 I h t the Norwegian SOCiaagist an 'bl and the acrua t a " gulf between t h e POSSl e would describe fifty years later as strUCpeace researcher Johan" Galtun~ltun 's famous definition, thiS was p.resent tural violence." Accord 109 to G, fI g d 0 that their actual somatic and "when human beings are being In uence s I lizations" (Galtung 1969: " b I w thelt potentia tea

mental realizations are 168). Goldscheid

eo

formulated

hOngmore drastically:

the same t I

254

Human

Ulrich Brochling If a worker with work corresponding to all hygienic requirements and those of developmental economy would be capable of healthily reaching the age of sixty, seventy, even eighty, instead of-as at presentdying in slow agony between thirty-five and forty-five, then it is clear that his life, that his health, that his joy in existence is consumed with the coal that we burn in OUf ovens; and since this is so, it is also clear that in tolerating these circumstances, we sin in the worst possible way against the highest law of the theory of developmental value and developmental economy, which demands an equivalence between labor value and developmental value, which demands that no developmental damage be accepted without a counterpart being present in developmental advancement.

(Goldscheid 1908: 86-87)

Correspondingly, he interpreted the efforts of the socialist movement and labor unions as a struggle, albeit one not entirely conscious of its human-economic dimension, against the worker's "organic expropriation" and for the preservation of his "developmental property, that is, for the "best possible unfolding of his organism" (Gold scheid 1908: 158). Socialism was, for Goldscheid, "management of workers for the sake of the workers themselves"-a comprehensive planning economy in which "the polity increasingly becomes the trustee of organic capita)"; a state capitalism that "sees both its surest fundament and highest goal in the most careful, conscientious individualizing Menschenokonomie" (Goldscheid 1932: 1122-1123, emphasis in original).

From a "sociologically grounded, social-biologically oriented administra-

tion" rooted "in individualization

and differentiation"

and aimed "at an

internalizing of social regulation," he hoped for a "restocking of the nation's entire human material" (Goldscheid 1911: 577).

As Goldscheid saw things, in the end developmental-economic reason would spread to the realm of international relations, setting an end to the "desolate paroxysm" of the imperial nation's quest for advantage (Goldscheid 1911: 552), This line of historical ascent would emerge as it were naturally, he believed, from scientific progress: "Just as the nineteenth century was the century of technology, the twentieth century will be that of internalized technology, and thus of organics and psychotechnology; where for that century nature was the starting point, for this century it will be life. In this way control over nature will be followed by control over life" (Goldscheid 1914b: 14).

The model for a universal biopolitical administration was offered by social security-"the modern economy's most revolutionizing moment , , . and at the same time its most conservative" (Goldscheid 1914a: 520), The historical process moved from the absolutist "rape·based state," to the "administrative state" and onward to a "community based On mutual solidarity" (Goldscheid 1912: 5) "in which not only the living and working person represents an economic value but also the dying person in the same sense that loss for the society is entered in the books just as dying and sick

Economy,

Human

Capital

255

t

cattle figure in the farmer's calcularion as a liability" (Goldscheid 19 0 217). Such a social order would subject an economy's human side, lust .1I e the roduction of goods, to a comprehensive "normallzat~on, t~plfi~atlon, d : d di . "(Goldscheid 1932, 1122) and precisely In this way an stan ar izanon ". bare h ' di id al's developmental rights-nghts that, to secure t e III IVI U d "e sure, themselves standardized in line with "socially necessary nee s. . . h an as c hire f homan-econormc actor 1m errand , inauguranng, Leviar .,. did n~t mean ~reeing individuals from their responsibility, The dedmdandfohr . ducri rationalization of SOCIalpro ucnon an d rep reduction correspon e to r e individual's

self-rationalization:

Re ardin his own manner of life, every individual has to repeatedly g hi g .. d I live in a developmental-economic way to the 0 ff .. to Pose t IS question. . ek with the energies that are e ecnve In me, highest degree, do I se , I I s? And regarding each va create the greatest possible develohPmenta h ute 'ask again: am I here . ivid I' ell every our one as o indivi ua action as w , , lified working capacity utilizing my life force, am I here using m~fiqua ~y' (Goldscheid 1908: with the highest possible evolutiOnIstiC e cten .

202-203)4 . ' s fair! important, Goldscheid remained Regarding one question that seem h Y -lling to follow the impera. happen to t ose unWI .

Silent: what was meant to . h se incapable of prodUCing ··k iei In any event, t 0 d tive 0 f Mensc h eno onomiei I be treated with respect an . dded va ue were to developmenta I-economic a .,. fi d this seeming altruism in ecobenevolent care-although he again )U~tIh: re roach that if he rigorously nomic terms. He apodicricallv rejecte t Ph end he would have "to hi M h i5konomle to r e , thought through IS ensc en I hild all invalids indeed all helpless approve the killing of all jncurab e c I ren, , people,"

as follows:

, that refined social empathy represents a Now there can be no question The certainty of being f rhe highest potency .. ' . d devdopmenta I factor o. h h an creative drive onwa r .. I b c etyspurst e urn treated apprectanve y Yso ~ bei bl to count on the assurance di d ee Just as eing a e to an extraor mary egr .rwh rks represents a strong rno" b h e for w om one wo f of apprecratron y t os . h. although maintenance a nve For r IS reason, . tor of our urge to b e ac. '. lid d old people in general IS not those incapable of work 109, Invall s, ahn ·nd·lrecr added value coming .

I'd dded va ue tel , I h always direct y £le to ~ . ' bstantial and preCise y t e . teoance IS very su , .' h about throug h t helr ma,m ,. h ws then, that maintammg t ese developmental-economIc ctltlque so; (Goldscheid 1908: 195) human categories is extremely Irnportan . . to be a weak argument to the exten~ rh~t This would 10 any case turn out . f crisis displaced faith In h I the semantics 0 h with the Great War at t e arest'l d.ff ent cost-benefit calculations, T e . ther entire y 1 er progress, opemng up a ,

256

Ulrich Brockling

more economic resources shrank (or seemed to do so), the greater became the readiness to cut expenditure on those who needed material support and care and were unable to produce productive services. Despite his highly moral economy of empathy and mutual solidarity, in trying, even to a bizarre degree, to economically determine the value of life, Goldscheid was moving on the same terrain as those convinced that for financial reasons it was "necessary to sacrifice life unworthy of living in order to maintain that worthy of living" (Tandler 1924: 306).5 Hence, in 1920, the psychiatrist Alfred Hoche compared German society of rhe time with "participants in a difficult expedition for whom the greatest possible capacity to perform on everyone's part is an indispensable precondition for the enterprise's success, and for whom there is no place for half, quarter, or eighth capacity" (Heche 1920: 54-55)6 In view of the "massive capital in the form of food, clothing, and heat" expended for the institutional care of "ballast existences," capital "taken from the national fortune for an unproductive goal," it seemed to him that "authorization for rhe annihilation of life unworthy of being lived"-this was the title of the notorious book he published together with the jurisr Karl Binding-was not only justified but even mandatory, in order to "bring about relief for our excessive national burden" (Hoche 1920: 54-56).'

Goldscheid's developmental pathos had vanished; what remained was the furor of human-economic accounting.

Whether the life of a human being was classified as worthy or not of living depended on the balance of his or her cost-benefit value. Those depending on permanent professional care, hence not creating economic value through their own work, were a burden on the budget and forfeited their right to existence. Goldscheid propagated investment in the "qualification of human material" (Goldscheid 1911: 495); Hoche called for systematic disinvestment when inferior quality left little hope for return.

3. HUMAN

CAPITAL

Rising to prominence in the decades following World War II and especially exerting its influence (which has recently been growing again) in the realm of educational and developmental economics, the theory of human capital is likewise concerned with investment in human beings.' As in Goldscheid's Menschenokonomie, the main concern here is quality and qualification.

And the claims being staked are equally high: "The thrust of my argument is that the investment in population quality and knowledge in large parts determines the future prospects of mankind," programmatically declares the dean of human capital theory, Theodore W. Schultz (1981: XI), in the foreword to his essay collection Investing in People. And his younger colleague Gary S. Becker seconds this statement: "Human capital is important because productivity in modern economies is based on the

Human Economy, Human Capital

257

creation, dissemination, and utilization of knowledge,:' (Becker 1993b: 50).

But where Goldscheid declared his project to be a normative econom~c . "(G Idscheid 1908: 70), the theorists of human capita! mSISt on t e SCience 0 . h Th d t mqutre mrc the purely descriptive character of their ~esearc. ey h 0, n~ di vidual actions ways human beings should economically arrange t err in I and social coopetation, but assume that they already do ond mere methodThis behavioral science otlentatlon, extendmg fat bey ki Fit's .' h least of the factors spar mg oucau ological indiVidualism, was not t e b h . "(Becker 1976). It . . " . ch to human e avtor mteresr in the econorruc a~proa. that he deciphered the rationale of g was espeCially from Becker s wntm because most radical form, distillest neoliberal govern mentality in Its clear .'

If (Brockling 2007). As was ..

I h fi of the enterptlsmg se mg Its nuc eus as t e gure d lib alisrn Foucault here iden. hi k 1 German or 01 er , already the case in ISwor 01 f h to that of competition: when tifies a shift from the, paradigm 0 t~;~ua~~~ being as homo (Economicus, theory of human capital presents f I 'cal economics not as a part. . .. hi . di ti cuon rom c aSSI , It IS desctlbmg im, in IS m f h' If being for himself his own 路 h b" ntrepreneur 0 rmserr, f ner in exc ange ut as e . d b ing for himself the source 0 capital, being for himself his own pro ucer, ei [his] earnings" (Foucault 2008 : 226). 'tallies in its conceprion of con. . f h ry 0 f h uman cap: The innovanon 0 t eo . I .'

It sees in the consumer not . If reneuna actiVity. k sumption as use an enrrep . ducer In this framewor , . f d but also an active pro . only a passive user 0 goo s , ' luding economic act; rather, d ervtce IS not a conc the purchase 0 f a goo or s . . divid I makes use of his resources, . . f . . h ch the m IVI ua f It IS a form 0 Input m WI. . h way that the highest degree 0 especially the scarce factor of ~lme, In sue Thi economization not only of 路 .

I f m this as output.

IS . hi h satisfaction eaps out ro .'

II' the decisive lever With W IC . . b f rrung time as we IS working time ut 0 consu . d . the entire spectrum of human . I cceeds in rawmg .' . theory of human caplta. su individ I pears here as an ecoriomtc msn路 ..' .

I SIS The In IVI ua ap d hi actrvines into ItS ana. y d . . t nee lik h f a company depen s on IS let at 0 , , [ution whose continue eXIS e, Id h ve been decided against or .

Wh meone does cou a . k or her chOlces. atever so .

For that reason It rna es 路 Ide at the same time. replaced by samet h mg ~ se. ?n I take u the options assumed to corresense to presume that mdlvldua s T:e human being of human-capital spond most closely to their preferences. . I decides .

II ne who unswervmg y . . theory IS above a scmeo I' d ro all human actIOn assu mes, The economic approach Becker sees aft Ie as they conceive it, whether firstly "that individuals maXImize fwe are ochistic" (Becker 1992: 38, , . . I I spite u l or mas h they be selfish altrUIstIc, oya, '. . human beings ere .' '..

F n analytlC perspective, . emphaSIS m ongma\). rom a . d .

II they do with allocating scarce . I reOCCllpie In a . appear as ratlOna actors, P I W' h' th'ls schema all aetlon repre. . f t ng goa s.

It In ' means In purSUit 0 corope I . d attractive and less attract'ves perceive as , sents a choice between a Iterna, I f h' sense with the self-lOterest ' ted m a ar-reac mg, I d h rive and is thus se If-Illteres I" t'sfaction at having he pe ot'f . the a trulst s sa I h' also potentially roalll est 10 f d how he or she ac ,eves ers. The question of the individual's pre erences an

258

Human

Ulrich Brochling

them lies outside the realm of economic

theory. Secondly,

however,

what is

decisive for Becker is the assumption that elementary preferences "such as health, prestige, sensual pleasure, benevolence, or envy" do not change over time. His third basic assumption is related to "the existence of markets that with varying degrees of efficiency coordinate the actions of different participants-individuals, firms, even nations-so that their behavior becomes mutually consistent." What he is referring to here is much more than simply monetary markets: even outside their sphere, "either directly or indirectly, each commodity has a relevant marginal 'shadow' price, namely, the time required to produce a unit change in that commodity" (Becker 1976: 4-6).

The axiomatic principle is that supply and demand regulate how the actors maximize their benefits and weight their competing pteferences.

For Becker, these basic premises do not have the status of empirical statements about human nature. Rather, what is at work here is a heuristic construct-an "as-if" anthropology or methodological move aimed at reducing complexity. The assumption that people behave as if they were

rational "contains no statement about reality but formulates an analytic schema guiding the generation of statements about reality" (Pies 1998: 19).

Theory of human capital grasps the human being as homo ceconornicus and grasps him only to the extent that he behaves accordingly: if individuals constantly try to maximize their benefits, their actions can be guided by raising or lowering their costs and thus altering the calculation.

As someone who constantly decides, homo ceconornicus is also "someone who is eminently governable" (Foucault 2008: 270). If there is no behavior that cannot be described in terms of cost-benefit calculations, then people have no other choice than to make choices in all their actions. The economic approach addresses them from the start as the entrepreneurial market subjects into which they need to be transformed and to transform themselves.

Within this framework, human capital initially means nothing other than that knowledge and skills and the state of one's health, but also outer appearance, social prestige, working ethos, and personal habits, need to be seen as scarce resources requiring investment to set up, maintain, and expand. "The human agent becomes ever more a capitalist by virtue of his personal human capital," Schultz ohserves, "and he seeks political support to protect the value of that capital" (Schultz 1981: 76). Even when he possesses no material goods, he at least disposes over his lifespan and will use it to maximum advantage, according to his preferences. This includes, for

instance, maintaining

one's health:

Gross investment in human capital entails acquisition and maintenance costs, including child care, nutrition, clothing, housing, medical services and care of oneself.

The service that health capital

sists of "healthy time" or "sickness-free work, consumption,

and leisure activities.

renders

time" which contributes (Schultz 1981: 13)

conto

Economy,

Human

Capital

259

Becker interprets the decision for or against marriage, for hor against c~i~~ dren or for a specific number of children according to t e same rna e.. , h s "when they expect to be better off than women or men marry, e argue, , d to i h .r . d si Ie and they divorce if that IS expecte to mcrease t et h t ey remarne sing , ..

I sidered "(B k 1992' 46). For their part children are err rer con '. . we If are ec er· f . "(B k 1976· 172) which In "a source of psychic income or sat is action ec er, . , . . h they are a life-long consumption the framework of economic t eory meadns ·11itself bring in monetary d f . s a production goo th at WI I goo , or unction a .

Id age Whether potential parents income and for examp~e assure c.are In a "de ends on whether the decide on having a child or having another o~ere ~he quality of the chilexpected benefit outweighs the costs mcurred . dren is also meant to be considered a cost factor:

.r

. ot only how many children it has but also the A family must determine :hether it should provide separate bedrooms, amount spent on them rivate colle es, give them dance or send them to nursery school and p g. hildren "higher . d f th I will call more expensive c I music lessons, an so or C· dill called higher quality cars than · hild " just as a I acs are h qua Iity c I ren, . d di let me hasten to add t at id any rrusun erstan mg, "I T I Chevro ets. 0 avo: II better If more is volu ntar i y hi h I'" does not mean mora y" d " ig er qua iry h ., b se the parents obtain a hild h n anot er It IS ecau spent on one Cit an 0 ddi . rial 'expenditure and it is this additional ditional utility from the a I,~IO I· "(B k r 1976: 173) utility which we call higher qua ity, ec e , dividuals are "abilities-machines" (FouAs entrepreneurs of themselves, I~ . dent development, cared these machmes require pr u h· 229) 8 cault 200 : an d' t to market requirements. T IS " d continuous a justmen k h ful malOtenance, an d d d before the individual ta es t e cannot begin early enough ~n eman s, f his competencies into his own " . d anent Improvement 0 building up an perm d ther social institutions: hands, the engagement of parents an 0 f hours a mother spends with her child, We know that the number 0 '11b ery important for the formawi even when it is still in the cradle'f h efv tion of a human capital, bili " chine or or t e orma , tion of an a I ltles-ma, danrive if in fact its parents or ItS and that the child will be much more a aptlvte~ him or her. This means ther than less time WI f d mother spen d more ra I he si pie time parents spend e e ibl to ana yze t e SlID that it must be pass! e,. h ff ction as investment which can ing their children, or grvmg t em ;' ~29) form human capital. (Foucault 20 O . f human capital corresponds to Goldscheid's To a great extent, the conc,ept 0 inn of Menschenokonomie saw the . I" b h Ie the champion 0 . f h· "organic capita ; ut WI, f h" dequate accumulation 0 t IS market's anarchy as responsible or / e ina. g economy, for the theorists capital and demanded the gUidance 0 a P anmn

260

Human Economy, Human Capital

Ulrich Brochling

of human capital the market not only cannot be fooled but is the best conceivable regulatory mechanism for increasing population quality and individual well-being. This does not, however, amount to a plea for laissez faire policies: Schultz and Becker themselves consider state engagement in the realm of education and health to be indispensable; but political measures should increase competition instead of compensating for putative market inadequacies in social-reformist zeal. Within their logic, the market can in any event only fail when the Leviathan of the "invisible hand" places fetters on it, distorting the free play of supply and demand. For this reason, Becker explains, the state "should be involved in financing only a small fraction of the large total investment in human capita]"; "in a well-functioning market economy," he continues, the vast majority of investments in human capital would be the private responsibility of individuals and organizations: parents who invest in their children, adults who gain additional training, and companies and universities that provide training, do research, and develop commercially viable technologies. (Becker 1993b: 56) Here at the latest, Becker's analytic method-which he claims lies at the heart of his economic approach-reveals itself as a normative guiding principle; and the theorist of human capital is seen as a political economist.

Goldscheid equated calculability and humanity; he responded to critics by insisting that human life would only be treated with care when viewed as capital. Becker and Schultz are themselves convinced that the rising significance of human capital-a pointer to the "knowledge society"-will lead to a more humane treatment of human beings. But just as Menscbenohonomie offered arguments both for health insurance and for the murder of incurably ill people, the theory of human capital alternates between a grammar of care and one of toughness.

It inverts Goldscheid's regulatory zeal Into a complaint, presented in ever new variations, that there are too many regulations. Becker thus populistically denounces especially that institution Goldscheid viewed as essentially anticipating human-economic organization: social secunty, It encourages, he argues, "many families to count on the. government .to provide their retirement income rather than saving for their old age while they are working" (Becker and Becker 1997: 96).

Becker consistently responds to moral indignation over the amorality of his economic approach by referring to its heuristic power, and in fact empirical evidence for his as-if anthropology is not lacking. His analysis of fertility has thus found practical confirmation in private eugenics (or "liberal eugenics," as jurgen Habermas 120031 calls it), which has long been an everyday practice. The lower the number of children per parents and the higher the costs the parents invest in their qualification, the more imporrant the quality of the raw producr becomes and the more probable it is thar children With prenatal diagnosable maladies Or handicaps will remain

261

unborn. In some countries, the embryo only needs to have the "wrong" sex for an abortion to follow or, if preimplantation genetic diagnostics is used, for implantation simply not to rake place. Individual managemenr of quality has stepped in for rerroristic selecrion by the state. One may full,y support the right of a mother to decide ro abort an embryo with Down s syndrome, but there can be no doubt that this decision is an individua l eugenic choice.

For the advocates of Menschenokonomie before and afrer rlie Great War, the state sovereign no longer simply functioned as an ideal. total ca.pitalist who tried to accumulare organic added value, bur also decided which life was ro be approved for destruction as "unworthy of being lived." In contrast for the advocates of human-capital theory, each individual not only becomes a capitalist but also a sovereign over himself. Wirh each of his actions he maximizes his individual benefit, but also exercises the power, to again take up Foucault's formulation, "to make live and t~ l~t di~.ll ..

Ar this point if not before, neoliberal governmenrality s blopolltlcal dimension, as pointed ro by Foucault, becomes apparent. Long before the relevant procedures had become operational on a ma~slve scale, ~e l~entified the logic of selection following from rhe coupling of genetic diagnostics with economization of the individual: "as soon. as ~ society p~s~s itself the problem of the improvement of its human capital 111 general, It IS inevitable that the problem of the conrrol, screening, and improvement of the human capital of individuals, as a function of Unions and consequent reproduction, will become actual, or at any rate, called for" (Foucault 2008: 228). . . .., h h f That with its generalized principle of urilitv maXI~lzat.l~n, t e r eory ~ human capital radicalizes political economy into b,opolmcal economy, IS evident not only in questions of family planning It also describes individuals' approach to their own healrh as the consequence of deCISions regardll1~ investment and disinvestment. "Corresponding to the economIC approa;h,.

Becker explains bluntly, "most (if not all!) dearhs are ro some exrenr SUIcides' in the sense that they could have been postponed If more .re~our~es had been invested in prolonging life" (Becker 1976: 10, emphasis In anginal). Blaming the victim here rules: whoever is sick has nor adequat~ly looked afrer his health; whoever falls vicrim ro an accident or cri rne ought to have better seen to his or her security. Whate.ver one does or allows always involves an encounter between tWO competing preferences: G

d health and a long life are important aims of most persons, but than a moment's reflection is necessary to convince sure 1y no more h b h Ith or a an one that they are not the only aims: some'.'" at. ertcr ea. lo:ger life may be sacrificed because rhey conflict with other; In15...

Therefore, a person may be a heavy smoker or so c~m.mltte to ~vo~ as to omit all exercise, not necessarily ~ecause h.e IS Ignorant 0 t e "" rcapable" of using the Information he possesses, but consequences or II 00

k

262

Ulrich Brockling because the lifespan smoking Ot working

Human Economy, Human Capital forfeited is not worth the cost to him of quitting less intensively. (Becker 1976: 9-10)

The sovereign decision over life and death here splits itself up into a multiplicity of micro-decisions, through which the individual shortens or lengthens his life. Every cigarette: a small death sentence; every time you go jogging: a small stay of execution,

4. CONCLUSION: THE ECONOMIC

GOVERNMENT

OF LIFE

Goldscheid's Menschenokonomie and the theory of human capital can be read in parallel, not least because both analyze individual life and the population as a whole in rigorously economic terms. The starting point is the same, an identification of human life with the capability to choose, and with the

necessity of doing so: "Life means wanting and the deepest sense of wanting is to be able to choose," declares Goldscheid apodictically, thus anticipating the utilitarianism of the human-capital theorists, extended across all realms of life. Becker und Schultz would most likely also agree with the second of Goldscheid's anthropological axioms, "the characteristic quality of our nature is that we not only can choose but also must choose" (Goldscheid 1921: 7, emphasis in original). The compelling outcome of the double condi-

tion humaine of "freedom" and "necessity" to choose-and

this conclusion

is also shared by the two economic theories-is that human beings are as in need of government as they are governable: the person who can rationally choose and must choose will make his or her decisions dependent on the structure of incentives. For this reason, behavior can be far more efficiently steered by controlling the incentives than through a repressive truncation of choices. The governmentalization of life here has its basis. To be sure, Goldscheid on the one hand, and Becker and Schultz on the other hand, derive very different rationalities of government from this: where for Goldscheid science, translating the developmental laws learnt from nature into psychotechnology and social technology, serves as the highest authority of good government, Becker and Schultz rely on the "permanent economic tribunal" of the market as a standard for governmental action (Foucault 2008: 247).

