/souto

Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: How To Deal With The Past And Build The Future

BY

Ver贸nica Sabrina Souto A T H E S I S P R E S E N T E D I N PA R T I A L C O M P L E T I O N O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S O F

The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

INDEX

INTRODUCTION

1

RECONCILIATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

2

Reconciliation as the pursuit of justice and retributive justice

3

Reconciliation as a shared truth and truth commissions

4

Reconciliation as forgiveness and relationship-building and restorative Justice

5

Reconciliation as coexistence and institutional reform

6

The other side of the coin: reconciliation as forgetfulness and amnesties

6

TRANSITIONAL COUNTRY ANALYSIS

8

Domestic Factors

8

International Factors

12

Transition Towards Reconciliation

12

CASES ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON

15

Domestic Factors

15

International Factors

25

Post-conflict phase and reconciliation.

29

GETTING TO THE BEST RECONCILIATION STRATEGY

34

CONCLUSIONS

38

BIBLIOGRAPHY

42

ACRONYMS ANC CONADE

African National Congress (South Africa) Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (National

P DROC ERP IACHR ICC ICTR ICTY IDEA IGO NGO NP OAS OAU OHCHR PRI RPF RTLM SATRC SC SIDA TJM TRC Triple A UN

Commission on Forced Disappearances) Democratic Republic of Congo Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (People’s Revolutionary Army) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights International Criminal Court International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance International Governmental Organisation Non-Governmental Organisation National Party (South Africa) Organisation of American States Organisation of African Unity Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights Penal Reform International Rwandese Patriotic Front Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Security Council Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Traditional Justice Mechanism Truth and Reconciliation Commission Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance) United Nations

Introducti o n

INTRODUCTION Given that dealing with the past implies the re-construction of the past within a present-future-complex, a look backward as a result of collective critical self-reflection is viable only if coupled with a look forwards, i.e. if there is a commonly shared feeling that the future is guaranteed.

Lidija Basta Fleiner

Reconciliation and transitional justice have become fundamental concepts in every society’s strategy to deal with the past and the key to open the door towards a more peaceful future. However, the universal support to these processes and the consensus regarding their content —mainly in the academic world and the political discourse— is not reflected in post-conflict societies which choose to follow a particular strategy that do not always satisfies the need to deal with the past.

As a first approach to the subject, I will analyse the conceptualisations of reconciliation and transitional justice to see if there is a connection between a certain notion of reconciliation and a transitional justice mechanism. This is crucial because the concept of reconciliation used will determine the road that will be followed to address reconciliation in the post-conflict phase.

The question that arises from this situation is: Why a society decides to follow a unique reconciliation and transitional justice strategy? The goal of this thesis is to answer that question. At first glance, we could say that each society has a culture, history and psychology within which it understands, copes with and overcomes conflicts, and that correlates with a certain way of making sense of the conflict and pursuing its resolution. But such complex matter is multi-causal by definition and deserves a more detailed evaluation. The hypothesis is that the choice and implementation of a specific reconciliation and transitional justice strategy in a post-conflict society is not discretional and is conditioned by many domestic and international factors that shape and influence the process.

In order to analyse this hypothesis a transitional country analysis matrix will be developed to explain the different factors that exert an influence towards the selection of the reconciliation strategy.

The use of a matrix as an analytical tool does not imply that a country’s social, political and economical reality is reduced or divided into separate compartments. A society, as any other complex organisation, has different elements that interact and generate results different from the sum of the parts.

After having described the matrix I will apply it to three paradigmatic cases: the South African transition from apartheid (1995), post-genocide Rwanda (1994) and Argentina’s transition from the last authoritarian rule, the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (Process of National Reorganisation) (1983).

The analysis of these cases will explain how those factors influence the strategy and the notion of reconciliation that the national elite will undertake.

More than usual, d espite ha vin g a br oad and inte gral n oti on of rec o n ciliati on, the transiti onal g o v ern m e nt c ann ot i mpl e m e nt it du e to c o nstrainin g fact ors lik e th e a b o v e m e nti on e d. Noneth el ess, th er e ar e s o m e w a ys of ad v an cin g fr o m th e p ossi bl e to the ideal strate gy that w ill b e d e v el op e d and o utlin ed after the c as e analysis.

Rec on ciliati on and Transiti onal Justic e

RECONCILIATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE Many v oi c es in the p olitical ar ena m a y c o nsid er transiti onal justic e and rec o n ciliati on as o pp osite ass ertin g that transiti onal justic e l o o k s int o the past, w h il e re c o n ciliati on d o es s o in the future. Ho w e v er, this fo cus is pre cis ely w h at m a k e s th e m substantiv ely c o m pl e m e ntary and n e c essary to brin g a b out a lastin g pea c e and e n d the c y cl e of vi ol en c e. Both c o n c epts ar e inti m at ely intert win ed to a p oint w h er e o n e c ann ot b e c o m pl et ely und erst o o d or e n a ct ed w ith out th e oth er and c o m i n g to ter m s w ith th e past app ears as a pre-c o n diti on to d e v el op a c o m m o n future. Transiti onal justic e and rec o n ciliati on c an b e c arried o ut in parall el c o ordinati on b e c aus e th ey c o ntribute to g eth er to th e o v erarc hin g pr o c ess of relati onshipbuildin g (UN Secr etary Gen eral, 2 0 0 4).

Th e ad opti on of a c ertain n oti on of re c o n ciliati on or transiti onal justic e w ill und ou bt edly shap e and c o n diti on the i mpl e m e ntati on and th e o utc o m e of the p ost-c o nflict strate gy. For instan c e, it is n ot the sa m e to includ e re c o n ciliati on as a part of transiti onal justic e than c o nsid er transiti onal justic e as a step to w ards re c o n ciliati on. Rec on ciliati on, in particular, is a c o m pl ex ter m and a v ery difficult o n e to d efin e b e c aus e it m e a ns differ ent thin gs to differ ent pe opl e b as e d o n cultural and hist orical le ga ci es, as w e ll as o n pers onal or p olitical situati ons resultin g fro m past c o nflicts and pres ent p olitical a g e n das. Alth ou gh the d efiniti on of transiti onal justic e m i g ht s e e m cl ear er in ter m s of el e m e nts and g o als, its i mpl e m e ntati on is usually restrain ed b y the sa m e el e m e nts.

Rec on ciliati on is a s o cial pr o c ess w ithin w h i c h pe opl e d e al w ith th e past, ac kn o w l e d g e past atr o cities and sufferin g, and at the sa m e ti m e c h an g e “ d estructiv e attitudes and b e h a vi our int o c o nstructiv e relati onships to w ard sustaina bl e pea c e ” (Broun éus, 2 0 0 7: 6). It includ es th e w h ol e s o ci ety, and it is n ot an e n d-state but a c o ntinuin g pr o c ess in c o nstant d e v el op m e nt that s e e ks to transf or m c o nflictiv e relati onships. Transiti onal justic e refers to justic e applied to p olitical transiti ons fr o m auth oritarian rule to d e m o cracy (Argentina in 1 9 8 3) or fro m o p en w ar to pea c e (Sierra Leon e), as “th e v ery first step for th e esta blish m e nt of the rule of la w and th e n e w, d e m o cratic g o v ern m e nt” (Thallin g er, 2 0 0 7: 6 9 5). Takin g int o a c c ount th os e d efiniti ons, transiti onal justic e is includ ed w ithin the d efiniti on of rec o n ciliati on b as e d o n the n oti on that it is i mp ossi bl e to a c hi e v e a l on g-standin g pea c e and a pea c eful s o ci ety w ith out addr essin g th eir le ga ci es of hu m an rights a bus es. Ulti mately, th er e is n o p ossi bl e rec o n ciliati on if justic e is sacrific ed to the altar of p olitical realis m.

In or d er to sh e d s o m e light o n the inti m at e c o-relati on b et w e e n th e n oti ons of re c o n ciliati on and transiti onal justic e, th e p oints of c o ntact b et w e e n th es e ter ms w ill b e analys e d. Th e n oti on of rec o n ciliati on as an h olistic c o n c ept is refl e ct ed in the Internati onal IDEA’s d efiniti on w h i c h d efin es it as an “Um br ella ter m ”, an o v erarc hin g pr o c ess that c o m pr e h en ds differ ent narr o w er c o n c epti on of rec o n ciliati on includin g: truth-s e e kin g initiativ es, judicial pr o c e e din gs, relati onship buildin g, forgi v en ess and instituti onal ref or m. Fro m this persp e ctiv e, th es e el e m e nts d o n ot c o m p et e w ith e a c h oth er; furth er m or e, they ar e c o m pl e m e ntary, interd ep en d ent and c o nstitutiv e parts of th e pr o c ess (Blo o mfi eld, 2 0 0 6 a). I w ill als o c o nsid er a h olistic d efiniti on of transiti onal justic e as a... “ n e e d to a c k n o w l e d g e publicly th e a bus es w h i c h ha v e tak en plac e [truth s e e kin g], to h old th os e resp onsi bl e w h o ha v e plann e d, or d er ed, and c o m m itted such vi olati ons [retributiv e justic e], and to reha bilitate [rest orativ e justic e] and c o m p e nsat e vi cti m s [reparati on] as n e c essary steps in

Rec on ciliati on and Transiti onal Justic e

e stablishin g ac c ountability and trust in s o ci ety [instituti onal ref or m]. This pr o c ess of d e alin g w ith the past is a n e c essary pre c o n diti on for rec o n ciliati on � (Siss on, 2 0 0 7: 2).

Th e c o m m o n el e m e nts in b oth d efiniti ons that b uild o n an inte gral and c o m pl ex ter m w ill b e explain ed h er ein to esta blish their si milarities joinin g a o n e-di m e nsi on d efiniti on of re c o n ciliati on (Blo o mfi eld (20 0 6a) and Odur o (20 0 7)) and its c orr elativ e transiti onal justic e m e c h anis m.

1. Reconciliation as the pursuit of justice and retributive justice: Some argue that reconciliation is more than just knowing the truth; it is about justice. From their perspective, if injustices generate conflicts, justice contributes to reconciliation. Despite that, there is constant debate regarding the balance between reconciliation and justice, and whether it is possible or advisable to restrain one in order to achieve the other. International human rights literature widely considers criminal punishment as an effective deterrent and a means of establishing a link between accountability, reconciliation, peace and democracy (Olson, 2006:279). However, reconciliatory justice “aims to do more than deter. It aims to provide a systematised definition of social right and wrong, from which grows an underlying shared value: that the justice system applies to all of us, that it acts fairly, that we can trust it� (Bloomfield, 2006a:19).

The transitional justice equivalent to that notion of reconciliation is retributive justice. For their advocates, reconciliation does not mean impunity, and bringing those responsible for mass-atrocities to justice is a pre-condition to attain it. Reconciliation needs retributive justice to prevent a relapse into conflict, to generate self confidence and trust in society and to install a culture of human rights.

There are different ways of pursuing retributive justice from national courts to international justice. At a national level, all states are obliged under international law to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide and all other human rights violations in their courts. The post-conflict country has primary jurisdiction and constitutes prima facie the best option to deal with the past.

Recently, the principle of universal jurisdiction emerged as an option to prosecute human rights violations. This principle allows national courts of foreign countries to prosecute the gravest crimes against humanity and war crimes even if the crimes were committed in other countries and/or perpetrated by leaders of other nationalities.

To remedy the shortcomings of the states in the prosecution of perpetrators of massive human rights violations and to assist them in the pursuit of justice, several advancements have taken place in the international justice arena including the creation of ad hoc criminal tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) and, later, the creation of hybrid courts (mixed international-local bodies that combine international and national legal frameworks, procedures and members). The establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998, constituted a great step forward in the international prosecution of perpetrators of widespread human rights violations, reinforcing the international direction towards retributive justice.

Rec on ciliati on and Transiti onal Justic e

In conclusion, the judicial systems at the domestic and international level should act together to assist each other in applying the necessary mechanisms for bringing all perpetrators of human rights violations to justice.

2 . R e c o n c i li ati o n a s a s h a r e d t r u t h a n d t r u t h c o m m i s s i o n s ( h i s t o r i c a l j u s ti c e ) : Rec on ciliati on is als o a b out truth, a b out sh e ddin g light o v er the past, includin g th e ac kn o w l e d g e m e nt and dis cl osure of hu m an rights a bus es perp etrated b y all parties. Hayn er n ot es that the n oti on of rec o n ciliati on as truth m ust c o nsid er that “th er e is n e v er just o n e truth: w e e a c h c arry o ur o w n distinct m e m ori es, and they s o m eti m e s c o ntradict e a c h oth er ” (Odur o, 2 0 0 7: 1 6).

Th e transiti onal justic e appr oa c h for this d efiniti on ar e truth c o m m i ssi ons, d efin e d as “ official, te m p orary, n on-judicial fact-findin g b o di es that inv estigat e a pattern of a bus es of hu m an rights or hu m anitarian la w c o m m itted o v er a nu m b er of y ears ” (UN Secretary General, 2 0 0 4: 1 7). Th es e initiativ es ar e a n e c essary resp ons e to th e right to th e truth, “ a c oll e ctiv e right that e nsures s o ci ety a c c ess to infor m ati on that is e ss ential for th e w o r kin gs of d e m o cratic syste m s, and it is als o a private right for relativ es of the vi cti ms, w h i c h affords a for m of c o m p e nsati on, in particular, in c as es w h er e a m n esty la w s ar e ad opt ed’’ (Inter-American Co m m issi on o n Human Rights, q d. in Sal m ó n, 2 0 0 6: 3 4 1).

Nahla Valji (20 0 9) distin guish es t w o g e n erati ons of truth c o m m i ssi ons ac c ordin g to their c o nt exts and g o als. Th e first g e n erati on w a s d e v el op e d in Latin American transiti ons fr o m auth oritarian rules to d e m o cra cy in th e ’ 8 0s and had li mited m a n dat es. Th os e e ntities w h er e rath er in quiry c o m m i ssi ons than truth c o m m i ssi ons, they w e r e h eld b e hind cl os e d d o ors and li mit ed to c ertain cri m e s, i.e. findin g the truth a b out cri m e s a gainst hu m anity c o m m itted cland estin ely. Th e s e c o n d g e n erati on w a s b orn w ith the South African Truth and Rec on ciliati on Co m m issi on. This n e w g e n erati on’s truth c o m m i ssi ons w er e o p en to th e public w ith h earin gs for vi cti ms and h eld instituti onal and the m atic h earin gs. Th eir appr oa c h w a s uni qu e in e a c h c o nt ext and addr ess e d linka g es w ith s o ci o e c o n o m i c cri m e s, such as th e m a n dat e of Liberia’s truth c o m m i ssi on to in v estigate e c o n o m i c cri m e s (Valji, 2 0 0 9). Anoth er significant differ en c e w a s that the first g e n erati on s ou ght to clarify and m a k e public cri m e s that w e r e plann ed and d esi gn e d to b e c o m m itted in s e cr et, w h il e in the s e c o n d g e n erati on, lik e in Bosnia, th e truth w a s n ot hidd en b ut ther e w er e m ultiple truths e stablish e d al on g ethni c lin es (Kritz, 2 0 0 5: 2 2).

3 . R e c o n c i l i ati o n a s f o rg i v e n e s s a n d r e l ati o n s h i p-b u i l d i n g a n d r e s t o r a t i v e j u s ti c e: Forgiv en ess is c o nsid er ed b y s o m e as the k ey for rec o n ciliati on. In this visi on, truth and justic e w ill gi v e plac e to forgi v en ess and w ill discard the pursuit of re v e n g e b y th e vi cti m. Th e pr ec o n diti on for for gi v en ess is th e rest orati on of relati ons a m o n g e n e m i es and the i mpl e m e ntati on of c o nfid en c e-buildin g m e a sur es and oth er related pr o gra m m e s. Ho w e v er, this n oti on has d etract ors w h o sustain that, alth ou g h rec o n ciliati on c an includ e forgi v en ess, they ar e n ot syn ony m s b e c aus e th e latter is a pers onal right, n ot a task of the state. In th eir vi e w, rec o n ciliati on is a s o cial pr o c ess w h il e for gi v en ess is a pers onal prer o gativ e. Croc k er (20 0 0 b) ass erts that i mp osin g for gi v en ess int o th e p olitical a g e n da g o e s a gainst indi vidual fre e d o m s, includin g the right to w ithh old forgi v en ess. This appr oa c h c an als o g e n erate

Rec on ciliati on and Transiti onal Justic e

resistan c e a m o n g vi cti m s w h o fe el o bli g e d to for gi v e past a bus es w ith out ha vin g ac c ess to s o m e kind of justic e.

Rec on ciliati on as relati onship-b uildin g c an b e d efin ed as “ a pr o c ess thr ou gh w h i c h a s o ci ety m o v e s fro m a di vid ed past to a shared future ” (Blo o mfi eld et al, 2 0 0 3 : 1 2). It is a pr o c ess that i mpli es re buildin g trust, c o m in g to g eth er after a c o nflict that dr o v e parties apart and m e n din g relati onships. This “ d e ep rec o n ciliati on ” as o pp os e d to “li ght rec o n ciliati on ” (se e Coexisten c e) is a l on g-ter m s o cial pr o c ess that re quires a refra min g of aspirati ons, e m oti ons, attitud es, b e h a vi ours and b eli efs.

