A Critique of Lafont’s Response to the Cognitive Dishonesty Objection >>> Larsa Ramsini §1: Introduction Do you not know that the wicked will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor male prostitutes nor homosexual offenders…will inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 6:9-10 New International Version). Many Christians with a strong faith in what they view as the word of God use passages from the Bible, such as this one, as justification for a ban on same-sex marriage in the United States. In the U.S., a liberal democracy with a plurality of both religious and non-religious beliefs, these individuals have the right to believe and practice whatever they choose, so long as these beliefs and practices do not infringe on the rights of others. It also seems that they have the right to justify their beliefs for or against a certain coercive law, like a ban on same-sex marriage, with whatever reasons they view as compelling. However, providing justification from the Bible—which not everyone believes is the word of God—also amounts to not treating one’s fellow citizens as equals, since this person is not providing justification that the non-Christian can reasonably accept. There is a conflict between allowing this person the freedom to provide reasons that adhere to his/her own beliefs, just as the non-Christian is able to do, and providing the non-Christian the freedom to not be forced to adhere to a coercive law that is justified solely by religious reasons. This is the conflict that John Rawls attempts to resolve by restricting the use of certain justification that can be provided in the public sphere in a liberal democracy. The question Rawls attempts to answer is to what extent, if any, justification from a particular religious, moral, or philosophical perspective that not everyone shares, should be used in the political process in a liberal democracy like the U.S., a country that has stipulated both the constitutional right to freedom of religion and the lack of an establishment of religion within the government itself. According to Rawls, each citizen has a duty to provide reasons for or against a political view that “all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational” (Rawls, 1993, pp. 217-18). He argues that coercive laws must be sufficiently justified by claims that everyone can reasonably accept.1 This account of public reason leads some to object that those citizens who are unable to provide justification for their own political views that everyone can reasonably accept will be obligated to offer or accept reasons for or against a coercive law that are not their own, if they are to fulfill their civic duty as described by Rawls. For example, if Frank, a conservative Christian, wishes to adhere to Rawls’ account of civic duty, he may need to either give or accept arguments given by others for a ban on samesex marriage rather than providing his own. Christina Lafont responds to this objection by requiring citizens to respond only to those objections that come from reasons that everyone
Aegis 2010
87