In his lectures, Foucault analyzes the theory of human capital as a variant of neoliberal govern mentality. The interferences between the "economic approach to human behavior" and governmental regimes that have become hegemonic in most Western COuntries since the 19805 are in fact evident, and have been frequently described On the basis of Foucault's reading of the texts of Becker and Schultz. The present essay has argued that the expansion of economic rationality to all realms of life necessarily radicalizes political economy into biopolitical economy-that the neoliberal interpellation of the entrepreneurial self also takes in a capitalizarion of one's own life.

263

I' Foucault Rudolf Goldscheid's draft of if we are to be ieve hi g' that does not exist: a socialhenok: ie documents somet In , a Mensc eno onom di g German Social Democracy s , In an excursus ISCUSSID . ' I ist governmenta ity. . di F It observes that in all as van'M rxist rra ItlOO oucau . f departure rom as a '. tionaliry and that It can ,. b I es an economic ra I , . ants, socialism dou tess pursu ., ' rionality But he indicates, hi . a1 and adrninistrauvc ra d also be accor d e d istortc , I'" (Foucault 2008: 93) an it "lacks an intrinsic governmenta~/a~~e~~~~ntality, say liberal forms or has always leaned on other forms g, ri police state rhe absence of , fa hyper-a d mimstra tve 'f h h the governmenra Iiry 0 b ' g compensated or t roug .

1" t art of governance em M an indepen d enr socia IS Id I inrer pret Goldscheid's en, f ic r xts We cou a so I . invocation 0 canonic e " f lib I and welfare-police state set schenokonornie as such a bncolage 0 I .iali "was not something that h ' n of "true sOCIa Ism pieces, although r e quesno h averse to any party orthodoxy. preoccupied this private scholar, ;as suggests anorher reading: GoldIn any case, the reconstructIOn o~ ere e,re b th socialist and biopolitical, , nmentalay th at IS 0 . scheid out Iines a gover li d that constructs an economic In contrast,

'l

t~

that follows the principle of mutua ity, an lasring usage, and shared , " f I'f on preventIve care, . . . rationalization 0 I e up d solidanty are ItS rna xrrns, h ourees Progress an . f safeguarding 0 uman res. " bili principle. Human-economic . f ic capital Its mo I mng isrn b accumulation 0 organ di I lrernarive to capita1Jsm ut on an socialism is not focused on a r~ tea a h I I bili ro society as a woe. , If expansion of ca ICll a I ity " ie a nd the theory of human capita arm

MenschenokonomIe a f nee between which the , ationahtles 0 governa k d I the two camp irnenrary r "b' olitieians oscillate: mar et an Ii st cenrurles lOp "e twentieth an d twenty- r I 'd nce or self-orgamzatlon, ar plan, invisible and visible hand, c~~~~~or~~'toagovern human life economithe poles berween which nearly a Goldscheid's

cally are located. , ' resented here is perhaps more n Another outcome of rhe OPPOSlrlO p rnmenrality have focused on , nalyses 0 fgove f b' important: untIl now, most a, 'alities and modes 0 su Jee' I echamsms ration, d h y f distilling the unetlOna m d ategies, In other wor s, r e t I programs an srr and rifieation of governmen a d I r patterns of governance . have been interested in rhe rules ahn regu a of sudden change in which 'on- for t ose pOlOrs h r of not in the state 0 f excep t I. I d' to economic terms, testa e fail Trans ate 10 d' s to the routines of governance, I'ty suspended in it correspon 109 , .. s and the norma I . exception means cnst , d' and consumption. the economic equilibrium of pro ucnon I heory also operate with models Menschenokonomie and human-capita bt tween costS and the returns of 1

of equilibrium.

For Goldscheid a 1~~I~;~:c;nomy.

For Schulrz and Becker: organic capital IS the telos of a p , rves as a heuristic principle. Gold the assumption of market equlhbflum :~urit ro a model of developmentalscheid raises rhe muruahsm ofdSO~la~s gen:ralize self-regulation throu;h economic justice; Schultz an. eC er dium of social integration. Nel.t edr l 1 nd demand into a Unlversa me "and yet it is inSCribe supp yak d Schultz refer ro a cnSlS, Goldscheid nor Bec er an

264

Ulrich Brockling

into both

their

theories.

value

in the framework

tion.

As indicated,

were considered feited.

of the interwar

Menschenokonomie

those

whose

"ballast

for a reckless

calculating

balance

murderous out

set for the long term,

of human-capital competitive

theory

struggle

lifeselec-

negatively had been for-

came

whose right to existence

seemingly

1993a)

period,

legitimized

cost-benefit

existences"

crisis,

(Becker

as an apology

In the crisis of

In the present

imperialism"

Human Economy, Human Capital

the

has

"economic

revealed

of all against

itself

all.

If

the

markets threaten to collapse, maximization of benefits becomes a zero-sum game and homo ceconomicus "a wolf to man."

At this

point,

constitutive with

Agamben's

linkage

the critique

connects

only

for everyone

economy

his own

else"

offered

realm

If

through

1998:

agent,

Agamben

figure from

of the

the human

Hobbes'

and state

having

he suggests,

renounced

the only

their

one to have

has not

potential

for

retained

his

the Hobbesian scenario hidden in the evident.

If it promotes each person to a

it declares him in the same breath to be homo sacer: as an acting

the individual

disposes

of others, with legal sanctions his calculations

as opportunity

external

he is thrown

depending

pages.

Correspondingly,

64). The sovereign,

others

we follow this argumentation, of human capital becomes

sovereign,

expelled

together

to every form of violence,

violence.

violence, but inversely through his being natural right to do anything to everyone. theory

in these mythological

once

of the

comes

view, "not so much a war of all against all as, in which everyone is bare life and a homo sacer

(Agamben

his position

deconstruction

sovereignty

to the

monster

in a law-free

through

of nature is, in Agamben's more precisely, a condition gained

and

animal-human

exposed

surviving

discussed

biopolitics

homo homini lupus

a hybrid

community,

previously

of biopolitical

Hobbes'

werewolf:

between

action,

on someone-whether

it. If life becomes

an economic

as he pleases

over

his own

or other consequences costs. back

As the

to the status

ego

or

function,

object

of hath

of "bare

after-being disinvestment

life and

over

that

of his actions entering his own

life,"

available

amounts

and

his existence to invest

in

to death.

NOTES 1. According to the definition of its most prominent spokesman, Johann Hei. nrich Gotrlob von Justi, the Po/iui comprised "all regulations and arrangements in the country's inner affairs through which the state's general assets are more enduringly grounded and made more usable ro the benefit of the state, the assets of the private person are increased and more precisely and effectively connected to the general advantage, and the powers of the state (or furthering the happiness of all can be mOre fully activated in general."

According to ]usti, the task of authorities governing according to the insights of Po/izeiwisscuschaft was to incrc<lse both real estate and goods and chattels, together with the "moral state of the subjects," with the aim of "happiness for the entire state" (Justi 1760: 6-"10). The nature of the countryside, natural resources, roads, population, agrarian production, trade, commerce,

265

... hall C ual clements of a functionally and public ad~lnIstr"atlOn were erc be i~strumentalized by the state and ld coherent whole In which a,l1 part~~~~alize had a right (0 existence. only parts the state could mstru N f (2009). Fritz and Mikl-Horke 2. On Goldscheid's biography ahnd(2~~~)S~f ·s~~hacker (2000); Korner (1976); (2007); Wltrlsal (2004); As , et and Tennies (1932/1998). diff irh Max Weber Goldscheid being h . d h unbridgeable I erence WI , '1 ·t) 3. T. is c.onsurure t.e _ II d vaiue-iud menr controversy (WertHr~el s5.trel his chief opponent In the so ca e J g d d i 1912 with Webers restgnahe contro~er~y en : ~~nigsheim 1959}. within German sociology. se tion from the German Society for SOCIO g~ ( If-optimization public enlightI h man-economic se '. .

4. In order to s~ur peop e to u Not the least of its goals was con~munlcatll1g enment was In turn necessary. d I connections of SOCial phenoru"insight into the numerically reco~d~ causasociety's self-knowledge," Goldlarize "stansncs as a . . I d " ena." In or d er to popu . hi epresentation of stansnca ata"; scheid proposed the "CIl1~mato.grap IC r"the living curve, the living chart, what her~ ~a~e inro"conslder~~\~n1;~;~ 210, 212). . . . . and the living Image (Goldsc d tor Social Democratic politician acnve 5 Julius Tandler was an Ausman . oc , . I h iene movement; he rook lip . in health issues, and protagoni~~klll the ~acla werlgas his demand for "qual itaGoldscheid's idea of Menscheno ono~~le a~ble selection of coupling human h I· licv." Althoug a senst dooi f la tive popu anon po ICy. "verthe1ess from the stan pomr 0 popu beings" was hard to carry out, ~e . least excluding those cases of . . . d d have an mteresr In add nd tion policies we 1Il ee . h tainty that the escen ants a reproduction in which we can s<? w~ ;:~erative transgressions" (Tandler o t general public will have to pay 9 ;8 ). ~ er (1988: 86-88); Sablik (1983) ..

1924· 17-18 20). See Weikert (1 , Y he i terwa r period see Faulstich . '. f i it rional costS In t e In b 6. On the diSCUSSIOn 0 1l1StI U. f f Mellschenokonomie even eca me an (1998: 79-109). In 1936 thiS orm 0 h- ear upils: "A mentally ill person exercise in a math book fo~ tht:~- ~~ s~~, ~ cri~inal 3.50 R.M daily Il1sntucauses around 4 RM, a cnpp official has at most 4 RM dally, .an em~loyee tional costs. In many cases an k hardl 2 RM for the entire famtly. a) barely 3 RM, an uneducated. war er A Yd·ng to careful estimations there . phlc form ccor I . ' .

I Present these fi gures In gra '·1' s etc in German IOstltutlOna 300000 mentally ill persons, epl eptlC , f 4 R' M'-c) How many marare, llyatarateo .. )" care. b) What do they cost annlla Id b ted annually with thiS money. . loans at 1000 RM each cou e gran nage .

07 103) _ (quored in FaulstICh 1998:!

-~che's rext Agamben (2002: 14)~152) d 7. In his analysis o~ BlIl.dll1g s a7 H eh exclusively on Bindin?'s /u",:ldlcal focuses, i.n line With hiS genef~h:~ftr~~d handicapped, overlooklllg hiS ecolegitimation of the murder 0 ."" nomic definition of "life unworthy?f 1Jvlllg~ent extend back to classical eco8. The toors of human-capital theory;n :e7h:ory see pfahler (2000, 7-45). On nomics' for a histotlcal overview 0 ~ 'nvestment in human capnal, see the pre~ent-day discussion of eduCatI01.l as l d Development (2001). an Organization for Economic . Co-operation

:r

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online

13 Decentering the Economy Governmentality Studies and Beyond?

at: hrr '/Iwww

Urs Staheli

pdf (acc:';ed Jul;

Have economics and the economy always already been posrsrrucruralisr?

In Foucault's lectures on governmentaliry, he introduces economics as a discipline

without

a center:

[E]conomics is a discipline without God; economics is a discipline without totality; economics is a discipline that begins to demonstrate not only the pointlessness, but also the impossibility of a sovereign point of view over the totality of the state that he has to govern. (Foucault 2008: 282) This confronts discourse analysis and governmentality studies with a problem-at least if we assume that one of the aims of discourse analysis lies in showing the heterogeneous assemblage which constitutes a totality or an abstraction such as the market.' One might ask: Why and how to decenter a totality which has never been a totality? Or, what might a critique of sovereignty contribute to economic analysis if modern economics has never conceived of the economy as a sovereign realm? I want to argue that the design of a poststructuralist account of the economy depends upon the nature of how it understands the "decentering the economy," and that this understanding affects the empirical analysis of governmental technologies.

1.

Foucault's description of economics is certainly quite surprising, considering the strange relation between postsrructuralism and economy. Politics, law, art, and even science have become objects of deconstructive and discourse analytical readings-only the economy has been neglected for quite a long time. While Ernesro Lac1au and Chantal Mouffe's (1985) seminal book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy offered an outline of a comprehensive political theory of hegemony in the 1980s, it took more than ten years to suggest a radical rethinking of liberal and Marxist notions of the

270

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Urs St.dbeli

economy. This rethinking is exemplified by Gibson-Graham's The End of Capitalism (1997) and the success of governmentality studies.

This delay of a poststructuralist analysis of economic processes is no coincidence; rather, it is due to the very success of poststructuralist political and social theory. Turning poststructuralism into a social analytics meant fighting against any form of economism; it was the attempt to develop a post-Marxist social theory. One of the effects of these endeavors was to identify and criticize the economy as the place of essentialism and substantialism. Thus, the economy became a no-go area. Should one-against better advice-decide to visit the place of the economy, chances were high to become infected by the virus of essentialism.

The disavowal of the economy and economic practices as a legitimate subject of poststructuralist theorizing resulted in an over-politicized theory of society. This becomes very clear in Laclau and Mouffe's deconstruction of Marxism, which tried to break with any idea of the economy as determining force-or, as a last instance that would eventually govern all social processes. Such a move was crucial for getting the necessary conceptual space for thinking the political construction of social identities.

In that sense, the theory of hegemony turned into a deconstructive social and political theory: now it became possible to think the contingency of identities, and to think precarious identities beyond any naturalized foundations. Thus, deconstructing Marxism created the conceptual space for a decentering of political identities. Such a poststructuralist analysis of the political implied doing without any necessary link between the economy and the political. One of the more unhappy effects of such a deconstruction was that the very concept of the economy has not really been challenged.

Instead of deconstructing the economy, it was quarantined.

It kept on living as a self-contained sphere, considered to be successfully and safely isolated from other spheres of society. The threat of economic contagion was believed to be banned! However, putting the economy aside in such a way was nothing less than a late victory of "essentialism."

The economy was not deconsrrucred, but became the undeconstructable other-the essentialist evil-of poststructuralist theory. Either it was made invisible or it haunted the analysis of identities as the spectre of a suppressed reality. One of the merits of govern mentality studies is to put the economy back on the screen of pOststructuralist theorizing.

In what follows, I Want to specify how govern mentality studies try to decenter economics and the economy.' In order to do this, I will introduce two different starting points of a poststructuralist understanding of the economy. This will lead me to a critique of certain versions of the idea of governmentality, which tend to neglect the self-reference of economic operations.

My reading of govern mentality studies is not a reading from "within." During my work on financial discourses, I found it very useful to combme tools from governmental studies with deconstructive concepts and approaches of systems theory, in order to aCcount for boundary conflicts:

the Economy

271

d for drawing the boundary between the which techniques are being use) Thi Iso means that my reading cannot economic and the non-econOmic.

IS a". '''3 be more than a-hopefully productivemisreading.

2. SUBSTANTIAL

AND FORMAL

ECONOMY

y has to situate itself within existAny attempt at decentering the ecofnohm h been the distinction between di h .

One 0 t ese as . I ing conceptua I IC otormes.

(W-Ik 1996). NeociasSica . I id f the economy I a formal and substantia I ea a hi h assumes a space of pure lif h f mal account w IC thinking exemp I es t e or. di ' the economy is basically con.

I' Within this para Igm, d economic rationa iry, d I Thi del was originally base on . f arket mo e.

IS mo If f ceived of 10 terms 0 am. _ During the second ha 0 .

II I lating economiC man.

3 the idea of rattona y ca cu id R . and Jack Amariglio (200 ) . ' what Davl UCCIO , the twentieth century-m , lution"-systemic ideas of market CqUIcalled the second "formalist revo. as the starting point of eco. . d h d ., g econom IC rna n f libriurn replace t e esirm h di b d economic processes rOI11 .

F I pproac es rsem e _ nomic theory. orma 1St a k b comes a machine of abstrac. I' . - ns-the mar et e cultural and socia insntuno 'S' the market is seen as all . mic practices. lOce . . h tion, reproducing pure econo f - ds of individual decision, t e -m- gout 0 myna , emergent phenomenon, ans , fi n with firm boundanes. an object 0 Its ow . - h economy is t h oug h t a f as di f the economy ormctzes t e .al understan mg 0 _.

K I In contrast, a su b sranu .

The classic posmon IS ar hi ica! abstractton.

Wh formal model as an a isrori _ b ddi of economic processes. at - f the dis/ern e mg hPolanyi's (1944) ana Iysts 0 d is now seen as a isronlays alrea y given, formal narratives present as, a w f h k t and its self-regulation are not di bddngotemare .II cal process. The isem e I . f historical cnSIS. Eventua y, '" d f I b t expreSSIOns 0 a I d simply universa rna e s: u. of cultural and social spheres: In,stea .0 this leads to an eCOOOffilzatlOn d i - I relations these relatlonshlps . b - embedde In socia , the economic system emg _ 1" (Polanyi 1944: 170). were now embedded in the economic systedn standings-a "formal" and a b these tWO un er 1 - The distinction etween . I been highly contested. Stil , It IS a pow"substantial" model-has certain y . f the formation of econorruc erful distinction that con figur es the terrain_ 0 of the economy WI'11 try to li t concepnon , discourse. Any poststructura IS d e to their different srarung . . d' - t on However, u -II dff overcome this dualistic rsnnc I 路od a enealogy of the economy WI . ~ er points a deconsrructive approach ~ g h wa poststructuralist critique consid~rably. To put it differently,lt ~~~e~~t\~een a substantial and formal of the dichotomy crosses the dlStl71ct that govern mentality studies start understanding of the economy.! WI f a~gue del in their genealogical read mg. from a substantial understanding 0 t e mo ted in the formal side of the h are not Interes 'd I h This does not mean t at t ey I _ I t sk begins on the other Sl e. n h' na yttca a h distinction, but only that t elr a h etical attemptS at overcommg t e nd systems t eor contrast, deconstructlve a f r t idea of the economy. dichotomy start off with the orma IS

272

Vrs Stiibeli

Decentering the Economy

3. POST-SUBSTANTIAL

ECONOMY

becomes

Governmentality studies try to arrive at a post-substantial understanding of the economy. They emphasize the heterogeneous network of practices and discourses within which economic practices are formatted and generated. Notably, the separation of politics and the economy is seen as political distinction: "Instead, the constitution of a conceptually and practically disringuished sphere (i.e., the economy, US), governed by autonomous laws and a proper rationality is itself element of 'economic' government" (Lemke 2002: 57). Any economic operation is always already embedded within political struggles and power technologies, thus not leaving intact the idea

of a pure economy. It is important to distinguish the notion of "economic from "governing the economy" (Miller and Rose 1990). Economic government refers to the rationality of governing, e.g., the efficient government"

usage of political

resources.

What is more central

to my argument

is what

"governing the economy" entails. Since there can be no "economic sovereignty," it is impossible to govern the economy directly: the market remains intransparenr and inaccessible. At the same time, it is emphasized that markets do not evolve naturally and that the existence of markets depends on fortunate circumstances.

What Foucault has shown in his analysis of German ordo-libera lism is that the market is a precarious, formal mechanism, made possible by governmental technologies.

However, these technologies do not directly aim at the market: One has to govern for the market (Foucault 2008: 121) by adapting one's devices to an imaginary market. In turn, the market becomes a measure that decides about the "quality" of governmental programmes and techniques. That is why Foucault speaks about the "market test" of neoliberal technologies: the market defines what is politically working or not, what is seen as efficient and what is able to foster the ideal market (ef. Foucault 2008: 246; Tellmann 2003). The economy confronts governmental rationalities with the problem of how to govern what cannot be governed. Thus, the assumption of a self-organizing market, which cannot be governed, comes surprisingly close to Foucault's political interest in ways of not being governed so much.' The success of governmentality studies in no small part arises from the fruitful confrontation of political sovereignty and the impossibility of economic sovereignty. Foucault's analysis of the "invisible hand" points precisely at this constitutive gap: It is not the "hand" which interests him, but rather the "invisibility" of this hand.' Putting emphasis on the hand would still imply maintaining a theological model of a control. However, control has become invisible and the market is constitutively intransparent-it seems that it is this invisibility which also affects Our understanding of the economic sphere.

Strictly speaking, the economy, just as it is prefigured in economic knowledge, is nor able to constitute a totality of its Own. "fElconomics is a discipline without totality" writes Foucault, as I have quoted previously. If one agrees with this analysis, then the idea of the economization of the social

highly

. problematic:

There

273

is neither an economic sphere which economic "super-coding" and

simply spreads to other social areas, ~.or ~n an economic logic. The reason reconfiguring

all social spheres accor ing 011 ontaminated by other disItself IS essenna y c . . h for this is that t e economy" "I bl to purify itself from ItS rrncro. const!tUtlve y una e " courses: the economy IS .'

"Governing the economy, " rhetic underpinnings I d political an micro-aes f bl pportunities for this strange rea m 1 to create avora eo.

6 then, can on y mean , f overnmental technologies. which remains a dark contlOen~ or g . man governmentality studf If" I, analysis 0 f economiC, Following Foucau t s fi f "the entrepreneur 0 onese . k hasize the gure 0 " f the ies were qutc to e~p .

