How Kantian Was Hegel? Author(s): Terry Pinkard Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jun., 1990), pp. 831-838 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20128947 . Accessed: 20/05/2014 18:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
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CRITICAL EXCHANGE
HOW KANTIANWAS HEGEL? TERRY PINKARD
that
hegel
from Kant, program as to just what he of great been a matter but it has always dispute to the much he altered and added he took, and how took, how much at a high point in ac is currently Since Kant Kantian program. JLt
is a truism
in Anglo-American philosophical criticisms of that and adoption
ceptance Hegel's
gration
on Hegel themes
new
shed
only
of his
took much
light of Hegelian
but
a fresh
circles, program
also
point in contemporary
will
the way
at
look
perhaps to a new
not inte
In Hegel's
thought.
Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, Robert Pippin goes a long way to doing just that. Pippin provides a balanced philo sophical things,
account that Hegel's
transcendental awareness
scious In
Hegel's
elaborating
system,
carries
egories
forward which
without
Pippin
On Pippin's
should be broadly construed
in something
the Kantian we
could
from
a special kind of self-con are impressive. ascribes
two Kantian
I shall call the "Apperception
Thesis."
"Transcendental
Hegel
other among by arguing, as a transformation be understood
unity of apperception, of objects.1 The results
theses to Hegel, which the
should
idea of deriving all the conditions of knowledge
of the Kantian the
and his program
of Hegel work
view,
Thesis"
Hegel's
and
program
like the following way:
of constructing the cat program no at all have scheme conceptual
1 Robert
The Satisfactions Idealism: Pippin, HegeVs of Self-Conscious Unless otherwise Press, 1988). Cambridge University (Cambridge: in the text are to this book. One caveat to the noted, page references book is an extraordinarily rich reading of Hegel, reader: Pippin's both in as well as in his material his use of historical and textual reconstruction As in all short exchanges, I am focusing argument. general philosophical on some very general of the book at the expense of the richness features of its detail. ness
Review
of Metaphysics
43
(June
1990):
831-838.
Copyright
?
1990
by
Metaphysics
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the Review
of
TERRY PINKARD
832 (the Transcendental
awareness
of self-conscious
in the conditions
reconstruction
of that
and, like Kant, he locates the principle
Thesis),
of objects (the Apperception Thesis).2 Hegel departs from Kant in rejecting the dependence of thought on intuition, and in adding a (Pippin defends social, intersubjective dimension to the categories. in a particularly
this
Hegelian
Spirit.) like Kant's This
philosophy. forms Pippin's
the most
than
ambitious
the
like
of
idealism
subjective sense
to make
attempt
of Hegel
aspects
problematic
Phenomenology
idealism thus finally ends up being more
antirealism
contemporary
on Hegel's
section
good
absolute
the
scholarship:
of
of one
of of
relation
the Phenomenology of Spirit to the rest of the system. This ismore than of merely parochial interest to Hegel scholars; it is important the Hegelian
program.
ferent
about
things unclear remains
of the the
rest
in his thought.
of his
on the value
judgment
is that Hegel
The problem
the Phenomenology it fits in his where
the presupposition or falls with stands reading,
a reasoned
to make
wants
who
for anyone
system,
said many
various On and
works,
it into
a more
social
it
it is
reading, the whole system
of the Phenomenology. that he later mostly work of
and
one
success
it is just a youthful a small nonetheless
of
dif
On
another
abandoned,
the mature
system. part seem on in his inter his to be strongest ground might Pippin in terms Thesis. of the the of Apperception Phenomenology pretation account transformed the of how Hegel he offers an intriguing There reworking
Kantian
idea
substituted transcendental Apperception
of rationality
into
a developing historical unity Thesis
of the
account
and
how
he
subject for the abstract Kantian
I. However,
on the Logic?indeed,
to impose the attempt on the mature system
the as
2 to be that "consciousness takes this apperceptive principle Pippin can be said to be in relation to an object only in the sense that it takes to "For anything This means: itself to be" in such a relation (p. 114). Imust be self-consciously of mine, count as a representation representing to be representing such an object, implicitly thusly" (p. 132). taking myself claims In Hegel's however, Pippin argues that the Kantian transformation, become transmuted of self-consciousness conditions about the apperceptive can count as such only if in a practice into the claim that "participating . . . the 'horizon' of assumptions . . .within is undertaken the practice to be those assumptions" taken by the participants Thus, the (p. 152). or apperception, for a determinate necessary cognitive relation self-relation, is possible to objects (p. 158). only under certain types of intersubjectivity thus becomes Kantian socially construed. rationality
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833
HOW KANTIANWAS HEGEL? a whole?is
more
than
strained
it is when
applied
The apperceptive Why? principle Kant in discussing had it, namely, of objects.3 Where Pippin's interpretation
Phenomenology. at home where awareness
to
purely is most
the
clearly conscious
our
is on
strains
the point of whether the principles appropriate for the philosophy of consciousness (with its inherent opposition of subject and object) are appropriate of dialectical for the consideration in which thought, to be overcome. is supposed This is a crucial such an opposition aware be reflexively of itself, difference. Consciousness but may concerns to the struc and former subsumes the itself; thought refers ture of our psychology,
whereas
latter
the
Pippin's use of the Apperception Hegel's
explain
goals.
