/smith by Peace Operations Training Institute

Peacekeeping without the SecretaryGeneral: The Korean Armistice Arrangements

Ray Smith A T H E S I S P R E S E N T E D I N PA R T I A L C O M P L E T I O N O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S O F

The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

Peacekeeping without the Secretary-General: The Korean Armistice Arrangements

A Thesis

Squadron Leader Raymond C. Smith Royal Australian Air Force

presented in partial completion of the requirements of The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents......................................................................................................................................... ii List of Illustrations .....................................................................................................................................iii List of Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................. iv Glossary......................................................................................................................................................... v Abstract........................................................................................................................................................ vi Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 1 United Nations Involvement in Korea 1945 to 1950 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Historical context............................................ 1 The United Nations and the Korean War â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the role of the Security Council........................................ 2 The Legal Basis for the Use of Force ...................................................................................................... 3 The Use of Force and US Command and Control .................................................................................. 5 The End of the Korean War ..................................................................................................................... 9 Chapter 2: The Korean War Armistice Agreement ............................................................................ 10 Overview of the Agreement ................................................................................................................... 10 The Military Armistice Commission ..................................................................................................... 11 Chapter 3: Status of the Peacekeepers on the Korean Peninsula ...................................................... 16 United Nations Command: From Peace-enforcers to Peacekeepers ................................................... 19 Chapter 4: Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 22 Table of International Instruments ........................................................................................................ 24 Security Council Resolutions................................................................................................................. 24 General Assembly Resolutions .............................................................................................................. 24 Economic and Social Council Resolutions ........................................................................................... 24 International Agreements ....................................................................................................................... 24 Table of Cases ............................................................................................................................................ 25 References ................................................................................................................................................... 26 Bibliographic........................................................................................................................................... 26 Newspapers ............................................................................................................................................. 27 Internet..................................................................................................................................................... 27

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1: Structure of the Military Armistice Commission 1953-1991. .................................11 Figure 2: Structure of General Officer Talks 1998-...............................................................13

iii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviation CFC DMZ DPRK KPA MAC MDL MFO ONUC ROK UK UN UNC UNCMAC UNCOK UNCURK UNEF I UNKRA UNMOGIP UNSF UNTCOK UNTSO US

[United States – Republic of Korea] Combined Forces Command Demilitarised Zone Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Korean People’s Army Military Armistice Commission Military Demarcation Line Multinational Force and Observers Operation des Nations Unies au Congo Republic of Korea United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations United Nations Command United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission United Nations Commission on Korea United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea The First United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Reconstruction Agency for the Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea United Nations Truce Supervision Organization United States of America

GLOSSARY General Officers

Army officers of the rank of Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General, and General. Includes in this context their Navy and Air Force equivalents (Flag and Air Officers, respectively).

Permanent Five

The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: China, France, Russia, The United States, and The United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT Fifty-five years after the United Nations Security Council authorised a United States-led coalition to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces; and fifty-two years after an Armistice Agreement ended hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, the UN Flag still flies over the Demilitarised Zone. Since the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the peace has been kept by a military armistice commission comprised exclusively of military officers of the former belligerents, under the command and control of their national governments. This thesis will examine the history of United Nations involvement in Korea, the enforcement action by the United Nations Command, and the current peacekeeping machinery on the Korean Peninsular, assessing its effectiveness in the absence of command and control by the Secretary-General.

1 INTRODUCTION United Nations Involvement in Korea 1945 to 1950 – Historical context By the end of the Second World War, Korea had been ruled by a Japanese colonial administration for 35 years.1 After the Japanese surrender, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the thirty-eighth parallel as the boundary of their respective zones of occupation on the Peninsula. In the North, the Soviet Union installed a Communist administration under the leadership of Kim Il-sung, while in the South, the United States supported Syngman Rhee, a leader of the former Provisional Government in exile.2 In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly established the Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to facilitate Korea-wide elections by 31 May 1948 and consequently oversee the transfer of power to the newly-elected government. In the event, UNTCOK was able to function only in the South; elections held south of the thirty-eight parallel on 10 May 1948 were held by the Commission to be valid; and Syngman Rhee became President of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948. On 3 September 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was proclaimed in Pyongyang under the Premiership of Kim Il-sung.3 Subsequently, on 12 December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly established a new commission, whose mission was to facilitate the unification of Korea, and the withdrawal of occupation forces. The United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), which included a number of military observers, did oversee the withdrawal of almost all the US and Soviet forces, but was unsuccessful in encouraging any moves towards peaceful unification.4 UNCOK, in turn, was replaced by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) after the outbreak of the war,5 and an additional commission, the United Nations Reconstruction Agency for the Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNKRA) was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council on

1 2 3 4 5

Japan occupied Korea in 1905 and then annexed it in 1910: Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: a Contemporary History, New Edition, Basic Books, 2001, p. 5. Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53: Volume 1 Strategy and Diplomacy, The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1981, pp. 6-7. ibid., p. 7-9. ibid., p. 9-10. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 376(V), 7 October 1950.

2 7 November 1950, to assume UNCURK’s responsibilities for the conduct of rehabilitation operations.6 UNCURK was wound up in 1973; UNKRA in 1960.

