How Kantian Was Hegel? - Terry Pinkard

How Kantian Was Hegel?

Author(s): Terry Pinkard Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jun., 1990), pp. 831-838 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20128947 .

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CRITICAL EXCHANGE

HOW KANTIANWAS HEGEL? TERRY PINKARD

that

hegel

from Kant, program as to just what he of great been a matter but it has always dispute to the much he altered and added he took, and how took, how much at a high point in ac is currently Since Kant Kantian program.

JLt

is a truism

in Anglo-American philosophical criticisms of that and adoption

ceptance Hegel's

gration

on Hegel themes

new

shed

only

of his

took much

light of Hegelian

but

a fresh

circles, program

also

point in contemporary

will

the way

at

look

perhaps to a new

not inte

In Hegel's

thought.

Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, Robert Pippin goes a long way to doing just that. Pippin provides a balanced philo sophical things,

account that Hegel's

transcendental awareness

scious In

Hegel's

elaborating

system,

carries

egories

forward which

without

Pippin

On Pippin's

should be broadly construed

in something

the Kantian we

could

from

a special kind of self-con are impressive. ascribes

two Kantian

I shall call the "Apperception

Thesis."

"Transcendental

Hegel

other among by arguing, as a transformation be understood

unity of apperception, of objects.1 The results

theses to Hegel, which the

should

idea of deriving all the conditions of knowledge

of the Kantian the

and his program

of Hegel work

view,

Thesis"

Hegel's

and

program

like the following way:

of constructing the cat program no at all have scheme conceptual

1 Robert

The Satisfactions Idealism: Pippin, HegeVs of Self-Conscious Unless otherwise Press, 1988).

Cambridge University (Cambridge: in the text are to this book.

One caveat to the noted, page references book is an extraordinarily rich reading of Hegel, reader: Pippin's both in as well as in his material his use of historical and textual reconstruction As in all short exchanges, I am focusing argument. general philosophical on some very general of the book at the expense of the richness features of its detail. ness

Review

of Metaphysics

43

(June

1990):

831-838.

Copyright

?

1990

by

Metaphysics

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the Review

of

TERRY PINKARD

832 (the Transcendental

awareness

of self-conscious

in the conditions

reconstruction

of that

and, like Kant, he locates the principle

Thesis),

of objects (the Apperception Thesis).2 Hegel departs from Kant in rejecting the dependence of thought on intuition, and in adding a (Pippin defends social, intersubjective dimension to the categories. in a particularly

this

Hegelian

Spirit.) like Kant's This

philosophy. forms Pippin's

the most

than

ambitious

the

like

of

idealism

subjective sense

to make

attempt

of Hegel

aspects

problematic

Phenomenology

idealism thus finally ends up being more

antirealism

contemporary

on Hegel's

section

good

absolute

the

scholarship:

of

of one

of of

relation

the Phenomenology of Spirit to the rest of the system. This ismore than of merely parochial interest to Hegel scholars; it is important the Hegelian

program.

ferent

about

things unclear remains

of the the

rest

in his thought.

of his

on the value

judgment

is that Hegel

The problem

the Phenomenology it fits in his where

the presupposition or falls with stands reading,

a reasoned

to make

wants

who

for anyone

system,

said many

various On and

works,

it into

a more

social

it

it is

reading, the whole system

of the Phenomenology. that he later mostly work of

and

one

success

it is just a youthful a small nonetheless

of

dif

On

another

abandoned,

the mature

system. part seem on in his inter his to be strongest ground might Pippin in terms Thesis. of the the of Apperception Phenomenology pretation account transformed the of how Hegel he offers an intriguing There reworking

Kantian

idea

substituted transcendental Apperception

of rationality

into

a developing historical unity Thesis

of the

account

and

how

he

subject for the abstract Kantian

I. However,

on the Logic?indeed,

to impose the attempt on the mature system

the as

2 to be that "consciousness takes this apperceptive principle Pippin can be said to be in relation to an object only in the sense that it takes to "For anything This means: itself to be" in such a relation (p. 114).

Imust be self-consciously of mine, count as a representation representing to be representing such an object, implicitly thusly" (p. 132). taking myself claims In Hegel's however, Pippin argues that the Kantian transformation, become transmuted of self-consciousness conditions about the apperceptive can count as such only if in a practice into the claim that "participating . . . the 'horizon' of assumptions . . .within is undertaken the practice to be those assumptions" taken by the participants Thus, the (p. 152). or apperception, for a determinate necessary cognitive relation self-relation, is possible to objects (p. 158). only under certain types of intersubjectivity thus becomes Kantian socially construed. rationality

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833

HOW KANTIANWAS HEGEL? a whole?is

more

than

strained

it is when

applied

The apperceptive Why? principle Kant in discussing had it, namely, of objects.3 Where Pippin's interpretation

Phenomenology. at home where awareness

to

purely is most

the

clearly conscious

our

is on

strains

the point of whether the principles appropriate for the philosophy of consciousness (with its inherent opposition of subject and object) are appropriate of dialectical for the consideration in which thought, to be overcome. is supposed This is a crucial such an opposition aware be reflexively of itself, difference.