I This figure is paradigmatlc or as a technology of indirect con~ro . t realm of modern economy hi h the mrransparen "" di new forms of power w IC f di t control was translared Into the In I; requires: The impossibility 0 rrec f d m into a primary technology 0 O reet "conduct of conduct"-turmng re: h s proved ro be a very successful f h "entrepreneur a , c control. The figure 0 tel d to suffer from its excessive su analytical tool, which, ho":ever, a so ~nt ~as not been analysed in (er~s of cess. There is nearly no sO.Clalsphere t a nd her/his decisions, the SClen~e a ho becomes responsi ibl e f0 r his "entrepreneuna "I" Ism:"be It the consumer \' h social-care C lent, w " Wh t has entrepreneur or even t e f hi success lies in its uniformity: . a . own well-being. The problem 0 t IS nderstanding of ecortormzattou , started off as a critique of a ~~molgehneous ~neous figure of the entrepreneur, ith surprising y omog fi Id tends to en d up Wit a I I" s to a pluraliry of e s. whose formal logic of contrO app re

4. POST-FORMAL

ECONOMY

"

(note " . overnmenta I路Ity "as post-substantial After this draft of eco,nomlc g tive I will now briefly turn to a postthe similarity to Polany i S crisrs n~rra ri )iism is interested in the precariOUS formal perspective. While post-su sftan ;:ibility of a self-regulated markelt, "" 0 po " pOInL "A good examp" e political an d cu Itura I conditions diff rent starting post-formalism" proceeds from ~ ~o~x's analysis of financial speculatllon: of such a posrnon IS Jean-Josef f as the idealized market of neoc aSk The stock market does not on y gU~~le new way of thinking: "the stoc sica I theory, but also introducets akwI"ng about this new paradigm which wars di " What IS s n "" I ess to pos exchange-para igrn. d f the nineteenrh century, "ISIrs c ~se~ ", which established at the en 0 " d mental instability 0 f va ue, , structuralist thinking: The fun a ds to an endless deferral of meamng characterizes thiS. para diIg m 'Gcorrespon1997: 161). The stoC k exc h an ge parad in poststructuralist accounts (d OU\nancial economy has alway~ alrea ~ di ill, then, assumes t~at rna ern f the missing "rea!" fau.n atlon 0 7 be~n decentered: PreCisely betaus; floucruating chain of price dlfferences he stock quotes, it gener;tes ahnt:,:a~uite different modes of dec~nt~~li~~ :he We are confronte Wit d" d center the market by em e economy: Governmentaltty stu ICS e

274

Decentering the Economy

Urs Stabeli

invisible economy within heterogeneous networks of power; post-formalism, in contrast, is interested in how economic self-reference disembedds itself. What does this mean? Governmentaliry studies assume, at least in principle, that the idea of a self-regulating market would be possible, provided adequate control technologies have been established-in principle, because govern mentality studies circumvent the very problem of theorizing the economy by exclusively focusing on an empirical analysis of technologies for governing the economy. In doing so, govern mentality studies have to deal with a paradox: on the one hand, they aim at radically historicizing the economy, thus pursuing a "happy positivism"; on the other hand, there are theoretical assumptions being made about governing of the self and implicitly about the economy, By analysing "neo-liberal" technologies of government, this tension becomes most clear: Such technologies presuppose the idea of the economy as self-regulated social sphere, This idea is rightly seen as a historical discursive construction-but what does this imply?

The first answer, which some positions of governmentality studies seem to cling to without spelling it out, is a redressed version of ideology critique: The construction of the self-regulated market is an ideological model, shaped by neoliberalist rationalities, for enabling new modes of government. Such an answer is, from a discourse theoretical perspective, highly problematic, since it does not take seriously what the historical discourse of the market does. The second answer is more in line with a Foucauldian perspective and emphasizes the performativity of economic discourses: discourses construct and constitute the very market they are describing (e.g., Calion 1998)-and this construction does not content itself with being a political myth that enables governmental practices. Taking seriously the very idea of performativity means to account for how economic constructions acquire a life of their own, It is precisely now that the need for theorizing the economy arises-not in the sense of an objectivist and a-historical notion of the economy, but as an analyrics of the becoming self-referential of economic practices, Such a theoretical move, however, entails loosening economic practices from a supposedly privileged function for political rationalities, however broadly defined, Instead, it is about focusing on the genealogy of economic practices and the constitution of the economy as self-referential social sphere. This is not an argument for discovering "pure" economic logics, but for looking at the discursive and cultural constitution of self-referential modes of the economy, It is such an argument about the performativity of economic discourses which would force govern mentality studies to go beyond an analysis of (micro-)political.

Doing so without a theoretical understanding of the economy, however, makes it impossible to understand the working and the failure of the "invisible economy." Economic failure would always be an empirical and political failure, leaving even open the possibility of a perfect market: If there were, hypothetically, a discourse which successfully institutes an "efficient market," governmentality studies would have to cling to a historical description of such a market.

275

the dynamics which I have called "self-disembedding" ork In contrast , I' h ' t mplya neo-c assifrom within the economy. post-forma Ism, t us, IS no Sl " hi h calor systems theoretical description of the economy; a description w IC. would accept the possibility of clearly distinguishing betwee~ afndeconotn~~ system and its environment. Rather, it locates the potentia 0 WI

and irritation within

Ils~~~~eir eco~~mic th::~:I:et~~;~n~~:i~l~ processes

~;onomy

(micro-)political precond~tlOns'v~7~;:t~hCea~sed by an impossible economic chang~s: It ISnot so.m~c'b~~ IOwhich has been transformed into the uncersovereignty, but an 1l1 VISI ~.I Y bout an "impossible economic sovereignty" S ta inty of the market. pea mg a f iant still adhering to the posimplies a somewhat nostalgic Idea 0 sovereIgha['(for some: unfortunately) h sibility of a political economy,t ose u~lty have given up this nostalgiabecome impossible, post-forma approac es d to i I de I d Is of the economy ten to Imp 0 ' and focus on how forma mo e ch emphasize the plurality of I lew does not so mu f Thus, t h e post- orma v fren i d'rectly-govern the economy , , hori ' hi ch try to-O ten in I , political aut orines w I 'II d R 1990) Rather it trres ro , ' ( f MI er an ose ' , or economic organizations .c. f' . ibl economic practices. To put it look at the internal dynamics 0 Idnvlsi he ery nature of economic selfoff I h iew IS mrereste m t e v d di erent y, sue a VI [erenti lit of the economy goes beyon a " the self-re erenna I y , h reference, Emp asistng , fiR ther it helps to problematlze , f I d t ding 0 c osure. a , , classical orma un ers an ich have-often invisibly-found their way those formal assumptions whic I' Wh Foucault emphatically points at into the concept of governmenta .ty, f ehn ket he tends to follow toO , If I tory nature 0 t e mar , the precarious se -regu a .. hi h h analyzes: capitalism is seen as a closely the ordo-liberal pOSItions w IC ."

II produced contradictions ossibility which does not suffer from interna , y p iet nositions would have It. , as, for example, Mar-xist poslfl raliy studies lie precisely In the " " 0 govern men I The conceptua cost~ ., nom. This status produces a con~epambiguous status of the invisible eco , O h one hand it is emphasized , h i diff It to navigate nt e , d tual aporia whic IS I cu f' , since it is always alrea y b sphere 0 ItS own . that the economy cannot e a d F Idian analysis of "neo-hberh ther han a oucau , 1 political economy; on teo . '. l here which cannot be dIrect y a alism" has to assume that therebls s~clahscPh 'ISpresupposed by neoliberal " h' " VISl lI Ity WI. I governed since It IS t IS 111 ..

I discourses is precise y '.

Th' closeness to emplflca . technologies of power.

IS, " Th s the very assumption of an "h ble" hlstoflClsm. u, . the danger 0 f a urn Oft of imaginary economIc . . 'bT " resupposes some s "ungovernable Invisl I Ity P, db olitical sovereignty. purity which is not yet con~amlOate an imminent analysis of ec?A post-formal perspective starts d' rhe excess of self-reference, m 'I' It s Intereste m bl' nomic self-referentla Ity. I ,,, of self-reference, Think of gam Ing the augmentation and "overheating ctacle of wild contingency. , h'ch generates a spe k I and financial specu atiOn, W I h tury were not simply struc ' 'the seventeenr cen , h Descriptions of gam bl Ing m , b b h shocking observation t at by the irrationaliry of gambling, yo; ;oney. With the introduction gambling celebrates the pure potentia Ity

:it~

.0;,

276

Urs St abeli

of paper money, money became pure representation without any intrinsic value. Marc Shell (1999: 61) notes: "A piece of paper money is almost always a representation, a symbol that claims to stand for something else."

Financial speculation shares with gambling this fascination for the potentiality of the medium of money. A true speculator is not so much interested in the instrumental value of money: it is not only greed, laziness and lust for profit which motivate him. Rather, it is the enjoyment of the "thrill" of speculation, generated by the self-reference of financial economy, which fascinates the speculator (cf. Sraheli 2007). A speculator resembles, as Georg Simmel (2001 [1900]) has noted, an adventurer who enjoys the suspense of adventure itself-the adventure is not a means for another end, but becomes an end itself.

Financial speculation is probably that set of economic practices which most clearly focuses on economic self-reference, thus becoming a secondorder economy. And it is in financial speculation that the "self-disernbedding" of self-reference becomes exemplarily visible. The excess of the economic finds itself within an excessive self-reference, in the enjoyment of the process of abstraction itself. It is remarkable that financial speculation becomes popular by literally staging the process of abstraction, the "becoming-abstract" of the economy. The excess of the economy is produced by itself; one does not have to assume a pre-economic desire for profit in order to explain these dynamics. It is this excess which becomes the site for struggles about what is seen as the legitimate economy and what is not.

Self-reference, then, cannor be reduced to a figure of c1osure-rarher it generates effects which move outside the realm of meaning. Recent discussions on affect and affectivity (e.g., Massumi 2002; Thrift 2008; Clough er al. 2007) emphasize the strong connection between sel f-reference and affectivity. It is important to note the difference between affect and emotion. Affects are social, but they are pre-individual and non-significarory flows. Affects circulate through social and psychic layers of meaning, without being meaningful themselves (Ahmed 2004). In contrast, emotionssuch as anger, greed, and anxiety-are individualized and normalized social constructions. Speaking about "expressing one's love" points at the individualization of emotions; in contrast, a panic is often described as contagious, i.e., it exists in the movement of contagion, it is intoxicating, but nobody is the origin of the panic.' Affect then also means the capacity of becoming affected, an openness to possible events.

There are two dimensions of affect which are crucial to self-reference.

First, a self·referential system is an emergent system; i.e., it is impossible to deduce the form of self-reference from pre-existing elements. For Massumi, affectivity denotes precisely this ungraspable and indeterminable moment of emergence-the moment, when something new is being created: "This is the turning point at which a physical system paradoxically embodies mUltiple and normally mutually exclusive potentials, only one of

Decentering the Economy

277

. 2002· 32-33) Secondly, affect is not surwhich is 'selected'" (MaSsulm~ed fo;ms of seif-reference. It is regenerated, passed by successfully estab is 'Th loss of a foundation of the .

If f oduces uncertainty. e 'II ' smce se -re erence pr d ' lerates this self-referentia ogre th of foun atlon-acce d economy-or: a my . . d f ar (Clough er al. 2007, rawy of uncertainty, producing InsecSurllft afn ee produces an endless deferral M ' and Parisi) e ore erenc , f ing rom assuml, .. \" ' h as the idea of limitless economic of value. Even political rationa mes sue The logic of economic self-disemnt for this process.

Wh growt h cannot accou f k g of the economy. at · ted by the per ect wor In I I bedding is a ogre genera hi hli hrs is that external foundations a perspective on self-reference g g ter na] to the economy, lose ' I· I programmes ex I Points formulate d 111 po inca I h I gies Technologiesofcontro ' , ' f f ern menta tee no 0 I . their onennng oree or gov lity produced by the economy. . h pond to a tempora I II and regulation ave to res i a nd CI h emphasize rhe new cha enge . h Massumi an oug ."

Affect theorists sue as P becomes "preemptive power, .' h of affect. ower h ' for conceiving t e power . f f '''. "The challenge for t eorres " dulation 0 uturuy: h k b which wor s y a 010 , I t a politics in the present, w en a e d I ' h b ecom es how . to ar .ncu lari of affect, ten, to a preemptive rna u anon . h ent IS set 10 re anon I . what constitutes t e pres . 72) Notably financial speeu anon was of futurity."

(Clough et al. 20~~ich institutionalized such a modulation one of the first SOCial spheres. ' If' the present stock quotes-and . scribes use m d f f of the future. T h e urure m '.

The already discounre urure I lay of uncertamty. , introduces a comp ex p h lineal nature of "pre-emptlve ec~. n Thus t e po I I I" b t s affects the f urure 10 tur . ed fan-economic rationa rues, u I . " not be deduce rom n . nomic power .can with this strange temporality. .' self-produced m the struggle hi hly contested terrain Itselflg This increased self-reference becomhes\a 't of economy are fought. The hi h gles about t e rrrn s fl s a terrain on w IC strug , li ted by self-reference overnow reason for this is that the potentia rry genedra he control technologies of the . f economics an r f d es the established categOries o. h of consciousness, self-re erence 0 economy. Contrary to the phtlosop Y but it also becomes the place not only protect the identity of the eCdonom;~ occur where economic logic d unexpecte even , I I rion where heterogeneous an h w to distinguish financia specu a I runs amok. The long fight about 0 There is no a priori knowledge or from gambling is a good POint ~~dc:~I~w one to take a definitive deCiSion. epistemic foundation which wo ed and its limits are temporatlly fixed The horizon of economiCS IS contest, well as by technologies pollCby competing descriptions of the economy as

'f boundaries becomes thus the center of constructlOnO d f ifying the economic and for . re beIng use or pur I h tes analysis: which strategies a h b mes political is precise y t e con . '" '·b·lity'" W at eco f h economy generating Its lIlVISI I. .' of the horizon 0 t e .. tat ion of economic limit~, the nego~;[1~~ identify in a Foucauldian veIn For doing so, it is certalllly necess ,Y f ower. But that is not t~e whole g,es discursive regularities and tec,hnolo °de~cribe the non-economiC, what story. Those imaginaries which rry to ing these limits.

The ptecarious

278

Urs Stiiheli

Decentering

Laclau called the "constitutive outside" of a discourse, become crucial.

Which semantics and iconologies are being used for describing the nonmarket? Speaking about constitutive exclusions means that it is not a purely empirical exclusion, i.e., not an accidental exclusion. Rather, this exclusion has to be performed, in order for the market discourse to work (Mitchell 2003: 245).9 However, it is only possible to conceive of such a radical exclusion of the non-economic, if one presupposes the-ever failing-attempt at economic totalization, i.e., of generating a sphere of the economy. That is also why systems theoretical concepts are useful for a deconstructive social theory: the strength of systems theory lies in analysing the constitution of a closed social sphere-however,

only a "deconstrucred"

able to note the failure of closure, the undecidabilities constructing a pure economic space.

systems theory is

that are generated

by

Let me summarize the three crucial aspects of a post-formal perspective on the economy. The focus lies on the working of self-reference and processes of abstraction: this creates an endless deferral of value, and produces uncertainty.

Secondly, I have tried to show that increased and accelerated self-reference creates boundary conflicts, which, in turn, call for economic and political technologies of control. Thirdly, there is a close alliance between self-reference and affectivity: self-reference produces an excess of possibilities and starts to oscillate, recalling a vast horizon of potentiality.

This points to the need for grasping technologies of affect, as well as affective technologies.

One aspect of such technologies is the individualization of affects as emotions, which in turn, are at the center of sel f-tech nologies,

5. DECONSTRUCTIVE

GOVERNMENTALITY

[ want to conclude by identifying three conceptual become visible if one observes govern mentality studies mal perspective.

(1) How to Account

for Failing Governmental

problems which from a post-for-

Strategies?

Governmentality studies have produced many precise descriptions of governmental programmes and technologies. But how to account for the ambiguities of these programmes?

The very notion of programme produces an argumentative logic of its own: programmes try to formulate idealized practices which are translated into technologies.

Such an understanding comes quite close to a normative concept of society. Parts of governmentality studies are, of course, aware of this idealized and idealizing logic and try to account for the limits of idealization: a programme does never fully succeed, its "application" is always separated by a gap from the practices it tries to generate. Thus, it is suggested to think of this gap as constitutive

for these technologies:

knowing

the Economy

279

that one does not (yet) fully cor/"st~n~hti~

a governmental logic creates the desi:~~oabpe;I~:;i~~e~e~~:e~~~:CI~o;or of sense, the gap between programme governmental However

technologies (IBr6ck~';t~;rO~:~ ;:~. is a question of empirical It rernams unc ear w .' h ther ' d heir translation into technologies, i.e., w e usage of programm;sb an h: empirical impossibility of fulfilling the governthis gap 1Sg~nerate y~ cis' "Programmes are never seamlessly transmental reqUirements an n~e . 'their rules always means to lared into individual behavior; to appropnate I·) In the process " B .. kli 2007· 40 my trans a tron . modify them as well ( roc mg . f' d and altered through ernpir, h ammes are trans orme of translation, t e progr . h h . I status of these alterations? In . I H what IS t e t eoretica . rca usage.. owever, icmt Der rid (1978) tried to distinguish between his dis.cusslOn of structura.h~~"De~~e ~dea of structure: The first c~iticisJ11 two different modes of cntlclzl~g b . ( g out the empirical Failure of highlights the limits of srructura ISm y pOlIO 10 lity There are always addibli hi f II fledged srructura rota I . d ever esta IS 109 a u y-. b n accounted for. The secon tiona I empirical data which ha~e no~yet ns~~uctive gesture. The empirical criticism is no longer cnncisrn, . uhta ec~ t 1scendental impossibility: the . ·1·· placed Wit a quasi- rat f h impossibility IS now re .d 1· d programme fails because 0 t e . f t t liry or of an I ea ize . construction 0 a 0 a id . This point raises the question impossibility of such an I entity. .

I conceptua I impossi I I . f ental technologies not simp y of how to account for the aponadofigovernm but as an impossibility which .. I h ings or rna I cations, .'

I as ernpmca S ortcomi irnpossihility which ISnot on y . If . hi these programmes, an I h I inscribes itse Wit In . b b h materiality of these tee no 0generated by individual reSistanCe, ut Y t e h . e that the very figure of . I tality studies emp asiz I gies. Certain y, govern men . ibili of ever achieving a ful entre. dri by the unpossi I uy b. the entrepreneur 1S nven fl ib! biecr is being created-a su [ect . l id .

Thereby a eXI e su J . I . H preneuna. I en~Ity.. ' rself. This is certainly a crucI~ POIOt. ~~always reinventmg him- or he . I subject is idenr ified as emplflever the impossibility of the entrepreneubrla t chllologies of impossibility, ' ·b·l· ~ t it briefly· It IS a out e .

I h cal impossl I Ity. 0 pu . .. ·f these technologies. Taking serious y t e but not about the ImposslbJlJty 0 I. ld however challenge the tal techno ogles wou , ' Id f impossibility 0 governmen . h' ernmenrality studies. It wou . . . f h research Wit 10 gov on empiriCiSm 0 muc f·1 as a theorectical category, e.g., ccount for al ure I . become necessary to a " h iterability of techno ogles. the basis of impossible totalization or as t e for Se If- R egu latory Markets? .. d. enralit studies are primanly mrereste In I have tried to show that governm k Y Inewhat neglecting the mecha. of the mar et, so h . db the political construction .. and self-control. This is emp aSlze Y nisms of economic self-refer~n.t1~hty ossible to govern the economy. Instead, Foucault's assumption th,ar It IS Im~ favorable conditions for the market. it is about to govern society crea~l ern mentality studies would have to But what then, is "the" economy. ov

(2) How to Account

J

280

Decentering the Economy

Urs Stiiheli

e ~~~::~I:t~U~i:~:.~~it;e~~il:~~~s::ot:ke~r:~i:egl~:e~c.a~s: tthb economy is an f the anal si h I·· I ' a ecomes part 0 · y IS are t e po inca conditions and the embedding of IfI

non, but not the operation and the rechni

f

.

se

reg~ a-

tion. It is this "invisibility" whi h h iques 0 economic self-organizanearly exclusively into the1~. PIlls e,s a governmental analyrics, often the economy 10 T'h·s I ffcer alhn y widely defined-political aspects of .

I a so a ects "mark fail The political control paradigm ;f gOW mar et . ai u res" are thought of. l governmental strategies that are no overnmenta iry would P~l~t at failing evolution of complex k h t able to guarantee conditions for the however would remal·nmar et mec dan ISms. The logic of the market itself, , u nconteste · I do not simply emphasise the self-r f f .

IS "missing" f . e erence 0 the economy because It rom governmenrality studies R th I . problem since man c . ~ ee, am interested in this f ful tools for analy{;n;~~~rts gove~nmentahty studies could be very useerentiality may become th ore erentra processes. If we accept that self-refthen the following questi e space °df excess (be it meaningful or affective), · on IS raise . How to deal with d ibl I It? Studying financial s ec I· ..

J an POSSI y contra technologies of "purifi~a/ a,:,on, qbuestlons like this become central: which Ion are emg used for pt d . . operations (in contrast flo UClOg pure economic , or examp e to mere .

Which discourses of fun t· I· .' , non-economic gambling)? · C rona izanon are being d f id i fi cia I speculation with a . use or provi mg nanproper economic functio h h . of prices? In contrast to I n-suc as t e production a systems theoretical a I· hi . need to account for the d . f na ysrs, t IS points to the pro uction a societal f .

A d a Iso ask which technologies f b d unctions. n one might , or oun ary mainten I df ea 109 with "improper" ance are emp oye or d I economic events (such a f . . or gambling)? What these rruest i s counter errs, corruption . e questions show is that th hasis i hif d the analysis of modes f bi ificari e emp asis IS site f rom · 0 su jeer: cation to th ducri d I non of an (impossible) eco . repro uctron an regu apany such an attempt of t -tali: IC tota Ity-and the problems which accomo a rzanon.

t

(3) Governmentality

and Economi . rruzation

Governmentality studies started off .h .. cisely by pointing at the necessar ~l.t a crlt1que of economi,zation, preAt the same time many st d· y hPOltlCal character of economic practices. , u les s ow how t h . f . entrepreneurialism start to t ' ec mques a calculatIOn and s ructure nearly all . I h . entrepreneurialism produc h ..

Socia sp eres. In this sense, . es a omogenlZlng eff . to the same pol·,t· I .

I. ect: many SOCIal fields are IInked · Ica ratlona Ity and ··1 h tlfication are used w·th· d·ff ' Simi ar tec nologies of subiec.

I In I erent fields I d . .

Ing effect it would be c . I .d . . n or er to aVOid a homogenlz.' rUCIa to I entlfy the d· different political rationalities and h Contra Ictory articulation of subJectification such as the ' . t e contradictory nature of a mode of enterptlSlng self Go I· t I1e strange combinati f. . vern menta Ity suffers from on 0 minute and detal d d' . rupolitics of power ancl an a I. I e case stu les about the mlCver-genera Ized f ' concept a neoliberalis111 whose

281

key mode of subjectification is the entrepreneur."

Thus, what escapes the abstract label of "neoliberalism" is the plurality of different logics in contemporary societies, possibly even "illiberal" modes of government (Opitz 2008), and their mutual articulation.

In this sense, the heterogeneity of discursive formations has to be accounted for not only as a celebration of countless micro-techniques, but also as failures of ever establishing a fully hegemonic rationality. While this argument cautions about speaking roo easily about "neoliberalism," the second argument points at the contradictory nature within the central figure of "neoliberalism": the entrepreneur.

Governmentality studies introduces the enterprising self as mode of subjecrification of indirect control: as conduct of conduct on the basis of freedom.

The subject is being instituted as self-controlling self that "calculates about itself, and that works upon itself in order to better itself" (Rose 1989: 7f.).

There is no telos of bettering, but the permanent flexibility and adaptation to new challenges. What is per-manent is the need for ever-changing modes of self-control. Empirically, there is high risk of overstressing, of not being able to reply to these demands. In Brbckling's (2007: 125) account, the enterprising self becomes even more precarious since he emphasizes that the entrepreneur has to combine "strength of will and courage on the one hand, and sober calculus on the other." Thus, the enterprising self has to develop a structure of self-control which is able to accommodate moments of the non-economic.

However, what happens if this explosive mixture gets our of control? Campbell Jones and Andrew Spicer (2006) have argued that the entrepreneur is far from being a well tempered self, but rather a deviant and passionate figure, often disregarding all economic probabilities and rationality.