The United Nations and the Korean War – the role of the Security Council On 25 June 1950, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) launched an all-out offensive across the thirty-eighth parallel, invading the Republic of Korea. On the same day, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, invoking his right under Article 99 of the UN Charter, brought the outbreak of hostilities to the attention of the Security Council.7 The Secretary General and consequently the Security Council was able to act swiftly partly due to the completion of a report on the invasion by two Australian UNCOK Military Observers, Major Peach and Squadron Leader Rankin, the day before. The report was a key piece of evidence in the Commission’s advice to the Secretary-General substantiating the allegations that the North Korean forces had launched a full-scale invasion against defensively deployed South Korean troops. The Council promptly passed a resolution calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces.8 United Nations Security Council Resolution 83 explicitly determined that there had been a “breach of the peace”, thereby implicitly invoking Chapter VII by use of the wording of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter.9 On 27 June, the Security Council passed an additional resolution, recommending that “the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area.”10 On the same day, the United States committed air and naval forces to support Republic of Korea forces; the United Kingdom and Australia quickly followed suit, committing naval forces in Japanese waters to the conflict on 28 and 29 June, respectively.11 This rapid response by member nations was made possible by the presence of allied air and naval forces in the area – mostly on garrison duty in occupied Japan – and by the intense lobbying of the United

6 7 8 9 10 11

United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 337(XI), 7 November 1950. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, New York, 1954, p.323-330. United Nations Security Council Resolution 82, Document No. S/1501, 25 June 1950; O’Neill, op. cit. pp. 12-15. Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p24. United Nations Security Council Resolution 83, Document No. S/1511, 27 June 1950. Australia committed a squadron of Japan-based fighter-bombers on 30 June 1950: O’Neill, op. cit., p. 53.

3 States Government, General MacArthur and the Secretary-General. The raising and deploying of the large-scale ground forces required for the war took considerably longer. By 7 July, 52 of the 59 Member States of the UN had showed their support for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, with over 30 States offering assistance to the Republic of Korea, including armed forces, food, medical supplies, transportation and financial assistance. Simultaneously, France and the United Kingdom jointly sponsored a Security Council Resolution authorising the creation of a “unified command under the United States of America”. The resolution recommended that Member States make their forces and other assistance available to the command, and requested the United States to designate the commander of such forces. The resolution also authorised the unified command to “use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces.”12 Within one week, the United States had designated General Douglas MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Forces in Korea, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie appealed for increased force contributions, particularly ground forces.13 The UN Flag which had been used by the United Nations Mediator in Palestine was handed to MacArthur on 14 July 1950.14 The so-called “United Nations Command” was formally activated by the United States Government on 24 July 1950. The Legal Basis for the Use of Force Although the Security Council did not explicitly identify the specific provisions within the Charter upon which it based its authorisation of the use of force on the Korean Peninsula, Resolutions 82, 83, and 84 all determined that the attack by the DPRK was a breach of international peace and security. Such a determination is provided for under Chapter VII, Article 39 of the United Nations Charter. Article 42 allows the Security Council to use armed force to restore international peace and security. Whether or not the action taken in Korea was supported by Article 42 is debateable. Certainly, actual command and control of these forces by the Security Council, as envisaged by the Charter, did not occur in Korea, and thirty-nine years after the end of the Korean War it was

12 13 14

United Nations Security Council Resolution 84, Document No. S/1588, 7 July 1950. O’Neill, op. cit., p. 63. In-Seop Chung, Korean Questions in the United Nations: Resolutions Adopted at the Principal Organs of the United Nations with Annotations (1946-2001), Seoul National University Press, Seoul, 2002, p. 257. The flag is now on display at the United Nations Memorial Cemetery Korea, in Busan.

4 still possible for the Secretary-General to assert, “The Security Council has not so far made use of the most coercive of these measures – the action by military force foreseen in Article 42.”15 More recently, however, an eminent panel appointed by the current Secretary-General felt able to say, “Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing states, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.”16 Thomas M. Frank has argued that such operations are indeed Article 42 operations: There is no reason, however, why the Council’s responses to aggression cannot be understood as a creative use of Article 42. Although the negotiators at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco undoubtedly had inferred that Article 42 would operate only in reliance on forces pledged by members under Article 43, The Charter does not make this interdependence explicit. On the contrary, Article 42 fully authorizes the Council to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Textually, Article 42 can stand on its own feet and it may be said to do so as a result of Council practice.17 Although the case of the Korean conflict must be seen in its own unique historical context, the use of force by “forces of the Members of the United Nations” (using the language of Article 42) at the behest of the Security Council, after a determination of the existence of “a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression,” (Article 39), did set an important precedent. It was followed, for example, in 1966, when the Royal Navy was authorised to use force in enforcing a blockade of Southern Rhodesia18, and in 1990 when Member States were authorised to use force to ensure the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.19 Thus, the use of force by the unified command in the Korean War is best characterised as an example of a peace enforcement operation authorised by, but not utilising all of, the provisions of Chapter VII, in the way the framers of the UN Charter intended.20 Longstanding similar “Council practice” in authorising operations in Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti and the former Yugoslavia has lent considerable legitimacy to these “coalition of the willing” operations, and it is likely that

15 16 17 18 19 20

United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General, A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 42. United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, (Brahimi Report), A/55/305, S/2000/809, 17 August 2000, para. 53. Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp24-28. United Nations Security Council Resolution 221, 9 April 1966. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 2 August 1990; and 678, 29 November 1990. John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations, 2nd edn, Brassey’s, Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 226.

5 a Security Council Resolution containing both an Article 39 determination, and an authorisation of the use of “all necessary means” by United Nations Members States, will increasingly be seen to be a legally sound basis for the use of force in Council-sponsored enforcement actions. The use of Article 43 forces as laid out in the United Nations Charter and as envisaged by the founders of the UN would no doubt confer enormous international legitimacy on any enforcement operation authorised by the Security Council. Experience has shown however, that although peacekeeping forces can be effectively managed by the Secretary-General on behalf of the Council, enforcement operations, as a matter of practicality, seem best to be commanded and controlled under a lead nation concept.

