/zuneidu

A Look at the Efforts of the Ecowas Sub-Region Towards Combating the Proliferation of Salw

BY

Osman Sham-Un Zuneidu A T H E S I S P R E S E N T E D I N PA R T I A L C O M P L E T I O N O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S O F

The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

A LOOK AT THE EFFORTS OF THE ECOWAS SUB-REGION TOWARDS COMBATING THE PROLIFERATION OF SALW

BY

CAPTAIN ZUNEIDU SHAM-UN OSMAN

GHANA ARMED FORCES (ARMY EDUCATION CORPS)

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF CERTIFICATE - OF -TRAINING IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS (COTIPSO)

i

A LOOK AT THE EFFORTS OF THE ECOWAS SUB-REGION TOWARDS COMBATING THE PROLIFERATION OF SALW

A Thesis

BY CAPTAIN ZUNEIDU SHAM-UN OSMAN GHANA ARMED FORCES (ARMY EDUCATION CORPS) Presented in Partial Completion of the Requirement of The Certificate - of -Training in Peace Support Operations (COTIPSO) Submitted:

________________

________

Signature of student

Forwarded Recommending Approval: _____________

Date

_________

Signature of Thesis Adviser

Approved:

_______________ Signature of Thesis Coordinator

Date

________ Date

ii

Abstract

From the day when the skies of Timbuktu were lit by the flame of three thousand (3,000) Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)1 voluntarily surrendered by disaffected northern Tuaregs and Arabs and the Malian government in 19962 to the day when Governments of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)3 entered into a ‘voluntary agreement’4 until this period of the signing of a legally and politically binding agreement5 to control the free flow and easy accessibility of SALW through their borders for all manner of uses and misuses by state and non-state actors (NSAs), West Africa has demonstrated a very strong political and practical will to stem the proliferation of the ‘Weapons of mass destruction in slow motion’6 (Kofi Annan). However, small arms by themselves do not cause conflict; their presence fuels conflicts that are caused by other factors. Therefore, the fight against the proliferation of SALW must go in tandem with similar initiatives to address the root causes of conflict.

The fight against the proliferation of SALW will not have the desired impact if the critical mass of people, governments and civil society do not understand the history, nature and scope of the evolving campaign and also the terminology used in the advocacy for transparency, control and management of weapon stock piles.

iii

DEDICATION This work is especially dedicated to the memories of my childhood friend (Abdulai Mahama. a.k.a Quash) who was shot and killed by armed robbers on the highway Kumasi -Tamale on the 2nd December 2009 leaving behind a wife and three (3) children and to the memories of all those who have been killed in conflicts (in which SALW have been used) in the northern part of Ghana and elsewhere in the world. They did not have to die if we were to have weapons free society in this world.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I began thinking about weapons free society ever since the 1994 communal conflicts in the northern region which killed thousands people and displaced several others. I was then doing my national service, as a classroom teacher in Yendi Abartey Junior High School (after my Advance Level Education) when the war broke out. The Yendi town and surrounding villages was deep in the conflict zone.

However, I had already experienced other low intensity chieftaincy conflict situations.

Experiencing everyday life in weapons infested society with the constant threat of gun-related crime gave rise to my interest in the small arms problems. My initial thoughts were greatly reinforced by my experience as a soldier in peacekeeping theaters and by the brutal murder of the late Yaa Naa Yakubu Andani II (the over lord of Dagbon traditional area in northern Ghana) and forty (40) others in Yendi in 2003 during an enduring age old chieftaincy dispute.

Someone from a society without this problems (however, no society is free of some form of small arms related problems in this world) cannot fully understanding what life is like for those who have to worry not only about providing a roof over their heads and putting food on the table, but also about protecting themselves and their loved ones from the huge consequences of small arms proliferation.

Never in my life have I seen such a strong belief that the future will bring mostly good. What a great society it would have been without all these ‘weapons of mass destruction in slow motion’ and with an enduring culture of peace.

v

There are several persons who deserve to be mentioned here. First I would like to thank Almighty God for his blessings and guidance.

First, I will like to thank my supervisor Col. Carl Marowski (rtd) of Chile for guiding a sometimes disillusioned writer through the process of writing this Thesis. Confronting the huge task of writing a thesis was initially a bit scary for an ambitious young man but his belief in me (even though we have not met in person) was of great help especially in the initial phase. Second, I am very grateful for all the help I have received from Mr. George Oliver, Vanessa Trochez and all the staff of the Institute of Peace Support Operations. My sincere thanks also go to the Officers and Men of the Canadian Peace Support Training Center - Kingston Ontario, Dr Kwesi Aning and the staff of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Department (CPMRD) of the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Center (KAIPTC), Accra, Mr Emanuel Sowartey of Ghana National Peace Council, Accra, Mr Gyebi Asante of Ghana National Commission on Small Arms (GNCSA), Accra, Chief Sup Aboagye Nyarku of the Ghana Police Service ( Head of Ghana National Fire Arms Bureau, Police HQ, Accra) and also Madam Afi Yakubu and Theodora Williams of Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA), Accra. These are the people and Institutions from where I harvested my information. All the credits in this work belong to them and all shot-comings are mine. Last but not the least; I thank my family sincerely for their cooperation throughout the project.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page……………………………………………………………..i Certification...…………………………………………………………ii Abstract...……………………………………………………………..iii Dedication...…………………………………………………………..iv Acknowledgement…………………………………………………...v Table of Contents……………………………………………………………..vii List of Annexes………………………………………………………xii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1.1

Introduction……………………………………………………..1

1.2

Aim……………………………………………………………….5

1.3

Purpose and Relevance……………………………………….5

1.4

Statement of the problem...……………………………………6

1.5

Research Methodology and Limitations……………………...7

1.6

Literature Review/Timeline…………………………………….8

Notes and References

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 2.1

SALW Defined…………………………………………………15

2.2

The Concept of Arms Control. ……………………………….16

2.2.01

SALW Control…………………………………………….17

2.2.02

Disarmament………………………………………..20

2.2.03

DDR…………………………………………………..21

2.2.04

SALW Control vrs DDR ……………………………21 vii

2.2.05

International and Regional Agreements …………….23

2.2.06

SALW Control Measures………………………………24

2.2.07

Guiding Principles of SALW Control Progammes….25

2.2.08

Types of SALW Control Programmes……………….25

2.2.09

Components of SALW Control Programmes……….26

2.2.10

National SALW Commissions (NATCOMS) and Legislations…………………………………………….27

2.3

SALW Proliferation as a Security, Development, Gender and Human Rights Issue…………………………………………28

2.4

The Role of various Stakeholders in Fighting Against the Proliferation of SALW…………………………………………..35 2.4.01

The Role of Governments…………………………...36

2.4.02

The Role of Parliaments……………………………..38

2.4.03

The Role of the International Community………….38

2.4.04

The Role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs)…..39

Notes and References

CHAPTER THREE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MORATORIUM AND THE CONVENTION 3.1.1 Agreements on SALW Control…………………………………50 3.1.01

The Bamako Declaration of the African Union….50

3.1.02

The UN Firearms Protocol………………………...52

3.1.03

UN Programme of Action (PoA)…………………..53

3.1.04

UN Security Council Resolution 1373……………54

3.1.05

ECOWAS Moratorium……………………………..55

3.1.06

The ECOWAS Convention………………………..58 viii

3.1.2 Detailed Analysis of the Moratorium and the Convention and their Implementation.

3.2.01

History of Moratoria…………………………….60

3.2.02

Background to the Moratorium………………..61

3.2.03

Analysis of the Moratorium…………………….64

3.2.04

Addressing Root Causes of Conflicts in West Africa………………………………………64

3.2.05

Analysis of the Implementation of the Moratorium………………………………………67 3.2.05.1

Establishment of National Commissions……………………….69

3.2.05.2

Exemptions………………………....71

3.2.05.3

Arms Collection and Destruction…72

3.2.05.4

Enhancement of Border Controls…73

3.2.05.5

Training of Security Personnel……74

3.2.05.6

Harmonisation of Laws…………….75

3.2.05.7

Peacekeeping Arms Register……..77

3.2.05.8

Regional Arms Register and Database……………………………78

3.2.06

Analysis of the Implementation of the Convention……………………………………….78 3.2.06.1

Preamble…………………………….79

3.2.06.2

Definitions and Objectives………....80

3.2.06.3

Transfers of SALW …………………81

3.2.06.4

Manufacture of SALW………………82

3.2.06.5

Highlights of other Key Issues in the Convention……………………83 ix

3.2.06.6

Civilian possession………………….84

3.2.06.7

Management and Security of Stockpiles…………………………...84

3.2.06.8

Marking………………………………85

3.2.06.9

Tracing……………………………….85

3.2.06.10 Brokering…………………………….86 3.2.06.11 Other measures…………………….87 3.2.06.12 Potential Implementation Challenges………………………….88 Notes and References

CHAPTER FOUR: SALW IN WEST AFRICA 4.1

Brief Profile of ECOWAS ……………………………………98

4.2

ECOWAS on Peace and Security in West Africa………..101

4.3

The Menace of SALW in WA………………………………113

4.4

Ghana and the Problem of SALW………………………...118 4.4.01

Manifestations of SALW Violence in Ghana…...125

4.4.02

Ghana's Legislation on Arms and Ammunition and the ECOWAS Convention on SALW……..126

4.4.03

Implementation Structures……………………….131

4.4.05

Ghana National Commission on Small Arms (GNCSA) at Work…………………………………132

4.4.06

Challenges Facing Ghana and the Way Forward……………………………………………137

Notes and References

x

CHAPTER FIVE: 5.1

Conclusion…………………………………………………….153

5.2

Recommendations……………………………………………156

xi

List of Annexes Annex - I ….. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Annex - II ….. Definition of Terms Annex - III ….. Figures and Boxes Annex - IV ….. Bibliography Annex - V ….. Timeline on Small Arms Control Initiatives Annex - VI ….. African Groups Working on SALW Control Campaigns Annex - VII….. Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons - 1 December 2000.

Annex - VIII … Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2001.

Annex-IX….. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 2001.

Annex - X …. Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa. Abuja 1998.

Annex-XI…..The Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED).

xii

Annex–XII….The Code of Conduct for the Implementation of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons.

Annex-XIII…..ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons,

their

Ammunition

and

Other

Related

Materials. Abuja 2006.

xiii

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xiv

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xv

INTRODUCTION In other to properly appreciate the problem of West Africa and the challenges of SALW, it is necessary to situate it within a global and regional context.

Globally, the phenomenon of the proliferation of illicit SALW has recently emerged as a major concern of the international community, posing a complex challenge that involves security, humanitarian and development dimensions. The end of the cold war led to a decline in control over these weapons in many parts of the world, resulting in a significant increase in their circulation worldwide. The accelerated pace of globalization in the same period facilitated both legal and illegal cross-border transfers of these weapons, while a sudden upsurge in intra-state conflicts created a staggering demand for the SALW, thereby making them weapons of choice in majority of recent conflicts and in non-war settings such as sectarian violence (ethnic, religious and chieftaincy conflicts), suicides, murders, homicides and accidents.

It is estimated that there are about 640 million small arms in the world today, nearly 60 per cent of which are legally held by civilians.

However, the distribution of these weapons is extremely uneven geographically, demographically, and institutionally. In all, 55 or 60% of the world’s SALW are in the hands of civilians, with 35 to 38% in the hands of armed forces, 3 to 5% held by the police and other state forces, and 1% in the hands of non state armed forces.7 These arms fuel, intensify and contribute to the prolongation of conflicts. As a conflict is prolonged, the need for more arms and ammunition grows, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle.

1

The spread of illicit SALW is a global threat to human security and human rights. At least 500,000 people die every year as a result of the use of small arms and light weapons. It is estimated that, out of the 4 million war-related deaths during the 1990s, 90 per cent of those killed were civilians, and 80 per cent of them were women and children, mostly victims of the misuse of small arms and light weapons.8 In addition, tens of millions more people have lost their livelihoods, homes and families because of the indiscriminate and pervasive use of these weapons. Other dimensions of the miss use of small arms are the emergence of the phenomenon of child soldiers, rape as weapon of war (and its attendant sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS) and the facilitation of general crime, terrorism, drugs and narcotics trade.

The study ‘Africa’s Missing Billions’, conducted by Oxfam International, International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and Saferworld shows that the cost of conflict on Africa’s development was approximately $300 billion between 1990 and 2005. This is equal to the amount of money Africa received in international aid from major donors during the same period. The research also shows that on average a war, civil war or insurgency shrinks an African economy by 15% and that, the continent loses an average of around $18 billion a year due to armed conflict.9 However, the global and continental dimension of the negative effects of SALW is not within the scope of this paper.

The target of this paper is West Africa’s specific case, where there are estimated 7 million SALW in the Sub-region of which 77,000 are in the hands of major West African insurgent groups10. The 2

results of the preponderance of SALW in the Sub-region are that, West Africa has become the most unstable Sub-region on the continent of Africa. Since 1960, of the 15 member states that make up ECOWAS most have been through several military coups, 37 of which were successful. SALW have particularly fuelled conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo and the Sub-region is still struggling to survive ongoing conflicts in which small arms play a central and destabilizing role.11 It is also rapidly changing the cultural and traditional fabric of the Sub-region, drifting towards self-destruction where uneducated and semi-educated youth who wield the power of the gun are ruling the educated and the older generation with their wisdom. The conflictridden West Africa is therefore a showcase of uncontrolled SALW proliferation - a region where in the not-too-distant past, SALW were alien to the society apart from the crude and primitive ones used by hunters in the hinterland.

In standing up to the challenge and in the sprite of the ECOWAS

Protocol

on

good

governance,

the

Sub-regional

organization (ECOWAS) is trying in various ways to control the proliferation, misuse and illegal possession of SALW. It started with the setting up of ECOWAS Small Arms Unit (SAU) in its Sub-regional secretariat in Abuja and has been using it to initiate and implement several programmes and projects through the ECOWAS Small Arms Projects (ECOSAP) aimed at ensuring effective control of SALW in the Sub-region.

The Sub-regional Governments adopted the Moratorium in 1998 which is now transformed into the Convention for the purpose of 3

shifting the focus from mere 'moral persuasion' in curtailing the spread of illicit weapons to 'enforcement' of the protocol.

This, it seeks to achieve by enhancing the capacity of the Governments of the 15-member States through their respective National Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons, commonly called NATCOM, for the effective control of SALW in their countries.

ECOSAP is also engaging and building the capacity of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Sub-region for the same purpose through the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA) headquartered in Ghana. ECOSAP is also in a strategic partnership with the Media, (through the West African Network of Journalists on Security and Development (WANJSD)) which it engages for the purpose of its advocacy and communication programmes in the fight against SALW.12 Seven West African countries, out of the eight required, have so far ratified the Convention and deposited their instruments of ratification at the ECOWAS Commission. The seven countries include Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo. Just one more is needed to ratify the Convention to facilitate the transformation of the 1998 Moratorium on Light Weapons into a legally-binding instrument.13 Certainly, the forces behind the global, regional, Sub-regional and national small arms trafficking are so strong and the fight against such forces is not an easy fight hence the challenges and obstacles that have saddled the Moratorium through to the Convention.

However, there are other success stories that keep the dreams alive.

4

1.1

Aim

The aim of this study is to examine the successes and challenges of the ECOWAS small arms control regimes from voluntary to legally and politically binding agreements with a view to come out with some recommendations to inform the regional debate on the fight against the illicit proliferation of SALW.

1.2

Purpose and Relevance

This study is relevant in many ways; 

It will explore, analyse, assess and provide an overview of the resilient phenomenon of SALW proliferation in West Africa thereby adding to the body of knowledge already existing in this field.



It will provide a one-stop-shop of information on the timeline and examination of the ECOWAS arms control regimes from voluntary to legally binding to feed the information needs of security services, Civil Society organizations (CSOs), policy makers and the general public.



As it is a requirement to obtain the Certificate of Training in Peace Support Operations, it will also serve as an advocacy piece for me to add my voice to the holy fight against the menace of the proliferation of these deadly weapons (SALW) that has visited untold hardships to humanity in the world, Africa, West Africa and to the people of Northern Ghana (where I come from) in particular.

5

1.3

Statement of the Problem

The ECOWAS Sub-region has for many years been the most unstable Sub-region on the continent. The preponderance of SALW has particularly fuelled conflicts from which the Sub-region is still struggling to survive. This must stop! Daily, within our countries, we read in the newspapers and hear from the radios of deaths and injuries caused by armed robbery attacks. This must stop! The wide spread availability of SALW has fueled conflicts that resulted in the lost of lives and displacement of millions of West Africans. It has also caused the destruction of an immeasurable amount of property, gross violation of human rights, facilitation of the practice of bad governance, subversion of constitutions, coups d’état, creating and maintaining general state of fear, insecurity and instability. This must stop!

Realizing the need to end the destruction and mayhem that these deadly weapons are causing in the Sub-region, in 1998, the Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS took a clear direction towards the control of small arms and light weapons in our Subregion with the adoption of the Moratorium. This was the first attempt at the international level that a Sub-regional grouping took their destiny into their own hands by saying NO to the real weapons of mass destruction. The Moratorium, a voluntary means to reduce armed violence was transformed into the Convention in 2006. The most important questions one needs to ask now are;  How much do we know about the menace that is caused by the proliferation of SALW in the WA Sub-region?

6

ď ś How fast and effective are we moving towards achieving the objective of the need to end the destruction and mayhem that these deadly weapons are causing in the Sub-region? ď ś What are the challenges in the way? ď ś How do we over come these challenges?

The adoption of this convention by the Heads of State and Governments of West Africa is a clear demonstration of a very strong political and practical will to stem the proliferation of these deadly weapons and presents a very good opportunity to mob up weapons in other areas where conventional Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) exercises in UN multidimensional and integrated Peace Support Operations (PSO) do not cover; such as weapons in the hands of civilians (peaceful disarmament of civilians) as part of sustainable arms management regimes in both countries that did not experience total out break of conflicts and civil wars and those that are still recovering from them .

1.4

Research Methodology and Limitations

Tremendous amount of research has already been done in this field. Therefore, due to logistical constrains, this research will, to a large extent, make use of secondary data obtained from books, articles and publications in both print and electronic media (the internet). Where information and opinion(s) of experts in this field are used, it will be clearly indicated for purposes of credibility and reliability of the dater in this research.

To the extent of the

dependence on secondary data, this study will be limited in that regard.

7

1.5

Literature Review/Timeline

The majority of African countries became independent between 1960 and 1963, when the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) 14 was formed in Addis Ababa. At independence in the early 1960s, SALW were not a problem. Apart from Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea –Bissau where Portugal imported millions of SALW to fight African nationalist and freedom fighters, and Algeria, where France also imported large quantities of the same kind of weapons to pursue its colonial agenda, the rest of the continent, more or less, were free from the ‘tools of death’ [International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)]15. The first case of ‘proliferation’16 of small arms in the territory making up modern Ghana17 was in 1842, when the colonial governor, Sir Charles McCarthy18 lost his gun and was beheaded in the battle of Nsamanko.19 The end of the cold war led to a decline in control over these weapons in many parts of the world, resulting in a significant increase in their circulation worldwide. The accelerated pace of globalization in the same period facilitated both legal and illegal cross-border transfers of these weapons, while a sudden upsurge in intra-state conflicts in Africa created a staggering demand for them which pushed for more supply. Presently, it is estimated that there are about 640 million small arms20 in the world today of which about 7 million are in the West Africa (WA) Sub-region.21 Experiences in intra-state conflicts and mercenary activities in Africa, Asia, the Middle East attest to the fact that SALW are indeed ‘tools of death’ and barrier to development. Other negative 8

experiences are general crime, narcotics and drug related violence in the Americas and worldwide terrorism.

Indeed, the SALW problem is a global one which requires global attention and the creation of solutions at all levels of political and social organization. As a result, many governments have signed a number of agreements at the global and regional levels to stop the illegal spread of SALW across borders22.

There are two different types of global and regional agreements on SALW: legal and political. The most important difference between these two types of agreement is that legal agreement is legally binding. By signing the agreement, states commit themselves to comply with its requirements. A political agreement is an expression of will and intent to behave in accordance with certain norms and principles.

There are two international agreements dealing with the illicit proliferation and trade of SALW: 1.

The UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and

Trafficking

in

Firearms,

their

Parts

Components,

and

Ammunition (UN Firearms Protocol). 23 2.

The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and

Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UN PoA).24 At the Sub-regional level, the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Related Material was adopted in 2006. It succeeded the ECOWAS Moratorium of 1998, the first political agreement on SALW in the Sub-region that bans the illicit importation and manufacture of SALW. Similarly, the 9

ECOWAS Convention prohibits the illegal manufacture of SALW, and is legally binding for its members.

Work on SALW via the United Nations falls to two main groups: the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), which acts as the focal point for the internal UN mechanism known as CASA (Coordinating Action on Small Arms), and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which carries out research in arms control affairs.

Many other related governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also work on SALW arms control25.

End Notes/References 1.

SALW (See Annex I: Terms and Definitions).

2.

Nicholas Florquin and Eric G. Berman. (2005). Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region. Small Arms Survey. Geneva, Switzerland.

Atar, p1.

3.

Brief Profile of ECOWAS; see chapter one.

4.

a.

ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and

Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons, October 31, 1998. Abuja, Nigeria: ECOWAS.

5.

b.

Hereafter refers to as ‘the Moratorium’ in this Study.

a.

ECOWAS

Convention

on

Small

Arms

and

Light

Weapons, Their ammunition and Other Related Materials, 14 June 2006. Abuja, Nigeria: ECOWAS. b.

Hereafter refers to as the ‘the Convention’ in this Study.

10

c.

By signing a legally binding agreement, states commit

themselves to comply with its requirements. d.

A political agreement is an expression of will and intent to

behave in accordance with certain norms and principles. Non adherence to those norms and principles has no legal consequences.

6.

Krause, K. (2007). Small arms and light weapons: Towards global public policy. Coping with Crisis. Working Paper Series.

New York: International Peace Academy.

7.

Krause, K. (2007). Ibid

8.

United Nations Security Council. Small arms Report of the Secretary-General. UN Doc. S/2002/1053.,20 September 2002.

9.

Africa’s missing billions, International arms flows and the cost of conflict. Briefing Paper 107. The International Action Network on Small Arms and Oxfam International. (2007) Available at http://www.iansa.org/documents/missing_billions_Afr.pdf

10.

Ebo, A. (2003). Small arms control in West Africa. West African Series, No. 1. London: International Alert.

11.

Langumba K (2008, 1). Small arms and light weapons transfer in West Africa: A stock-taking.

12.

Efik, Surveyor. (2008). West Africa: Small Arms - Roadmap for Control

in

West

Africa.

Available

at

http://allafrica.com/stories/200801160170.html 13.

Ratification status as of July 2009. Available at; www.fosda.net

14.

The African Union is the successor organisation to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Economic Community (AEC). The OAU was established on 25 May 1963, 11

with its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At that Conference of Independent African States 30 of the 32 independent African states signed the OAU Charter. The remaining two, Togo and Morocco signed before the end of that year. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in 1985, after admission of Western Sahara. It is now the only African state that does not belong to the AU. 15.

IANSA's partners in West Africa, under the banner of the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA), are working with governments and other NGOs to curb the proliferation of small arms in the region.

16.

Proliferation of SALW (See Annex II: Definition of Terms)

17.

Brief history of the Republic of Ghana (See Annex II: Definition of Terms)

18.

Brigadier-General Sir Charles McCarthy, KCMG (15 February 1764–21 January 1824) was an Irish-born soldier who served in the French, Dutch and British armies, and was a governor of various

British

territories

in

West

Africa.

Available

at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_MacCarthy_(governor)#Ash anti_War_and_the_Battle_of_Nsamankow .

19.

a.

Abdulai, N. (2003). Introduction to Small Arms. Ghana.

Foundation for Security and Development. pp 19. b.

The Battle of ‘Nsamankow’ was fought between the

forces of the British Colonial Administration and the native Ashantes from the hinterland of the then Gold Coast in late 1823 following disagreements between the coastal native Fanti tribe (who formed part of the forces of the British Colonial 12

Administration) and the native Ashanti tribe. Victory was on the side of the Ashantes.

Almost all the British forces were killed

including Governor McCarthy (who was beheaded); only around

20

soldiers

managed

to

escape.

Available

at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_MacCarthy_(governor)#Ash anti_War_and_the_Battle_of_Nsamankow 20.

Krause, K. (2007). Ibid

21.

Ebo, A. (2003). Ibid

22.

An account of the chronological development of these initiatives in the form of Protocols and Conventions – beginning from 1945 - are attached as Annex V. There are two types of initiatives; ‘Direct Initiatives’ and ‘Indirect Initiatives’. ‘Direct Initiatives are targeted at controlling the physical trafficking of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. The ‘Indirect

initiatives’

are

targeted

at

ameliorating

the

consequences of the misuse of SALW. 23.

United Nations. 2001. Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. New York: UN DDA. Available at http://www.iansa.org/un/un-firearms-protocol.pdf .

24.

United Nations. 2001. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. New York: UN DDA. Available at <http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html>.

25.

List of some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on SALW arms control in Africa is attached as Annex II. 13

14

CHAPTER TWO CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 26

2.1

SALW Defined

‘Small arms are easy to buy, easy to use, easy to transport and easy to conceal. Their continued proliferation exacerbated conflict, sparks refugee flows, undermines the rule of law and spawns a culture of violence and impunity.’ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.27

The term SALW has no universal definition. The most common definition is the one used in the United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (UNGA, 1997) and makes a distinction between ‘small arms’ and ‘light weapons’. Broadly speaking, small arms are defined as “those weapons designed for personal use” and light weapons as “those weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a crew”. The UN definition puts forth a list of weapons within each category to identify those weapons that are considered to be SALW.28 It refers only to weapons that use explosive ammunition thereby creating a gap in the scope of potentially deadly instruments that need to be controlled.

The category of the so called ‘cold arms’ or ‘arms blanches’ – lethal weapons like spears, bows and arrows, or swords – and items that were not designed to kill, like sickles, sticks, or machetes, but may be, nonetheless, used to do so have been effectively excluded.

These tools can and have been used notoriously to commit atrocities and genocide. For example 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda 15

within a few weeks in 1994; they were slaughtered largely through the use of cold-arms.29Media reports of the Kenyan post election conflict are replete of evidence of these implements being used to prosecute the violence.