For Jones, the entrepreneur represents the excess of economics, the idea of pure expenditure and waste. In a sense, the entrepreneur is, temporarily, out of control, defying the ideal of se[f-control and calculation which Rose highlights-and it is precisely because of these moments of affection that the figure becomes attractive. Such an analysis might overemphasize "entrepreneurial excess." However, it is worthwhile to link this description with that of govern mentality studies. This might open a perspective for noting the immanent ruptures within the figure of the entrepreneur. Assuming a position against the idea of economization, then, wou ld necessarily imply to contaminate economic figures such as that of the entrepreneur: to show, how these modes of subjectification do not automatically produce "neo-liberal" subjecrs. Rather, these subjects are confronted with an undecidability, which is inscribed within rhese technologies: a logic of creative responsibility and, at the same time, a logic of thrill and excess.

NOTES 1. In this sense, Mary poovey's (1998: 28) Foucauldian analysis of the market

tries to undo reified abstractions such as the market.

282

Urs Stiiheli

Decentering

2. bFor the mo~ent'l I will leave asi~e the question of why knowledge y econonucs re ares to economic r .

A . h

economic knowledge (cf. Calion 1:9~~~es'K not simply two distinct

spheres.

,ae

generated

Burler, Judith.

ss~m~~~~) e ~erforrnativiry of

enzte

3. Parts 2 and 3 draw from Sraheli (2008).

4. Thl.S. uncanny closeness has stirred a somerim

,t ese are certainty I'

.

political positions criticize Foucault for being a ~~r~~u~~~~~;~~~~"bRa~~cal (eh~'I'Reitz 2003), others simply stare the close relation (e.g., Saras:n e~~~~) w 1 e proponents

of governmentality

srudi

critical stance (e.g., Rose 1999) How v Foucault's

fascination

et,

e.s are eager to d~fend Foucault's

'

with the ~e lib e I~~ouldfbe a mistake to misuse _? I era CrItlq.ue 0 gov~rnment for polin(Donzelor and ~ordon 200~1~;)wln~ yr a ne~-['beral project. Colin Gordon in Foucault's rereading f ["rIg r yemp asrzes: "The seductive element government was 0 I era Ism was the thought that the art of better

cal parrisanshi -be

it for

l"b

ar

liberalism forms ~~e~~~~ec~i~~~he of governing less, and that in this sense which develops and corrects ~s:lrt~overhn~ental rea.s~n: a govern mentality 5. See Tellm ~oug Its own critique." in Foucau~t~sn for a more detailed reading of the "invisible economy"

l~~~.8)

6. The invisibility of the econorn . diff f . directly governing a social s ~e~: ~ erent. rom the ?enerallmpossibility of general imaginary of controfin . d overnl~g .at a distance has become the represented as a sphere which is th~ vern sOClet.les. T he econ~~~, however, is ing. ery opposite 0 fthe possibility of govern7. With the fall of the gold standard h .

Mark C. Taylor (2004.52) h. ,t e economy has lost Its foundation.

For Now, the economy tra~sfo:~s It cor~esponds to .the death of god in religion.

8. However, there are contradicto:seI:e~nJf a volatile, sel.f-re.g~lati~g.system. of panic. See Dupuy (2003) f \ ngs of the de/individualizing effects within a panic. or t e paradoxical status of individualization

9. Thi.s stands a discussion

in contrast to Foucault's of the function fli 0 Imas

Sraheli (2004).

in

."

In

oucault,

. t;rest

In

.. discursive regularities.

Laclau and Luhmann

For see

10. This creares a dynamic between a resu d f . social interventions for Ger Pd IPbPos~ ormalIsm of the market and . man or 0- I erallsm' "Wh .

I h . ereas economIC reguIatlon takes place spontaneo tion, the social regulation o~sc~'n~i:~~g.h the for~al properties of competicaused by some to others, and so forth Irr~gulantle~ o~ ?eh.avior, nuisance which has to operare as arbitration with" ca Is for a Judicial Interventionism game." (Foucault 2008: 175) In the framework of the rules of the

11. Lawrence

Grossberg points at his r bl . '. . when he criticizes the" . k Pfol em 10 hIS diSCUSSion with Toby Miller mlsta e 0 eap; f h .

(Packer 2003). ng rom t e micro to the macro"

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E .

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OZtO ogle emer Subiek路 B .. kl路 a. .. u ramp roc

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vemementalitiit Frankfurt

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Krasmann

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(1999). Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society.

London: Sage.

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(2003). La Panique. Paris: Les empecheu rs de penser en rondo Foucault, Michel. (200S). The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979.

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(1997). Values and Speculations: The Srock-Exchange Paradigm. Cultural Values 1(2): 159-177.

Jones, Campbell and Andre Spicer. (2006). Enterpreneurial Excess, pp. 187-202 in Joanna Brewis, Stephen Linstead, David M. Boje and Tony O'Shea (eds) The Passion of Organizing. Kopenhagen: Abstrakr.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso.

Lemke, Thomas (2002). Foucault, Governrnentality, and Critique.

Rethinking

Marxism 14(3): 49-64.

Donald. (2006). An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Massumi, Brian. (1995). The Autonomy of Affect. Cultural Critique 31: 83-109.

Massumi, Brian. (2002). Parables for the Virtual. Movement, Affect, Sensation.

MacKenzie,

Durham: Duke University Press.

Miller, Peter and Nikolas Rose. (1990). Governing

Society 19(19): 1-31.

Mitchell,

Timorhy.

(2003).

Economic

Life. Economy . .

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Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Biopower, and Everyday LIfe.

London: Rourledge Chapman & Hall. .. .

Opitz, Sven. (2008). Zwischen Sicherheitsdispositiven. und Se.c~ntIzatIon: Zur An~lytik illiberaler Gouvernmentalitat, pp. 201-228 10 Patncla PurtSC~ertl. Katnn Meyer and Yves Winter (eds) GOHvememelltalitat und Sicherhelt. BIelefeld: transcript.

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14 The Economic Beyond Governmentality

1. INTRODUCTION:

NOVEL PERSPECTIVES

ON ECONOMY

Over the past decade, the economy has become the object of novel theoretical perspectives.

Scholars from diverse disciplines have begun ro unravel the understanding of the economy as a self-standing entity, governed by some essenrial mechanism (Barry and Slater 2002; Callan 1998; du Gay and Pryke 2002; de Goede 2005; Escobar 1995; Leyshon and Thrift 1997; Mirowski 1994; Mitchell 1998; Ruccio and Amariglio 2003; Sraheli 2007; Tellmann 2003). These scholars have elucidated the uncertain boundaries, impure constituents, cultural representations and political imaginaries at work in the making of economy. These works propel and call forth what Arturo Escobar once termed "economics as culture," in order to indicate that the economy is "above all a cultural production, a way 01 producing human subjects and social orders of a certain kind" (Escobar 1995: 59).

The oeuvre of Michel Foucaulr has been an important source of inspiration for this theoretical endeavor in two respects. At a very general level, Foucault's theoretical and methodological perspective makes it possible to circumvent the "universals employed by sociological analysis, historical analysis, and political philosophy" (Foucault 2008: 2)-of which the notion of the economy is a paramount example (Gibson-Graham 1996). Instead of taking monolithic accounts of economic reality at face value, scholars have used Foucauldian notions of discourse to dissect the particular "politics of truth" inherent in apparently neutral depictions of the economy (de Goede 2005; Escobar 1995; Mitchell 2002; 2005; Millet and Rose 1990; Kalpagam 2000; Tellmann 2003). But Foucault did not only offer rools ro be used in unravelling the objectifications of economic discourse. More particularly, his concept of govern mentality provides an analytical frame for understanding the modes of power at work within the economy. Governmentality describes a type of power that "shapes the way we act" through incentives and other indirect means (Dean 2002: JI9,121). The very economic and liberal character of this type of power lies, according to Foucault, in its reliance upon

286

Ute Tel/mann

Economy Beyond Governmentality

the freedom of the calculating and sentient "economic" subject as its relay station. In this perspective, economic discourses and subject-positions are integral to the exercise of power (Miller and Rose 1990; Miller and O'Leary 2002; Rose 1993): economic rationalities are political rationalities, as they elaborate modes of conduct.

The notion of govern mentality undoubtedly provides an ingenious and instructive perspective on how relations of power and the economic intersect. Nevertheless, this chapter will argue that the dominant conception of govern mentality also contains unwitting limitations, which make it difficult to refocus OUf perception of the economic.' An important source of limitation lies in the prevalent understanding of the "conduct of conduct" as the dominant analytical key for decentering the economy. Is the economy not, one might ask, as much about governing money and objects as it is about governing subjects' Linking the understanding of power solely to the rationality of governing the conduct of subjects lends itself to an underestimation of the "ontological politics" ingrained within the economic and monetary

order of things.2 Annemarie Mol has coined this composite term in order

to

address the fabricated "conditions of possibility we live with" (Mol 1999: 75).

Monetary, juridical, or spatial arrangements conjoin in defining, negotiating, and contesting the malleable forms of the economic, its temporality and its regimes of valuation (Calion, Millo and Muniesa 2007: 3).3 They define types of economic reality. But employing a conceptual frame which subsumes all these ways of "world-making" in terms of "conduct of conduct" makes it more difficult to understand how and where else the economic becomes defined. The claim being made here is not that govern mentality studies in general have never transgressed the bounds of this formula of conduct.

But

the theoretical and conceptual discussion of these bounds has mostly been avoided, and the opportunities for pushing the perception of the economic onto a new terrain have thus been neglected.

The argument proceeds in three steps. The first part seeks to show that the formula of "conduct of conduct" actually narrows the conceptual understanding of the liheral security dispositi] that Foucault introduced at the outset of his lectures. The second part demonstrates how this narrowed focus on conduct stays within the bounds of liberal economic disCourse without rendering them visible. The question of money serves as an exemplary case to discuss this unwitting reiteration of the liberal imaginary of economy. Just like liberal discourse, the perspective of governmentality is 10 danger of eschewing reflections about the density and politics of money.

The third and concluding part argues that govern mentality studies need to engage in historical-conceptual work about "the economic" in order to explore the "type of reality" it is dealing with (Foucault 1983: 209).

Instead of using the "conduct of conduct" to characterize a general form of power regardless of the question at hand, it is hence necessary to revive the conceptual "art of using history" that Foucault practiced. This art consists in the constant inflection of the conceptual and historical horizons in order to

287

. t al tools while simultaneously unsettling them. The chapretrieve concep u , li di s virh ter concludes with a short meditation on how governmenta I.ty-stu . I~ \ a newly gained sense of "the economic" could compl.em~nt, In crucia ed by t h e recent discussi ISCUSSlon of the economic and econOffilzatlOn 8) as propose Actor-Network Theory (Calion et al. 2007; Calion 199 .

2. FROM THE SECURITY TO THE ALLURE

DlSPOSITIF OF CONDUCT

. g g rounds as Francois Ewald and Aleslecture courses were t.estm F 'cault used these courses to k : their pre f ace: au . sandra Fontana remar 10 f hi ki (2007' xiv) The elaboration . f h d ways 0 t 10 109 . . explore lines 0 researc an . h on Security Territory, Popu. f liry 10 t e courses , of the notion 0 g~vernmen.ta I ..' exce tion in this respect. In these lotion and The BIrth of BlOpolitlcs IS no d p t nd the "birth of politics" d tests how to un ers a .

I· lectures, Foucau t rnes an . f hi I tics of power for decenrering . bility 0 IS ana y I f 3) h (Foucault2008: 31 ,t e Via ~007' 512), and the genealogy and dangers 0 the state (ibid.: 186f; Foucault .

I 2008' 134 312). How the economy ·· I h on (Foucau t . , liberalism as a po Imea ariz I. fer" is therefore, arguably, a . hi " oa yncs 0 pow can be thought Wit m an a I These former interests evene centra concerns. .

I' side-product 0f t h ese mor . h it dispositif of libera Ism: it peCifies t e securt Y F tually shape how oucau sid rationality of governing at a . revo ve aroun a . more and more, It comes to . . h omy in terms of the security ibili f thinking t e econ distance. The POSSI I ity 0 .

I plored as I shall show. dispositif is thus left comparative y une~ h m;dern meaning of economy as Foucault suggests that the emergendce 0 t e a mere effect of a presumed · " h Id not be un erstoo das f a "level of rea Iity s ou . f ionall y coherent subsystem 0 .. f h my into a unctt . differentiation 0 t e econo d f he commonly assumed quasl-ontOsociety (Foucault 2007: 95). Instea 0 t d the political horizon, Foucault the economy an 0 . logical difference b etween t I strategies and rellectlons I of govern men a . k assumes that an unbro en pane. h ulation of the population ki as ItS target t e reg . . envelops both spheres, ta JOg f d 328) He sees the conceptuahzatlon (ibid.: 64, 95; Foucault 2008: 323 an h m'utation of technologies of power h "episo de JO t e f of economy as part 0 f t e f hi hnique of apparatuses 0 secu.

11 ent 0 t IS tee . . " and an episode in the msta m f the tical features of modern ~OCletleS rity that seems to me to be one 0 f . y~ the proper administration of the (Foucault 2007: 34). No longer re errmg 0 means economy projects a new . dvi b t saving on ' , d . oikos or prudential a Vice a ou .

I flows naturalness an inter. .

I' lane of ClfCU aror y now>, ·1· d socio-political onto ogy. a Pl. termeshing between a rru leu an nal forces, forging a complex '::~JS:5 1~4). "It is therefore the problem of its population (Foucault 2007. , k . this notion of milieu l ... I. The circulation and causality that l~ ahts~a elJOt.Ollis carried out. The milieu IS a . I b h . whlc ClfCU a I ·fi . I· smilieu , then, wd e t at. 111 al,d a set of art! cia.. given sh es h·11 I sset of natural givens-flve.rs, mar f I ' etcerera. The milieu IS a certain an agglomeration of indiViduals, a louses, Foucault's

288

Ute Tel/mann

number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it" (Foucault 2007: 21). As rhe economy is taken to articulate the milieu of circulation, it becomes integral to this new dispositif The conception of economy is thus firmly positioned within the field of governmental reason and technique, and thus opened up for an "analyrics of power." But what kind of relations of power does this analytic render visible? What kind of technologies of power does the security dispositi( depict? Foucault addresses this question by contrasting the techniques of discipline and the technologies of security in respect to time, space and norms (Foucault 2007: 17, 44, 62). The space of the security dispositi] is no longer organized within the cells and grids of discipline, it does not rely on a temporality of homogeneous units of time, and it does nor impose the norms of disciplinary conduct on the individual body.

Instead it assumes a given milieu of circulation, reckons with the aleatory occurrences of events, and derives its norms from statistical regularities calculated on the level of the population: "Security therefore involves organizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever wider circuits" (2007: 45). Foucault's analytics of this dispositi] is not comparable to the dense and detailed descriptions he marshalled in order to understand the dispositi( of sexuality or disciplinary arrangements (Foucault 1990; 1995).4 Still, these cursory remarks are inspiring, since they invite us to focus on the ordering of spaces of circulation, temporality, and norms as aspects of the economic and the making of economy.

Indeed, those who have used Foucault's account of governmentality for re-thinking the economy have often had recourse to notions of spatiality and norms (Barry and Slater 2002; Miller 1992; Larner and Heron 2004; Larner and Walters 2004): Peter Miller's (1992: 74) coinages of "calculable spaces" and "functional ensembles of financial flows" are telling in this respect.

These phrases point beyond the subject and its conduct; they focus on the making of economic space, which allows for comparisons and differentiations that constitute novel economic norms. In this vein, Wendy Larner and Richard Le Heron (2004) have suggested that we should understand the global economy as the manufacturing of "spaces of comparison." Pointing to this possibility, they also indicate that their suggestion remains schematic and needs further elaboration. From a different, albeit related angle, Aihwa Ong (2006) turns towards Giorgio Agamben's notion of the sovereign exception in order to point to the territorial strategies of zoning and gradation as ways of creating the spaces and milieus of circulation. The enumeration of these works signals that the notion of 'spaces of circulation' has captured the scholarly imagination, as it seems to harbor the analytical potential to decenter the economy. Foucault's account of the security di5positif resonates with or even inspires this scholarly imagination.

But one has to recognize that the concept of govern mentality, as developed by Foucault, does not offer further analytical refinement in this respect. Foucault does not engage in rethinking the economic in terms of temporality, valuation and space. He does

Economy Beyond Governmentality

289

nor wonder about the role of money or objects in shaping the p~~uliar? of economic relations, and he is not disquieted by .the questl~n 0 ow t 1~ .. b thought He eschews these questions for a Simple reason. econorruc IS to e. " I 5 I deed he hi in object of rheoretica concern. n , the economy was not ~s~al d theor provide a good instrument" assumed "that economic history an " "y I 1983. 209) whereas di "I' s of production (Foucau t . , for understan 109 re anon f k ledge and the subject were less to his mind, the intersectlons 0 power, now x licit! to unravel the well understood (Foucault 2003). He ~ought, very ~h~s to ~oucault himself cold monster of the state rather than t e econom\ b'een "defined as offand many of his followers, the economy seems to avhe " " " iller and '"G d 0' L ar (2002: 91) ave put It. limits" as Peter Miller an e e y I nature of economic discourse Foucault's explorarion of the governme~ta terests Intent on thinking the has to be seen in the light of rhese researc Ihn acco'unt of govern mentality . f rati alities of govermng, IS state m terms 0 ration led interplay between a Ive d the economy as a govefl be.g.ins to revo. aroun biect. He identifies the figure of the sentient, milieu and the inrerests of the su J . t of an "economic" technol" bject as the main targe f willing an d ca Icu Ianng su I" (F cault 2007: 21). The ocus "" t rhe level of popu anon ou " I ogy 0f power airnmg a "I d poral organization of crrcu aan on the order of things and the spatb,a k tem As Stuart Elden (2007) has di I " t the ac groun d . tion recedes accor 109 Y 10 0 b ally muted The broader " f . . lity ecomes equ . argued, the question 0 ternto~l~ I I dimly present in the subsequent " f h "dspos/t/( are on y outlines 0 t e secunty I F It never fleshes out the sugges. ental power: oucau " h elaborations on governm." f hi I crure Instead of unearthing t e tions he makes at the begmnlng 0 "( IS e "I . f shion to the disciplinary 'disPOSltl In sirru ar a . I h "anatomy" 0 f t e security id if h notion of interest as the sing e " Foucault I enn es t e "anatomy 0f power, . f f liberal governmental power: key to understand the economic orm 0

. d in interests. The new government, the Government is only mtereste d I ith what I would call the I does not ea WI . new governmenta reason, I' such as individuals, things, " h I of governmenta uy, I I things 10 t ernse ves . h h e things in themse ves. t longer deals Wit t es hi h d I wealth an d Ian. t no . . hat i to say interests, w ic f pohtlcs t at IS , h deals with the p enome,n~ 0 d i tak s: it deals with interests, or . olitics an Its s ta e , d so on i precisely constitute p . individ I h g wealth an so on In. hi h given indivi ua ,t in , . ' I that respect 10 w IC a II" body of individuals. (Foucau t terests other individuals or the co ectlve 2008: 45) . lIy Foucault describes the new " . d' " of how emp h atlCa I " 1 This passage IS In lCatlve . f h' . herent focus on the regu atlo! . ntermsotelfll1 h"" technologies 0 f govermng I I h . lstanees corroborate t IS Impres. ests Severa ot er II ". "one of f or governing 0 mter. . f h individuals' interest, IS "the pursuit 0 t e . d the fi d d sion. Desire, e ne as f the whole system" as It ren eTS the important theoretical elements 0 chni ue (2007: 73). "Mechanisms of population accessible to govern mentahi te { inrerests" (2007: 352) are the . '" incentives an d "the law and mec anlcs 0

290

Ute Tellmann

Economy

words Foucault uses to describe the ne

f f I?~m 10hgo.vernmental reason which,

he maintains, still circumscribes W F I ,. our po inca

on zan

IntImate connection on d s IStInCt In order to think their ' e nee s to recognize th . " own f arms of density in ord d e economic In terms of its " er to un erstand"t . . " power. P uttlng aside the q f I S intimate conjunction with _ uestlon 0 how to t kl h economic, the "conduct f d" ac e t e specificity of the -b I 0 con uct comes th I "ra er C ose to reiterating the I1 era Imaginary of th " . e economy wIthout . to

OF GOVERNMENTALITY

Governl11entality

29]

AND THE VEIL OF MONEY

6

Oucau t s reartlCulation of the econo . . thus rightly be said to culm- h rruc as governmental rationality can _ f mate m t e contention th h If Jeer 0 economic discourse f . at t e se -interesred subsr raregv. Undeniably this entunlctlons afs a point of relay for a governmental I d ' alsaprooundandc(( I hif f nstea of being an apolitic I fi f I rca Sit 0 perspective. renders the homo oecono':路 gu~e .obl purely economic interest, Foucault tcus VISI e as "the he vi asic element of the new partner, t e vis-a-vis the b govern menta I reason fa I d' century" (2008- 27]) Th _ rmu ate m the eighteenth e netton of govern me t Ih un d ersrand economizario n a tty t us enables us to - -_ I n as a strategy for h o f responsibilizarion evaluation ditari governing trough techniques th ,- - I ' ,accre uanon and moti .

I h e po mea technologies wo k b _' rvanon. t sows how id I r y putting the mo I d I I - - VI u~ at the center of visibilir and' .... ~,a an ca ell anng indias Nikolas Rose concisely def y _ :~telllglbdlty_ Advanced liberal rule," f d id nes It, governs through th I d h o In IVI ual citizens" (Rose ]993: 285- D e regu ate c oices neohberalism the entrep - h 'h- ean ]999)_ Under the paradigm of .' reneur wit IS rrn . f I - peranve 0 se f-activarion has become an ubiquitous form f bi _ _ _If 0 su jecttvrty which d socia eld (Brockling 2007) I h-' is ma etotraversethewhole - n ttus sense gove I-we II equipped to underst d h _' rnmenta Ity IS admirably an t e pervasive appl f h Con d ucting conduct- histo - I I_ rcanon 0 t ese strategies of nca rea rty and I - I I _ I ana ynca strategy interrnesh perf ecrly, In both critical and ana ynca ways Wend B (20 w h at t h IS perspective on th y rown 03) summarizes h e economy as part of I-b I ernIng sows: "Neo-libe Ineo I era strategies of gov" ra Ism ISa construct" " . " t h e ontological givenness f h IVlSt project: It does not presume 0 a t oroughgoing -_ economic rationality for all d omams of society but rath t k - _ er a es aSlts task the d I - an d institutiOnalization of h . . eve opment, dissemination, Th suc a rationalirv," e strength of this analysis of liber ]_ the lIberal subJect in govern ] d a economy IS that It reclothes n -t f hmenta ress But ack I d h UI Y 0 t IS governmental u d d- nowe grng t e ingeu t n erstan mg of ec h s 0 presume that we have f d h k onomy s ould not lead This would be to assume th Oun ; e ey to decentering the economy_ e ing of the very sub)-ect matt at w 0 not need any further understander we h ope to I h one needs to see power and kid unrave: t e economic_ Just as _ _ nowe gea d- -

lamy_ It underwrites so ligibility which take ;h

3. SILENCES

Beyond

k h estranging us from its familspea _' t e same modes of visibility and intel-

e economIc to be an "b to structured choices Th . attn ute that pertains solely _ _ e next sectIon el -d h omISSIon and its unCan I UCI ates t e contours of this ny c oseness to the lib If era Imaginary b y CIlScussing the questIon 0 money.

of the market

It is revealing that Foucauldian scholars, who have turned towards the question of money and economy, have actually pushed the conceptual frame of govern mentality into the background_ Marieke de Goede (2005), for example, takes the general understanding of discourse, objectification and performativity as her conceptual vantage points. Indeed, there is very litrle

about money in Foucault's account of the economic form of liberal government. This omission is not without consequences for how the notion of govern mentality

depicts the economy:

it implies that it is possible to define

the "economic," for example, without taking into account the forms of (monetary) mediation. It follows the classical liberal understanding that the essence of things economic lies in the calculations or governing of interest. In order to counter this understanding, this section takes money as an exemplary

case for highlighting

the limits of the focus on the "conduct

of conduct." The issue of money is taken as a paradigmatic case for a discussion of the conceptualization of the economic for two reasons. Firstly, money is often taken to be a quintessential characteristic of economic issues.