The Use of Force and US Command and Control By adopting UNSCR 84, the United Nations had, for the first time in its short history, authorised the use of large-scale military force to restore international peace and security. However, although sanctioning the use of force, the organisation itself was unable to control or manage the conduct or the ensuing combat operations. Once appointed by the Security Council as the executive agent for the prosecution of the war, the United States essentially determined the war-time military policies and objectives of the unified command, in the name of the United Nations, but without any significant involvement of the organisation itself. According to the then Secretary-General Trygve Lie, he had tried to fashion the Resolution of 7 July 1950 in such a way as to involve himself, as “the executive for the decisions by the legislative organs of the United Nations” in the coordination of multinational effort and: to promote continuing United Nations participation in and supervision of the military security action in Korea of a more intimate and undistracted character than the Security Council could be expected to provide.21

In the event, the United States, probably feeling that such supervision would prove unworkable in the context of large-scale coalition warfare, rejected the proposal. In the minds of the Americans: there was never any doubt that a multinational organisation such as the United Nations could be a useful political forum, but could play only a supporting role in military affairs.22

21 22

Lie, op. cit., p.334. Hillen, op. cit., p.225.

6 Furthermore, with the United States providing the bulk of the combat power on the UN side, that country had too much at stake to do anything other than control the conduct of the war on behalf of the so-called “free world”, in line with United States’ national interests. The Republic of Korea, which was not to become a member of the United Nations until 17 September 1991,23 also placed its military forces totally under General MacArthur’s command on 14 July 1950,24 giving the US command and control of all allied forces, both UN and non-UN. The role of the Security Council in supervising the action in Korea was reduced to receiving periodic reports from the Unified Command, although the Secretary-General did appoint a personal representative to the Unified Command to maintain liaison with General MacArthur.25 The Security Council passed additional resolutions on the Korean conflict on 31 July26 and 8 November 1950,27 before voting, on 31 January 1951, “to remove the item … from the list of matters of which the council is seized.”28 Thus, in the middle of the Korean War, the Security Council took the surprising step of deciding to ignore it. This can only be understood in terms of changes in the make-up of the Security Council itself. The Security Council’s initial prompt and assertive management of the situation on the Korean peninsula had only been made possible by the absence from the organ’s meetings of the representative of the Soviet Union between 13 January and 1 August 1950. (The Soviet Union boycotted the Council over its continued recognition of the nationalist Republic of China (Taiwan), rather than the communist People’s Republic of China, as the legitimate incumbent of China’s Security Council seat.) With the return to the Council of the Soviet Union on 1 August 1950, “[i]t was widely considered that further debates at the [Security

23 24

25 26 27 28

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also became a Member State on the same day: United Nations Security Council Resolution 702, Document No S/RES/702, 8 August 1991. Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53: Volume 2 Combat Operations, The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1985, p. 14. Should war break out today, command of all Republic of Korea forces would vest in General MacArthur’s most recent successor as Commander, United Nations Command, US Army General Leon J. LaPorte. Lie, op. cit., p334. United Nations Security Council Resolution 85, Document No. S/1657, 31 July 1950. United Nations Security Council Resolution 88, Document No. S/1892, 8 November 1950. United Nations Security Council Resolution 90, Document No. S/1995, 31 January 1951.

7 Council on the Korean Conflict] would be meaningless”, 29 and the Security Council effectively washed its hands of the matter. The Security Council had entered into the long period, which would last until the end of the Cold War, when super-power rivalry and the veto power of each of the “Permanent Five” produced stalemate after stalemate on issues of international peace and security. This failure of the Security Council to address its responsibilities under the UN Charter, prompted the General Assembly (at the suggestion of the United States30), on 3 November 1950, to adopt its “Uniting for Peace” resolution, which asserted the competence of the General Assembly to deal with matters concerning the maintenance of international peace and security, including recommending the use of armed force.31 The “Uniting for Peace” resolution was historic because it challenged the Security Council’s monopoly on issues concerning international peace and security. Article 24 of the United Nations Charter gives the Council, “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. This responsibility vests in the Council in order to “ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations.” Clearly, in the circumstances outlined above, the Council was incapable of “prompt and effective” action on the Korea issue, and the United States sought to explore new ways of initiating United Nations involvement in matters of international peace and security, in the face of Security Council inaction. The resolution was later to be used as the basis for the General Assembly Special Emergency Sessions which led to the establishment of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)32, and the extension of the mandate of the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC).33 The competence of the General Assembly to authorise and oversee military operations in the course of restoring international peace and security was later confirmed by an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice which held that the “Charter made it abundantly

30 31 32 33

In-Seop Chung, Korean Questions in the United Nations: Resolutions Adopted at the Principal Organs of the United Nations with Annotations (1946-2001), Seoul National University Press, Seoul, 2002, p. 262. The People’s Republic of China eventually displaced the Republic of China in 1971: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), 25 October 1971. Co-proposed by Canada, France, Philippines, Turkey, the UK and Uruguay. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377(V), 3 November 1950. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 998 (ES-I), 4 November 1956. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1474 (ES-IV), 17 September 1960.

