Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments in Hegel, Marx

Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments in Hegel, Marx and Contemporary Thought Author(s): Robert J. Antonio Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sep., 1981), pp. 330-345 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/589281 .

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RobertJ. Antonio

Immanentcritiqueas the coreof critical theory:its originsanddevelopmentsin thought* Hegel,Marxand contemporary ABSTRACT

My goal is to explainthe intellectualandhistoricalbasisof critical theory-a term withvagueand imprecisemeaningfor sociologists.

Confusion about the approachis more fundamentalthan that usually attributedto its difficult, philosophicalterminology.The central issue is that criticaltheory is not a generaltheory, but is insteada method of analysisderivingfroma nonpositivistepistemology. The focus will be upon the method of immanentcritique, roots and its developmentas the centralmode its Hegelian-Marxist of critical theoretic analysis. Immanentcritique is a means of detecting the societal contradictionswhich offer the most determinate possibilities for emancipatorysocial change. The commentaryon method cannot be separatedfrom its historicalapplication, since the content of immanent critque is the dialectic in htstory.

Jayl suggeststhat criticaltheory is opposed to closed philosophical systems and that the preciseshapeof the approachis elusivebecause it is 'expressedthrough a series of critiques of other thinkersand philosophical traditions'.Jay's book describes the highly diverse worksof criticaltheorists(in socialtheory,philosophicalspeculation, aesthetic critique, and historicaldescription)and the broadvariety of thinkers they address (e.g., Hegel, Marx, Dilthey, Nietzsche, why SusanBuckWeber,HusserlandHeidegger).It is understandable Morssconcludesthat criticaltheory is 'a termwhichlackssubstantive precision'.2

Despite its diverseelements,criticaltheory does have a definable core. However,this is often overlookedbecauseit is an historically applied logic of analysisratherthan a fixed theoreticalor empirical content. Critical theory is based on an interpretationof Marx's thought.3 It adopts Marx'sanalyticcategories,continueshis critique of capitalism and embraces his goal of emancipation.However, BritishJournal of Sociology i)R.K.P. 19810007

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critical theorists do not retain the whole of Marx's theory, but instead argue that the developmentof managerialcapitalism,state socialism and fascism require its partial revision. Marx believed that the 'laws'of capital were broughtout by the 'freemarket',4so it is consistent to expect that corporateplanning,oligopoly,streamlined bureaucracyand state interventionwould requiresome theoretical innovations.Furthermore,Marx was aware of the expanding dominationof the nascentbureaucraticstate,5 but did not live long enough to see its full development(especiallyin its state socialist form).Marx'sappreciationof historicalchange,sensitivityto developing tendencies of capital and criticalapproachto all existing social formations projects a view that theory must confront the most seriouscrises of the day.6 For these reasons,criticaltheoristsbelieve that historicallybased criticism of Marxismis fully consistent with Marx'sown method of analysis.7 forembracing CriticaltheoristsattackorthodoxMarxism-Leninism the 'Word'of Marxwhile ignoringhis method. In strivingfor theoretical purity, Marxism-Leninismadopts the ahistoricalformalism of nineteenth-centurypolitical economy, which Marx detested.

Furthermore,it preservescertainproblematicthemes within Marx's work (e.g. optimistic conceptions of science, 'the party' and revolutionary proletarianconsciousness)which deepen, ratherthan strip away, the mystificationsof modern domination.Mechanisticinterpretations transformMarxisminto 'a pseudo-scienceof legitimation and domination',promotingrationalizationof productionat the cost of extreme dominationin the political and social spheres.8Whenit Marxismpromotes becomesthe official ideologyof state-bureaucracy, the expansion,rather than the 'witheringaway', of the state. As a result,Marx'sra?sond 'etre-emanczpation9-is eclipsedby concerns for politicalexpediencyand administrativeefficiency.

Westernsocial science, based on the Kantiandivisionof fact and value, is supposed to describe 'what is' without makingvaluejudgments. Only science providesvalid knowledgeand its epistemology offers no groundsfor valuativetruth. Valuescan only be objects of empiricalinquiries, not the basis of scientific critique and praxis.

Social scientists may strongly disagree about method, but almost description. alwaysequatevalidknowledgewith correct,value-neutral Critical theorists attack western empiricismbecause it reifies conventional valueslegitimatingcapitalistsociety. Likewise,they reject Marxism-Leninismfor ordaining dominant values as scientific laws and socialist state bureaucracyas the rationalsociety.l째 Critical theorists oppose the inherentrelativismof bourgeoissocial science, as well as the absolutism of Marxism-Leninism,because neither addressesthe most urgentissuesof the day (characterizedby the rise of fascism,Stalinism,managerialcapitalism,oligopoly and universal state-bureaucracy).

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Criticaltheorists also reject metaphysicsbecause the latter legitimated precapitaliststructuresof dominati.on,and could be revived again for similar purposes (e.g., Nazi Germany exploited metaphysically based folk culture). Criticaltheorists desire to establish, from the ruins of Enlightenmentreason,a basis for validknowledge that is not fully empirical,purely ideological or metaphysical.It must provide a basis for consideringquestions of value, but still maintainthe requirementfor empiricaland theoreticalrigourin instrumentalmatters My goal is to explainthe intellectualandhistoricalbasisof critical theory -a term with vague and imprecisemeaningfor sociologists.

