North Vietnamese
1964-8
The Vietcong: leadership, tactics and effectiveness Leadership The overall leader of North Vietnam was Ho Chi Minh, and he held some considerable sway over their actions, however, the “real” leaders were General Giap and Hoang Van Thai. General Giap was a brilliant North Vietnamese general, who managed to gain both Ho’s complete respect, and admiration from the US in his younger years for his brilliant military command. In 1945, he became Minister of the Interior for the newly-formed Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He, in 1954, defeated the French at the battle of Dienbienphu, using ingenious tactics. In that year he became Deputy Prime Minister of North Vietnam. He was the overall leader of the North Vietnamese militaries, which included the PAVN and the NLF. Hoang Van Thai was the most senior North Vietnamese military commander in South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive. He co-ordinated the events of 30 January 1968, and rose over time to the rank of general. Although after Tet, the NLF as a force was virtually incapacitated, Thai’s work was vital in the overall success of the war from 196775. Tactics The NLF were a guerrilla force much like the Cuban forces led by Castro and Guevara. They took advantage of their knowledge of the terrain to melt away into the dense jungles and only fight when they wanted to. They also knew the importance of keeping the South Vietnamese peasants on side, as this allowed them to place booby traps in villages, and store weapons and food for themselves. These guerrilla tactics were frustrating and demoralising for the US/ARVN troops, as they were being taught to fight a conventional war against a military that refused to do this except on a select number of occasions, such as Ia Drang. The tactics for melting into the jungle were perhaps the most impressive and ingenious. An enormous network of tunnels was built for the VC in South Vietnam, allowing troops to live down here. Much of the civilian population of Hanoi could disappear into similar tunnels if US bombers were spotted. The Ho Chi Minh trail was the main supply route from the North to the South, avoiding the 20km thick de-militarised zone. The route was not a single track, instead branching off into several different routes through eastern Laos and Cambodia. Despite almost relentless US bombing of the trail, it never closed, and thus the supply of rice and weapons continued to flood into the south. Later in the war, around 1966, the Soviets and Chinese supplied lots of cheap, $6000 trucks. Many were lost, but the cost to replace them was insignificant compared to the cost to America of the multimillion dollar bombers lost. These tactics were used to wear down the Americans and to play to the NVA’s strengths. It consequently made the US fight an economically unviable war, and led to an unpopular war both at home and on the front line. Effectiveness The Americans didn’t appreciate that the North Vietnamese were so passionate about a united Vietnam that they were prepared to die for their cause. They were prepared to endure incredible hardships. Almost every soldier was malnourished and malarial, and quinine was in short supply. One soldier commented that whilst the Americans had water to shower, the Vietnamese often didn’t have enough to drink. The Vietnamese were more used to hardship though, given their almost constant battle with foreign powers, such as the Chinese. Giap said, “We were not strong enough to drive out half a million American troops, but that was not our aim. Our intention was to break the will of the American government to continue the war.”