While these weapons are equally deadly when

misused, they are also common tools and household items and therefore need to be controlled in a different way.30 The ECOWAS Convention (2006), has however captured a broad range of objects within its description of SALW, including ammunition, ammunition cartridges, and “all components, parts or spare parts for small arms or light weapons or ammunition necessary for its functioning; or any chemical substance serving as active material used as propelling or explosive agent;”.31 SALW are currently the weapons of choice of warring parties because they are; easy to buy, easy to use, easy to transport and easy to conceal as a result, their continued proliferation exacerbated conflict, sparks refugee flows, undermines the rule of law and spawns a culture of violence and impunity.

2.2

The Concept of Arms Control

‘(w)e will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights(;) (u) nless all these causes are advanced none will succeed.’ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.32

Arms management is a normatively neutral term that includes the concepts of arms control and disarmament.

16

Arms Control is the imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread of weapons by an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce such restrictions. It encompasses all those restrictions that are imposed on the production, development, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of small arms and light weapons, conventional weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear weapons. Arms control is typically pursued by means of diplomatic approaches

and

instruments,

such

as

international

treaties,

agreements, as well as regional and Sub-regional protocols. Arms control can also be achieved by means of national legislation and policy. Thus, when the target of arms control measures is SALW (weapons and ammunition of less than 100 mm caliber), it is known as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Small Arms Controlâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

2.2.01

SALW Control

SALW control refers to activities that, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW spread and possession. These activities include cross-border control issues, legislative and regulatory measures, SALW awareness and communications

strategies,

SALW

collection

and

destruction

operations, SALW survey and the management of information and SALW stockpile management. The full impact of the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW on nations, communities and individuals will be discussed separately in this chapter.

However, SALW control and its activities are interrelated and overlap

with complementary humanitarian and

developmental

programmes, and in some cases with peacekeeping and peace 17

support operations. SALW control requires management planning at global, national and local levels, and involves international, regional, national, commercial, NGO and military stakeholders operating under a variety of conditions. The role of these groups (subsequently refers to as stakeholders in) in the fight against small arms proliferation will be discussed separately in this chapter. The need for SALW control is also grounded in Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law and principles (See Box 1 in Annex III for ‘Legal and Humanitarian Basis for Small Arms Control’).

SALW control programme should involve measures that address the three dimensions of demand, supply, and Misuse. These three dimensions are interrelated. In order to combat the problem of SALW, all three dimensions of the problem must therefore be addressed in a sustainable and effective manner.33 Demand is the reason why guns are acquired, owned and/or used. These can be: 

For income and/or part of a livelihood option;



To extort money in criminal activities;



To enhance personal security in places where the capacity of the state to do so is limited;



For status, power and prestige;



For traditional uses in celebrations, burials, and other ceremonies;



Self-protection and defense in the absence of the state and/or during conflict situations;



The protection of one’s assets, including crops or cattle, against theft; 18



National defense and security.

Supply is where guns come from and how they proliferate within a community, country or region. Sources are: 

Industrial production by licensed national and international producers;



Illegal production by manufacturers without a license;



Legal and illicit trade in SALW by sea and across borders;



Diversion from state stockpiles;



Migration of weapons from one conflict situation to another.

Misuse involves the use of guns to commit crimes and atrocities, such as: 

Murder, manslaughter, attempted murder, intimidation, or robbery;



The settling of private scores and causing harm;



Inter-ethnic violence, rivalry between clans, armed conflicts and civil wars;



Land conflicts;



Intimidation of political opponents during elections;



Use by land-guards and armed robbers, and in ‘contract killings’;



Domestic violence.

The objectives of SALW control interventions include: 

Reducing the availability and use of illicit SALW in societies; 19



Reducing the number of SALW- and ammunition-related accidents;



Increasing public awareness of the connection between the availability of weapons and the level of violence in any given society;



Reducing and disrupting the illicit transfers of SALW at the national and regional levels;



Regulating the possession and use of SALW through national legislation and registration;



Recovering illicit SALW from the community;



Reducing the visibility of weapons in the community, and counteracting the culture of weapons, especially among the youth; and



Reducing gender-based violence related to the holding and carrying of weapons legally or illegally.

2.2.02

Disarmament

Disarmament includes a range of processes and measures by which the holdings, stockpile and supply of weapons (including arms, ammunition and explosive devices) to states, non-state groups and individuals are reduced or destroyed. Disarmament measures typically include: weapons collection initiatives; weapons destruction and disposal programmes; decommissioning of weapons systems; arms embargoes; as well as weapons moratoriums and prohibitions.

Disarmament initiatives generally take place as part of a peace agreement (implementing UN Peace Support Operations and often refers to as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – DDR) 20

after a prolonged period of armed conflict, such as civil war. However, disarmament also takes place in countries without an immediate history of armed conflict; to support a national SALW control strategy in the framework of national recovery or development programme and this is known as ‘arms collection’.

2.2.03

DDR

DDR is a process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods. The fundamental aim of a DDR process is to reduce the destabilising and destructive impact of weapons on the state, society and the environment. It is worth noting that, disarmament takes place in both SALW control and DDR process albeit in different context. In this respect, successful SALW Control and DDR initiatives can contribute to building confidence and stability in a situation characterised by tension and uncertainty; thereby creating a secure environment for sustainable development.

2.2.04

SALW Control vrs DDR

While DDR and SALW control contribute to the same objective – namely the creation of a secure environment for sustainable development – some significant differences exist between the two processes:

21

Comparing DDR and SALW Control DDR SALW

Control

Individual

Individual civilians, including

members

of women

and

armed forces and organized groups, Target groups

children,

criminal

groups,

their communities,

dependants, women

national

authorities and others and

children associated

with

armed forces and groups Types weapons

of All

types

weapons

of All weapons and ammunition and less than 100 mm in calibre

ammunition Timing

Post-conflict A

specific Supports

mandate support Mandate

Any time

of

peace process

DDR,

in sector

reform

the social

and

security

(SSR),

and

economic

development. SALW control programmes

are

integral

component of a medium to long

time

national

development framework.

Although DDR and SALW control interventions are linked, and should therefore be closely coordinated, it is preferable that they remain separate, and that they are not carried out simultaneously in

22

order to avoid possible confusion that may lead to the following scenarios:  Civilians may attempt to surrender weapons at DDR programme pick-up points (PUPs) or weapons collection points (WCPs) designed to deal with combatants. This could result in increased tension and local outbreaks of violence;  The sensitization and core messages of the disarmament and SALW control components will necessarily be very different.

The risk of mixed messages should be avoided;  Disputes may arise over entitlements to “reintegration” by excombatants or “incentives” by the civilian population.

The decision on when to initiate a SALW collection programme for the civilian population should therefore be made on a country-bycountry basis following careful conflict analysis and detailed assessments.

2.2.05

International and Regional Agreements34

The international community, recognizing the need to deal with the problem and the grave consequences SALW pose to society, adopted the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (A/Conf.192/15) in 2001 (UN PoA). In this programme, States committed themselves to, among other things, strengthening agreed norms and measures to help prevent and combat the illicit trade in SALW, and agreed to mobilize political will and resources in order to prevent the illicit transfer, manufacture, export and import of SALW. 23

There have also been many activities at the regional level, where agreements, declarations and conventions often go further than the commitments contained within the UN PoA. These regional agreements include;  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium;35  European Union (EU) Code of Conduct on Arms Exports;36  EU Joint Action on SALW;37  EU SALW Strategy;38  Nairobi SALW Protocol; 39  Organization

of

American

States

(OAS)

Firearms

Convention;40  OAS SALW resolution AG/RES.1968 (XXXIII-O/03);41  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Document on SALW;42  OSCE Document on Conventional Ammunition;43  OSCE Decision on MANPADS;44  Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on SALW;  Stability Pact SALW Regional Implementation Plan.45  ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their ammunition and Other Related Materials, 2006.46

2.2.06

SALW Control Measures

SALW control measures are a range of measures introduced to attempt to control the proliferation of SALW. The three main groups

24

are: reduction measures; preventive measures; and coordination measures.

2.2.07

Guiding principles of SALW Control

The basic principles of SALW control programmes are safety, control, transparency, sustainability, replicability, impartiality and legitimacy. They are to a certain extent interrelated, and can be adapted to fit any type of SALW control programme. These principles were developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in July 200147.

2.2.08

Types of SALW Control Programmes

The debate on how to categorize the different types of SALW control programmes is still in progress. Categorization has so far been based on the experience of programmes over the last 10 years, which have indicated that there is no one â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;templateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (i.e., standard way of carrying out a programme). For the purposes of IDDRS, it is suggested that there are three main types of programme (which can be based on the SALW collection incentive or concept used): These types

of

programme

are;

directed

programmes,

cooperative

programmes and nationally controlled programmes48.

The decision as to which type of programme to adopt will depend less on the political situation within a society than on the strength of the movement towards peace, the DDR operational plan, other peace support operations and the resources available. Whatever the type of SALW control programme developed, it should be designed to:

25

 DETER individuals, groups and organizations from illegally possessing or transferring SALW;  DENY access to SALW by inappropriate holders or users;  DISRUPT criminal operations, and the movement and storage of SALW;  DESTROY surrendered SALW.

2.2.09

Components of SALW Control Programme

SALW control is a complex process, in which there are many components, all of which must interact correctly with each other. The components of this process should include:  the formation of a national SALW commission to develop and implement a national SALW control programme. This should be a component of the national commission on DDR (NCDDR);  an assessment of the risk of SALW, and their impact on the community. This should form part of the weapons survey (also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament);  the operational planning of a national SALW control programme as a component of the wider DDR programme;  the development of a SALW awareness campaign;  the development of an amnesty plan for those illegally holding SALW;  the development of national legislation to support the collection and destruction of weapons, and to develop policies for the period following the amnesty programme;  the development of a collection and destruction plan;

26

 seeking/securing international funding and technical assistance for the SALW control programme;  the implementation of the collection phase of the control programme;  the selection and establishment of the destruction capability, and the implementation of the weapons and ammunition destruction phase;  the development of a cross-border weapons movement prevention programme;  carrying out an evaluation to assess the degree of SALW control achieved.

The

components

above

should

also

include

continuous

monitoring, to assess the progress being achieved; to inform the government, population and donors to the programme about such progress; and to eliminate as far as possible any difficulties of implementation.

2.2.10

National

SALW

Commissions

(NATCOMS)

and

Legislations The primary responsibility of SALW control lies with the government of the affected state. This responsibility should normally be vested in a national SALW authority or commission, which acts as a national focal point on SALW issues, and is expected to perform the following key functions:  The development and implementation of national strategies or action plans;  The facilitation of cooperation and coordination; 27

 Awareness-raising and risk education; and  The monitoring and evaluation of, and formal reporting on, SALW control activities.

The membership should be broader than security and law enforcement organs, and include a number of ministerial departments (justice, interior, youth and women affairs, foreign affairs, defense etc.), as well as Civil Society organizations. SALW control is unlikely to be successful without the establishment and enforcement of an adequate national legal framework. However, revising and updating national SALW legislation is a time- and resource-intensive process, which may be speeded up where members of parliament are associated with national SALW commissions. This process requires ensuring that national SALW legislation conforms with – or exceeds – international and regional standards, and that relevant international SALW control instruments are ratified. For SALW collection programmes, a related amnesty law (which can apply for a specific period) may be required in order to permit the public transportation of weapons to the collection points.

2.3

SALW Proliferation as a Security, Development, Gender

and Human Rights Issue.

‘The accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues to be a serious threat to peace, stability and sustainable development.’ 49

28

â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;The proliferation of small arms is not only a security issue but also a human rights and development issue. The proliferation of small arms supports and aggravates armed conflicts. They put in danger, agents, for the maintenance of peace and humanitarian workers. They fragilize the respect of international humanitarian law. They put in danger, the legitimacy of weak governments and profit terrorists and other organized crimesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;50.

The nexus between Small Arms and Development is vividly captured in the above speech-excerpts by Mr Kofi Annan. The negative impact of the proliferation and misuse of SALW on security, human rights and developments caught global attention in the late 1990s. Since then, a lot of efforts have been invested in the quest to provide a framework for both understanding and action to curb the menace. In the seminal 1999 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report, Arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict, more evidence has emerged of the enormous human cost

arising

from

the

abuse

of

these

weapons.51

Further

understanding was advanced with the 2001 report commissioned by Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) from the Small Arms Survey (SAS), Humanitarianism under threat: The humanitarian impacts of small arms and light weapons.52 A significant contribution was also made in 2003, with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue report, Putting People First: Human security perspectives on small arms availability and misuse.53

29

Worldwide, small arms are devastating communities through conflict and crime. There are estimated to be around 875 million SALW in the world, three quarters of which are in the hands of civilians and non-state actors. However, it must be said that small arms by themselves do not cause conflict.54 Their proliferation is fuelling armed violence. The widespread arms availability and misuse is a barrier to human development with both direct and indirect consequences. Below are some of the major direct and indirect humanitarian and developmental impacts of arms availability and misuse.

There are at least 550 million SALW that cause at least 500,000 deaths each year. Studies indicate that for every fatal small arms-related injury, there are likely to be two to three times as many non-fatal injuries.55 Men and young men in particular are hardest hit by gun violence. It is believed that: over 85% of homicide victims with weapons are under age 4456. Over 90% of gun related homicides occur amongst men57 and 88% of all male and 12% of female suicides use a gun58. The death and injury of productive individuals places a huge burden on societies, and serves as a barrier to social and economic development. While small arms proliferation is not a new phenomenon, weapons today are very much sophisticated (in their lethality), easy to operate, durable and are available to almost anyone who has the will to obtain them. Arms strategically delivered to military or paramilitary groups during the cold war have exchanged hands many times in the years of fragmentation that followed. The human cost of such easy access to weapons is enormous. (See

30

Annex III for Figure 1 - ‘Violent Deaths Attributed to Small Arms in 1995-1999’).

Easy accessibility to small arms denies millions of civilians of their right to shelter, livelihood and security. Current estimates suggest that there are approximately 12 million refugees and 20 to 25 million

internally

displaced

persons

(IDPs)

on

the

move59.

Paradoxically, safe havens created to aid victims of war have instead become breeding grounds for armed groups. Arms are made available at these sites by former combatants, local dealers and active militias. In some cases, host governments support the flow of arms

into

camps

that

are

used

to

launch

cross-border

counterinsurgency operations”.60 Saving the lives of gun violence victims imposes pressures on health care systems all over the world. In situations of armed conflict, this is further compounded when people cannot access health services or when medical personnel withdraw. Since the war broke out in 1998 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), there was a sharp increase in diseases such as cholera, measles, polio, plague and meningitis. Also, during the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, rates of tuberculosis increased by half, and outbreaks of Hepatitis A were reported in Bosnia.61 The inaccessibility of medical facilities and drugs due to small arms violence makes otherwise preventable diseases claim lives of human beings mostly women and children.

Another dimension of the phenomenon of SALW proliferation is the recruitment of child soldiers (child combatants). UNICEF estimates that 2 million children were killed in armed conflict in the 31

1990s. There are some 300 000 child soldiers under age 18 actively fighting in 41countries with another 500 000 recruited into paramilitary organisations, non-state armed groups and civil militias.62 These children are violently taken from their schools and separated from their families to serve as combatants, domestic labourers or sexual slaves for both formal and informal armies. Constant exposure to violence damages the physical and psychological welfare of these children and presents long-term generational and developmental challenges to communities. (See Box 2 in Annex III - ‘Children and Guns’).

Small arms are principal tools used to facilitate gender-specific atrocities such as the rape and sexual abuse of women. In approximately 75% of all reported incidents of rape and attempted rape in Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp, one or more assailants were armed.63 Similarly, there is a pattern of abuse against women in socalled peaceful situations. A number of gender-disaggregated studies of weapons-related violence in industrialised countries have observed the association between arms availability and the victimisation of women.64 (See Box 3 in Annex III - ‘Rape in Dadaab’).

In situations where security services intervene to maintain law and order, their behavior often contributes to a further abuse of rights.

Media reports indicated that in Guinea Conakry, on the 28 September 2009, about 150 unarmed civilian at a political rally (against the Military Junta lead by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara) met their untimely death when the military opened fire on them in an attempt to disperse the rally. Police forces patrolling slum communities in Kenya have used excessive force without legal ramifications or 32

accountability. Particular groups such as immigrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs), discriminated groups, gangs or street kids may be targeted, tortured and murdered in state-sponsored campaigns to “clean up” violent neighborhoods65 further undermining public confidence in the rule of law.

Inadequate policies and laws or corrupt and incompetent implementation practices can mean that state weapons are used in criminal activity and that poorly-kept stockpiles located in the middle of residential areas can result in deadly accidents. The explosions at military ammunition depots in Lagos-Nigeria in 2002 and in MaputoMozambique in 2007 killed more than 1,600 people.66 The resulting loss of confidence in the state can lead households and communities to resort to informal security measures, including self-defense groups, vigilantism, or the recruitment of local gangs and armed groups for protection. Armed violence and the weakness of state security provision are therefore mutually reinforcing phenomena that lead to rights abuses. (See Figure 3 in Annex III – ‘Explosions at Arms Depots in Africa’).

In terms of development and economic and social rights, the impact of armed violence is deep and wide ranging. Most of the world’s current armed conflicts are occurring in the global South, and more than one-third of all countries caught-up in poverty have experienced armed conflicts since the late 1990s. The same patterns are true for criminal violence: many poorer countries and a large number of middle-income states are exposed to high rates of homicide, armed assault, and victimization associated with collective or criminal violence. A report of the Geneva Declaration states that 33

“where armed violence reaches near epidemic levels, as in major cities in El Salvador, Honduras; Guatemala, South Africa, or Nigeria, it distorts livelihoods, sustains cycles of poverty, permeates a culture of violence, diverts spending to increased security, and often undermines local confidence in state institutions.”67 The report also stated that the cost of armed violence in non-conflict countries is estimated at 163 billion USD annually, more than the total annual spending on development assistance.68 Africa loses around $18bn per year due to wars, civil wars, and insurgencies. On average, armed conflict shrinks an African nation’s economy by 15 per cent, and this is probably a conservative estimate. The real costs of armed violence to Africans could be much, much higher.69 The UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Small Arms, Barbara Frey, has identified the misuse of arms to be an issue of critical concern, particularly by state forces.70 The use of weapons in violation of human rights and humanitarian law is seen the world over, though exacerbated in situations characterised by war, corruption and dysfunctional justice systems. She noted that existing tools, including the 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials provide standards for the use of force by law enforcement officials. Additionally, reform of the security sector, with emphasis on strengthening the rule of law; training armed and police forces in human rights and humanitarian law, particularly norms and principles concerning the responsible use of weapons; improving police-community relations; and the provision of swift

34

access to justice are all critical factors for reducing the demand and misuse of these weapons.

2.4

The Role of various Stakeholders in Fighting Against the

Proliferation of SALW The impact of the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW is devastating on nations, communities and individuals. SALW control requires management planning at global, national and local levels, and

involves

international,

regional,

national,

commercial,

governments, intergovernmental organisations71, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)72, state actor and non-state actors (NSAs) operating

under

comprehensive

a

(but

variety not

of

conditions

exhaustive)

list

and of

interests.

A

the actors and

stakeholders involve in the phenomenon of SALW include; governments (state agencies and institutions such as parliament, military, police, customs / immigrations officials, national small arms commissions/focal points, etc ), the international community, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and institutions, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)73, Community Based Organisations (CBOs)74 , arms manufacturers, arms brokers 75 , civilians, combatants 76, armed groups

77

, peacekeepers, humanitarian and aid workers

78

, religious

bodies and the media.

The above actors and stakeholders79 may fall into categories such as those who are responsible for producing, proliferating, using and profiting from SALW, as well as victims and those who are attempting to control, limit and eradicate the illicit trade. However, it should be noted that the various categories overlap; i.e. a civilian may 35

be an arms broker, perpetrator and victim at the same time whereas governments may be a manufacturer, supplier, user/perpetrator, victim and advocate at the same time. While this multiple identity may be a source of potential conflict of interest in the SALW control process, it can also be a valuable source for positive change definitively addressing the SALW problem.

The role played by the suppliers, users and victims of SALW is sadly played out in the devastating effects of the misuse of SALW on security, development, gender and human rights as discussed above.

The role of SALW control advocacy groups or stakeholders will now be discussed. Discussions will cover stakeholders such as the government, NGOs/CSOs and the International Community.80

2.4.01

The Role of Governments

The proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW is a complex and multidimensional problem that affects people and communities in a range of ways (including inter alia the deterioration of physical security, the undermining of development prospects, the degradation of access to and availability of social services, etc). Combating proliferation and illicit trafficking therefore requires a multisectoral approach that provides for a wide variety of measures and approaches, including legislation and regulation, law enforcement, Civil Society cooperation, stockpile management, collection and destruction of surplus arms and development. Given the array of people and activities involved at the local, national, regional and international levels in combating SALW proliferation, it is crucial that

36

small arms control efforts are coordinated by governments at the national and international level. In particular, the governments should;  put in place National SALW Commissions needed to act as coordinating bodies and focal points.  facilitate the review of national arms ownership laws and legislations.  empower the judiciary and state security for effective law enforcement  put in place effective arms management regime for effective stockpile management and arms collection or disarmament.  secure the borders from external aggressions (Sovereignty of the state).  protect lives and properties.  protect and promote human rights.  improve the economic, social and political well-being of its citizens.  create an enabling environment for the smooth conduct of elections.  be accountable to the people.  demonstrate commitment to combat corruption.  create the political space for active Civil Society participation in governance.  enhance the ability of policy and decision makers to make strategic decisions on the basis of improved knowledge of the environment of operations, options available for response or action and finally, the implications of each decision or option made.

37

 strengthen regional and Sub-regional collaboration.  mainstream gender parity.  embark on reforms (security sector reform, good governance and judicial reforms) that positively impact peace, security and development.

2.4.02

The Role of Parliaments

Other state institution like parliaments which is the legislative arm of government has a much greater role to play. (See Annex III Box 5 – The Role of Parliaments in SALW Control).

2.4.03

The Role of the International Community

The international community comprising the UN and her agencies (UNDP, UNIDIR and UNDDA) have an important role to play in helping to keep governments accountable and committed to fulfilling their promises on accessions to international SALW control protocols and conventions and other instruments (See the Role/Profile of UN Agencies and other International NGOs in SALW control in Box 4 Annex III – Figures and Boxes). In general, the role of the international community in SALW control includes;  sustained and substantial support from the International Community to build the capacity of Government and CSOs on emerging development issues including disarmament  ensure both international and regional efforts to establish and maintain

good

governance,

democratic

processes,

and

accountable leadership.

38

 providing the resources for the formulation and implementation of issues of national interest.  ensure the domestication of international human rights instruments, conventions and treaties.  offer relevant advice on reforms and social change.  protect and promote human rights and disability issues.  create an enabling environment for the smooth conduct of elections.  uphold International law and justice.  assist in the apprehension and prosecution of individuals who commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.

2.4.04

The Role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and

Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) West African conflicts are intricate, multifaceted and multi-party in nature, which exposes and draws in local populations. The nature of these conflicts makes it impossible for state actors to prevent, manage or resolve them without the assistance and involvement of non-state actors. Civil Society in particular has been at the forefront of

promoting

localized

peace

building

initiatives,

initiating

reconciliation processes, advocating for adherence to peace agreements and building capacities in peace education.

The advantages of involving NGOs and CSOs are many. First of all, these organizations have local expertise and links with local actors. They are often able to gain access to areas of conflict where official representatives should not or cannot go. The warring factions

39

generally regard NGOs as impartial humanitarian do-gooders, and this makes them effective as operating partners in peace initiatives.

There is a multiplicity of organisations dealing with small arms in West Africa. Some of the most active Civil Society organisations involved are; The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)81 is an important organisation which has been cooperating with Amnesty International. They have also formed a suborganisation called the West Africa Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA).82 Global Witness83 and Human Rights Watch84 are two other examples. An example of an NGO only focusing on African issues is Safer Africa.85 One Civil Society actor that has been quite actively involved in the Moratorium was NISAT86 (it is supported by the Norwegian government). The Small Arms Survey87 which is situated in Geneva and is one of the most comprehensive sources of information related to small arms. (See the Role/Profile of UN Agencies and other International NGOs in SALW control in Box 4 Annex III â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Figures and Boxes).

But NGOs are not the only group of Civil Society actors involved.

The Church is one of the most influential Civil Society elements in Africa. Its position in society in general is very strong and different actors within the Church have been involved in solving the SALW problem.88 We should also not forget the influence of women organisations in Africa such as Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET).89 They are certainly a force to be recognised. Some of the roles that NGOs involve in peace, security and small arms issues include;

40

 Engage Government on policy formulation and advocacy for peace  Collaborate with other state actors including the international community on issues of national interest  Promote reforms and social change  Promote public awareness on small arms issues  Protect and promote human rights and disability issues  Provide a space for interaction and interface between the political establishment and the citizenry  Hold

Government

accountable

for

their

responsibilities

(Resources & time)  Create an enabling environment for the smooth conduct of elections  Encourages and facilitates direct citizen participation in public affairs such as national arms control programmes  Monitoring the practices of the Government in particular and the public in general – including public spending and tracking of resources  Ensure active participation in governance  Follow up policy and decision made to ensure that they are implemented  Engage in baseline surveys/research  Mainstream gender parity  Embark on programs and activities that positively impact peace, security and development.

41

End notes/References 26.

a. The Conceptual Framework of this thesis is largely adapted from the UN DDA Integrated Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) of 1 August 2006 – Level 4: Operations,

Programmes

and

Support.

Module

4.10:

Disarmament; Sub module 4.11: Small Arms Control, Security and Development. However, where other reference materials were consulted, they are clearly indicated. b.

For further information on Disarmament, Small Arms

Control,

Security and Development, see; UN DDA (2006).

Small Arms Control, Security and Development. Integrated Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS).

Available

at;

UN

DDR

Resource

Centre

http://www.unddr.org c.

27.

Profile of IDDRS (See Annex II – Terms and Definitions).

UN, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Opening speech to the Small Arms Review Conference (2006).

28.

See foot note 1 of chapter one for the definition of SALW by the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (UNGA, 1997).

29.

a.

TRESA (Training and Education on Small Arms). Small

Arms Basics - Recognizing SALW & Ammunition. Training Module

SB-R05A02

(2005).

BICC.

Available

at:

http://www.tresa-online.org/ b.

Profile of TRESA (See Annex II – Terms and Definitions).

42

30.

Ashkenazi, Michael, Elvan Isikozlu and Helen Radeke. 2008.

SALW Control Training Manual for West Africa. Accra: KAIPTC. p

8.

