Explain why President Kennedy believed that keeping South Vietnam free from Communism was essential for the protection of the USA’s national interests. (12 marks)
Kennedy was committed to containment. This commitment led to two very clear perceptions. One was that containment would protect US economic and business interests on a global scale, and secondly that the US had a moral responsibility to use its economic power to protect democracy in the face of communist expansionism. Containment was central to US interests.
Vietnam was a key state in SE Asia and the Far East as a whole. Kennedy was committed to the domino theory and he was certain that it was a reality in Asia. Any expansion of communist influence in this region would challenge US interests.
Kennedy was aware of the spread of communism into China in 1949 and North Korea. He saw these as further examples of the validity of containment.
During the 50’s the Cold War escalated with developments in the Space race (Sputknik) Khrushchev’s forecast the triumph of communism just before Kennedy’s inauguration, stating “We will bury you”. Failures in Cuba (Bay of Pigs) meant that Kennedy had to be tough in order not to be seen as soft on communism.
Eisenhower warned Kennedy that the Republicans would not stand for “any retreat in SE Asia”.
Reinforce the US’s status as a credible cold war power and an international power. This in turn helped to protect the USA’s national interest.
The Commitment Trap – What was it? Was the war “Kennedys War?
Commitment trap is the idea that successive presidents were trapped by their predecessor’s actions. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 established that America would support “free peoples” around the globe and reverse their historical tradition of isolationism.
Eisenhower was instrumental in creating the state of South Vietnam in 1954. This nation building created a situation which required US intervention in Vietnam.
Kennedy criticised Eisenhower in 1958 for being “weak” in Vietnam and described Vietnam as “essential to the nations security”. Kennedy thereby was responsible for trapping himself into a commitment trap as a result of political opportunism.
Kennedy could have withdrawn from Vietnam on two occasions; Diems failure to reform (1958-1969) and his persecution of Buddhists. The nationwide media coverage gave Kennedy the opportunity to withdraw but he failed to. Johnson never had this chance.
Kennedy was responsible for the deeper intervention by sending 16,000 military advisors into South Vietnam. This was despite some advisors raising concerns.
Kennedy instead relied on Robert McNamara who believed in a quantitative was possible.
Kennedy’s involvement in the coup which killed Diem meant that he was now committed to Vietnam.
Why did Johnson stay involved in Vietnam? Man of his time – Typically anti-communist and patriotic. A true American, southern in nature. Patrotism – called Vietnam a “damned little pissant country”. Defeat by North Vietnam, a “raggedy litte ass ittle fourth rate country, was inconceivable. Fear of appeasement. The day you let a bully get his way the “day after he will rape your wife” Believed in the domino theory Misunderstood foreigners. “The trouble with foreigners is that they’re not like the folks you get reared with”. Even though he travelled widely, it did not lead to a greater understanding. Kennedy Legacy. Johnson did not want to get involved in Vietnam; we “can’t get bogged down by guerrillas in South East Asia. Yet he recognised that it was Kennedy who had escalated invovlemtn in Vietnam, yet he couldn’t let him down (commitment theory). “ I would continue for my partner who had gone down ahead of me”. Within two days (November 24th 1963) he stated “Tell those generals in Saigon that I intend to stand by our word; to reaffirm Kennedy’s policy”. Advisors – Johnson kept Mcnamara on as his key advisor in Vietnam. He was a “Kennedy” man who believed a victory could be achived in Vietnam He also kept on Rusk. No fresh ideas appeared. This could also be due to the removal of Chinese experts during the Mccarthy withchunt. There were few Asian experts. He was more interested in a united Government than an open defiant one which debated. A secret memorandum in 1963 remarked; “The president expects that all senior officers of the government will insure ful unity of support for US policy in Vietnam”. Johnson also stated that he wanted advisors who would “kiss my ass and tell me it smells like roses. He wanted every assistants “pecker in my pocket”. From “Lyndon Johnson’s War”; Larry Berman It was Robert Mcnamara’s obsession with statistical analysis as a method to breaking the will of Ho Chi Minh that was the key policy of both the Kennedy and Johnson administration Inside the White House. As the Johnson administration was pre-occupied with a legitimate transition of government after the killing of kennedy, Mcnamara became responibile for the running of the War and it became known as “Mcnamara’s War”. Mandate – Johnson had no “mandate”. He felt he had to continue Kennedy’s work. He had not been elected President. Generals – Air Force Commander Curtis Le May wanted to bomb North Vietnam back into the “stone age”. One officer remarked; “This is the only war we’ve got; don’t knock it”. Johnson felt duty bound to listen to military advice. Le may commented that the USA were “swatting flies” in S.Vietna, where what was really required was to go after the “manure pile” (Hanoi)
Commitment Trap Johnson privately admitted in 1964 that; “They’d impeach a president who would run out. I don’t think we can fight them 10,000 miles from home. I don’t think its worth fighting for and I don’t think we can get out. Of course, if you start running from the communists they may just chase you inot your own kitchen, This is a terrible thing we’re getting ready to do.