8 clear that the General Assembly was also to be concerned with international peace and security.”34 In fact, during the last two and a half years of the Korean War, while the Security Council adopted not a single resolution on the Korean Conflict, the General Assembly passed no fewer than ten resolutions related to the situation on the Peninsula – dealing with: the intervention of China;35 the establishment of an arms embargo on China and North Korea;36 the unification, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea;37 repatriation of prisoners of war;38 recognition of UN soldiers killed in the conflict;39 the exchange by the belligerents of sick and wounded personnel;40 and allegations of the use of bacteriological warfare by United Nations forces.41 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the position of the Republic of Korea enjoyed the support of a clear majority of the members of the United Nations, and the General Assembly was able to continue its proactive involvement in the southern part of the peninsula, passing several resolutions supporting the work of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and deploring the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea’s antagonistic stance toward the UN. However, by the mid-1970s, the enlargement of the General Assembly had enabled the DPRK to build its own support base among communist and “non-aligned” nations, leading finally to a stalemate on Korean issues in the Assembly. The Assembly eventually washed its hands of “the Korean question” in 1976. Since 1975, when rival, conflicting resolutions to encourage the negotiation of a peace treaty to replace the Armistice Agreement failed, no more resolutions on the Korean conflict or armistice have been passed by the Assembly.42

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, 1962 ICJ 151; summary at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iceunsummary620720.htm. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 498(V), 1 February 1951. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 500(V), 18 May 1951. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 507(VI), 5 February 1952; 574(VI), 7 December 1951; 611(VII), 25 November 1952; 701(VII), 11 March 1953. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 610(VII), 3 December 1952. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 699(VII), 5 December 1952. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 705(VII), 18 April 1953. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 706(VII), 23 April 1953. The resolutions themselves actually passed the General Assembly, but as they were inconsistent with one another, they were destined never to be implemented. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3390 (XXX) A&B, 18 November 1975; Chung, op. cit., p. 201.

9 The End of the Korean War By July 1951, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie had proposed the appointment of a special neutral mediator, responsible to the Security Council, to assist in the negotiation of an armistice. However, these proposals were strongly opposed by the United States, were unlikely to have been supported by North Korea, Communist China or the Soviet Union, and were thus most unlikely to avoid veto in the Security Council. It seems that the proposals were not formally discussed in the Council, and Lie’s proposals lapsed. It was left to the United States – with the consent of its allies – to secure agreement to, and then advance armistice talks.43 Substantive armistice talks began on 27 July 1951, and an armistice was finally concluded on 27 July 1953, a full two years later. Included in the Armistice Agreement was a provision recommending to the governments concerned that a political conference be held within three months, to effect the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.44 On 28 August 1953, (while the Security Council remained mute,) the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution supporting this provision,45 but a conference dealing with the Korean conflict was not held until 26 April 1954 in Geneva. By 15 June 1954, the United States and its allies had abandoned further consideration of an enduring peace treaty at the conference as fruitless. As a result, the Armistice Agreement has remained the primary mechanism for preserving security on the Peninsula for over fifty years.

43 44 45

O’Neill, op. cit., pp. 240-2. Korean War Armistice Agreement, 27 July 1953, para. 60. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 711(VII), 28 August 1953.

CHAPTER 2: THE KOREAN WAR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT Overview of the Agreement The Korean War Armistice Agreement, comprising a mere five articles and a total of 63 paragraphs is a remarkably concise document to have maintained a cessation in hostilities for over fifty years. The penultimate paragraph provides that the Agreement “shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.” This means that – legally at least – neither side may unilaterally abrogate or walk away from the agreement, although the DPRK has purported to do just that on a number of occasions. As well as providing for a cessation of hostilities, the Agreement established a system of peacekeeping machinery including: a military demarcation line (MDL) and a four kilometre wide demilitarised “buffer” zone (DMZ);46 a prohibition on the introduction of foreign reinforcements and materiel to the Peninsula;47 a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) to supervise and maintain the Armistice;48 and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to monitor the prohibition on foreign reinforcements and armaments, and to assist the MAC in supervising and maintaining the Armistice.49 It is now well-known that the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) is something of a misnomer, with thousands of heavily-armed soldiers facing each other across the MDL. Nevertheless, a remarkably stable status quo has established itself within the DMZ, and apart from a number of serious incidents – some costing the lives of soldiers – and many more minor ceasefire violations committed periodically by both sides, the existence of the buffer zone itself has not been seriously challenged. Although the provisions for monitoring the introduction of foreign personnel and materiel proved unworkable, the withdrawal of foreign forces has largely been achieved, with around 99% of the military personnel on the Peninsula belonging to the armed forces of the two Koreas.

46 47 48 49

Article 1, Paragraph 1. Article 2, Paragraph 13. Article 2, Paragraph 19. Article 2, Paragraphs 36 & 41.

11 The Military Armistice Commission Much of the responsibility for the maintenance of the Armistice falls to the Military Armistice Commission. Pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, the MAC is composed of: ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.50

Unlike the Armistice Commissions set up after the Arab-Israeli War of 1948,51 the Korean MAC had no neutral party to act as Chairman (with a casting vote), and so deadlocks between the two sides were not easily broken. Immediately after the signing of the Armistice Agreement the structure of the MAC was as shown in the following diagram:

Figure 1: Structure of the Military Armistice Commission 1953-1991.

The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command appointed a US Major General as Senior Member; with a ROK Major General, a ROK Brigadier General and a British Brigadier as additional members. The fifth position was to be held, on rotation, by a Colonel from one of the remaining UNC nations which had supplied combat forces to the Command. The Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) jointly appointed a KPA Major General as Senior

50 51

Article 2, Paragraph 20. United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd edn, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 21.

12 Member, with a CPV Major General, a KPA Major General and two KPA Colonels as additional members. Between 1953 and 1991, the MAC met 459 times, with thousands of meetings occurring at the Secretary (Colonel), and Staff Officer levels. Although major, fatal incidents – such as the 1976 “Axe Murder” incident, and the 1984 defection of a Soviet citizen (which resulted in an exchange of small arms fire in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom) – continued to occur, a large scale resumption of hostilities was avoided. On 25 March 1991, the Commander, United Nations Command appointed a ROK Army Officer, Major General Hwang Won-tak as the UNC Senior Member of the MAC.52 This was the first time a ROK Officer had been appointed to this position. The DPRK’s strategy at this time was to pursue a bilateral peace treaty with the US, while attempting to marginalise the ROK. The KPA thus refused to accept the credentials of Major General Hwang, and from May 1992 boycotted the MAC, beginning a period of non-participation in the MAC forum which has continued ever since.53 By 23 May 1991, the KPA had also ceased any cooperation with the activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. On 3 April 1993, the KPA pressured the Czech Republic to withdraw from the NNSC, refusing to accept it as the successor state to Czechoslovakia, which had split into the Czech and Slovak Republics on 1 January 1993. On 28 April 1994, the KPA purported to withdraw from the Military Armistice Commission altogether, and later established the “Panmunjom Representative Office” in the place of its MAC delegation.54 On 1 September 1994, at the request of the KPA, the Chinese People’s Volunteers announced the withdrawal of their delegation from the MAC. After suffering KPA threats and the withdrawal of all services (including heating) – which the KPA were obliged under the

