Science and politics are rarely integrated well with one another. Apparently disparate practical and academic fields, they are often approached independently, making their integration into effective policy formulation problematic. Scientists frequently engage in research independent of particular policy related goals, while politicians may fail to approach the appropriate scientist or scientific body for relevant information to inform policy-related decisions (Hoppe 2005). This is particularly evident in the case of plant biosecurity, where policies are continually challenged by the need to plot a consistent course between the benefits of lowering trade barriers and the concomitant increase in risks from the introduction of exotic pests and diseases (Old & Dudzinski 1998). The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), through the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) allows countries to enact quarantine measures based on risk
1
assessment and scientific justification to allow for an Appropriate Level of Protection (FAO 1999). Much of the language is highly interpretive, and while the precautionary principle governs many decisions where sufficient scientific justification is not yet available, it can also be weakened by the strength of international markets and the sensitivities of international relations. As a consequence, plant biosecurity efforts can be compromised. Despite the best efforts to prevent the introduction of exotic and invasive species into a country, increased international trade and rapid human movement have led to an escalation in the spread and establishment of these species, including invasive plant pathogens such as P. ramorum (Levine & D’Antonio 2002; Ehrenfeld 2005).
1
2
3
4
5
6
5.1.4.1 ‘Civil mandate’ In this arrangement science and policy operate in separate spheres (Fig. 5.2a) (Sterk et al. 2009). Policy is ultimately in control, effectively assigning detailed research projects to scientists, who create knowledge and tools and “engineer research outcomes” (Hoppe 2005). 5.1.4.2 ‘Trickle out’ In this arrangement the development of research goals is initiated in the science sphere (Fig. 5.2b) (Sterk et al. 2009). Scientists may need to argue for the uptake of their research outcomes, with little consideration in the early stages of development as to the complexity of the political decision-making process into which they would like to feed their results (Roetter et al. 2005). Relative to the investments made into tool and methodology development, little effort is placed in fostering uptake or evaluating impacts of their research (Rossing et al. 2007). 136 5.1.4.3 ‘Janus face’
7
In this arrangement policy and science spheres function in parallel (Fig. 5.2c) (Sterk et al. 2009). Scientists can become engaged within the political sphere, working to become part of the political establishment so as to have their science heard in political debates (Sterk et al. 2009). Primacy of the science sphere in this arrangement is essential, as it allows scientists to maintain their scientific credibility (Sterk et al. 2009). 5.1.4.4 ‘Critical participant’ In similar fashion to the ‘civil mandate’ arrangement, scientists are funded to do specifically policy oriented work (Fig. 5.2d) (Sterk et al. 2009). However, the specific objectives of the work are primarily formulated in the science sphere and scientists are expected to scrutinise policy developments in a constructive way (Sterk et al. 2009). 5.1.4.5 ‘Knowledge broker’ In this arrangement scientists engage with interest groups, affecting policy through the transfer of scientific knowledge into these groups and then on to policy makers (Fig. 5.2e) (Sterk et al. 2009). Scientists align their research goals with the interest groups’ focus, resulting in a greater primacy of science within the policy sphere (Sterk et al. 2009).
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16