Th e transiti onal justic e appr oa c h that falls int o thes e t w o d efiniti ons is rest orativ e justic e w h i c h app ears as o n e of th e b est m e c h anis m s to attain rec o n ciliati on thr ou gh relati onship-c h an gin g and brid g ebuildin g in p ost-c o nflict s o ci eties. This s o cial rest orativ e vi e w is an ans w er that c o m pl e m e nts c ertain punitiv e m e c h anis m s to reac h an effe ctiv e rec o n ciliati on and s o m e of its el e m e nts c an b e found in truth c o m m i ssi ons and oth er truth-s e e kin g m e c h anis m s that inv ol v e interacti on b et w e e n vi cti m s and tor m e nt ors, all of w h i c h pr o duc e p ositiv e ad v an c es in the rest orati on of the s o cial fabric.

Restorative justice focuses on repairing the damage done, rather than punishment, on the victim and the hurt, rather than the offender and the crime (Bloomfield, 2006b:60). In this view, crime primarily causes injuries to the victim, society and the perpetrator and only secondarily is it lawbreaking, so this is about restoring while repairing the injuries caused (Estrada-Hollenbeck, 2001).

Estrada-Hollenbeck explains that parties “use their understanding of the conflict to identify the problem, shape the course of interaction, collectively and integratively [sic] create a settlement, and bind them psychologically to the settlement” (2001:83).

Traditional forms of justice are intimately related with restorative justice. A traditional justice mechanism (TJM) can be defined as “a non-state justice authority, which may be religious or secular, restorative or retributive” that incorporates traditional leadership, communal justice structures and rural, urban and religious justice mechanisms (Mobekk, 2006:49). The state can play a supportive role and even the people in charge of them might be state officials. These social methods use traditional forms of justice to foster reconciliation and rebuild relationships, taking into account culture, religion, customs, and the social-economic context.

It is important, on the other hand, to understand that restorative justice should be limited to less serious offenses because “while mutual ‘re-humanisation’ of conflict protagonists is an important dimension of reconciliation, it is hard to see how the new political order can gain credibility without at least addressing the question of punishment for offenders” (Lerche, 2000b). And from a factual perspective, although this mechanism might be helpful for minor offenses, its effectiveness against decades of abuse remains an unanswered question.

4 . R e c o n c i l i ati o n a s c o e x i s t e n c e a n d i n s tit u ti o n a l r e f o r m : This is a m o r e prag m atic and m i ni m alistic idea of re c o n ciliati on und erst o o d as s o ci ety’s c apa city to discuss and res ol v e c o nflicts w ith out recurrin g to vi ol en c e. It is cl os er to p olitical c o n n e ct edn ess than rec o n ciliati on and it “r ef ers to a relativ ely a mi c a bl e relati onship, typically e stablish e d after a rupture in the relati onship inv ol vin g o n e-sid ed or m utual inflicti on of extre m e injury ” (Louis Kries b er g q d. in

Rec on ciliati on and Transiti onal Justic e

Odur o, 1 9 9 8: 1 1). Under this c o n c eptualisati on, nati onal re c o n ciliati on c an b e ac hi e v e d w ith out for gi v en ess w h i c h — as explain ed a b o v e — is d e eply pers onal. Coexisten c e c ould b e a m o r e prag m atic and m o d e st appr oa c h at the b e ginnin g of p ost-c o nflict pea c e buildin g, as a first step to w ards th e ac hi e v e m e nt of rec o n ciliati on, foll o w e d b y c o nfid en c e b uildin g and e m pathy b et w e e n parties (Blo o mfi eld, 2 0 0 6 a).

At first sight, this definition has no parallel in transitional justice. However, it keeps certain connection with the term of institutional reform in that they both refer to means and mechanisms to channel political and social conflicts through peaceful means within a democratic political system. As part of the transitional justice framework, institutional reform is focused almost totally in the future and consists in judicial, legal, police, penal and military reforms that are necessary to build a peaceful and viable political system based on the rule of law and the upholding of human rights.

Judicial reform means restructuring the judiciary in terms of infrastructure, personnel, mechanisms and philosophy. The reforms depend on each country but the goal is to have a professional, fair and effective judiciary that ensures the respect for human rights and that guarantees the right of all its citizens regardless of their condition. This reform is vital for transitional societies where there is scepticism or lack of trust in the legal system.

Law enforcement and police reform is another important issue of transitional justice because security and armed forces are, in most cases, at the centre of the claims regarding human rights violations. This reform includes: police and military capacity building, human rights education; building a new relationship between the forces and the people; adoption of international policing standards and eliminating any ethnic or cultural bias in the forces.

The goal of institutional reform is related to the notion of reconciliation as coexistence and consists in the reign of the rule of law defined as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards” (UN Secretary General, 2004:4).

The other side of the coin: Reconciliation as forgetfulness and amnesties In many cases, reconciliation is unjustifiably equalled to forgetting, to letting go of the past.

Generally, this policy of impunity is proposed either by those involved in past abuses or those willing to sacrifice justice to “move forward”. As Cassin (2006) points out, in ancient Greece, an amnesty was a decree of forgetfulness (“amnesty” and “amnesia” were synonyms) and reconciliation is, in this sense, quite the opposite; it is anamnesis, remembrance and full disclosure (Cassin, 2006:237).

The equivalent in political transitions is amnesties, defined as official acts “granting an individual or group immunity from criminal prosecution for crimes committed in the past” (Mobekk 2006:30).

Although they are not part of the “toolkit” of transitional justice given that they seek to avoid any kind of justice, they are usually used to reach reconciliation in post-conflict societies. Their legitimacy and

Rec on ciliati on and Transiti onal Justic e

effectiveness as facilitators of reconciliation are rather disputed, but their presence in many transitional societies cannot be ignored.

It must remain clear that amnesty and pardon are different concepts. Although pardons are an exemption or shortening of sentences they do not eliminate convictions. In terms of political costs, pardons are preferred because they are granted after the offense was proven and the perpetrator convicted and they do not erase the crime or the guilt. However, they are also contested because they do not constitute a satisfactory punishment for the crimes committed.

There are different kinds of amnesties according to their scope (blanket, partial or conditional), and origin (de jure, de facto and self-amnesties). The United Nations limit the possibility of granting amnesties and affirm that any peace agreements endorsed by them “can never promise amnesties for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights, and, where we are mandated to undertake executive or judicial functions” (Secretary General, 2004:5).

Yasmin Naqvi (2006:267) brings out an emerging doctrine of “accountable amnesties”, which are valid and can be recognised under international law, and promotes the right to the truth as a legal value. This term was developed by Ronald C. Slye (See Naqvi, 2006) to describe an amnesty that: could be accorded foreign recognition, must be created by a democratic regime and does not apply in cases of serious international crimes, among other conditions.

In conclusion, reconciliation implies transitional justice but it goes beyond it in that it cannot be achieved without individual and collective healing, social justice, without human rights or a legitimate system of government. John Paul Lederach’s (1997) definition of reconciliation as a meeting point, an ideal balance between justice, truth, mercy and peace coincides with the integral notion of reconciliation as an umbrella term. He asserts that although sometimes these elements seem to be contradictory, they can and should be balanced and complemented.

“Truth is the longing for acknowledgement of wrong and the validation of painful loss and experiences, but it is coupled with Mercy, which articulates the need for acceptance, letting go, and a new beginning. Justice represents the search for individual and group rights, for social restructuring, and restitution, but it is linked with Peace which underscores the need for interdependence, well-being and security”. (Lederach, 1997:29) In his view, all these values must be satisfied in order to pave the way towards true reconciliation, while highlighting the need to achieve a broader sense of justice that includes social and economic justice. Any holistic approach to a reconciliation process needs to attain and maintain a delicate balance among relationship-building, forgiveness, truth and justice.

Transiti onal Country Analysis

TRANSITIONAL COUNTRY ANALYSIS Having analysed different elements of a reconciliation process and the holistic approach to transitional justice, there is a question that comes to mind: Why is that each transitional society applies a unique set of mechanisms to deal with the past that not always include a holistic notion of reconciliation and transitional justice? To begin to answer that question, a theoretical approach will be outlined below to analyse a transitional society, in particular the domestic and international factors that shape the conflict and the post-conflict phases.

In general, political theories consider domestic factors and the state as the main influencers in a conflict. Even if this still holds true, nowadays the nation-state paradigm is being increasingly shaped by a multiplicity, diversity and interdependence of actors within the international arena1 (Krahmann, 2003).

The mutual interaction and feed-back that takes place between domestic and international levels discards the notion that sees them as autonomous spheres. The goal of this analysis is to find out if there is a correlation between a society’s particular situation and the choice of the transitional justice and reconciliation strategy. The general outline of our matrix is based on existent bibliography of conflict analysis, actors’ analysis, context assessment and transitions2.

DOMESTIC FACTORS Domestic factors usually determine policies at both the internal and international level. For analytical purposes, three sets of domestic factors will be identified herewith: the conflict itself, the main actors involved and the context.

A. THE CONFLICT: This set of factors describes causes, forms of violence and characteristics of the conflict. a . C o u n t r y h i s t o r y : Analysin g th e hist ory of th e c o nflict and th e hist ory of relati ons b et w e e n c o m m u nities is crucial b e c aus e c o nflict is n ot o nly related to w h at happ en e d (history) b ut als o to h o w th e differ ent c o m m u nities perc ei v e w h at happ en e d (myth ol o gy) (Blo o mfi eld et al, 2 0 0 3). Understandin g the past is a m ain fact or to b e c o nsid er e d in the rec o n ciliati on strate gy. Many vi ol ent c o nflicts aris e in s o ci eties fro m ol d unh eal ed w o un ds, an ci ent discri minati on or unaddr ess e d gri e v an c es. A hist orical analysis is als o ess ential to d et er min e th e peri o d of ti m e that the rec o n ciliati on pr o c ess sh ould c o v er. b. C a u s e s o f t h e co n f lic t ( t y p e ) : Conflicts result fro m m ultiple c aus es that tak e plac e in a c ertain c o nt ext and that ar e us eful to h elp us m a k e s ens e of th e c o nflict. In th e p ost-c o nflict stag e, th ey ar e funda m e ntal in th e d esi gn of th e re c o n ciliati on strate gy b e c aus e th ey h elp us k n o w w h er e gri e v an c es and 1

1

2

2

See Elke Krah m a nn (20 0 3): M ultile vel Net w o rk s in E ur op e a n F o r e ign P o li c y. Ashgate Publishin g Ltd. Ha mpshire, England.

Multiplicity: th e steady gr o wth of p olitical a ct ors, a g en ci es that c o m m u ni cate dire ctly w ith th eir c ounterparts in oth er c ountri es, transnati onal b usin ess interests and caus es. Diversity: includ es th e public-private d e b ate c o nsid ering different le v els of analysis.

Interdep end e n c e: as a result of spe cialisati on in pr odu cti on and gl o b al m a rk eting.

See Bibliography for further reference specially: APFO-Safeworld (2004), The World Bank (2007), SIDA (2006), Dan Smith (2004b), IDEA Handbook (2003), David Bloomfield (1998).

Transiti onal Country Analysis

di visi ons resid e and h o w to o utlin e a plan to d eal w ith th e m pr op erly. Dan Smith explains th e n e e d for a m i x e d analysis of the s o cial, cultural, e c o n o m i c and e n vir on m e ntal b a c k gr ound (ro ot c aus es) and the p olitical for e gr ound (proxi m at e c aus es, trig g ers), “ b oth th e structural c aus es and the fact ors that lie w ithin the d e cisi on-m a kin g p o w er of p olitical act ors ” (20 0 4: 8). In his c aus e analysis h e us es Dessler’s four-part typ ol o gy (Smith, 2 0 0 4):

1 . B a ck gr ound c a u s e s : Funda m e ntal lin es of p olitical, s o cial, e c o n o m i c, or nati onal cl ea va g e. Th ey n e e d p olitical m o b ilisati on to c o m e int o acti on. Azar has ide ntified the d eprivati on of hu m an n e e ds as th e und erlyin g s ourc e of pr otracted s o cial c o nflict (Woodh ous e, 2 0 0 8 and Miall, 2 0 0 4). Azar’s classificati on includ es: S e cu rity n e e d s (nutriti on, h ousin g, a safe e n vir on m e nt and physical s e curity); Ac c e s s n e e d s (political and e c o n o m i c participati on); A c c e ptan c e n e e d s (rec o g niti on, id entity and culture).

2. M o bilisation st rat egy : This refers to the o bj e ctiv es of k ey p olitical act ors and their strate gy to attain th e m (their p olitical b e h a vi our and h o w they c o n c eptualis e and pr es ent th eir c aus e). Smith (20 0 4) affir ms that the d eprivati on of n e e ds d o es n ot n e c essarily lead to c o nflict if it is n ot m o b ilis ed b y p olitical a cti on. Conflict unrav els o n c e larg e nu m b ers of pe opl e ar e c o n vin c e d that th e rec ours e to vi ol en c e is the o nly w a y of s e curin g th eir n e e ds (Smith, 2 0 0 4). Th e suffici ent c aus e of c o nflict is p olitical m o b ilisati on w h e n lead ers persuad e th e pe opl e and o btain th eir l oyalty and c o m m it m e nt.

3. Trig ge r s : Fact ors that s et o ut th e c o nflict. Th ey ar e acti ons und ertak en b y a party that li mit the c h oi c es of the o pp on ents, fav ourin g vi ol en c e instead of a pea c eful appr oa c h, e. g. unfair el e cti ons, the arrest or assassinati on of a k ey lead er or p olitical figure, a m ilitary c o u p, un e m pl oy m e nt or a natural disaster.

4. C ataly st s : Fact ors that affe ct the intensity and durati on of the c o nflict and c an b e internal (military b alan c e) or external (UN interv enti on), e. g. th e radicalisati on of c o nflict parties, para militaries, th e e c o n o my, incr eas ed hu m an rights vi olati ons and the a vaila bility of w e ap ons. c. A u t h o r i t y o f t h e p r e v io u s r e g i m e : Th e ori gin of a g o v ern m e nt (wh eth er it is d e fa ct o or d e jure), the auth ority in p o w er (wh eth er it is m ilitary, ci vilian or reli gi ous) and its syste m of id eas (wh eth er it is c o m m u nist, nati onalist-c o ns er vativ e, nati onalist-ethnic, s e cular or religi ous) ha v e gr eat influen c e up on the s el e cti on of a transiti onal justic e and rec o n ciliati on strate gy. d. F o r m s o f v i ole nc e, c r i m e s co m m i t t e d: It refers to the nature, scal e and d e gr e e of past vi ol en c e (Blo o mfi eld et al, 2 0 0 3). Th e le v el and quality of vi ol en c e durin g the c o nflict d efin es th e resp ons e, e v e n th ou g h da m a g e and sufferin g c ann ot b e m e asured. A crud e and vi ol ent past c an pr o m pt transiti onal s o ci eties to d e v el op an effe ctiv e and pr of ound rec o n ciliati on strate gy.

Th e type of cri m es c o m m itted als o influen c es the future strate gy du e to th e internati onal le gal o b li gati ons of th e state. It is n ot o nly a state’s right but als o its o b li gati on to pr os e cut e th e perp etrat ors of w ar cri m es, cri m e s a gainst hu m anity and g e n o cid e. Other m i n or offens es and cri m es c an b e d ealt b y m e a ns of rest orativ e justic e m e c h anis m s and offens es c o m m itted for th e s ol e fact of takin g part in h ostilities c an b e a m n esti ed.