Available

at:

http://www.kaiptc.org/_upload/general/SALW_october08_Part% 201.pdf 31.

ECOWAS, ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their ammunition and Other Related Materials, 14 June 2006. Abuja, Nigeria: ECOWAS.

32. UN, Report of the UN Secretary-General, UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan. “In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”, 2005.

33.

Ashkenazi, Michael et al (2008). Ibid. p11

34.

International Agreements on SALW Control will be discussed further in the next chapter under the subheading ‘Agreements on SALW Control’. In this paper, the; PoA, UN Firearms Protocol, ECOWAS Moratorium and ECOWAS Convention are used as Informative References while other International Agreements on SALW Control are used as Normative References.

35.

ECOWAS, ECOWAS Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa, 31October 1998 and subsequent reaffirmations, http://www.sec.ecowas.int

36.

EU, EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 5 October 2000, http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/c_178/c_17820010622en02730278.pdf .

37.

Council of the EU, Joint Action on the European Union’s Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and 43

Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2002/589/CFSP, 12 July 2002.

38.

Council of the EU, EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and Their Ammunition, Council of the EU 5319/06 of 13 January 2006, adopted 15â&#x20AC;&#x201C;16 December 2005.

39.

Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, 21 April 2004.

40.

OAS,

Inter-American

Convention

Against

the

Illicit

Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, 14 November 1997, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-63.html .

41.

OAS, OAS Resolution on Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking in SALW,

10

June

2003,

http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres_1968.htm .

42.

OSCE, OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons,

24

November

2000,

http://www.osce.org/docs/english/fsc/2000/decisions/fscew231. htm .

43.

OSCE, OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition,

19

November

2003,

http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2003/11/1379_en.pdf .

44.

OSCE, OSCE Decision on Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS).

Available

at;

http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2004/05/2965_en.pdf .

44

45.

Stability Pact, Combating the Proliferation of SALW: Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan for South Eastern Europe, 28

November

2001

(revised

May

2006),

http://www.stabilitypact.org.

46.

ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their ammunition and Other Related Materials, 14 June 2006.

Abuja, Nigeria: ECOWAS.

47.

a. Wilkinson, Adrian and John Hughes-Wilson, 2001. Safe and

Efficient

Small

Arms

Collection

and

Destruction

Programmes: A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures, UNDP, New York, in UN DDA (2006). Small Arms Control, Security

and

Development.

Integrated

Disarmament

Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). Available at; UN DDR Resource Centre http://www.unddr.org b.

See UN DDA (2006). Small Arms Control, Security and

Development. Integrated Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) for details of the Guiding Principles of Small Arms Control programmes. Pp7,8 48.

See UN DDA (2006). Small Arms Control, Security and Development.

Integrated Disarmament Demobilisation and

Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) for details of the Guiding Principles of Small Arms Control programmes. (pp 9-13) for details of the types of SALW control programmes and Annex III for details of Incentives.

49.

UN Report of the Secretary General Kofi Annan, â&#x20AC;&#x153;In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for allâ&#x20AC;?, 2005.

45

50.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, "Millennium Declaration, 2000.

51.

Available

at:

www.gva.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_arm s_availability 52.

Available

at:

www.smallarmssurvey.org/SReports/SReport1.pdf 53.

Available in French, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic and English at; www.hdcentre.org/Programmes/smallarms/hsn.htm

54.

The Root Causes of Conflict (See Annex II â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Terms and Definitions).

55.

Frey, Barbara (2002), The Question of the Trade, Carrying and Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Context of Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms. Working Paper submitted by in accordance with Sub-Commission decisions 2001/120 ECOSOC - Other Human Rights Issues. United Nations.

Available at: www.umn.edu/humanrts/demo/FreyPaper.pdf

56.

Small Arms Survey: Rights at Risk, (2004), Oxford University Press, p.180

57.

World Health Organisation (2002), World Report on Violence and Health, p.274-5

58.

Small Arms Survey: Rights at Risk, (2004), Oxford University Press, p. 178.

59.

Available at www.unhcr.ch

60.

Frey, Barbara (2002) Op Cit

46

61.

Oxfam, Amnesty International, and IANSA (2003), Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control, p.33.

Available at: www.controlarms.org

62.

Available at www.child-soldiers.org

63.

Robert Muggah and Eric Berman (2001), Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Small Arms Survey, p. 24.

64.

Small Arms Survey (2003), p. 148.

65.

See Humansecurity-cities.org, (2001) p.17

66.

Anders, Holger. (2009). Ammunition stockpile management in Africa: challenges and scope for action (Note d’analyse).

Brussels: Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité. http://www.grip.org/bdg/g1057.html

67.

Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2006), p.27

68.

Global Burden of Armed Violence, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, (2008).

69.

Debbie Hillier (2007). Africa’s missing billions; International arms flows and the cost of conflict. Briefing Paper 107. The International Action Network on Small Arms and Oxfam International.

Available

at

http://www.iansa.org/documents/missing_billions_Afr.pdf 70.

71.

Frey, Barbara (2002) Op Cit International organizations (IGOs) are institutions drawing membership from at least three states, having activities in several states, and whose members are held together by a formal agreement [i.e the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU)

African

Union

(AU),

ECOWAS].

47

http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Intergovernmental+organisation 72.

Non-Governmental

Organizations

(NGOs)

are

voluntary

organizations that are non-profit oriented and independent from the government and government institutions.

73.

Civil Society Organization (CSO) (See Annex II – Terms and Definitions).

74.

Community-Based Organization (CBOs) is association of people with common rights, privileges and/or interests.

75.

Arms Broker(s); (See Annex II – Terms and Definitions).

76.

Combatant (See Annex II – Terms and Definitions).

77.

Armed group(s) (See Annex II – Terms and Definitions).

78.

Humanitarian and aid workers are individuals working for organisations that provide humanitarian services and aid to needy people around the world.

79.

Stakeholders; (See Annex II – Terms and Definitions).

80.

The international community is a vague term used in international relations to refer to all the governments of the world or to a group of them. The term is used to imply the existence of common duties and obligations between them, frequently in the context of calls for the respect of human rights and for action to be taken against repressive regimes. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_community

81.

www.iansa.org

82.

http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/waansa.htm

83.

www.globalwitness.org

84.

www.hrw.org 48

85.

www.saferafrica.org

86.

www.nisat.org

87.

www.smallarmssurvey.org

88.

Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in West Africa (FECCIWA) http://www.oikoumene.org/en/memberchurches/regions/africa/Sub-regional-fellowships-of-counciland-churches/fellowship-of-christian-councils-and-churches-inwest-africa-fecciwa.html

89.

Women

in

Peacebuilding

Network

(WIPNET).

http://www.wanep.org/programs/wipnet.html

49

CHAPTER THREE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MORATORIUM AND THE CONVENTION

3.2

Agreements on SALW Control The outbreak of civil wars in the 1990s in many parts of the

world including Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda, all of which were fought primarily with small arms was one of the main motivations for the development of global and regional initiatives to curb the proliferation and illegal trade in SALW in the last two decades. Subsequently, several initiatives emerged in the attempt to curb the menace of SALW proliferation. In this study, modalities of five main global and continental initiatives will be discussed with emphasis on the West African Initiatives. Among these are; The Bamako Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union), the UN Fire Arms Protocol, the UN PoA, the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the ECOWAS Moratorium and the ECOWAS Convention.

3.1.01.

The Bamako Declaration of the African Union90 .The

Bamako Declaration evolved out of the need for a common African approach at the UN Small Arms Conference of 2001. Following a Ministerial Conference in Bamako from 30 November - 1 December

50

2000, it was recommended that the following actions should be undertaken at the national level:  Creation of national coordination agencies for small arms;  Enhancement of the capacity of national law enforcement and security agencies and officials, including training and upgrading of equipment and resources;  Destruction of surplus and confiscated weapons;  Development and implementation of public awareness programmes; and  Conclusion of bilateral arrangements for small arms control in common frontier zones.

At the Sub-regional level, African states sought to achieve the codification, harmonisation and standardisation of national norms and the enhancement of Sub-regional and continental cooperation among police, customs, and border control services. In addition to the Bamako Declaration, the African Union (OAU/AU) created on 9 July 2002 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Council was created as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and as a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union reiterates the growing concern about the impact of illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW on Africa’s peace and security as well as on its economic and social development. It therefore emphasises the need for a well-resolved and coordinated framework of cooperation to tackle this problem.91 51

3.1.02.

The UN Firearms Protocol92. The Protocol against the

Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components, and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol) is the first global agreement dealing with SALW. It is a legally binding agreement that was negotiated as a supplement to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime based on the growing recognition of the role of illegal firearms in facilitating organized crime. It was agreed in May 2001, just before the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms. The Protocol, however, did not enter into force until July 2005 following the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification by Zambia.

The Protocol is mutually reinforcing with the PoA. The Protocol requires states to introduce legislation that criminalizes the illegal production of firearms, to strengthen national gun licensing procedures and to establish effective marking and tracing measures to prevent and reduce the diversion of these weapons into the black market.

The UN Firearms Protocol does not attempt to limit civilian possession of guns nor government-to-government transfers of weapons. Rather, it commits states to establish national regulations, which prevent the use of guns in crime. It does not deal with the global SALW trade nor the use and impact of guns in inter- or intrastate conflict. While it calls for the marking and tracing of firearms, the Protocol only includes a limited commitment to maintain these records for 10 years, which is significantly shorter than the life span of most SALW.

52

UN Programme of Action (PoA)93. The United Nations

3.1.03.

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) is the first international agreement that deals with the problem of SALW more comprehensively. Agreed in 2001, the UN PoA establishes a set of norms and principles to address and prevent the illicit trade in SALW. It is not a legally binding document. Its effectiveness and impact on the ground therefore depends on the political will of states to fulfill its commitments. Among other things, the PoA aims to:  Develop agreed international measures to prevent illicit SALW manufacture and trafficking;  Promote responsibility by states in the import, export, transit and retransfer of SALW; 

Raise awareness of the threat and international problems posed by illicit SALW.

The key commitment areas of the framework that requests governments to establish and/or enforce adequate national laws to ensure that the commitment is fulfilled include; transfers, brokering, stockpile management and destruction, disarmament, marking and tracing, cooperation, assistance and transparency. (See Annex III Figure 3 for the explanation of the key commitment areas of the PoA).

The UN PoA calls for a biennial meeting of states to monitor progress and identify needs and challenges in implementing the agreement. To date, implementation has been inconsistent both within and across states and requires continued will and political engagement. At the 53

same time, the UN PoA has contributed to greater awareness, understanding and policymaking on SALW control and has led to the formation of other global initiatives, such as the UN Marking & Tracing Instrument and the promotion of the global arms trade treaty.

3.1.04.

UN Security Council Resolution 137394. The events on

and after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America generated a resolution by the UN Security Council that has highlighted the need to prevent the flow of SALW into the hands of terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism. As an expression of its condemnation of the attacks and its determination to prevent similar attacks in future, the UN Security Council also formed the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in Resolution 1373, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (concerning threats to international peace and security). The CTC is made up of all 15 members of the Security Council. It monitors the implementation of Resolution 1373 by all states and tries to increase the capability of states to fight terrorism. The CTC has already stated that SALW issues are highly relevant to its mandate. There are two parts of the CTCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s priority list that are relevant to SALW control that states need to address: firstly, customs, immigration and border controls to prevent the movement of terrorists and the establishment of safe havens; and secondly, the establishment of controls preventing terrorist access to weapons.

54

3.1.05.

ECOWAS Moratorium95. The ECOWAS Moratorium on

the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa was signed in Abuja, Nigeria on 31 October 1998, for an initial period of three years. In 2001, it was extended for an additional period of three years and renewed again for a further three years in the summer of 2004. The Moratorium has been transformed into the ECOWAS Convention that is legally binding and which entered into force on 29 September 2009.

Until 1996, efforts at controlling arms flows in West Africa were minimal. By 1996, however, the search for a viable and sustainable peace in the Malian internecine conflict between the Tuaregs and Arabs in the north and the Malian government necessitated a regional approach, which eventually resulted in the adoption of a small arms moratorium. Building on the success of the Malian peace process, President Alpha Konare of Mali proposed a regional freeze on the import, export and manufacture of SALW in West Africa. Though the proposal was welcomed by some ECOWAS member states, others displayed relative indifference to and/or ignorance of the Moratorium in advance of its adoption.

However, it received active support from the multilateral organisations, and formed the basis for a number of meetings, consultations and conferences. For instance, the UNDP and UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) hosted a Sub-regional conference (UN Conference on Conflict Prevention, Disarmament and Development) in Bamako, Mali, in November 1996. In April 1998, the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs convened the Oslo Platform for a Moratorium.

55

The goal of the Moratorium was derived from the ECOWAS Treaty - to create an environment conducive to socio-economic development in the Sub-region. The parties to the Moratorium agreed to suspend the import, export and manufacture of light weapons.

More specifically, the Moratorium applied to the import, export and manufacture of pistols, shotguns, rifles, submachine guns, machine guns, anti-tank mortars and howitzers, landmines and components and ammunition for the above. The West Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s moratorium regime was composed of three main related instruments: 1.

The Moratorium Declaration;

2.

The Plan of Action. Recognising the limited capacity of

ECOWAS to fulfill the task of implementing the Moratorium, the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was established by UNDP in March 1999 for an initial period of five years as an institutional arrangement meant to assist in the implementation process. It was, among other things, meant to temporarily replace and assist the National Commissions (NATCOMS), which was going to be established. There has been a mistaken general impression that PCASED is an implementing agency. However, PCASED was created to lend support to the implementation. The primary responsibility for implementing the Moratorium rested upon the NATCOMS. The establishment of NATCOMS has proceeded at a very slow pace. Many of them exist only on paper and therefore, the main responsibility for the implementation has been placed with PCASED even though that was not intended.

56

The document presenting the guidelines for PCASED was the Plan of Action. It had nine priority areas: 

Establishing a culture of peace;



Training programmes for military, security and police forces;



Enhancing weapons controls at border posts;



Establishment of a database and regional arms register;



Collection and destruction of surplus and unauthorized weapons;



Facilitating dialogue with producer/suppliers;



Review and harmonization of national legislation and administrative Procedures;



Mobilizing resources for PCASED objectives and activities;



Enlarging membership of the Moratorium. 96

3.

The Code of Conduct was adopted on 10 December 1999

and approved at the level of ECOWAS Heads of State. The Code of Conduct contains all the practical actions seen as necessary for the implementation of the Moratorium as well as concrete measures to be taken in order to reach the objectives laid out in the Moratorium. It consists of 17 articles. The most important of these are:  Institutional Arrangements such as National Commissions (NATCOMs) (Article 4) and the ECOWAS Executive Secretary (Article 5)  Administrative Mechanisms such as Information Exchange (Article 6), Harmonisation of legislature (Article 7) and Exemptions (Article 9) 57

ď ś Operational

Aspects

such

as

Intra-

and

Inter-state

Cooperation (Article11), Enhancing Border Controls (Article 12) and Collection and Destruction of Surplus Weapons (Article 13) ď ś Promotion and Expansion measures such as Public Relations and Outreach (Article 14), Resource Mobilisation (Article 15), Dialogue with Suppliers and Producers (Article 16) and Expansion of the Moratorium (Article 17) 97 In March and June 2004 ECOWAS assessed and evaluated the record and progress of PCASED. The initial five-year period was over and one needed to decide on an approach for the future. The result was that UNDP proposed the establishment of an ECOWAS Small Arms Unit and ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP).

The hope is that ECOSAP shall provide technical and financial support to the NATCOMS and ECOWAS Small Arms Unit will provide liaison and strengthen the capacity for implementation at the ECOWAS secretariat.

3.1.06.

The ECOWAS Convention98. The ECOWAS Convention

on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Related Material (ECOWAS Convention) was adopted in 2006 and entered into force in 2009. It succeeded the ECOWAS Moratorium of 1998, the first political agreement on SALW in the Sub-region that bans the illicit import, export and manufacture of SALW. Similarly, the ECOWAS Convention prohibits the illegal import, export, or manufacture of SALW, and is legally binding for its members. The

58

ECOWAS Convention reaffirms the basic principles of the Moratorium and includes a number of the same key provisions, including:  The establishment of National Commissions;  A regional arms register and database;  The training of security personnel;  The harmonization of laws;  The enhancement of border controls;  Arms collection and destruction.

Since the Convention is a legally binding agreement, States that have agreed to it must implement its provisions and can be sanctioned if they fail to do so through the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council or the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The Convention entered into force following ratification by the ninth Member State on 3 November 2009. The nine countries that have ratified the convention are Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Guinea and Liberia.

The ECOWAS Convention is unique in the sense that it includes several new elements that are not found in already existing measures. Among the most salient of these are:  Ammunition and other related material;  Reference to non-state actors;  Provision of a sanctions mechanism in the case of noncompliance.

The Convention seeks to achieve its mandate by:

59

 Enhancing the capacity of the ECOWAS member states through their respective National Committees on SALW, commonly called NATCOM;  Obliging member states to undertake revisions of existing legislation.

The ECOWAS Convention is the most modern instrument on SALW control. The International community can take this as an example and should adopt a similar, legally binding agreement on an international scale.

3.3

Detailed Analysis of the Moratorium and the Convention and their Implementation

3.2.01. History of Moratoria. The dictionary defines moratorium as ‘a deferment or delay of any action’. In arms control history the word moratorium has been used in conjunction with suspending the testing of nuclear weapons but very rare in the specific issue of small arms.

Acting in isolation, suppliers have imposed arms restraint on recipients of small arms. A few examples include the restriction of arms shipments to the Middle East taken by the United Kingdom, France and the United States from 1950 to 1955. On 8 January 1968, the French Government extended a selective arms embargo, in force since June 1967, to cover all arms and spare parts for Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. There was a short-lived attempt in 1994 by eight Andean states, the Declaration of Ayachuco, which called for conditions for an effective limitation of arms. Mention can also be made of UN Arms Embargo sanctions over the last two decades.

60

The closest example in history to the kind of moratorium declared by ECOWAS states could be traced back to the treaty ending the war in Vietnam. In that agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties to the conflict accepted not to introduce armaments, munitions and war material into South Vietnam, except as required for periodic replacement on a piece-for-piece basis of items that were destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire.

In sum, what history there is on recipient states voluntarily agreeing to halt or postpone arms acquisitions and production to their region is rare. Where they obtain, they are related to larger conventional weapons.

Finding a history book example of West Africa’s unique example is further complicated by the fact that the Moratorium has been supported by arms suppliers and producers under the WASSENAAR Arrangement, a novelty in arms control history.99

3.2.02.

Background to the Moratorium. The origins of the

Moratorium can be traced back to October 1993 when the President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konaré, approached the United Nations and requested support in demobilising an armed rebellion, stopping the influx of light weapons and collecting surplus guns in the northern part of that country. Mali’s request, identified by most scholars as the genesis of today’s Moratorium on Light Weapons in West Africa, led to the sending to that country in August 1994 of an Advisory Mission to deal with the problem in the Sahara-Sahel region.

61

The Advisory Mission issued its report to the UN SecretaryGeneral in November 1994. In February/March 1995, the Mission visited Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal.

Following these missions, the United Nations (UNDP and UNIDIR) convened an international conference in Bamako (Mali) 25– 29 November 1996 on the theme ‘Conflict Prevention, Disarmament and Development in West Africa’ at which delegates, predominantly from 12 West African countries, sought common ground on options for future regional development. The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, which attended the Bamako conference as a participant, endorsed the idea of a moratorium on light weapons once it was suggested.

Supported by the United Nations, the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat sold the idea to the Authority of Heads of State and Government during their summit on 17 December 1997 in Lomé (Togo) to discuss the establishment of a subregional mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security. The meeting of ECOWAS Foreign Ministers, Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Security held in Yamoussoukro (Côte d’Ivoire) on 11 and 12 March 1998 continued discussions on the proposed

Moratorium

and

draft

Code

of

Conduct

for

its

implementation.

At an international conference held in Oslo (Norway) on 1–2 April 1998, ECOWAS member states, again, confirmed their commitment to curbing the proliferation of light weapons through the declaration of a moratorium. They sought and obtained the support of the international community, notably the firm commitment of member 62

states of the WASSENAAR Arrangement, to back the subregion in its efforts to implement this practical disarmament measure.

ECOWAS Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs and Security ministers met again on 23 and 24 July 1998 in Banjul (Gambia). During that meeting, they debated and approved the proposed Moratorium and draft Code of Conduct and urged the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat to take the necessary measures to table the Moratorium Declaration on the agenda of the 21st ECOWAS summit. That gathering held and declared the Moratorium on 31 October 1998 in Abuja (Nigeria). The Code of Conduct for its implementation was delayed until 10 December 1999 when it was adopted in LomĂŠ (Togo) by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS. The origins of the Moratorium could also be traced back to the inspiring work undertaken by tens of non-governmental organizations and research institutes. From most accounts, the work of the United Nations on arms restraint mechanisms provided much needed inspiration to West Africa. The main event cited by most researchers is the 1997 meeting at the United Nations of experts on small arms from 23 governments, including the five permanent members of the Security Council. In their report, the experts encouraged the adoption and implementation, where appropriate, of regional and subregional moratoria as one of the policy tools needed and readily available, where political will exists, to deal with the challenge of small arms. 100

63

3.2.03.

Analysis of the Moratorium. A review of the Moratorium

regime indicates that the performance of the Moratorium presented a mixed and modest picture of successes and failures.

As stated earlier in this paper, SALW do not cause conflict (their presence fuels the conflict).The fight against the proliferation of SALW must go in tandem with efforts to address the root causes of conflicts and disputes in order to achieve durable peace, stability and development. The success or otherwise of the moratorium is therefore partly dependent on the efforts made to address the root causes of conflicts and disputes on the geopolitical and security landscape of West Africa during the same period (October 1998 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; November 2009). In this paper, the analysis of the Moratorium is based on a brief review of the geopolitical and security situation of West Africa and examination of the implementation of the Moratorium itself (during the same period).

3.2.04.

Addressing Root Causes of Conflicts in West Africa.

If it is true that curbing proliferation of small arms and light weapons could diminish tensions and armed conflicts, lasting peace can be established and consolidated only if efforts are made to get to the root causes of the disputes that provoked the degeneration into violence. Experts have cited among the essential building blocks of durable peace and security, the need to promote good governance, the eradication of violations of human rights, the promotion of civil liberties and minority rights and the enhancing of the meaningful participation of all citizens in nation-building.

64

The last two decades in West Africa were characterised by intrastate armed conflicts and civil unrest leading to deaths, injuries, and large scale displacement of persons. These conflicts made West Africa the destination of SALW which were the weapons of choice the belligerents elements. This phenomenon posed the greatest challenge to the achievement of the objective of the Moratorium now the Convention.

Closely linked to this is the emergence of the

phenomenon of child soldiers, mercenaries, conflict entrepreneurs, warlords, terrorist and drug traffickers which has made the situation worst.

The root causes of these conflicts and wars are interconnected to challenges of poverty, bad governance and weak states in the region.

The eruptions of fratricidal conflicts necessitated the regional institution to prioritise the promotion of peace and security as prerequisites for regional integration; the main justification for its foundation.

ECOWAS Heads of State and Governments, empowered by Article 58 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 24 July 1993101 were compelled to undertake conflict management initiatives and thus became the first African subregional block to launch a major military intervention in member states102 breaking the tradition of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;noninterference in internal affairs of other statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; that had persevered even when thousands of lives were being lost and humanitarian disasters were looming.

It is against this backdrop that the ECOWAS Moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in the 65

subregion was agreed by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in October 1998, as an instrument for the promotion of collective peace and human security, including the fight against the proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.

The Moratorium now constitutes a critical component of the wider provisions of the ECOWAS Protocol Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security, adopted

in

December

1999

and

a

supplementary

protocol

1/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance adopted on 21 December 2001 to promote peace and security in the subregion as a whole. This mechanism is based on the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the OAU Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights. It also embodies and reaffirms commitments undertaken by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in the Protocol on Non-aggression signed on 29 April 1978; the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence signed on 29 May 1981; and the provisions of the Declaration of Political Principles of ECOWAS on Freedom, Peoples' Rights and Democratization, adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991.103 Under this new dispensation, the objective of ECOWAS is to create a secure environment suitable for socio-economic and political development and integration of the subregion. Consequently, there has emerged a new wave of peace, security, freedom, democracy and development that is being witnessed in the subregion compared to the 1990s where most of the subregion was submerged in civil wars; a state of affairs that reflected negatively on the attainments of 66

the objectives of the Moratorium. However, there still remain a lot of challenges in the areas of democracy and good governance, corruption, human rights, economic freedoms and sustainable developments. With Liberia, Sierra Leone evolving into democratic states and semblances of stability coming to Cote dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Ivoire, there is the hope that West Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s dark days of open conflicts are over and the region is on the trajectory to building strong viable peaceful and democratic states.

However, democracy is being challenged in The Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Niger. Ghana is still battling internal chieftaincy and land disputes in the country whereas Nigeria is also grappling with religious and natural resources disputes and conflicts in the Plateau and Niger Delta regions. The subregion as a whole is being challenged by the up surge in crime such as armed robberies, murders, drugs and narcotics trade where SALW are still the preferred weapons for the criminals.

3.2.05.

Analysis of the Implementation of the Moratorium.

Critics of the Moratorium have it that its effectiveness was significantly impaired by its voluntary nature and the lack of a corresponding regime of enforceable sanctions. They have also pointed out that the Moratorium is unduly state-centric and fails to address the role of non-state actors on the West African security landscape. These two factors are seen as major obstacles to the goal of entrenching the Moratorium as a priority and practical security instrument in West Africa. Some also contend that the Moratorium

67

was largely unknown, and was not popularized in ECOWAS member states.

The review of the implementation of the Moratorium at the ECOWAS Summit in 2003 pointed out the following weaknesses.104  The Plan of Action was a ‘sleeping beauty’, which had remained largely unimplemented.  Both the Plan of Action and the Code of Conduct for the Moratorium are ambitious.  The ECOWAS Secretariat lacks the capacity to implement the Moratorium.  Even though the office of a Deputy Executive Secretary (Political, Defence and Security Affairs) has been established within ECOWAS, its staffing remains grossly inadequate.  There is no effective monitoring of the Moratorium.

Nevertheless, the ECOWAS Small Arms Moratorium was the first of its kind globally and has emerged as a useful template, upon which a West African SALW control regime has eventually been born. A number of significant achievements have been realized, particularly in the establishment of National Commissions, the promotion of the culture of peace, the strengthening of border controls, the harmonization of legislation, the collection and destruction of weapons and in the evolving relationship between ECOWAS Member States and the ECOWAS Commission.