systematic would
system
to capture fails
being
that
require
a Logic
at all
in which
"substance"
in which from
and qualitative
becomes
like the following. we
articulate
each
features
other
the with
of which could
less
(much
interacting
causally is the world-substance.
perhaps described it),
be said it could
with
its failure
and his
thought as
system
I would
"subject."
take
the
of individuals conceptions to their respect quantitative
each Now,
as
It gives way to
of superstructural ends in an account
appearance of a world of
the whole other, while this causal
to be self-explanatory be self-subsuming.
never
the Encyclo
The Logic begins with
(the "Doctrine of Being").
a logic of substructural explanation of Essence"). This (the "Doctrine substances
fail to
the Phe
why
Most importantly,
of consciousness distinction the Hegelian saw to capture in which the sense Hegel
this to be something categories differentiated
it explains
Perhaps
paedia system that follows the Logic). also
in nature.
"logical"
Thesis ultimately must
the Logic, but it is difficult to see why
nomenology would precede Hegel's
is more
(causa
sui,
system system
as Spinoza
Self-subsumption
3 concerns The Phenomenology appearing (erscheinende) knowledge, that is, the knowledge involved in the opposition between our consciousness and the objects of which it is aware. The purpose of the Phenomenology is to delineate and order the possible forms that such an opposition of can take. consciousness After it has run through all the possible forms, the Phenomenology that reaches the stage at which depicts a consciousness it has no relation a relation to an object at all. A consciousness without to an object, however, at all but thought thinking is no longer consciousness is self-mediating about itself. Since this thought (it has no object to me diate it), it is therefore "absolute" and is thus ready to begin the Logic. the Phenom presupposes Pippin takes the view that the Logic nonetheless I take in with this this issue later paper. enology.
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TERRY PINKARD
834 is a
relation
logical "Substance" that
to
among
the
categories thus Logic
is, "Subject."
self-explanatory
subsuming,
It was this move but
tell us how
this
a Philosophy
"thought"
of the Real
in a conception
minates
and
religion,
to forms
Spirit
stage
at which
we
that,
cul mind
of human
and
understand
have
communities,
as Spirit
ourselves
(communal subjectivity) and how we (determinate historical viduals) are now culturally ready for pure thought (the Logic). Phenomenology at the stage
is thus
that culminates not
only
we
at which
a study of how we are ready to begin not
the key
Thesis.
arrived
the systematic
to Hegel's
it as such will blind us to the systematic were
have
first in Idea, then later in Absolute
is apperception
of
practices
self-reflection
of thought. Where does the It turns out to be the study
individuals
historical
determinate
the cultural
reached
For
is, the human
the historical
is the
not
it does
is required, which that
Spirit,
on itself through
sys
the Logic
Although
self-reflexivity, to human minds.
(Realphilosophie)
philosophy.
The
of consciousness.4
of thought's is connected
minds, just as Idea is the self-reflection fit into this picture? Phenomenology of how we,
beyond thought, of self
thought Kant had implicitly made
of Absolute
reflecting
collectively art,
that Hegel
an account
with
concludes
go
of
he drew are the following.
tematic conclusions
must
inferential conceptual, in the conception culminates the Idea. namely, thought,
restricted
had mistakenly
we
Thus,
concepts.
historically reflection
Spirit.
system,
features
indi The
but
Thus, seeing
that for Hegel
so
important. even deeper I have By
seeing
Hegel's
misgivings program
Thesis, Pippin forces Hegel's
Transcendental Pippin's in terms of the Transcendental
about
idealist dialectic
into two claims that
4 into In Hegelian eyes, Kant's theory of the mind should be divided in it which divided "the" is the of there two parts. gets mind, theory First, there is the theory as to and concept. into a faculty of intuition Second, as our forms of sen in human minds, is realized how "the" mind namely, of If our forms of and you drop the condition understanding. sibility it perhaps as a condition of "the" mind (retaining intuition as a requirement In like the Hegelian then one gets something for human minds), Logic. we should a of Kant's of view achievement, proper appreciation Hegel's and understanding, our minds may be sensibility that although understand is text in this regard The relevant Kantian is only concept. "the" mind Deduc to ?16 (B134n.) of the "Transcendental footnote celebrated Kant's that highest is therefore tion": "The synthetic point, unity of apperception even the of the understanding, to which we must ascribe all employment transcendental of logic, and conformably whole therewith, philosophy."