Transiti onal Country Analysis

B . T H E A C T O R S : Th e s e c o n d s et of fact ors refers to the a ct ors of th e c o nflict. This analysis w ill tak e int o a c c ount th eir n e e ds and fears, inter ests, m o b ilisati on strate gy and interrelati ons 3 . a . C o n f lic t p a r t ie s : It c an b e th e state itself, the s e curity s e ct or (military, p olic e), a ci vil g o v ern m e nt, gu errillas, ethnic or reli gi ous gr oups, l o c al (militia) lead ers and ar m e d gr oups, and traditi onal auth orities. b. V i c t i m s/ S u r v i v o r s : Peopl e w h o ha v e suffer ed vi ol en c e and w h o s e rights ha v e b e e n brutally and syste m atically vi olated. Differ ent types of c o nflict affe ct the di c h ot o m y vi cti m-perpetrat or and e a c h c o nflict dra w s a uni qu e di visi on lin e. Blo o mfi eld (20 0 3) p oints o ut that th e di visi on lin e b et w e e n an allp o w erful re gi m e that targ ets the p opulati on and the o pp ositi on m a k es th e vi cti m s e asi er to identify. But if ther e is state vi ol en c e (“ oppr essi on ” fr o m th e vi cti ms’ perspe ctiv e) and re b el vi ol en c e (“terr oris m ” fr o m the g o v ern m e nt’ perspe ctiv e) th e b oundary b e c o m e s m o r e blurred. c. P e r p e t r a t o r s/O f fe n de r s : Peopl e that ha v e c o m m itted c o m m o n cri minal a cts to hu m an rights vi olati ons, w ar cri m e s, cri m e s a gainst hu m anity and g e n o ci d e 4 . T w o issues m ust b e m e nti on e d in this c at e g ory. First, ther e is a differ en c e b et w e e n state vi ol en c e and n on-state vi ol en c e. Th e for m er is substantially differ ent and gra v er b e c aus e of th e state’s rai s o n d’ être, w h i c h is to pr ot e ct all citizens w ith n o distincti on, uph old th e rule of la w and resp e ct hu m an rights. “It is a m atter of the gra v est c o n c ern w h e n th e state, w h i c h h ol ds the m o n o p oly o n public forc e and is c h arg e d w ith pr ot e ctin g the rights of citizens, us es that forc e to vi olate th os e rights. Th e state has a w h ol e ran g e of p o w erful instituti ons at its disp osal —t h e p olic e, th e judicial syste m, the m a ss m e dia, parlia m e nt — w ith w h i c h it m a y d en oun c e, inv estigate and punish hu m an rights vi olati ons b y private citizens or n on-g o v ern m e ntal gr oups ” (SATRC, 1 9 9 8 : 7 0). Sec on d, th er e ar e v aryin g le v els of resp onsi bility a m o n g perp etrat ors b et w e e n the plann ers that or d er e d gr oss vi olati ons and th os e w h o c arried th e m o ut, e v e n if th ey ar e all cri minally resp onsi bl e. Th e argu m e nts that tak e resp onsi bility fro m a pers onal to a c oll e ctiv e sph er e (structural vi ol en c e, p olitical ind o ctrinati on, ide ol o gy, et c.), th e principl e of du e o b e di en c e or s elf vi cti misati on d o n ot ex culpate th os e resp onsi bl e. d. G e n e r a l p o p u l a t io n : Th e g e n eral p opulati on is als o a vi cti m of th e c o nflict b e c aus e it suffers s o m e of its c aus es and c o ns e qu en c es. Ho w e v er, in s o m e c as es, indiffer en c e fro m th e g e n eral public facilitates th e spr ead of hu m an rights a bus es and c oll e ctiv e inacti on, w h e n c o nfr onted w ith atr o cities, is als o a w a y of b ein g an ac c o m plic e. In p ost-c o nflict s o ci eti es, th er e c an b e an oth er c as e of s o ci ety as a perpetrat or w h e n the pe opl e fav our i mpunity und er the m a ntra of “ m o vin g for w ard ”. e. C i v i l s ocie t y : This ter m c o m pris es all instituti ons w h i c h stand o utsid e the public (g o v ern m e ntal) s e ct or as w e ll as th e private s e ct or (busin ess). It is c o nf or m e d b y s o cial or ganisati ons (als o c all ed

3

3

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4 Mobek k (20 0 6) ass erts that in c ertain c o nflicts the distincti on b et w e e n vi cti m s and perp etrators b e c o m e s blurred b e c aus e, in s o m e

Ne e d s a nd F e a r s : Needs relate to the things that m o ti vate th e parties to carry o ut th eir a cti ons and sustain c ertain p ositi ons and fears are th e a cti ons that c ould je opardise th e a chi e v e m e nt of o n e’s g o als; A g e nd a/Intere st s : Includes th e a g en das of k ey a ct ors and th e p o w er to i mp os e th e m ; F o r m of M o bilis ation: Ho w d o th ey pursue th eir g o als? In th e stre ets, th e judiciary, th e parlia m e nt, th e m e dia, etc.; R elation s with oth e r p a rtie s : the kind of intera cti on b et w e e n a ct ors at v ari ous l e v els. Th er e c an b e allianc es b et w e e n gr oups that share th e sa m e g o als (do m e sti c or internati onal c o nn e cti ons) and ther e c an b e c o m p etiti on or o pp ositi on w h e n th ere are c o ntradict ory o bj e ctiv es.

cas es, during the c o nflict, pe opl e play the r ol es of b oth th e vi cti m and the perp etrator.

Transiti onal Country Analysis

inter m e diary instituti ons) that ai m at satisfyin g s o cial n e e ds, pr o m otin g s o cial g o als, fosterin g p olitical p olici es and oth er inter ests and a cti ons. Th e c ivil s o ci ety’s d e v el op m e nt c an d et er min e th e e v oluti on and the dyna mi cs of th e transiti on as w e ll as the rec o n ciliati on pr o c ess.

C . T H E C O N T E X T : Th er e ar e oth er d o m e stic fact ors that c an b e distin guish ed fro m the c o nflict and its a ct ors and that ha v e to d o w ith th e o v erall c o n diti on of a s o ci ety, its culture and psy c h ol o gy, its le v el of c o h esi v en ess and th e rule of la w. a . C u l t u r e ( h o w t o de a l w i t h co n f lic t ) : Culture c ould b e d efin e d as a “syste m of b oth i mplicit and explicit m e a nin gs, b eli efs, v alu es and b e h a vi ours shar ed b y th e m e m b ers of a c o m m unity or gr oup, thr ou g h w h i c h exp eri en c e is interpret ed and c arried o ut� (Woodh ous e and Duffey, 2 0 0 8). Culture is a vital forc e in s o ci ety that tints e v ery s o cial und ertakin g m a kin g it uni qu e and unrep eatabl e, thus, Kevin Avruch and Peter Black (qd. in Woodh ous e and Duffey, 2 0 0 8: 1 7 0) d e v el op e d the ethn o c o nflict the o ry, w h i c h explains the l o c al und erstandin g that pe opl e us e to pr oduc e and interpret c o nflicts (the l o c al c o m m o n s ens e a b out c o nflict). Acc ordin g to this the ory, ther e ar e m a n y d et er minants that v ary fro m culture to culture, includin g p olitical structures, reli gi on and folk psyc h ol o gy. Ho w e v er, as Woodh ous e affir ms, th es e d et er minants sh ould n ot b e s e en as s ourc es of c o nflict but as v ariabl es that influen c e c oll e ctiv e thinkin g and b e h a vi our. b. S o c i a l co h e s i ve n e s s : In w i d espr ead and pr otract ed c o nflicts, s o ci ety tends to b e m o r e frag m e nt ed, thus m a kin g it difficult to e stablish transiti onal justic e m e c h anis m s, suc h as truth c o m m i ssi ons, at a nati onal le v el. In this c as e, the alternativ e is to inte grate l o c al truth-s e e kin g pr o c ess es int o a nati onal pr o c ess (Zupan and Serva es, 2 0 0 7). c. S t a t u s o f t h e r u le o f l a w : This fact or is e ss ential to e v aluate the real p ossi bilities of any transiti onal justic e strate gy. It is a gl o b al c o n c ept that inv ol v es p olitical, judicial and s o cial v alu es funda m e ntal for any s o ci ety; i.e. supr e m a c y of the la w, e quality b ef or e th e la w, ac c ountability, fairn ess, s eparati on of p o w ers, a bs en c e of ar bitrarin ess and pr o c e dural transparen cy. In transiti on peri o ds, th e status of the rule of la w and its p ot ential ref or m ar e, si multan e ously, influen c e d and influen cin g fact ors.

IN T E R N ATIO N A L FA C TO R S As it w a s m e nti on e d b ef or e, the i mp ortan c e of internati onal fact ors in p ost-c o nflict s o ci eti es is indisputabl e. Everyday, b oundaries b e c o m e m o r e p or ous and th e internati onal/nati onal di visi on lin es fad e.

Ho w e v er, th e v ari ous internati onal fact ors interv en e in differ ent w a ys, ha v e di v ers e i mpacts and pursue v ari ed inter ests. a . I n te r n a t io n a l co m m u n i t y : This is a br o ad c o n c ept that includ es c ountries, Internati onal Gov ern m e ntal Organisati ons (IGOs) and Internati onal NGOs; i.e. internati onal trad e uni ons, m ultilateral or ganisati ons, re gi onal or ganisati ons, d e v el op m e nt a g en ci es and religi ous or p olitical n et w or ks.

Internati onal a ct ors ar e s eld o m n eutral (Zupan and Serva es, 2 0 0 7); they inter v en e at differ ent stag es,

Transiti onal Country Analysis

foll o win g inter ests, pushin g p olitical, s o cial and e c o n o m i c al a g en das, and, usually, fav ourin g c ertain types of transiti onal justic e m e c h anis m s. b. I n f l u e n t i a l p o w e r s : Th e individualisati on of this c ate g ory is b as e d o n analytical purp os es.

Po w erful states lik e the per m an ent m e m b ers of the UN Security Council influen c e transiti ons i m m e ns ely and their supp ort or indiffer en c e c an b e n d th e p o w er b alan c e in a p ost-c o nflict s o ci ety. T w o c o ntrastin g exa m pl es ar e th e r ol e of USA in Central America in the ’ 8 0s, o n o n e han d, and th e Irish-Americans c o ntributi on to th e pea c e s ettle m e nt in North ern Ireland in 1 9 9 8 o n the oth er (Blo o mfi eld et al, 2 0 0 3). c. Hi s t o r ic p e r iod s : Th er e ar e hist orical cy cl es that g e n erate c o nflicts of si milar c h aracteristics and, ther ef or e, th eir transiti ons ha v e c o m m o n features; e. g. transiti ons after p ost-c ol o nial c o nflicts and ci vil w ars in Africa sin c e the ’ 6 0s, Latin American transiti ons after m ilitary re gi m e s in the ’ 8 0s, Eastern Europ e’s transiti on after th e fall of the Berlin Wall in th e ’ 9 0s. While it is true that transiti ons in a c ertain hist orical c y cl e shar e si milar c haract eristics, the pretensi on of d esi gnin g univ ersal m o d els (“ on e size fits all”) is err on e ous and m a y exa c er b at e c o nflicts. d. R e g io n a l co n t e x t : a transiti onal pr o c ess c ann ot b e fully und erst o o d w ith out analysin g th e re gi onal sc en ari o. Th e re gi on c an reinf orc e or w e a k en th e transiti on peri od a ctin g as a c ataly st or a c ount eractin g forc e. Fro m a strate gi c p oint of vi e w, the spill-o v er effe ct of a crisis m u st b e tak en int o ac c ount, as w e ll as that of a transiti on, o n o n e hand, and the us e of n ei g h b ourin g c ountries as b as es to launc h attac ks or influen c e th e c o nflict, o n the oth er. Th e “ d e m o n strati on effe ct” (do min o effe ct) explains that th e e v e nt in o n e c ountry c an ha v e effe cts o n an oth er and this pr o c ess c an replicat e in the e ntire re gi on.

T R A N S I T I O N T O WA R D S R E C O N C I L I AT I O N Do m estic as w e ll as internati onal fact ors and th e b alan c e of p o w er b et w e e n th e m influen c e th e transiti on peri o d. Th es e el e m e nts w ill c o n diti on a gr eat d eal of the rec o n ciliati on strate gy. Po w er is th e c apacity to d o thin gs, ha vin g th e p ot ential to affe ct the c o nt ext (res ourc es, ac c ess, s o cial n et w or ks and c o nstituen ci es, oth er supp ort and allian c es) (Blo o mfi eld, 1 9 9 8). Th er ef or e, the b alan c e of p o w er and th e act ors’ c apa bility to ex er cis e it in or d er to attain their g o als w ill b e d et er minant in th e d e v el op m e nt of the transiti on.

P o w e r is e n er gy that fl o w s c o nstantly, but it is i mp ortant to d es cri b e w h er e it lies in s o ci ety. Who is in a str on g er p ositi on? Who has or ha v e m o r e supp ort? Is it p ossi bl e to m a k e c h an g es in th e b alan c e?

Can o n e party ac hi e v e a d efinitiv e vi ct ory? SIDA (20 0 6) has cr eated a to ol for p o w er analysis w ith w h i c h the k ey a ct ors’ p o w er b as e and res ourc es ar e studi ed, c o nsid erin g for m al and inf or m al p o w er relati ons, hidd en p o w er, inter est gr oups and structures. Directly related to p o w er is the c a p a city to s p oil the pr o c e s s ; in oth er w o r ds, to bl o c k any atte m pt at transiti onal justic e. A classic exa m pl e is a transiti on w h er e perpetrat ors re m ain in p ositi ons of auth ority, ar e a bl e to bl o c k ref or m pr o c ess es and pr o m ot e a culture of i mpunity. IDEA has a thre e-type classificati on of transiti ons (Blo o mfi eld et al, 2 0 0 3):

1 . A b r u pt tran sition : A for m erly o ppr essi v e re gi m e has b e e n vi ol ently and c o m pl et ely o v erthr o w n or a ci vil w ar has e n d e d w ith a d e cisiv e m ilitary vi ct ory for o n e sid e. Proba bl e rec o n ciliati on

Transiti onal Country Analysis

m e c h anis m: retributiv e justic e. Th es e transiti ons c an pr o m ot e retributiv e justic e and re c o n ciliati on, or c an transf or m pre vi ous perp etrat ors in n e w vi cti m s. Exa mpl e: Rwanda, 1 9 9 4.

2. S m o oth tran sition : Th e re gi m e in p o w er initiate a pr o c ess of ref or m to m a n a g e transiti on und er their ter ms. If an auth oritarian re gi m e i mpl e m e nts ref or m s to w ards d e m o cracy and ad mits s o m e of its w r o n gs, p opulati on m a y ha v e leni en cy.

Proba bl e m e c h anis m: s elf-pr ot e ctin g m e asur es lik e

a m n esti es. Exa mpl e: Brazil in 1 9 8 5.

3. Ne g otiated tran sition: Transiti on is th e result of a s ettle m e nt b et w e e n th e for m er g o v ern m e nt and o pp ositi on gr oups. Th er e is a b alan c e of p o w er b y w h i c h the pre vi ous re gi m e retains s o m e d e gr e e of p o w er and the o pp ositi on d o es n ot ex ert total c o ntr ol. Th er ef or e, e v erythin g m u st b e n e g otiated, fro m the rec o n ciliati on strate gy to th e b ar gain of a m n esties for pea c e. “If such a n e g otiati on si mply gi v es the vi ct ory to o n e sid e, th e lin g erin g res ent m e nts, h o w e v er d e eply th ey app ear to b e b uri ed, w ill al m o st c ertainly c o m e b a c k to haunt and hind er re c o n ciliati on at a later stag e –an d ulti m ately that path leads b a c k to c o nflict and to ren e w e d vi ol en c e ” (Blo o mfi eld et al, 2 0 0 3 :4 3). Exa mpl e: South Africa’s transiti on fro m aparth eid.

Besid es the funda m e ntal i mp ortan c e of the type of transiti on, its c hr on ol o gi c al pr o gr ess and e v oluti on d o es als o play a r ol e in th e esta blish m e nt of the re c o n ciliati on pr o c ess. Bleek er (20 0 4) d es crib es thre e phas es of th e transiti on:

1 . C o nflict pha s e : it d e v el ops durin g the c o nflict and b ef or e n e g otiati ons.

2. Ne g otiation pha s e : it is a k ey peri o d that all o w s transiti on to d e v el op.

3. P o st-c o nflict pha s e : it is fo cus e d o n d ealin g w ith th e past and rec o nstructi on.

To analys e th e hist orical d e v el op m e nt of transiti ons, Pierre Hazan (20 0 6: 2 8) d es cri b es a w i d er arc for th e i mpl e m e ntati on of transiti onal justic e. In his vi e w, th e transiti on peri o d rea c h es far b ey o n d the e n d of o p en c o nflict and th e for m al transiti on. After th e repr essi on phas e (c onflict) and th e p ost-c o nflict peri o d w h i c h tak es plac e durin g the first fiv e y ears, th er e is a ti m e c o ntinuu m in w h i c h transiti on is far fro m finish e d. Transiti ons includ e th e m e diu m ter m (fiv e to t w enty y ears) durin g w h i c h s o ci ety g o e s und er m aj or (political, e c o n o m i c, s o cial) re c o nstructi on and l o o ks for n e w p oints of refer en c e; and th e l on g ter m that b e gins t w e nty y ears after w ards, w h e n the n e w g e n erati on starts to b e w illin g to o v er c o m e di visi ons.

Case Analysis and Co m paris o n

CASE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON In this section, I will use the matrix described above to analyse and compare three different transitions: the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1995, reconciliation in Rwanda after the genocide in 1994 and the Argentine transition from the last authoritarian rule in 1983. The main goal is to see whether each domestic and international factor favoured a certain approach over another and how that influenced the final choice of the reconciliation strategy. This analysis will also show that, while in some cases, factors might call for a restorative approach, in others they might tend to a retributive or truthseeking mechanism.

INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC FACTORS THE CONFLICT History In th e c as e of South Africa and Rwanda, the l on g hist ory of s e gr e g ati on and ethnic di visi ons, resp e ctiv ely, m a d e the ad opti on of a rest orativ e justic e and truth s e e kin g m e c h anis m s p ossi bl e and e v e n rec o m m e n da bl e. This includ e d the p ossi bility for South Africans and Rwandans to addr ess their past gri e v an c es and to sh e d light o v er their dark est ti m es fro m a rest orativ e perspe ctiv e. In South Africa, th e g o al w a s to e n d th e c y cl e of vi ol en c e and s e gr e g ati on, w h il e retributiv e justic e, gi v en its c o nfr ontati onal nature, c ould ha v e d e ep en e d di visi ons. In Rwanda, this fact or in particular c all ed for a rest orativ e appr oa c h. Sinc e its ind ep en d en c e, p olitical parties w er e cr eat ed a l on g ethnic lin es and th e pursuit of p olitical a g e n das thr ou gh vi ol ent m e a ns, an e stablish e d p olitical practic e, w a s the m ain o pti on to suppr ess the o pp ositi on.