Give reasons for the rise of the VC between 1965-1968;
Vietnamese nationalism – Foreign imperialist involvement from the Japanese and French creased an atmosphere of distrust. After the Geneva Accord it was clear that the US were pulling the strings of Diem. The CIA backed coup in 1963 confirmed this and made the Saigon government even more unpopular.
Strategic Hamlet Policy – Villagers were uprooted from good agricultural land and given infertile soil. They were removed from their ancestral burial plots (key to their faith), and rich landowners were able to bribe officials and avoid hard work in building the defences. The ARVN failed to arrive in good time when called for, which meant the VC ruled at night. Villagers, who were anti-communist, simply gave the VC support out of fear. It was safer to support the VC. “I am not dying for a gun”.
VC Heart and Mind policy – their code won over the villagers in contrast to aggressive US and ARVN policy (forced resettlement/search and destroy); “we had to destroy the village in order to save it”. Heavy bombing (rolling thunder) and the use of chemicals and napalm killed and destroyed lives and vegetation.; eg, My Lai – 1968.
ARVN inefficiency. The Vietminh (now VC) defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu (1954) and seemed efficient in comparison to the weak ARVN (defeat at Ap Bac – 62)
Religious Persecution – Buddhists were forbidden to have flags up to celebrate Buddha's birthday. A Buddhist burnt himself to death in protest at Diem’s Catholic persecution. Catholicism was a minority faith which did not endear him to the people.
Corruption – The 1956 election (rigged) as well as the pocketing of money by officials in the SHP programme led to distrust of the Saigon government. The coup in 1962 merely exacerbated this.
Communism – People in villagers lived a communal lifestyle anyway so the idea of shared wealth was not a radical departure from their everyday lives. Capitalism in the form of US intervention did not appear to offer anything better than the corrupt leadership of the landowners. Communism as least offered an alternative.
Escalation – 1964 Working Group Recommendations 1964-1965 Johnson put together a working group to suggest policy actions before the election. He was unwilling to hugely escalate the War (although there had been small strikes in Aug 64 – Pierce Arrow) and wanted some ideas. The group involved people from the CIA, the JCS, the defence department and the State Department. These were their conclusions;
A free South Vietnam was essential. The domino theory is a real and credible threat American “national prestige and honour” was at stake The Saigon Government was weak and required immediate help Heavy bombing should be launched. It should only be halted if North Vietnam agree that South Vietnam can continue to exist.
Was Johnson to blame? He had won a landslide election after bombing North Vietnam. The Working group was behind escalation and the public appeared supportive. George Ball and Mike Mansfiled however continued to warn him. In 1965, as a result of the Working groups recommendations, Johnson took the first big step into War, when Operation Rolling Thunder was launched. With electoral victory, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and the Working groups recommendations behind him, Johnson felt empowered enough to act.
Two events occurred in 1964 which allowed Johnson to escalate the War. The first one, was the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which gave him congressional support. The second, was Johnsons massive electoral victory in November 1964. This gave him public support. Johnson now had permission to wage war in Vietnam.
What happened in the Gulf of Tonkin?
The US ship the Maddox was sailing through waters near to the coast of North Vietnam in international waters on 2 August. They were supporting South Vietnamese special forces (trained by the CIA) inside North Vietnam on sabotage missions. The ship came under fire from three North Vietnamese ships after firing warning shots (this was not revealed at the time!) and was hit by a single bullet. Two days later another engagement occurred involving Maddox and North Vietnamese ships. In the middle of the night and in freak weather conditions, there was allegedly another engagement, with two torpedo boats being supposedly sunk by the Maddox. Johnson was informed about this unprovoked attack and decided a response was necessary (in 2003 McNamara admitted the incident never happened). Due to this ‘violation of international law’ Johnson had a resolution passed by Congress, decreeing that “the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol state of the South Asia Collective Defence Treaty requesting assistance in defence of its freedom. Translation = Johnson could send US troops to fight in Vietnam, having acquired Congress’ support and having public backing.