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835
HOW KANTIANWAS HEGEL? cannot, about depend
own admission, live up to what Hegel has to say by Pippin's to finality in the Science claims it. First, Hegel's of Logic on there being some kind of rigorous either logical procedure
called determinate as
(which is implausible,
negation on
bad,
a prior
p. 255), or, just
and
about implicit assumption so too many of Hegel's Second, on any possible con constraints
depend they final self-understanding. thought's as a priori called concepts required
are too specific to be plausible and too contingent scheme ceptual as such constraints cites "elective affin categories Pippin (p. 258). as to function of categories that are too specific ity" as examples con constraints. These "cannot such a priori be concepts possibly . . ." results of thought's sidered pure self-determination categorial Since Hegel's (p. 258). it must dental claims, An
available. of
claim
contradictory is the rational), if one explains how both
are
Taken
each
Of
compatible. that without
"mathematical course
we
can.
to these
transcen
not the only Hegel
dialectic
as
certain
an
expla The as
categories. are impossible of categories one how a category and explains
real
or the
the world.
of
possibility
is that
therefore
"force"
is to see Hegel's sets
sumption ter all, the possible "other"
is fortunately
Hegel
alternative rational
the
live up
a failure.
be considered
This transcendentalized nation
cannot
dialectic
it and
the
is
its apparently in that way,
notions
contradictory need not Hegel or of "elective affinity" cannot have of thought
we infinite," we cannot What
with
(af
have
is that
set of
of the world.
coherent
For along thought consistent, one as that he could show if that example, thought Hegel began, one Parmenides with the notion of Being could show that did, itself, one could not have consistent one also supplemented unless thought categories,
a number of other In that way, idea with simple categories. can claim the set of categories in the Logic to be more found than one sets. alternative with the min among many just By beginning imal presuppositions of a Parmenidean of and concept Being showing that
how the problems with it generate further categories, Hegel thought he could thereby also claim a kind of priority for his categories that had eluded other philosophers. This sees the Kantian legacy for as does Hegel, the categories, conditions suming similar
in the Pippin's reading, but it sees its importance
of
sel?-consciousness
thought. means.
Hegel
continues
but
transcendental
of Kant's
not
deduction
of
as a philosophy of the and self-sub
self-reflexive
categorial
program
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via
836
TERRY PINKARD In this light, we should also distinguish
transcendental
in many
consciousness"
often
self-understanding in Hegelian
Thus, type
it is to Kantian there
dialectic, self-consciousness
of
to be
of self-consciousness
conditions
of that self-consciousness. the
various
for
of,
calls Absolute
of an age,
sciousness
This
categories
(what Hegel
but
to ordinary notions of apperception.
of
notions be
may attained
Spirit): are
they
type
(and, in of "self
conditions
for
are
that
not
a certain
themselves
in general but categorial conditions seems in fact to be the way in which art and religion function example, not
they structure
the self-con
transcendental
conditions
sense.
in any Kantian
self-consciousness
apperceptive put it, in those dental conditions
system use Hegel's
of the Phenomenology), seems to be more akin
than
from
a particular
in which
In the mature
is structured.
sections
self-consciousness
apperceptive of the way
a condition
something's being of self-consciousness deed,
of
condition
being a
something's
is not
sections, Hegel of apperceptive
with
concerned
self-consciousness
of
As we might the transcen se (with the ways
per
the
scheme in general), in but with conceptual of self-consciousness types (as self-understandings) or consistent in which the more and with the ways be coherent of any
aspects which
various
may or less found that
they engender logical problems in new forms of self-consciousness.
egorial is aware science,
reading apperceptive of natural science treatment
are
are
sciences in the whole
also
(It should
also make
solutions be noted
extensive
Hegel's
cat
as Pippin to understand, of the categories of natural the Hegelian inter theory
difficult
[p. 263, note 20]. The treatment are not a problem for however, as the explanation of possibility.
preted the natural they
will
this
to new
rise
give
New
in a similar
introduced
a priori in categories to the way fashion
system.)
Now, Pippin might reply that this is all well and good, but with out the Transcendental Thesis, Hegel is left completely open to Kierkegaard's orate game
that the Logic was charge just an elab no application to the real world. Even
devastating with of thought
more
it would strangely, into the precursor sibility
make
Hegel
the
of contemporary
theorist
of rational
possible
world
pos
theorists.