Argentina w a s a totally differ ent c as e b e c aus e the hist ory of th e c ountry as k e d for a retributiv e justic e appr oa c h in that the rep eated re gr essi ons int o di ctat orial rule had to d o m o r e w ith an utter disresp e ct for th e la w and th e c o nstituti on — o n th e part of th e p olitical elite — than w ith p olitical di visi ons a m o n g the p opulati on. Th e d e fa ct o g o v ern m e nt that ruled Argentin e b et w e e n 1 9 7 6 and 1 9 8 3 w a s th e last stag e of an alternati on b et w e e n d e m o cratically-el e ct ed g o v ern m e nts and dictat orships that lab ell ed th e c ountry as an “int er mittent d e m o cra cy ”.

Causes B a ck gr o un d c a u s e s in Rwanda includ ed physical, s e curity and a c c ess n e e ds that re quired a br oad s oluti on that a retributiv e appr oa c h al on e c ould n ot gi v e. Econ o m i c rec o nstructi on, e qual ac c ess to land and res ourc es, p olitical participati on and rec o n ciliati on w e r e funda m e ntal to ac hi e v e suc c ess in the Rwandan transiti on. South Africa als o d e m a n d e d a s oluti on that c ould reac h b e y o n d a guilt s ent en c e.

Aparth eid had cr eat ed a re gi m e of ex clusi on and c o n d e m n e d the bla c k c o m m u nity to und erd e v el op m e nt and c hr onic p o v erty. This had to b e ac k n o wl e d g e d and a m e n d e d thr ou gh an array of m e asures that ran g e d fro m le gal justic e to s o cial and e c o n o m i c justic e. Th es e finan cial and m at erial urg ent n e e ds in South Africa d e m an d e d that res ourc es w er e d estin ed to und ertak e th e ref or m s n e c essary to i mpl e m e nt th e n e w c o nstituti on and pr o m ot e a unified South Africa, instead of i mpl e m e ntin g m a ssi v e and exp ensi v e judicial pr o c e e din gs.

Case Analysis and Co m paris o n

In th e c as e of Argentina, the path that led to the 1 9 7 6 c o u p in particular and th e brutal syste m of d o m inati on b y the m ilitary re gi m e re quired a m o r e c o m pr e h e nsi v e appr oa c h of justic e and truth du e to th e unpre c e d ent ed le v el of p olitical vi ol en c e and th e cri m e s c o m m itted. In this last particular aspe ct, th e li mited m a n date of th e CONADEP fell sh ort to addr ess that issue. Th e retributiv e appr oa c h w a s n e c essary to addr ess th e fact that all th e m ain p olitical act ors had ign or e d the “ g a m e rules ” to c hann el p olitical disputes and ad opt ed strate gi es that disre gard ed its d estructiv e c o ns e qu en c es up on oth er gr oups and th e w h ol e s o ci ety (Cavar ozzi, 1 9 9 4: 4 1). Ho w e v er, l o o kin g at th e sa m e fact or fr o m a s o ci ol o gi c al perspe ctiv e, s o ci ety c ann ot b e fully rec o n cil ed w ith out l o o kin g int o the reas ons that led to auth oritarianis m fr o m a truth-s e e kin g and rest orativ e appr oa c h.

Takin g int o c o nsid erati on the inc o m m e n surabl e differ en c es b et w e e n th e Argentin e and Rwandan c o nflicts, they c oin cid e in the effe ctiv en ess of th e m o bilisation st rat egy i mpl e m e nt ed b y th e parties’ lead ership to c arry o ut d espica bl e cri m e s . In Rwanda, this p olicy of m o b ilisati on includ ed th e fosterin g of ethni c c o nfr ontati on and the cr eati on of a p ois on e d p olitical e n vir on m e nt thr ou g h dir e ct m e a ns (use of m ilitias and ex e cuti on of m a ssacr es) and indire ct m e a ns (ethnic pr opa ganda) (Sellstr ö m, 1 9 9 6). Th e fact that the vi cti m s of th e g e n o cid e w er e n ot o nly Tutsi but als o Hutu o pp os e d to the re gi m e reinf or c e d th e idea that th er e w a s a w e ll-or ganis ed plan of p olitical m o b ilisati on w ith th e s ol e purp os e of perpetuatin g Hutu p o w er. For this kind of cri minal and racial act, the punitiv e appr oa c h w a s appr opriate and e v e n n e c essary. This appr oa c h w a s als o th e m o st c o n v e ni ent in Argentina w er e th e M o nton er o s gu errilla and the m ilitary pr o m ot e d s o cial vi ol en c e and justified it in th e na m e of justic e (M o nton er o s ) or or d er a gainst the “ c o m m u nist threat” (the ar m e d forc es). Th e utilisati on of Sorelian m yths o n th e part of the parties’ lead ership, in th eir atte m pt to dissuad e and rally supp ort b as e d o n vi ol en c e and fals e antin o m i es, had to b e d e alt w ith thr ou g h a retributiv e justic e appr oa c h.

Trig ge r s are th e last link in a c h ain of unsatisfied n e e ds and unr es ol v e d c o nflicts that es c alate the c o nflict to the n ext le v el, initiatin g a n e w dyna mi c w ith unfor es e e n and un exp e ct ed c o ns e qu en c es.

Alth ou gh their influen c e as fact ors is str on g er re gardin g the es c alati on of the c o nflict in ter m s of vi ol en c e and c o m pl exity, th ey ar e an indir ect influen c e in th e re c o n ciliati on strate gy du e to th e a b o v e m e nti on e d unfor es e e n c o ns e qu en c es. In the c as es of South Africa and Rwanda, ther e w er e m a n y id entifiabl e trig ge r s alth ou g h th eir i mpa ct in the c o nflicts v ari ed, m o stly, ac c ordin g to their p o w er of m o b ilisati on and n ot their inh er ent grav en ess.

Fro m an o v erall persp e ctiv e, trig ge r s are i mp ortant to esta blish the b e ginnin g and e n d of c o nflicts and th e ti m e-fra m e that w ill b e analys e d via transiti onal justic e m e c h anis m s. For ex a m pl e, in Rwanda, ther e w a s a funda m e ntal differ en c e b et w e e n the nati onal di m e nsi on of transiti onal justic e m e c h anis m s (nati onal c ourts and m o d ernis ed ga c a c a ) and th e internati onal (ICTR). Fro m a nati onal perspe ctiv e, the trig g e r of th e c o nflict w a s the RPF inter v enti on (1 9 9 0) and the cut-off dat e w a s Dec e m b er 3 1 st 1 9 9 4. For the internati onal c o m m u nity, th e c o nflict b e g an in 1 9 9 4 w ith th e final es c alati on that led to the g e n o cid e. This is n ot a m i n or d etail, b e c aus e it e stablish es a differ ent c o nt ext and explanati on of th e g e n o cid e and re c o g nis es that it w a s th e result of m ultipl e c aus es and n ot o nly of ethnic tensi ons, brin gin g to th e for e gr ound the ci vil w ar and th e strug gl e for p o w er. This br oa d er ti m e-fra m e as ks for and gi v es plac e to a m o r e h olistic appr oa c h that s e e k s to d eal w ith past gri e v an c es, find th e truth and re build relati onships.

Case Analysis and Co m paris o n

C ataly st s ar e i mp ortant to analys e th e life cy cl e of the c o nflict and c haract eristics of the c o nflict and, as a c o ns e qu en c e, the b est transiti onal justic e strate gy to addr ess the issues. Th ey als o h elp to esta blish resp onsi bilities re gardin g oth er s e c o n dary cri m es c o nn e ct ed to the m ain c o nflict, i.e. ar ms traffic kin g, m e dia m a nipulati on, targ et m a ssa cr es, etc. In South Africa, c ataly st s w er e c e ntred in the p olici es e n a ct ed to d e ep en aparth eid as w e ll as the targ etin g of the ANC m o v e m e nt. This c all ed for a rest orativ e appr oa c h du e to its inti m at e relati on w ith the hist ory of w h ite rule in South Africa.

In Rwanda, o n the oth er hand, th e m ain c ataly st w a s th e us e of th e m e dia as a persuasiv e w e ap o n of hate pr opa ganda that g e n erated an anti-Tutsi s enti m e nt a m o n g Hutu Rwandans. Th e cr eati on of th e Radi o-T él é visi on Libre d es Mille Collin es (RTLM) and the n e w spap er “ K a n gu ra ” b oth c o m m a n d e d b y the ak azu —Habyari m ana’s e nt oura g e of Hutu extre mists — play e d a crucial rol e in incitin g to g e n o cid e and o pp osin g the Arusha pr o c ess. This d e m o nstrati on of p o w er and influen c e w a s an oth er pr o of of th e gr o wi n g c apa city of the m e dia to m a nipulate and m o b ilis e pe opl e b e hind an idea or p olitical pr oj e ct.

Th es e acti ons d e m an d e d a c o m b in e d appr oa c h of rest orativ e justic e (rest or e relati onships and m e dia e du cati on) and a retributiv e appr oa c h to th os e resp onsi bl e of m a nipulatin g infor m ati on to incite to c oll e ctiv e vi ol en c e.

In Argentina, the p o w er that th e m ilitary h eld o v er the p opulati on thr ou gh the us e of state p o w er pr ol on g e d th e c o nflict and s er v e d as a c ataly st. Th er e w er e oth er t w o k ey c ataly st s : the initial e c o n o m i c suc c ess of the g o v ern m e nt’s e c o n o m i c p olicy (do m e stic) and th e b ur eaucratic-auth oritarian w a v e of m ilitary-c o ns er v ativ e di ctat orships in South America (with the ex c epti on of Col o m b ia and Venezuela).

Th e last c ataly st in particular c all ed for a re gi onal rest orativ e and truth-s e e kin g m e c h anis m b e c aus e ther e w er e joint a cti ons a m o n g differ ent di ctat orial re gi m e s to terr oris e and c o ntr ol d e p olitical and s o cial life in the sub c o ntin ent (P l a n C ó n d o r is th e m ain exp on ent of this tacit allianc e).

A u t h o r i t y o f t h e p r e v i o u s r eg i m e Non e of th e g o v ern m e nts analys ed had le giti m a c y du e to their d e fa ct o nature as a result of th e m a ssi v e dis enfran c his e m e nt of the bla c k m aj ority (South Africa), th e d enial of a c c ess to p olitical participati on (Rwanda) or a m ilitary c o u p (Argentina). Alth ou gh th e m ain appr oa c h to d eal w ith ille giti m at ely-c o nstituted g o v ern m e nts is retributiv e, th e fact that their ille giti m a c y w a s c o nn e ct ed to d e ep er c o nflicts re quired a c o m b in e d appr oa c h —truth-s e e kin g and rest orativ e.

South Africa’s aparth eid w a s a re gi m e of instituti onalis ed s e gr e gati on d e v el op e d und er a facad e of d e m o cracy that d e m an d e d hist orical truth and rest orati on of relati onships in or d er to, in Des m o n d Tutu’s w o r ds, “turn hu m an w r o n gs int o hu m an rights”. Habyari m ana’s re gi m e in Rwanda w a s b as e d in a nati onalist-ethnic ide ol o gy that c o nta minated th e p olitical syste m and d e ep en e d di visi ons in s o ci ety, m a kin g a retributiv e appr oa c h an insuffici ent ans w er. Argentina’s P r o c e s o , a quintess ential s on of th e nati onal s e curity d o ctrin e, us ed repressi on to suppress th e “ c o m m unist threat” and blatantly ac kn o w l e d g e d their cri m e s as le giti m at e w ar a cti ons. Th ey e stablish e d a re gi m e of lib eral e c o n o m i cs and s o cial ex clusi on to cl os e th e g ap g e n erated b y w h at th ey c all ed p opulist re gi m e s.

Th es e auth orities w e r e ci vilian in th e c as es of Rwanda and South Africa and m ilitary in th e c as e of Argentina but, in e v ery c as e, th er e w a s an inti m at e relati onship b et w e e n th e p olitical lead ership and th e s e curity s e ct or (intellig en c e s er vic es, ar m e d forc es, s e curity forc es, ci vilian p olic e, etc.) in th e plannin g

Case Analysis and Co m paris o n

and perp etrati on of th e cri m es and in s e curin g th e perpetuati on of the o ppr essi v e re gi m e s. This last c o m m o n feature, th e c o n ni van c e b et w e e n top-lead ers and the s e curity s e ct or, re quired n ot o nly a retributiv e appr oa c h but als o a truth c o m m i ssi on to esta blish the patterns of a bus e, m o dus o p erandi and strate gi es of exter minati on, as w e ll as instituti onal ref or m to red efin e the rol e of th e s e curity s e ct or in s o ci ety.

F o r m s o f v i ole nce , c r i m e s co m m i t t e d Th e p ost-c o nflict pr o c ess in South Africa re m ain ed c o ntr o v ersial in ter ms of pr os e cutin g aparth eid as a cri m e a gainst hu m anity. Aparth eid, the d eprivati on of rights b as e d o n a bi ol o gi cal fact or as the c ol our of th e skin and its p olitical c or ollary of s eparate d e v el op m e nt, w a s n ot instituted as a cri m e a gainst hu m anity until th e Ro m e Statute in 1 9 9 8 (whic h e nt er ed int o forc e in 2 0 0 2), thre e y ears after th e e n d of aparth eid, w h e n th e TRC m a n dat e had alr eady b e e n s ettled. This refer en c e is v ery i mp ortant to esta blish the state of internati onal la w at the ti m e of th e TRC. On the oth er han d, th e TRC’s m a n dat e c o m pr e h e n d e d the in v estigati on of cri m e s that happ en e d as a c o ns e qu en c e of exp eri en cin g aparth eid in e v ery day life (killin gs, n e c klacin g, torture, disapp earan c es, ar bitrary d et enti on), but it re c o g nis e d that ther e w a s a m u c h larg er pattern of hu m an rights vi olati ons that w a s n ot b ein g c o nt e m plated. Th e m ain parties d e cid e d in fav our of a c o n diti onal a m n esty — a m n esty in ex c han g e of full discl osure — that ruled o ut pr os e cuti ons in th e na m e of nati onal unity and rec o n ciliati on, th e d esire of l o o kin g ah ead o v errul ed the right to justic e.

In Rwanda and Argentina, th e nature of th e vi ol en c e and the cri m es c o m m itted left little spac e for n e g otiati on; they d e m a n d e d a punitiv e m eth o d rath er than any oth er transiti onal m e c h anis m or, e v e n less, an a m n esty. This is b e c aus e cri m e s a gainst hu m anity and w ar cri m e s g e n erate a state’s o b li gati on (bas ed o n internati onal p ositiv e la w and in internati onal cust o m ary la w) to pr os e cute. In the African nati on, th e internati onal c o m m unity supp orted the retributiv e appr oa c h w ith the cr eati on of th e ICTR and the rec o g niti on that w h at had happ en e d in Rwanda w a s g e n o cid e. Th e PRI (20 0 0) b a c k e d this acti on explainin g that, du e to Rwanda’s hist ory of i mpunity, it w a s n e c essary to s end a str on g signal to the s o ci ety and to e stablish a p ot ent d et err ent.

In Argentina, the d e m o cratic g o v ern m e nt w a s str on g e n ou g h to d eny a m n esty and foll o w a m o r e a g gr essiv e punitiv e appr oa c h thr ou g h nati onal c ourts to jud g e th os e resp onsi bl e of ille gal arrests, torture, forc e d disapp earan c es, kidnappin g of adults and b a bi es, and rape. Ho w e v er, w h e n the m ilitary lead ers re gain e d s o m e le v era g e, th er e w a s a s et ba c k in th e judicial pr o c e dures a gainst th e m ilitary that ulti m at ely w o uld lead to the i mpunity la w s (“Due Obedi en c e ” and “Full Stop”).

TH E A C TOR S C o n f lic t p a r t ie s , v ic ti m s a n d pe r pe t r a t o r s Th e nature of aparth eid resulted in th e vi olati on of hu m an rights of th e gr eat m aj ority of the p opulati on in South Africa (blac k and indi g en ous) and th e m ain parties in the c o nflict, th e National Party (NP) and th e African National Con gr ess (ANC), w e r e esta blish ed al on g racial cl ea v a g es d espite th eir e v oluti on as p olitical e ntities. Th e hist oric p olitical d o m i nati on of the w h ite m i n ority w a s c h all en g e d b y

Case Analysis and Co m paris o n

the pr o gr essiv e or ganisati on of the d e m o graphi cally str on g er but p olitically dis enfranc his ed blac k m aj ority. This p os e d a gr eat c hall en g e in th e p ost-c o nflict transiti on b e c aus e m o st of the p opulati on had b e e n vi cti m s and it w a s n ot p ossi bl e to rec o n cil e and reinte grate South Africa w ith a m e r e retributiv e appr oa c h. All dire cti ons p ointed to a rest orativ e and truth-s e e kin g m e c h anis m.