Consequences of Tonkin Incident Why did Johnson escalate after 1964?
1. Johnson’s personality – arrogance, anti-communist tendencies. 2. Election victory (1964) 3. Incompetence of Saigon government – there were frequent changes in leadership prior to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident (General Khanh had been in charge since January 1964, but he would last only 13 months). 4. Working Group Recommendations – the Working Group was a group of experts (taken from the Defence Department, the State Department, the CIA and the JCS) brought together to support Vietnam. Their findings reiterated domino theory and said a non-communist Vietnam was vital to America. 5. To protect US bomber bases in Vietnam (to allow Rolling Thunder to take place). 6. National pride 7. To demonstrate to USSR and China that the US were not weak and would not appease communism.
Had a resolution from congress
Huge election victory (mandate)
Attacks on American patrol boats
How was Johnson able to escalate?
Congress passed resolution
Explain why the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was adopted by the USA in August 1964. (12 marks)
Short term reasons;
Attacks on the American battleship in the Gulf of Tonkin – Explain what happened.
“For all I know, our navy was shooting at whales out there” – Lyndon Johnson Provided the US with a justification for escalating the Vietnam War. National Securuty Memo – 24th December 1963 – Called for raising the “possibility of North Vietnamese retaliation”. Johnson got retaliation and a blank cheque for the War. “This bill was like Grandma’s nightshirt- It covered everything” Lyndon Johnson – It gives Johnson the permission to do anything he wants.
Johnson also pushed the bill to appear strong in election year. Barry Goldwater was calling him “soft on communism”. The bill allowed Johnson to bomb North Vietnam for the first time (operation Pierce Arrow), and Johnson’s approval rating jumped from 42% to 72%. Gelb and Betts - Johnson knew the prospects were poor, but kept escalating because he feared looking weak (Stalemate Theory)
“The Middle Course” – Satisfied both sides. He was able to satisfy the right of his party who wanted an aggressive response to Hanoi, and to the left promised;
“We are not going to send American boys away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves” He had privately told the Joint Chiefs of Staff (military) that in December 1963; “Just let me get elected and then you can have your War” “Lyndon Johnson pursued consensus, which is the absence of leadership” (M.R Mcmaster) – This supports the idea of the “Middle Course”
Long term reasons
Johnson was continuing Kennedy’s administration as he didn’t have a mandate. Kennedy had escalated US involvement and Johnson was continuing this. Johnson’s personality – He was a “cold war warrior” and didn’t want to be seen as the first president to lose a war. Johnson had the same advisors as Kennedy. They (Mcnamara) believed the war was winnable.
Schmitz (2005)Johnson was a victim of commitment trap; “All the logic and rationale of the Cold War and containment called for escalation”. The Tonkin resolution was “inevitable”
How important was President Johnson in bringing about an escalation of the war in Vietnam in the years 1964 to 1968? (24 marks) (Was he to blame?) Introduction – Introduce who Johnson was and refer to his personality, and what shaped his presidency. Some of these things will blame Johnson, some will exclude him. Man of his time – Typically anti-communist and patriotic. A true American, southern in nature. Patrotism – called Vietnam a “damned little pissant country Fear of appeasement. The day you let a bully get his way the “day after he will rape your wife” Believed in the domino theory Misunderstood foreigners. “The trouble with foreigners is that they’re not like the folks you get reared with”. Even though he travelled widely, it did not lead to a greater understanding. Kennedy Legacy. Johnson did not want to get involved in Vietnam; we “can’t get bogged down by guerrillas in South East Asia. Yet he recognised that it was Kennedy who had escalated invovlemtn in Vietnam, yet he couldn’t let him down (commitment theory). “ I would continue for my partner who had gone down ahead of me”. Within two days (November 24th 1963) he stated “Tell those generals in Saigon that I intend to stand by our word; to reaffirm Kennedy’s policy”. Advisors – Johnson kept Mcnamara on as his key advisor in Vietnam. He was a “Kennedy” man who believed a victory could be achived in Vietnam He also kept on Rusk. No fresh ideas appeared. This could also be due to the removal of Chinese experts during the Mccarthy withchunt. There were few Asian experts. He was more interested in a united Government than an open defiant one which debated. A secret memorandum in 1963 remarked; Mandate – Johnson had no “mandate”. He felt he had to continue Kennedy’s work. He had not been elected President.
