North Vietnamese
1964-8
The Vietcong: leadership, tactics and effectiveness Leadership The overall leader of North Vietnam was Ho Chi Minh, and he held some considerable sway over their actions, however, the “real” leaders were General Giap and Hoang Van Thai. General Giap was a brilliant North Vietnamese general, who managed to gain both Ho’s complete respect, and admiration from the US in his younger years for his brilliant military command. In 1945, he became Minister of the Interior for the newly-formed Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He, in 1954, defeated the French at the battle of Dienbienphu, using ingenious tactics. In that year he became Deputy Prime Minister of North Vietnam. He was the overall leader of the North Vietnamese militaries, which included the PAVN and the NLF. Hoang Van Thai was the most senior North Vietnamese military commander in South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive. He co-ordinated the events of 30 January 1968, and rose over time to the rank of general. Although after Tet, the NLF as a force was virtually incapacitated, Thai’s work was vital in the overall success of the war from 196775. Tactics The NLF were a guerrilla force much like the Cuban forces led by Castro and Guevara. They took advantage of their knowledge of the terrain to melt away into the dense jungles and only fight when they wanted to. They also knew the importance of keeping the South Vietnamese peasants on side, as this allowed them to place booby traps in villages, and store weapons and food for themselves. These guerrilla tactics were frustrating and demoralising for the US/ARVN troops, as they were being taught to fight a conventional war against a military that refused to do this except on a select number of occasions, such as Ia Drang. The tactics for melting into the jungle were perhaps the most impressive and ingenious. An enormous network of tunnels was built for the VC in South Vietnam, allowing troops to live down here. Much of the civilian population of Hanoi could disappear into similar tunnels if US bombers were spotted. The Ho Chi Minh trail was the main supply route from the North to the South, avoiding the 20km thick de-militarised zone. The route was not a single track, instead branching off into several different routes through eastern Laos and Cambodia. Despite almost relentless US bombing of the trail, it never closed, and thus the supply of rice and weapons continued to flood into the south. Later in the war, around 1966, the Soviets and Chinese supplied lots of cheap, $6000 trucks. Many were lost, but the cost to replace them was insignificant compared to the cost to America of the multimillion dollar bombers lost. These tactics were used to wear down the Americans and to play to the NVA’s strengths. It consequently made the US fight an economically unviable war, and led to an unpopular war both at home and on the front line. Effectiveness The Americans didn’t appreciate that the North Vietnamese were so passionate about a united Vietnam that they were prepared to die for their cause. They were prepared to endure incredible hardships. Almost every soldier was malnourished and malarial, and quinine was in short supply. One soldier commented that whilst the Americans had water to shower, the Vietnamese often didn’t have enough to drink. The Vietnamese were more used to hardship though, given their almost constant battle with foreign powers, such as the Chinese. Giap said, “We were not strong enough to drive out half a million American troops, but that was not our aim. Our intention was to break the will of the American government to continue the war.”
North Vietnamese
1964-8
Communist propaganda was focused mainly on military victories, or American public opposition. Examples include leaflets published and distributed by the NLF, showing the civil unrest and anti-war protests in the US. A popular slogan was “Hey, Hey, LBJ, How many kids did you kill today?” Messages like this were perfect for the communist’s propaganda mill. They showed that the US military was losing the war not in Vietnam but at home, which was surely more dangerous than a couple of military defeats. The “hearts and minds” battle for the support of the South Vietnamese peasants was a vitally important one. The NLF took this very seriously and in their code of conduct, they required their soldiers to be kind and courteous to the peasants. The NLF avoided the rape and pillage tactics of the ARVN, and in any case, communism was suited to the communal life in villages, so many villagers were happy with the faire land distribution that the NLF offered. The peasants were indoctrinated into the communist beliefs, through propaganda and a carrot-and-stick approach. This meant that the VC offered them concessions, such as land reform, and being nice to them in return for the villagers stashing weapons. However, they could also be ruthless. During the Tet Offensive, the VC troops dragged “unfriendly” people out of their homes and killed them or committed other atrocities. Over 3000 bodies were found in the rivers and jungles around Hue alone. Past Papers Explain why the Vietcong launched the Tet Offensive in 1968?