Confusionabout the approachis more fundamentalthan that usually attributed to its difficult, philosophicalterminology. The central issue is that critical theory is not a generaltheory, but is insteada method of analysisderivingfrom a nonpositivistepistemology.This paper will focus upon the method of immanent critique, explaining its Hegelian-Marxistroots and developmentas the centralmode of critical-theoreticanalysis.11 Immanentcritiqueis a meansof detecting the societal contradictionswhich offer the most determinatepossibilities for emancipatory social change. The commentary on method cannot be separatedfromits historicalapplication,since the content of immanentcritiqueis the dialectic in history.

THE HEGELIAN AND MARXIAN ROOTS OF IMMANENT CRITIQUE

Hegel's 'radicalimmanentist'philosophy holds that reason serves only 'Spirit'.12He rejects both metaphysics and empiricismfor assumingrealitiesbeyond the subject-e.g., Platonicforms, thingsin-themselves,sense data. Hegel arguedthat constituted objects as well as the forces of contradiction,negation and change are contained within Spirit.13 Driven by 'Desire', the Hegelian subject engagesin self-formativeand self-transformative labour,causing'the developmentof Spiritin Time . . . [and] Space'.l4 Hegel arguesthat the subjectloses control of its self-creationby positing its own products as externalto itself ('self-estrangement').

However, through labour, the subject discovers its capacity for rationally transforming the reified object world. Estrangement abatesgraduallyas the increasingly'self-conscious'subjectshapesits world progressivelyinto more highly rationalsyntheses.Historically specific labour, througha processof 'determinatenegation',moves Spirit toward a 'terminus'of complete freedom and rationality.15 Hegel provides a critical analysis of reification (as objectification) aimed at demystifyingthe human constructionof history. It is an immanent critique becauseits critical standards are ones given in the historical process. 16

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Marx departs from a reconstructedHegelianfoundation.He was attracted to Hegel's philosophy because it lacked the antagonistic divisionof 'is' and 'ought'usuallyfound in Germanidealism.17Marx wrote, 'Settingout from idealism. . . I hit upon seekingthe Ideain the real itself. If formerlythe gods had dwelt above the world,they had now become its center.'l8 Marx concluded that immanent principles were necessary weapons in the struggle for progressive social change,19 because they provide a basis for critique within historical reality. Later, this immanentgroundingbecame the axis of his emancipatorycritiqueof capitalism.

Marx retains the Hegelian view of humanity: it creates itself through labour, loses itself in estranged labour and overcomes alienationthrough reappropriationof the labourprocess.However, despite their mutual appreciation of labour, Marx alters Hegel's immanentcritiqueradically.Marxstates that Hegel's view of history presupposesan abstractor AbsoluteSpirit which developsin such a way that mankindis only aMass,a conscious or unconsciousvehicle for Spirit. Hence Hegelprovidesfor the developmentof a speculative,esoterichistorywithin empirical exoteric history. The history of mankindbecomes the history of the abstractspiritof mankind,thus a spiritbeyondactualman.20 MarxattacksHegel for emphasizing'abstractmental labor'. He sub' for Hegelian idealism, replacing 'Spirit' with stitutes 'naturalism 'real,corporealman'.2l This 'actual,sensuous,real,finite, particular' humanoccupies a world of 'realnaturalobjects'mediatedby human For Marx,both 'naturalobject' and 'essential 'essentialpowers'.22 powers' are objective and real; history reflects the interactionof humanity's objective, essentialpowers with real objects.23Labour transformsnatural objects into human objects, creating a human history open to rationalunderstanding.

Marx rejects Hegel's equation of objectificationwith estrangement -that 'reappropriationof the estrangedobjectiveessence' is simply 'a process of incorporationinto self-consciousness'.24Marx arguesthat estrangementdoes not derive from objectification,but originatesin the economicallymediatedprocessof socialdomination.

He asserts that alienation can be overcome only by labour and struggle,not by a simplealterationof consciousness.25 Marx assertsthat Hegelianphilosophy makes the 'subject'a 'selfknowing and self-manifestingIdea', while 'realmen and real nature become mere predicates'.26He believesthat Hegel,despitehis claims to immanence,creates a metaphysicalsubject divorced from real historical individuals.27Marx implies that Hegel's idealist idiom generatesan uncriticalperspectivetowardthe empiricalworldwhere 'real men' live their lives. In particular,it fosters the characteristic error of bourgeoissocial thought: confusing legitimationswith the