Then, use the two colums below. One outlining why Johnson WAS responsible, one why he WASN’T. Yes H.R Mcmaster “Dereliction of Duty” Frontilne documentary; “McNamara continued to view the war as another business management problem “ “Lyndon Johnson pursued consensus, which is the absence of leadership. He so feared dissent that he excluded everyone but his most trusted advisers from discussions on Vietnam”. He ordered a strategy of kill more VC, yet only ordered minimum bombing attacks. “Robert McNamara, was particularly adept at sensing the president's needs and giving him the advice he wanted”. Johnson got from the JCS what he wanted.
No George C Herring “LBJ and Vietnam” Says that Johnson was “pathologically unable to make a decision, cautious and reluctant in escalation”. Schmitz (2005) Johnson was a victim of commitment trap; “All the logic and rationale of the Cold War and containment called for escalation” Gelb and Betts Johnson knew the prospects were poor, but kept escalating because he feared looking weak. (1979) – Stalemate Historians Kearns (1976) believes that Johnson wanted to look tough on foreign policy so conservatives would support him with his Great Society project in the USA.
Bombing fixed installations and economic targets was not appropriate for Vietnamese communist mobile forces Windchy, 1971 Johnson deceived congress about the Gulf of Tonkin incident. This was backed by Rovert Mcnamara in later years.
Finally, conclude with your own view; was Johnson to blame for the escalation?
Some key questions regarding Johnson’s War. The above would help you answer;
Explain why the war in Vietnam is viewed as ‘Johnson’s War’ (12 marks) Explain why President Johnson escalated the war effort between 1964 and 1968 (12 marks) President Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam to send a message to Russia and China. To what extent do you agree with this statement? (24 marks)
Explain why President Johnson began the bombing of North Vietnam. (12 marks)
In November 1963 a private memorandum gave details about how actions in the Gulf of Tonkin could be used in order to create the possibility of a retaliatory attack and subsequent war in Vietnam. Johnson told his aides in December 1963 that if he got elected he would give them their “damned war”. The supposed attack on American ships in 1964 gave the US the opportunity to take strikes against North Vietnam. Alongside Johnson’s anti- communist stance, the incompetence of the South Vietnamese government, laid the Working groups recommendations that a tough stance was required in Vietnam as part of the US Cold War strategy. Rolling Thunder appears on paper to be a very simple military strategy. 10,000 trucks were destroyed, 76% of the North’s ammunition depots were put out of action and 50% of bridges were demolished. Such bombing would slow down the rate of supplies heading down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and prevent the VC from waging war in the south. It was also designed to show the world that America would not allow Vietnam to fall the way of China in 1949 and it would demonstrate the force of American credibility across the globe. In February 1965 General Khan had been overthrown, and the next civilian government only lasted until June 1965. Marshal Ky had become the Prime Minster (the bottom of the barrel) according to Johnson’s advisors. He was corrupt and unpopular. It was hoped that American bombing would improve the morale of the South Vietnamese and show them that America would stick by the Truman Doctrine and stand by their allies. There was political pressure as well. McGeorge Bundy had been pressing for a bombing campaign, and it is often conveniently forgotten that later doves, like David Halberstam of the New York Times had pushed for the US to retaliate against VC attacks on American targets. Attacks at Pleiku and Qui Nhon, which took the lives of 23 Americans, provided the US government with justification to launch bombing attacks on North Vietnam. An all-out invasion of the North was out of the question anyway, with Johnson privately fearing Chinese intervention (No sir, I don’t want to fight them!). Bombing remained the only viable option for the US military.
Operation Rolling Thunder was a critical part of American policy. In the words of Clausewitz, war is “politics by other means”; this statement describes Rolling Thunder perfectly; rather than a series of military strikes with clear military objectives, it was a political act .The military despised the micro-management of the war by government officials. John McConell said of Rolling Thunder; “I didn’t think Mr McNamara understood air power nor its application very well”. In fact, I don’t think there was, at that time, anybody in the Office of the Secretary of Defence who understood the application of tactical and strategic powers”. McNamara saw the bombing policy as a political act. It was the policy of “gradualism”; holding back on hitting major attacks to put fear into the North Vietnamese and force them
to the negotiating table. Rolling Thunder was sometimes paused, sometimes escalated, as a response to political movements by the North. Rolling Thunder served as the stick over the carrot. Yet despite the micro management and gradualist strategy, up to 200,000 civilians were killed between 1965 and 1968. America saw bombing as a clear and visible message to the governments of Russia and China that they would not stand by idly and allow Vietnam to collapse. Vietnam was seen as a critical domino in South East Asia, and one that was more accessible than Laos because it allowed America to operate from the Gulf of Tonkin. Admiral Sharp sums up the American policy perfectly; “The most powerful country in the world did not have the willpower needed to meet the situation”. Whilst a lot of bombs were dropped, it was never really decided whether Rolling Thunder was a political or military solution to the worsening situation. It was really the only thing America could do in the region; they couldn’t win the ground war and McNamara realised that it was the only way the North could be brought to the negotiating table and allow an honourable American exit. .