Symptomatically, social and economic theorists like Niklas Luhmann, Georg Simmel and John Maynard Keynes commence their reflections 011 the economic with the question of money (Luhmann ]994; Simmel 2004; Keynes 1936; ] 930)_ Even Karl Marx's substantial definition of economy in

terms of production uses the idea of money's power of abstraction in order to explain

how the laws of value take hold (Marx]

973: 244)_ At the same

time, money is also the most impure economic element. As Karl Polanyi puts it: "The separation of the political and economic spheres had never been complete, and it was precisely in the matter of currency that i~was ~ecessarily incomplete" (1957: ]96)_ Money ties issues of representation, discourse, politics and economic valuation together in all intricate knot (Pryke 2007, Kirshner 2003a; Carruthers and Babb 1996; de Goede 2004)_ The example

of money therefore functions like a window revealing the impure constItution of the "economic." As the following discussion will show, liberalism's account of money as a neutral veil closes this window and governmentality studies

should not be so unsuspecting

as to follow_

David Hume's contention that money is "nothing but the representation of labor and commodities" still holds as an accurate description of the liberal quantity-theory of money (Hume ]955: 37)_ Irving Fisher, the patriarch of American monetarism, described his opus The Purchasing Power of Money at the beginning of the twentieth century as "at bottom Slm~~ya restatement of the old 'quantity theory of money'" (Fisher ] 920: Vll, ] 96, ] 97, quoted in Kirshner 200]: 56)_7 These quotations provide the first Indications of how classical and (neo-)Iiberal economic discourse problemame money In

terms of its representational capacities vis-a.-vis the order of things (see Shell ]995: 72 seq_; Goux ]990:

96 seq_)_ Money is supposed

to serve as a proper

292

Ute Tellmann

E canomy Beyond Governmentality

place-holder for exchange values. Only if operating as a representational sign can it fulfil its most central functions: to be the medium of exchange, the

store of value and the unit of account. To a certain extent, demanding that money should assume this role of representation is an uncontroversial aspiration: the inflationary derailment of the rnonerary sign clearly undermines money's functions'" But the crucial difference lies in the fact that money is only problematized in terms of this representational function or the lack of it. By analogy, this would be like entertaining a theory of language that

focused exclusively on the representational

function of a signifier without

apprehending the formative aspects of language (Shell 1994). Money can therefore appear to liberal discourse as being essentially neutral-neither adding nor taking, neither qualifying nor constituting the economic order of things: "The long-run money neutrality is a crucial property of the classical model" (Snowdon, Vane and Wynarczyk 1994: 56).' Consequently, money

pales into insignificance compared to the realm of scarcity, calculation and decision, or however the real sector comes to be defined. As John Stuart Mill states it in the nineteenth century, "there cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money [ ... ]" (Mill 1848: 333)-" The later monetarist and more constructivist position is that the task of an appropriate monetary policy is to make sure that money actually is as neutral and insignificant as it is supposed to be. Preventing the excesses of government spending is the key to ensuring this neutrality (Hayek 1981: 58). Whereas the nineteenth century took the gold standard to be the guarantee of this representational function of money, the monetarist position assumes that an unhindered market mechanism will itself ensure that only "honest money" circulates (Hayek 1986: 8-10; 1976). Recent decades, which turned "transparency" into a "governance panacea," have

demonstrated the persistent discursive regularities that shape approaches to money and finance (Blyth 2003: 245). A profound

family resemblance connects nineteenth-century liberalism and twentieth-century neo-liberalism in this belief about money as essentially a medium of representation and transparency.

In this perspective, the question of power and politics only arises if money is made to deviate from its neutrality by the spending practices of politica I authorities (Snowdon et al. 1994: 145). Disturbances of this medium of representation are usually seen to be caused by Short-term panics

or excessive government spending, which results in a period of adaptation and crisis. Apart from these moments of crisis, money does not even appear as a contentious issue of political rationality. Liberal economic discourse rules out, by definition, tous politics" (Kirshner The

analytical

the possibility 2003a).

ability

to grasp

that money itself entails an "ubiqui-

whether

indeed entail an inherent "ontological

and

how monetary

regimes

politics" depends, in contrast, on

a conceptualization of money that differs from the liberal account of neutrality. A lively debate within social theory and anthropology about the

social nature of money offers instructive suggestions in this respect (Gilbert

293

. 2004 , Pryke and du Gay 2007; 06 M 2005· Me K em ie b h 2005; Ingham 20 ; aurer. ' ible to do Justice to this de ate ere, Thrift 2002). Although It IS ImpOSSI h s in which the very concephi to indicate t e way Ie" a few remarks may e p . ibili f "the economic as cu rur . f d fines rhe VISI I rty 0 h The tualization 0 mon~y.e . . about money are of interest. ere .. g Two conceptual shifts 10 thmklO a relation of credit, obligafa money as h d finirion first one concerns tee . oral horizon (Ingham 2006) . " As tion and debt, which establishes a temp. "money is above all a subtle John Maynard Keynes (1936: 294) P~tS It, " The temporality of a debt device for linking the prese~lt to t~~ t~~~r~'recedence in the definition of relation, its measures and a Igatl° a monetary economy, Keynes c1all"~, f

money. Indeed, the specific traits

ttles the units of account, In which

0

only come into being once money S\ 930' 3) Instead of taking money to relarions of debt and credlt;re fix~dr~prese~ta;ion, this perspective PO~I1tS

be a neutral veil and a me, rum

0

.

relation of a certain kind

(Ing

a~l

towards money as formatting ~ socI~eI2004; Gilbert 2005). Its economic 2006; Bryan and Rafferty 2007, SIf';,ed through the variable conventions, character one might say, IS fashio ine monetary patterns of tempoinstrume~ts and dispositils that ~t~~:1 up this perspective, Bill Maure~ rality and regimes of obl,gatl~n'h : one should problematize the financ:a_ (2008, 171) has recently argue tha lineal negotiations that shape reha . term s of t banks e po I I and hierarc hires a f pa ymenr h e offshore. economy 10

tions of payment. Not exchange,

ut r s Even these brief comments s ow

. . define these offshore space. d. f exchange and money as mamta ms, as a me iurn a . lely thar differentiating between different analytical thrust than focusing so ose a relation of payment has a I e'r duct" The former enables us to p on the technologies of "conduct a cOdnefined and the latter tends to assume h the economiC IS , the question 0 f ow cred " this question ;:~:~~~yo~:e: i~I~:nati~g shi~,t~:~~n,~e:;I~a~~z~n~n~~;s?; The secon . of commensurability.

Y.I recently drawn pertains to the quesGtl°lnb t (2005: 360) records, "has untl comparable . It" Emily I er . " Money rend ers equiva en , f ocial rheorisrs. . ly given h b Ik of the attention 0 s. . w argued, is not simp . t e u. b this capacity, as IS no. . lence-in current and quantlfiableur inuous "reproduction of eqUiva 2007: 147).

Rather it requtt'es the conn " (Bryan and Rafferty d d ' acrosS time and across space d that we need to un erst~n exchange, d M· h el Rafferty have argue d h commensuratiOn Dick Bryan an IC a instrument that exten s suc . 153). According derivatives as a rnon7~ry ncial and physical assets (Ibld,," ce of compari-

across a wide range a .na lar form of money defines a. SIP~ all forms, at h· ent a partlcu fall caplfa , 10 to t IS argum '. n "on-going measure 0 " hat was not possison" anew. It permits a . e" to take place, sornethlOg ~ and Rafferty all locations

f

h

and across tim of derivatives

biqultDUS use

ble be are t e u.

adulation

(ibid.: 141£). ryan suration that . and com men of companson P ttin aside for rhe

delineate a particular m 'c" in a different way. u. ~ 's valid or shapes mter a 1G. "the economl f hether rheir ren d'enng of derIvatIves 1 moment the questiOn a W

.

r

<

294

Ute Tel/mann

Economy

sufficient: for the question at hand, it functions as an example that orients us toward an analysis of how monetary arrangements and financial instruments partake in moulding the "spaces," temporalities and media of comparison that shift the notion of what counts as "economic."

This research perspective is somewhat akin to the recent suggestions of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) that we should be studying the "rendering of the economic" (Calion et al. 2007: 3). Indeed, ANT and govern mentality share theoretical sensibilities and methodological devices (Rose, O'Malley and Valverde 2006: 92). But before merging these approaches too quickly, the conceptual tools of each-and their respective limits-need to be scrutinized. How far a reworked Foucauldian perspective could offer valuable insights beyond ANT's "market test" (Calion 1998) will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter. At this point it suffices to demonstrate that the important shift in perspective concerns the very question of the economic: how it comes to be defined in terms of temporality and obligation, of translation and valuation (Maurer 2005; 2006; 2002).

If governmentality studies continue to neglect the question of the economic, the field deprives itself of the possibility of detecting the multiple sites at which it is fashioned. Instead, the opposite effect ensues: the regime of visibility and intelligibility which classical and neo-liberal economicpolitical discourse organizes is strengthened, because the field continues to ignore the disputable and historical character of the economic. The question of money has served only as an example to pinpoint this omission, its costs and effects. In order to avoid falling unknowingly into the grid of visibility that liberalism organizes in respect to economy, governmentality would have to inquire about the "type of reality with which we are dealing"-as Foucault puts it. Unlocking the "conduct of conduct" from its status as a conceptual short-cut for power is a necessary step in this process of renewing the "toolbox"

of gov-

ern mentality studies, as the remainder of this chapter shows.

4. THE PECULIARITY OF GOVERNING AND THE ART OF USING HISTORY

MEN

Foucault's historical mode of investigation never proceeded without constantly destabilizing and questioning his conceptual tools by relating them to a historical frame. Curiously, the concept of "conduct of conduct" seems to be an exception in this respect: it has been turned into a general conceptual tool that supposedly captures the essence of relations of power. Like no orher concept of Foucault's, the "conduct of conduct" enjoys a status of conceptual refinement and closure (Allen 199J). The "conduct of conduct" is said to have effectively broken with the somewhat claustrophobic grid of disciplinary power, and is seen as a concept which enables us to think power and the suhject as a conjunction of conduct and counter-conduct, in which freedom is an over-determined practice (Foucault 19~3: 220£.;

Beyond

Governmentality

295

002 49f) g others has demonstrated 2008:185f.)., Thon;~s Lemke (f2 ~ ct"· ;:a~~e~ Foucau'lt to bring together how the nonon of conduct 0 (o~ u d the "technologies of the self" in an h " h I gles of domination an ic or mech t e tee no 0 id h itf lis of a deterministic or mec aunderstanding of power that aVOi sht e Pllt a ms to articulate the "conduct . .

II I deed Foucau It imse f see b d rusnc account. n, I f wer and ties it to the roa " , t ch a genera concept 0 po , f d o can uct as JUS su , hi sense is to structure the pos. f ment: "To govern m t IS, d meaning 0 gov,ern .

"1983.221) Government, power and can ucr sible field of action of others ( . . tl as Senellart has shown, govh b ymous Consequen y, hence fort ecome synon ,., 11 cific concept-geared to underern mentality mutated from a historica y spe I' d notion of "'the way in . d positi] Into a genera ize standing the security IS -,,, (S llart 2008: 388). Thus, Fouie's conduct ene , h which one con d ucrs peop hori d to treat govern mentality as t e If h parentlyaut onze us I hi cau t irnse as ap h ddi its historical horizon. understanding of power, thereby s e ing st taking these words of FouThe following argument cauhtIons aglafimalization of the "analytics of t al and a istorrca n h Id cault's as a concep U f d t" and suggests that we s ou , f h "conduct 0 con ue , . h power" In terms 0 t e .

'I h f 'nvestigarion. It tries to s ow 'F I' hlstonca et os 0 I d f instead revisit oucau r s , ' id ense of rhe boun sot hiIS t to cultivate a V\VI s ki f that Foucault never orgo "II d alytically. Rather than ra mg .

I' politIca yan an I f governmental rationa ItyI' he wrote a genea ogy 0 " s a conceptua given, . the "conduct 0 f con d ucr a . sense of histoncal estrange· h dded this concept to a f this rationa Iuy t at we hani I pplications of the concept 0 go vment More often than not, mee ~l1Ica a hi t ry Reminding oneself of . is d hili ng turn to IS 0 .

I ern mentality forget this esta I I~I, the possibility of conceprua this historical peculiarity means eepl~g opetn nce ' h f paramount Impor a . d' innovation, an d IS t us 0 . h f d n politics" occurs, accoe mg to . f h "blrt 0 mo er 'II The deciSive moment or t e 'd with a quintessentla Yre I'I. I . I'ty becomes lI1veste I Foucault as politIca ratlona I'd 1997.260 266): pastora power. , .. 'd r' power (Hm esS . d ' gious form of mdivi ua IZlI1g f e "-its peculianty an speelPastoral power is a "quite specific type 0 PO~eraim (Foucault 2007: 194). It k' h nduct of men as Its so d h "gov ficity lies in ta rng t e co " I h· must revolve aroun suc a is not inevitable that a polltlca ,onzon On the contrary, this approach to ernment of men," as Foucault pOl~rs o~~~intermeshing between rhe pastoral governing men belongs to the questIonal'b l"sm (Foucault 2007, 184, 148). and the political that still accompanrefs ~i~r:rilzation of this political horizon F It (2007· 122) performs a de a , f I" . "lO]ne thrng clearly Qucau ~ k dersrandmg 0 po mes.

by J'uxtaposing It to the Gree un h' h' that one never governs a state, h 'ngs w IC IS I'd' emerges through all t ese meaOi hom one governs are peop e, III 1a territory, or a political structu~. 'd ose ;~overning people is certainly nor a viduals, or groups r ... J Now, t e ,1 ea olirics which consists in the ve,ry Greek idea" The Greek understandrng 0 p h "~ity-state in its substantial .

I heme" targets t e Th hasis "rejection of the pastora t ,,' f he city" (2007: 123). e emp " reality, its unity" bur not r~,e m:~r~a: a curious trait of t~e modern ~ollt~~ on the "conduct of conduct app unds of the histoncal formation cal horizon and clearly reveals the bo 1

Th

7

.

296

Ute Tel/mann

Economy

belongs to. It is not just a conceptual tool, but equally a historical horizon.

Does Foucault ever undo this conceptual-bistorical interrneshing?

After these lectures, as we know, Foucault shifted his focus away from the state, power and the "birth of modern politics." At this point in his writing, he boldly and confusingly claims that "not power, but the subject" is the general theme of his research (1983: 209). He explains his renewed interest in the question of the subject by referring to the pressing actuality of this question. The "struggle against the forms of subjection-against the submission of subjectivity" is becoming, he observes, "more and more important" for understanding the present (Foucault 1983: 213). The codification of "the conduct of conduct" as a formula of power stems from exactly this moment. Hence, the fact that Foucault coined "the conduct of conduct" as a frame for understanding power needs to be related to the very specificity of the problematique he was interested in at that time. Power as "the conduct of conduct" aims at understanding the forms of subjectivity that are at stake in these struggles. But it does not mean that the triangulation of power-knowledge-subject should be reduced to this formula: it does not seem fit to capture the whole "anatomy of power" that economic dispositifs entail.

What can be learnt from this moment of Foucault's thought is not the particular codification Foucault used, but the ethos of investigation he laid out in the famous Afterword on "The Subject and Power": The task of analysis is to "check the type of reality, with which we are dealing," to "know the historical conditions which motivate

OUf

conceptualization."

And this

(00-

ceprualizarion implies, he adds, "critical thought-a constant checking" (Foucault 1983: 209). I am not claiming that this reminder of Foucault's particular

way of using history is an original

observation.

Rather,

in view

of the need to unearth novel perspectives on the economic, this reminder hopes to reinvigorate the methods that Foucault employed for working within a historical formation. His style of genealogical and archaeological analysis did not offer a secure theoretical or analytical ground for writing a "history of the present." His very theoretical stance committed him to working in between the historical and the conceptual register. With the words "I am in effect much more a historicist and Nietzschean," he contrasted his work with )Urgen Habermas' project of founding a transcendental way of thinking, hostile to any form of historicism (Foucault 2001: 1099; my translation). But "happy positivism," the term he coined as a characterization of his mode of reading the historical record, did not imply a purely immanent , 13 0 h perspective. n t e contrary, he always sought to produce a sense of an outside that signalled the limits of the historical formation he was analyzing. To "become someone else" and to think differently were the professed alms of this exercise (Foucault 2001: 1596; Saar 2003: 167 and 172). For this reason, Foucault remained consistently and notoriously equivocal about how wholeheartedly he adopted a historicized concept as his own-which is an ethos of investigation very much opposed to taking a single conceptual

Beyond

Governmentality

297

int for analysis." This continual destabilization between f I bl ormu a as a uepnn . d otiate the immanence the historical and the conceptual, u~ed inti':n:r :~r ~~~ Foucauldian merhodof this perspectlvel~~ th~s n~~:xe,:ei: aO~achine for referring concepts back ology. The Foucau Ian tOO ., . nee tua l force-rather than to rhe historical record while retainding rhe~ co m: outcomes regardless of being a "cookie-cutter" that repro uces t e sa the question at hand.

I" I horizon and because the , lib I' forms our po inca , It IS because , era ISm , f 1 of power that one ".. d d such pervasive orn , d "conduct of can uct IS In .ee . .' this distinction between the hishas to be especia, IIy dili ligen. t in maintaining . . re of their permanent OSCI'IIai hile remaining awa , torical and t h e conceptua w f nralirv as a way of capruring . h ccess a govern me . tion. Otherwise, t every su f er might ironically turn Into adequately some very dominant types f pow As this chapter has sought , ina other Sites 0 power. d b an impediment to seeing 0 , bl' tique that is not exhausre y . tltutes a pro ema .. to show, the econorruc cons d historical-conceptual enquines the logics of conducting conduct but nee s about this "type of reality."

5. CONCLUSION: GOVERNMEN~ALITY THE ECONOMY-BEYOND ANT.

AND

, ' d "analyticS of power" that govti ed the Imute .'

This chapter has pro bl ema I.Z "cond f conduct" as ItS main ana. ' k the con uct 0 f bi ernmentality delivers In ta mg as a "cultural production a su Je.cts lyrical key. To understand the econ~~y Escobar 1995: 59) means analyZing and social order of a certain kin ( h s the governing of subjects. b' rs as muc a . I d the dispositifs of money an 0 jec n of rhe economic as a malleable socta Without engaging With rhe questlo . within the limits of the libt liry remainS . f form the concept of govern men a , f this. My diSCUSSIon 0 , . h t being aware 0 d eral economic discourse wit au I se showing why we nee to exemp ary ca , I' d money has served here as an. . hi espect Governmenta tty stu e In t IS resuec c. ki ' broaden the analytical p~rspec[Iv h uestion that scholars war I~gIn ies should therefore consider a resTeahrc q h ve recently articulated: Michel , 0 f A ctor- Network eory ad that we nee dieto ana yz how the perspective .

Calion and colleagues (2007: 3) have argue of wbat it is to be 'economIC' " d d路 "The meaning , , rhar IS the economIC IS pro uce . f 'economizatlon, a process . h . h e of a process 0 , t'nue mig r is preCisely t e outcom . bl" The economiC, they can I , , . I contingen . t and dlSputa e. bT , h t equa Ily mean savhlstorlca But it mig imply cOl~mensurability or exc.hanlg~a I It~'economy materialize is the very . or ratlol1lOg. "H lIlg ow these artlcu atlons a 'h of researc . ' Iy that govern-, object 10mic should not Imp But raising this quesrion of the eco , ANT Therearestill importantdlf'd ntlca l to路 .

ANT mentality studies will become I ~ d how they are put into prawce. I ' ferences between these approac e~ an I t configure "economic ca1cu atlve , h 111'cal deVices t 1a atrends [0 the SOCio-tec

Ute Tel/mann

298

E conomy Beyond Governmentality

and "qualify market objects" (ibid.. 5; Calion 1998). "Market range in this respect from shelves in supermarkets via shopping to pricing models (ibid.), The studies that are now being undertaken

capacities"

devices" carts

demonstrate empirical

the diversity cases.

of these

"devices"

But the announced

by unfolding

a multiplicity

conceptual-historical

question

of

of the

"economic" and its "anatomies of power" is rarely an overarching aim. In contrast, the concept of governmentality points to the political rationalities and technologies that animate a particular dispositi]. Governmenraliry studies

works

normative than

focusing

mentality govern

toward

offer a distinct

outlines

on the technical

studies

that

and valuable to embed

diagnostic

of the present.

delineate

to the fuzzy

mentality

unavailable

that

solely

attends

the potential a more

understanding

mechanisms

focus

As I have

as long

argued,

as govern

of the security

that

up the

and

on "economics

their

such The

networks,

govern-

of power."

as culture." that

the "lines research

heuristic

and Rather

A type

of the economic

case studies dissects

temporal

of the present."

question

mentality-studies

disposti].

of spatial,

of "technologies

the particular

perspective

forms "history

objects

logics took

the the

of force

perspectives lose

sight

of govern

not be misunderstood as a mechanical toolkit that dispensing with theoretical and historical work.

It would

characterize

can

and

of

could have

ANT

in

fragility"

will of the

mentality be employed

remain broader should while

NOTES

]. The thoughts presented here are part of a mOre comprehensive argument about the invisibility of the economy within Foucault's oeuvre. The other facers of this argument have been developed in my arricle "Foucault and the Invisible Economy" (Tell mann 2009).

2. J would like to thank Monica Greco for reminding me of this term, which makes it possible to point out very precisely what is in danger of being excluded within the prevalent understanding of the governmental perspective.

3. The relation of governmentality to this research perspective on the economy, as recently articulated by scholars of Actor-Network Theory, will be discussed later on.