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attributesof concretesocialinstitutions.Thiserroris manifested real in Hegel'sPhilosophy of Rzghtwhere he attributesa higher grossly rationality to the Prussianstate and its institutions of substantive monarchy,bureaucracy,limited sufferage and private property.28 it attacksthe work becauseits subject matteris portrayed'asof Marx concept the abandons thinksitself' ratherthan 'as it is'.29 Marx and 'Spirit'in order to avoid the Hegelianconflation of ideologythan rather contradiction, socialstructure. The emphasis on the their correspondence,between concrete social formations and critique. is the basisof Marx'simmanent ideologies Like Hegel, Marx argues that immanent contradictions lead ultimatelyto an emancipatoryterminus.However,Marxattempted rather togroundhis standardof emancipationin concrete history, telos, emancipatory The than in presuppositions about 'Spirit' to Marx,derivesfromthe struggleagainstnaturalnecessity. according social Humanity,in labouringto satisfy its animalneeds30confronts material as well as andpolitical constraints(unreconcilednature)31 ones.Social structures,createdexpresslyfor the provisionof animal needs,replacethe direct strugglefor survivalwith socially mediated as a necessitypitting 'man against man'. Emancipationoriginates extended later is but battleagainstdominationin the naturalsphere, human to society in reactionto humanexploitation.Marxholds thatadvance production needsbecome more elaborateas the means of need andnaturalnecessity receeds.Emancipation,itself, becomes a rationalpromoting becauseother 'higher'needs requirea socialorder ityand freedom.

Marx substitutesa history of class dominationand class struggle for Hegel's historical phenomenology. For Marx, the movement in contoward freedom and reason is not an unfolding of labourborn of sciousness, but is instead, an historical transformation32 an hisof efforts the social struggleand ultimatelyrealizedthrough for toricalagent of emancipation-the proletariat.This is the basis bourgeois of values treasured an immanentcritique that turns the ideology againstthe unfreedom,inequalityand miseryof developing capitalism.33 CRITICAL THEORY AND INSTRUMENTAL REASON

Horkheimerand Adornosay that 'with the extensionof the bourgeois by the commodityeconomy, the darkhorizon of myth is illumined a new of seed the sun of calculatingreason,beneath whose cold rays barbarismgrowsto fruition'.34They state further: the In their [the masses] eyes, their reductionto mere objectsof administeredlife, whichpreformseverysector of modernexistence includinglanguageand perception,representsobjectivenecessity,

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agaJnstwhich they believe there is nothing they can do. Misery as the antithesisof power and powerlessnessgrowsimmeasurably, togetherwith the capacityto removeall miserypermanently.Each individualis unableto penetratethe forestof cliquesaxldinstitutions which, from the highestlevels of commandto the last professional rackets,ensurethe boundlesspersistenceof status.35 Criticaltheoristsbelieve that the conditionsof capitalistdomination have been altered, but not so radicallyas to force abandonmentof the critiqueof commodity production.Moderndominationinvolves new forms of control, yet still contains the generalcontradictions emphasizedby Marx.The 'new barbarism'is characterizedby 'comfortable,smooth, reasonable,democraticunfreedom',ratherthan the crude,directexploitationof earlyindustrialcapitalism.36'Domination is transfiguredinto administration'and 'the tangible source of exploitationdisappearsbehindthe facadeof objectiverationality'.37 The worker's consumption, freedom and generalquality of life declined sharply during the transition from household to factory production.38Exploitationwas transparentand workerssometimes resisted it.39 The conditions of productionwere so cruel that they could not be legitimatedinternally.Thus, absolutereason (religion) remainedan importantideology. Workerscould not conclude from their condition that the ideal wasreal,but religions,such as Methodism, could promiserewardsin anafter-life.40Marxunmaskedabsolute reasonas a means of legitimatingtheugly realitiesof earlyindustrial society. This, of course,was latercombinedwith his broadercritique of the seculardogma(politicaleconomy) of the bourgeoisclass.

Marcusestates that, The technicalachievementof advancedindustrialsociety, and the effective manipulationof mental and materialproductivityhave brought about a shift in the locus of mystification.If it is meanful to say that the ideology comes to be embodiedin the process of productionitself, it may also be meaningfulto suggestthat, in this society, the rationalrather than the irrationalbecomes the most effectivevehicleof mystification.4l Marcuse implies that otherworldly and secular idealism are now unnecessary.In his 'one dimensionality'thesis, he explains.that a system that 'deliversthe goods' legitimatesitself in the processof commodity production and distribution.42Advancedindustrialism preserves work's alienating qualities, but does not demand the quantity and intensity of labour characteristicof early industrial capitalism.43The reduced demands imply that the system is responsive to the worker'splight. Despite some continuedprivations, workerscan rememberlower wages, longer workdays,fewer benefits, and greaterinsecurity.44The wage labour system and worker

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powerlessnessremain, but are now counterbalancedby conditions which increasethe ' "socialand culturalintegration"of the laboring classwith capitalistsociety'.45 The improvingmaterialfate of workersis a prtma facie legitimation that promotesmoreefficientcapitalistdomination.The expansionof workerconsumptionmust be consideredin the context of corporate responsesto the intensifyingcontradictionsof industrialcapitalism.46 Corporate regulated commodity consumption defused increasing worker discontent, while at the same time it provideda new arena for capitalistvalourization.Finally,the productionof new needs and administeredmeansof 'satisfying'them extendedcorporatemanipulationbeyond the workplacedeep into sociallife.