Give reasons for the rise of the VC between 1965 and 1968. ‘The successes of the Vietcong in the years 1965 to 1968 were due to the effectiveness of its military tactics.’ Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.
(24 marks)
There needs to be balance in this answer, so depending on your point of view, you could either say that the military tactics were the most important factor, but not the only factor; or that the military tactics were a major contributing factor. Paragraph one needs to mention the guerrilla tactics of the Vietcong, and how difficult they were to combat for the US forces. The US forces ending up using the wrong tactics to combat the Vietcong’s tactics, as body count and search-and-destroy were only temporary solutions, as the North were able to keep sending troops flooding into the country through the Ho Chi Minh trail. This led to increasing numbers of casualties for the US, which increased anti-war feeling on the home front. Giap said that he only wanted “to break the American forces, not to defeat them.” More casualties meant escalation and more soldiers being sent into the war, which meant more opposition to the war. The respect shown to the peasants by the Vietcong was vital in maintaining a large support base for communism, and for being able to store weapons and food in villages. This was not matched by the US and ARVN forces. The victory of the “hearts-and-minds” battle led to a campaign of organised terror by the US, in the form of Operation Phoenix. This only served to increase VC support. The second main point needs to be about Tet. Although Tet was a military defeat for the VC, it did lead to huge anti-war feeling in the US. It was an invaluable piece of propaganda for the communists, who could show that the US army was not such a powerful force; it took them three weeks to fully clear Saigon of VC troops. However, the VC were completely decimated as a military force, and it took them until 1972 to launch another offensive, (the Easter Offensive) which shows that military tactics cannot have been that successful. The organised distraction at Khe Sanh base showed the US that the VC’s planning and co-ordination was phenomenally successful, and that their tactics had outwitted the American military. The final point of the essay needs to show balance and include negatives about the military tactics. For example, the fact that the VC were never able to deliver a final crushing defeat upon the Americans, unlike Dienbienphu, showed that their military tactics were not completely successful. Also, other factors, such as the attractive land reform policies and the nationalistic propaganda, seemed to attract the Vietnamese peasants more than just the military successes of the VC. In the conclusion, you should reiterate your original argument. Either the military successes were the most important factor, or they were merely a contributory factor, along with the propaganda and nationalistic message.
As a summary. Key reasons for the success of the VC between 65 and 68.
Vietnamese nationalism – Foreign imperialist involvement from the Japanese and French creased an atmosphere of distrust. After the Geneva Accord it was clear that the US were pulling the strings of Diem. The CIA backed coup in 1963 confirmed this and made the Saigon government even more unpopular.
Strategic Hamlet Policy – Villagers were uprooted from good agricultural land and given infertile soil. They were removed from their ancestral burial plots (key to their faith), and rich landowners were able to bribe officials and avoid hard work in building the defences. The ARVN failed to arrive in good time when called for, which meant the VC ruled at night. Villagers, who were anti-communist, simply gave the VC support out of fear. It was safer to support the VC. “I am not dying for a gun”.
VC Heart and Mind policy – their code won over the villagers in contrast to aggressive US and ARVN policy (forced resettlement/search and destroy); “we had to destroy the village in order to save it”. Heavy bombing (rolling thunder) and the use of chemicals and napalm killed and destroyed lives and vegetation.; eg, My Lai – 1968.
ARVN inefficiency. The Vietminh (now VC) defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu (1954) and seemed efficient in comparison to the weak ARVN (defeat at Ap Bac – 62)
Religious Persecution – Buddhists were forbidden to have flags up to celebrate Buddha's birthday. A Buddhist burnt himself to death in protest at Diem’s Catholic persecution. Catholicism was a minority faith which did not endear him to the people.
