An Examination of Richard Kraut’s Liberalization of Socrates’ Political Philosophy
13 craig
In his book Socrates and the State, Richard Kraut interprets Plato’s Crito in a way that he thinks will allow it to fit better with its counterpart, the Apology. Traditionally, most commentators and early translators (such as Grote1) have interpreted the Crito to be a piece of writing that leaves little (or no) room for disobedience on the part of the citizen who feels the laws have treated him unjustly. This presents a problem, as it seems to be in stark contrast with the Apology, Plato’s version of Socrates’ defense argument at his trial.2 There are some parts of the Apology in which Socrates seems to be advocating higher moral principles which surpass the orders of law, e.g., not going to capture Leon the Salaminian at the behest of the Thirty Tyrants (Apology, 32c-e). Socrates uses the Leon story as a way to show that (a) he has an extra-legal code, (b) the extra-legal code does not allow him to commit acts of injustice, and (c) he is willing to disobey an unjust law or command. These acts of defiance towards the law, and his reasons for showcasing them, would lead one to assume that Socrates was not advocating total submission to the laws of the state. The Crito, set after the trial and guilty verdict (the punishment is death), is Socrates’ argument that it would be unjust for him to accept the offer from his friends to escape from jail. Parts of this argument seem, by their very nature, to conclude that one owes more obedience to the state than is set out in the Apology, especially in the speech given by the personified Laws of Athens. Kraut believes, however, that the “conservative” commentators (like Grote and Woozley) who leave little or no room for any disobedience to laws or orders are wrong in their interpretation of the Crito. Kraut attempts to interpret the Crito in a liberal way that justifies Socrates’ arguments against escape, while still allowing for citizens to disobey an unjust order or law. This liberalization is one that I believe fails, and does not fit with the political philosophy set out by Socrates in the Crito. In light of my view that Kraut’s liberalization of Socrates’ political philosophy is wrong, I want in this essay to do two things: First, I intend to show that while Kraut’s interpretations of many of the key issues in the Crito – namely, the persuade-or-obey doctrine, the principle of just agreements, and his interpretation of the parent/city analogy – are interesting attempts to make the Crito fit with the Apology, there are simply too many problems with the interpretations to make them stand up. In short, I disagree with Kraut’s liberal interpretation of the Crito. I intend to show that Socrates placed a strong emphasis on obeying the laws of the state, even if they caused one to suffer injustice. Second, I will also discuss some other interpretations of why Socrates drank the hemlock, and how these interpretations are dependent upon how one interprets the political philosophy of the Crito and Apology. In the final analysis, I hope to show that while there is some room for disobedience in the Crito, in reality there is a stronger argument for “just” obedience rather than for Kraut’s conception of Socratic jurisprudence. Kraut’s interpretation allows for much more disobedience than I think is present in the political philosophy of the Crito.
aegis 2006
J.T. Craig