Ewenstates that The triumphof capitalismin the twentieth century has been its ability to define and contend with the conditions of the social realm. From the period of the 1920's, commercialculture has increasinglyprovided an idiom within which desires for social change and fantasiesof liberationmight be articulatedand contained. The cultural displacementeffected by consumerismhas provided a mode of perception that has both confronted the question of human need and at the same time restricted its possibilities.47 Consumersociety altersthe conditionsof 'classconflict'.48Despite continued exploitation, alienation and increased administration, workersnow share,with those who control their labour,an interest in perpetuatingthe system. The materialand symbolic significance of commodities results in workersfeeling that they have more to lose than their chains. Except for the lumpenproletariat,most workers'immediateinterests requiremaintenanceof the corporate structure. Periodic dysfunctions (e.g., the 'oil crisis', inflation, layoffs) can cause considerablesuffering,but generateameliorative, instead of revolutionary,reactions. Most labour/managementdisputes now affirmratherthan challengecorporatestructure.Labour demandsmore security,commoditiesandleisuretime, but with each gain it becomes more dependentupon capitalism.Despiteoccasional confIicts, the radical polarizationof bourgeoisieand proletariatis being contained. Class conflict is, more than ever, a latent conflict of interests,ratherthan a 'classwar'.

The contradictionsof capitalismremain in mutatedform, manifesting themselvesnot merely in the exploitationof labour,but in the ruthlesspower of capital overthe organizationof social,cultural and material life. The elite-concentratedownership of American wealth has been stable (despiteincreasesin workerconsumption),49 while the means of administeringit havebeen extendedand rationalized. The manipulationof needs throughadvertising,the development

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of 'cybernetic' controls for state and corporatebureaucraciesand organizationalstreamliningall contributeto increasedadministrative power. The 'separation' of owUershipand managementfurther rationalizesthe pursuitof exchangevalue by placingthe operations of the modernfirmin the handsof specialistswho must manageit in the interests of long-termprofitability. This promotes profit and stability, while it frees capital owners for full-timemanagementof their diversecapitalinvestments.Finally,the technocraticdivisionof labour covers the real interestsand activitiesof highermanagement with a veneer of scientism.Controlbecomesdistant,impersonaland indirect-it emanatesfrom reified routinesthat take on a transcendentalquality.

The contradictions of capitalism shift from the rude material privationof workers,to a dialecticinvolvingdepoliticization,overadministration,waste, environmentaldestruction and other consequences of the rationalizationof the arbitrarypower of capital.

However,the broadercontradictionremainsbetween revolutionized means of productionand social relationsof productionthat arenot yet fully socialized. Irrationalityand necessity are perpetuated, despitethe existenceof meansfor overcomingthem. emancipation Criticaltheorists do not have faith in an inevitasole arisingfrom either an armedconfrontationbetween the proletariat and bourgeoisieor from a scientific 'revolution'.Instead, they are deeply concerned with the pacification of the working class and with the functioning of science and technology as instrumentsof domination.S째Criticaltheorists imply that Marx'sfaith in the proletariat and in science/technology introduce a quasi-metaphysical determinisminto his analysis.This is reflectedin his proletarianized, materialistversion of the Hegelianunfoldingof history to an eventual terminus in rationality and freedom. Marx's optimism was understandablein his day, though questionable.Today his position is not only implausible,but it also erodesMarxism'scriticaledge and opens it to ideological abuse. The guaranteedterminusjustifies repressivemeansin the short term when people live their lives. The promise of emancipation,'insured'by the advanceof science and technology under the guidanceof the 'workers'state', legitimates cultural,politicaland socialrepression.

Marxunderstoodbureaucracy,but was insensitiveto the possible despotic consequences of the bureaucraticcentralizationof state power duringthe 'transition'to communism.SlModernstate socialism has transformedthe 'temporary'dictatorshipof the proletariat into an awesomeandenduringinstrumentof bureaucraticdomination.

For this reason, critical theorists criticize state socialism with as much vigouras they attack consumercapitalism.The expropriation of surplus value, worker alienation and powerlessness,as well as political and cultural repression,exist in these 'socialist'societies.

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The state-ownedmeansof productionmanagedby a planningelite, is contradictoryto the Marxistideologyof democraticallydetermined communityneeds. Criticaltheoristsperformon MarxismwhatMarx did to Hegel.They criticizeits ahistoricalaspectsfrom the perspective of the concrete conditions under which people now live. Thus, the immanentcritiquehastwo criticalmoments:one movingfromideology to socialrealityandthe other in the obversedirection.The goal of the method is immanent truth which unifies what is, with the determinatepossibilitiesfor, what could be.

Schroyer describes immanent critique as a means of restoring 'actuality to false appearance'by first describing'what a social totality holds itself to be, and then confrontingit with what it is in fact becoming'.S2Immanentcritique attacks social reality from its own standpoint,but at the same time criticizesthe standpointfrom the perspectiveof its historicalcontext. Horkheimerstates Again and again in htstory,ideas have cast off their swaddling clothes and struck out againstthe social systems that bore them.