Corruption – The 1956 election (rigged) as well as the pocketing of money by officials in the SHP programme led to distrust of the Saigon government. The coup in 1962 merely exacerbated this.
Communism – People in villagers lived a communal lifestyle anyway so the idea of shared wealth was not a radical departure from their everyday lives. Capitalism in the form of US intervention did not appear to offer anything better than the corrupt leadership of the landowners. Communism as least offered an alternative.
Tactics - They took advantage of their knowledge of the terrain to melt away into the dense jungles and only fight when they wanted to. They also knew the importance of keeping the South Vietnamese peasants on side, as this allowed them to place booby traps in villages, and store weapons and food for themselves. These guerrilla tactics were frustrating and demoralising for the US/ARVN troops.
The Tet Offensive What was it? •
A massive offensive by the NVA and VC in the South take American troops by surprise during the Tet New Year(30 Jan 1968)
•
The US embassy in Saigon is over run by suicide squads.
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The ancient city of Hue in over run
•
Khe Sanh, the American base in the North stands by to be over run.
•
Some American generals see this as an opportunity to destroy the NVA and VC in the field – they are coming out to fight!
Why was it launched? 1) Giap was keen to break the stalemate in Vietnam. 2) Giap believed that the attacks would cause Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces to collapse and 3) The attack would cause rebellion among the South Vietnamese population, leading them to rise up against the regime in Saigon. 4) Giap believed the alliance between South Vietnam and the United States was unstable; he hoped the offensive would drive the final wedge between them and convince American leaders to give up their defence of South Vietnam.
Explain why the Vietcong launched the Tet Offensive in 1968?
(12 marks)
The argument should be that it was a combination of factors that led to the offensive being launched, however, the most important reason should be that Tet Offensive was launched to inspire a mass uprising against the government of Thieu. In this paragraph, you should elaborate on the idea of a mass uprising against the government. This, it was hoped, would be enough to show the US that they had lost the “hearts-and-minds” battle for the support of the South Vietnamese peasants. Thieu had only been in government for 5 months, and had been a successful and popular leader compared to those before him, such as Ky. In order to undermine his apparent success, the VC felt that they had to inspire a mass uprising. In this paragraph you should mention that the VC used the cover of the Tet festival to move the materials around the country in rice lorries, that looked like they were merely providing food for the nationwide feasts. Also during this time there was a ceasefire being observed for the Tet festivities. Hanoi had said that it would observe this, and so almost half of the ARVN were sent home for recreational leave. In this paragraph, you should mention that that the attacks were designed to shock the American military and public into the speed, co-ordination and strength of the VC’s attacks. The distraction at the Khe Sanh base, which the US thought was the great prize, were designed to stretch the US and ARVN. This was so that they would have to fight an extremely long battle, and the war would seem to become unwinnable. This would create a psychological defeat for Washington. In the conclusion, just reiterate that the hoped creation of a mass uprising in the South, sparked by the Tet Offensive, was the main reason for the VC’s launch of the offensive.
Key Quotes on Tet
“If I’ve lost Cronkite… I’ve lost the country.” - LBJ “Television is an instrument…which can paralyze this country” - Westmoreland “Despite the large enemy losses during Tet, the United States was no closer…to achieving its goal in Vietnam than it had been in 1965” - US foreign relations statement “For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam… Is to end in stalemate” Walter Cronkite "For the first time in modern history, the outcome of a war was determined not on the battlefield… but on the printed page and, above all, on the television screen." Former Los Angeles Times and Newsweek correspondent Robert Elegant "What the hell is going on? I thought we were winning this war.“ - Cronkite’s reaction to news footage on Jan 31st ‘68 "We think the American people should be getting ready to accept, if they haven’t already, the prospect that the whole Vietnam effort may be doomed, that it may be falling apart beneath our feet." - February 23, Wall Street Journal editorial
The Impact of Tet 1) Americans realised that the war was far from over. The American public would not be willing to pay the price that America would have to pay. 2) The President lost the support of the American people. In March 1968, he would announce his resignation. His popularity had fallen to 26%. 3) Walter Kronkite announced the War as now “unwinnable�. The images broadcast home have a traumatic impact on the people at home. It was a psychological victory for the South. 4) America announces a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and a desire to seek peace.
5) America won a military victory. The VC were decimated and the south did not rise up in support of the North as they had hoped. The North now agreed to the peace talks as well. 6) The US Congress refused to give General Westmoreland any more troops. They have had enough of the War.