4. The cursory explication of the security dispositif provided by Foucault has given rise to the complaint that his analytical strategies concentrated to an undue extent on purely theoretical or textual material (O'Malley, Weir and Shearing 1997).

5. For a further discussion of this point see Tellma nn (2009). Foucault conceded that relations of power, conduct, and truth intertwine with economic relations, but he articulated them as distinguishable and explicitly set them aside (Foucault 2007, 196; 2003; 1983, 213). Of course, he did include economic discourse in his analysis of the human sciences as presentcd in the Order of Things. His attention in this case did not revolve primarily around the question of economy, but the general shifts of the cpistemc, of which economic discourse proved to be one instance.

6, GovernmentJlity directed towards

is sometimes chJracrerized [IS being a mode of power that is the "<1rrangemenr of things." The textual passage in which

299

. . these terms stems from the lecture ~f Foucault refers to gover~~e~ta~~y In ses the genealogical emergenc~ of this February 1, 1978, i~ whic e ISCUSGiven the considerable historical gap rationality in the Sixteenth century. ce of liberal rationality proper III the between this period and the e~ergenh more prominent, consistent and preeighteenth century, as we~l as t ,e m~~ the only stakes of modern g~vcrnmencise focus on interest and mcennves h . ht on this textual allusion to the taliry we should not place too rnuc wctg . , I role of' t himgs. , h antity theory a f money In ItS genera h 7 N· 1 Dodd (1994- 10) explains t e gu I Iy as a medium of exc ange, . ~see as follows: ':In so far ~s money ser.v~~ s~beout the theorem itself. If there ~~ere is little which is contentiOUS °dr sU;Ifi~:tegquantity of goods to be so.ld , thee . ity of money an a esrion 0 fant un l . is a definite quanti ds wil! be sold is an elementary q~ d h lume prices at which those goo s:~ velocity of money's circulation an t e vo tic, at least once values for t" . f inflaof transactions are known. . f anomie tolerance 111. respect 0 h 8. For a discussion of the ~ar~~\~ s;r~ct policy of no inflation, see jonar an rion, which are conrraste Wit t _ conomic thought Kirshner (2001). h the basic tenets of macro e 9 The dassical model refers ere to 94' 42). 'v. from 1776-1936 (Snowdon et at. ~,9 '] except in the character of the CO~trl _ . s follows' [.,. . f ney does not Inter 10. This passage .cont.lOue~:d labor [ .' .. ] The introductlo~ °do:'°n in the preceding ance for sparing tlm.e f the Laws of Value laid in unaltered

fere with the oP~~~I~:/:ii~~YOr commodities to 0/1: a;;~~tr~rh~,~'~uch or how chapters i·..} I I tion introduced IS to mon y h he Exchange Value by money: the on ~ re a h for' in other words, ow t . I they will exc ange , h litt e money . d." (ibid.) belongs to w at f itself is determine. .

II gic of money o money I d hat the represent3t10na 0 . f exchange, in contrast 11. It should b~ note di terms of money as a rnediu m 0 be the crucial fearu re is usually discusse 111 k the unit of account to f noney that ra es d h to a teary 0 I 006' 268). 'e in the A(terwor to of money (Ingham 2 .

It articulates this stanCh. k' "Perhaps the . t1y Foucau . n of IS wor . .

12. Most promtnen 'fus' influential inter~reta[jo f he best aids for COffill1g Rabinow and Drey f h term conduct IS one a ~ 'conduct' is at the equivocal nature 0 t .efi . y of power relations. ?r to f coercion which . h the speci Cit echanlsms 0 to ter~s Wit 'I d' others (according to m f b having within a .more .~r same time t? ea ees strict) and a way.o e ower consistS III gUI ,: are to varYll1g degr .'bTt·es The exerCise of p h ssible outcome les; open field .of POSSI d11 c\ ~nd putting in order tepa 'b'ltty of can u .. ing the POSSI I Ide in order to POSltlo.n e (Foucault 1983: 2,21). 'n his Archeology of KflOtr. questions about hIS 13. Fouc~ult ~oined ~IS t:d~s~ription against philo;~P21;'d). This immanent perhis hlstortcal mo eo .. ation (Foucault 19 , d' visible what has, own epistemologica~ Ifg1tl'~arize the familiar by ren er~~~ simply lies on the spective intends ~o e amb~en invisible in the ~rst p l ace~rs ective. The arg~as Foucault putS It, nebver d from a slightly dlfferenht PI d by Paul Ricoeur IS I 't can e rea .' "as mars a e . surface, w 1ere I r"cs of SUSpICIon . f h· gs in an "overView, , he "hermeneu I fi 'altty 0 t In , f nt menr against t . d ex osing the super Cl th to be laid out 1I1 ro based ~n showlI1g ~n p which allow~ ~h.e.d~p rh is resituated as an from higher and higher up, rofound Vlslblltty,. dep I, text, Nietzsche, of him in a more .and ~;~~~, ~s Foucault puts it In a~~~rll)ow 1983: ~07). l,~ absolutely superfiClal\seI967 quoted in Dreyfu.s and Genealogy, History Freud, Marx (Fau.cau t them; in his text on "NlctZSCh e, is also a very domInant (Foucault 1977, 187).

1

300

Ute Tel/mann

Economy

14 A striking example of how Fo I f hi a historical analysis of disc ucau rdr ers IS conceptual questions back to I ourses an practices in 0 d .. hei and effects i . hi I . r er to scrunruze r elf use H 5 present In IS ecrures entitled Society Must be Defended (2003) e commences the lecrure course b drawi h ,e . carding an "economism of ower". uY drawing. out t e c<;>nsequences of disstruggle he contends remaP :d n erstandmg power In terms of war and .' , Ins-aSI e from the also disca d d . f 510n-a viable possibility F f door! . r e notion 0 repres-

the valid conclusion of hi~ t~;o;e~:a~

opnng this understan.ding of powe~ as

conclusion back to historical anal si arf~me~t, he turns this very theoretical use and qualify the aim of I.Y s. ~ different lectures tease and test, war and struggle. There is n~nfian~~~~~d~soclalhf.ormati~n through the notion of ture. Rather, Foucault tries t d .ICt on t IS quesnon at the end of the leeimplied.

0 erermme the effects, the strength, the politics

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Mitchell, Timothy. (2005). The Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes its World. European [ourn al of Sociology 46(2): 297-320.

Mol, Ann~marie. (1999). Ontological Politics: A Word and Some Questions, pp.

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Oxford, Blackwell.

O'Malley, Pat, Lo:na Weir and Clifford Shearing. (1997). Governmenality, Critictsm, Politics. Economy and Society 26(4): 501-5]7.

Ong, Aiw~a. (2006). Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and

Sov~relgllty. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Polanyi, Karl. (1957). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Orrgins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press.

Pryke, Michael. (2007). Geomoncy: An Option on Frost Going Long on Clouds.

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(2002).

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312-323.

Constructing the Socialized Self

15 Constructing the Socialized Self Mobilization and Control in the" Active Society" Stephan Lessenich

1. GOVERN MENTALITY

AND THE WELFARE

STATE

For almost two decades now, critical studies of the development of advanced capitalist societies have been stimulated by what has been called the "Foucault effect." I According to the editors of a volume which back at the beginning of the 1990s, set out the state of the art in the emerging field of "governmentality studies," the Foucault effect in the social sciences consists in "the making visible, through a particular perspective in the history of the present, of the different ways in which an activity or arr called government has been made thinkable and practicable" (Burchell Gordon and Miller .. ' 1991: IX). When talking of "Government" in Foucauldia n terms there is

mu~~ more at ~take than the operations,

rules, and procedures ~f states,

political executives and public administrations.

Colin Gordon argued that with the nse of the "govern mentality school," the analytical perspective had been WIdened well beyond the classical political science notion of the con-

cept: "Government" was conceptualized as an activity that could concern the whole of social relations constituting modern "society"-"the relation between self ao.d self, private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty" (Gordon 1991: 2-3; emphasis added).

If government was conceptualized by govern mentality scholars as a cOl~prehe~sive "social activity," with political government seen as only one of Its possible forms (Miller and Rose 2007: 15), governmentality studies aimed at uncoveringthe rationality of the governmental practices specific to co~temporary SOCieties, revealing the ways in which a particular set of practices becomes "thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon which it [is] practised" (Gordon 1991: 3). The central question posed by a Foucauldian-style analysis, then, is how it comes about tha~ governing individuals, relationships, collectivities and ultimately "the social" (Donzelot 1984) is socially effective. How are government, the conduct of conduct, action on actions, made thinkable, sayable-and practicable, operable, doable? "The sense and object of governmental acts do not

305

fall from the sky or emerge ready formed from social practice. They are things which have had to be-and which have been-invented."

(Burchell et al. 1991: xl This "invention" of government and its specific rationality, in turn, is a question of power. Who is capable of conducting people in the ways they conduct their lives? Who is enabled to take action on whose actions, in which manner, and to what end?

In pursuing these (and related) questions, those studies in govern mentality which have turned out to be most fruitful for the deciphering of the social world of our time have taken the work of the late Michel Foucault as an instruction manual for a specific mode of analysis which, focusing on the relations of knowledge, power, and subjectivity inherent to our society, effectively questions prevalent accounts of the present. "The study of governrnenrality studies might thus be thought of as a disruptive technology of intellectual inquiry which can pose different kinds of questions outside the arc provided by commonly accepted narratives" (Dean 2007c: 9). In this context, contemporary narratives on the state and its public action are among those challenged and called into question. For students of governmentality, the state is neither society's monopolist of political power nor the epicenter of the ordering of social relations, but is thought of as being embedded and levelled into society and its practices. In a way, when we adopt the perspective of governmentality, the state is moved away from the center stage of social order. The state is "no super-technique of power ... taking effect behind all other power techniques" (Gehring 2007: 15), but ultimately an effect of social practices-and an effective social practice itself, an ensemble of different governmental techniques.

The intellectual and analytical preference for practices and effects of "Political Power beyond the State" (Rose and Miller 1992; emphasis added) may explain why the state itself and, more specifically, the transformation of state capacities and state intervention, has not been an issue of primary interest for governmentality studies during the last two decades.

The relevance of the state's "actions on others' actions" (Gordon 1991: 5) becomes obvious in the context of the transformation of social policies we estare currently witnessing in all the advanced capitalist societies of the ern world. It comes as a surprise, then, that this fundamental change 111 the institutional arrangement of the Western welfare state has not been among the most popular themes of the governmentality approach. Even more surprising, however, is the fact that those analyses which actually deal wlt,h the recent change from "welfare society" to "ac,tiv,e sOCl~ty" (Dean 19:); Walters 1997) seem to limit themselves to classifying this transformatIOn as a "neoliberal" move towards the construction of a self-relying homo oeconomicus. But it can be argued that this is only half t~e. story about the reformed Western welfare state. "Activating" social policies are not. only directed by an economic rationality, and they amount to more than Just.a political project of "enterprisation" (Dean 1995: 580) of the self. In addition, they are guided at least as much by a social rationality: they aim at

:V

306

Stephan

Lessenich

Constructing

the construction of a "socialized self" who, in relying on and taking care of him/herself, is actually acting in the name and for the sake of "society."

In line with this argument, in what follows I will present an initial con-

tribution to a reinterpretation

of the welfare state and its current, "acti-

vating" reform(s).' Starting from the assumption that the modern state's action on people's actions amounts to a specific mode of subjectivation, the first central question to be clarified is what type of subjectivit-y is currently

emerging our of the social implementation

of renewed, activating welfare

state programs: those to be governed can be [and have historically been, S.L.] conceived of as children to be educated, members of a flock to be led, souls to be saved, Of, we can now add, social subjects to be accorded their rights

In the reformed

the Socialized

Self

welfare state of the active society, then, governing

307 people

means relocating the promotion of the social into the individual, resubmitting it to the individual's responsibility Of, to put it another way, subjecting the subject to a social-or societal-logic.

If this description of the specific type of subjectivity

rent welfare state transformation

emerging

from cur-

is accurate (Lessenich 2003), the second

central question to be dealt with at this point relates ro rhe modus operandi of this type of subjectivation, to the specific models) of processing these new "sociopolitics" of the welfare state. In this respect, the argumenr tobe developed here holds that in the governmentality of contemporary active society, there reappears-in new guise-a contradlctlO.n. inherent 111 the political economy of liberal society: the dilemma of mobility and control.

and obligations, autonomous individuals to be assisted in realising their potential through their own choice, or potential threats to be analysed in logics of risk and security. (Miller and Rose 2007: 7) From its beginnings in the late nineteenth century and throughout most of the 20'", the institutionalization of the welfare state in West-

ern democracies

meant transforming

individuals

into citizens

endowed

with social rights (Marshall 1963)-a transformation which constituted a public responsibility for individual welfare, and indeed for the constitution of "the social" itself. The welfare state established a "sociopolitics" (Ewald 1991: 210) through which society-or "the promotion of the social" (Donzelot 1988)-became "a permanent principle of political self-Justification" (Ewald 1991: 210). At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, however, a reformed, activating welfare state has been constituting itself as the new mode of political self-justification of society vis-a-vis its individual members constructing

acti.ve .subjects as be~rers not of social rights, but of social obligations-as SOCialized selves obliged not only to be responsible society and its welfare as a whole.

for themselves,

but for

2. THE "LIBERAL PARADOX": THE WELFARE STATE BETWEEN MOBILIZATION AND CONTROL The analysis of current welfare state transformation(s) ro"be presented her: rests on what in political economy has been called the. liberal paradox (Hollifield 1992,2003).

The basic-and apparently trlv,al---:-'l1ltlal insight is that the welfare state of twentieth century Western socletl.es was consntuted and has been instituted as an (a) capitalist and (b)nat/Onal arrangeth e hand (a) the institutions and interventions of rhe welfare menr. O n e, on ducti d f

state are functionally related to the productive and repro u~tl~e n~e s a . I· To be sure and to avoid any eCOnOITIIStiC misread- I t h e capita isr economy. '. ing

this is by no means the only functional

attribute

of the modern

we-

far; state. But the welfare state is basically (among other characteristics) a . I· t t (Offe 2006) in that rhe constitution of a market economy

capita 1St s a e, . "(C I and more specifically, of labor markets, the "employment society .call: ' and a capitalist . . system 0 f pro ducti 1996), ucnon, are logically .and . hisrorica y_ related to the welfare state social policies which systematically ~ommod f ify-and situationally and selectively de_commodlfy-substantl~ parts 0

(Gordon 1991: 3). In a sense, activating the self for the sake of society can be interprered as the up-to-date version of this modern governmental

the population, which by means of welfare state Interve~;~n 1;~~.mgff: way of forming the capitalist workforce (Lenhardt and lei . ' . I . di id al and co ecuve socra f In h n the other hand (b), t e set 0 IVI u . d I .

1984) . O . .. . k I an tne provlrights the insnrurional practices of solldanstlC tIS -poo iated di I .h , fi II f hi h are assoCiate irecr y wtt sian of social services and bene ts, a 0 w '~ te have all developed the (de-jcornmoditying function of the wei are st; ~nd are inextricably in the context of the national polttlcal commUni y ti state (Marshall linked to the constitution of the modern polity as a '~ /On- national in the

ratlon,allty: the re-invcnnon of the welfare State as an activating enterprise ~sta~,lJshes a social setting in which "individuals are willing to exist as sub-

same basic sense

It is this new-or

renewed-focus of the welfare state on "governing of society" (Walters 1997: 221) which comprises the

from the perspective

essence of Its ~o~t recent, neosocial stage of development. "Foucault saw it as a characteristic

...

property

of the development

of the practice

of gov-

ernment In Western SOCIetiesto tend towards a form of political sovereignty ... whose concerns would be at once to 'totalize' and to 'individualize'"

Jects (Gordon 199·1: 48; Maasen and Sutter 2007), in which each subject assumes (or IS assumed to be assuming) "the idea that all have to contribute 'of themselves'" (Gehring 2007: 27) to a Common good called "the social."

1963; Donzelot

1984). The

modern

welf:~~ Stt~::'citrc~~~~~ribes irs (to this

which It IS capItalist? I· I . "to its (national) ciri. t i of "soc!a 11K uston . ex rent exclusive] programma IC .h h III irs most basic version, ·· II t on a par Wit t em. zens and t Ilose po Iinca y pu .. () anonuc logic-the logic the resulting "liberal paradox" consistS 111 a an ec 1I1

308

Stephan Lessenich

of commodification-that

is fundamentally (among other things: territorially) unlimited, being combined Of, to be more precise, being functionally intertwined with (b) a political logic-the logic of inclusion-which is strictly (not least: territorially) delimited in its operation.

Looking rather more closely at the liberal concomitance of capitalism and the nation-state, however, we can identify behind the dualism of an "open economy" and a "closed polity" an even more fundamental opposition which, arguably, is central to the operational logic of liberal governmentality as such: the antagonism of liberry and discipline (Wagner 1994), the dialectics of mobility and control. Although the two dimensions of this dialectics ate analytically separable, ernpirically the liberal mobility/control complex is operative in the economic as well as the political dimension. From its very beginning, the history of liberal capitalism is a history of mobilizing labor, of channelling it from traditional and static forms of self-sufficient, communitary or tributary work into modern and dynamic modes of productive, profitable, wage-related employment.

This historical process of active (and passive) "proletarianization" (Lenhardt and Offe 1984: 92-100) of large parts of the population, escorted and dnven forward by the (avant la lettre) social policy ptograms and provisions of the nascent welfare state, has been (and is) of a highly ambivalent nature. Operating by means of positive and negative incentives, of rewards and sanctions, of material and immaterial power, of money, law, and (not least) violence, it is productive and destructive at the same time. A significant part of this ambivalence is due to the fact that throughout the secular process of mobilizing people for commodification, and arguably until today, there have been (and are) countervailing powers aiming at controllmg people's mobility or (to put it in a less intentional way) leading to an opposite, political dynamic of narrowing, constricting, and confining the very mobility unleashed in the economic realm. Activities like keeping people at their workplace, imposing continuous service and deferred grarification on them, controlling the transformation of their productive capacities. I.oro day-to-day work performance, or ensuring that their economic ~ctlvlty d~es notspill over into the political arena mark only part of the business of SOCial regulation of capitalism. To be sure, people making use of given (or arising) opportunities for mobility are porentially productiveand treasured; but at the same time (and on the very same grounds of their mobility), they are potentially dangerous-and risky. As with any highly valued property (in the wider sense of the word), mobilized people-and a society In morlon-arc hazardous goods.

To put it in a nutshell, the capitalist mobilization and ensuing "movement of society" (Donzelor 1988: 397; 1991) has raised, right from the start, fundamental Issues of governability-of "governing the freedom" given to Its citizens by a liberal political economy (Lemke 2007; Saar 2007).

But this IS only part of the story of the inbuilt ambivalence of liberal societies. To complieate the picture further, the interplay (or counter-play) of

Constructing the Socialized Self

309

mobility and conrrol, of mobilization and de- or im-mobilization, is not only inherent in the process of capitalist accumulation of economic wealth.

In a complex and contradictory-and historically contingent-way, this process interacts with the political drift toward stare-building in the guise of the nation-state.

The modern capitalist (political) economy constitutes itself as a national affair. Producing wealth by unleashing the productive

forces of labor works as a structural incentive for further mobility, as a pull factor attracring-e-rbe ambiguities of the capitalist mode of production notwithstanding-people across territorial, spatial, and cultural borders, making them move in order to seize the opportunity to become an integral part of national production systems. This "wealth appeal" of (advanced, metropolitan) capitalism, however, is thwarted by the logic of limitation and control inherent to the nation-state and to the institutions of national citizenship (Bornrnes 1999; Bommes and Geddes 2000). The modern stare as a nation-state is defined-and even more so to the extent to which It historically develops features of a welfare state-:-by instituting an effective regime of external surveillance and control of ItS rerruory (Giddens 1987; Dean 2007a, b). In a way akin to but even more mrense than In the case of the internal mobility of "risky subjects," external (or inward) mobility implies severe operational problems for national systems of capitalist production and reproduction.

Therefore, people on the move outside the borders of the national polity (and around them) are constructed neither as "citizens" nor as "workers"-or "citizen workers" (Montgomery 1993)but at least in principle as "aliens," "foreigners," and "boarders," i.e., as , . '. . (B 1991) potential (or actual) Intruders and, 10 a sense, as en~mles auman .'

In a paradoxical manner, then, the ~~dern regime of w,elfare capitalism is based-in all its institutional va rtettes (Hall and Soskice2001)-on the (economic) mobilization of people and, at the very same time, on the internal and external (political) limitation of the IT mobility. Any va na nt or model of national welfare capitalism is builr on confining and delimiting the social risks of people's mobiliry. lnternalty, this means msnruring not only the technology of insurance agamst the risks of the capitalist 路 (E Id 1991) but also a range of rechnologies for emp Ioyment re Iatron wa "'I' d .. . , . d feguarding society against Its mobilize citizens, securing, assuring. an sa f ' d trol externally it implies the establishment of a regime 0 secunry a n con h that allow; for the systematic (and, compared TO controllingcitrzvt'>. mubc . and violence Vis-a-VIS rna I eI more unrestrained) use 0f foree, coercion,,, ' " h disen"non-nationals"-inc1uding political acts of sovereignty sue as franchisement,. displacement, and exclusion d'. f h liberal mobility/conA Foucauldian (or govern mentality) rea mg 0 t e blc vi 0 trol paradox outlined previously can be said to have a dou .~ vlTtue' n d the one hand the (welfare) state, with all its functional arm. ures an 10 , . ot so much as a sovereIgn, auronoall its regulative interventions, appears n b . ible as an insriffici of power but ecomes VISI rnous and sel f-su crent source , I h logies-as a tutional effect of social practices and governmenta tee no

310 (pretty

Stephan

Lessenicb

material)

Constructing

social construction,

a complex

co-production

of institu-

tional actors acting on the actions of individuals (or collectivities).

On the other hand, it becomes possible to grasp the essential characteristic of the current, "neoliberal" transformation of the welfare state which-as will be argued in more detail in what follows-consists in a process of subjectiuation of the dialectics of mobility and control through technologies of self-regulation and social knowledge production.

In a sense, this process constitutes a radicalization of the "liberal paradox," with people being socially subjectivated by individually subjecting themselves to a governing programmatic

of self-rationalization

Of, more precisely, of

self-mobilization

and self-control. In this process, what we used to call "the state" emerges (or reemerges from its alleged withdrawal in the age of globalization) as a political "authority" torn between contradicting logics of action, selectively and situationally urging people to mobilize and, at the very same time, to demobilize themselves.

3. THE WELFARE (DE-)MOBILIZING

STATE TRANSFORMED: PEOPLE IN THE "ACTIVE

SOCIETY"

Recent social policy reforms in all advanced welfare states have revolved around the idea of "activation" (Serrano Pascual and Magnusson 2007).