In this paper, the analysis of the implementation of the Moratorium is based on the following: 68

 Establishment of National Commissions;  Exemptions;  Arms collection and destruction.  Enhancement of border controls;  Training of security personnel;  Harmonisation of laws;  Peacekeeping Arms Register; and  Regional Arms Register and database

3.2.05.1.

Establishment of National Commissions. Article 4 of

the Code of Conduct for the implementation of the Moratorium requires the establishment of National Commissions in Member States with the mandate to promote and ensure the coordination of the concrete measures adopted in view of the implementation of the Moratorium (now transformed to Convention) at the national level.

These National Commissions have played an important role in the implementation of the former PCASED105, now replaced by the ECOSAP. Article 4 of the Code of Conduct states that:

In order to promote and ensure co-ordination of concrete measures for effective implementation of the Moratorium at the national level, Member States shall establish National Commissions, made up of representatives of the relevant authorities and Civil Society. The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat shall prepare guidelines to assist the Member States in the establishment of their National Commissions.106

69

National commissions (NATCOMs) are meant to serve as the hub around which national and regional initiatives will revolve. Their main functions are:  formulation of strategies, policies and programmes against the proliferation of small arms;  sensitisation of the public on the need to hand in to the police illegally held weapons;  update of arms registers and transmission to the ECOWAS Secretariat;  provision of appropriate recommendations to the ECOWAS Secretariat on exemptions to be granted to the Moratorium for weapons covered by the agreement;  resource mobilisation for programme expenditures;  liaison on a permanent basis with ECOWAS and the Programme for Co-ordination for Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED) secretariats on issues relevant to the Moratorium, as well as issues regarding the proliferation of small arms in general; and  initiation and development of mechanisms for exchange of information and experience with the other NATCOMs.

Crucial as the NATCOMs are to the successful implementation of the Moratorium, their establishments in the various states have rather been very slow throughout the life of the Moratorium. The current situations on the ground revealed varying degree of compliance to the provision of Article 4 of the Code of Conduct by the member states. As a response to their peculiar national challenges some 70

member states created national committees/focal points (models different from the one recommended in the Code Conduct). However,

by November 2009, all 15 member states had established one form of small arms coordination body or the other in respect of Article 4 of the Code of Conduct. The major Challenges confronting the NATCOMs effective functionality include; the lack of political will, office space, Information exchange among major stakeholders, problem

of

coordination

and

internal

/

external

institutional

relationships, decentralization, human resource management (Lack of staff), administration and finance (absence of dedicated budget lines) and lack of Technical capacity. 107

3.2.05.2.

Exemptions. The class of light weapons covered by the

West African Moratorium presents a different set of problems and complications because these weapons are essential to every country’s national security establishment. This makes it impossible to ban them entirely or to rely on the traditional tools of disarmament to control their proliferation.

However, Article 9 of the Code of Conduct allows memberstates to apply for exemptions to the Moratorium ‘in order to meet legitimate national security needs or international peacekeeping requirements’. An application to the ECOWAS Secretariat for exemption by a member-state is circulated to all other memberstates. In the absence of an objection from any other member-state within 30 days, an exemption may be granted. Objections are referred to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (see Articles 9.2 of the Code of Conduct). The exact measure and definition of 71

â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;legitimate national security needsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; remains a grey area for the ECOWAS Moratorium regime. Individuals, through their respective National Commissions, may also apply to the ECOWAS Secretariat for exemptions (Article 9.3). From 2001 to 2002, a total of 47 exemptions had been granted. 108 The fact of application for exemptions is proof that the Moratorium

enjoyed

some

degree

of

compliance.

However,

compliance and political will cannot be said to be even, and some states

do

not

demonstrate

genuine

commitment

to

the

implementation of the Moratorium. For example, it has been pointed out that â&#x20AC;Śnot all signatories are complying with the spirit of the Moratorium and it is suspected that small arms continue to be imported by some countries in violation of the declaration. According to various UN reports, Burkina Faso and Liberia have facilitated arms deliveries to rebel groups in Sierra Leone, and the UN has explicitly linked Burkina Faso and Togo to issuance of false end-user certificates for sanctions bursting transfers to UNITA in Angola.109

3.2.05.3.

Arms Collection and Destruction. Arms collection and

destruction is a major component of the fight against SALW proliferation if you consider the fact that the presence of illicit weapons constitutes a major threat to human security in the West African subregion. Consequently, reducing and eventually eliminating illicit weapons from the Sub-region is seen as a sine qua non for socioeconomic development in the subregion. If not destroyed, excess weapons in government armouries are likely to enter the illicit 72

weapons market and exacerbate the conflict cycle in the region.

Article 13 of the Code of Conduct therefore calls for the “collection, registration and destruction of all weapons, ammunition and components covered by the Moratorium …”. The collection, registration,

and

destruction

of

weapons,

ammunition

and

components fall under three categories:  Surplus to national security requirements. As with the exemptions, the determination of arms that are ‘surplus to national

security

requirements’

remain

essentially

the

prerogative of the member-state;  Seizures from illegal possession and illicit trafficking; and  Weapons and ammunitions collected following peace accords and upon completion of peace operations.

Since the spectacular "Flames of Peace" organized in Timbuktu in Mali in 1996, arms destruction events in West Africa have attracted worldwide interest and attention. Member states emerging from internecine conflicts have been active in weapons collection and destruction. These include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger, and Mali.

Most other states in West Africa restrict themselves to symbolic arms destruction programmes, which are staged in July each year, to mark the July 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms.110

3.2.05.4.

Enhancement of Border Controls. The West African

subregion is characterized by long and porous borders which contribute to the flourishing cross border crimes including weapons

73

trafficking. Consequently, Article 12 of the Code of Conduct requires that;

‘’The Executive Secretariat, in conjunction with Member States and with the assistance of PCASED, will develop more effective border control mechanisms, including improved equipment, and training and co-operation of customs and other border officials’’.

This part of the Moratorium regime seeks to improved national and regional capacities for the detection and prevention of small arms trafficking in the Sub-region, facilitated by improved exchange of intelligence. Strategies for enhancing the capacity of border controls within and between Member States have been developed. To date, PCASED has provided technical and logistical assistance to the Governments

of

Mali,

Niger

and

Ghana

through

National

Commissions. Activities included the strengthening of border control infrastructure,

procurement

of

vehicles

and

communication

equipment; training of border control officers and undertaking sensitization missions to elicit the support and participation of local communities in border areas 111.

3.2.05.5.

Training of Security Personnel. The Moratorium regime

is also based on the availability of adequate professional security personnel to monitor, document, and stop the illicit flow of arms in the Sub-region. The Code of Conduct therefore requires the training of security and law enforcement personnel on the modalities and best methods for controlling illicit flows of SALW within and between member states. In this direction, A PCASED/ECOWAS sponsored 74

workshop in August 2000 developed a four-part training programme comprising the following stages:  Developing a training curriculum;  Training of trainers, on the basis of the four ECOWAS Monitoring Zones;  National-level training; and  In-service training for respective individual armed forces.

PCASED has successfully conducted 3 regional training of trainers workshops as part of its Regional Training of Trainers Programme. A training handbook has been produced and over 300 senior military and security officers from the ECOWAS member states have benefited from those training programmes.

PCASED has decentralised training to the national level through the National Commissions. The first of these decentralised training was organised by the National Commission of Senegal from 12-15 November 2002.

In addition, the United States, through their Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, provided assistance to law enforcement agencies in Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone to identify illicit trafficking of SALW and have implemented a course designed to identify illicit small arms trafficking and strengthen interdiction skills in the Sub-region. 112

3.2.05.6.

Harmonisation of Laws. The diverse cultural and

colonial background of the West African societies and states implies different customary practices and legal systems that are in place in 75

West Africa. This also means that relevant legislation to control SALW at the national level in most states is nonexistent, outdated or not strong enough. The Code of Conduct therefore recognises the need for similar legal and administrative structures on small arms control to be in place.

As of late 2002, only eight out of the fifteen countries had made their legislation on small arms available to PCASED for comparative analysis. This has hampered this aspect of the Moratorium considerably, because regional model legislation is not possible without a thorough analysis of the firearms laws of all member states.

Furthermore, by 2001, it had been realised that many member states operated outdated laws. It was therefore resolved that â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;member states should first undertake national legislative reviews before continuing with the regional harmonisation processâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.113 Though there appears to be considerable interest and political will on the harmonisation of laws among both state actors and Civil Society, the objective, as of the date of this report, remains largely unrealised. Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Cape Verde have requested PCASEDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s assistance to review their existing laws. Mali also submitted its national legislation on SALW to UNDDA. However, so far, PCASED has only provided assistance to Mali and Guinea.

Neither of them has submitted a progress report or statement at the 2003 Biennial Meeting of States.

It becomes clear, therefore, that the objective of the harmonisation of laws is still far from being realised. However, PCASED has recruited a consultant to undertake the review and harmonisation of national legislations.114 76

3.2.05.7.

Peacekeeping Arms Register. This aspect of the

Moratorium seeks to keep an up-to-date record of the movement of weapons used in peacekeeping operations, so as to ensure their effective control and withdrawal after peacekeeping operations have been completed. This applies to weapons earmarked for use by West African troops engaged in peacekeeping operations outside the Subregion, as well as weapons used by troops from any part of the world in the management of West African conflicts.

A major handicap is that countries contributing to peacekeeping operations outside ECOWAS are reluctant to subscribe to an ECOWAS political and security framework. This appeared to be the case in the management of the Sierra Leone civil war, where discussions between PCASED and UNAMSIL were protracted and difficult. While PCASED would appreciate a speedy declaration by UNAMSIL on the ground, UNAMSIL officials insist that there are political and legal issues that need to be regularized with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

However, it is important to emphasise that the Peacekeeping Arms Register represents a strategic objective within the Moratorium regime in West Africa, as experience has shown that peacekeeping operations could be sources of illicit arms and agents of small arms proliferation.

This objective remains unrealised, and several questions remain unanswered, namely who has the mandate to authorise the Arms Register, who funds it, and who administers it. 115

77

3.2.05.8.

Regional Arms Register and Database. The Code of

Conduct also envisages a Regional Arms Register and Database, which would provide the necessary information and data upon which informed intervention and policies could be based. However in implementing this objective, a top down approach which concentrated on a regional electronic database was initially used making the project over ambitious and unrealistic. Such a centralised approach ignored the absence of national arms registers, and failed to recognise the poor state of information exchange between ECOWAS states, especially in the peace and security sector.

An alternative paper-based database, with a focus on capacitybuilding for effective national registration and management of weapons stocks, including imports, exports, arms manufactures, seizures and destruction, is currently being pursued, with external technical and financial support. A UN Register currently exists for conventional weapons (e.g. battle tanks, artillery, aircraft, warships and missiles), but it does not list SALW. As SALW are among the greatest security threats in the region, it is essential that a regional arms register and database is established. In October 1999, PCASED held in Accra its first workshop on the setting-up of a register. However, despite the provision of international assistance towards pilot projects in a few selected countries, this component of the Code of Conduct is yet to be achieved. 116

3.2.06.

Analysis of the Implementation ot the Convention.

As stated earlier in this chapter, the review process of the implementation of the Moratorium pointed out some weaknesses and 78

recommendations. One recommendation was to transform the Moratorium into a binding Convention, and this was approved by the Heads of State. Consequently, on 30 January 2003, the Authority of Heads of states of ECOWAS meeting in Dakar, Senegal directed the ECOWAS Executive Secretary to examine the possibility of transforming the Moratorium into a Convention.117 In March 2005, ECOWAS member states met to review a draft convention that would transform their voluntary moratorium into a legally binding treaty. The outcome was the adoption and signing of the ECOWAS SALW Convention on 14 June 2006 by the Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State. The Convention entered into force on 29 September 2009.118 It consists of a preamble and seven chapters, which contain a total of 32 Articles.

3.2.06.1.

Preamble.

fundamental texts

119

The

preamble

refers

to

a

series

of

and stresses a number of key principles, in

particular States' rights to self-defence, non-interference in the internal affairs of another State, and the prohibition to use or threat to use force against another State.

It also points to certain legal instruments within ECOWAS, in particular the ECOWAS Protocol relating to Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security, which provides the basis for ECOWAS policy in the fields of defence, security and peace building.

In this section, ECOWAS member states also express their concern regarding the effects of SALW proliferation, which is perceived as a direct threat to human security, a universal concept 79

which extends beyond the concepts of state security or commercial safety.

They also underscore their determination to consolidate the gains of the Moratorium through a legally-binding convention, and to increase the capacity of the Executive Secretariat to combat illicit SALW. The latter point is very important because practically all the chapters of the Convention refer to the tasks incumbent on the ECOWAS Secretariat in order to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention. 120

3.2.06.2.

Definitions and Objectives (Chapter I). This chapter

identifies the scope of the Convention and provided definitions to a number of key terms according to internationally agreed/validated definitions in order to ensure the uniform interpretation of the Convention. 121 As the field of disarmament issues evolves, there are normative and definitional challenges associated with the concepts. A plethora of definitions on these concepts introduce confusion for actors working on SALW activities. By providing a conceptual framework for prevention, the Convention clarifies ECOWAS’ approach and the raison d’être for prevention.

The objectives of the Convention are:  To prevent and combat the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of SALW within ECOWAS;  To continue the efforts for the control of SALW within ECOWAS;

80

 To consolidate the gains of the Declaration of the Moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and its Code of Conduct.  To promote trust between the member states through concerted and transparent actions on the control of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS;  To build institutional and operational capacities of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and the Member States in the efforts to curb the proliferation of SALW, the ammunitions and other related materials;  To promote the exchange of information and cooperation among Member States.

3.2.06.3.

Transfers of SALW (Chapter II). Art. 3 establish basic

principles on SALW transfers as follows:  Member States shall ban the transfer of SALW into and from/through their territories.  Member States shall ban, without exception, transfers of SALW to Non-State Actors that are not authorised by the importing State.  SALW, as defined in this Convention, shall not be deemed to be goods for the purpose of Article 45 of ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993.

Armed groups have contributed to destabilising West Africa, and this ban on transfers of SALW to Non-State Actors reflects the particular concerns of the region. This provision of the Convention is

81

unique, and not found in any other international agreement on preventing armed violence. 122 However, conditions for exemptions based on legitimate national defense, security, law enforcement needs and state participation in peace support operations are laid down in Art.4 of the convention.

Art.5 describes the procedure for an exemption request and Art.6 provides the ECOWAS Commission with relevant elements to analyse the request for exemption. The convention requires that conditions upon which exemption request are made must ensure respect for human rights, application of international humanitarian law, embargoes, the UN Charter and all other treaties or decisions to which member states are bound.

3.2.06.4.

Manufacture of SALW (Chapter III). Articles 7 and 8 set

out the principle of strict controls on the manufacture of SALW:  By regulating the activities of local manufacturers in light of an overall policy of arms  reduction and limitation  By compiling information on industrial manufacture where it exists  By

subjecting

arms

manufacturing

activities

to

certain

requirements related to the provision of precise information to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat The Moratorium prohibits local manufacture. However, it became evident that in practice this prohibition was impossible to check, especially in certain States where local manufacture is anchored in the culture of the country. The interdiction therefore risked pushing 82

the activities of local manufacturers underground. By subjecting the activity to State control, a number of manufacturers would become known and it would be possible to follow their activities in accordance with the requirements stipulated in the Convention (Article 8). Data is to be collected at the national level and transmitted to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat.

3.2.06.5.

Highlights of other Key Issues in the Convention.

Transparency and Exchange of Information to build confidence between member states by:  institutionalising databases and arms registries (Articles 9-11);  establishing a dialogue with manufacturers and suppliers of SALW (Article 12) to  promote their support for the Convention;  combating

corruption

through

preventive

and

effective

measures (Article 13).

The requirement for Arms Registry for peacekeeping operations, which is another novelty in convention, has made compulsory the registration of any weapon introduced into the Sub-region for this purpose. This raised an important problem relating to the management of these weapons, as no country taking part in peacekeeping operations in the Sub-region had hitherto wanted to agree to an inventory of the weapons held by their soldiers. As a result, a number of these weapons remained in the ECOWAS territory even after the departure of the peacekeepers, resulting in an important source of proliferation that was particularly difficult to 83

control. With the new measures introduced under the Convention, weapons held by peacekeeping forces can be traced from the time of their entry into the region until their effective withdrawal at the end of the peacekeeping operation.123

3.2.06.6.

Civilian Possession. Article 14 of the convention

imposes controls on the possession of SALW by civilians:  Prohibition on the possession of light weapons by civilians;  Member state responsibility for the regulation of possession, use and sale of small arms by civilians;  The ECOWAS Executive Secretary develops the authorisation procedures and communicates them to the competent national authorities;  Licenses are granted only when there is proof of a legitimate reason for possession, and this following a 'cooling off' period of at least 21 days;  The incorporation into legislation of criminal sanctions for illicit SALW possession and use.

3.2.06.7.

Management and Security of Stockpiles. Article 16 of

the convention foresees for the first time in an international, legallybinding instrument the control of military weapons. To this end, member states undertake to:  Define effective standards and procedures for the management and

storage

of national

stockpiles,

including

those

of

manufacturers and sellers as well as private individuals;

84

 States undertake to regularly review their facilities and the conditions of storage of SALW held by their armed forces and security personnel, and other authorised organisations with a view to identifying surplus and obsolete stocks for destruction;  Identical measures will be taken for the management of weapons collected in the scope of peacekeeping operations, under the supervision of the Executive Secretariat.

3.2.06.8.

Marking Article 18 of the convention envisages the

appropriate marking of all SALW, including their ammunition and other related equipment:  A "classic marking" that includes a unique serial number, the manufacturer's identify and identification of the country of manufacture;  A "security marking" applied to every weapon manufactured after the entry into force of the Convention;  Marking upon import;  Marking of ammunition with batch numbers, which must also be applied to their smallest packaging.

3.2.06.9.

Tracing. Article 19 of the convention envisages a tracing

mechanism based on the obligatory exchange of data on SALW between member states. It was inspired by the best practices of the existing international instruments, and in particular the UN instrument on SALW traceability. However, the latter is a politically (rather than legally) binding instrument that envisages a voluntary system in which States reserve the right to refuse to cooperate in tracing requests, 85

under certain conditions. Under the ECOWAS Convention such cooperation is compulsory. Moreover, the Executive Secretariat coordinates the exchange of data between member states as well as the tracing requests themselves. A member state can therefore initiate a tracing request to the Executive Secretariat if it considers weapons to be illicit, and provides it with the necessary information.

Member states subject to a tracing request must respond in a reliable way within one month of receiving the request.

3.2.06.10. Brokering. Article 20 of the convention aims to regulate brokering activities by imposing:  The registration of brokers, financial agents and agents transporting arms;  The

obtaining

of

an

authorisation

for

each

individual

transaction;  Information on transit points and routes, as well as the brokers and transporters involved in the transaction;  The criminalisation of illicit broking of SALW. This constitutes a novelty in the region in the sense that the majority of member states hitherto considered that no arms brokers were operating in their territories, and that arms transfers were largely the prerogative of the State. Certain government experts expressed concerns that the introduction of an Article on brokering in the Convention would accord a certain degree of legitimacy to private brokers who could also deal on the illicit arms market. Others considered that on the contrary, the lack of regulation of brokering activities would constitute a missed opportunity to oversee transfers 86

via brokers and, if necessary, sanction illicit activities. Indeed, majority of arms suppliers work through representatives, even if they are not established in the importing country. It was finally decided by the majority of experts to include brokering in the Convention.

3.2.06.11. Other

measures.

States

commit

to

update

and

harmonise their legislation and strengthen cross-border controls. Any activity that constitutes a violation of the Convention will be sanctioned as a criminal infringement. The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat will play an active role in the establishment and implementation of these measures with a view to strengthening Subregional cooperation. Public awareness-raising programmes will be developed in collaboration with Civil Society.124

The

Convention

also

spells

out

the

institutional

and

implementation arrangements and the procedures for complains and enforcement

of

sanctions.

Responsibility

for

monitoring

the

implementation of the Convention rests with the ECOWAS Executive Secretary. He has been tasked with developing a Plan of Action to implement the Convention's many provisions, and will submit this to the Member States for adoption.

The Convention authorises the creation of a group of independent experts who will assist the Executive Secretary in monitoring implementation of the Convention. If a Member State is found to be in violation of its obligations, the Convention has provision for imposing sanctions. This was not the case under the previous Moratorium.

87

The entry into force of the convention marks a very important milestone in that it provides a very powerful mandate for West Africa in both subregional and global efforts at eradicating the illicit trade in small arms which requires strong and effective international cooperation and commitment. ECOWAS Heads of State and Government have, in the Convention, provided a reference point for West African delegates at important global conferences such as the biannual review conference of the UN PoA and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) dialogue.

3.2.06.12. Potential Implementation Challenges.

The transformation of the politically binding Moratorium into a legally binding Convention is, in no doubt, a clear demonstration of a strong political will to stem the effects of SALW in the subregion and in keeping with international commitments. However, a successful implementation of the convention requires more than a diplomatic chorus. It requires the translation of this strong political will into practical actions on the part of the leadership to achieve the objective. Like the Moratorium, the implementation of the Convention is bound to face a number of similar challenges.

With the adoption of the Convention, the challenge for ECOWAS and the region is no longer the absence of a strategy for engaging in comprehensive combat against SALW proliferation but the political will to apply and implement the framework. Linking rhetoric about the importance and necessity of prevention to States taking preventive action is difficult. This has been one of the key impediments in achieving traction in implementing previous initiatives 88

such as other ECOWAS Treaties and the Moratorium. Member States have to be committed to implementing the framework.

However, this should be accompanied by a rigorous decentralized approach to generating political will which should involve working with local government authorities and traditional rulers.

Even though, there seem to be a collective demonstration of strong political will towards the fight against the menace of SALW, individually, due to their parochial political and economic interest, some Heads of State (on their own or in connivance with some multinational business entities) have demonstrated exactly the opposite as witnessed in the Moratorium regime. This resulted in the slow progress in the establishment and adequately resourcing NATCOMs in terms of independent budget lines, permanent office space and technically competent personnel to role out the programmes of the instrument. This also resulted in the deliberate lack of transparency which affected the confidence building measures and the harmonization of legislations among member states (Article 21 of the Convention) to eliminate the uneven implementation of regional agreements which leaves loopholes that arms traffickers can utilize for their nefarious trade.

Another potential challenge in terms of lack of political will concerns Article 28 of the Convention which gives the Executive Secretary the power to appoint a group of independent experts to whom Member States shall provide information. This Article required Member States to submit annual reports to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary on activities relating to SALW. However, the practice of reporting on such matters in Africa is limited. For example, African 89

governments in general, have rarely found it a priority to report on their import and export of conventional arms to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.125 The moratorium was criticized for lack of awareness among the populace. Experience with the Moratorium acknowledges that in the past ECOWAS has not adequately conveyed its objectives. This communication gap extends to its past inability to inform the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s citizens on its policies and initiatives as a regional organisation.

Article 23 of the convention requires the creation of strategy for raising awareness of the convention among the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s peoples. The implementation strategy should involve working with community based organizations (CBOs), Civil Society Groups (CSOs) and actors to ensure that the objectives of the framework are owned by communities across the region. The convention calls for a communication strategy that will assist in localising the framework.

This strategy should incorporate components of educating the public on the purpose and the relevance of the framework to the lives of West Africans.

Lack of good governance, weaker state institutions (that are unable provide good standard of living, security and protection and deliver justice to the citizenry) and activities of corrupt government, security and border officials (that characterize the subregion), are factors that have the potential to affect the smooth implementation of the convention.

Activities of Mercenaries, drug and illegal arms traffickers, child soldiers and warlords are other potential challenges to the implementation of the convention. Closely linked to the outbreak of 90

conflict in the region is the alliance between warlords and mercenaries, traffickers and marauders especially in the Mano River basin countries of West Africa (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone plus Cote dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Ivoire). Diamond and gold dealers, drug traffickers and arms merchants seem to thrive in conditions of confusion and instability126. With the alleged complicity and connivance of governments and multinational corporations in these resource driven conflicts127, the discoveries and potential discovery of more resources such as oil, has the potential to negatively affect the security architecture of the West African subregion and therefore likely to affect the implementation of the convention.

Notes and References 90.

Full text of the document is attached as Annex VII

91.

Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and

Security

Council

of

the

Africa

Union.

Available

at;

http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol_peace%20and% 20security.pdf 92.

Full text of the document is attached as Annex VIII

93.

Full text of the document is attached as Annex IX

94.

See the Counter Terrorism Committeeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (CTC) web site at http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/laws.html

95.

Full text of the document is attached as Annex X

96.

a. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, (2000): Oslo:

United

Nations

Regional Centre

for

Peace

and 91

Disarmament in Africa in cooperation with Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). b. Full text of the document (The Plan of Action) is attached as Annex XI. 97.

a. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, (2000): Oslo:

United

Nations

Regional Centre

for

Peace

and

Disarmament in Africa in cooperation with NUPI b. Full text of the document (The Code of Conduct) is attached as Annex XII 98.

Full text of the document is attached as Annex XIII

99.

Full text of the document is attached as Annex XI

100. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa - UNRCPDA (2000), The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons.

101. UNRCPDA (2000). Ibid.

102. ECOWAS. Revised ECOWAS Treaty, Benin, Cotonou 24 July 1993;

available

at

http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/ecowasfta.pdf UNDP. (2008) How to Guide Lines on the Establishment and Functioning of National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commissions.

Available

at;

http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/sa_control/SALWGuide_En glish.pdf 103. The ECOWAS Cease fire Monitoring Group [ECOMOG (now formally recognised as the multi-purpose standby force] was formed

as

a

subregional

conflict

intervention

and

92

peacekeeping force (see the next chapter for details on ECOMOG).

104. UNDP. ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP), Programme to Tackle the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in ECOWAS States. Programme Document August

2007.

P6.

Available

at;

http://www.ml.undp.org/html/projets/prodocs/ECOSAP.pdf 105. ECOWAS . A summary of the findings of the Report of the Moratorium Evaluation. ECOWAS Summit, Dakar, Senegal 27 January

2003;

available

at;

http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/ecowas_dakar.htm 106. For detailed information on PCASED, see the ECOWAS Plan of Action for the Implementation of the PCASED, Bamako, Mali, March 1999. PCASED was established with the support of the UNDP. The aim of the programme is to assist the ECOWAS Secretariat and member states in the implementation of the Moratorium and to extend it to other regions of Africa. Support from PCASED is supposed to strengthen the capacity of member states in the areas of security and disarmament, which are vital for the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development. However, at the time of writing, plans are under way for the creation of an ECOWAS Small Arms Programme (ECOSAP) that will consist of a Small Arms Unit to be located at the ECOWAS Secretariat, and an operational unit to be located in Bamako. PCASED will be replaced by the newly created operational unit in Bamako.