The cause, in large degree, is that spirit, language,and all the realmsof the mind necessarilystake universalclaims. Even ruling groups, intent above all upon defendingtheir particularinterests, must stressuniversalmotifs in religion,moralityand science.Thus originatesthe contradictionbetween the existent and ideology, a contradictionthat spursall historicalprogress.Whileconformism presupposesthe basic harmonyof the two and includesthe minor discrepanciesin the ideology itself, philosophy makes men conscious of the contradictionbetween them. On the one hand it appraisessociety by the light of the very ideas that it recognizes as its highest values; on the other, it is aware that these ideas reflectthe taintsof reality.S3 Horkheimerarguesthat immanentcritiquedescribesthe dialecticin history which is driven by the contradictionsbetween ideology and reality. Elites attempt to stall changeby denyingthese contradictions; they portray a false unity of the ideal and real. However, the greaterthe ideologicalclaims, the more dangerousthey become to their social context. Immanentcritique seeks, by revealingthe contradictionsof claim and context, to transformlegitimationsinto emancipatoryweapons.The goal is to replacethe inactionbasedon the false correspondencewith emancipatorypraxisaimed at making the idealreal.

Critical theory alters the content, but not the form of Marx's immanentcritique.Marx'srejectionof religionandpoliticaleconomy are retained,but the critique is extended to modernepistemology (which equates truth with 'calculationsthat work').54Thisapproach defines experimentallycontrolledobservationas the idealmeansfor determiningvalidknowledge.As a result 'all thingsin naturebecome

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identical with the phenomena they present when submittedto the practices of our laboratories,whose problems no less than their apparatusexpress in turn the problems and interests of society as it is'.Ss This radicallyinstrumentalizedform of reasoneliminates questionsof value from its inquiries-and from rationalknowledge.

In the process,it destroysnegativity,hypostatizesthe realand in the end, becomesitself a metaphysicof the concrete.S6 Horkheimerstates, Accordingto the philosophy of the averagemodernintellectual, there is only one authority, namely, science, conceived as the classificationof facts and the calculation of probabilities.The statement that justice and freedomare better in themselvesthan injustice and oppressionis scientificallyunverifiableand useless.

It has come to sound as meaninglessin itself as would the statement that red is more beautifulthan blue, or that an egg is better than milk.S7 Horkheimer believes that societal values (e.g., justice, equality, happiness,tolerance)have lost their 'intellectualroots' and although they still exist as vagueaims 'thereis no rationalagency authorized to appraiseand link them to an objectivereality'.S8Science grasps technical routines, while leavingquestions of good or right to personal belief. Criticismof ends is relegatedto the valuativesphere, which-partly as a result of earliercritiques of absolutism-has been discredited,relativizedand made a matter of individualtaste.

Instrumental reason promotes bureaucraticallyadministeredlife, becauseits value neutralityallows it to work for whomevercontrols it. In consumercapitalisminstrumentalrationalityconformsto the interests of commodity production and its corporateagents,while it servesthe party,state andplanningelites understate socialism.

The means orientation of both Marxist-Leninistand bourgeois science contradictsthe universal,humanistclaims that providetheir ultimate grounding.The most importantissue involvesthe fact that instrumentalreason cannot be used to evaluateends, nor to judge the substantiverationalityof instrumentalroutines.Marxist-Leninists and western scientists both claim to be strivingultimately for the creation of a rationalsociety of abundanceand freedom.However, theirepistemologiesdo not providea way of measuringtheirrespective societies' progressagainst these ultimate ends. In fact, because of their foundation in instrumentalreason,both approachesare easily harnessedto the prevailingsystem of dominationfor purposesthat contradictthese values.

The criticismof instrumentalrationality,supplementsthe critique of absolutereason,andprovidescriticaltheorywith a broaderunderstanding of the links of knowledge to domination.Marx did not analyse instrumentalreason critically, and so remainedwithin the

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incompletedialecticof Enlightenment.Enlightenmentreasonhas an extreme 'anti-authoritarian principle'-a reaction to the absolute ideologies of the preindustrialage. This principlegiven free reign, as instrumentalreason, turns into irrationality.It bringsabout 'the abrogationof everythinginherentlybinding' allowing 'domination to ordain as sovereign and to manipulate whatever bonds and obligationsprove appropriateto it'.59 Fully instrumentalized reason contributesstronglyto the dominationof nature,but at the cost of vastlyextendingrational dominationin the socialsphere.

Instrumentalreasonhas two opposingelements: the abstractego emptied of all substanceexcept its attempt to transformeverythingin heaven and on earth into means for its preservation,and on the other hand an empty naturedegradedto mere material, mere stuff to be dominated,without any other purposethan that of this very domination.60 The Enlightenmentabolishedabsolutereason,but did not providea rational basis for directing the technical development it helped generate. This made way for unbridled domination in both the naturaland humanrealms.Marx'soptimismaboutproletarianrevolution, science and state centralizationderivesin part from his view of instrumentalrationalityas an exclusivelyemancipatoryforce. He considereddominationto have its origins in necessity and did not recognize a new logic of dominationwithin the 'scientific'means of overcomingnecessity.

Criticaltheory emphasizesthe contradictionbetweenthe ideology of the 'rational society' and the actual instrumentallyrational domination of bureaucraticadministration.It transformsMarx's critiques of religion and political economy into a broadercritique of domination.The Enlightenmentideal of emancipationbecomes the standardfor criticism in every sector of life under consumer capitalismand state socialism. Criticaltheorists do not adopt ahistorical assumptionsabout eithera 'terminus'or an agentthat guarantees emancipation. Such assumptions become justifications for domination and must be rejected. As an immanent critique of domination,the truth of criticaltheory lies in neither absolutenor instrumentalreason,but in the determinatenegationof domination.