Consciousness but may concerns to the struc and former subsumes the itself; thought refers ture of our psychology,

whereas

latter

the

Pippin's use of the Apperception Hegel's

explain

goals.

systematic would

system

to capture fails

being

that

require

a Logic

at all

in which

"substance"

in which from

and qualitative

becomes

like the following. we

articulate

each

features

other

the with

of which could

less

(much

interacting

causally is the world-substance.

perhaps described it),

be said it could

with

its failure

and his

thought as

system

I would

"subject."

take

the

of individuals conceptions to their respect quantitative

each Now,

as

It gives way to

of superstructural ends in an account

appearance of a world of

the whole other, while this causal

to be self-explanatory be self-subsuming.

never

the Encyclo

The Logic begins with

(the "Doctrine of Being").

a logic of substructural explanation of Essence").

This (the "Doctrine substances

fail to

the Phe

why

Most importantly,

of consciousness distinction the Hegelian saw to capture in which the sense Hegel

this to be something categories differentiated

it explains

Perhaps

paedia system that follows the Logic). also

in nature.

"logical"

Thesis ultimately must

the Logic, but it is difficult to see why

nomenology would precede Hegel's

is more

(causa

sui,

system system

as Spinoza

Self-subsumption

3 concerns The Phenomenology appearing (erscheinende) knowledge, that is, the knowledge involved in the opposition between our consciousness and the objects of which it is aware.

The purpose of the Phenomenology is to delineate and order the possible forms that such an opposition of can take. consciousness After it has run through all the possible forms, the Phenomenology that reaches the stage at which depicts a consciousness it has no relation a relation to an object at all. A consciousness without to an object, however, at all but thought thinking is no longer consciousness is self-mediating about itself.

Since this thought (it has no object to me diate it), it is therefore "absolute" and is thus ready to begin the Logic. the Phenom presupposes Pippin takes the view that the Logic nonetheless I take in with this this issue later paper. enology.

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TERRY PINKARD

834 is a

relation

logical "Substance" that

to

among

the

categories thus Logic

is, "Subject."

self-explanatory

subsuming,

It was this move but

tell us how

this

a Philosophy

"thought"

of the Real

in a conception

minates

and

religion,

to forms

Spirit

stage

at which

we

that,

cul mind

of human

and

understand

have

communities,

as Spirit

ourselves

(communal subjectivity) and how we (determinate historical viduals) are now culturally ready for pure thought (the Logic).

Phenomenology at the stage

is thus

that culminates not

only

we

at which

a study of how we are ready to begin not

the key

Thesis.

arrived

the systematic

to Hegel's

it as such will blind us to the systematic were

have

first in Idea, then later in Absolute

is apperception

of

practices

self-reflection

of thought. Where does the It turns out to be the study

individuals

historical

determinate

the cultural

reached

For

is, the human

the historical

is the

not

it does

is required, which that

Spirit,

on itself through

sys

the Logic

Although

self-reflexivity, to human minds.

(Realphilosophie)

philosophy.

The

of consciousness.4

of thought's is connected

minds, just as Idea is the self-reflection fit into this picture?

Phenomenology of how we,

beyond thought, of self

thought Kant had implicitly made

of Absolute

reflecting

collectively art,

that Hegel

an account

with

concludes

go

of

he drew are the following.

tematic conclusions

must

inferential conceptual, in the conception culminates the Idea. namely, thought,

restricted

had mistakenly

we

Thus,

concepts.

historically reflection

Spirit.

system,

features

indi The

but

Thus, seeing

that for Hegel

so

important. even deeper I have By

seeing

Hegel's

misgivings program

Thesis, Pippin forces Hegel's

Transcendental Pippin's in terms of the Transcendental

about

idealist dialectic

into two claims that

4 into In Hegelian eyes, Kant's theory of the mind should be divided in it which divided "the" is the of there two parts. gets mind, theory First, there is the theory as to and concept. into a faculty of intuition Second, as our forms of sen in human minds, is realized how "the" mind namely, of If our forms of and you drop the condition understanding. sibility it perhaps as a condition of "the" mind (retaining intuition as a requirement In like the Hegelian then one gets something for human minds), Logic. we should a of Kant's of view achievement, proper appreciation Hegel's and understanding, our minds may be sensibility that although understand is text in this regard The relevant Kantian is only concept. "the" mind Deduc to ?16 (B134n.) of the "Transcendental footnote celebrated Kant's that highest is therefore tion": "The synthetic point, unity of apperception even the of the understanding, to which we must ascribe all employment transcendental of logic, and conformably whole therewith, philosophy."