Th e TRC all o w e d th e vi cti m s to d e m o n strate th e cri m e s c o m m itted b y the aparth eid re gi m e and als o b y the ANC, tacitly le giti misin g the d eal b et w e e n De Klerk and Mandela that e n d ors ed a rest orativ e justic e (Hazan, 2 0 0 6: 3 8). Th e TRC c o nsid er ed that th er e w e r e vi cti m s fro m b oth sid es that d es er v e d the sa m e justic e. In this respe ct, th e applicati on of hu m an rights principles to judg e the a cti ons of a n on-state e ntity (ANC) w a s an inn o v ati on. Th e TRC ass erted “th e i mp ortanc e of und erstandin g th e Co m m issi on as but o n e of s e v eral instru m e nts resp onsi bl e for transf or m ati on and brid g e-b uildin g in p ost-aparth eid South Africa ” (SATRC, 1 9 9 8: 6 4). This truth c o m m i ssi on w a s n ot a m o r al s e c o n d b e st b ut an ad v an c e fr o m retributiv e justic e to rest orativ e justic e in the vi e w of th eir ide ol o gists; it w a s a c han c e to build an inclusiv e s o cial fabric (inclusi on in e c o n o m i c and s o cial aspe cts re m ains a pen din g subje ct).

Ho w e v er, as m e nti on e d a b o v e, a bus es c o m m itted b y th e state and b y th e lib erati on m o v e m e nt sh ould al w ays b e differ entiated b e c aus e they ar e qualitativ ely and le gally differ ent. When the state ex er cis es p o w er a bus e, n ot o nly it vi olates the la w and hu m an rights, b ut als o lea v es citizens w ith out av enu es of e s c ap e and totally d ef en c el ess.

In Rwanda, th e l on g hist ory of ethnic di visi ons and strug gl es d e v el op e d in a c o nt ext w ith n o ac c ountability or justic e and g e n erated a c y cl e of vi ol en c e in w h i c h th e vi cti ms of the past b e c a m e the offend ers of the pres ent. What for m a n y m a y ha v e b e e n “ vi ct or’s justic e ”, for the n e w g o v ern m e nt w a s a m e a ns of e n din g the “ culture of i mpunity” that had pre v ail ed in Rwanda for d e c ad es and st oppin g the vi ci ous c y cl e of vi ol en c e that w a s its m ain c o ns e qu en c e (Uvin, 2 0 0 3). Nev erth el ess, the i mpl e m e ntati on of a purely retributiv e appr oa c h, fav our ed b y p opular d e m a n d, w o uld ha v e b e e n insuffici ent to addr ess past gri e v an c es and attain re c o n ciliati on. Th e e stablish m e nt of m o d ernis ed ga c a c a , a rest orativ e initiativ e, cl os e d that re c o n ciliati on g ap.

Th e status of th e m ain a ct ors (ar m e d forc es and gu errilla) in Argentina, th eir penal resp onsi bility and th e fact that they w er e cl early differ entiated fro m th e p opulac e facilitated a punitiv e appr oa c h. This n oti on d o es n ot i mply that this c o nflict w a s a w ar, b e c aus e the m ilitary did n ot o nly initiated an ille giti m at e w ar b ut als o d e m o lish e d all d e m o cratic instituti ons, d estr oy e d th e o pp ositi on and c o m m itted m a ssi v e vi olati ons of hu m an rights.

Other issue pertainin g to the le v els of resp onsi bility of th e perpetrat ors and to retributiv e justic e in particular is the c o n c ept of s el e ctivity. In th e c as es of Rwanda and Argentina, the principl e of s el e ctivity w a s i mpl e m e nt ed for the sak e of rec o n ciliati on and to a v oi d a l on g peri o d of trials in th e for m er, and to reaffir m d e m o cra cy and the suc c ess of th e transiti on in the latter. By applyin g this principle, judicial pr o c e e din gs w o uld b e h eld o nly a gainst the m o st resp onsi bl e a ct ors that participated in the plannin g and i mpl e m e ntati on of a syste m atic pattern of hu m an rights a bus es. Nev erth el ess, this sh ould n ot b e us ed as a m e a ns of “ d el e giti misati on of th e rol e of pr os e cuti on or punish m e nt in d ealin g w ith past cri m es ” (Paul Van Zyl q d. in Mobek k, 2 0 0 6: 2 7).

In Rwanda, th e c o m pl exity of this c o nflict and the differ ent le v els of resp onsi bility a m o n g th e perpetrat ors d e m a n d e d a m ulti-appr oa c h strate gy for practical and p olitical purp os es. It w a s unfeasi bl e to

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pr os e cut e all the ac cus e d and it w a s p olitically i mp ossi bl e to put a di vid e d c ountry o n its fe et w ith out any rec o n ciliati on that includ e d m e m b ers of th e g e n eral p opulati on that to o k part in the g e n o cid e. For that purp os e, th e transiti onal g o v ern m e nt s eparated th os e w h o plann e d and or ganis e d the g e n o cid e (the akazu —“little h ous e ” —, Habyari m ana’s e nt oura g e; rural or ganis ers fr o m the c o m m un al and prefe ctural c adr es; m ilitias (Interaha m w e) and the Presid ential Guard) fro m the g e n eral p opulati on that c o m m itted a bus es (Sellstr ö m, 1 9 9 6).

As a result, the perpetrat ors that w e r e m o st resp onsi bl e w o uld b e jud g e d in

internati onal c ourts (if th ey w e r e o utsid e Rwanda) or in nati onal c ourts (if th ey w e r e in th e c ountry) and oth er perpetrat or w o uld b e d e alt w ith in th e ga c a c a .

Sev eral p olitical i mplicati ons led the Argentin e n e wly-el e ct ed g o v ern m e nt to pr os e cut e o nly the hi gh est c o m m a n d ers and to e n a ct the c o n c ept of “ du e o b e di en c e ” to superi or or d er for the l o w er-le v el offic ers (Wilk e, 2 0 0 4). Massiv e pr o c e e din gs w o uld ha v e affect ed m a n y l o w-rank offic ers in activ e duty and Alfonsín w a nt ed th e ar m e d forc es m o r ally inte grated in th e n e w d e m o cracy, e v e n at th e pric e of i mpunity (Wilk e, 2 0 0 4). Alth ou g h the g o v ern m e nt insisted that th e m ilitary had n ot pressured th e m, th e n e e d to pr es er v e d e m o cracy o v erturn ed a v ast er n oti on of justic e.

General population Th e rol e of th e g e n eral p opulati on thr ou gh c o nflicts is n ot e v aluated to d et er min e cri minal resp onsi bility, but to d esi gn a rec o n ciliati on strate gy c apa bl e of addr essin g th e c oll e ctiv e b e h a vi our of th e p opulac e, d et er minin g the forc es that pr o m ot e d it and buildin g n e w relati onship to pr e v ent a ren e w e d c o nflict.

In South Africa, m o st of the p opulati on w a s inv ol v e d in the injustic e that aparth eid e m b o di e d — as a vi cti m, perpetrat or or sil ent b ystand er — du e to the g o v ern m e nt’s acti on of pr oj e ctin g th eir racist p olicy int o e v eryday life. As in Rwanda, ther e w a s a n e e d to rec o n cil e and to b uild a n e w s o cial c o ntract b et w e e n e stran g e d c o m m unities. Furth er m or e, s o m e racist s enti m e nts pre v ail ed after th e transiti on that n e e d e d to b e addr ess e d thr ou gh rec o n ciliati on and truth, b e c aus e pr os e cuti on w o uld ha v e d e ep en e d th e c o nfr ontati on.

In Rwanda, du e to th e participati on of a gr eat part of th e g e n eral p opulati on in th e g e n o ci d e, judicial pr o c e e din g w o uld ha v e fell sh ort to d e al w ith th e past. Restorativ e justic e, o n the oth er hand, all o w e d perp etrat ors and vi cti m s to c o m e to g eth er and c o nfr ont e a c h oth er in a s e cur e spac e, to ac kn o w l e d g e, c o nfess, rep ent and repair th e da m a g e d o n e or th e sufferin gs c aus ed to th e c o m m unity. Th e ga c a c a w a s a s o cial rest orativ e pr o c ess as m u c h as an individual o n e.

For Moren o Oca mp o, in Argentina, s o cial resp onsi bility did n ot resid ed in killin g pe opl e b ut in letting it happ en, and then n ot c o ntr ollin g w h at had happ en e d (1 9 9 6: 2 5 1). In his vi e w, p olitical lead ers, top b usin ess m e n and journalists, m a gistrates and bish ops had a differ ent and grav er resp onsi bility and, alth ou g h they c ould n ot b e e qualled to the actual perp etrat ors, th ey had a m o r al m a n date that w a s n ot fulfilled.

Th e idea of “s o cial resp onsi bility” m u st n ot b e und erst o o d as a g e n eralisati on b e c aus e m a n y w h ite South Africans fou ght a gainst aparth eid, m a ny Hutu Rwandans pr ot e ct ed th e Tutsi and m a n y Argentin eans d ef end e d hu m an rights in th e dark est h ours. Ho w e v er, this n oti on refl e cts th e idea that n o cri m e is c o m m itted w ith out the tacit and/or explicit c o ns ent of a gr eat m aj ority of the p opulati on. Th er e is

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al w ays a s o cial resp onsi bility in th os e kinds of c o nflicts that sh ould b e addr ess ed in the rec o n ciliati on strate gy fro m a h olistic p oint of vi e w.

T h e ci vil s ocie t y Civil s o ci ety’s influen c e in the transiti on peri o d v ari ed a c c ordin g to th eir c o m p o siti on, d e v el op m e nt and c apa city to m o b ilis e th e p opulati on and to pr essure p olitical lead ers. Nev erth el ess, ci vil s o ci ety or ganisati ons in South Africa, Rwanda (onc e it w a s re built) and Argentina had a funda m e ntal r ol e in the i mpl e m e ntati on and m o nit orin g of th e transiti onal justic e and rec o n ciliati on strate gi es. Th ey pressur ed g o v ern m e nts, d e m an din g ac c ountability and the eli minati on of s e cr e cy claus es, inf or m e d the p opulati on, audited the m e c h anis m s and m a d e rec o m m e n dati ons.

Most of South African ci vil s o ci ety s e ct or w a s m o r e c o m m itted to ac hi e v e p olitical transiti on and the public discl osure of th e past re gi m e’s cri m es than indi vidual punish m e nt. This c o m m it m e nt pr o m pt ed NGOs and c hurc h es to fav our the dis cl osur e of cri m e s and a bus es fr o m all parties and n ot o nly th e aparth eid re gi m e, and m a d e a v o w to pr ot e ct th e rights of all vi cti ms. Alth ou gh th e TRC w a s m o r e a c o ns e qu en c e of p olitical party n e g otiati ons, the ci vil s o ci ety w a s a bl e to re m o v e “s e cr e c y claus es ” pr o m ot e d b y the m aj or parties in the TRC le gislati on, play a k ey r ol e in th e el e cti on of TRC c o m m i ssi on ers and m o nit or its w o r k.

Th e d e ci m ati on and fracture of the ci vil s o ci ety after the Rwandan g e n o cid e m a d e it i mp ossi bl e to start a c oll e ctiv e rec o n ciliati on pr o c ess right a w ay and th e pressur e for justic e push e d th e retributiv e appr oa c h. With out str on g grassr o ots m o v e m e nts, a truth-s e e kin g m e c h anis m s e e m e d i mpr o b a bl e and w o uld ha v e b e e n resulted in effe ctiv e. Th e gr o wth and d e v el op m e nt of ci vil s o ci ety or ganisati ons durin g the y ears after the g e n o ci d e all o w e d the m to b e c o m e part of the transiti onal justic e strate gy. So m e NGOs and internati onal hu m an rights or ganisati ons fav our ed th e punitiv e appr oa c h at the nati onal le v el and initiated trainin g-pr o gra m m e s for la wy ers and jud g es and w o r ks h ops fo cus ed in hu m an rights and th e rule of la w.

In Argentina, the ci vil s o ci ety did als o pursue a punitiv e appr oa c h but it als o m a d e its c o ntributi on to th e CONADEP w ith their d o cu m e ntati on and inf or m ati on re gardin g forc e d disapp earan c es. In this s ens e, th e rol e of s o m e NGOs and Human Rights Organisati ons durin g the P r o c e s o w a s re m arka bl e b e c aus e n ot o nly did th ey c oll e ct infor m ati on but als o d en oun c e d m a n y c as es in internati onal foru ms lik e th e OAS and the UN. Th es e brav e and risky initiativ es w er e c arried o ut w h il e the m ilitary h eld a tight leash o n public lib erties. Th e r ol e of s o m e th e ci vil s o ci ety in the transiti on w a s funda m e ntal to supp ort th e punitiv e justic e appr oa c h alth ou g h th er e w er e differ en c es w ith re gard to th e m et h o d and for m it sh ould tak e.

TH E CO N T E X T Culture Blo o mfi eld (20 0 3) explains that s o m e cultures ha v e a n e c essity to for gi v e w h il e oth ers tend to b e inclin ed to w ards punish m e nt. So m e cultures m a y prefer traditi onal or c o m m unity-b as e d m e c h anis m s to ac hi e v e rest orativ e justic e and truth instead of c o n v e nti onal appr oa c h es.

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In South Africa, culture had an i mp ortant rol e in the i mpl e m e ntati on of a rest orativ e justic e appr oa c h. Th en a gain, this transiti on in v ol v e d th e task to rec o n cil e a hist ory of dis cri minati on and estran g e m e nt and re quired for gi v en ess and b uildin g n e w brid g es b et w e e n alienated c o m m u nities. Th e rol e of th e c hurc h — i n c arnated in the figur e of Des m o n d Tutu — and the d e v el op m e nt of th e idea of u buntu, built a cultural and psy c h ol o gi cal m e etin g plac e for c o m m unities.

Th e c hurc h es influen c e d the pr o c ess and s et th e c entral idea of th e TRC w h i c h w a s rest orativ e justic e. Tutu c o nsid er ed “ ‘s o cial har m o n y’ or ‘ c o m m u nal har m o ny’ as the s u m m u m b o nu m , or hi gh est g o o d ” (Croc k er, 2 0 0 0 b). Th e oth er v alu e of this rec o n ciliati on pr o c ess w a s th e c o n c ept of “ u b u ntu ” .

Graybill (20 0 7) explains that u buntu d eriv es fr o m the Xhosa expr essi on “Umuntu n gu m untu n ga b any e b antu”, w h i c h m e a ns “p e opl e are pe opl e thr ou g h oth er pe opl e ”. Peopl e sh ould re c o g nis e th eir o w n hu m anity in the oth er and that their d estini es as pe opl e are intert win ed. Th e m ain id ea is that the indi vidual o nly ac hi e v es its gr eatest d e v el op m e nt and happin ess in the c o m m u nity and o n e c ann ot exist w ith out the oth er. Th e idea of forgi v en ess and u buntu, m a nifest ed th e superi ority of rest orativ e justic e c o m par e d w ith the Western retributiv e appr oa c h and le giti mis e d the a gr e e m e nt that refl e ct ed th e b alan c e of p o w er. More o v er, u buntu w a s an African c o n c ept that add e d a s ens e of o w n ership and an el e m e nt of inclusi on for n on-Christian indi g en ous c o m m u nities.

Despite the fact that the m aj ority of Rwandans ar e Christians (63 % Cath olic and 2 3 % Protestant), th e a ctiv e r ol e of th e c hurc h es durin g th e Habyari m ana re gi m e and th e g e n o cid e (Gray bill, 2 0 0 4), dis card e d th eir p ossi bility of actin g as facilitat ors or brid g e-b uild ers. Th e South African id ea of u buntu and the r ol e of the c hurch c ould n ot b e replicat ed, e sp e cially in a s o cial e n vir on m e nt that fav our ed justic e o v er rec o n ciliati on.

Giv en th e n e e d to c o m pl e m e nt th e judicial appr oa c h, a uni qu e cultural el e m e nt n e c essary for rec o n ciliati on w a s pr o vid e d b y an an ci ent Rwandan traditi on of c o nflict res oluti on, th e ga c a c a . This c o nflict res oluti on pr o c ess dat es b a c k to the pre-c ol onial ti m e s and had b e e n functi onin g for c enturies.

G a c a c a m e a ns “ grass ” and refers to “a m e etin g of n ei gh b ours s eated o n the grass (the ga c a c a ) to s ettle a dispute b et w e e n pe opl e, it is a grassr o ots instituti on that traditi onally d ealt w ith m i n or offens es (Gray bill, 2 0 0 4: 1 1). Th e g o al of th e ga c a c a w a s to “r est or e s o cial or d er thr ou g h th e reinte grati on of th e offen d er b a c k int o the c o m m unity. Traditi onal ga c a c a w a s less fo cus ed o n punish m e nt [...] than o n rest orin g har m o n y b y reinte gratin g th e o n e w h o w a s the s ourc e of dis ord er ” (Gray bill, 2 0 0 4: 1 1). Th e “ m o d ernis ed G a c a c a ” adapted this c o m m u nity-b as e d m eth o d culturally fa miliar to all Rwandans. This m e c h anis m br o ad en e d th e sc op e in ter ms of d ealin g w ith past a bus es and g a v e a w i d er le giti m a cy to th e pr o c e e din gs.

Besides, it had a h e alin g el e m e nt w h il e s er vin g rec o n ciliati on and justic e (Blo o mfi eld et al, 2 0 0 3). Abo v e all, th e ga c a c a e m p o w er e d pe opl e to d eal w ith the past in their o w n cultural ter ms.