This approach does not lead to a rejection of proletarianismor socialism,but instead emphasizesthat both issues must be freshly andrigorouslyrethoughtin the context of theirdemocraticideologies.

CRITICAL THEORY AND EMANCIPATION

Marxist-Leninistscondemn critical theory as a modern form of Hegelian idealism.6l Critical theorists respond that when the

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claims of Marxism-Leninismare contrasted with the realities of its role in creatingand perpetuatingstate socialist bureaucracy,it slogans, can be rightfully accused, despite its dialectical-materialist of Hegelianism.The substitution of ahstract promises for emancipatorymeans of organizationtransformthe approachinto a metaadvocacyof the primacy physic of the concrete.Marxism-Leninism's of theory, over fact, is easily translatedinto the contentionthat the idealis real.This sharesthe one-dimensionalityof westernempiricism which, starting from an opposing premise, implies that the real is ideal. Criticaltheorists reject the approachesbecauseboth attempt to liquidatethe creativetensionsbetweenideology and reality.When the latter two are fused in one dimension,the meansfor crystallizing classconsciousnessareeroded.

Criticaltheory has emphasizedprimarilythe negativemoment of the dialectic. It has attacked domination, rather than describing explicit, determinatepossibilities for new social formatic)ns.However, it is still clear that democracy,in as direct a form as possible, is the flip-sideof the critiqueof state bureaucracy.Criticaltheorists imply that the 'democracyof the councils' (self-managedsocialism) is the revolutionaryalternativeto both corporatecapitalismand state socialism.62This would involve a debureaucratizedpublic sphere where all citizens could participate in free communication and practicalaction to determinethe 'consensualnorms'governingsocial and economic life.63 Emancipationis not reducedto a formalpossibility, but is viewed both as a matter of immediatestruggleand a long-termgoal.

The emphasison denlocraticorganizationis not an idealist fantasy, but arisesfrom the fact that elite-controlledbureaucraticsocial formations, whatever their ideology, reproduce themselves and expand their hegemonyratherthan 'witheringaway'. Emancipatory action must establishan alternativeto capitalistbureaucracywithout restoringdominationin the shape of revolutionaryauthoritarianism or socialistplanningelites. Criticaltheory needs to focus increasingly upon the concrete, practicalproblemsof creatingdemocraticinstitutions and practices.Its traditionalconcern with metatheory and culturalcritiqueprovidesan intellectualalternativeto both empiricism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism.However,it is now time to translate this philosophic foundation into determinatecritiques of social and economic arrangements,that have more direct bearing upon emanclpatorypraxls.

Critical theory, to retain vitality, must transcend theoretical archaeology(constant rehashesof Marx,Adorno and Horkheimer), repetitious attacks on positivismand endless debates about highly abstracttheories (e.g., of Habermas).64The critiqueof domination must be translatedinto historicallyconcrete and regionallyspecific immanent critiques of bureaucraticdomination. These detailed *

o

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analyses should investigate the possibilities for democratization accordingto the particularneeds and concreteconditionsof nations and regions at different levels of development and with varying histories, social traditionsand materialcultures.Thus, despite the generalemphasisupon socialistdemocracy,criticaltheoryshouldnot insist that a singlemodel of post-bureaucratic society be imposedin all settings. In some contexts these models requireextreme force.

Whenthis occurs, they seldom achievetheirultimateends and often become the justificationfor hegemonyby the elite allegedlyattempting to imposethe model.

PerhapsMarx's original contention holds true, that socialismis possible in only the most advancedindustrialnations. Orthodox Marxism-Leninismhas little to contribute in such a setting. Its authoritarianmeans of organizationarebest suitedfor concentrating powerin the handsof a planningelite for purposesof rapideconomic development. The creation of socialism should be considered a separate, and even contradictory,task that is as much political as economic. Once advancedindustrialismis a reality,the battle against exploitation must be waged as part of a larger war against elite control. The desire for a democraticpublic sphereand massparticipation in the planningand managementof social life, replacesideas of revolutionaryvanguard,state centralizationand planningelites.

However,before this can occur,the socialandpoliticaltheoryguiding emancipatoryactivity must be freed from its tie to bureaucratic centralism.This goal does not requirecreationof entirelynew ideas, but instead a commitmentto the realizationof the incompleteproject contained in democratic ideology. Emancipatoryimmanent critiqueshould both portraythe contradictionbetweenstate bureaucratic society and its democraticideals (about rationalityand freedom) and point to the determinatepossibilitiesfor overcomingthe contradiction.The critique is not an idealist reduction because it aimsto become a basis,not a substitute,for praxis.

Robert J. Antonio Department of Sociology University of Kansas NOTES *I am indebted to David Dickens for stimulating my interest in the topic and for his careful criticism of my work. Thanks also go to Michael Lacy for generous substantive criticism and editorial comments, Alan Sica for general criticism of an earlier draft, and Gary Shapiro for help on the Hegel section. I also wish to acknowl-

edge the University of Kansas General Research Grant (3485-X0-003 8) for support in preparing the manuscript.