Their guiding principle, to quote the former president of the United States Bill Clinton, has been "to move people from welfare to work" (Ledemel and Trickey 2001). In essence, the conventional analysis underlying the transformation of public interventions in this field during the last two decades claims that the post-World War II welfare state was based mainly on compensating people for the loss of their work or employment (i.e., their earning) capacity-be it due to injury or sickness, unemployment or ageing, pregnancy or motherhood,

or any other

"social

risk." This compensation

was meant to

be made effective via transfer payments replacing (at a higher or lower rate, depending on why people were obliged to leave their workplace) the wage earner's former income. In the course of the postwar expansion of the welfare state, this "compensatory logic" of social policies, so the story usually goes, was expanded qualitatively and quantitatively, granting ever higher benefits to ever larger parts of the (potential) working population-gradually incorporanng Into the "compensation community" even individuals (and groups) who had never been wage earners before or who were (held to be) perfectly capable of work. Looking back at the old welfare state through the eyes of its CritICS,Its main defining feature was its passiveness: all sorts of people were made (and kept) passive by means of public transfers, giving them all sorts of opportunities to opt for exit from the labor market-or so it seems. The wel~?re state in its golden age, commonly described as "Fordist" or "KeynesIan, IS thus retrospectively depicted as if it had been a perfect materialization of Cesra Espmg-Andersen's famous (and obviously misleading') version

the Socialized

Self

311

of the concept of "de-commodification": "A minimal definition must entail that citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary" (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23).

Consequently, and in line with this interpretation, the main guiding principle of welfare stare reforms throughour the Western (OEeD) world has been to activate those (allegedly) made passive: to move people into work.

Clinton's (successful) crusade "to end welfare as we know it" was continued (though somewhat less straightforwardly)

by European-first and foremost British-and EU policies. New Labour's "New Deals", the "European Employment Strategy" (EES), and German labor market reforms ("Hartz IV") are all, in one way or another, regulative sequels to "Clinton's law": "anyone who can go to work must go to work" (d. Caraley 2001: 527).

Not only for the "undeserving poor" of our times-the non-disabled unemployed receiving public benefits-but for non-employed women or elderly people as well, activation-meaning the re-commodification of their working capacity-is the public order of the day: "The active society seeks to make us all workers" (Walters 1997: 224). _ The social philosophy of these activation policies rests on two marn pillars. Basically, "activation" means (a) a changed allocation of responsibility for social welfare (or "well-fare") between the individual and SOCIety-"society" meaning (depending on the context) the larger commurut y, the general public the national economy, the tax-payer (or Simply the state itself). Put in its ~ost condensed form, the activat.io.nyaradlgm advances the well-known "Kennedy formula" regarding the division of labor between the individual and the social: "Do not ask what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your countr.y." !n this se~se, w.elfare sta~e . . . f d d the activation paradigm with a modiCItizens are being con ronre un er . . . fied weighting of rights and responsibilities.

IndiVidual tights and" (coribil iti I rominence "public tights and responding) public responsi I mes ose P _' . d I ivid I ibilitie s coming to the fore mstea . n (corresponding) indivi ua responSl I I I _ __ h legitimate claim against Its mernthe activation perspecuve. society as a . bli . bers to each and everyone of them individually, act In th~ pu IC Inr~re.st, '. d d ing the welfare of the larger collective: beneficIatles en h ancing an a vane: . id orry about not drawing on tax-payof public assistance programs s h au w k b d - to enter the labor mar et ecause I h ers' support unduly' women s au strive - I Id ' . d _. g their human capita; 0 -age of the investment society has ma e III rarstn . .. f h . . II roductlve acuviry a rer t ey retire pensioners should look f or some SOCIa y p h h-Id ies should srrrve to ave c I ren (as late as possible)' young gra d uate coup -f , b I' f h sian system the competitiveness 0 for the sake of the via i it y ate pen 'In all these _ h II-b - of future generations. the national economy, or t ewe eing f sent or prospective cases individual behavior is seen in the context 0 pre social goods or public needs. hifr in social liabilities, On the basis of this fundamental Sit I -' I I iashing what IS (inconststen policies aim at (b) consistent y un e

activation tl ) called

y

312

Constructing the Socialized Self

Stephan Lessenich

313

private initiative, personal responsibility, and/or individual autonomy (Ullrich 2005). Activation relies on-and at the same time (paradoxically) is

actual)

meant to produce-the self-arranging, pro-active behavior of individuals acting as "responsible risk takers" (Giddens 1998: 100). Anthony Giddens' (ibid.: 99-128) programmatic account of "the social investment state, operating in the context of a positive welfare society" (ibid.: 117), is a pretty accurate portrayal of the active society-s-a society in which "Government has an essential role to play" (ibid.: 99). Activating social policies are meant to guide people not merely toward (more) activity, but also toward the

"The cultivation of human potential should as far as possible replace 'after the event' redistribution" (Giddens 1998: 101). In a way, with the paradigm shift from social policies which supposedly keep people passive to straight-

adoption of "pro-active" behavior, understood as planned, purposive, and prudential action. Pro-active behavior means taking risk(s), adopting an entrepreneurial self-management and self-control. Pro-active both self-centered and pro-social. "Deciding

calculating and (on that basis) stance toward life, relying on behavior is, at the same time, to go to work and give up benefirs, or taking a job in a particular industry, are risk-infused activities-but such risk taking is often beneficial both to the individual and to the wider society." (ibid.: 116; emphases added). In exactly this vein, ongoing social policy reforms revolve around producing such "risk-infused" activities: "a

more active risk-taking attitude ... , wherever possible through incentives, but where necessary by legal obligations" (ibid.: 122).

In all Western welfare states, these policies of activation are by no means restricted to the core area of labor market and unemployment policies, but have begun to spread-mainly in the context of the public discourse on demographic change-into other fields of social policy intervention such as public education, health care, long-term care, and welfare provision in old age. But beyond that diffusion process, what is analytically important is that the obvious activation logic dominating recent social policy and welfare

state re.f?rms is being accompanied,

complemented,

and counterbalanced

by addirional (co-)Iogics. Insofar as the national welfare state citizenry is concerned, activation policies are being systematically supplemented by a politics of prevention. Additionally, with regard to non-nationals seeking

inclusion in the national "activation game," a second tier of the mobility! control complex is operating. This, in a paradoxical way, combines what may be called the technologies of exclusion and toleration. In what follows I will very briefly sketch this complex constellation, thus providing a fairly

complete picture of the current transformations of the welfare state.

In principle, welfare state interventions aiming at prevention are perfectly complementary to the dominant an integral part of pro-active behavior, to

activation paradigm.

Prevention is and social policies increasingly tend

aOlm,ate people, by way of discursive persuasion and material incentives,

to providently and foresightedly take care of themselves in order e.g., to aVOid diseases (through regular medical checkups), to secure the flow of Income 111 old age (through private savings), or to prevent the loss of produc~"ve capacIties and human capabilities (e.g., through "life-long learning").

Investing In people" means investing in their potential for (and in their

pro-active

behavior-and

it implies that social policies (and pub-

lic interventions more generally) adopt a pro-active orientation themselves:

forwardly activating ones, "Government itself assumes the discourse of critique, challenging the rigidities and privileges of a blocked society" (Gordon 1991: 46)-calling society to activity, to a SOCial order of movement and mobility. However, beyond the public cultivation of ~,uman potentla~; there is another side of the activation COIn. This consists of counter-acting activities of public frustration of human potential-in case this very pot~n. I" Preven.l.on t rial is defined as being socially unacceptable or even " unsocial. policies have a productive as well as a p~ni~ive dim~l~sion, the "pLlrllt~ve turn" (Garland 2001) being inherently built 1I1to posinve measures of risk

prevention. The inbuilt contradiction of public prevention ~olJC1es, then, is that

being oriented

to the mobilization

of people, they Simultaneously

operate through immobilization: individual. non-cOJ~pll~nc~ With th~ SOCial . f ti behavior results In de-actlvatlllg .' Interventions hof requirement 0 pro-ac rve the welfare state-ranging

from cuts in benefits that effectively restrain

t Ie

individual's capacity to meet the expectation of. mobility to t~e inevitab e recourse to the devices of criminal law if active cmzens eng.age Il1 unw~n~e~ .. , (S nd Sullivan 2001' Johnston and Shearing 2003).

VIacnvines tenson. a '.. _. of ublic intervention for au sly the preventive-and ,

hence punitive .

I"

bias d b

p

the sake of activation is potentIally un irrure , ecause, thing and everybody

, ' by definition

(literally: every thing and every body) can

b '

every-

. 11

e sOCIa y

constructed as being a-or at-fISk. If Curiously (in a way), what is highly valued with regard to we are state .. . .., . k k g and self-actIvation, selzlI1g opporcitizens-to show II1ltJatIVe,rts -ta III , .' h is not

.. tunities for inclusion

.111

pro

d

ti e participation In t e economy-l .

I ("aliens") exhibiting the

L1C IV

honored when It comes to non-nanona s k i g to be part of the havi F . nationals activel y see In very same b e avror. oreign d wi hi' dimensional system of , I . . confronre Wit a mu [1(nationa ) active society are fi t and repel external , di 'I d I' g) measures to con ne, aver, (legal, JU rciar, an po ICII1 I at the level of national bili T ki h ofGermanyasanexampe, rna I ity. a II1gt e case . b how to mobilize internal . ics fh ' politics, r ere are ongom g diSCUSSions a out I before and instead a f resources-women, elderly people" young fPheoPh~y-qualified immigrants is

truly

c

.

.

.

'.

resorting to imrrugranon; pursued only reluctantly,

the recrUitment a

Ig

.

, all kinds of obstacles in the way of their placingal I b ability fat citizens of the

. . limit to their stay; a or m k entry an d setting a time I C I E ope is still restricted, mar et . . s in East enrra ur new EU accession cauntne . 2011' he numbers of asylum seekers liberalization being postponed unt~l, '~I st decade (and the numbers have gone down to very low levels unng f e a who cannot be deported , d I ven lower)' re uge es h' I being grante asy urn are e 'f kind (be it geograp Ica f f d m of movement a any k' d

are dispossesse or labor

0

mobility).

ree

0

On the European

I I "forrress Europe" is wor JI1g eve,

314

Stephan

Constructing

Lessenich

quite smoothly and inconspicuously, with the "Frontex" agency' having been established in 2004 and its "European Patrols Network" executing the Joint Operations "Hera" (to tackle "illegal" migration flows from West Africa to the Canary Islands) and "Nautilus" (reinforcing border control activities on the shores of Malta, Lampedusa, and Sicily, cutting off North African migration).

Once again, however, the dominant logic of exclusion of external (migrant) mobility is complemented (and, in a way, undermined) by a cologie which is called here, in allusion to a legal concept in German residence law, the logic of toleration ("Duldung").

Externally exclusive though welfare state policies are, they still provide for (highly selective and always precarious) channels of mobility and inclusion. As a matter of fact, certain ("high potential" or otherwise socially indispensable) groups or categories of people do have the opportunity to gain access-if only temporarily-to the national labor market(s). A mechanism that seems to be more important, however, being a direct consequence of the strict and exclusive admission and residence regime of national welfare states, is the one discussed under the heading of "illegal," "irregular," or "undocumented" migration (Jordan and Duvell 2002). People overstaying their legal entitlement to reside within the national territory are forced into a whole range of "illegal" activities, into a world of "submerged pro-activity" where they constantly run the risk of being discovered, identified, and expelled from the country. Thus, by means of (unavoidably imperfect) exclusion and control, the welfare state and its institutions produce a para-legal world of activation which is functional to the highly flexible service and knowledge econo-

mies of advanced capitalist societies-and

which, its coerced and repressive

character notwithstanding, is effectively being co-produced by those "illegal" migrants who try to take advantage of the possibilities of action the submerged economy, the changing demography, and the prosperity needs of Western societies offer them.

4_ TORN BETWEEN TWO LOGICS OR: HOW TO ACTIVATE THE HOMO SOC1ETAL1S What does this preliminary analysis of the activating welfare state, its mode of subiectivation, and its forms of operation mean for further research on what is commonly called the "neoliberal" political economy of Western societies? There are at least two ways of answering this central question.

First of all, the ongoing transformation towards an active society driven forward by a reformed welfare state is not sufficiently captured when it is conceptualized as a process of subordination of the social to an overwhelming economic rationality.

In addition to and well beyond this undeniable process of "economization" (Brbckling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000), a distinctive feature of the Current development is what may be called a tendency

the Socialized

Self

315

towards the subjectiuation of the social: handing over social responsibility from public (collecrive) institutions to private (individual) actors. Tim IS what I have been addressing here and elsewhere (Lessenich 2003, 2008) as the neosocial philosophy of the welfare stare. Generally speaking, welfare state policies may be seen as involving "prac~l~es of "self-f~rrnatlon, practices concerned to shape the attributes, capacrnes, o~len~atlons and l11ora,~ conduct of individuals and to define their rights, obligations and statuses (Dean 1995: 567). Th;ough social policies of "activation," individualsare guided towards taking responsibility not only for themselves, bur for society at lar e. Activaring social policies not only "seek ethical effectivity m the shaping of the relation of self to self" (ibid.: 575), but aim at moving people into an ethical relationship to society as a whole, making themhwant to . . f rom t hi'ernse ves, I ..e , from the risk t , ey pose serve society by protectlOg It ." " to society if they do not act as responsible

selves. Welfaredstate factlv(lfiedsIII

d ring the can uct 0 an un erthe active society are not on Iy a bout can uc I " I b . b I and equally Important y-a our socialized) homo oeconomlCUS, ut a so. I" d h the political

construction

of the subjectivity

of an (over-)socla

ize

01/10

soeietalis. ". h . f the social a Closely related to this "subjective turn in t e prfomotlon 0 elates to the . ' f If e state trans ormation r second analytical dimension 0 we ar d .

Iy between public and . f d fini the boun anes not on ongoing process 0 re e nmg he acri ciety's inner and outer ibili b I between t e active so private responsi I tty, ur a so t lity of our present fun· th t the govern men a I space. On the who Ie, It seems a t f b und aries: welfare states damentally revolves around the managemen °b a en "the passive" and .

I· f demarcanon etwe are constantly drawing mes o. d "rh . mobile" between "good" . "b "th obile" an t e irn , "the active, erween t em" h are busy blurring these and ~<bad"mobility-"a~d, at t,he ~~~~i;lm~;~:~oPting the perspective of very boundaries.

Mobility and irn y'. mobilization and control, " people's actlonsthe welfare state s actions on ," h transformation towards . ed) marnage in t e . celebrate a strange (an d stram 0 h e hand activation IS the . . h 2006) n t e on, . an active society (LesseOlc, .". drivi ople to adopt a pro-acnve bl C pohctes nving pe d h (social) order 0 f t h e d ay, pu I f lif f the sake of society an t e .' iducr a I eor . attitude a sel f -monltonng COl "Ifare state interventions , h h hand preventive we common good. On t e ot er f'f . t 's security-people who do not . d bili on behal 0 SOCle y . .

I . selectively e-mo I Ize. .

B b d this the actlvanon ogle , . d ecnve ut eyon , comply with the actlvatlon Ir " 'f .' 'l control that is meant to . . d· d b regime 0 tenltona . ... d IS systematically eme Y a b h . _individual InitlatlVe an · the very e aVlOr h prevent, by way 0 f exc IUSlon, ... t1y being called for. At t e . .. h' h "s otherWise II1slsten d' self-responslbllity-w IC I. further these exclu mg prac" the picture even , ,," . " same time and to comp IIcate "h "ubterranean aCtiVitieS , d' h Iities of toleratmg t e s tices are entangle Wit a po of illegalized non-citizens. . d blurring the lines between .

I . of draWing an At this point, the Slmu taneltY b·l· atl·Oll and conrrol, becomes ·d "b tween ]110 I IZ " . ) "insiders" and "outSI ers, e h' of "us" all (activation, · d be t e saVIOr I . 0 b'VIOU, s What( is proe all11e to qUite

316

Stephan

Lessenich

is being suggested to, taught to, or even imposed on some people but effectively denied to others. What is operating as the counter-logic to mobilization in some cases, control, acts (and is enacted) as the primary logic in others. What is formally being controlled as undesirable mobility is informally promoted as a functional contribution to the mobility regime of capitalist economies. Thus, governing society today is not only about the management of boundaries, bur also-and to an even greater extent-about the management of antagonisms.

Quite obviously, the central antagonism of the reformed welfare state's activation regime is a revenant of the essential paradox of liberal governmentality, its resuscitation in a contemporary (neoliberal) guise. The rationality of liberty, spelt out as "activity" and "mobility" today, inescapably breeds its counter-rationality of security, of "discipline" and "control". The mobilization of society inevitably creates a dynamic of controlling what is considered to be a permanently unsafe public good: the (neosocial) movement of people for the sake of society.

Instead of systematically looking for government beyond the state, then, governmentality studies should take more interest in the state itself, and a Foucauldian perspective on the welfare state and its current transformation should try to make sense of the structural contradictions and strategic ambivalences of public policies for an "active society." Earlier analyses of this new societal formation suggested that, since it is geared toward the selfrna rketization of its citizens, it constitutes a turn away from the "project of governing from the perspective of society" (Walters 1997: 221). In the light of the analysis presented here, quite the opposite seems to be true: the active welfare state is a renewed arrangement of "governing through society" (ibid.)-or, more specifically, of governing the self in the name of society. Because we are badly in need of an evaluation of the social effects of this "neosocial" constellation, studies in governmentality should re-orient themselves toward a critical analysis of political power not beyond, but within the (welfare) state. It would not be the first time that taking a step back means advancing.

NOTES 1. Thanks go ro Sven Opitz and to the three editors of this volume for their critical comments on an earlier version of this chapter, which improved it significantly.

2. For a more systematic elaboration of the argument, see Lessenich 2008.

3. Esping-Andersen's aCCount clearly relates not to a "minimal" but to a maxi~ ':lal or ideal-typical~and thus, by very definition, extra-empirical-concepIIO~ of "d~-.co~lmodlfication": it would be impossible for de-commodifying SOCIalpolICIes III real-world (i.e., capitalist) welfare states ro match EspingAndersen's definition.

4. The acronym "~rontex" stands for the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. According to the Fromex website (http://www.

Constructing

the Socialized

Self

317

its official device obeys classical liberal governruenrality: "I ibertas-secu ri ras-e-justitia."

5. In line with Foucault's (1991: 103) assertion that "[the] gover nmentalization of the state is a singularly paradoxical phenomenon." frontex.europa.eu),

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Contributors

Friedrich

Balke is Professor of Media Studies, Bauhaus-University

Weimar,

Germany.

Ulrich

Briickling

is Professor

Halle-Wirtenberg,

of Sociology,

Martin-Luther-University

Germany.

Didier Fassin is a james D. Wolfensohn Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, USA, and Director of Studies at the Ecole des Haures Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, France.

Bob jessop is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Co-Director of the Cultural Political Economy Research Centre, Lancaster University,

Great Britain.

Lars Thorup

Larsen

of Aarhus,

Lessenich

jena,

Germany.

Lemke

is Professor

is Professor

versity Frankfurt/Main, Susanne

Professor

of Political Science, University

Denmark.

Stephan

Thomas

is Assistant

Krasmann

of Sociology,

Friedrich-Schiller-University

of Sociology, johann_Wolfgang-Goethe-Uni-

Germany.

is Professor

of Sociology,

University

of Hamburg,

Germany.

Sven Opitz Martin

is Lecturer

of Sociology,

Saar is Assistant

Goethe-University Urs Sriihcli is Professor

Professor

Frankfurt/Main, of Sociology,

University of Hamburg,

Germany.

of Political Science, johann-WolfgangGermany.

University of Hamburg,

Germany.

322

Contributors

UteGermany.

Tellmann

is Assistant

Professor

0

f Soci Sociology,

, University

William Walt ers IS 'P ro fessor of P I" I Sociology, Ottawa C d 0 inca , ana a.

Peter Wehling Germany.

is Senior Researcher

in'

Carleton

, SocIOlogy, University

of Hamburg,

Persons Index

U'ruversity, ,

of Augsburg,

A Adler, Alfred, 206 Agamben, Giorgio, 24-25,106-108, 117,125,130,142,166-167, 169,174,179,188,190,194, 203,248-249,264-265,288 Albahari, Maurizio, 147 Alrhusser, Louis, 39, 50, 58,88, 90-91 Amariglio, Jack, 271, 285 Anderson, Benedict, 180 Aradau, Claudia, 131 Arendr, Hannah, 24, 90, 167, 187-188, 190-191,194,249 Aristotle, 188-189, 194 B Bachelard, Gaston, 187 Bakhrin, Michail, 58 Balibar, Etienne, 58 Balke, Friedrich, 21, 74, 106 Barret-Kriegel, Blandine, 69 Barry, Andrew, 101, 111, 148, 157, 180,204 Barrhes, Roland, 1,58 Bataille, Georges, 167 Bauman, Zygmunt,

190

Bayarr, jean-F mncois, 10 Becker, Gary S., 25, 249, 256-263 Benjamin, Walter, 106, 131, 167 Bentham, Jeremy, 6, 130 Berlin, Isaiah, 41 Biehl, jodo, 190 Bigo, Didier, 159,190 Binding, Karl, 256, 265 Bockenforde, Ernst- Wolfgang, 124 80h111, Franz, 27

Bondirti, Philippe, 146, 159 Bourdieu, Pierre, ] 59,206 Brockling, Ulrich, 1,25,50,247,281

Brown, Phil, 232-233 Brown, Wendy, 290 Bryan, Dick, 293 Burchell, Graham, 57, 159 Butler, Judith, 106, 130-131 Buzan, Barry, ] 01-1 02

C Callan, Michel, 180, 230, 233, 242, 297 Campbell, Timothy, 179 Canguilhem, Georges, 24, 187-191, 193, 197 Cassels, Alan, 230 Cassirer, Ernsr, 41, 90 Cava illes, Jean, 187 Chadwick, Ruth, 242 Clinton, Bill, 310-311 Clough, Patricia Ticinerc, 277 Conrad, Peter, 231 Crelinsren, Ronald D., 132 Croce, Benedeno, 41 Croissant, Klaus, 105 Cruikshank, Barbara, 180

o

Daase, Christopher, 127 Danner, Mark, J26 Darwin, Charles, 25] Davidson, Arnold 1.,49-50 Dean, Mirchell, 27, 50 Debrix. Fran<;ois, 139 Defert, Daniel, 8 Deleuze, Gilles, 139,219 Derrida, jacq ues, 90, 131, 279 Dershowitz, Alan, 122-123, 129-130 Dillon, Michael, 97, 179 Dodd, Nigel, 299 Donzelot, Jacques, 8,48, 56, 70 Dratel, Joshua, 95

324

Persons Index

Persons Index

Dreyfus, Hubert L., 49, 187,299 Dupuy, Jean-Pierre, 282 Durkheim, Emile, 122

E Eckert, Julia, 132 Elden, Stuart, 140, 159,289 Escobar, Arturo, 285 Esping-Andersen, Gesta, 310, 316 Esposito, Roberto, 100, 169, 179

Eucken, Walter, 27 Ewald, Francois, 8,48,127,287

F Fahrrneir, Andreas, 227 Passin, Didier, 10, 23-24,

143, 154,

180,185 Faulstich, Heinz, 265 Fisher, Irving, 291

Hobbes, Thomas, 49, 97,124,169, 264 Hache, Alfred, 256, 265 Hughes, Bill, 235 Hume, David, 291 Huspek, Michael, 159 Husser}, Edmund, 187 Huysrnans, jef, 103 [