53 54

United Nations Command Public Affairs Office, Backgrounder No. 7: The Armistice and the Military Armistice Commission, January 2000, http://www.korea.army.mil/pao/backgrounder/bg7.htm, downloaded on 9 January 2005. Naewon Press, “Does Pyongyang Really Want Peace,” Vantage Point: Developments in South Korea, Vol. XVIII, No. 8, Seoul, August 1995, pp. 1-6, p. 1. Like the purported withdrawal of the Israelis from the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission in1956, the withdrawal of the KPA from the MAC must be regarded as legally ineffective, as unilateral withdrawal is prohibited under the Armistice Agreement: Article V, para. 62.

13 Armistice Agreement to provide – the Polish delegation withdrew, under protest, from the Joint Security Area on 28 February 1995.55 On 3 July 1995, DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam sent a letter to then UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros Ghali calling on the United Nations to withdraw permission for USled forces to use the UN Flag.56 Ironically, the DPRK continued to press for a DPRK-US bilateral peace treaty, claiming that the Armistice arrangements had ceased to function because of the US.57 From 1991 until 1998, no talks occurred between General Officers at Panmunjom. In 1998, talks which included the UNC Military Armistice Commission members (with the exception of the Senior Member) and the KPA Panmunjom Representative Office delegates began, dealing with much of the subject matter previously dealt with by the MAC. The structure of this new forum for maintaining the Armistice is shown below:

Figure 2: Structure of General Officer Talks 1998-

The General Officer talks have dealt with Armistice-related matters including: the infiltration of a DPRK submarine and its capture by ROK forces in 1998; the sinking of a DPRK naval vessel by ROK naval forces in disputed waters in 1999;58 the sinking of a ROK naval vessel

57 58

The Poles continue to consider themselves part of the NNSC, and periodically visit the JSA to participate in its activities: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Consultations of the Member States of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Korea, 28 October 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.pl/start.php, downloaded on 9 January 2005. Naewon Press, op. cit., p. 2. UNSCR 84 authorised the unified command to use the UN Flag in the “course of operations against North Korean forces”. Whether that authorisation still applies after fifty years of armistice is an interesting point. Certainly the Security Council has never expressly revoked its authorisation, although it could be argued that UNSCR 90 does this by implication. ROK Ministry of National Defense, Chronology of North Korea’s Attempts to Neutralize the Armistice Agreement, http://www.mnd.go.kr/english/html/02/1996/ref/ref4.htm, downloaded on 27 December 2004. Richard Saccone, To the Brink and Back: Negotiating with North Korea, Hollym, Elizabeth, NJ and Seoul, 2003, p 65-6.

14 by DPRK naval forces in the same area in 2002; the negotiation of inter-Korean “transport corridors” through the DMZ in 2002; and the negotiation of confidence building measures such as the cessation of propaganda broadcasts in and around the DMZ, and the establishment of a “hot line” between naval headquarters in the West (Yellow) Sea in 2003. On the UNC side, the Operations Division of the MAC Secretariat continues a programme of regular guard post inspections throughout the southern portion of the DMZ, and conducts investigations of any alleged Armistice violations which come to its attention. The inspection and investigation missions are primarily planned by US and ROK personnel,59 but routinely include military liaison officers from Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Since the end of 2004, all but one of the eighty UNC guard posts in the DMZ have been manned exclusively by ROK Army soldiers,60 and the continued presence of highly visible, unarmed MAC inspection teams comprising US and other UNC nationals represents an important “internationalisation” of the DMZ. The teams, which report through the MAC Secretariat directly to UNC Headquarters, and which are therefore at arm’s length from the tactical chain of command, also provide a useful audit of the front-line units’ understanding of the Armistice Rules of Engagement and their obligations under the Armistice Agreement. The results of these inspections and investigations are briefed to the MAC’s Advisory Group which comprises liaison officers from the nine nations with accredited military liaison officers, plus civilian liaison officers from the Embassies of Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and Norway: all countries which provided either combat forces or military medical support to the UNC during the Korean War. Yearly consolidated reports are prepared by the UNC for delivery through the Pentagon and the US State Department to the UN Security Council, although since the UNSC no longer “remains seized” of the Korean Issue, it is not clear whether the reports are given any consideration by that body. Although these arrangements are not the model of impartial and neutral peacekeeping normally associated with the United Nations, the presence of military observers from ten long-standing members of the United Nations surely lends credibility and an element of transparency to UNC armistice maintenance operations along the DMZ.

59 60

At the time of writing, the planning team includes an officer seconded full-time from the New Zealand Defence Force. Britain and France have also supplied officers full-time for this role. There is one US-manned Guard Post, overlooking the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom.

15 Moreover, the arrangements have prevented a resumption of full-scall hostilities for over five decades in the absence of a peace-treaty and must therefore be regarded as largely successful.