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835

HOW KANTIANWAS HEGEL? cannot, about depend

own admission, live up to what Hegel has to say

by Pippin's to finality in the Science claims it. First, Hegel's of Logic on there being some kind of rigorous either logical procedure

called determinate as

(which is implausible,

negation on

bad,

a prior

p. 255), or, just

and

about implicit assumption so too many of Hegel's Second, on any possible con constraints

depend they final self-understanding. thought's as a priori called concepts required

are too specific to be plausible and too contingent scheme ceptual as such constraints cites "elective affin categories Pippin (p. 258). as to function of categories that are too specific ity" as examples con constraints.

These "cannot such a priori be concepts possibly . . ." results of thought's sidered pure self-determination categorial Since Hegel's (p. 258). it must dental claims, An

available. of

claim

contradictory is the rational), if one explains how both

are

Taken

each

Of

compatible. that without

"mathematical course

we

can.

to these

transcen

not the only Hegel

dialectic

as

certain

an

expla The as

categories. are impossible of categories one how a category and explains

real

or the

the world.

of

possibility

is that

therefore

"force"

is to see Hegel's sets

sumption ter all, the possible "other"

is fortunately

Hegel

alternative rational

the

live up

a failure.

be considered

This transcendentalized nation

cannot

dialectic

it and

the

is

its apparently in that way,

notions

contradictory need not Hegel or of "elective affinity" cannot have of thought

we infinite," we cannot What

with

(af

have

is that

set of

of the world.

coherent

For along thought consistent, one as that he could show if that example, thought Hegel began, one Parmenides with the notion of Being could show that did, itself, one could not have consistent one also supplemented unless thought categories,

a number of other In that way, idea with simple categories. can claim the set of categories in the Logic to be more found than one sets. alternative with the min among many just By beginning imal presuppositions of a Parmenidean of and concept Being showing that

how the problems with it generate further categories, Hegel thought he could thereby also claim a kind of priority for his categories that had eluded other philosophers.

This sees the Kantian legacy for as does Hegel, the categories, conditions suming similar

in the Pippin's reading, but it sees its importance

of

sel?-consciousness

thought. means.

Hegel

continues

but

transcendental

of Kant's

not

deduction

of

as a philosophy of the and self-sub

self-reflexive

categorial

program

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via

836

TERRY PINKARD In this light, we should also distinguish

transcendental

in many

consciousness"

often

self-understanding in Hegelian

Thus, type

it is to Kantian there

dialectic, self-consciousness

of

to be

of self-consciousness

conditions

of that self-consciousness. the

various

for

of,

calls Absolute

of an age,

sciousness

This

categories

(what Hegel

but

to ordinary notions of apperception.

of

notions be

may attained

Spirit): are

they

type

(and, in of "self

conditions

for

are

that

not

a certain

themselves

in general but categorial conditions seems in fact to be the way in which art and religion function example, not

they structure

the self-con

transcendental

conditions

sense.

in any Kantian

self-consciousness

apperceptive put it, in those dental conditions

system use Hegel's

of the Phenomenology), seems to be more akin

than

from

a particular

in which

In the mature

is structured.

sections

self-consciousness

apperceptive of the way

a condition

something's being of self-consciousness deed,

of

condition

being a

something's

is not

sections, Hegel of apperceptive

with

concerned

self-consciousness

of

As we might the transcen se (with the ways

per

the

scheme in general), in but with conceptual of self-consciousness types (as self-understandings) or consistent in which the more and with the ways be coherent of any

aspects which

various

may or less found that

they engender logical problems in new forms of self-consciousness.

egorial is aware science,

reading apperceptive of natural science treatment

are

are

sciences in the whole

also

(It should

also make

solutions be noted

extensive

Hegel's

cat

as Pippin to understand, of the categories of natural the Hegelian inter theory

difficult

[p. 263, note 20]. The treatment are not a problem for however, as the explanation of possibility.

preted the natural they

will

this

to new

rise

give

New

in a similar

introduced

a priori in categories to the way fashion

system.)

Now, Pippin might reply that this is all well and good, but with out the Transcendental Thesis, Hegel is left completely open to Kierkegaard's orate game

that the Logic was charge just an elab no application to the real world.

Even

devastating with of thought

more

it would strangely, into the precursor sibility

make

Hegel

the

of contemporary

theorist

of rational

possible

world

pos

theorists.