Th e Argentin e cultural appr oa c h to c o nflict res oluti on fit int o th e Western m o d el of punitiv e justic e and the principle that the rule of la w is liabl e to s ettle s o ci etal c o nflicts. This appr oa c h to c o nflict res oluti on w a s alter ed b y th e lac k of d e m o cratic stability that d o m inated the Argentin e p olitical s c en e pri or to the 1 9 8 3 transiti on. Th e pe opl e had n e v er d ealt w ith past a bus es and justic e had b e e n s et asid e b y factual p o w er. Argentina had recurred rep eatedly to vi ol en c e in or d er to s ol v e its p olitical disputes, m ainly und er th e for m of c o u p s d’ état. This b e h a vi our cr eated th e id ea that a p olitical pr oj e ct c ould g ain

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le giti m a cy of ex er cis e to m a k e up for the lac k of le giti m a cy of ori gin; in oth er w o r ds, effici en cy and c apacity to g et thin gs d on e w a s pr eferred to th e rule of la w and justic e.

In 1 9 8 3, th e brutality of the “t e c h n ol o gy of h orr or ” d e m an d e d effe ctiv e m e c h anis m s to d eal w ith the past in or d er to assure d e m o cra cy for the future g e n erati ons and to cr eate a “ cultural d et errent”, a c oll e ctiv e id ea that d e fa ct o sh ortcuts, th e vi olati on of th e Constituti on (the s o cial c o ntract that g o v ern e d the p olitical life) and c o m m un al indiffer en c e w er e n ot the el e m e nts that w o uld build a d e m o cratic and pea c eful s o ci ety. This last p oint w a s crucial b e c aus e th e pr o c e e din gs c ould a ct as a d et errent b ut w o uld als o reaffir m th e n oti on that n o gr oup or c orp orati on is a b o v e th e la w and th e fact that “trials w o uld c o ntrast the o p enn ess and fairn ess of lib eralis m w ith th e s e cr e c y and i mpunity of auth oritarianis m, thus buildin g supp ort for d e m o cra cy ” (Grandin, 2 0 0 5).

S o c i a l co he s i ve n e s s In South Africa as w e ll as in Rwanda, th e lac k of c o h esi v en ess in s o ci ety and th eir di visi ons al on g ethnic and racial cl ea v a g es m a d e it i mp ossi bl e to attain rec o n ciliati on thr ou gh retributiv e justic e. In South Africa, judicial pr o c e e din gs c ould ha v e b e e n s e en as a blac k “ w itch hunt” if it e n d e d in guilty s ent en c es or “ w hite i mpunity” if it e n d e d oth er wis e. Th e o nly w a y of ac hi e vin g a d e gr e e of justic e, e asin g ethni c pressures and th w artin g n e w racial c o nfr ontati on w a s a truth c o m m i ssi on w h i c h i mpl e m e nt ed a rest orativ e appr oa c h. Th e add e d v alue o f rest orativ e justic e w o uld h elp to cr oss-ethnic relati onship buildin g.

In s o ci eti es that lac k c o h esi v en ess, re c o nstructi on thr ou gh l o c al initiativ es c an b uild the rec o n ciliati on bl o c k fro m the b as e to the top. Th er ef or e, the Rwandan ga c a c a syste m to o k rec o n ciliati on to th e c o m m u nal le v el w h i c h h elpe d to o v er c o m e the ethnic differ en c es thr ou g h a b ott o m-up appr oa c h.

Ho w e v er, the fracture that persisted in s o ci ety after th e g e n o cid e w a s pr ol on g e d b y the initial punitiv e appr oa c h and the d esire of v e n g e an c e of m a ny Tutsi In Argentina, d espite th e c o h esi v en ess in ter m s of nati onal identity, the p olitical c o h esi on and th e differ ent vi e w s re gardin g th e “ nati onal pr oj e ct” c o ntinued to e n dan g er any p ossi bilities of s o cial c o n c ord.

Th e brutality, d estructi on and disr esp e ct for hu m an di gnity durin g th e P r o c e s o pr o m ot e d the idea that pea c e and d e m o cra cy w e r e dra m atically n e e d e d and they c ould o nly b e a c hi e v e d b y a retributiv e appr oa c h. This w a s true in th e s ens e that th os e resp onsi bl e had to b e jud g e d for th eir cri m e s. Ho w e v er, that analysis failed to addr ess th e c or e of the pr o bl e m w h i c h w a s th e lac k of w ill to attain nati onal rec o n ciliati on and to b uild fr o m the past to w ards th e future. In this c as e, nati onal rec o n ciliati on b e c a m e reduc e d to a judiciary s ent en c e.

S t a t us of t he r ule of la w Pursuin g cri minal pr os e cuti on after a ci vil c o nflict c an b e i mp ossi bl e b e c aus e, m o st of the ti m es, the syste m is n ot prepar ed, pr o c e dural guarante es ar e hard to sustain and n e w vi ol en c e c an aris e fr o m such i mpl e m e ntati on. Retributiv e justic e in nati onal c ourts is a c o m pl ex und ertakin g that presupp os es th e participati on of m ultiple syste m s liabl e to c o o p erate w ith th e pr o c ess: judiciary syste m, p olitical instituti ons, s e curity s e ct or (intellig en c e for th e g ath erin g of e vi d en c e, la w e nf orc e m e nt, penitentiary

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syste m, etc.). In s o m e c as es, it is ad visa bl e to cr eate a sp e cial or a d h o c c h a m b er that d eals ex clusiv ely w ith w ar cri m e s, terr oris m and or ganis ed cri m e, e quipped w ith th e re quired pers onn el and res ourc es (Kritz, 2 0 0 5: 1 9). This w ill tak e a w ay the burd en fro m oth er c ourts in the c ountry and all o w the c h a m b er to pr os e cute its c as es pr op erly.

In South Africa, th e p ossi bility of e stablishin g an internati onal cri minal c ourt or oth er judicial b o dy w a s disre gard e d b y all parties. In or d er to b e effe ctiv e in the ey es of South Africans, trials w o uld ha v e to tak e plac e insid e their c ountry and that w a s n ot an o pti on at that ti m e. Th e status of th e judiciary durin g transiti on als o pre v ent ed the ANC fro m pursuin g a retributiv e appr oa c h b e c aus e c ourts w er e the NP’s d o m ain. Befor e g oin g in that dir e cti on, they n e e d e d a str on g and i mpartial judiciary. Further m or e, the existen c e of a p o w erful s e curity s e ct or had a str on g influen c e up on the transiti on. If a retributiv e justic e appr oa c h w a s to b e us ed to pr os e cute m e m b ers of a still p o w erful s e curity s e ct or, justic e w o uld ha v e b e e n li mited and, in s o m e c as es, rh et orical as a result of b ar gainin g b et w e e n pea c e and justic e (Mob e k k, 2 0 0 6).

Th e rule of la w in Rwanda w a s d e ci m at ed after the g e n o ci d e, the judicial infrastructure had b e e n d estr oy e d, ther e w er e s carc e hu m an res ourc es av ailabl e, the m ilitary had b e e n c arryin g o ut p olic e w o r k and the rights of th e vi cti ms and th e le gal guarante es of the d ef endants c ould n ot b e uph old. Nev erth el ess, the g o v ern m e nt’s w ill and d esire to foll o w th e punitiv e appr oa c h led to or ganis e the nati onal c ourts and prepar e th e syste m d espite the li mitati ons m e nti on e d a b o v e. In 2 0 0 9, the Gov ern m e nt of Rwanda ass erted that th e lac k of pr os e cut ors, judg es and la w y ers d elays the d eli v eran c e of justic e and that it w o uld tak e o v er 2 0 0 y ears if Rwanda relied totally in th e c o n v enti onal c ourt syste m. More o v er, th e lac k of judicial guarante es of the ac cus e d c ould brin g ren e w e d dis cr edit to th e judicial syste m. As Mobek k explains, “ b y vi olatin g rule of la w n or m s it c o ntinues to s et a n e gativ e pre c e d ent for the d o m e stic justic e syste m, n ot e n h an cin g trust but und er minin g it and n ot institutin g c h an g e in th e justic e syste m [...] [the judicial syste m m ust] dra w a lin e b et w e e n past a bus e and pres ent ac c ountability” (20 0 6: 1 6).

Th e n or m alisati on of th e judiciary and the rule of la w in Argentina and th e pr eparati on and pr ofessi onalis m of th e pers onn el all o w e d the d e m o cratic-el e ct ed presid ent to initiate judicial pr o c e e din gs that w er e n ot re gard e d as “ vi ct or’s justic e ” b y th e g e n eral public or th e internati onal c o m m u nity. Th e ref or m of th e m ilitary justic e c o d e g a v e the High Military Court th e c h an c e to judg e th e c as es and i mpr o v e th e reputati on of the ar m e d forc es, but their inacti on pr o m pt ed th e Fed eral Appeals Cha m b er to assu m e jurisdicti on (Wilk e, 2 0 0 4).

IN T E R N ATIO N A L FA C TO R S T h e i n t e r n a t io n a l co m m u n i t y As m e nti on e d a b o v e, th e rol e of th e internati onal c o m m u nity w a s i mp ortant in th e initiati on and d e v el op m e nt of th e c o nflict in South Africa, Rwanda and Argentina, b ut their inv ol v e m e nt in th os e transiti ons d ep en d e d o n its acti ons or o m issi ons durin g th e m. Overall, th eir influen c e w a s m o r e d e cisi v e in th e cy cl e of the c o nflict than in th e s el e cti on of th e rec o n ciliati on strate gy.

In the c as e of South Africa, th e internati onal c o m m unity interv en e d in t w o w a ys: it pressured to e n d the aparth eid era (with acti ons lik e the Harare Declarati on and e m b ar g o s) and foster ed the

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transnati onal m o b ilisati on of the ci vil s o ci ety b y sp ons orin g NGOs in South Africa and oth er n on-vi ol ent d e m o n strati ons ar ound th e w o rld.

During the transiti on, the internati onal c o m m unity w a s ada m ant a b out th e e stablish m e nt of any kind of transiti onal justic e, w h il e hu m an rights m o v e m e nts and internati onal NGOs pressur ed for a retributiv e justic e appr oa c h and sa w the truth-s e e kin g m e c h anis m s as a ti mid resp ons e. Th ey e v e n p os e d the qu esti on of w h eth er th e TRC had vi olat ed th e internati onal la w o b li gati on of punishin g cri m e s a gainst hu m anity w ith its n e g ativ e to pr os e cut e and the pr o visi on of a m n esties. Despite this internati onal o utcry, the transiti onal justic e and re c o n ciliati on strate gy foll o w e d an oth er path guid ed b y th e nati onal parties.

Unlik e in South Africa and Argentina, in Rwanda, the internati onal c o m m unity w a s substantially inv ol v e d in th e w h ol e arc h of th e c o nflict, fr o m its es c alati on to its e n d. Th e failure of th e internati onal c o m m u nity to for es e e, pre v ent or st op th e g e n o cid e, g e n erated a s ens e of guilt and resp onsi bility that pr o m pt it to c o m p ensate its ori ginal o m issi on w ith a str on g interv enti on in th e transiti on and p ost-c o nflict phas e. Th e cr eati on of th e ICTR b y th e UN and its punitiv e appr oa c h is a c o ns e qu en c e of that inv ol v e m e nt.

In Argentina, the internati onal c o m m u nity did n ot ha v e a transc en d ental w e i g ht in th e d et er minati on of th e transiti onal justic e m e c h anis m s. Th e OAS and the Inter-American Co m m issi on o n Human Rights (IACHR) in particular play ed an i mp ortant rol e in d en oun cin g th e cri m es that w e r e b ein g c o m m itted and rec oll e ctin g data for future indict m e nts and in quiries. Th e IACHR visit durin g the P r o c e s o, g e n erated th e cl osur e of d et enti on c e ntres, alth ou gh m a n y d o cu m e nts that pr o v e d hu m an rights vi olati ons w er e d estr oy e d. This m i ssi on did n ot o nly inspe ct and intervi e w officials of th e re gi m e b ut als o o p e n e d offic es to rec ei v e clai ms in situ and rec ei v e d th ousands of pe opl e, m a kin g th e OAS o n e of th e m ain recipi ents — if n ot th e m ain o n e — of c as es of disapp ear ed pe opl e durin g the dictat orship (Moren o Oca mp o, 1 9 9 6).

Influential Powers Influential powers conditioned the domestic policy of the countries under analysis, which ultimately affected their type of transition. Those powers’ pressure in the post-conflict phase was focused in their demand of results in terms of rule of law and political and economic reforms than with the collaboration to reach national reconciliation.

In the case of South Africa, influential powers had to do more with the end of apartheid than with the transitional justice strategy. Progressively, the increasing internal pressure of the civil society and the changing of balance in the East-West dispute modified the policy of the Western powers — initially allied to the apartheid regime. From tacitly accepting apartheid, they began to condemn it explicitly.

In Rwanda, France had a controversial role during the civil war and the transition, in particular with Opération Turquoise, a unilateral intervention under national command which was legitimised by the UN Security Council (Adelman, 1996). On the other end, the United States government erroneously saw Rwanda as a new Somalia (Adelman, 1996) and refrained from taking active part in that conflict’s resolution. This negligence, however, did leave a space of manoeuvre that allowed Rwandans to carry out their own transitional strategy besides the ICTR.

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In the case of the Argentina, the influential powers played a role in setting the conditions for the instalment of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in 1976. During the 60s, the US-led military academy Escuela de las Américas (School of the Americas) in Panama, trained generations of military men from all Latin America to combat the “intern communist threat”, who were indirectly motivated to insubordinate against their national governments in the pursuit of this goal (Moreno Ocampo, 1996).

Interestingly enough, the most brutal stage of the military Junta was during Carter’s administration. His policy on human rights prompted the US to abandon their support to dictators in the Americas and even started to denounce the crimes committed. In the military front, the Malvinas War debacle against the United Kingdom accelerated the democratic transition and, by debilitating the armed forces’ legitimacy before the people, helped the implementation of a retributive justice strategy.

Historical period The Cold War, the Decolonisation Period and the Third Wave of Democratisation impacted the conflicts in South Africa, Rwanda and Argentina and prompted their end more than determining their transitions. It can be said that, their influence in transitions was indirect as a result of the impact that these processes had in the balance of power between the conflicting parties.

The Cold War influenced the spiral of violence in Argentina while its end accelerated the transition in South Africa. In Argentina, the pre-conflict stage that had started in 1955 and the escalation that ended in the 1976 coup can be described as a classical Cold War scenario where the US sought to maintain control over their natural zone of influence. On the other hand, the changes originated in the post-Cold War era —which focused the main powers’ attention in other regions— gave more space for manoeuvre to the post-apartheid South African leadership.

The decolonisation process that started in 1948 in India, affected both South Africa and Rwanda, although in different ways. The decolonisation policy in South Africa’s neighbours (mainly Namibia and Angola) altered the country’s geographical isolation barrier, its cordon sanitaire. On the side of Rwanda, the way in which Belgium left the country, exacerbated a conflict already latent between Hutu and Tutsi and created conditions for the establishment of an authoritarian regime. Although the post-decolonisation power struggle is not a sufficient cause to explain the genocide, it is a key element that increased ethnic tensions and allowed the development and growth of extremist groups like Habyarimana’s akazu and the Tutsi RPF that ultimately led to a civil war and genocide.

Huntington called the “Third Wave of Democratisation” to a global process of transitions from authoritarian regimes that started in the ’70s in Spain, Portugal and Greece, continued in the ’80s in Latin America and ended in Eastern Europe and Asia in the ’90s. Argentina was one of the first countries to undertake the transition from dictatorship to democracy in 1983, while Chile, Brazil and Uruguay were still governed by the military. This could have been dangerous for the new-born democracy but fortunately, by that time, those countries were already starting to envision their own negotiated transitions towards democracy.

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Regional context The regional influence upon the post-conflict strategy is connected to the leverage that neighbouring countries or regional organisations had domestically and regionally, their actual power as arbitrators, and their governmental ties with the country in conflict. In the cases analysed in this thesis, the regional context acted as influencers that affected the cycle of the conflict more than the choosing of the transition strategy. This was due, in part, to the fact that the neighbouring countries were undergoing similar political and social conflicts and transformations.

In South Africa, certain changes in the regional context helped to unravel the events that would end apartheid, i.e. the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe which destroyed South Africa’s isolation; the independence of Namibia originated by the UN Resolution 435 (1978); and South Africa’s failed incursion in Angola’s civil war (Maharaj, 2008).

In Rwanda, the OAU was ineffective during the genocide due to its internal divisions and the regional implications of the Tutsi-Hutu struggle. Rwanda’s conflict did not end within its territory and the confrontation between the Hutu and the Tutsi spilled-over into other countries (Uganda, Zaire (now DROC)) even during Rwanda’s transition. In this case, the regional context spawned the conflict and did not bring about peace.

In Argentina’s transition, the presence of authoritarian regimes in its neighbouring countries could have generated a more passive strategy of transitional justice, but two main reasons prevented that from happening: the weakened position of the Argentine armed forces after Malvinas and the fact that other neighbouring dictatorships had started or were starting to implement their strategies for a settled transition.

Type of transition The type of transition and the balance of power among the main parties appear as one of the main factors influencing the decision of the transitional justice and reconciliation strategies in the short term. In simpler words, initially, the decision between prosecution and pardon is political.