CHAPTER 3: STATUS OF THE PEACEKEEPERS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA Many newcomers to the strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula are confused by what they find. The name of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) will sound familiar to some – and evokes comparisons with the Mixed Armistice Commissions of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), regarded as the first true United Nations peacekeeping mission. Even the acronym, “UNCMAC” seems to sit comfortably alongside such UN missions as UNTSO, UNDOF and UNMOGIP. United Nations flags fly from headquarters buildings, guard posts and cars. Officers having served on previous UN missions often expect to see UN blue berets and cap badges.61 Appearances can be deceiving. The UNC and UNCMAC are not referred to on the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations website.62 No blue berets are worn on the Peninsula and no United Nations service medals are awarded to the soldiers who serve under the UN Flag and in the UN’s name. According to a United Nations spokesman, “The UN Command, despite its name, is not a UN peacekeeping force… It's a U.S.-led force…".”63 This position is perhaps understandable – although the Security Council, under the terms of its Resolution 84 of 7 July 1950, requested the United States to provide it with “reports as appropriate on the course of action under the unified command”, its Resolution 88, adopted only four months later, removed the Korean War “…from the list of matters of which the Council is seized.” Although the United Nations Command was clearly authorised by the Security Council to take enforcement action to repel North Korean forces, its status as a peacekeeping force is not expressly supported by any Security Council Resolution. Nevertheless, until 1975 the General Assembly continued to refer with approval, in its resolutions on Korea, to “United Nations forces” and their role in preserving “peace and security” in the area. However, in spite of Assembly approval, like the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), set up in 1982 to supervise the implementation of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel concluded in 1979, the Korean Armistice peacekeepers operate outside United Nations

62 63

Canadians serving in Korea with UNCMAC are eligible for the “Canadian Peace Keeping Service Medal”: Canadian Forces Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Peacekeeping Service Medal, http://www.forces.gc.ca/dhh/engraph/faqs_e.asp?category=cpsm&FaqID=13, downloaded on 8 October 2005. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp “N Korea Wants US out of South,” Los Angeles Times, 28 July 2004, p. A-3.

17 command and control arrangements.64 Unlike the MFO, the peacekeepers in Korea are predominantly nationals of the former belligerents. Current United Nations peace support operations doctrine requires effective command and control of operations by the Secretary-General and the Security Council: As regards command and control, it is useful to distinguish three levels of authority: (a) Overall political direction, which belongs to the Security Council; (b) Executive direction and command for which the Secretary-General is responsible; (c) Command in the field, which is entrusted by the Secretary-General to the chief of mission (special representative or force commander/chief military observer).65

In the case of the United Nations Command and its Military Armistice Commission, overall political direction comes from the United States government; executive direction and command is the responsibility of the US general appointed to command the UNC; and command in the field is exercised by the ROK and US general officers of the UNC with special responsibility for the activities of the Military Armistice Commission.66 The Security Council and the Secretary-General are not involved. Clearly, the use of the United Nations’ name and flag without Security Council or SecretaryGeneral control or oversight has the potential to have a negative impact on the Organisation’s stature and credibility, especially considering that both Koreas have been members of the UN since 17 September 1991.67 In addition, at least according to some commentators, “Both the Military Armistice Commission and the UN Command are obsolete vestiges of an adversarial cold war relationship between the Untied States and North Korea…The Military Armistice

Under the Egypt/Israel peace treaty, provision was made for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force and observers. The Security Council was unable to reach agreement on such a deployment and a US-led force was deployed with the consent of the former belligerents. 65 United Nations, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Positions Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Untied Nations, A/50/60, S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, para. 38. 66 The Senior, US and ROK members of the Military Armistice Commission. 67 United Nations Security Council Resolution 702, Document No. S/RES/702, 8 August 1991; United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/1, 17 September 1991.

18 Commission set up in 1953 should be replaced with new peacekeeping machinery, together with companion steps to dissolve the United Nations Command.”68 Steps to dissolve the United Nations Command and the Military Armistice Commission have in fact been suggested by both sides. In 1974, North Korea almost succeeded in obtaining a favourable UN resolution when a draft resolution calling for the withdrawal on UN forces from South Korea was narrowly defeated in the UN’s First Committee. In 1975, alarmed by the increase in North Korean diplomatic influence caused by increasing numbers of communist and “non-aligned” gaining seats in the UN, the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed to dissolve the Command on 1 January 1976, on the condition that progress was made in securing a peace treaty to supersede the Armistice Agreement.69 The US government suggested peace talks to include North and South Korea, the United States and China, and possibly other nations (viz., Japan and the Soviet Union). The US government began to circumscribe the operational role of the UN Command, restricting the command and its use of the UN Flag to activities related to the preservation of the Armistice, such as those of the Military Armistice Commission. By 1976 only around 300 non-Korean troops remained subordinate to the UNC,70 including MAC Secretariat Staff. According to the US government, the bulk of the US troops on the peninsula were in Korea, “pursuant to the United StatesRepublic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Korea… [and]…are not under the United Nations flag and are not a matter of United Nations business.”71 On the issue of peace talks, North Korea refused to entertain proposals which included the participation of South Korea, while the United States insisted on the inclusion of the South. Progress acceptable to the United States therefore did not occur – and although the war planning and fighting role of the UNC was transferred to the newly-established ROK/US

70 71

Selig S. Harrison (Chairman), Turning Point in Korea: New Dangers and New Opportunities for the United States, Report of the Task Force on US Korea Policy, Cosponsored by The Center for International Policy and the Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago, February 2003, p. 24 B.C. Koh, “The Battle Without Victors: The Korean Question in the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly,” Journal of Korean Affairs, Vol. V, No. 1, (January 1976), pp. 43-63, p. 44; United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3390(XXX), 18 November 1975. Koh, op. cit., p. 45. US Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, United Nations, A/C.1/PV.2065, 23 October 1975, p. 3 and pp. 8-11, cited in Koh, op. cit., p. 54.