This paper was presented at the Critical Theory Session of the 1978 Southwestern Sociological Association Meetings.

1. Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, Boston, Little, Brown,

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Immanentcritiqueas the core of criticaltheory 1973,p.41.

2. Susan Buck-Morss, The OriSnn of Negative Dialectics, New York, Free Press,1977, p. 65.

3. See ibid., pp. 1-62; Jay, op. cit., pp. 41-85; Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination, Boston, BeaconPress,1973, pp. 44-100.

4. Karl Marx, Capital, volume 1, New York, International Publishers, 1967, p. 270.

5. KarlMarx,Writingsof the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, New York, Anchor Books, 1967, pp. 151-202.

6. See Karl Marx, Grundrisse,New York, Vintage Books, 1973, pp.

85-111.

7. Norberto Bobbio, 'Marxismand Socialism', Telos, no. 39, 1979, pp. 191-200.

8. See Kansas Telos Group, 'The Antioch Telos Conference', Telos, 32,1977, pp. 188-92; see also Andrew Arato, 'Understanding Bureaucratic Centralism', Telos,35,1978, pp.73 -87; Castoriadis, 'The Social Regime in Russia', Telos, 38,1978/1979, pp. 3247; Herbert Marcuse,Soviet Marxism, London, Pelican, 1971.

9. Marx considered communism 'the actual phase of human emancipation and rehabilitation'. KarlMarx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, New York, International Publishers,1964, p. 146.

10. Soviet 'Marxists'eliminate practically all of Marx'sthought pertinent to criticism of Soviet society. Their version of 'scientific socialism' aims at perfectingstate administrativestructure through 'scientific' management (see Gvishiani, Organization and Management,Moscow, Progress,1972, pp. 77-173; V. G. Afanasyev, The Scientific Management of Society, Moscow, Progress,1971, pp. 77-113, 186-253). Soviet administration is impervious to criticism because it reflects 'objective laws' of MarxismLeninism. Soviet sociologists claim that critical theorists confuse administration, the 'necessary'state machinery of socialism, with capitalist bureaucracy. (See Eduard Batalov, The

343

Philosophy of Revolt, Moscow, Progress, 1975,pp.226-30.) Furthermore, they arpe that any 'attempt to gliberalize"or gdemocratize" Marxism will . . . play into the hands of those anti-communists who are openly endeavoring. . . to discreditMarxism and undermine its influence on the masses' (Vol. I. Dobrenkov, NeoFreudians in Search of 'Truth', Moscow, Progress,1976, p. 162).

11. Immanent critique is an important theme in critical theory, but its role should not be exaggerated.(See Schroyer, op. cit., pp. 29-36; Jay, op. cit., p. 63, Buck-Morss,op. cit., pp.

49-57, 63-9, 113-21.) Majorcritical theorists, such as Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, do not restrict themselves to a single method. Like other broad intellectuals, they engage in numerous modes of analysis.However, immanent critique provides unity to their work and distinguishesit from other approaches. Finally, this is the method, partially developed by the first generation of critical theorists, that contains the potential for an even richercriticaltheory of the future.

12. George Lichtheim, 'Introduction to the Torchbook Edition', GeorgW. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, New York, HarperTorchbooks, 1967, p. xxiii.

13. See Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, New York, Basic Books, 1969, p. 232; Hegel op. cit., pp. 13145.

14. Georg W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, New York, Dover Publications,1956, p. 72.

15. Hegel, The Phenomenology . . .. pp. l 16-21,137,507-610,789-808.

16. Hegel argues that all forces promoting and retardinghuman development derive from human labour.

Therefore, immanent critique must portray the retarding aspects of historicallabourin its fully humanized, phenomenological form. For an explicit example of how his critique uses immanent standards, I recommend Hegel's chapter on 'Lordship and Bondage' (ibid., pp. 22840).

This material is one of the crucial

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Ro bert J. A ntonio

344 departure points for the development of Marxismout of Hegelianism (see Kojeve, op. cit., pp. 31-70; Charles Taylor, Hegel, New York, CambridgeUniversityPress, 1977, pp.

148-70, 537-71.)

17. Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of KarlMarx, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968, pp. 8-9.

18. Marx, Writings of the Young Marx. . ., p. 46.

19. See ibid., pp. 62-3. Marx states that 'Philosophy is the head of this emancipationand the proletariatis its heart'. KarlMarx,Early Writings,New York, McGrawHill, 1964, p. 59.

20. Marx, Writings of the Young Marx. . ., p. 382.

21. Marx, The Economic and PhilosophicManuscripts. . ., pp.180-1.

22. Ibid., pp. l 72,180-1.

23. Ibid., p. 180.

24. Ibid., pp. 175, 179.

25. Ibid., pp. 106-19.

26. Ibid., p. 188.

27. Marx, Writings of the Young Marx. . ., pp. 374-84.

28. Georg W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, New York, Oxford UniversityPress,1967, pp. 160-223.

29. Marx, Writings of the Young Marx. . ., pp. 152-202. Marxargues that Hegel's analysis of the Prussian statebureaucracy'could be taken verbatimfrom the PrussianCivil Code'.