(12 marks)
The argument should be that it was a combination of factors that led to the offensive being launched, however, the most important reason should be that Tet Offensive was launched to inspire a mass uprising against the government of Thieu. In this paragraph, you should elaborate on the idea of a mass uprising against the government. This, it was hoped, would be enough to show the US that they had lost the “hearts-and-minds” battle for the support of the South Vietnamese peasants. Thieu had only been in government for 5 months, and had been a successful and popular leader compared to those before him, such as Ky. In order to undermine his apparent success, the VC felt that they had to inspire a mass uprising. In this paragraph you should mention that the VC used the cover of the Tet festival to move the materials around the country in rice lorries, that looked like they were merely providing food for the nationwide feasts. Also during this time there was a ceasefire being observed for the Tet festivities. Hanoi had said that it would observe this, and so almost half of the ARVN were sent home for recreational leave. In this paragraph, you should mention that that the attacks were designed to shock the American military and public into the speed, co-ordination and strength of the VC’s attacks. The distraction at the Khe Sanh base, which the US thought was the great prize, were designed to stretch the US and ARVN. This was so that they would have to fight an extremely long battle, and the war would seem to become unwinnable. This would create a psychological defeat for Washington. In the conclusion, just reiterate that the hoped creation of a mass uprising in the South, sparked by the Tet Offensive, was the main reason for the VC’s launch of the offensive. ‘The successes of the Vietcong in the years 1965 to 1968 were due to the effectiveness of its military tactics.’ Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.
(24 marks)
North Vietnamese
1964-8
There needs to be balance in this answer, so depending on your point of view, you could either say that the military tactics were the most important factor, but not the only factor; or that the military tactics were a major contributing factor. Paragraph one needs to mention the guerrilla tactics of the Vietcong, and how difficult they were to combat for the US forces. The US forces ending up using the wrong tactics to combat the Vietcong’s tactics, as body count and search-anddestroy were only temporary solutions, as the North were able to keep sending troops flooding into the country through the Ho Chi Minh trail. This led to increasing numbers of casualties for the US, which increased anti-war feeling on the home front. Giap said that he only wanted “to break the American forces, not to defeat them.” More casualties meant escalation and more soldiers being sent into the war, which meant more opposition to the war. The respect shown to the peasants by the Vietcong was vital in maintaining a large support base for communism, and for being able to store weapons and food in villages. This was not matched by the US and ARVN forces. The victory of the “hearts-and-minds” battle led to a campaign of organised terror by the US, in the form of Operation Phoenix. This only served to increase VC support. The second main point needs to be about Tet. Although Tet was a military defeat for the VC, it did lead to huge anti-war feeling in the US. It was an invaluable piece of propaganda for the communists, who could show that the US army was not such a powerful force; it took them three weeks to fully clear Saigon of VC troops. However, the VC were completely decimated as a military force, and it took them until 1972 to launch another offensive, (the Easter Offensive) which shows that military tactics cannot have been that successful. The organised distraction at Khe Sanh base showed the US that the VC’s planning and co-ordination was phenomenally successful, and that their tactics had outwitted the American military. The final point of the essay needs to show balance and include negatives about the military tactics. For example, the fact that the VC were never able to deliver a final crushing defeat upon the Americans, unlike Dienbienphu, showed that their military tactics were not completely successful. Also, other factors, such as the attractive land reform policies and the nationalistic propaganda, seemed to attract the Vietnamese peasants more than just the military successes of the VC. In the conclusion, you should reiterate your original argument. Either the military successes were the most important factor, or they were merely a contributory factor, along with the propaganda and nationalistic message.