For some, that would no doubt be sufficient grounds to banish Hegel to Twin Earth and be done with him forever.

Much for

it goes

it touches

more to the on many

needs

to be

said

about

this

than

can

be done

core

here,

and Kant's of both Hegel's Indeed, projects. debates about realism, contemporary antirealism,

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HOW KANTIANWAS HEGEL?

837

and internal realism

(the latter only being the idealism that dare

not

The

its name).

speak

of Hegel's

first part

I think,

answer,

in his thesis that "the real is the rational, and the rational real."

can put

We

that

there

moreover, tional

is nothing can (there

of things in themselves;

be no

by ra that we are

not knowable

is in principle

that

is a requirement

if something

like this:

thesis

of rational thought, then it is a requirement

lies

is the

of the

real

categories thought no mysteries that lie in principle of understanding, incapable beyond our cognitive not On dialectic my view, Hegelian may give grasp). us the transcendental of knowledge, conditions but it can tell us is consistent and coherent.

The program in our thought of what a self-subsuming,

providing

possibility native

self-reflexive

of the rational

explanation

shows that the realist skeptical alter

of the categories

to things-in-themselves) do not apply (that the categories as an explanation of those categories. answer lies in his understanding The second part of Hegel's

is

deficient

the rational in history,

in that to another.

superior

of these

criticism he

different

claims

Hegel's

consistent, complete, (as being can perhaps with be reconciled

in the following way: none

of the

that

no new

can

for his

gories new problems another paper

is complete

(dialectical not

it may

but

in that it leaves out

that

recast

of possibility.

Discussing on its own.5 just

of

its carrying

out

that

in his

system

(1) each

further

in

moves

in

is self-subsum

thought)

in that

the present this fully,

set

new

cate

and

present take alas, would

thought is best understood

the program

dental deduction of the categories.

it is consistent

be final

Both Pippin and I agree that Hegel's

thought

being and self-reflexive) determinate character

categories; historically given in it to propel contradictions appear

its basic principle

is

"absolute"

theory's

self-subsuming, its historically

the theory

self-explanatory; can arise in history

in terms

of self-understanding demonstrate that one

relevant

the dialectic; ing and

one

that

argues

of

forms

of the Kantian

transcen

We also both agree that Hegel new

category

was

to

necessary

avoid a contradiction, and (2) it was the only such category that could be posited. We both agree that a close reading of Hegel's texts

leads

one

to the conclusion

that, Hegel

51 offer an account of how this ties of history in chapter 8 of Hegel's (Philadelphia: Temple University

teleology Possibility

to the contrary,

neither

into Hegel's theses about Dialectic: The Explanation Press,

1988).

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the of

838

TERRY PINKARD

(1) nor (2) is true. We disagree on where to go from there. Iwould argue that by reading Hegel in terms of the Transcendental Thesis, Pippin dooms Hegel from the outset, since Hegel quite clearly failed to show on

the

the

conditions

of any conceptual at all. scheme However, we can endorse the idea of di view, speculative while nonetheless necessitarian foregoing Hegel's

alternative as a method

alectic claims

for

are

it. We

then

left with

the

task

of constructing

cate

gorial claims simply in terms of how well they do their explanatory job.

I would

Likewise,

that

argue

in terms of the Apperception in the mature

tinction ness

and

the

we

can

all of Hegel's

by reading

system

between

system

loses the crucial dis

Thesis, Pippin

the principles on However,

of conscious

of thought. the alternative principles see a in terms of still modified version of very view, Hegel can always see how the principles the Apperception Thesis?we of are a in the reflected consciousness of thus thought period?and have our rich and nonmetaphysical without to Hegel being subject of him as a transcendental criticisms Pippin's a chastened and more Socratic end up with Hegel

still recognizable and

of

theorist

as Hegel.

Hegel

self-consciousness

celebrated

historicism

relatively

undamaged.

and

his

agree

where

who

intact.

"philosophical

thus

We

is nonetheless

the chastened dialectical remains

Both Pippin and I locate Hegel

theorist.

Even can

history"

idealist Hegel's remain

in a direct line from Kant.

We

line begins Deduc (in ?16 of the "Transcendental as to how the is line and drawn, disagree consequently I think, about where the line ends up. disagree, Pippin's the

but we

tion"), we would

Thesis

Apperception

form?but

modified

dental Thesis makes

Hegel

far-ranging

may why

still,

perhaps, want he would

is beyond me.

After

in a

be maintained?albeit to maintain

the Transcen

all, the Transcendental

so clearly and that wrong, of idealism. study Hegel's

is not

Pippin's

Georgetown

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aim

Thesis in his

University