Ibid.,pp. 180-2.

30. Marxstates that 'the firstpremise ofall human existence . . . [is] that menmust be in a position to live in orderto be able to "make history".

But life involves before everything else,eating and drinking,a habitation, clothingand many other things. The firsthistorical act is thus production ofmeans to satisfy these needs, the productionof material life itself.'

Marxcontinues, arguing that 'the second point is that the satisfactionof thefirst need . . . leads to new needs; andthis production of new needs is thefirst historicalact.' KarlMarxand Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Moscow, Progress,1964, p. 39.

31. The term 'unreconciled nature'

refers to social relationsof production in which naturalnecessity is refracted through partially rational means of overcoming necessity. Such systems may provide technically advanced goods and services, but at the same time preservedomination and struggle by perpetuating the unequal distribution of labour responsibilities and benefits.

32. I do not claim that Marx succeeded in developing an argument totally devoid of transhistorical elements, e.g., his claims about a communist 'terminus' to history are not historical.

33. Even Marx'smature works contained immanent criticism, e.g., his analysis of commodities, the labour theory of value and his discussion of unequal exchange. However, Marx's workwas not exclusivelyan immanent critique.His rich legacy includes historical,structural, scientific and polemical aspects. Immanent critique provideda foundation and direction to his emancipatoryproject, but was nothis only tool.

34. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, New York, Seabury Press, 1972,p.32.

35. Ibid., p.38.

36. Herbert Marcuse, One DimensionalMan, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966,p. 1.

37.Ibid.,p.32.

38. See Marx, Capital, vol. 1, pp.

394-504.

39. For example, see E. P. Thompson,TheMakingoftheEnglishWorking Class,New York, Vintage Books, 1966,pp.711-832; MalcolmI. Thomis, TheLuddites, New York, Schocken, 1970;E. G. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, New York, Mentor,1962, pp.44-73,238-57.

40. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 350400.

41. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man .. .,p.189.

42. Ibid., pp. l -18.

43. Ibid., pp. 26-7.

44. This commentary refers to conditions in the United States.

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Immanentcritiqueas the core of criticaltheory 45. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man * ** , p.29.

46. Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness, New York, McGrawHill, 1976.

47. Ibid., pp.219-20.

48. See Jurgen Habermas,Towarda Rational Society, Boston, Beacon Press 1971, pp. 107-22; Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, Cambridge,Mass., MIT;1978, pp. 232-71.

49. See Douglas Dowd, The Twisted Dream, Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers,1977, pp. 127-64; Gabriel Kolko, Wealthand Power in America, New York, Praeger,1962.

50. For example, see Habermas,op. cit., pp. 81 -122; William Leiss, The Domination of Nature, Boston, Beacon Press,1974.

51. See Marx, Writingsof the Young Marx. . ., pp. 177-90.

52. Shroyer,op. cit., pp.30-1.

53. Marx Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, New York, Seabury Press, 1974, p. l 78. The emphasisis mine.

54. Max Horkheimer, Critique of InstrumentalReason, New York, Seabury Press,p. 47.

55. Horkheimer,Eclipse of Reason, p.49.

56. Ibid., pp. 70-91.

57. Ibid., p. 24.

58. Ibid., p. 23.

59. Horkheimerand Adorno, op. cit., p. 93.

60. Horkheimer,Eclipse of Reason, p.97.

61. For example, Batalov, op. cit.;

345

Perry Anderson, Considerations on WesternMarxtsm, NLB, 1976; John Horton and Fari Filsoufi, 'Left-Wing Communism:An Infantile Disorderin Theory and Method',InsurgentSociologist, 7, 1977, pp. 5-17; GoranTherborn, 'The Frankfurt School', New Left Review, 63,1970, pp.65-96.

62. Max Horkheimer,'The AuthoritarianState', Telos, 15,1973, p. 6.

63. See the following writings of Jurgen Habermas:'On Systematically Distorted Communication', Inquiry, 13, 1970, pp. 205-18; 'Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence', Inquiry, 13, 1970, pp.

360-75; Toward a Rational Society; and 'The Public Sphere',New German Critique, 3, 1974, pp. 49-55; see also McCarthy,op. cit., pp. l -16,272-357.

64. This project has already begun among the current generation of critical theorists. See Arato, op. cit.; Jose Baptista, 'Bureaucracy and Society', Telos, 22, 1974/1975, pp.

66-84; Norberto Bobbio, 'WhyDemocracy', Telos, 36, 1978, pp. 43-54; Antonio Carlo, 'The Socio-Economic Nature of the USSR', Telos, 2151974, pp. 2-86; and 'Capitalismand Crisis in Yugoslavia',36, 1978, pp. 81-110; CorneliusCastoriadis,'The Hungarian Source', Telos, 29, 1976, pp. 4-22i Ferenc Feher, 'The DictatorshipOver Needs', Telos, 35, 1978, pp. 31 -42; ClaudeLefort, 'Whatis Bureaucracy?', Telos, 22, 1974/1975, pp. 31-65; KarelKovanda,'CzechoslovakWorkers' Councils (1968/1969)', Telos, 28, 1976, pp.36-54.

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