19 Combined Forces Command (CFC) on 7 November 1978 – the United Nations Command continues to exist today.72 What is clear, is that the United States Government concedes that those troops who are under the UN Flag are a matter of “United Nations business”. What is also made clear, by a multitude of General Assembly Resolutions and Security Council Presidential Statements, is that the Armistice Agreement, as maintained by the United Nations Command, remains the lynchpin of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, with or without the active involvement of the Security Council or the General Assembly. What the United Nations has been unable to do – because of the impossibility of gaining a clear mandate on Korea in the Security Council or the General Assembly - is to find a way to actively involve itself in the command and control of the UNC. United Nations Command: From Peace-enforcers to Peacekeepers United Nations Command operations in Korea may be divided into two phases. The first phase was the war against North Korean and Chinese aggression on the Korean Peninsula. This phase was characterised by prompt Security Council action, and the authorisation by the Council of the use of force by member states. Although the Council did not actually command the UN forces through the Secretary-General, it lent its authority, its name and its flag to the United States as the unified command in Korea. This action was the first “Coalition of the Willing” campaign, and it is now widely accepted that the military and logistical exigencies of actual war-fighting require UN authorised peace-enforcement operations to be carried out under a “lead-nation” arrangement. The essence of the arrangements in Korea has been followed in the first Gulf War, in the International Force intervention in East Timor and elsewhere. The second phase is the post-Armistice Agreement phase. This phase is characterised by a system of peace-monitoring, and armistice maintenance. Although the peace-keepers continue to use the flag and the name of the United Nations, there is virtually no United Nations Security Council, General Assembly or Secretary-General involvement, or even official interest, in the activities of the United Nations Command. The maintenance by most of the former belligerents who fought under the UN Flag, of liaison officers to the UNC, gives the

ROK/US Combined Forces Command, Official Website, http://www.korea.army.mil/cfc.htm, downloaded on 1 March 2005.

20 peace-keeping arrangements a “multi-national force” flavour, although the liaison officers do not match the substantial troop contributions made to other multinational forces such as the Multinational Force & Observers in the Sinai. The peculiar peace-enforcement and peacekeeping arrangements on the Korean Peninsular have resulted from a number of historical and political factors. Firstly, the United Nations had maintained significant interest and involvement in Korea in the years between the end of the Second World War and the outbreak of the Korean War, in the form of the Temporary Commission on Korea, and the United Nations Commission on Korea, the latter of which included military observers. Secondly, North Korea’s main pre-war ally and sponsor, the Soviet Union, absented itself from the Security Council between 13 January and 1 August 1950. These two factors combined to allow a well-informed and resolute Security Council to take prompt and effective measures immediately after the attack on the Republic of Korea by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These measures included the determination of a “breach of the peace” under the provisions of Chapter VII, Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, and the authorisation of a multinational force under the unified command of the United States to restore international peace and security. Fifty-two of the then fifty-nine member states supported the UNSC Resolutions with thirty States offering assistance to the Republic of Korea. Thus, by UNSCR 84, the United Nations had, for the first time in its short history, authorised the use of large-scale military force to restore international security. However, the effective and resolute stand of the Security Council was not to last: by January 1951 the return to that organ of the Soviet Union had rendered useless any attempts by its other members to deal with the “Korean Question”. The Security Council was not to pass another resolution on Korea until the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the failure of the Security Council to address its responsibilities under the UN Charter, prompted the General Assembly to adopt the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, and the last two-and-a-half years of the Korean War saw vigorous activity in the latter organ regarding the War. In the post-war period however, the General Assembly, like the Security Council before it, was forced to recognise the futility of attempting to broker a lasting peace on the Peninsula. Both “Koreas”

21 were finally admitted to the United Nations in 1991, but after 38 years of Armistice, no peace treaty had been signed. For practical military reasons, as well as the on-going political stalemate in the Security Council, there was no prospect of effective political direction by the Security Council or of command and control by the Secretary-General of the enforcement operation on the Peninsula. As a result, the United States assumed the role of providing political direction, and strategic, operational and tactical command and control in the field, and took the lead in Armistice negotiations. Even after hostilities had ceased, the enduring deadlock in the Security Council meant that the (eventually doomed) peace-talks were also initiated by the United States and its allies.

22 CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS At the time of the signing of the Korean War Armistice in 1953, United Nations Peacekeeping was still in its infancy. The classical, military observer missions of the UNTSO and UNMOGIP had commenced, but the first “interpositional” peacekeeping “force”, UNEF I, was yet to begin. The first UN “blue beret” was yet to be donned, and (apart from the UN Korea Medal,) the first UN peacekeeping medal was yet to be minted. The years since the signing of the Armistice have seen significant developments in United Nations Peacekeeping doctrine. Documents such as the Agenda for Peace and its Supplement, and the Brahimi Report have introduced and refined such concepts as “classical peacekeeping”, “peace building”, “peace support operations” and “peace enforcement”. The requirement for Security Council involvement in the direction of peacekeeping missions is generally accepted, although the first United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea are still regarded as UN Peacekeeping missions even in the absence of the Council’s direction, and the MFO is also recognised as a peacekeeping operation outside the United Nations, without Security Council direction nor Secretary-General command and control. It is clear that having been authorised by the United Nations Security Council, the military operation on the Korean Peninsula soon became a creature of the United States and its allies. Apart from Security Council authorisation, the operation bore none of the characteristics which would see it fit comfortably into a modern doctrinal definition of United Nations peacekeeping. Nevertheless the continued approval of the United Nations Command by the General Assembly throughout much of the war and afterwards, gave the Command considerable credibility as an instrument of United Nations policy. By the end of the war, the ability of the United Nations to involve itself in the peace process had been greatly reduced. The United States and its allies, using the name and flag of the United Nations Organisation, but without its deeper involvement, went on to establish an Armistice and initiate a peace conference. After the war, the General Assembly kept up its active involvement in Korean affairs through it supervision and support of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and it seems the UNCURK worked closely and effectively with the United Nations Command in pursuing its objectives in Korea, and that the Assembly was able

