Designing better surveillance programs with plant biosecurity practitioners Mark Stanaway
Scientist, Biosecurity Queensland DAFFQ Supervisor: Kerrie Mengersen, QUT biosecurity built on science Cooperative Research Centre for National Plant Biosecurity
Surveillance provides one input into actions
Surveillance Technical Pest Knowledge
Policy
Decisions & Biosecurity Actions
Outcomes Growers / Consumers biosecurity built on science
National Surveillance Policy Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB) National Plant Biosecurity Strategy (NPBS) Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance (SNPHS) - under Plant Health Committee - to develop guidelines and plans that satisfy national biosecurity policy objectives - Strategic and response plans biosecurity built on science
Determination of pest status in an area
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1 All surveillance should be delimiting to a useful level of “confidence�. biosecurity built on science
Surveillance provides information for management
IGAB “target biosecurity resources to those areas of greatest return from a risk management perspective” - Risk = Probability x Consequences - Risk Return = Risk0 – Risk1
Surveillance doesn’t directly reduce probability or consequences
Surveillance resources
- Provides information to do things like regulation and control - Return depends upon surveillance improving the risk choices - More is better but how much better and is it cost effective - Policy advice is needed to define how useful
biosecurity built on science
Pest Status and Decisions Pest Information
Surveillance
Control Decisions Pest Information
Pest Status of Areas
Policy Containment Decisions
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Decision makers want to know - numbers (costs) - level of confidence from surveillance
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Surveillance planning requires - confidence needed for decisions biosecurity built on science
Assimilating Surveillance Pest Information
Pest Status of an Area
information ISPM 8 The determination of pest status requires expert judgement concerning the information available on the present-day occurrence of a pest in an area.
Pest information provides some probabilities - How strong are the pathways from other areas? - Can the pest establish?
Surveillance - Positive → contain, control, recover - Negative → play the pest information against the quality of evidence biosecurity built on science
Quantitative Assimilation Model for Pest Risk
Pest information on arrival
Spread rates
Surveillance data over time
Assimilate - residual probability maps to target surveillance Stanaway et al (2011) Environmental and Ecological Statistics
biosecurity built on science
Implementing Risk-based Surveillance
 Extending methods developed to - Banana industry - Review fruit fly trapping
biosecurity built on science
Value from Surveillance Data
Targeted towards risks (eg. black Sigatoka history, value of industry)
Justify on expected eradication benefits from detection
Getting as much mileage as possible out of data
Getting tangible benefit for pest status of an area and market access
biosecurity built on science
Surveillance for Market Access Pest Status in Source Area Survey
Pest Info
Carrier Probability Regulation
Pest Status in Target Area Survey
Pest Info
ALOP
Consequences
ISPM & IGAB - cooperation in controlling pests of plants, phytosanitary measures should be technically justified
Surveillance to demonstrate target area free and therefore at risk Surveillance to demonstrate source area free and therefore no risk Many uncertainties to balance Answer is >ALOP then regulation
biosecurity built on science
Myrtle rust Surveillance to justify restricting
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45.0% 40.0%
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35.0% Probability
Scenario
30.0% Without survey
25.0%
Survey 300
20.0%
15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0
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No. Infected Nurseries
1500 nurseries in jurisdiction 1/1000 probability that any one is infected (uncertain)
Risk-based prior Pr. of area freedom in jurisdiction is 40% Survey 300 updates probability of area freedom to 47% Cost $60 000 What is a useful low prevalence?
biosecurity built on science
Getting Research into Quantitative Surveillance Plans Can we communicate expectations with decision makers - Surveillance will not give a definitive answer - There is no “right” number to survey
Can we define how much information is useful for decisions - Changing market access regulation - Changing eradication plans - Independent arbiters of ALOP (WTO, IGAB dispute resolution)
Can we incorporate risk (and its uncertainty) into surveillance guidelines and plans - True freedom requires more epidemiology information - Designed for timeframes, simple solutions for complex systems biosecurity built on science