107. ECOWAS Code of Conduct, p 3.

93

108. a. See Draft Annex III, Figures and Boxes (Figure 5- Status of National Commissions in ECOWAS states as at November 2009). b. For detail information on the status of NATCOMs in ECOWAS

states

see;

ECOWAS.

Status

of

National

Commissions in ECOWAS States. A Report on functionality mission conducted by ECOSAP Programme in conjunction with the ECOWAS Small Arms Unit from November 2006 to March 2007 to appraise the status of the various NATCOMs. Available at; http://www.parliamentaryforum.org/joomla/images/stories/4._sta tus_of_national_commissions.pdf .

109. Bah Alhaji, (2003). Micro-Disarmament in West Africa, The ECOWAS Moratorium on small arms and light weapons.

African Security Review 13(3).

110. See Draft Annex III, Figures and Boxes (Figure 4. Exemptions Granted by ECOWAS Under the Moratorium 2001-2002).

111. Paul George, ‘Assessing the Future Development of the ECOWAS Moratorium’, Paper prepared for International Alert, May, 2001 in Monitoring The Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC), West Africa Series No.1 (English Version), International Alert.

112. See Draft Annex III, Figures and Boxes (Figure 5. Selected Arms Destruction in West Africa, 1996–2002).

113. PCASED. Annual Programme Report, 2001–2002.

114. Adedeji Ebo, Laura Mazal (2003), Small Arms Control in West Africa. Monitoring The Implementation of Small Arms Controls 94

(MISAC),

West

Africa

Series

No.1

(English

Version),

International Alert.

115. A. Musah,'The Sorrows of War: Small arms, Conflict and Poverty in West Africa', Democracy and Development, Vol. 2, No. 3, September- December 1999 in Adedeji Ebo, Laura Mazal, op cit.

116. Adedeji Ebo, Laura Mazal, op cit.

117. The experts appointed to draft the Convention project were Dr. Sola

Ogunbanwo (Nigeria), international consultant, and,

Mr. Ilhan Berkol (Belgium), researcher at GRIP (Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité).

118. So far the countries that have ratified the Convention are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Ghana.

119. Examples include the principles set out in the UN Charter and under international humanitarian law and human rights law, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty (notably Articles 58 and 77 relating to regional security and sanctions, respectively), UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, as well as a series of initiatives such as the UN Programme of Action, the Firearms Protocol, the UN Instrument on small arms traceability, the Bamako Declaration, and the African Common Position of 2006 for the UN SALW Review Conference.

120. Berkol Ilhan. Analysis of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and recommendations for the development of an Action Plan, Note d’Analyse du GRIP, April

95

1,

2007,

Brussels.

Available

at:

http://www.grip.org/bdg/g1071en.pdf .

121. a. See The Convention (1996) for the terms and their definitions. b. Unlike the Moratorium, the Convention considered Non-state actors, for the first time in an instrument of this kind. As such, the sub-Saharan region has taken an important and innovative initiative that has still not been defined at the international level.

122. IANSA, Interview with Dr Sola Ogunbanwo, lead international consultant,

on

the

Convention.

Available

at;

http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/ecowas-interview.htm .

123. Berkol Ilhan Op Cit. 124. Berkol Ilhan Ibid.

125. a. The UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) was established by UN Resolution 46/36L on Transparency in Armaments and adopted without dissent on 9 December 1991 by a vote of 150-0, with Iraq and Cuba abstaining and China and Syria not participating in the vote.

UNROCA calls on all member countries to report the number of arms in seven categories (battle tanks, attack helicopters, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, warships, missiles and launchers) exported or imported from their territory during the calendar year.

Information contributed by countries to UNROCA is available to all countries and is compiled by the Secretary General in a report to the UN General Assembly.

96

UNROCA is intended to serve as a confidence-building measure and may encourage countries to develop national procedures for reviewing the potential impact of arms transfers on regional and international security, and could encourage countries to develop appropriate means of control over the export and import of arms. However, the register is not an arms control measure, nor does it provide a means of measuring the military

capabilities.

Available

at;

http://www.defense-

aerospace.com/article-view/feature/63429/focus:-u.n.-registerof-conventional-arms.html . b. From 1981- 2009, 19 of the 53 States belonging to Africa regional group reported at least once their military expenditures to the UN. In 2009, two countries of this region submitted their reports

on

military

expenditures. Available

at;

http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/DOCS/2010 -04-27MILEX&RegisterFactsheetFINAL.pdf 126. Takwa Zebulon. Small Arms Proliferation Poses Challenges in West

Africa

p8.

Available

at

;

http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/Newsletters/Focus/Vol3No1_04/Tak wa.pdf 127. Abdel-Fatau Musah (2002). Small Arms: A Time Bomb Under West Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Democratization Process, The Brown Journal of World Affairs Volume IX, Issue 1. p240

97

CHAPTER FOUR SALW IN WEST AFRICA 4.1

Brief Profile of ECOWAS President William Tubman of Liberia first mooted the idea for a

West African community in 1964. A subsequent agreement that was signed between C么te d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in February 1965, did not work. In April 1972, General Gowon of Nigeria and General Eyadema of Togo re-launched the idea with new proposals. This brought forth the treaty (Treaty of Lagos) for an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which was finally signed by 15 West African countries on 28 May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria. Subsequently, the protocols launching ECOWAS were signed in Lom茅, Togo on 5 November 1976. In July 1993, a revised ECOWAS Treaty designed to accelerate economic integration and to increase political co-operation, was signed. ECOWAS is one of the pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC). Generally, ECOWAS, like similar Sub-regional bodies around the world, was not envisioned at its inception as a collective security institution.128

98

Source: Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Objectives The core objectives of ECOWAS are to promote co-operation and integration in economic, social and cultural activity, ultimately leading to the establishment of an economic and monetary union through the total integration of the national economies of member states. It also aims to raise the living standards of its peoples, maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent. ECOWAS integration policies and programmes are influenced by the prevailing economic conditions in its member countries, the need to take the principal provisions of the Africa Economic Communities (AEC) Treaty into account, and relevant developments on the international scene.

99

The revised treaty of 1993, which was to extend economic and political co-operation

among

member

states,

designates

the

achievement of a common market and a single currency as economic objectives, while in the political sphere it provides for a West African parliament, an economic and social council and an ECOWAS court of justice to replace the existing Tribunal and enforce Community decisions. The treaty also formally assigned the Community with the responsibility of preventing and settling regional conflicts.

On 15 June 2007 the ECOWAS summit adopted the ECOWAS Strategic Vision, which seeks to convert West Africa into a borderless region by 2020. According to the subsequent communiqué the vision would also result in the transformation of existing integration structures at the regional and national levels into a single Regional Economic Community with coherent specialised agencies. It said the short-term priorities of the region should include the development of regional infrastructure, the enhancement of trade negotiation capacity, consolidation of peace and democracy, poverty reduction, faithful implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) and the design of the Community Development Programme.

Institutions The Institutions of the Community are: 

the Authority of Heads of State and Government;



the Council of Ministers;



the Community Parliament; 100



the Economic and Social Council;



the Community Court of Justice;



the Commission;



the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development;



Specialized Technical Commissions; and



Any other institutions that may be established by the Authority.

4.2

ECOWAS on Peace and Security in West Africa The era of the 1990s mark a watershed in the history of

ECOWAS as an economic union and Sub-regional Security. Because of distressing events in several of its Member States, ECOWAS soon realised that the case of economic development and progress can only be pursued in an environment of peace and stability. It found that it had to involve itself in conflicts in Member States to ensure that an environment conducive to the implementation of its economic programmes was maintained. Article 2 of Protocol Relating To The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, PeaceKeeping

and

Security

states

‘….the

economic

and

social

development and the security of peoples and States are inextricably linked;…’ 129.

Pursuant of the peace and security objective, Members of the Mediation and Security Council of ECOWAS acting on the recommendation of the meeting of the Committee of Experts on 101

Political Affairs, Peace and Security in Ouagadougou on the 14th and 15th of January 2008,

came out with the ECOWAS Conflict

Prevention Framework document [(ECPF) 2008]. The ECPF is intended as comprehensive operational conflict prevention and peace-building strategy and a guide that enables the ECOWAS system and Member States to draw upon human and financial resources at the regional (including Civil Society and the private sector) and international levels in their efforts to creatively transform conflict. In doing so, it draws its mandate and legitimacy from diverse but

related

regional

and

international

normative

framework

documents. These include foundation and related legal documents of ECOWAS, AU, The New Partnership for Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Development (NEPAD) and UN.130 In the framework of comprehensive operational conflict prevention and peace-building, since the inception of ECOWAS (ECOWAS Treaty, 28th May 1975, Lagos), the principles of cooperation, mutual assistance and non-aggression have provided the ethos for organizational behavior within the Community and with external partners. It is within this context that ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the related Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense (1981). Building on these foundation documents, the Community has adopted groundbreaking instruments in response to the demands for conflict prevention, resolution and peace-building.

The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment (1979) with its associated supplements 102

sets out the principles, definitions, criteria, obligations and codes of movement and settlement, as well as citizenship within the Community. It sets out to create a borderless region with a common community citizenship of equal rights.131 The Declaration of Political Principles (1981) reaffirmed the commitment of ECOWAS Member States to guarantee fundamental human rights, individual freedoms, the rule of law, and responsive and responsible governance to their citizens.

The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS (24th July, 1993) conferred the status of supranationality on ECOWAS. Paragraph 2 of Article 58 of the Revised Treaty on Regional Security, commits Member States to cooperate with the Community for the purposes of reinforcing the appropriate mechanisms to ensure the timely prevention and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts.132 The principal objective of the Declaration of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons (31st October, 1998) was to facilitate conflict-sensitive development through preventive disarmament initiatives. The Moratorium has, since June 2006, been converted into a binding instrument â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials which entered into force on 29 November 2009.

The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security (10 December 1999) constitutes the most comprehensive normative framework for 103

confronting the threats to peace and security in the region on a more permanent basis by boosting the conflict prevention capabilities of ECOWAS to pre-empt potential outbreak of violence, resolve conflicts when they occur and to engage more effectively in post-conflict reconstruction in places, where peace has been restored. The Mechanism establishes inextricable links between the primordial raison dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ĂŞtre of the Community, i.e. the economic and social development of the peoples, and the security of the peoples and Member States [Article 2(a)]133; and tasks ECOWAS Member States with the responsibility to manage and resolve internal and inter-State conflicts [Article 3(a)]134, as well as manage humanitarian, natural and environmental crises. Finally, the Mechanism identifies the institutions and supporting organs responsible for implementing its provisions and sets out the procedures in this regard135 .

The Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (21 December, 2001) was adopted to reinforce the Declaration of Political Principles and the Mechanism. It sets out the constitutional convergence criteria to be fulfilled by Community members based on the principles of good governance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, the promotion of non-partisan and responsible press and the democratic control of the armed forces. It also commits Member States to ensure poverty alleviation, uphold, defend and promote international norms regarding basic human rights, including the rights of minorities, children, youth and women136.

104

The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance also advocates for the strict adherence to constitutional norms in electoral practices that reject unconstitutional accession to or maintenance of power and sets the parameters for the conduct of peaceful and credible elections that are free, fair and transparent. The Protocol further tasks ECOWAS to assist Member States in electoral matters137.

In a nutshell, according to the ECPF, conflict prevention comprises the following elements: ď ś

Operational prevention, including early warning, mediation, conciliation,

preventive

disarmament

and

preventive

deployment using interactive means, such as good offices and the ECOWAS Standby Force. ď ś

Structural prevention, often elaborated under peace-building initiatives and comprising political, institutional (governance) and developmental reforms, capacity enhancement and advocacy on the culture of peace.

ď ś

Peace-building,

on

the

other

hand,

describes

the

development of the requisite multi-actor institutional capacity to design, implement and monitor initiatives aimed at checking the deterioration of social and economic conditions during hostilities, and strengthening the peace fabric of postconflict countries over a long period of time in order to prevent

a

relapse

into

violent

conflict.

Aimed

at

operationalizing Chapter IX of the Mechanism, initiatives to 105

this end include, but not limited to, humanitarian assistance, restoration and maintenance of economic and social infrastructure;

restoration

and

reform

of

governance

institutions (political, economic, socio-cultural and security); justice, rule of law, reconciliation and reintegration; and conflict-sensitive development138 .

The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

In July 1991, while endorsing the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, the Authority adopted a Declaration of Political Principle to Promote Mutual Collaboration in Defence and Security Issues. A subsequent extraordinary ECOWAS summit in December 1997 in Togo endorsed the concept of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peace and Security. This was followed by the Yamoussoukro meeting of Ministers of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs during March 1998, and a ministerial and experts meeting held in Banjul during July 1998. The Protocol establishing the Mechanism was finally adopted by the ECOWAS Authority at the Abuja summit in August 1999 and sought to institutionalise structures and processes that would ensure consultation and collective management of regional security issues.

The institutions of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security (the Mechanism) Include; (1) The Authority of Heads of State and Government (the

106

Authority); (2) the Executive Secretariat; and (3) a Mediation and Security Council of ten member states.139 The Authority of Heads of State and Government The Authority of Heads of State and Government is the highest decision-making body of the Mechanism but, without prejudice, has delegated it powers in terms of Article 7 of the Treaty (of the Mechanism) to the Mediation and Security Council â&#x20AC;&#x201C; an innovative approach yet to be copied by other Sub-regions.

The Executive Secretary The Executive Secretary has the power to initiate fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiations and reconciliation actions in the effective prevention and management of conflicts in the Sub-region.

In terms of Article 30 of the Protocol, the Executive Secretary is responsible for the training and preparation of composite standby units through regional peacekeeping training centers. The office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security supervises the Departments of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, Defence and Security and the Mission Management and Planning Cell.

Mediation and Security Council The Mediation and Security Council oversees the activities of the following organs: ď ś

Defence and Security Commission;

107



Council of Elders;



Early Warning Observation and Monitoring Centre;



ECOMOG

The Mediation and Security Council of the Mechanism was officially launched in Monrovia during May 2000. The meeting, which marked the first ordinary session of the council, followed two special sessions held in Bamako, Mali, and discussed the transfer of power of the different ECOWAS mediation committees to the Council. The Council serves as the equivalent to the UN Security Council at Subregional level and meets at ambassadorial, ministerial and head of state and government level: 

The Committee of Ambassadors of the ten elected Member States of the Council meet each month to review issues of peace and security.



The Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence,

Internal Affairs and Security meets at least every 3 months “… to review the general political and security situation in the Sub-region.” 

The ten-member Heads of State of the ECOWAS

Mediation and Security Council meets at least twice a year and has the authority to make final decisions on the appropriate measures, policies and mandates to be taken with regard to situations under consideration with a two-thirds majority vote of the Members present.

108

The Council can authorise all forms of intervention, including the decision to deploy political and military missions, inform the UN and the OAU of its decisions, provide and review mandates and terms of reference, and appoint force commanders.

Defence and Security Commission The Defence and Security Commission comprise Chiefs of Defence Staff of ECOWAS. The Commission's role is to examine all technical

and

administrative

issues

and

assess

logistical

requirements for peace-keeping operations. The Commission assists the Mediation and Security Council in: 

formulating the mandate of the Peace-keeping Force;



defining the terms of reference for the Force;



appointing the Force Commander;



Determining the composition of the Contingents.

The Defence and Security Commission meets once every quarter and when necessary. It also examines reports from the Observation and Monitoring Centers and makes recommendations to the Mediation and Security Council.

Council of Elders The Council of Elders is appointed by the Executive Secretary to engage in preventive diplomacy in the region. These eminent personalities are chosen “to use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators”. The first 109

Council of Elders was inaugurated in July 2001 in Niamey, Niger and count election monitoring in The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Togo as well as Zimbabwe among their achievements.

Early Warning /Observation and Monitoring System To facilitate the realization of Articles 3(d), 19, 23 and 24 of the Mechanism, the Early Warning component sets the objective to furnish incident and trend reports on peace and security, as well as real-time preventive response options, to ECOWAS policy makers to ensure predictability and facilitate interventions to avert, defuse or creatively transform acute situations of conflict, instability, disruptions and disasters.

The Observation and Monitoring Centre (located at the ECOWAS Secretariat-Abuja, Nigeria) is the hub of activities of the ECOWAS Early Warning System that has four Observation and Monitoring Zones within the Sub-region as follows; a. Zone I. Banjul-Gambia (Zonal Capita) - Cape Verde, The GambiaGuinea-Bissau,Senegal. b. Zone II. Ouagadougou-Burkina Faso(Zonal Capita) - Burkina Faso, Cote dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Ivoire, Mali,Niger. c. Zone III. Monrovia-Liberia (Zonal Capital) - Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone d. Zone IV. Cotonou-Benin (Zonal Capital) - Benin, Nigeria, Togo.

110

ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) The military missions that ECOMOG has carried out since it came into existence in 1999 may be categorized as Intervention, Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping. The interventions of the ECOMOG in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998), the ECOWAS Missions in Liberia (ECOMIL) in 2003, and Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) in 2002, were classic military operations designed to stop wars, intervene or monitor cease-fires, thus creating space for peace negotiations and humanitarian operations. Indeed, ECOMOG interventions in West Africa have often created the bridgehead

for

the

subsequent

deployment

of

larger

UN

peacekeeping and international humanitarian missions. In the process, ECOWAS has always acted in concert with the African Union and UN. ECOWAS has developed a comparative advantage in the area of peace-keeping and peace enforcement, and has become a model for the continent. Under the aegis of the African Union, a Pan-African Stand-by Force (ASF) is in the process of being established.

Designed for rapid preventive deployment and peace-keeping, this force will comprise five brigades, one brigade to be provided by each of the five Regional Economic (Integration) Communities (RECs).

ECOWAS is well placed to be the first REC to deliver its brigade and it is the lead organization in the development of the ASF Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) designed to create harmonization and interoperability within ASF.

111

ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) The ECOWAS Standby Force component takes its legal bases from the relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty; the provisions of the Mechanism, in particular those set out under Article 21 and Chapters V â&#x20AC;&#x201C; IX; and the provisions under Section IV of the Supplementary Protocol. The objective of ESF under the ECPF is to guarantee peace and security in situations of conflict and disaster through effective observation and monitoring, preventive deployment and humanitarian intervention, and to train and equip multi-purpose composite standby units made up of military and civilian components in Member States within the framework of the African Standby Force arrangement.

The ESF concept is coordinated by the Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC). The total strength of troops pledged to the ESF by member states is 6500 made up of a Task Force of 1500 troops and a Main Brigade of 5000 troops with training assistance from ECOWAS centers of excellence in Ghana, Nigeria and Mali. The concept of operation of the ESF is for the Task Force to have the capacity for rapid deployment to contain emergency situations within 30 days notice and be self sustainable up to 90 days (before an main Force takes over if required) while the main Brigade can be deployed within 90 days notice and be self sustainable for 90 days.

112

Control of the Proliferation of Small Arms Cognisant of the role that small arms has played in fueling conflicts in the Sub-region, West African governments adopted the ECOWAS

Moratorium

on

the

Importation,

Exportation

and

Manufacture of Light Weapons in 1998. At the request of ECOWAS, the UNDP established the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) in 1999 as a regional project on small arms to promote the implementation of the Moratorium. The moratorium was eventually transformed in June 2006, into the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Abuja, Nigeria, all aimed at reducing armed violence in West Africa.

During February 2007 West African officials agreed on a set of measures to guide member states of the Economic Community of West African States to control the millions of Small Arms and light weapons circulating in the Sub-region. The subsequent ECOSAP (that succeeded PCASED) is a five year program that will provide training, funding and logistical support to National commissions and national organizations working to fight illicit arms trafficking in West Africa. The ECOWAS Small Arms Unit was also set up at the ECOWAS Secretariat to coordinate activities of the Convention.

4.3

The Menace of SALW in West Africa The accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light

weapons continues to be a serious threat to peace, stability and sustainable development. This is particularly true in West African that 113

has experienced widespread violence in which small arms remain the primary weapons in the numerous intra- and inter-communal feuds, local wars, armed insurrections, armed rebel activities, armed robberies, homicide, murders, violent crimes and terrorism throughout the subregion. Millions of West Africans have been killed or displaced as a result, and an immeasurable amount of property has been destroyed. There is no dispute that small arms have had a devastating effect on development, governance and everyday life for West Africans as has been discussed in chapter 2 in this paper.

Statistics have it that there are about 639 million SALW circulating globally, with some estimated 7 million in West Africa, and 77,000 of them are in the hands of major West African insurgent groups. Now, how did West Africa came to be saddled with these weapons of mass destruction in slow motion? Small arms proliferation in the subregion has multiple sources.

The porous nature of West Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s borders plays a significant role

in

proliferation.

Unmanned

border

crossing

points

and

widespread corruption facilitate illicit trafficking in small arms. GuineaBissau, a reservoir of left-over Soviet-supplied weapons from the liberation war, has become a key source of illegal trafficking across the border to arm combatants of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance in their secessionist war in Senegal. Similarly, arms have poured into the Mano River Union [(MRU) Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, plus Cote dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Ivoire] from Libya and transited through Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast with government blessing. Yet more weapons from the Great Lakes conflicts are recycled to fuel 114

conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Despite the ending of many conflicts in the subregion, smuggling and the illicit trade in small arms are reported to be on the increase.140 Proliferation has also been facilitated by legal means. During conflict and the numerous coups d’état, some states in West Africa liberalized gun possession laws in order to stimulate civilian arming to facilitate regime security. The spate of military coups in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Benin from the late 1960s through to the end of the 1980s was, in part, a function of these security dynamics.

Except in Guinea-Bissau, where an active liberation war raged, West Africa was not burdened with a proliferation of weapons upon independence. The weapons that were available were adequately controlled by state organs. The advent of coups d’état gradually emphasized the decisive role of weapons as the surest route to power and personal enrichment; the entry of junior military officers into the political arena increased weapons proliferation. In West Africa, six junior officers’ coups occurred between 1979 and 1986 (Ghana, 1979 and 1981; Liberia, 1980; Burkina Faso, 1983 and 1986; and the Gambia, 1984). Junior officers’ coups further exacerbated arms diffusion; introduced arms possession to the civilian population, which

included

radical

students,

workers’

leaders,

and

the

marginalized sections of the urban population; and increased gunrelated civilian casualty rates. With the advent of junior officers’ military coups and the diffusion of arms into Civil Society, the stage was set for the entry of civilian warlords and their ill-trained combatants into the conflict vortex. Charles Taylor and Prince 115

Johnson in Liberia and Foday Sankoh and the many “commanders” of the infamous RUF in Sierra Leone exemplify this phenomenon of civilians-turned-warlords. Many more operate in the rebellions in Guinea-Conakry, in Casamance, and within vigilante groups in Nigeria.

141

. Arms were directly distributed to paramilitary groups by

governments in order to fight rebel forces during the civil wars in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, but legislation was also liberalized, and proved a major driver of small arms diffusion.

Admittedly, while some states are guilty of supporting, and often participating in, illicit small arms transfers, it is important to emphasise, however, that non-state actors are playing more prominent roles in the proliferation of SALW in West Africa. Ethnic militia groups, private security companies, arms smugglers, criminal gangs, bandits, mercenaries, and vigilante groups all play their respective roles in the proliferation of SALW in West Africa.

Indeed, a defining character of small arms proliferation in West Africa is the increasing difficulty of states to provide and/or guarantee public security. Those states that are not themselves theatres of war, either have their own tensions or are neighbours to countries at war.

While the MRU states are the most visible arenas of violent conflict, a ‘promising democracy’ such as Nigeria has suffered more than 100,000 deaths in more than 50 ethno-religious conflicts since the start of the fourth republic in mid-1999. Ghana is reputed to be an island of peace in West Africa but has suffered from violent conflicts in the north, in which SALW are reported to have been used. The report of the UN Committee of Experts on Liberia confirmed that Togo 116

and Burkina Faso are conduits for illicit small arms, and Gambia is embedded in the Casamance conflict which afflicted Senegal. No part of the Sub-region is free from the scourge of illicit small arms proliferation.142 Weapons are also brought in to West Africa by poorly paid soldiers who have served in peacekeeping missions, for example in Lebanon, Liberia or Sierra Leone, and who often return home with their weapons to sell them on to combatants and gun dealers.

Leakages from poorly constructed and insecure stockpiles of the security services are also a chronic problem in West African countries with large numbers of weapons, before, during and after conflict. Under resourced security forces may be unable to secure stockpiles properly, and poorly paid individuals may resort to using their official weapons for criminal activities or may rent them out to others to supplement their income. SALW also circulate through the desertion of military personnel. Many of these legal weapons find their way into the illicit market.

Lack of good governance, weaker state institutions that are unable provide good standard of living, security and protection and deliver justice to the citizenry within the context of widespread economic decay and the concomitant rise of unemployment and crime results in the increase in demand for more weapons. However, for the past few years, international actors have started to emphasise the importance of good governance across various sectors and

117

development assistance now recognises the importance of security sector reform.

Indeed, the effects of the proliferation of SALW are multiple and interrelated. Some 2 million West Africans are reported to have died in conflicts involving SALW since 1990.143 Small arms bring devastation to lives, property and the physical environment, exacerbate conflict, spark mass displacement and refugee flows, undermine the rule of law, and promote and sustain a culture of violence. Small arms have become the choice instruments of terror and gross human rights abuses in West Africa. Small arms proliferation mostly affects the vulnerable segments of society (children, women, and the aged). A major issue in particular is their impact on children. More than 120,000 African children under the age of 18 are reported to be engaged in civil wars and wielding small arms.144 This is made easier by the fact that small arms are light, portable, and can be operated with minimal instructions and training.

However, many children are also often victims of SALW, through slavery and rape for example.

4.4

Ghana and the Problem of SALW Ghana145 has enjoyed relative peace and largely escaped civil

strife in comparison to most of its regional counterparts (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and more recently Cote dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Ivoire). In fact, the Economist Intelligence Unitâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (EIU) Global Peace Index (GPI) report for 2010 ranks Ghana as the third most peaceful country in Africa, and the forty-eighth most peaceful country globally (out of 148 118

countries covered). Over all, Ghana is ranked as one of the most peaceful countries in the world on a scale of 1-5 scores

146

. However,

the country has witnessed a marked increase in firearms-related violence since independence (on 6 March 1957); a situation which is partly blamed on local production of fire arms. The country is mentioned as an exporter of guns to other parts of West Africa and a link has been established between the growing Ghanaian small arms industry and conflicts across the West African Sub-region147.