In South Africa, a truth commission with a conditional amnesty was the result of a negotiated transition after which the ousted regime retained grip on some of the political and judicial structures. It was a middle-ground between prosecution and blanket amnesty. The fact that the idea of an amnesty was brought up as a reconciliation tool before the truth commission was a proof of the equivalent power that the parties held. From the very start, that meant the abandonment of any retributive justice approach and the common decision to implement a truth commission mechanism with a conditional amnesty and restorative characteristics.

In Rwanda, the nature of the genocide and the position of the regime generated a zero-sum game in which the winner would take all. After an abrupt transition and without constraints, the victor

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(the RPF) could impose the punitive model that gained the upper-hand from the beginning with the judgement of genocidaires in international and national courts.

In Argentina, the Malvinas defeat, the catastrophic economic situation and the international pressure lessened the leverage that the military would have had in any other transitional scenario. All the attempts of the armed forces to control the transition were rejected. However, according to Grandin (2005), the transitions in Argentina was negotiated, it was a middle ground between the people’s demand for justice, the wish to avoid provoking the still-powerful military command, and their own understanding of the role of criminal jurisprudence in society.

As it was mentioned above, there are political reasons why transitional governments decide not to prosecute the heads of the old regimes or to apply an alternative transitional justice mechanism.

However, a realpolitik approach that favours a pragmatic transitional justice strategy without taking into consideration a holistic notion of reconciliation, is bound to deepen society’s divisions and exacerbate social resentment. In Argentina, for example, the retributive approach was a strong step forward, but it was later reversed by the same political power that had carried them out when the military regained some leverage and could halt the democratic transition. In Rwanda, on the other hand, the continuation of this asymmetric distribution of power in the post-conflict government allowed it to sustain a combined approach of retributive and restorative justice chosen in the first place.

POST-CONFLICT PHASE AND RECONCILIATION After having analysed the domestic and international factors that shaped South Africa’s, Rwanda’s and Argentina’s transitions, I will describe the transitional justice approaches that resulted from those experiences.

Sequencing Transitional societies face substantially complex processes that intervene in multiple sectors of the social and political life, exercising pressure on key actors and institutions. These actions could put strain on the transition and, therefore, applying a sequenced strategy appears as a useful option that allows the government to build on the previous stage and broaden its support base while eroding the power base of the spoilers of the process. It is fundamental to design a strategy where each step prepares and enforces the success of the next. It is not convenient to rush an ambitious reconciliation process if the society is not prepared, if it does not have strong institutions and public support to carry it out.

The Rwandan and the Argentine cases are examples of sequenced strategies, although they have an important difference: the Rwandan strategy is a descendent sequence from punishment (retributive justice) to reconciliation (restorative justice); the Argentine is an escalating sequence from truth commission (historic justice) to judicial proceedings (retributive justice).

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Rwandan’s post-conflict phase was determined by a two-stage transitional strategy to deal with the past and initiate reconciliation. The first stage had a purely punitive approach with the ICTR and the national courts proceedings while the second had a restorative one with the implementation of the gacaca. The first stage was the classic result of an abrupt transition, during which the victor imposed the transitional justice mechanism. Nevertheless, the gacaca was implemented to advance from punishment to reconciliation and to solve the material limitations of the retributive justice approach.

Argentina, on the other hand, applied an escalating sequencing, fundamentally to strengthen the process of democratisation and gradually limit the power that the outgoing military regime retained.

The first phase was a truth-seeking mechanism, the CONADEP, which, despite criticisms regarding its mandate and conformation, gave factual knowledge about the atrocities and the horror of the dictatorship and gathered essential documentation for the trials. The retributive phase was built on the evidence found by the CONADEP and on the public effect that this commission had had. After the CONADEP people knew what had happened and this widened the support base of the democratic regime to pursue punitive justice and assign responsibilities for those crimes (Wilke, 2004). The case of Argentina showed that truth-seeking mechanisms can cooperate with a strategy of punitive justice and that investigatory bodies can serve diverse objectives: gathering evidence to present cases before the courts, establishing institutional responsibilities, finding out the fate of the disappeared and, fundamentally, rallying people’s support by showing them the hidden truth. Based on the Argentine case, Crocker affirmed that those countries that choose to make a just transition by means of official investigatory bodies need not forgo the additional tool of trial and punishment (Crocker, 2000a:8).

South African truth and reconciliation commission: historical and restorative justice The post-conflict phase included the implementation of mechanisms to deal with the past. The chosen approach was a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that would grant conditional and individual amnesties in exchange for full public disclosure of the crimes committed before an impartial tribunal and public repentance. Those who refused would be tried in a court of law. These conditional amnesties were an innovation, because the formula “truth for amnesty” gave space to justice without jeopardising the transition (Cassin, 2006).

The TRC mandate was to investigate and record gross human rights violations occurred between st

March 1 1960, before the Sharpeville massacre, and the May 10 th 1994, when Mandela came to power.

The focus was neither on the effects of apartheid laws or on the general policies of the government, but on those crimes that were consequence of experiencing apartheid in every day life. The mandate was centred in “bodily integrity rights”5 and not in fundamental rights (SATRC, 1998:64). Adding to this investigation limitation, it must be mentioned that the disclosure was far from full, because the applicants revealed as little as possible leaving aside chains of command and orders.

5

5

“Bodily inte grity rights” includ e th e rig ht to life, to b e fre e fro m torture, fro m cru el, inhu m a n, or d e gra ding treat m e nt or punish m e nt, and th e rig ht to s e curity of th e pers o n (fre e d o m fro m a b ducti on and arbitrary d etenti on) (SATRC, 1 9 9 8: 6 4).

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Impartiality of the TRC For Desmond Tutu, the claim of many South Africans that considered the TRC as a “witch hunt” against Afrikaners and biased in favour of the ANC, was far from the truth (SATRC, 1998). In fact, Tutu opposed a potential self-amnesty for the ANC, threatened with his resignation and, thus, helped to sustain the credibility of the TRC and its commitment with the victims.

Some argue that the impartiality of the TRC was unquestionable, especially considering the opposition to its final report by the whole political arc (Lewis Herman, 2002; Kisiangani, 2004). Judith Lewis Herman (2002) stresses the importance of the impartiality of the TRC when it came to investigate past abuses and, especially, those committed by the ANC. The ANC believed that, because of the inherent justice of their cause, their crimes were justified and they did not have any responsibility.

Regarding the justification of violence due to “just cause”, Tutu affirmed that the higher moral ground does not mean carte blanche regarding the methods used in the struggle for liberation; it means to “assert that we move in a moral universe where right and wrong and justice and oppression matter” (SATRC, 1998:13-14). There is thus legal equivalence (Lewis Herman, 2002) although not equal gravity or responsibility among all perpetrators.

Rwanda’s combined approach Retributive approach: ICTR and national courts After its controversial role before and during the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council created the ICTR in November 1994, with the mandate of prosecuting acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the Geneva Conventions committed between January and December 1994.

The co-operation of the Rwandan government with the ICTR was fundamental to prosecute the masterminds of the genocide at a time in which some people doubted if there had been genocide (Hazan, 2006). Nonetheless, Hazan (2006) affirmed that, when the ICTR put some members of the regime under risk of prosecution, the government initiated a systematic obstruction. In fact, the ICTR never indicted anyone for the crimes committed in revenge or retaliation for the genocide. This and the internal problems of the ICTR weakened its credibility in the eyes of the Rwandans and the world.

The cases tried in national courts were heard in special courts of three judges. The role of the judiciary was criticised because it did not fulfil international standards and lacked effectiveness and fairness. Moreover, there was little political will and insufficient professional and legal personnel (most of them had been killed or were implicated) to remedy those shortcomings.

Restorative justice: the gacaca Once the Rwandan government had attained more stability and society’s reconstruction was underway, the government implemented a restorative justice approach that seemed impossible in 1994 (Graybill, 2004) when the government and the people demanded the punishment of those responsible

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for the genocide. The restorative mechanism chosen was the gacaca, a mechanism based on the principle that the offenses committed must be recounted, disclosed and tried before the community (Kritz, 2005:27). This mechanism was able to achieve a double purpose of ending the cycle of impunity while making it compatible with reconciliation. Even more, the complementarities of justice and reconciliation enhanced the effect of both over the local population and fostered the idea of promoting TJMs in other post-conflict societies.

As Graybill (2004) explains, the ICTR was mainly directed at a Western audience very few Rwandans of the rural communities got to see its convictions, while the gacaca was in every community, available for anyone who wanted to take part in it, ensuring the participation in the reconciliation process at a local level (PRI, 2000). In the gacaca, victims must come face to face with their attackers, tell their stories and lay out all their emotions in a secure environment (Graybill, 2004); it reintegrates the perpetrator and foster apologies and forgiveness, promoting reconciliation and reconstructing relations in the community.

There is also a truth commission element in the gacaca, because perpetrators and victims are given the chance to recount history and reconstruct it before and with the community. At the cell level, the adult population “participate[s] in clarifying the facts and establishing a comprehensive record of the genocide as it transpired in their village” (Kritz, 2005:27). Through the gacaca, the community has a chance to tell the story from their position and without the mediation by the government or pressure groups. However, there were variables that could affect the gacaca (Uvin, 2003): distrust or dislike of the government (and their actions post-genocide), the memories of the soldiers’ behaviour immediately after the genocide, and the economy.

Argentina’s escalating strategy Truth commission phase: the CONADEP Five days after assuming as president, Alfonsín created the CONADEP, with a limited mandate of clarifying the acts related to forced disappearances and the location of the remains and leaving aside crimes like temporary disappearances, staged killings, forced exile, acts of violence from the opposition and crimes prior to the 1976 coup (Hayner, 2006). This last item was contested because it left aside from the inquiry members of the Peronist party which had initiated the “state terrorism” with the creation of the Triple A and the authorisation (by decree) to “annihilate” the subversive groups.

The military pressure regarding investigations of the past and Alfonsín’s necessity to strengthen a young democracy and to tackle other issues generated a restrained commission and the governmental support to the “theory of the two devils” that held the military and the guerrilla equally responsible for Argentina’s violence in the ’70s. Despite those limitations, the CONADEP had a fundamental role in Argentina’s history. It gathered over 50,000 pages of evidence and complaints and its report Nunca más (Never Again) was a best-seller for many years. Furthermore, it demonstrated that a cooperative action between the government and human rights organisations can “take important steps toward establishing

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the painful truth about repression which took place just a few years earlier, provided that the political will is available to investigate and report that truth” (Americas Watch, 1991:19).

Retributive phase: judicial proceedings The decision to prosecute the members of the three Juntas for the crimes committed in their “war against subversion” was very much applauded. Alfonsín also ordered the prosecution of seven guerrilla leaders (of Montoneros and the ERP) another sign of the “theory of the two devils” (Americas Watch, 1991). Although the decision to prosecute all the parties involved was correct, there should have been a clear differentiation between “violence from the state” and “violence against the state”.

These trials were a hallmark in the history of Argentina and the world and an example of the positive effects of applying this kind of approach after an authoritarian regime. As Wilke affirms, if courts recognise killings or torture as crimes, they delegitimise public discourses justifying these crimes and spread the message: “this should not have happened” (2004:5).

Impunity Carrying out an ambitious retributive approach without the proper social and political safeguards, or a holistic view of reconciliation, generated political instability and prompted the government to take a huge step backwards in the search for justice and reconciliation. The great number of judicial claims presented to the courts by victims and relatives provoked a military reaction and campaign against the trials that pressured the government into passing the Ley de Punto Final (Full Stop Law) in 1986, which established a deadline for initiating criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of human rights abuses. The Easter rebellion of 1987 proved that the military had the power to halt the democratic transition forcing the government to pass the Ley de Obediencia Debida (Due Obedience).

These impunity laws where further complemented by Carlos Menem’s presidential pardons that stopped proceedings against almost 400 persons and freed all of the convicted perpetrators (Wilke, 2004).

To overcome the limitation of the impunity laws, a series of procedures were enacted mainly by the relatives of victims and human rights organisations, i.e. trials for crimes related to the abduction of babies and the alteration of their identity, which were not covered by the impunity laws; the enactment of “truth trials” in foreign courts (Wilke, 2004) and before the Inter-American Human Rights system (Commission and Court); the pursuit of a declaration of unconstitutionality of the “impunity laws” from the national courts. This last initiate was finally achieved in 2005 when the Supreme Court invalidated the amnesty laws confirming the Law 25.779 of 2003 that had declared them null and void.

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Getting to the Best Rec on ciliati on Strate gy

GETTING TO THE BEST RECONCILIATION STRATEGY The conditioning domestic and international factors described above may incline transitional governments to implement a certain approach to reconciliation that do not necessarily satisfy society’s need to deal with the past. Taking this into account and, in order to implement a holistic approach to reconciliation and transitional justice, there is a need to potentiate to the fullest the social forces that favour such approach.

Drawing from the cases analysed above as well as the literature regarding reconciliation, there are a few selected measures that can cooperate to create a strong support constituency that helps the nation to further on its quest towards justice and reconciliation without conflict regressions: 1. Proper sequencing. This is an interesting tactic for escalating the reconciliation and transitional justice strategy without overstretching the society’s capability to deal with past. Sequencing consists in implementing a holistic approach in a progressive manner, where the results of the first phase could affirm society’s commitment to defend the process. There are no rules as to which mechanism — retributive, restorative or truth-seeking— should be implemented first, because that it conditioned by the factors explained in the previous chapter. Sequencing allows the government to build on the previous step and improve its negotiating position against the parties that want to annihilate the process or secure their impunity. This tactic carries many benefits:

a.

It addresses the essential issue of building legitimacy of exercise to complement the legitimacy of origin, which widens the room of manoeuvre to implement all the phases and safeguard the process.

b.

It considers the complexity of the process, including whether the prerequisites for specific measures are in place, whether the mandate, objectives and implementation strategy are coordinated and whether sufficient consideration is being given to complementarity and synergies (Zupan and Servaes, 2007). It prevents the overlapping of tasks and resources.

c.

It establishes a feasible process in political terms and responds to the real possibilities of reconciliation.

d.

It addresses the demands of different parties without disrupting the process.

e.

It allows the government to tackle other urgent socio-economic issues like physical and housing security in the short-term. It cuts the classical division lines in society —may they be ethnic, racial, national or religious— by creating new types of relationship among the people.

2. Create or strengthen the reconciliation constituency: One fundamental step towards reconciliation is creating a broad-based social coalition that favours negotiations and transitional justice and organising formal forums to discuss the process. As Bleeker points out, the emergence of multiple actors in society represents a demilitarisation of culture and a pluralistic society which is essential to neutralise the supporters of violence (2006:158). This diversity should be complemented with a legitimate internal

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leadership that considers justice and reconciliation as national interests and not sectarian agendas that turn reconciliation into “victor’s justice”.

A well-planned and implemented outreach and communication strategy is vital to build a reconciliation constituency. The authorities must communicate clearly all the aspects of the strategy and open a national debate, seeking the collaboration of respected people within the nation.

Another important component of this policy is to include the debate of transitional justice and reconciliation in the educational syllabus of elementary schools, high schools and universities. Usually, this is a mid-term measure taken when transitional justice mechanisms are already developed or in their advanced stages, but it should be implemented from the very beginning in order to open a new space of dialogue within the school and the family. Educational institutions are a second circle of socialisation for children and teenagers and an ideal space to internalise important values like justice, solidarity, the respect for human dignity and human rights and to build up citizenship.

3. Support the victims during the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. The avoidance of the risk of re-victimisation must be a central task of the state in transitional societies. Reconciliation must always take into account the feelings of the victims including their view of reconciliation and transitional justice. Forcing the victims into a scheme of transitional justice that limits or conditions their right to justice can be a dangerous precedent and can perpetuate demands that will eventually jeopardise the political transition. Paul Van Zyl (2006) expresses the importance of prioritising the needs of victims when adopting a retributive strategy by helping them with the healing process by listening to their stories and giving them the possibility of overcoming such violent past.

4. Carry out institutional reforms: It might be useful to seize momentum during a transition to carry out institutional reforms, while legitimacy and popular mobilisation favourable to change are strong. A broad institutional reform implies the creation or reconfiguration of state institutions in order to fulfil human needs, uphold human rights (political, civil, economic, social and cultural) and avoid a relapse into conflict. It means that “the political system and state institutions must be able to create and safeguard room for equal opportunities, democratic participation and reconciliation processes in the long term” (Zupan and Servaes, 2007).

The implementation of good governance policies that reinforce the political systems and the rule of law is a great way of rebuilding society’s strength and confidence in problematic transitions. Good governance means the capacity to make decisions and to implement them and has eight characteristics: participation, consensus, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, equality and inclusiveness, and the rule of law (ESCAP, 2009). It minimises corruption, secures the representation of minorities and the most vulnerable groups in the decision-making process (ESCAP, 2009).

Getting to the Best Rec on ciliati on Strate gy

The reform of the security sector is another issue that must be taken into account. People must feel that those in charge of the judiciary are able and willing to deliver justice. Law enforcement and police reform include police capacity-building, human rights education, building a new relationship between the forces and the people, and fighting against any ethnic or cultural bias.

There is a close link between transitional justice mechanisms and political system and state institutions reform; therefore the integration of transitional justice in institutional reform projects might potentiate both (Zupan and Servaes, 2007). An example would be the establishment of lustration and screening in recruitment processes for public office and security forces (Zupan and Servaes, 2007).