For some, that would no doubt be sufficient grounds to banish Hegel to Twin Earth and be done with him forever. Much for
it goes
it touches
more to the on many
needs
to be
said
about
this
than
can
be done
core
here,
and Kant's of both Hegel's Indeed, projects. debates about realism, contemporary antirealism,
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HOW KANTIANWAS HEGEL?
837
and internal realism
(the latter only being the idealism that dare
not
The
its name).
speak
of Hegel's
first part
I think,
answer,
in his thesis that "the real is the rational, and the rational real."
can put
We
that
there
moreover, tional
is nothing can (there
of things in themselves;
be no
by ra that we are
not knowable
is in principle
that
is a requirement
if something
like this:
thesis
of rational thought, then it is a requirement
lies
is the
of the
real
categories thought no mysteries that lie in principle of understanding, incapable beyond our cognitive not On dialectic my view, Hegelian may give grasp). us the transcendental of knowledge, conditions but it can tell us is consistent and coherent. The program in our thought of what a self-subsuming,
providing
possibility native
self-reflexive
of the rational
explanation
shows that the realist skeptical alter
of the categories
to things-in-themselves) do not apply (that the categories as an explanation of those categories. answer lies in his understanding The second part of Hegel's
is
deficient
the rational in history,
in that to another.
superior
of these
criticism he
different
claims
Hegel's
consistent, complete, (as being can perhaps with be reconciled
in the following way: none
of the
that
no new
can
for his
gories new problems another paper
is complete
(dialectical not
it may
but
in that it leaves out
that
recast
of possibility. Discussing on its own.5 just
of
its carrying
out
that
in his
system
(1) each
further
in
moves
in
is self-subsum
thought)
in that
the present this fully,
set
new
cate
and
present take alas, would
thought is best understood
the program
dental deduction of the categories.
it is consistent
be final
Both Pippin and I agree that Hegel's
thought
being and self-reflexive) determinate character
categories; historically given in it to propel contradictions appear
its basic principle
is
"absolute"
theory's
self-subsuming, its historically
the theory
self-explanatory; can arise in history
in terms
of self-understanding demonstrate that one
relevant
the dialectic; ing and
one
that
argues
of
forms
of the Kantian
transcen
We also both agree that Hegel new
category
was
to
necessary
avoid a contradiction, and (2) it was the only such category that could be posited. We both agree that a close reading of Hegel's texts
leads
one
to the conclusion
that, Hegel
51 offer an account of how this ties of history in chapter 8 of Hegel's (Philadelphia: Temple University
teleology Possibility
to the contrary,
neither
into Hegel's theses about Dialectic: The Explanation Press,
1988).
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the of
838
TERRY PINKARD
(1) nor (2) is true. We disagree on where to go from there. Iwould argue that by reading Hegel in terms of the Transcendental Thesis, Pippin dooms Hegel from the outset, since Hegel quite clearly failed to show on
the
the
conditions
of any conceptual at all. scheme However, we can endorse the idea of di view, speculative while nonetheless necessitarian foregoing Hegel's
alternative as a method
alectic claims
for
are
it. We
then
left with
the
task
of constructing
cate
gorial claims simply in terms of how well they do their explanatory job.
I would
Likewise,
that
argue
in terms of the Apperception in the mature
tinction ness
and
the
we
can
all of Hegel's
by reading
system
between
system
loses the crucial dis
Thesis, Pippin
the principles on However,
of conscious
of thought. the alternative principles see a in terms of still modified version of very view, Hegel can always see how the principles the Apperception Thesis?we of are a in the reflected consciousness of thus thought period?and have our rich and nonmetaphysical without to Hegel being subject of him as a transcendental criticisms Pippin's a chastened and more Socratic end up with Hegel
still recognizable and
of
theorist
as Hegel.
Hegel
self-consciousness
celebrated
historicism
relatively
undamaged.
and
his
agree
where
who
intact.
"philosophical
thus
We
is nonetheless
the chastened dialectical remains
Both Pippin and I locate Hegel
theorist.
Even can
history"
idealist Hegel's remain
in a direct line from Kant.
We
line begins Deduc (in ?16 of the "Transcendental as to how the is line and drawn, disagree consequently I think, about where the line ends up. disagree, Pippin's the
but we
tion"), we would
Thesis
Apperception
form?but
modified
dental Thesis makes
Hegel
far-ranging
may why
still,
perhaps, want he would
is beyond me.
After
in a
be maintained?albeit to maintain
the Transcen
all, the Transcendental
so clearly and that wrong, of idealism. study Hegel's
is not
Pippin's
Georgetown
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aim
Thesis in his
University