Indeed, though violent clashes do occur in the country, they are not on a scale that is assessed to influence the general peace status of the entire country. The reason for this is that many of the violent conflicts that erupt are localized or are related to specific issues that do not attract the participation of the majority of the citizens.

The conflicts that occur in Ghana are derived mainly from social and political discontent, and ethnic assertiveness or contestations.

The conflicts take several forms: Political violence (including military takeovers or coup d’états148), demonstrations by opposition and/or pressure groups, and sporadic election violence between supporters of rival political parties149. Occasional violent clashes between and within different religious groups occur in several places across the country: for instance among several Muslim groups150, and between the traditional religious authorities and some Christian churches in Accra151. The most perennial and potentially violent forms of conflict are so-called ‘chieftaincy conflicts’152. In all these conflicts, experts say, SALW (especially locally manufactured weapons) fuels or intensifies them.

119

Gun manufacture in Ghana dates back several hundred years, when iron working was first introduced. In pre-colonial and colonial Ghanaian society, guns were used in a variety of different contextsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; but were most often deployed in the slave trade. Guns were used to terrorize and enslave thousands of people, to force them to dig for gold in order to buy and/or manufacture more guns, and to capture even more slaves. Among the several Ghanaian ethnic groups involved in slave-raiding expeditions, guns are a symbol of a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;gloriousâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; past now colourfully recreated during festivals.153 In Ghana, Gun production was first criminalized in the midnineteenth century, after colonial powers (Denmark and then Great Britain) began to perceive the proliferation of small arms as a serious threat to their hegemony. Legislation, however, succeeded only in driving the industry further underground. Under the guise of producing trinkets, gold ornaments, and basic farm implements, blacksmiths secretly continued to manufacture the more profitable small arms which then slipped outside the purview of the law and the state. Not only did clandestine manufacture continue to grow, but it also engendered networks and mechanisms designed to elude lawenforcement agencies154.

Illicit SALW has become a common household possession in most communities experiencing conflict in Ghana. Gun production estimates vary. Contrary to initial estimate of 10,000, the 2006 Baseline Survey Report on the Proliferation of SALW in Ghana reported that there are about 100,000 small arms in the country155.

The National Commission on Small Arms, set up in 2007 to check the 120

manufacture and cross-border movement of small arms, estimates 40,000 Ghana-made guns are in circulation156. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) mentioned that some 75,000 small arms are circulating in Ghana with the Tudu market in Accra as one place where locally produced weapons are openly available for sale (such as multi-shot revolvers and shot-guns which go for as low as $100)157. Dr. Kwesi Aning, head of the conflict resolution department of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in the capital Accra, puts the figure at 200,000158. Other media reports put the estimates at 220,000 SALW circulating in Ghana159. However, the truth is that, there are no official figures of the total number of guns currently registered in Ghana160. Therefore, the figures put out here should be interpreted with caution given the fact that information available on the issue is limited and inconsistent.

Though the figure of illicit SALW circulating in Ghana is comparatively low as compared to other West African states, the rate of local production and proliferation could threaten the social stability of the country if antidotes are not found to curtail the illegal use of small arms. Most weapons found at crime scenes are in the local production category. According to the Ghana Police Service, about 90 per cent of guns used by armed robbers arrested in the country were locally manufactured 161. UNODC also indicated that homemade guns are used in one-quarter to one-third of Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s violent crimes 162

.

A distinctive element of SALW proliferation in Ghana compared to other West African countries is the existence of an important illegal 121

local production

163

. Several causes are attributed to the growing

prevalence of SALW in the country. Dr Kwesi Aning, says that the proliferation of small arms in the country have been necessitated by a mix of poverty, youth unemployment and political manipulations.

He also believes that the police and other security agencies have been ineffective in clamping down on the illegal acquisition of weapons164. In addition, the feeling of insecurity among a section of Ghanaians who think they need to protect themselves from armed robbers and the increasing levels of armed violence across the country due to chieftaincy and land disputes as well as criminal and banditry activities account for the increasing demand for firearms across the country. Other sources of illicit SALW proliferation in Ghana include returning peacekeepers and leakages from official armouries (as illustrated in Case Study ‘A’ bellow), illicit flows from, but not limited to, neighbours at war, such as Côte d’Ivoire and the MRU. CASE STUDY Soldier Busted Over Weapons An unfortunate corporal of the Ghana Armed Forces on peace keeping in Lebanon has been arrested for illegally trying to smuggle two short guns out of Lebanon to Ghana. Another 79 soldiers who successfully dispatched their guns by sea to Ghana are being trailed for arrest and retrieval of the guns when they arrive at the ports. A source at the military barracks in Tamale told this reporter that the military man (name withheld for now) and 79 others on completing their peace keeping assignment in Lebanon bought the guns from a shop for export to Ghana, since gun selling is fast becoming a lucrative business. The source told Public Agenda that a pistol in Lebanon costs $250 and can be sold in Ghana for more than GH¢2,500 about four times the price .He said the high cost of the

122

sophisticated guns has lured many military men into illegally importing guns into the country for sale to civilians. Giving details, the source said the corporal was arrested when he tried boarding a plane with the guns hidden in a speaker after the cargo plane failed to arrive for their luggage. For that reason the officials decided that the luggage be sent by sea, instead of by air. The source told this reporter that it took more than four hours for the UN command to lobby the Lebanese government to release the corporal and also took the Ghana government another four to five hours to lobby the UN command for man to be released for trial in Ghana. Investigators traced the source of the gun to a shop and the shop owner disclosed that, the corporal was just one of the many Ghanaian soldiers who bought two or more guns from him. He revealed that eighty Ghanaian soldiers bought guns from him with some buying as many as ten guns. The source said some well meaning military officers are unhappy about the increasing importation of arms by some military men and women. "Look every body is now buying a gun which is not good and this is what has destabilize many countries", he lamented. According to security experts, the proliferation of arms among civilians is the cause of the upsurge in crime and the many bloody chieftaincy disputes across the country.

Submitted by Foundation for Security and development in Africa (FOSDA) on Wed, 06/25/2008. Available at; www.fosda.net

Local production represents the main source of proliferation of SALW in the country, in particular for pistols, shotguns and singlebarrel

guns.165

Each of

Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ten

regions

houses

gun-

manufacturing workshops. Although many of these workshops also engage in the manufacture of other goods such as farming hardware, arms production is their most lucrative activity.166 It has been noted that there is indeed a gun culture in rural Ghana. Eight locally made guns have featured prominently in Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s socio-political history and have been used in hunting, 123

farming, chieftaincy rites, funerals and festivals. In addition, Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s kingdoms have historically been characterised by a strong military sector.167 SALW are not only illegally trafficked by blacksmiths but also by security agency personnel stealing arms from the state armouries and renting or selling out to criminal groups in the black market168 ; contributing to increase in crime levels both in the country and across the

West

African

Sub-region.

Developing effective stockpile management and ensuring the security of these stocks is therefore a key element to improving SALW controls in Ghana.169 The operations of licensed armourers in Ghana are another source of proliferation. Their actual number and extent of activities is not clear and it is problematic to classify any of these as dormant or active importers. However, available data indicates that Ghana is currently served by 5 major licensed importers: Game Marketing Ltd, Yadco Enterprise, Globart Teslria Enterprise, Bradco Trading and Associates, and Ampoma Ahwene Enterprise. These companies collectively account for the 20,000 firearms which, on average, are imported annually into Ghana170.

As with other West African states, illicit SALW proliferation is also the direct result of protracted military rule. During the years of the Provisional National Defence Council in the 1980s, the regime liberally armed its civilian cadres and functionaries. The militias of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution often carried arms and 124

there has been no substantial programme to disarm them since the end of the revolution. Many of these arms have illegally filtered into criminal hands and have been recycled for use in criminal networks.171 4.4.01 1.

Manifestations of SALW Violence in Ghana

Armed robberies and criminality.

Armed robberies have been

consistently increasing in Ghana, arguably a consequence of increasingly harsh socio-economic conditions, within the context of the inability of the State to provide basic human needs, including employment and qualitative and affordable health and education services. There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between SALW availability and armed robbery in Ghana. While social deprivation and poverty may have directly led to armed criminality, the easy availability of SALW has also facilitated the process of transforming frustration into crime.172 2.

Ethnic conflicts.

In addition, despite its overall peaceful

existence, Ghana, like many of its regional counterparts, has been affected by violent ethnic conflicts. Land disputes in the north resulted in ethnic violence during 1994 and 1995. Over 1,000 people were killed and over 150,000 were internally displaced. In April 2002, a state of emergency was declared in the north when a tribal chief and 30 others were killed as clan violence increased.173 The Northern Regions of Ghana are currently in the grips of chieftaincy crisis in Dagbong, Bawku, Wa

174

and Bunkpurugu

175

which resulted in the

loss of several lives and property and displacement of thousands of 125

others. Various SALW, both imported and locally-produced, are reported to have been used in most of these ethnic and identity conflicts. In deed, it is intimated that, Dagbong is full of illegal weapons. 176 3.

Land guards.

Finally, the prevalence of multiple claims to

land in Ghana has resulted in the phenomenon of land guards, youngsters whose function is to enforce the land claim(s) of their employer(s) against all rival claimants. For example, in October 2001, a group of armed civilians led by a police sergeant stormed a building site and, without provocation, started firing indiscriminately ostensibly to scare people and force them to flee from the land. In May 2003, nine people took refuge at the palace of a local chief near Accra (Anyaa), following an attack on the residents of the town by suspected armed land guards and thugs wielding AK-47s and machetes.177 4.4.02

Ghana's Legislation on Arms and Amunition and the

ECOWAS Convention on SALW178 The ECOWAS Convention among other obligations imposes on Contracting State Parties the important obligation (in article 21) to undertake to revise and update existing legislation to ensure that the provisions in the Convention are the minimum standards for the control of SALW and other related materials. Member States are particularly enjoined by the Convention to establish as criminal offences activities contravening the Convention and activities carried

126

out in violation of arms embargo imposed by the UN, AU or ECOWAS. The wording of the Article 21 obligation clearly anticipates that existing

national

legislations

related

to

SALW

are

certainly

inadequate for regulating the current intensity and complexity of the SALW industry. The reasons for such a possible inadequacy are obvious. Most of these national legislations are outdated; as Ghana's main legislation on the subject dates back to 1962. Over time and due to subsequent developments in the security sector most of these legislations have become obsolete. In addition, the detailed provisions of the Convention and obligations arising from similar global and regional security arrangements require the updating and revision of national regulations on SALW. Existing regulations which address issues of SALW in Ghana include the following:  Arms and Ammunition Act, 1962 (Act 118);  Arms and Ammunition Regulations, 1962 (L.I.200);  Arms and Ammunition Decree, 1972 (NRCD 9);  Arms and Ammunition (Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act 519); and  Arms and Ammunition (Amendment) Act, 2001 (Act 604).

127

The above legislations and regulations dating from 1962 address issues of Arms and Ammunition:  Exportation and importation in terms of requirements of licenses or permission from the competent authority;  Deposits

and

safekeeping

in

either

public

or

private

warehouses or conditions for their withdrawal as well as stock examination;  Condition of ownership, possession and control; and  Penal provisions against contravention of the legislation and regulations.

An important consideration in Ghana's legal regime on Arms and Ammunition is that it does not take account of illegal trans-border movements or transfers of such weapons. It therefore has no clear provisions on the need for Visitor Certificates, marking of weapons (in classic and security forms), tracing and brokering activities as provided for in the Convention. The marking, record keeping and tracing of fire arms is not provided for in our law. Although the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service and other security service organisations have some guidelines governing the marking on the weapons that they import, this is not a requirement in our law.179 For instance, there is no law that requires a weapon imported into Ghana to have the name or brand of manufacturer, name or code of country, caliber, and serial number, year of manufacture, printing 128

depths and unique organisationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s initial or logo. These requirements would be considered in the review process.180 It should also be noted that Ghana's legislation regulate arms and ammunitions while the Convention seeks to regulate small arms, light weapons, ammunitions and related materials. The Specific weapons which constitute the above categories, though similar, are not the same as between Ghana's law regime and that of the Convention.

For instance the Convention makes a distinction between light weapons and small arms based on the number of persons required to operate each category of weapons. Ghana's legislation on the other hand makes a distinction between arms, firearms and arms of war.

The definition given to each of these categories of weapons conflicts small arms with light weapons. The Ghana law further makes the complicated distinction between ammunitions and munitions of war.

A close reading of the Convention shows clearly that it has the benefit of a hind side of global, regional and Sub-regional developments in the security sector as regards the proliferation of weapons of many kinds. It is therefore important for Contracting State Parties to adopt the legal definitions of concepts contained in the Convention.

When

the

Convention

becomes

operational,

interpretational difficulties are bound to arise between the Common law and Civil law jurisprudence. Such difficulties will become exacerbated if Member States do not revise the regulations in line with the Convention provisions. I can immediately see difficulties arising from the notion of who is a broker in the law of agency between the Civil law and Common law traditions.

129

It is also not clear why Ghana's definition of ammunitions and munitions of war excludes lead. The Convention's definition of both ammunition and related materials does not make any exception to possible devices that can be shot or projected by firearms as well as substances used as active material for propelling ammunitions.

Though provisions exist in the Ghana law to deal with issues of seizures and forfeitures of arms and ammunitions to the state, there are no detail provisions on their disposal. Regulation 67 of L. I. 200 of 1962 leaves the issue of disposal of arms forfeited to the state entirely to the Minister of Interior. The minimum standard in the Convention on disposal of weapons expressly includes their destruction without any possibility of recycling them. However, the provisions in Ghana's law do not expressly preclude the Minister from disposing of seized or forfeited weapons through private or public auction. Literature abounds to the effect that most illegal weapons often begin their cycle as legal weapons which eventually join the illegal circulation. The objectives of the Convention cannot be achieved if illegal weapons seized or forfeited are put back in circulation as legal weapons through auctions.

The criminal offences provided for in Ghana's legislation do not cover the possible offences anticipated by the Convention. The most comprehensive formulation of offences relating to arms and ammunitions in Ghana are in section 11 of NRCD 9 of 1972 as subsequently amended. The said penal provisions relate to acts which contravene the law as well as obstructions to enforce the laws 181

. The Convention on its part seeks to criminalize not only violations 130

of its provisions but also violations of arms embargos imposed by the UN, AU or ECOWAS. Therefore the possible acts under the Convention which can trigger criminal consequences are larger than those under the Ghana law.

The above issues notwithstanding, Ghana's legal regime which seeks to regulate SALW have a number of important provisions which are also captured by the Convention. However, what is needed in Ghana is a totally new comprehensive legislation and regulations specifically on SALW because of the minimum standard requirement in article 21 of the Convention and possible guidelines from the ECOWAS Executive Secretary.182 4.4.03

Implementation Structures

The Arms and Ammunition Inventory Committee is responsible for parliamentary oversight of SALW issues, though its institutional capacity to play this role is in need of enhancement. The scale of proliferation and the increasing sophistication and transnationalisation of firearms-related criminality impose challenges on the Committee which are far beyond its present capabilities. The National Firearms Vocational Licensing Authority (which was â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;the Ghana Fire Arms Bureauâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; or Ghana fire Arms Registry) is responsible for the monitoring of the proliferation, trading and licensing of SALW in Ghana. Regardless, problems persist relating to non adherence to established procedures for the importation, storage, supervision and distribution of SALW and ammunition.183

131

4.4.05

Ghanaian National Commission on Small Arms

(GNCSA) at Work The GNCSA was established in 2007, with support from the UNDP-Ghana to fulfill the requirements of the ECOWAS Moratorium, now the ECOWAS Convention. It was also expected to work towards the effective implementation of the UNPoA. The ECOSAP, the successor of PCASED, would work with the national commissions in all the ECOWAS member states to implement and enforce policies aimed at controlling small arms circulation in the West African Subregion. The Commission has been engaged in various programmes and activities since its inception in a real attempt at fulfilling its mandate as follows; 1.

Capacity Building.

A workshop was organized at Elmina

in the Central Region of Ghana for Security Operatives and a retreat for Commission members at Ada in the Eastern Region of Ghana. It created the appropriate forum for capacity building for selected Security Operatives from all the ten (10) Administrative Regions of Ghana and GNCSA members. The workshop also created the platform for Capacity Development in Arms Inventory and Stockpile Management, Cross border Control, Sensitization and Awareness Raising Campaign, Strategic Planning, identification of national priorities and intra and inter-agency coordination.84 2.

Stockpile Management / Arms Collection and Destruction.

A

national stock-taking exercise of small arms which were confiscated or surrendered to the security agencies, was undertaken in some 132

selected Police armouries in 2004 in all regional capitals and was later extended to other armouries. These weapons are being destroyed as part of Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s commitment to fulfill her international requirement geared towards the realization of the objectives of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW which re-enforces the United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA). In this regard, Ghana destroyed Six Hundred and Seventy-Five (675) assorted weapons on 9th July, 2005 (UN Weaponsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Destruction Day) at Tamale, an area noted for protracted disputes in the Northern part of Ghana. In all, Ghana has destroyed over 2,500 weapons since 2001.185 The Government of Ghana has directed the Ghana Police Service to install arms registries across the country as part of measures by the government to properly control weapons.186 Additionally, the government is also taking steps to ensure a good stockpile management, as well as branding and tracing of official weapons, to deal with the impunity with which small arms are being used for violent crimes and conflicts in the country.187 In this direction, steps are being taken by the GNCSA to engage the Armed Forces on the transparency and accountability obligation of Ghana under the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, the

UNPoA

on

Small

Arms

and

the

International

Tracing

Instrument.188 The Ghana Police Service is being assisted by the UNDP through the GNCSA to computerise their firearms units in the

133

Regions and capture SALW data electronically (Small Arms Register).189 3.

Addressing the Issue of Blacksmiths and Illicit Production. The

Ghana National Commission on Small Arms with support from the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] has been engaging local Blacksmiths to shift their focus from the production of small arms to that of other socially-beneficial tools for peaceful purposes and which have ready markets, examples being plough blades for farmers and hand cuffs for the Police. It is hoped that this will help in helping to preserve their entrepreneurial skills as well as re-directing same into productive and equally lucrative economic activity.

Interactions with the Ashanti Regional Association of Blacksmiths (ASHRAB), which is currently the best organized in the country, has yielded very fruitful results. As a result, blacksmiths in other regions are also being encouraged to organize themselves into well recognised groups to form a National Association to present a formidable front. This will enhance the process of identifying their needs which will facilitate the rationalisation of support from the Ghana National Commission of Small Arms, Development Partners and other organizations. Meanwhile, part of a comprehensive National Plan of Action (NPA) is to introduce skills training and support measures to convert skills to other viable alternatives.190 4.

Awareness Raising Campaign.

Sensitisation

and

Awareness Raising campaigns which were initiated in the latter part of 2004 are on-going and have yielded positive results. A significant percentage of the citizenry have been sensitized about the dangers 134

associated with illicit arms and on the need to reduce the demand for weapons. Thousands of students of first and second-cycle schools as well as inhabitants of communities have been encouraged to establish Weapon-Free Clubs or Societies during the Commissionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s outreach programmes which have yielded good results as evidenced by the number of communities renouncing violence and using dialogue to resolve disputes. Some communities in the Volta and Northern Regions of Ghana with protracted disputes have now resolved them amicably.191 The Commission has published series of articles in the state print media to create awareness on the dangers of SALW proliferation in the society. It has developed infomercial on the dangers of armed violence for showing on the local television stations. Officers from the Commission also from time to time appear on radio and television talk shows.192 5.

Baseline Survey. The report of the Baseline Survey which was

initiated in 2004 to research and provide a comprehensive overview of the SALW situation in Ghana, and conducted by the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) was completed and presented to government. This survey formed the

background

document for a National Strategic Conference on Small Arms which was held in Accra from the 14th to 16th of March, 2006, which brought together the Development Partners, Security operatives, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and local craft producers of Small Arms to foster dialogue and build consensus for a National Plan of Action.193 135

6.

Policy and Legislation.

Measures

are

underway

to

develop Ghana’s SALW policy, and to review the country’s legislation on small arms. A policy drafting committee is expected to be established to draft Ghana’s SALW policy, and the committee is expected to ensure that CSOs are effectively consulted in its development. This process of policy development is already far advanced. Based on the committee’s report, Ghana is expected to formulate a more effective and comprehensive national policy on firearms, ammunition, explosives and related materials in accordance with international and regional programmes, protocols and national objectives (The work of the committee is in its final stages as explained above). Meanwhile the existing laws on Arms have been consolidated into a single legislation.194 7.

Sub-regional and International Co-operation.

Ghana has

continued to participate in international Small Arms conferences, seminars and workshops. Ghana has been quite active in a Consultative Group process regarding the issue of arms transfer with particular focus on transfer to non-state actors and will continue to support all the recommendations from the process for onward submission to the United Nations for possible adoption. Ghana acknowledges that for effective control of the proliferation of small arms in the country, she requires coordination and cooperation with her neighbours. Therefore, Ghana will continue to: engage in consultative processes; in the ECOWAS framework, to promote collaboration among Sub-regional agencies on the control of small arms, explore and promote bilateral and Sub-regional cooperation on 136

efforts to combat small arms proliferation, and initiate cooperation and information sharing within the Sub-region and internationally within the framework of national policy. 195 8.

Empowering Women and Children.

Ghana National

Commission on Small Arms is working towards better collaboration with CSOs to put in programmes that can focus on sensitisation and empowerment of women and children. We are of the view that children and women suffer most in times of conflict, so the Commission is in consultation with CSOs and the UNDP-Ghana to empower children and women to understand the negative implication of armed violence which has come about as a result of the proliferation of SALW. This will make them consider joining seriously the fight against illicit SALW which is expected to result in their playing a very significant role in order to help protect them.196 9.

Cooperation with Civil Society and NGOs.

IANSA sends

updates on news regarding developments on small arms and light weapons issues worldwide. There is a close collaboration between the Ghana Government and WAANSA (the regional representative of IANSA) in fashioning policies and programmes to control SALW.197 4.4.06

Challenges Facing Ghana and the Way Forward

The menace of small arms has been perceived seriously at the level of the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Presidency and National Security Council.

However, due to the fact that Ghana has never experienced civil war, greater efforts are needed to let the citizenry appreciate the problem of the proliferation of small arms as both a Security and 137

Developmental issue. Lack of accurate statistics on the number of SALW in the system, lack of information on the activities of private armourers, porous borders, corrupt government, judicial and security officials, poor institutional capacities and share lack of political will continue to hamper the implementation and enforcement efforts towards the fight against the proliferation of SALW in Ghana.

The GNCSA is beset with a lot of problems which is affecting her operational readiness status to achieve her objectives. The Commission has limited expertise in-house (no adequate and permanent office staff198) to implement but can rely on other actors outside the commission (CSOs and NGOs who have a lot of expertise in this field) to assist. It is yet to effectively do so. The biggest problem is lack of funding; and what seem to be the lack of interest (due, in part, because even politicians do not see the strong link between illicit proliferation of SALW and poverty and in part, because of other pressing needs from other sectors of the economy)199. However, the commission has a permanent office and some office equipment, full complement of Board Members including a full time Executive Secretary200. Perhaps, these are encouraging signs that the government is stepping up efforts to adequately resource the GNCSA to effectively execute its mandate in keeping with the remarks made by HE President John Evans Atta Mills (President of the Republic of Ghana), who said, "We have committed ourselves to eliminating armed violence and the proliferation of small arms in Ghana, as well as the West African Sub-region", in a speech read on his behalf by the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Cletus Avoka, at 138

a forum on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons organised by the WAANSA - Ghana Chapter 201.

There should be serious efforts geared towards disarmament in localities and communities identified as areas of high concentration of firearms and in the Volta Region where two (2) communities have smoked the peace pipe recently after decades of war, as well as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;weapons for developmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; programmes and practical projects in areas of tension and conflict. This will enhance weapon-free societies and bring development to the people, especially the youth who are easily recruited into conflict.

Artisans who have the capacity to manufacture arms locally have continued to succeed in carrying out their production in the criminal underworld despite the fact that this activity remains illegal, making efforts to ensure the ban counter-productive. The main motivation for the production of locally-made small arms by these artisans, especially blacksmiths, is that of economic factors more than any other. The prevailing economic situation in the country and the Sub-region makes the manufacturing and the smuggling of small arms very profitable, and unless economically viable alternatives are provided to these blacksmiths, it is expected to be very difficult to win the fight against the local production of arms.

There is the need for greater collaboration with identifiable organizations and CSOs, of which some consider themselves as competitors with the Small Arms Commission in their activities, to build a cohesive intervention in the area of awareness raising.

139

End Notes/References 128.

a. ECOWAS, established in 1975, originally had 15 members: Benin (then known as Dahomey), Burkina Faso (then known as Upper Volta), Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Cape Verde joined ECOWAS in 1977 and Mauritania left the organization in 2000. Guinea - suspended after 2008 coup d'état. b. It operates officially in three coequal languages (French, English, and Portuguese). c. The current President of the Commission is Ambassador James Victor Gbeho. The current chairman is President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria. d. ECOWAS has a; (1)

total land area of 5,112.903km2

(2)

population of 251,646,263 people and a Population

Density of 115.6Km2 (2006 estimates).

(3) $

GDP of US $ 342,519 Billion and a Per capita of US 7,890

(2005

estimates).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_Community_of_We st_African_States

140

129. ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (December 1999).

130. ECOWAS Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08. Conflict Prevention Framework document OUAGADOUGOU (JANUARY 2008). p7 131. ECOWAS Protocol A/P.1/5/79, on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment, (May 1979).

132. The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS (July 1993).

133. ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (December 1999 Abuja, Nigeria), p 4.

134. Ibid, p 5.

135. Ibid, p 5.

136. ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (December, 2001), p4.

137. ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (December, 2001), p6.

138. ECOWAS Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08. Conflict Prevention Framework document OUAGADOUGOU (JANUARY 2008), p9.

139. ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (December 1999 Abuja, Nigeria), p 4.

141

140. Abdel-Fatau Musah (2002). Small Arms: A Time Bomb Under West Africa’s Democratization Process, The Brown Journal of World Affairs Volume IX, Issue 1, p242.