23 to at least monitor the Commandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s operations through its association with the commission until the latter was wound up in 1973. It may well be that the credibility, legitimacy and prestige of the United Nations Command as well as that of the United Nations Organisation itself would benefit from a more formal involvement of the UN in UNC activities. Indeed, it has been suggested that the UNC may somehow morph into a neutral international force under UN command and control as part of steps toward a negotiated peace settlement. The real goal for the United Nations, as expressed in numerous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, is the peaceful unification of a democratic Korea following a political settlement of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Korean Questionâ&#x20AC;?. An absence of military hostilities is a necessary precondition for such a settlement but in itself is insufficient. The political will to replace the armistice machinery with an enduring peace treaty has not yet manifested itself. However, the fact remains, that in the absence of a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, the United Nations Command, through its continued control of its portion of the DMZ, and the guard posts located there, and its involvement in the Military Armistice Commission, has successfully fulfilled the role of an effective peacekeeping force for over 52 years, without the involvement of either the Security Council or the Secretary-General.

TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS Security Council Resolutions • • • • • • • • • •

United Nations Security Council Resolution 82, Document No. S/1501, 25 June 1950. United Nations Security Council Resolution 83, Document No. S/1511, 27 June 1950. United Nations Security Council Resolution 83, Document No. S/1588, 7 July 1950. United Nations Security Council Resolution 85, Document No. S/1657, 31 July 1950. United Nations Security Council Resolution 88, Document No. S/1892, 8 November 1950. United Nations Security Council Resolution 90, Document No. S/1995, 31 January 1951. United Nations Security Council Resolution 221, 9 April 1966. United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, 2 August 1990 United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, 29 November 1990. United Nations Security Council Resolution 702, Document No. S/RES/702, 8 August 1991.

General Assembly Resolutions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377(V), 3 November 1950. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377(V), 3 November 1950. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 498(V), 1 February 1951. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 500(V), 18 May 1951. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 507(VI), 5 February 1952. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 574(VI), 7 December 1951. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 611(VII), 25 November 1952. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 701(VII), 11 March 1953. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 610(VII), 3 December 1952. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 699(VII), 5 December 1952. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 705(VII), 18 April 1953. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 706(VII), 23 April 1953. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 711(VII), 28 August 1953. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 998 (ES-I), 4 November 1956 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1474 (ES-IV), 17 September 1960 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), 25 October 1971. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3390(XXX) A&B, 18 November 1975. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/1, 17 September 1991.

Economic and Social Council Resolutions •

United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 337(XI), 7 November 1950.

International Agreements • •

The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945 Korean War Armistice Agreement, 27 July 1953

25 TABLE OF CASES â&#x20AC;˘

Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, 1962 ICJ 151; summary at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/ iceunsummary620720.htm

REFERENCES Bibliographic Chung, In-Seop, Korean Questions in the United Nations: Resolutions Adopted at the Principal Organs of the United Nations with Annotations (1946-2001), Seoul National University Press, Seoul, 2002. Franck, Thomas M., Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002. Harrison, Selig S. (Chairman), Turning Point in Korea: New Dangers and New Opportunities for the United States, Report of the Task Force on US Korea Policy, Cosponsored by The Center for International Policy and the Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago, February 2003. Hillen, John, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations, 2nd edn, Brassey’s, Washington, D.C., 2000. Koh, B.C., “The Battle Without Victors: The Korean Question in the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly,” Journal of Korean Affairs, Vol. V, No. 1, (January 1976), pp. 43-63. Lie, Trygve, In the Cause of Peace, New York, 1954. Naewon Press, “Does Pyongyang Really Want Peace,” Vantage Point: Developments in South Korea, Vol. XVIII, No. 8, Seoul, August 1995, pp. 1-6. O’Neill, Robert, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53: Volume 1 Strategy and Diplomacy, The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1981. O’Neill, Robert, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53: Volume 2 Combat Operations, The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1985. Oberdorfer, Don, The Two Koreas: a Contemporary History, New Edition, Basic Books, 2001. Saccone, Richard, To the Brink and Back: Negotiating with North Korea, Hollym, Elizabeth, NJ and Seoul, 2003. United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General, A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992. United Nations, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Positions Paper of the SecretaryGeneral on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Untied Nations, A/50/60, S/1995/1, 3 January 1995

27 United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd edn, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996. United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, (Brahimi Report), A/55/305, S/2000/809, 17 August 2000. Newspapers “N Korea Wants US out of South,” Los Angeles Times, 28 July 2004, p. A-3. Internet Canadian Forces Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Peacekeeping Service Medal, http://www.forces.gc.ca/dhh/engraph/faqs_e.asp?category=cpsm&FaqID=13, downloaded on 8 October 2005. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Consultations of the Member States of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Korea, 28 October 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.pl/start.php, downloaded on 9 January 2005. ROK Ministry of National Defense, Chronology of North Korea’s Attempts to Neutralize the Armistice Agreement, http://www.mnd.go.kr/english/html/02/1996/ref/ ref4.htm, downloaded on 27 December 2004. ROK/US Combined Forces Command, Official Website, http://www.korea.army.mil/cfc.htm, downloaded on 1 March 2005. United Nations Command Public Affairs Office, Backgrounder No. 7: The Armistice and the Military Armistice Commission, January 2000, http://www.korea.army.mil/ pao/backgrounder/bg7.htm, downloaded on 9 January 2005. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp, downloaded on 1 March 2005.