Michael, 192 Irwin, Alan, 226 Isin, Engin, 241 Ignatieff,

J Bob, 21, 56 justi, Johann Heinrich Gotrlob von, 264 Jessop,

Fontana, Alessandro, 287 Forsthoff, Ernst, 21-22, 75, 82-90

K

Franklin, Sarah, 170 Freudensrein, Roland, 146 Fromm, Heinz, 95

Kelly, Mark G.E., 61 Kerr, Anne, 228-229

Kessler, Oliver, 127 291, 293, 310 Kiesow, Rainer Maria, 130 Kirchheimer, Otto, 70 Kirshner, Jonathan, 299 Knoppers, Bartha Maria, 242 Koch, Carsten, 219 Koselleck, Reinhart, 43, 45-46 Krasmann, Susanne, 1,22,49,50,70, 115 Keynes, John Maynard,

G johan, 253 Genel, Karia, 179 Gibson-Graham, ].K., 270 Giddens, Anthony, 312 Gilbert, Emily, 293 Goede, Marieke de, 291 Goldscheid, Rudolf, 25, 249-257, 259260,262-263, 265 Gordon, Colin, 50, 57, 70, 149, 155, 282,304 Gorrweis, Herbert, 180 Goux, Jean-Joseph, 273 Galtung,

Greenberg, Karen, 95,129-130

Grossberg, Lawrence, 282 Guanari, Felix, 139 H Haahr, Jens Henrik, 108 Habermas, jurgen, 11, 180,260,296 Hamdan, Salim, 132 Haraway, Donna, 179 Hardt, Michael, 144, 148,166-169,

203 226, 228-229, 241 Hedgecoe, Adam, 232 Heidcgger, Martin, 167 Hindess, Barry, 27, '160

Heath,

Kant, Immanuel, 49, 252

Deborah,

L Laclau, Ernesto, 269-270, 278, 282 Lalonde, Marc, 208, 223 Lane, Christopher, 230 Lamer, Wendy, 288 Larsen, Lars Thorup, 24, 174, 180,201 Latour, Bruno, 180 Lazzararo, Mauriz.io, 179 Le Heron, Richard, 288 Lefort, Claude, 130 Lemke, Thomas, 1,23,27,49,50,70, 165, 179-180, 295 Lessenich, Stephan, 26, 304, 316 Lindemann, Gesa, 180 Lock, Margaret, 170, 234, 241-242 Louis XIV., 105 Lowy, lIa na, 190 Luban, David, 116, ]31 Luhmann, Niklas, 50, 282, 291

M Machiavelli, Niccolo, 38, 79 Malkki, Liisa, 190 Marcuse, Herbert, 18 Marx, Karl, 58, 205, 291 Massumi, Brian, 276-277 Maurer, Bill, 293 Mauss, Marcel, 237 Mayer, Jane, 111 Mbeki, Thabo, 192 Mbembe, Achille, 189 McKinley, Brunson, 144 Meinecke, Friedrich, 41 Melville, Herman, 18 Memmi Dominique, 10 Merlea~-Ponty, Maurice, 187 Mill John Stuart, 292 Mill~r, Peter, 11,57-58,70,288-289 Miller, Toby, 282 Mitchell, Robert, 236 Mol Annernarie, 286 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondar Baron de, 106 Morrell, Geoff, 132 Mouffe, Chantal, 269-270 Moynihan, Ray, 230 Muller-Armack, Alfred, 27 Muller-Wille, Staffan, 232 Milnkler, Herfried, 43,50 N David, 190 8 166-169,203 Negn Antonio, 144, 14 , 142 Nietz;che, Friedrich, 1, 36, 46, 50, ' 191,206,296,299 Novas, Carlos, 228, 241 Nyers, Peter, 160,241

Napier,

o O'Leary, Ted, 289 O'Malley, Pat, 154, 160

Oakeshon, Michael, 41 Oestreich, Gerhard, 43, 50 Ong, Aihwa, 288 Opitz, Sven, 22, 93, 128 Osborne, Thomas, 16, 27

P Paolo, 242 48 Pasquino, Pasquale, 8, Patron, Paul., 50 0 Pecheux, Michel, 58, 18 Peter the Great, 91

Palladino,

325

Petryna, Adriana, 190,228 Pfahler, Thomas, 265 Pocock, John, 43, 46 Polanyi, Karl, 271, 273, 291 Poovey, Mary, 281 Poulantzas, Nicos, 50, 58 Procacci, Giovanna, 8, 48

R Rabeharisoa, Vololona, 230, 233, 242 Rabinow, Paul, 49, 187-188, 190, 225, 229,234,240,242,299 Rafferty, Michael, 293 0 Ranciere, Jacques, 17,19,128,16 Rapp, Rayna, 241 Rarzel, Friedrich, 149 Redfield Perer, 144, 150 Reem(sl~a, Jan Philipp, 115, 125 Reid, Julian,179 Rejali, Darius, 130, ~.31 Rheinberger, Hans-Jorg, 232 Ricoeur, Paul, 299. ..

Robespierre, Maxirnilien, 90 Ropke, Wilhelm, 27 Rorry Richard, 41 0 Rose 'Nikolas, 11, 27, 50, 57-58, 7 , , 189_190,226,228-229,235, 238,241,281,290 Roth Klaus, 51 , 9 179 Rouse, Joseph, 4 , 49 74-82, Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 21, , 84-85,87-91 Ruccio, David, 271, 285 Rumsfeld, Donald, 127 Rusche, Georg, 70 4 Rustow, Alexander, 27, 17 Rutherford, Paul, 171,180

~aar Martin, 21, 34,49,

50 Sart;e Jean-Paul, 187 Sauss~re, Ferdinand de, 58 Savulescu, Julian, 239 Scarry, Elaine, 129 Schauble, Wolfgang 9i3 106,117, Schmitt, Carl, 21, 8 , 124,167 _ 249 256 Schultz., Theodore \V., 2), , ' 258 260 262-263 " 29~) Senellart, Michel, 49, 63, Shakespeare, Tom, 234 Shell Marc, 276 ' I Georg ' 276,291 S路Imme,

2

326

Persons Index

Sir~lOn, Dieter, 125 S~~nn~r,Quentin, 43, 46 Sraheh: Urs, 25, 50, 269 Starobinski, Jean, 80 Strauss, Leo, 41 Sunder Rajan , K aus hikI

,

V

242

Wa:ver, Ole, 101-103 ~aldbY, Catherine, 170 236 ablters, William, 21-23' 108 138 ' , W e er Max 11 1 Wehl" p' ,20,205-206 265 . mg, erer, 24, 225 ' Wtlde, Jaap de, 101-102

Tadros, Victor, 131

Tandl~r, Julius, 265 Taussig, Michael, 189 Taussig, Karen-Sue 241

u y, ames 46 Turner, Brya'n, 241

Subject Index

W

T

Taylor, Mark c., 2in Tellmann T II J ' U te, 26 ,282

Mariana, 103 eblen, Thorstein, 205 VI fait, .Maurizio, 43 Voegelin, Eric, 41 0alverde,

'

285

Z Zitek, Slavoj, 122-123

# 9111,109,115,121,126 141

129 131

",

A Abu Ghraib, 115 126 activation, 22, 26, 89, 290, 310-316 active society, 304-305, 307, 310-316 actor-network-theory (ANT), 26, 287, 294,297-298 advanced liberalism, 59 See also neoliberalism affect, 276-278 AIDS, 24, 165, 189, 191-193, 195 anatornopolitics, 61-63, 66, 171, 185~ 186,247 Anglo-Foucauldian school 56-62 64 69-70 " , antagonism,

8, 18,44,

104, 119, 308,

316 anthropology, 10, 14, 16,23-24,34-35, 48,51,104,166,180,185,189191,258,260,262,292 anrhropopolitics, ] 70, 172 apparatus of security 4 5 20 22 97 103,1]9,287 " , , , asylum, 24, 66, 105, 144-145, 147, 151,154,157,190-191,194, 313

biologization, 228-230, 234, 240-241.

See a/so geneticization biomedicine, 24,191,196,225-227, 233,236,238-240 biopolitics, 20, 22-25, 37, 46, 48,59, 63,81,93,117,119,130-131, 139,142-144,148,150,152, 156,158,165-180,185-189, 191,193,196,197,201-206, 208,211_213,215-216,218, 221_222,225-227,229,236, 238,247-249,254,261-264 biopower, 7, 37, 61, 83, 105, 146, 152, 159,168,179,181,185-186, 196_197,203,225,238,247248 bios, 24, 188-191, 194 biosciences, 170, 190,225,230 biosocialiry, 190, 225 -226, 229-231, 233_235,237,240-242 biotechnology, 170_171,225,227, 239-240 biovalue, 170, 179, 190, 236 body politiC, 75-76, 78, 80-81, 91, 166, 174, 248 border, 4, 21-23, 76, 107-108, 118119,127,132,138-159,309, 314,316; border control, 22, 150, 153, ]59,314

C B bare life, 117, 130, 167, 188-189, 191, bi 194, 248-249, 264. See also locapital,190 bioerhics, 170 227 236-239 242 b~ohistory, "179, 188 ' hiolegiriruacy, 196-197 biological citizenship, 24, .190,225路 230,232.235,237-241

zoe

Cambridge School, 43-44,46 camp, 108, 167, 190,194 capitalism, 3, 25-26, 61, 66, 70, 87, 166,168,170,242,253-254, 258,261,263,275,304-305, 307_309,314,316 care of the self, 186, 189 Chicago School, 6-7, 68, 256-262

328

Subject

26, 236-237, 307308,311,316 conduct of conduct, 2, 22, 26, 56, 60, 63,70,93,110,204,273,281, 286,290-291, 293-297, 304 commodification,

constitution,

8, 22, 45, 78-81, 83-85,

87-91,95,102,116-122,124125,129,131-132 constructivism,

39-40, 102, 193, 290,

292 . Copenhagen School, 94, 101-102,104 crisis, 19, 59, 86, 115, 119, 144-145,

204-205,255,263-264,271, 273,292

o danger, 6, 8, 16,86,95,99-101,104,

109-110,119,121-122,126_ 128,131-132,150,159,194195,215,229,231,308 Daseinsvorsorge, 83-84, 86, 89, 91 death, 4, 23,74,130,138,147,150, 16~ 16~ 169, 171, 176, 17~ 180,185-186,190,193,236, 247,261-262,264,282 demography, 79, 176, 192,204,207, 312,314 deterritorializarion,

107,139

discipline, 1,4-5,12, ]7, 37, 43, 60-63, 65-68,70,85-87,99,103, lOS, 118,129, ]40, 142, 158-159, 166-167,173-174,176,186, 204,219,247,288-289,294, 308,316 dispositif, 37, 64, 93, 99-101,103,108, 117,286-289,293,295-298

E 90, 168,256-257,265, 269-270,277,281-282,285, 298 economiza tion, 20, 25, 249, 257, 261, 271-273,280-281,287,290, 297,314 economy of power, 37, 62, 1] 9 education, 10, 76, 78, 193,206, 212, 215,221,234,256,260,265, 306,312 Empire, 148, 168 empowerment, 9-10, 12, ] 4-1 5, 106 enhancement, 227, 238·239 enterprising self, 12, 15,257,280-281 enrrepreneurialism, 6, 9, 25, 65, 93, 257.258,262,273,279.281,312 economics,

Subject Index

Index epistemology, 170, 195,298 essentialism, 41, 57, 231-232, 242, 270

EU, 83, 108, 131, 145-146, 148, 154155,157,160,311,313 eugenics, 188, 190,204,228-229, 241, 250-251,260-261 everyday life, 43, 190, 217, 219-221, 235 exclusion, 21-22,94,101,103,108,119, 126,167,177,188,235,240, 249,278,309,312,314-315

6,13-15,21-22,37,59, 84-85,89,91,93-94,99-100, 103-104,110,117,119-120, 128,169,173,205,230,237, 239,249,262,273,281,286, 294, 308, 313 frontier. See border

312

12, 35, 67-68, 262, 2 270,281

-

M

44-48, 50 264 homo ceconomicus, 65 257 258 290305315 homo sacer, 167, 188,264 citi-

genericizarion, 228-232, 234, 240. See also biologiza tion genocide, 188, 191 govemabiliry, 19,79,308 governance, 13, 103, 108, 141-142,

148,153-154,158-159,193, 248, 263, 292

17,19,25,185,189,204 practices, 2, 7, 11-13,

17,42,59-61,63,66,69-70, 84-85,89,105,107,120,153, 173-174, 176, 178, 274, 304; 4, 11, 21, 25-26,

61,79,94,97-98,106,108, 203, 209 217, 219-220, 222, 240,263,272,290,295,306; technology, 8, 9, 11·13, 15·17, 20-21,34,69,85,89,99,104, 121, 143,203,21~ 216,221· 222,269,272.274,277,279, 289,305,309 governmenraliry: liberal, 5, 59, 93, 97,

Malthusian law, 250 5 39 41 46 50 Marxism 9,14,21,2, , , '5'

57_59,68,167,186,193,20 , 263 269-270,275 mechanism's of security. See apparatus

homosexuality, 231-232, 241 human capital, 6, 12,25,178,24,7

of security

249 256-265,311

, human economy,

Menschenokollol1lle,

247, 249, 254256 ,

260,263,265

49 151

human rights, 101, 124, 131, 1,

'

154,157,178,249,251 139, 143-145, 148- .

150,152.157,194-195; hurnamtarian border, 23 138-140,

humanitarianism,

government: of biomedicine, 225, 239; of bodies, 180, 186, 189; of borders and frontiers, 22,141; of life, 23, 25, 165, 172, 186, 222, 262; of migration, 146; of others, 189; of the self, 2, 13,

99,108·110,159,176,308,

69

historicism, 40, 275, 296 historiography, 34-35, 37-38, 40,

zenship

rationality,

97,124,255,260 3_8,14,16,22-23,25-26, 34,37,41,46,48-49,59-60,63, 68_70,84-85,93-94,97-101, 103-111,115-120,122-123, 128_129,155-156,158-159, 165,167,173-176,178-180, 189,214,220,248,260,263, 269 282 285·287,289-292, 294'295' 297,299,307-310. See also gov;rnmenraliry,.liberal life unworthy of living, 177 178 249 256261 265 lifestyle, 24, 201-203, 205-223, 232 239

Liberalism,

6,10,23-24,93,173,177,185, 192·193,195-196,201-223, 226_229,232-236,238-242, 253-254,258,260-261,265,

hegemony,

G

governmental:

Leviathan,S,

2, 46, 62, 64,

H

freedom,S,

gambling, 275-277, 280 genealogy of morals, 191 genetic citizenship. See biological

Lampedusa, 144-145, 148, 150, 157,314 legislative, 75-76, 79, 95, 115, 125, 132

74_75,82,119,151,186,262, 317 Guanranamo, 117, 129, 131-132

health,

F

L

316-317; illiberal, 93-94, 103, 105,107-108; neoliberal, 12, 17, 20,25,59,85,89,108,257, 261-262 governmentalization,

143-158; humanitarian governmenr 138_139,143,146-147, 159-160; humanitaria~ In~erven.

152 156' humanttanan non, " 195 reason; 143, 156, 191, ;

humanitarianization, 138-139, 146-147,158 . hvei yglene, 173 , 192 , 251 . See also racial hygiene

.

ideological

state apparatuses,

Ideologiekritik,58 immigration,

39 58 ,

5 151,156,

10, 141, 14 ,

158,191,193,313 immunization,

282

insurance,

it:

100, 169

imperialism, 168, 194, lIldlvldua!Jzatlon,2-3,

6, 8,208,26 invisible hand, 15,260,272

276,278,

,

0 309

-250 253.

25,249

,

256,259·265 17 21,34-37, ~2, 15 ,102 202,207, 40-00 06, 6, 3 , 252,257-258,285,294,297 . 0 f powe.,r 1 61 63-64, microphYSICS

methodolop,

1

.

15810

'

101 141 143-147,151, 9'1 31'3-3]4; migrant, 155-108, I , 1'0 23 138 144-145,147-148, 0 -

mlgratlon,

:

160,194,222,

251? 31~3~1:~9,

migration control,

_2,

185 193-194 hili 10'7 141 146, 150,185,307rno I try, , '6 310,312-31 307-309,313, 04 mobiliz;~~o_~'1~~'s;lf_~lObilizarion,17, 26,310.

I

329

molecular polltic;7~ money, 26, 275--,

70171 286 289-294, ,

297 299, 308 3 . d '18 68 76 167-168,19 multiru e, , ' ,

N

38 74 80 82-83,98,

nature, 5, 23'70 '17i-173

168,1,

194,225,

258,262,264

176, 178,

~ , 257 754

235, 2)0,

-, -

l

330

Subject Index

Nazism, 83, 165, 169, 188, 194 necropolirics, 189 neoliberalisrn, 3, 6-7, 9,12,15-]6, 21,22,25,27,48,59,68,85, 103,139,142,158-159,178,

204,222,231,242,248,262, 272,274-275,280-282,290, 292, 294, 305, 310,314,316.

See also advanced liberalism; governmentality, neoliberal neosocial, 306, 315-316 normalization,S, 66, 116, 118, 123,

145,167,185-186,219,255

o optimization, 16-17, 172, 177, 203-

204,215,227,238,240,249, 265 ordoliberalism, 6, 27, 68, 87, 257, 272,

275,282 organic capital, 249-250, 253-254, 259, 263 p

59, 205

patient group, 226, 229, 232-233, 242 pa u perism, 99 pedagog~ 76, 78, 91 perforrnativity,

208-213,215-219,221-222, 228,247-250,256,260,262, 264-265,287-289,307-308,310 posrstrucruralism, 9, 167, 269-271, 273 poverty, 6,10,48,99,142,146,156, 160,177,195,237 prevention, 19, 24, 26,107,126,128, 165,201,206,208,211-212, 214-217,222,232-234,249, 251,312-313 problernarizarion, 18,40, 76, 78, 97, 100-101,103-105,108-109, 111,126,172,178,196,210 property, 91,169,254,292,308 public health, 195-196,201-203,205217,219-223 punishment, 66-67, 77, 95, 241, 313

Q quality of life, 25, 171,177,192-193, 234,236-237,240 quarantine, 141, 270

R

pastoral power, 3, 7, 40, 88, 101, 141, 152,155,158-160,175,295 paternalism,

Subject Index

14, 18, 102, 116, ] 21,

124-125,127,129,131,274, 282, 291 police science (Polizeiwissenscha(t), 3, 7,107,248,264 political economy, 5, 25, 37, 40, 46, 56-57,60-61,63,65-66,68-69, 74,98,170,173,180,248-249, 261-262,275,307-309,314 political technology, 24, 175, 186, 206, 221,278,290 poliricization, 154, 203, 248-249

politics: of care, 145; of life, 24,177, 185-186,189-191,193_195, 197,228; of populations, 185; of torture, 95; of truth, 12, 36, 285 population, 5, 23, 25, 37, 39-40, 48, 61,66,68,70,74,77,79_81, 83,89,91,98,102,104,108, 117,119-120,140,144,146_ 147,150,152,154,158,165, 168,171-178,180-181,185_ 186, 189, 196-197,202-204,

racial hygiene, 250, 265 racism, 59, 65, 93-94, 159, 166, 169, 177-179,188,247,250-251, 265 reason of state (raison d'Etat), 3-5, 7, 40,43,94,100-101,119-120, 140, 173, 186 refugees, 10, 148, 153-154, 158-160, 165,167,190,193-195,249, 313 resistance, 11, 13, 17~19,59, 64, 66, 70,130,148,153,168,172, 279 reterritorialization, 107-108, 139 risk, 8, 12-13, 15,22,26,84,86, 88,91,110,121,126-128, 141,146-147,150,159,172, 178, 186-187, 195,206,208, 214,220,229,232,235,237, 239-240,242,281,306-310, 312-315

S 22,94,101-]08,110111,126,138-139,141,145, 147 security, 4-6,10, ]4,20-22,34,37,48, 61,93-111,116-124,126-130, 132,141,143,146-147,150151,154,156,158-159,169, securitization,

189-190,193,205,249,254, 260-261 263,286-289,295, 298,306,309,315-316; social security, 193, 249, 254, 260, 263 self-constitution, 1,174,178 self-control, 17,26,101,279,281, 310,312 self-refereutialiry, 25, 270, 274-280 self-regulation, 23, 25,173,263,271, 280,310 self-help group, 24, 231 shyness, 230-231, 239 social contract (Contrat social), 74-8], 90,119 Social Darwinism, 250-251 69 Socialism 7 64 228,249,254,263,2 " 4, ,9, 17,20-22,37, 40 , 43 , sovereignty, 45,48,59-61,63,67-68,74-79, 82,85-87,90-91,94,97-98, 100-101,103,105-109,111, 117_118,124,129-131,139, 141-142,167,169,171,204, 221,247-249,261-262,264, 269,272,275,288,304,306, 309 d state: statecraft, 56, 57, 63; stateho 0 , 2 20-21 35 40-42,46-49, 6 1 , 139 149· st~te control, 20, 23, 64· ~tate ~ffect, 62, 68-69; state ph~bia, 20, 41, 45,121,205; state racism, 247; state theory, 10,39,40,57,121,204; total state, 82-83; welfare state, 8-9, 16,22,26,48,86,89,91,126, 141,149,152,159,203-205, 304-316

7 125 state of exception, 86, 107, 11, , 148,167,169,263 6 192 201 statistics, 4, 46, 98,152, 1~1'9 221 ' 204 208-209,213, - , 229:241,248,265,288 structuralism, 58, 279

331

1-3, 9, 12, 14-16, -18, 118,172-174,176-177,263,.

280-281. See also subJecnvanon

subjectification,

subjectivation,

13,59,

94, "104, 110,

187,203,213,280,306-307, .

310,314-315. See also subjecrificarion 109-110 subjecnvuy, 2, 9,12,15,10 7 '0 296 '

152,155,187,190, 2 9 , 305-307,315

,

T of control, 13-14, 109, 155 277-278 .

4' 405961 63 66,68, rerrttory, , , '7 1'38 140 79 81, 108, 12, . , 143 146 148-149,156,159, 189'191:204,288-289,295, 308-309,314-315 .

1495-96 115,121,126rerronsm, , 141 158 261;\\IarOIl 128,132, , , 109 terror, 95-96, 104, 106, ·· 167 169-171 thanatopo Imcs, '106 III 2 66 94·95,104, , , 2 torture, , , 0127 129-132 115-118,12 -, 205 . ..

63 , 83, 88, 194, , toralnanamsm,

technologies

249

trut

h 3 12 14 17,22,25,36,124"

1"3 168, 12- "127-130 152-), 17~: 177, 180, 191, 195, 197, 207,220,230,285,298

U utilitarianism, V

··

142,2 51, 262 172 174

vital poIn~cs; , 75.76 78,82, volonte generale, 21, '

87-89

~e, 188-191,

194. See also bare life