141. Ibid 142. Adedeji Ebo, Laura Mazal (2003), Small Arms Control in West Africa, Monitoring The Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC),

West

Africa

Series

No.1

(English

Version),

International Alert, p12.

143. Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA), FOCUS On Small Arms In West Africa, Accra, April 2001, p. 1.

144. See ‘USA Support Needed for International Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers’; available at http://www.woaafrica.org 145. See brief history of the Republic of Ghana at Annex II (Definition of Terms) 146. The Peace Index scores from 1 to 5 where 1 = one of the most peaceful country. Ghana scores 1.781. This ranking is based on analysing relative states of peace using 23 indicators. Some of the indicators include data on Level of organised conflict (internal), Level of violent crime, Political instability, Level of disrespect for human rights, economy, military expenditure and ease of access to weapons of minor destruction, etc. It is assumed that the 149 countries measured for the Global Peace Index (GPI) are a representative sample of all countries).

142

Available

at;

http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-

data/#/2010/scor/GH/detail .

147. ‘Ghanaian homemade guns and instability in Togo, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire’. Available at; http://en.afrik.com/article16453.html 148 Political

violence

has

also

occurred

during

military

interventions. Ghana has experienced 5 such interventions since independence. During these takeovers the military and the police have used violence for political repression. Military and police brutality and excesses (in the form of beatings, torture, rapes and murders) are common during such periods.

149. Such violence mostly occurs close to the general elections.

Political violence in the country sometimes takes ethnic dimensions. For instance, media repots have it that during the run-up to the 2008 election, there were some incidents that involved violence. In August, two people were killed in Tamale when supporters of the two leading parties, the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the main opposition party, National Democratic Congress (NDC) clashed after a political rally.

(Source;

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44982

)

On September 1, there were violent clashes in Gushiegu District in the Northern Region between NPP and NDC supporters when they attempted to erect campaign flags in the same location. The clashes resulted in six deaths and the burning of houses and vehicles. Another NPP rally in Tamale was disrupted by gunfire, forcing the party’s vice presidential 143

candidate to flee, also in early September. The incident led to attacks on NDC supporters returning from their own rally and in the

destruction

of

houses

and

vehicles.

(Source;

http://search.conduit.com/ResultsExt.aspx?ctid=CT2542127&q =GHA35336&SearchSource=15 ). However, it was reported that political differences had only exacerbated conflicts arising from chieftaincy and irrigated land distribution disputes 150. Clashes have been reported in the media between Muslim groups in Tamale in the Northern Region, Kumasi in the Ashanti Region and Wenchi in the Brong-Ahafo Region.

Interestingly, violent clashes between Christian and Muslims of the magnitudes that have occurred in neighboring countries like Nigeria have not occurred in Ghana. Christians and Muslims have largely been able to co-exist peacefully in the country.

151. The issue of contention has been with the ban on drumming and

dancing

which

precedes

the

annual

Homowo

(Thanksgiving) Festival in the Ga Traditional State of the Greater Accra Region. Some churches operating in the city have persistently refused to observe the ban and have been attacked by organized Ga youth groups enforcing the ban.

152. Chieftaincy conflicts, is characterised by disputed claims between rival claimants to the traditional political office of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;chiefâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in a traditional area. Chieftaincy conflicts are often associated with ethnicity. It can be described as intra-ethnic when rival claimants to chiefly office come from different lineages within 144

the same ethnic group. The dispute becomes inter-ethnic when the disputing factions come from different ethnic groups within a ‘traditional state’, as with the case of Bawku (a communal dispute between Kusasis and Mampuruis in the Bawku traditional area of the Upper East Region of Ghana). In such cases the terms ‘ethnic conflict’ and ‘chieftaincy conflicts’ can be used interchangeably to describe the nature of the conflict.

Because

chieftaincy

is

also

closely

associated

with

custodianship of land, the dispute about who is the rightful occupant of the chiefly office is ultimately linked to disputes over control over resources like land, water, mineral resources, etc. Though chieftaincy conflicts occur in all parts of the country, those that have been accompanied by extreme violence have occurred in the Northern and the Upper East Regions, specifically in Dagbon (a chieftaincy dispute between the Abudu and Andani clans of the Dagbong Royal family) and Bawku respectively. Examples of longstanding inter-ethnic conflicts across the country: Northern Region, there are conflicts between the Nanumba and the Konkomba, Gonja and the Konkomba and between the Dagomba and the Konkomba.

In the Volta Region, there are two of such conflicts, the Nkonya/Alavanyo conflict and the Nkwanta conflict between the Nawuri and the Adele. And in the Brong-Ahafo Region, the Nafana are in conflict with the Ntore. The Northern Region has witnessed the most violent inter-ethnic clashes in Ghana in the post independent period. The Pito War of 1981 and the Guinea Fowl War of 1994/95 have been the bloodiest. These wars 145

were fought by more than two million people and claimed thousands of lives. The Guinea Fowl War between the Nanumba, Dagomba and Gonja on one side against the Konkomba for instance is said to have claimed at least 2000 lives, destroyed 441 villages and displaced more than 178,000 people (see Jonson, Julia(2007): “The Overwhelming Minority: Traditional Leadership and Ethnic Conflict in Ghana’s Northern Region”. Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University. CRISE Working

Paper

30,

p18

Available

http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper30.pdf

at; ).

Examples: over land - Peki-Tsito conflict in the Volta Region, the Nsuta-Beposo and Effiduase-Asokore conflicts in the Ashanti Region, and the Weija-Oblogo conflict in the Greater Accra Region.

153. Kwesi Aning Emmanuel (2005). ‘The anatomy of Ghana’s secret arms industry’. In Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, Small Arms Survey, Switzerland: Atar, p81.

154. Ibid, p81.

155. Africa Security Dialogue & Research [ASDR (2006)], Illicit Small Arms in Ghana, A Baseline Assessment 156. Integrated

Regional

Information

network

[(IRIN)

2009].

‘Ghanaian homemade guns and instability in Togo, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire’.

Wednesday 11 November. Available at’

http://en.afrik.com/article16453.html 146

157. Koomson Fiifi (2009), ‘UN report cites Ghana as major illegal weapons

trader’.

Wednesday,

8

July

.Available

at;

http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/200907/32411.asp 158. IRIN (2009) Op cit and in ‘Koomson Fiifi (2009), OP cit 159. Ghana News Agency [(GNA) 2007] ‘Infiltration of small arms and weapons’, 16 August. Available at; http://ghanawebnews.com/LATEST_GHANA_NEWS_WEEK_33_2008.aspx 160. ASDR (2006), Op Cit. 161. Ghana Daily Graphic (2009), ‘Arms registries to be installed nationwide’,

Wednesday,

4

November.

Available

at;

http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/200911/37319.asp 162. Koomson Fiifi (2009), Op Cit. 163. International Alert, Small Arms Control in Ghana, Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC).

164. ‘UN report cites Ghana as major illegal weapons trader’.

Available

at;

http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/200907/32411.asp 165. Wisdom Awuku, as cited in Nnamdi Obasi, 2002, Small Arms Proliferation and Disarmament in West Africa, Apophyl Productions, Abuja. P.66, in International Alert, Small Arms Control in Ghana, Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC).

166. International Alert, Op Cit, p2.

147

167. Ibid, p2 168. Joy FM (2010), ‘Ghana Indecisive On Small Arms Control’. A report on an Accra FM station by a former inspector of Police, Albert Johnson, claimed that some arms and weapons that disappeared from the Police Armoury at Tamale in the north of the country were later used in armed robbery and conflicts in the

region.

Saturday,

June

12,

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44982) 169. International Alert, Op Cit, p2 170. Ibid, p5 171. Ibid, p5 172. Ibid, p5 173. Ibid, p5 174. A chieftaincy dispute among four royal gates of the Wa skin affairs of the Wa traditional area of the Upper West Region of Ghana 175. A land dispute among three Bimoba clans - Dikporu, Nakuuks and Naadaungs who were fighting over a parcel of land at a village called Tobong since January 2008 in the BunkpuruguYunyoo District of the Northern Region 176. Ghana News Agency (2004), ‘Dagbon is full of illegal arms’, Thursday,

23

December.

Available

at;

148

http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/arti kel.php?ID=72258 177. International Alert, Op Cit, p5.

178. This paragraph ‘Ghana's Legislation on Arms and Amunition and the ECOWAS Convention on SALW’ is culled from an article by Dr. Benjamin Kunbuor (former Member of Parliament and now The Hon Minister of Health of the Republic of Ghana).

Available at; http://www.fosda.net/?q=node/24 .

179. GNCSA (2010), Report Submitted by the Republic of Ghana during the Fourth Biennial Meeting Of States on the implementation of the UNPoA fom14-18th June , United Nations Headquarters, New York, USA. 180. GNCSA (2010), Ibid.

181. Under the Criminal Offences Act (1960), Act 29 as amended in Act 458 sections 179B and 192 illegal possession of firearm is a 1st degree felony and attracts a

prison terms ranging

between 7 – 25 years. In Ghana illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trading of SALW are all 1st degree felony and attract a prison term of 7 – 25 years with no option of a fine. (Source; GNCSA (2010), Ibid) 182. In this regard, a draft Ghana's comprehensive legislation and regulations on SALW is in the final stages where experts and consultants are harmonizing it with the tenets of the ECOWAS

149

Convention. (Source; Interview in the form of discussion with Mr. Gyebi Asante- A programme officer at the GNCSA ) 183. Biting the Bullet/International Action Network on Small Arms, ‘Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Report of Action States and Civil Society’, July 2003. p60. In International Alert, Small Arms Control in Ghana, Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC), p 7.

184. GNCSA (2006), Report Submitted by the Republic of Ghana during the Second Biennial Meeting Of States fom26-27th June , p3 United Nations Headquarters, New York, USA. Available http://www.un-

at;

casa.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2007@74@ Ghana.pdf 185. a. b.

Ibid, p3.

The information on the stock taking exercise was

corroborated by Mr. Gyebi Asante in an Interview in the form of discussion (A programme officer at the GNCSA) and senior police officer Superintendant (Sup) Francis Aboagye Nyarko who is the Officer in Charge of the National Firearms Bureau of the Ghana Police Service and was also the acting Administrator of the GNCSA. 186. Joy FM, (2009), ‘Arms registries to be installed nationwide’. 4 November.

Avalable

at;

http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/200911/37319.asp 150

187. Ibid 188. GNCSA (2010), Op Cit. 189. a. Ibid. b. The Electronic Small Arms Database is being developed by the GNCSA in conjunction with the Ghana Police Service with the technical and financial assistance from the UNDP. The project has been completed and in full operation in six police divisional Headquarters; Accra, Cape Coast, Takoradi, Kumasi, Sunyani and Tamale. Other four divisional headquarters; Koforidua, Wa, Bolgatanga and Tema are still work-in-progress.

A Small Arms Incidents Database is also being developed to capture (electronically) incidents such as crimes committed using small arms. (Source; Interview in the form of discussion with Sup. Francis Aboagye Nyarko and Mr. Gyebi Asante).

190. GNCSA (2006), p3.

191. Ibid, p4.

192. GNCSA (2010), Op Cit. 193. a.

GNCSA (2006), p4-5

b. Presently, Ghana has no National Plan of Action on the fight against the proliferation of SALW. Mr. Gyebi Asante explained that a Draft National Plan of Action which was reviewed in January 2010 to address new security challenges pose by the discovery oil in Ghana is awaiting approval.

151

194. Ibid, p5 195. Ibid, p5 196. Ibid, p5-6 197. GNCSA (2010), Op Cit. 198. In an interview in the form of discussion with Mr Gyebi Asante, it was explained that, apart from the Executive Secretary, there are other three staff in the office who are on secondment from the Ghana Police Service (two persons) and the Ghana-UNDP office.

199. Email response from Mr. Emmanuel Addo Sowatey of Ghana National Peace Council under the Ministry of the Interior.

200. The Board was reconstituted in August 2009 with Lt Col Seth Ohene-Asare (rtd) as the Executive Secretary. (Source; ‘Ghana steps up measures to ratify ECOWAS Small Arms Convention’ http://ghanaupdate.com/ghup/?p=21125 ).

201. Joy FM, (2009), ‘Arms registries to be installed nationwide’. 4 November.

Avalable

at;

http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/200911/37319.asp

152

CHAPTER FIVE 5.1

CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters, it is quite clear that leaders of the West African Sub-region have accepted the fact that SALW are indeed the weapons of mass destruction in slow motion and that they have wrecked havoc in the socio-economic and political fibre of the Sub-region. The Leaders have also woken up to the realization that the only way forward is to stop the proliferation and the misuse of these weapons. For the past several years, this is exactly what they have sort to achieve from a politically binding Moratorium to a legally binding Convention on SALW through ECOWAS and her Revised Treaty in the framework of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism of Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. In pursuit of the above objective, SALW control mechanisms have been pursued and are relatively well developed in member states although resource constraints are hampering their effective implementation. Though, the Convention is too young to be assessed, however, just like the Moratorium, it may be afflicted by similar difficulties in its implementation.

Different levels of commitments from Governments to address SALW issues in member states is reflected in the varying degrees of implementation of the programmes and activities of the SALW control instruments within member states which is reflective of their perceived SALWâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s threat.

Lack of political will is one major factor that affected the effective implementation of the Moratorium and may also affect the 153

Convention. Adoption and ratification of protocols is not enough. The political will to implement the texts is the final purpose of the Convention. ECOWAS has adopted scores of protocols and agreements but what is lacking is the will to foster the implementation process. This is an area the Civil Society, the media and other related organizations have to come in and pressurize the governments to action.

Though,

SALW

control

mechanisms

are relatively

well

developed in member states there is still the lack of autonomy, independent budget lines, office space and equipments and permanent specialize personnel for some NATCOMs. The process of harmonisation of member statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; legislation is very slow. Also, border controls and arms stockpile management is very poor resulting in arms depots explosions and licit arms becoming illicit. Furthermore, the intervention of the security services to maintain law and order sometimes results in the abuse and misuse of small arms and gross violations of human rights. This results in the undermining public confidence in the rule of law. There is also the lack of cross-border cooperation and communication between implementing officials of neighbouring countries.

Many governments that do not produce or officially export SALW have often neglected dealing with exportation or brokering in their national legislation and this has made them easy targets for illegal transport and triangulation. Furthermore, many governments are unwilling to engage with both collaborative and critical elements of Civil Society, either out of self-interest or lack of practice in constructive engagement with NGOs and other actors.

154

The lack of financial resources is a serious impediment to the effectiveness and efficiency with which member states role out the programmes and activities of the Convention. This means the Convention would depend a lot on external assistance to implement its activities just like the Moratorium. Dependence on donors may mean losing the original ideas and buying the donorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s agenda. This may jeopardize the cooperation, respect and observance of the principles of the Convention by arms producing and exporting countries (who are largely the donors/financiers of the programme) that is crucial to the success of the Convention.

Popularisation of the Convention is key to its success. One of the short comings of the Moratorium was its lack of awareness among key stakeholders. Awareness among the populace is a benchmark indicator of the degree of acceptance and ownership by the beneficiaries of the programme (the citizenry). Lack of knowledge and expertise/capacity on small arms issues on the part of executing agencies

of

the

programme

such

as

government

officials/parliamentarians, security personnel and even personnel at the ECOWAS Secretariat affects the effective implementation of the Convention. This, again, is an area the Civil Society, the media and other related organizations have to come in to conduct public awareness education and sensitization campaigns on the dangers of gun possession; peace education programmes that advocate the non-violent resolution of disputes and conduct research that informs government policy implementation. Also capacity building for key stakeholders is crucial for the success or failure of the Convention.

155

Much as the problem of SALW proliferation is blamed on imported weapons, others are of the view that it is increasingly becoming a home grown problem with the advent of locally manufactured weapons industry in Ghana and elsewhere gaining some notoriety. The growing expertise of local artisans in the manufacture of small arms in West Africa is largely a bread and butter issue. Alternative livelihood programmes could redirect the efforts of these artisans to the production of peaceful items such as farm implements.

The adoption of this Convention by the Heads of State and Governments of West Africa also presents a very good opportunity to mob up weapons in other areas where conventional DDR exercises in UN Multidimensional and Integrated PSO do not cover; such as weapons in the hands of civilians (peaceful disarmament of civilians) as part of sustainable arms management regimes in both countries that did not experience total outbreak of conflicts and civil wars and those that are still recovering from them.

5.2

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above conclusion, the following recommendations are made: 1.

Donors and regional bodies should support mechanisms

through which networks of key implementers can meet with each other in order to facilitate informal communications and bilateral experience sharing in both formal and informal settings.

156

2.

Greater attention should be given to fostering cross-

border cooperation and communication between implementing officials of neighbouring countries.

3.

Attention should be given to targeted awareness raising

and capacity building.

4.

It is important to ensure that donor support is coordinated

in such a way that cooperation between implementing agencies and Civil Society groups is encouraged.

5.

International SALW control instruments, where relevant,

need to be updated to include brokering, especially in those countries that are neither producers nor exporters.

6.

Stockpile management is a key tool to help limit the entry

of licit weapons into the illicit market and should be supported more robustly. Responsible stockpile management of national stocks by governments is essential to prevent loss of arms to undesirable armed groups.

8.

There should be significant changes in the national

legislation with regard to arms possession, arms trade and stockpile management. The import-export laws have to make provision for explicit declaration of weapons and material directly related to the production of arms. The control of goods in transit at airports, seaports and border roads has to be better monitored with strict regulations and modern equipments. The changes in laws could be accompanied by a greater coordination of effort between States, civil societies, and religious groups so as to reduce the flow of illegal arms.

157

9.

It is the responsibility of national governments to control

the flow and supply of SALW into and out of their countries.

Governments can effectively achieve this goal by: 

developing border and customs controls to combat illicit trafficking;



building the capacity of police and other law enforcement mechanisms through constant training;



regulating and restricting arms flows and transfers through export criteria, regulation of brokering activities, and prosecution of offenders;



establishing small arms registers at all levels of state administration;



maintaining transparency in legal arms deals by regularly reporting to the UN arms register;



opening a dialogue with producers and suppliers about the need to maintain transparency;



harmonising and implementing regional instruments of arms control with the neighboring countries such as legislation;



establishing,

empowering

and

adequately

resourcing national commissions on SALW that include should Civil Society representatives; 

effectively enforcing restrictions on the production, possession and use of arms.



researching and investing into equally attractive

alternative livelihood programmes that could redirect the efforts of the artisans from producing small arms to the 158

production of farm implements and other peaceful tools and equipments.

10.

There is the urgent need of security sector reform within the

Security Services in the West African Sub-region, with emphasis on: 

democraticisation and civil control over the military;



strengthening the rule of law and justice;



improving civil military relations;



improving police-community relations;



training armed and police forces in human rights and humanitarian law;



training armed and police forces on norms and principles concerning the responsible use of weapons. The 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials provide standards for the use of force by law enforcement officials.

11.

The UN, in conjunction with leaders of countries that have not

experience total outbreak of war/conflict should vigorously promote sustainable arms management regimes in the later countries in West Africa and beyond. This is because the absence of war precludes UN Conventional DDR Exercises in these countries. Conversely, the proximity of wars to these countries necessitates some kind of disarmament exercise to mob up the numerous weapons circulating within their borders. This situation has created a serious gap in the world’s conflict prevention and management strategy. This requires urgent research, policy direction and immediate action. The UN, AU,

159

ECOWAS and other Research Institutions are therefore requested to take this up to bridge the gap.

160

ANNEX - I

ANNEX - LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym

Definition

AEC

African Economic Community

ASDR

African Security Dialogue and Research

ASF

African Stand-by Force

ASHRAB

Ashanti Regional Association of Blacksmiths

ATT

Arms Trade Treaty

AU

African Union

BICC

Bonn International Center for Conversion

BMZ

German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development

CASA

Coordinating Action on Small Arms

CBOs

Community Based Organisations

COCOM

Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls

CSOs

Civil Society Organisations

CTC

Counter-Terrorism Committee

DDA

Department for Disarmament Affairs

DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

EIU

Economist Intelligence Unit

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group ECPF

ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework

ECOSAP ECOWAS Small Arms Project ESF ANNEX - I

ECOWAS Standby Force Page 1

ANNEX - I

EU

European Union

FECCIWA Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in West Africa FOSDA

Foundation for Security and development in Africa

GNCSA

Ghanaian National Commission on Small Arms

GNA

Ghana News Agency

GPI

Global Peace Index

HRW

Human Rights Watch

HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus, the virus that causes IANSA

International Action Net Work on Small Arms

IASC

Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IATT

International Arms Trade Treaty

IDDRS

Integrated Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards

IDPs

Internally Displaced Persons

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

IGOs

Inter-Governmental Organisations

IHL

International Humanitarian Law

IRIN

Integrated Regional Information network

KAIPTC

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

MRU

Mano River Union

MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense Systems MDGs

Millennium Development Goals

MPMC

Mission Planning and Management Cell

MISAC

Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Controls

NATCOM National Commission on SALW

ANNEX - I

Page 2

ANNEX - I

NCDDR

National Commission on Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration

NDC

National Democratic Congress

NEPAD

The New Partnership for Africa's Development

NGOs

Governmental Organisations

NPA

National Plan of Action

NPP

New Patriotic Party

NISAT

Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers

NSAs

Non-State Actors

OAU

Organisation of African Unity

OAS

Organization of American States

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PCASED

Programme of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development

PoA

UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects Arms

PSO

Peace Support Operations

PUPs

Pick-up Points

RECs

Regional Economic (Integration) Communities

RUF

Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

SAC

SALW awareness campaign

SADC

Southern African Development Community

SALW

Small Arms and Light Weapons

SAS

Small Arms Survey

ANNEX - I

Page 3

ANNEX - I

SASP

Small Arms Support Pact

SAU

(ECOWAS) Small Arms Unit

STDs

Sexually Transmitted Diseases

TRESA

Training and Education on Small Arms

UN

United Nations

UN DDA

UN Department of Disarmaments Affairs

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNGA

United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small

UNICEF

UN Institute for Children and Education Fund

UNIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNODC

UN Office on Drugs and Crime

USA

United Sates of America

USD

United Sates Dollar

UNSG

UN Secretary General

WA

West Africa

WAANSA West African Action Network on Small Arms WANJSD West African Network of Journalists on Security and Development WCMD

Weapons Collection, Management and Disposal

WCPs

Weapons Collection Points

WHO

World Health Organisation

WIPNET

Women in Peacebuilding Network

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

ANNEX - I

Page 4

ANNEX - II

ANNEX II â&#x20AC;&#x201C; DEFINITION OF TERMS

Term

Definition

(a)

(b)

Abuse

This means to use wrongly or improperly The imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread of weapons by an authority

Arms control

vested with legitimate powers to enforce such restrictions.

Arms embargo

A prohibition on the trade of arms with a particular government.

The sending of weapons, guns and ammunition from

Arms exports one country to another, often closely monitored and controlled by governments.

A group that has the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic Armed group

objectives; is not within the formal military structures of a

State,

State-alliance

or

intergovernmental

organization; and is not under the control of the State(s) in which it operates.

ANNEX - II

Page 1

ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) The Geneva Declarationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s described armed violence as:

Armed violence

â&#x20AC;&#x153;the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives against a person, group, community, or state, which undermines peoplecentered security and/or sustainable development.â&#x20AC;?

Armed violence

Diversified, long-term activities targeted at underlying conditions for armed violence.

Reduction Biological Weapons (or Bioweapons)

Border Controls

The use of pathogens such as viruses, bacteria, other disease-causing

biological

agents,

or

the

toxins

produced by them as weapons to kill, injure, or incapacitate an enemy (also known as Biological warfare (BW), germ warfare) The existence of checks and regulations between countries that control access to and from the country of people, goods and services.

A third party acting as an intermediary arranging some or all key aspects of the transfer including: sourcing of

Broker

arms, submission of documents for applications for authorization, arrangement of transport, arrangement of financial matters (negotiating price, transfer of funds etc).

Brokering Capacity ANNEX - II

Brokering refers to a range of activities that are undertaken to establish.

Training given to individuals and groups to equip them Page 2

ANNEX - II

Building Armed

with the necessary skills they require Diversified, long-term activities targeted at underlying

Violence

conditions for armed violence.

Reduction Ceasefire Agreement

A binding, non-aggression pact to enable dialogue between conflicting parties.

(a)

(b) Weapons that use the toxic properties of chemical substances as weapons to kill, injure, or incapacitate an

Chemical Weapons

enemy [Chemical warfare (CW)]. This type of warfare is distinct from the use of conventional weapons or nuclear weapons because the destructive effects of chemical weapons are not primarily due to their explosive force.

UNICEF defines a child soldier as any person under the

Child soldier/ age of 18 years who is part of any kind of regular or Child

irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity,

Combatant /

including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers,

Children

and those accompanying such groups, other than purely

associated

as family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual

with Armed

purposes and forced marriage. It does not, therefore,

Groups

only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.

Any human below the age of 18, unless under the law

Child

applicable to the child in a particular country, majority is attained earlier.

ANNEX - II

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ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) The term CSOs defies a simple definition. The threesector model, which looks at the State as consisting of the government, the market and the citizenry, is a useful starting point to define civil society. In this perspective, civil society constitutes the third sector, existing alongside and interacting with the State and profit-seeking firms. Civil society emerges as a voluntary sector made up of freely and formally associating individuals pursuing non-profit purposes in social movements, religious bodies, women and youth groups,

Civil Society

indigenous

peoples'

organizations,

professional associations, unions, etc.

Organisation(s) Civil society organization (CSO) is a Non-State (CSOs)

organization composed of voluntary participants. Other functional terms are; Civil Society - Collectivity of civilian and social organizations or institutions which form the basis of a functioning society.

Community Groups - An association of people with common rights, privileges

and/or interests.

The term ‘civil society organization’ (CSO) is often used synonymously with the term ‘non-governmental organization’

(NGO)

or

‘community-based

organization’ (CBOs). However, this is incorrect, as the latter two organizations only make up a part of civil ANNEX - II

Page 4

ANNEX - II

society. They are, just like any other group mentioned below, one of the target groups of this module.

Examples of civil society organizations include:

Cold arms/ arms

•

Registered charities or non-profit groups,

•

Non-governmental organizations,

•

Community groups,

•

Women's organizations,

•

Faith-based organizations,

•

Professional associations,

•

Trade unions,

•

Self-help groups,

•

Social movements,

•

Business associations,

•

Coalitions and advocacy groups,

•

Schools, universities,

blanches Implements other than firearms that can be used as weapons, e.g. sticks and clubs, machetes, knives, swords, etc. Not included in the definition of SALW.