5. Do not postpone policies for socio-economic development: Post-conflict societies have multiple issues that need immediate resolution and scarce resources to tackle them. In most cases, due to social demands, political urges or international pressure, governments focus in transitional justice ignoring that one of the main causes of violence is social injustice (distributive and economic) and inequality.

Particularly, in this item, the help of the UN, World Bank, other international organisations and NGOs is fundamental to design programmes suitable for unique national contexts, including: infrastructure, sanitary facilities, communications, food security, agricultural development, education, etc.

6. Integrate local methods of conflict resolution: Bleeker affirms that transitional justice is a contentious matter that can create a new dynamic for conflict resolution, if it is managed properly, or can lead to violence if it lacks legitimacy, technical resources and dialogue (2006:158). For transitional justice to succeed, “multi-track” mediation is essential because it ensures ownership of the process and guarantees its implementation (Bleeker, 2006). Culture is of great influence on the way in which a society creates and solves conflicts; therefore, it is fundamental to create processes that integrate social practices to facilitate the regeneration of the social fabric.

7. Promote a strong civil society: Fortify the structures of the civil society that are normally disunited and weak after conflict or an authoritarian regime and encourage them to transcend the “grass roots” and promote the broadest possible dialogue to reinforce the support of transitional justice (Crocker, 2000a). However, it must be recognised that this sector has limitations to carry out its mission without government support. As Crocker explains, civil society cannot and must not replace the state. It can supplement, evaluate and control, but it is the government’s role to secure “some forms of prosecution, punishment, investigation, compensation and commemoration” (Crocker, 2000a:23).

The decision to initiate prosecutions for human rights violations is a political one. Serious government efforts are needed to overcome procedural and institutional obstacles to prosecutions (Wilke, 2004). Thus, strengthening political support for prosecutions is crucial. NGOs should understand that they can play a key role in pressuring the government into creating conditions under which prosecutions are possible.

Getting to the Best Rec on ciliati on Strate gy

8. Seek international cooperation for support and capacity building: International civil society organisations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) can bring legitimacy to domestic civil groups and elected governments that pursue transitional justice based on their appeal to human rights and the necessity in a post-conflict society to deal with the past (Crocker, 2000a).

External actors should cooperate in educating and training the top-levels of all sectors to create a new generation of leaders with capacity and skills to deal with the past (Bleeker, 2005) and launch a new era in their society. The assistance must be focused on building capacity and providing the instruments necessary to build reconciliation on local foundations.

The international community can contribute in two ways: as a source of information, expertise and training; and in the development of international humanitarian and human rights laws that foster the setting of standards in the international legal order (Bloomfield et al, 2003).

Getting to the Best Rec on ciliati on Strate gy

Conclusi o ns

CONCLUSIONS Identifying the definitions of reconciliation and transitional justice chosen by any transitional government is important because those notions are intimately related to the implementation, the outcome and the socio-political purpose of the post-conflict strategy. John Paul Lederach (1997) defined reconciliation as a holistic concept, a meeting-point of four values: justice, mercy, peace and truth; a delicate balance among relationship-building, forgiveness, historical truth and justice. Although there is a general accord regarding the convenience of implementing this approach to reconciliation, the actual application of this concept is very limited. As stated above, the definition of reconciliation and transitional justice may vary according to structural conditions (culture, psychology, etc.) and political agendas. Post-conflict governments sometimes apply a more limited notion of reconciliation (as punitive justice, as a shared truth, as forgiveness and relationship-building, as coexistence or as forgetfulness) following their political convenience or feasibility.

In the case of South Africa, reconciliation equalled “moving forward”, rebuilding the “new South Africa”, a multicultural and unified state. The main parties of the conflict favoured a restorative approach with truth-seeking elements as a means of acknowledging the past while focusing on the future. Initially, in Rwanda, reconciliation meant justice and punishment. Retributive justice was the corollary of this approach to answer the demand of punishment wanted by the Tutsi and the government. As time went by, due to many material and social factors, a broader notion of reconciliation that included new relationship-building and forgiveness was adopted. In Argentina, the motto of many people after the Proceso was “Juicio y Castigo” (Indictment and Punishment). The word reconciliation was forbidden and seen as an insult, even equalled to impunity. All those who sustained a notion of reconciliation that included relationship-building and forgiveness were seen as supporters of the military. For a great part of the people, it was about transitional justice alone and not reconciliation because, in their view, there was no reconciliation possible with murderers.

The hypothesis that the choice of the reconciliation and transitional justice strategy is conditioned by domestic and international factors which, in the short-term, limit the options and mechanisms liable to be used in dealing with the past was demonstrated. There is no universal recipe to attain reconciliation because many factors incline the election of the strategy towards a certain approach. No size fits all and all reconciliation and transitional justice processes must take into account the characteristics of the conflict, the actors involved, the context, the international influencers and the type of transition. It is impossible to design a successful reconciliation strategy if it is not deducted from the reality in which it is taking place. Therefore, the imposition of foreign models or paradigms could risk, as seen in the case of Rwanda, a relapse into conflict or the collapse of the transition.

As for the domestic factors that condition the transition, the cases of South Africa and Rwanda have shown that, if the conflict is rooted in a society’s history and the causes go beyond a simple political juncture, restorative and truth-seeking approaches are great tools to deal with the past. Moreover, if

Conclusi o ns

there are social inequalities and lack of access to essential resources, reconciliation would be impossible without addressing social injustices.

In th e c as es of Argentina and Rwanda — alth ou g h w ith s o m e li mitati ons — w h er e it w a s p ossi bl e to cl early id entify the m a st er-m i n ds b e hind th e m o b ilisati on strate gy to w ards th e c o nflicts, as w e ll as th e trig g ers, a retributiv e appr oa c h w a s m o r e feasi bl e and e v e n m o r e appr opriate to d el e giti mis e suc h pr o c ess es and cr eate th e c oll e ctiv e n oti on that c ollusi ons to c o m m it suc h cri m e s w o uld n ot b e tol erated.

Th e m ilitary junta in Argentina d e m o n strated that the nature of th e auth ority of the re gi m e influen c es th e p ossi bility of c arryin g o ut le gal pr o c e e din gs, ex c ept w h e n their existen c e refl e ct a d e ep er c o nflict in w h i c h c as e a c o m b in e d appr oa c h c ould b e m o r e appr opriate. Th e c o nni van c e b et w e e n toplead ers of th e g o v ern m e nt and th e s e curity s e ct or to es c alate a c o nflict and c o m m it cri m e s, w h i c h existed in th e thre e c as es analys ed, tends to sug g est that instituti onal ref or m sh ould b e a top pri ority al on g w ith truth-s e e kin g m e c h anis m s and retributiv e justic e.

As for the cri m e s c o m m itted, th er e ar e t w o k ey issues to e v aluate in rec o n ciliati on pr o c ess: the o b li gati on of th e state to pr os e cute cri m e s a gainst hu m anity and the differ entiati on b et w e e n w ar cri m e s, c o m m o n cri m e s and m i n or offens es. Th e pursuit of a rest orativ e appr oa c h sh ould n ot m e a n a state’s renun ciati on to c o m ply w ith internati onal and nati onal o bli gati ons (this w a s a m aj or d e b at e in South Africa re gardin g th e esta blish m e nt of aparth eid as a cri m e a gainst hu m anity and in Argentina as a c o ns e qu en c e of the “i m punity la ws ”). On the oth er han d, for the sak e of re c o n ciliati on, m i n or offens es and oth er cri m e s c ould b e d ealt w ith fr o m a rest orativ e perspe ctiv e, as sh o w n in Rwanda w ith the m o d ernis ed ga c a c a . Th e e n a ct m e nt of c o n diti onal a m n esties in South Africa re m ains c o ntr o v ersial du e to their qu esti on e d le giti m a c y and th e effe ctiv en ess of th eir i mpl e m e ntati on to d eal w ith th e past.

Th e identificati on of the m ain parties w a s crucial in Argentina and in Rwanda w h e n it w a s n e c essary to d et er min e the le v el of resp onsi bility for the i mpl e m e ntati on of the retributiv e appr oa c h.

Anoth er k ey issue in c as es of ci vil w ars and internal c o nflicts of si milar nature is to differ entiate b et w e e n vi ol en c e fr o m or a gainst the state. Violen c e ex erted fro m th e state lik e th e m ilitary junta in Argentina, Habyari m ana and the akazu in Rwanda, and th e NP’s aparth eid in South Africa c ann ot b e c o m par ed w ith the vi ol en c e c arried o ut b y th e gu errilla gr oups, th e RPF or the ANC. When th e state is the perpetrat or, it acts a gainst its o w n nature w h i c h is to attain the c o m m o n g o o d and th e w e lfar e of its p opulati on.

An i mp ortant less on dra w n fr o m the analys ed c as es is that a s o ci ety that und er g o es a rec o n ciliati on pr o c ess n e e ds to addr ess its c oll e ctiv e b e h a vi our pri or and durin g th e c o nflict, and the b est w a y of d oin g that is thr ou g h rest orativ e justic e and h ealin g. Undou btedly, th er e is a s o cial resp onsi bility in e v ery c o nflict b e c aus e n othin g happ ens if th e m aj ority of th e p opulati on d o es n ot w a nt it to happen.

Usually, in transiti onal peri ods, w h e n th er e is a n e e d of putting s o ci ety b a c k o n its fe et, all th e guilt and resp onsi bility is c h arg e d up on th e top-lead ers. Ho w e v er, th os e lead ers d o n ot c o m e o ut of n o w h er e; th ey rea c h p o w er — m a y it b e d e fa ct o or d e jure— b e c aus e they pers onify v alu es and attitud es that ar e pres ent in a s o ci ety, and in m o st c as es, in the m aj ority of th e pe opl e.

Culture is a crucial el e m e nt in c h o o sin g th e re c o n ciliati on strate gy and in d e alin g w ith th e past.

As m e nti on e d b ef or e, so m e cultures m a y prefer traditi onal or c o m m u nity-b as e d m e c h anis m s to h e al and to addr ess past gri e v an c es instead of a punitiv e appr oa c h. Cultures ha v e p ositiv e and n e g ativ e el e m e nts

Conclusi o ns

re gardin g the n oti on of c o nflict and pea c e but, w ith out any d ou bt, they c an cl os e th e g ap b et w e e n th e p ossi bl e and the ideal rec o n ciliati on strate gy, lik e in the c as e of Rwanda’s ga c a c a syste m. Cultural and traditi onal c o stu m es and b e h a vi ours m a y b e crucial to und erstand the c o m pl ex l o gi c of c o nflict and th e k ey to o p e n th e d o or to w ards n e w relati onship-buildin g and rec o n ciliati on lik e South Africa’s phil os ophy of u buntu and its c hurc h es.

Social c o h esi v en ess m a y c o n diti on the appr oa c h to re c o n ciliati on and th e m o r e frag m e nt ed a s o ci ety is, th e m o r e fo cus e d and l o cal th e pr o c ess n e e d to b e. For exa m pl e, in Rwanda, th e frag m e ntati on that rei gn e d a m o n g th e p opulati on re quir ed a b ott o m-up m e c h anis m to s ol v e th e distan c e and th e estran g e m e nt a m o n g n ei g h b ours and b et w e e n the m and th e state.

Regardin g the i mp ortanc e of the rule of la w, the i m m e diat e re-instal m e nt of the rule of la w and the judiciary w a s d et er minant to reinf or c e th e p olicy of pursuin g a retributiv e appr oa c h in transiti onal Argentina. On the oth er han d, Rwanda’s exa m pl e sh o w e d that d espite ha vin g p olitical ro o m of m a n o eu vr e to instate judicial pr o c e e din gs, th e lac k of a stabl e and i mpartial judiciary m a y e n dan g er rec o n ciliati on.

In this gl o b alized w o rld, internati onal fact ors ex ert an influen c e in d o m e stic p olitical pr o c ess es.

In th e c as es analys ed in this th esis, th e internati onal c o m m unity and the influential p o w ers influen c e d the life cy cl e of the c o nflicts w h i c h, in turn, affect ed their type of transiti on. This w a s cl early s e e n in the c as e of Argentina, w h er e th e d efeat in th e Malvinas w ar d estr oy e d th e m ilitary’s le giti m a cy b ef or e th e pe opl e and facilitated an asy m m etric — alth ou g h n e g otiated — transiti on. In South Africa, influential p o w ers pressur ed for the e n d of aparth eid but did n ot pursue an a g gr essi v e transiti onal justic e a g en da. In Rwanda, influential p o w ers shap e d th e p olitical pr o c ess sinc e th e d e c ol onisati on, and th eir rol e — eith er b y o m i ssi on or o v er-reacti on — durin g th e last phas e of th e c o nflict and the g e n o cid e, c h an g e d substantiv ely the p olitical sc enari o of the transiti on.

Th e type of transiti on and th e b alan c e of p o w er a m o n g the m ain parties w e r e d e cisiv e in th e s el e cti on of th e transiti onal justic e and re c o n ciliati on strate gy in the thre e c as es studi ed. Th e a brupt transiti on in Rwanda and th e n e g otiated transiti on in Argentina shar ed the fact of an asy m m etric b alan c e of p o w er b et w e e n th e parties w h i c h all o w e d a m o r e a m biti ous appr oa c h lik e retributiv e justic e. On th e oth er e n d, South Africa’s transiti on w a s n e g otiated b et w e e n t w o parties that h eld a gr eat d e gr e e of p o w er, ther ef or e, they w er e inclin ed to a less pr o bl e m atic appr oa c h lik e a truth-s e e kin g m e c h anis m w ith a rest orativ e el e m e nt w h i c h includ ed a c o n diti onal a m n esty.

Despite the c o nsid erati ons m a d e a b o v e, if a rec o n ciliati on strate gy is d e cid e d s ol ely o n p olitical gr ounds and o n th e existin g b alan c e of p o w er, as s o o n as that c o-relati on c han g e, the path tak en c ould b e und on e and s o ci ety c ould b e for c e d to reliv e its painful past as in th e c as e of Argentina w ith the Due Obedi en c e and Full Stop La ws. In oth er w o r ds, if a transiti on or rec o n ciliati on strate gy is s ol ely b as e d in the sh ort-ter m influen c e of the type of transiti on, it is p ossi bl e that it c ould v ary in th e m i d- and l on gter m.

In c o n clusi on, transiti ons ar e n ot d e v el op e d in a v a cuu m and, m o r e oft en than n ot, g o v ern m e nts in c h arg e of transiti onal pr o c ess es o pt for th e feasi bl e strate gy and n ot the ideal strate gy to w ards rec o n ciliati on. Th er ef or e, stren gth enin g the s o cial forc es that fav our a h olistic appr oa c h to rec o n ciliati on and d e bilitatin g th e sp oil ers of the pr o c ess c ould all o w transiti onal g o v ern m e nts to cl os e th e current g ap

Conclusi o ns

b et w e e n w h at s e e m s feasi bl e and w h at s e e m s to b e th e b etter suited strate gy. Th e appr oa c h is n ot to rush an a m biti ous rec o n ciliati on pr o c ess that w ill falter w ith out instituti ons and public supp ort to c arry it o ut.

Rather, th e strate gy sh ould fo cus o n m e asur es that add to that eff ort includin g: Creatin g or stren gth enin g the rec o n ciliati on c o nstituen cy; Supportin g th e vi cti m s and takin g int o c o nsid erati on th eir vi e w s and o pini ons; Carryin g o ut instituti onal ref or m s that e nsur e the fulfil m e nt hu m an n e e ds and the uph old of th e rule of la w; Impl e m e ntin g p olici es for s o ci o-e c o n o m i c d e v el op m e nt; Fav ourin g l o cal o w n ership of the pr o c ess; Pro m otin g a str on g ci vil s o ci ety; Seekin g internati onal c o o p erati on for supp ort and c apa city buildin g.

Th e clai m that truth b y itself, or justic e b y itself, c an lead to re c o n ciliati on is a m i s c o n c epti on that, rath er than layin g the foundati on for re c o n ciliati on, c ould risk g e n eratin g m o r e gri e v an c es and c o nflicts. Thus, rec o n ciliati on sh ould b e treated as a bidir e cti onal pr o c ess: o n e fac e that l o o k s int o the past to ac k n o wl e d g e and re m e dy past w r o n gs, and oth er fac e that l o o k s int o th e future to rec o n cil e estran g e d parties and to g e n erate pea c eful w a ys of m a n a gin g c o nflicts.

Rec on ciliati on is als o a n on-lin ear pr o c ess w h er e the interacti on b et w e e n m e c h anis m s w ill ha v e an e n d result differ ent than th e su m of th e parts. Th e d e v el op m e nt of a tail or ed and uni qu e r oad-m a p to rec o n ciliati on d o es n ot c o ntradict th e id ea of i mpl e m e ntin g a h olistic appr oa c h in p ost-c o nflict s o ci eti es that m a y includ e retributiv e justic e (acc ountability and e n d of i mpunity), rest orativ e justic e (victi ms’ reha bilitati on, rest orati on of th e psyc h ol o gi cal, physical and s o cial w e ll-b ein g da m a g e d b y past w r o n gs), hist orical justic e (truth c o m m i ssi on), s o cial justic e and distributiv e justic e. Th e a bs en c e of a c o m pl e m e ntary appr oa c h to rec o n ciliati on, a n oti on w h er e justic e, truth and rec o n ciliati on ar e c o nsid er ed inc o m p atibl e g o als, c an gi v e w a y to a superficial and fragil e re c o n ciliati on.

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