ANNEX - II

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ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) Based on an analogy with the definition set out in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in relation to persons engaged in international armed conflicts, a combatant is a person who:• is a member of a national army or an irregular military organization; or • is actively participating in military activities and hostilities; or

Combatant

• is involved in recruiting or training military personnel; or • holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organization; or • arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part of a military structure; or • having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of the above attributes.

Compliance

The act of observing official requirements or commitments, whether they are political or legal.

When a dispute turns into something bigger where more

Conflict

issues, often hidden and underlying ones, are at stake.

A conflict can be carried out by means of violence.

Community Groups

ANNEX - II

An association of people with common rights, privileges and/or interests.

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ANNEX - II

(a) Conventional Weapons

(b) Refers to all weapons designed and used for military purposes. Small arms and light weapons belong to the broader category of conventional weapons.

Demand Side Refers to measures that tackle the reasons why small Measures

Development

arms enter a particular community.

Long-term efforts aimed at bringing improvements in the economic, political, social and environmental spheres, as well as in the quality of life of all segments of the population The process of collecting, controlling and disposing of

Disarmament SALW in order to remove the means and tools of violence.

Disputes

Where one individual or group expresses a position or interests that are in opposition to those of others.

The formal entry of a treaty into international law

Entry-into-

following the signatures of a designated number of

Force

states. States that have signed the treaty are now obliged to implement its provisions and obligations.

Former

ExCombatants

members

of

an

armed

group

(military,

insurgency, militia, gang, or any other). The precise definition may be contested from one situation to another and is sometimes stipulated in a peace agreement.

ANNEX - II

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ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) A substance or a mixture of substances, which under

Explosives

external influence is capable of rapidly releasing energy in the form of gas and heat.

Gender

The social expectations in any society that are attached to a particular biological sex.

The Republic of Ghana (capital city Accra) is a West African nation. It is a former British colony known as the Gold Coast until 1957. That year Ghana became the first state in sub-Saharan Africa to gain political independence from European colonial rule. Ghana took its name from that of the medieval empire of Ghana on the upper Niger River, several hundred miles to the northwest of modern Ghana. Following independence, Ghana assumed the leadership role in the African

Ghana

continentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s struggle for national liberation. English is the official language of the country, but most Ghanaians also speak at least one African language.

The Republic of Ghana has a total land area of about 238,500 sq km with a population of about 22931 299 and a population growth rate of about 1.97 percent (2007 estimates). The people of this densely populated country belong to more than 100 different ethnic groups, but Ghana has largely been spared the ethnic conflicts that have torn apart many other African countries.

Ghana has one of the strongest economies in West

ANNEX - II

Page 8

ANNEX - II

Africa, yet the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economic base continues to be agriculture and the people remain poor. Gold mining, the production of cocoa (used to make chocolate), and tourism are the main sources of revenue. However, the recent discovery of oil may alter the economic base of the country. Ghana was known as a source of gold hundreds of years ago. European explorers who arrived in search of gold in the 1400s and 1500s first named the region the Gold Coast.

A series of military coups and severe economic problems plagued Ghana from the late 1960s into the 1980s. However, Ghana reemerged in the 1990s as a democracy and a leading player in African affairs. In 1997 Kofi Annan, a diplomat from Ghana, became secretary-general of the United Nations.

The process of decision-making and the implementation of these decisions if they are characterized by being participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, Good Governance

equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. Good governance ensures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.

ANNEX - II

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ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) A people-centered approach to security. Human

Human

security aims to remove the threats to people arising

Security

from poverty, conflict, disease, starvation and the environment, among other things.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules that place restrictions on the use of weapons and

IHL

methods of warfare. It aims to protect people who are not involved in the fighting and to limit human suffering during times of war.

Illicit trade

The trade in arms that breaks either international or national laws of both the exporting or importing states.

The act of putting into action or fulfilling the provisions

Implementation and commitments a state has agreed to via an official document.

ANNEX - II

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ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) IDDRS are a comprehensive set of policies, guidelines and procedures covering 24 areas of DDR. The IDDRS consolidate policy guidance on DDR, providing a United Nations integrated approach on the planning,

Integrated

management and implementation of DDR processes.

Disarmament,

They are also the most complete repository and best

Demobilisation practices drawn from the experience of all United and

Nations

departments,

agencies,

funds

and

Reintegration

programmes involved in DDR. The IDDRS are

Standards

accompanied by the DDR Briefing Note to Senior Managers and the Operational Guide to the IDDRS. The

IDDRS

were

jointly

developed

by

DDR

practitioners, at headquarters and country level, of the UN system.

A set of laws and principles based on treaties or International Law

customs that control or affect the rights and duties of states and their relations. International law based on treaties only applies to those states that have consented to it.

Internally Displaced Person

IDPs are persons who have been forced to leave their home for reasons such as natural or man-made disasters, including religious or political persecution or war, but have not crossed an international border.

Legally

Refers to those commitments, principles or provisions

Binding

that are part of a treaty and that states are formally

ANNEX - II

Page 11

ANNEX - II

obliged to implement under international law (a) Legislation and Regulation

(b) The

national

legal

regimes

that

regulate

the

possession, use and circulation of small arms and light weapons. These may be enforced by the State’s security forces.

A crew operated weapon of less than 100-mm caliber.

Light weapons In practice, these include weapons of caliber’s of between 12.7 and 100 mm.

Machete Machine gun Millennium Development

Large, heavy knife with a long blade.

Medium-sized and larger automatic firearm (less than 20mm caliber) that fires in bursts.

Eight goals compiled by the Member States of the UN which shall be achieved in the year 2015.

Goals (MDGs) Refers to the use of small arms that is contrary to the Misuse

principles of international humanitarian law and that result in the gross abuse of human rights or the suffering of innocent civilians.

Missile

A type of warhead consisting of a rocket with some guidance mechanism A suspension of a particular activity. A moratorium on

Moratorium

the trade of arms suspends all planned sales or potential transfers of these weapons.

Mortar

ANNEX - II

“Mini-artillery” that can fire bombs vertically over long distances.

Page 12

ANNEX - II

(a)

(b)

Mounted

Weapon attached to a support, e.g. to a car.

A comprehensive, short, medium or long-term strategy

National Plan

to bring about the development of a specific issue in a country.

Non-State

NSAs

Actors

refers

to

political,

military

or

corporate actors that act independent of the national government. NSAs range from armed groups, private corporations to non-governmental organizations.

Nuclear Weapons

Paramilitary Groups

Stockpiling

A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion.

Paramilitary groups are groups of people that dress, arm themselves, and have military titles and ranks, but are NOT in the military.

Refers to the accumulation of large stock of weapons and explosive ordnance.

Pick-up Points Temporary locations where armed forces and groups (PUPs)

will gather before moving to the disarmament site.

Refers to those commitments or principles that have

Politically-

been made in good faith between states, but which

Binding

states are not formally or legally obliged to uphold.

Political commitments are voluntary in nature.

Proliferation

ANNEX - II

Spread of weapons, weapons parts, weapons systems and Ammunition.

Page 13

ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) The flow of SALW; be it legal or illegal. This means an increase or spread of weapons to many different actors. It is partly a consequent of the lackadaisical control over existing stocks of arms and over transfers. The 1997 Report of the panel of Governmental experts on Small Arms examines the demands and supply side of proliferation

(p16

available

at

:

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/a52298.p df). It states: ‘When the state loses control over its security functions and fails to maintain security of its citizens, the subsequent growth of armed violence, banditry and Proliferatio organised crime increases the demand for weapons by its n of SALW

citizens seeking to protect themselves and their property’.

The cultural aspects were not loss to the UN Experts.

They stated that: ‘the possession of military-style weapons is a status symbol, a source of personal security, a means of sustenance, a sign of manliness and, in some cases, a symbol of ethnic and cultural identity. In many countries in Africa, proliferation follows coups and wars such as the overthrow of dictator Idi Amin of Uganda, 1979; the 31 December 1981 coup in Ghana; the 31 December 1983 coup in Nigeria; military coups in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and December 1999 in Ivory Coast (now Cote d’Ivoire).

ANNEX - II

Page 14

ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) The formal act of joining an international treaty. A state

Ratification

can only ratify a treaty if it has already signed it and thereby expressed its intent to abide by its obligations.

Recruitment is an act of joining any kind of regular or Recruitment irregular armed force or armed group, be it compulsory, forced or voluntary Fundamental factors that lead to a given outcome. In general, root causes are generally social, economic, ethnic, political or legal factors in a society that lead to violent conflicts. The availability of SALW does not by itself cause violence, armed conflicts or armed crime.

Violence has numerous causes and dynamics that increase or reduce its likelihood. The root causes of conflict are largely context specific, which makes generalizations very difficult. Nevertheless, there are Root Causes several factors that play a role in causing armed violence, of Conflict

which can be divided into 3 categories: Structural factors, also called root causes, create the conditions that are necessary for a conflict to develop.

These

can

inequalities,

include

weak

economic

state

structures,

exclusion,

group

poverty

or

environmental degradation.

Situational factors are factors contributing to a climate which can bring about violent conflict or escalate violence further. They include ethnic or religious rivalry, economic self-interests, or the presence of SALW. ANNEX - II

Page 15

ANNEX - II

Trigger factors are single key acts, events, or their anticipation that set off or escalate violent conflict. Both triggers and situational causes fuel the escalation of conflict and determine whether or not it will turn violent.

A programme of activities that aim to raise SALW problems and issues with the general public, the authorities, the media, governments and their institutions SALW Advocacy

to achieve changes at both institutional and/or individual levels. These types of activities also include campaigns highlighting the SALW problems and issues with the aim of encouraging people to surrender weapons. This is generally carried out to support weapons collection programmes.

A programme of activities carried out with the overall goal of minimizing, and where possible eliminating, the negative consequences of inadequate SALW control by carrying out an appropriate combination of SALW

SALW

advocacy,

SALW

risk

education

and

media

Awareness

operations/public information campaigns, which together

Programme

work to change behaviours and introduce appropriate alternative ways and attitudes over the long term.

Wherever it exists, the operational objectives of a national

SALW

control

initiative

will

dictate

the

appropriate type of SALW awareness activities.

ANNEX - II

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ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) This is a mass mobilization approach that delivers information on the SALW threat. It may take the form of

SALW Awareness

formal or non-formal education and may use mass media techniques. In an emergency situation, due to lack of time and available data, it is the most practical way of communicating safety information. In other situations it can support community liaison.

Activities that, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW spread and possession. These activities include

SALW Control

cross-border control issues, legislative and regulatory measures,

SALW

awareness

and

communications

strategies, SALW collection and destruction operations, SALW survey and the management of information and SALW stockpile management.

A process that encourages the adoption of safer behaviours by at-risk groups and by SALW holders, and which provides the links among affected communities, other SALW components and other sectors. SALW risk SALW Risk

education can be implemented as a stand-alone activity,

Education

in contexts where no weapons collection is taking place.

If an amnesty is to be set up at a later stage, risk education activities will permit an information campaign to take place efficiently, using the networks, systems and methods in place as part of the risk education programme

ANNEX - II

Page 17

ANNEX - II

and adapting the content accordingly. SALW risk education is an essential component of SALW control.

There

are

two

related

and

mutually

reinforcing

components: (1) community involvement; and (2) public education. Generally, SALW risk education programmes can use both approaches, as they reinforce each other.

They are not, however, neither alternatives to each other, nor are they alternatives to eradicating the SALW threat by weapons collection and destruction. The use of those approaches will also depend on whether a weapons collection programme is taking place.

A systematic and logical process to determine the nature and extent of SALW spread and impact within a region, nation or community in order to provide accurate data SALW

and information for a safe, effective and efficient

Survey

intervention by an appropriate organisation. The following terms have been used in the past, though the preferred one is as indicated above: ‘national assessment’, ‘baseline assessment’ and ‘mapping’.

SALW Transfers

Change in possession and usually ownership of SALW within and across international boundaries. It involves two or more actors.

A coercive measure adopted by one or more states

Sanction

against a government that is guilty of violating international law.

ANNEX - II

Page 18

ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) An individual or states feeling of safety or well-being,

Security

protected from attack or violent conflict. OR The control of threat, integrated with an appropriate response capability.

Security Forces

Forces that are supposed to guarantee security, such as the military, the police, intelligence service, the paramilitary, etc.

Organizations and individuals in a state that are officially

Security

responsible for public order, physical security, and the

Sector

borders of the state, such as the army, police, border police etc.

A

dynamic

concept

involving

the

design

and

implementation of a strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically accountable, Security

efficient and effective manner to initiate and support

Sector

reform of the national security infrastructure. The national

Reform

security infrastructure includes

(SSR)

appropriate

national

ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services, privateâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;military companies (PMCs), correctional services and civil society â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;watch-dogsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

Small Arms

ANNEX - II

Weapons that can be carried and are used by one person.

Page 19

ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) The Small Arms Survey uses the term ‘small arms and light weapons’ broadly to cover small arms intended for both civilian and military use, as well as light weapons intended for military use. When possible, it follows the definition used in the United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (UNGA, 1997): - Small arms: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns.

- Light weapons: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-

Small Arms

barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-

and Light

aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles,

Weapons

portable launchers of antitank missile and rocket

(SALW)

systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm.

The Survey uses the term ‘firearm’ to mean civilian and military hand-held weapons that expel a projectile from a barrel by the action of an explosive. Unless the context dictates otherwise, the Survey uses the term ‘small arms’ to refer to both small arms and light weapons, whereas the term ‘light weapons’ refers specifically to this category of weapons. See www.smallarmssurvey.com Throughout this paper, the terms ‘SALW’, ‘small arms’ and ‘guns’ are used interchangeably.

ANNEX - II

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ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) Someone â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a person or an organization â&#x20AC;&#x201C; who has or feels they have an interest in a particular issue. It is a broad term used to denote all local, national and international actors who have an interest in the outcome

Stakeholder

of any particular disarmament process. This includes participants

and

beneficiaries,

parties

to

peace

accords/political frameworks, national authorities, all UN and

partner

implementing

agencies,

bilateral

and

multilateral donors, and regional actors and international political guarantors of the peace process.

Stockpile Stock Pile Destruction

Supply-side

ANNEX - II

A large accumulated stock of weapons and explosive ordnance. The physical activities and destructive procedures towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile. measures Refers to measures that tackle how small arms enter a

particular community.

Page 21

ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Training and Education on Small Armsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; is a project of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). TRESA develops and implements a methodology and practice for the delivery

TRESA

of configurable, assessed, training material and tools and courses related to small-arms control. The developed TRESA modules are all available online, and are free of charge to anyone engaged in SALW-control training across the world, no matter whether this is an individual, organization or government body.

UN Program A UN document calling for national, regional and of Action/

international action to address the global problem of

UN (PoA)

SALW. Anything used, designed or used or intended for use: (1) in causing death or injury to any person; or (2) for the

Weapon

purposes of threatening or intimidating any person and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a firearm.

Weapons Control

ANNEX - II

Regulation of the possession and use of firearms and other lethal weapons by citizens through legal issuances (e.g., laws, regulations, decrees, etc.).

Page 22

ANNEX - II

(a)

(b)

Weapons

A temporary, or semi-permanent, location laid out in

Collection

accordance with the principles of explosive and weapons

Points (WCPs)

safety, which is designed to act as a focal point for the surrender of SALW by the civil community.

The term weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is often used to describe a weapon that can kill large numbers of humans and/or cause great damage to man-made structures

(e.g.

buildings),

natural

structures

(e.g.

mountains), or the biosphere in general. The term is often used to cover several weapon types, including nuclear, Weapons of biological, chemical (NBC) and radiological weapons.

Mass

Additional terms used in a military context include atomic,

Destruction

biological, and chemical warfare (ABC) and chemical,

(WMD)

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) warfare. The phrase was used in reference to nuclear weapons during the Cold War; following the collapse of the Soviet Union and increasing tensions between the Middle East and the Western powers, the term broadened to its modern, more inclusive definition. It entered widespread usage in relation to the U.S.-led 2003 invasion of Iraq.

ANNEX - II

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ANNEX - II

(a)

(b) Or

weapons

management

refers

to

a

national

government’s administration of its own legal weapons stock.

Such

administration

includes

registration,

Weapons

according to national legislation, of the type, number,

Stock

location and condition of weapons. In addition, a national

Pile

government’s implementation of its transfer controls of

Management weapons,

to

decrease

illicit

weapons’

flow,

and

regulations for weapons’ export and import authorizations (within existing State responsibilities), also fall under this definition.

ANNEX - II

Page 24

ANNEX - III ANNEX - III

Figures and Boxes

Box 1. Legal and Humanitarian Basis for Small Arms Control

Basic principles of IHL provide for the protection of non-combatants and prohibit the indiscriminate use of any weapon (Geneva Conventions 1949 and the Protocols 1977). Based on a number of case studies elaborated by the ICRC (1999) in its seminal report, Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the organisation has elaborated a “case for restraints on arms availability, based on humanitarian law and core humanitarian principles”. It can be summarised as:

“The unregulated availability of weapons can increase tensions, facilitate their indiscriminate use and lead to a rise in civilian casualty levels … Fundamental humanitarian principles require that the issue of weapons proliferation be addressed, as it can needless increase the number of victims in war situations."

Although Article 51 (of the UN Charter) allows states to acquire armaments required for security, states also have a solemn moral and legal responsibility, under Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions (1949), to “respect and ensure respect” for IHL. “In particular, the knowing provision of arms into situations where serious violations of IHL occur or are likely to occur should be considered a matter of ANNEX - III

Page 1

grave concern”.

ANNEX - III

“While the primary responsibility for compliance with IHL falls on the “user” of the weapon, arms producing and exporting states and companies bear some responsibility to the international community for the use made of their weapons … States should also, as a matter of urgency, elaborate rules and principles, based on IHL and similar criteria, governing the transfer and spread of arms and ammunition”.

Extract from ICRC (1999: 63-64)

Source: Robert Muggah and Eric Berman (2001), Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Small Arms Survey, p. 3.

ANNEX - III

Page 2

ANNEX - III Figure 1-Violent Deaths Attributed to Small Arms in 1995-1999

Homicides

Suicide

Accident

Undefined

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

20,353

25,665

20,435

18,416

19,553

575

658

653

681

708

NA

63

86

81

69

NA

91

105

121

NA

Source: Grupo de EstadĂ­stico del INML y CFI in Robert Muggah and Eric Berman (2001), Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Small Arms Survey, p. 18

ANNEX - III

Page 3

ANNEX - III Box 2 - Children and Guns

Children and Guns

Much attention has been focused on the role of children (less than 18) in formal and informal military service. According to the Coalition to Ban the Use of Children in Armed Conflict, guns are in the hands of as many as 300,000 children under the age of 16 in 25 countries.

According to one background paper prepared for the Machel (2000) report, child soldiers are "more obedient, do not question orders and are easier to manipulate than adult soldiers." For the last 10 years what has occurred is the systematic use of children on a very large scale. And it's developing very, very fast.â&#x20AC;? But the impacts of small arms and children are vast, and go far beyond child soldiering.

Indeed, the availability and use of small arms have severe intergenerational implications for the productivity and security of societies.

There are reasons why the consideration of small arms is intrinsic to any discussion of children in conflict or post conflict situations. The M16, the AK-47, the G-3, the AR-15 and the Arma-Lite rifle, weapons that, as this report (Robert Muggah and Eric Berman (2001)) notes, are found in Kenya, Colombia and East Timor, weigh about 8 pounds.

With a light squeeze of the trigger, they fire a burst of bullets that travel at more than 900 yards per second and can punch a fist-sized hole in human flesh. For many children that squeeze of the trigger is ANNEX - III

Page 4

ANNEX - III

their first sensation of power, identity and belonging. In Colombia, for example, young children (and potential recruits for paramilitaries or guerrilla groups) are seduced by the gun and see it as a source of status and privilege.

On the one hand, guns are inexpensive and toy-like in their simplicity.

In countries impoverished by war or underdevelopment - there is a strong economic incentive luring children into armed gangs or organised military factions. For example, in Colombia and Kenya, children joining particular gangs in urban centres are often able to earn up to the equivalent of $US 100 for every policeman killed.

There is, however, a tremendous amount of ignorance among young recruits - many of these children lack an education or a clear understanding of what they are fighting for. One Colombian priest described this as â&#x20AC;&#x153;painting birds in the skyâ&#x20AC;?. The implications of this naivety are devastating. As soldiers, children are often considered the most expendable: during the Iran-Iraq war, child soldiers were sent out ahead in waves over minefieldsâ&#x20AC;? and Sierra Leonean children are often severely abused drugged and raped (Machel, 2000).

Source: Robert Muggah and Eric Berman (2001), Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Small Arms Survey, p. 29.

ANNEX - III

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ANNEX - III

Box 3 - Rape in Dadaab Rape in Dadaab

UNHCR officials working with the Dadaab refugee camp, located in Northeast Kenya, hired CASA Consulting in Montreal to assess the high incidence of rape of refugee women and girls in the bush around the camp while collecting firewood. Firewood is the principal cooking fuel in many parts of Africa and its collection is often the traditional responsibility of women and girls. Rape and sexual violence - either within or outside the camps - have posed a serious threat to refugee women and girls in the Dadaab camp(s) since the early 1990s - and a difficult challenge to UNHCR, with its mandate to assist and protect refugees. Between January 1998 and September 2000 alone, some 300 rapes and attempted rapes have been documented among registered refugees - with vast majority perpetrated by armed assailants.

The sheer number of armed individuals in the Dadaab area and ease of access to firearms, often brought across the nearby border with Somalia, are key contributing factors to the vulnerability of refugees within and outside the camps. Local bandits, some of whom have taken up residence within the refugee camps, are well armed, as are Somali militia who are said to frequently traverse the open border with Somalia. Refugees interviewed in the region believe that there are large numbers of firearms being stockpiled within the camps, from which point they are trafficked and sold in Nairobi and throughout ANNEX - III

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ANNEX - III

Kenya. Many explain that they live in terror and are reluctant to report rape and other forms of violence, theft and extortion, for fear of reprisal from armed perpetrators.

The prevalence of firearms also conditions the reactions of women, who often leave the camps in large groups to collect firewood. In approximately 75 per cent of all reported incidents of rape and attempted rape in Dadaab, one or more assailants were armed with firearms. The sight of even a lone male in the bush will often cause groups of women to scatter and run back to the camp, rather than act in each others defense: they know the chances that he is armed are high, and they dare not risk defending one from rape, if one among them could be killed. Generally, the prevalence of firearms in Dadaab presents a major obstacle to the types of community-based policing and security practices normally prescribed for the prevention of rape.

Source: contributed to the IASC study by Virginia Thomas, CASA Feb 2001in Robert Muggah and Eric Berman (2001), Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Small Arms Survey, p. 24.

ANNEX - III

Page 7

ANNEX - III Figure 2 - Explosions at Arms Depots in Africa (January 1997- September 2005) Loss of

Country

Date

Location

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Khartoum

0

BBC, 1998

Kinshasa

101

BBC, 2000

Conakry

10

GICHD, 2002

Tongo Field

6

Lagos

1,500+

Sudan

17 July 1998

Life

Source

14 April Congo

2000

3 March Guinea

2001

Sierra

5 January

Leone

2002

Nigeria

Sierra Leone Web, 2002

27 January 2002

GICHD, 2002

International

Mozambique

Federation of

24 October 2002

Beira

?

Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,

ANNEX - III

Page 8

ANNEX - III

Angola

2004

16 July 2003

Menongue

6

23 Nigeria

February 2005

Based on OCHA, 2003 Biafra Nigeria

Kaduna

4

World News & Archives, 2005

23 Sudan

February 2005

Côte d’Ivoire

Juba

80

Abidjan

2

4 March 2005

IRIN, 2005

NATO/MSIAC, n.d.

Source: Based on Wilkinson, 2006, pp. 248-53 in Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms in Africa: Increasingly a Home-Grown Problem; a Talk by Eric G. Berman, Managing Director, Small Arms Survey at GTZOECD-UNECA Expert Consultation of the Africa Partnership Forum Support Unit.

ANNEX - III

Page 9

ANNEX - III

Box 4 - The Role of UN Agencies and other International NGOs in SALW Control

The Role of UN Agencies and other International NGOs in SALW Control

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

The UNDP plays a leading role in assisting countries curtail illicit weapons, address the needs of ex-combatants and other armed groups through alternative livelihood and development prospects, while building capacities at all levels to promote human security.

UNDP undertakes a number of small arms and demobilization activities, including support to public awareness campaigns, the building of national capacities for weapons collection and destruction, and the implementation of effective demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programs. http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/

United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA)

The UNDDA collects data and information provided by states on a voluntary basis on SALW, including national reports on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action. The full text of the PoA

is

available

on

the

UNDDA

website,

http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salwnationalreports.html.

ANNEX - III

Page 10

ANNEX - III

As part of the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism, the UNDP, the UNDDA and UNIDIR have jointly developed an Assistance Package to help states in preparing national reports on measures taken to implement the PoA. This package offers reporting assistance tools and includes a suggested template

that

can

be

used

for

completing

the

report.

http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/PoA.htm

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

The UNIDR conducts crosscutting research on small arms collection, weapons as a public health issue, and security-building measures.

The Institute undertakes a number of research activities on small arms and provides funding for research-oriented projects and programs. http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/focus-search.php?onglet=5

International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)

IANSA is the global network of civil society organizations working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Founded in 1998, IANSA has grown rapidly to more than 500 participant groups in nearly 100 countries, with representation from many gun-affected regions. IANSA is composed of a wide range of organizations concerned with small arms, including policy development organizations, national gun control groups, research ANNEX - III

Page 11

ANNEX - III

institutes, aid agencies, faith groups, victims, human rights and community action organizations. http://www.iansa.org/index.htm

IANSA, in partnership with Amnesty International and Oxfam, launched the Control Arms campaign in October 2003. Control Arms focuses on the international trade in small arms and seeks to build support among governments for an Arms Trade Treaty. Control Arms also encourages governments to develop and strengthen national and regional arms controls measures and supports the strengthening of partnerships between governments and civil society to reduce small arms availability and demand at the local level. www.controlarms.org

International Alert (IA)

IA has been working on this issue since 1994, when they identified unregulated small arms proliferation and misuse as one of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most pressing security issues. IAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s work centers around assessing progress made and challenges faced in the implementation of international small arms control measures, and also work to strengthen the knowledge and expertise of policymakers in understanding

and

responding

to

small

arms

matters.

http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/themes/small_arms.php

Biting the Bullet is a joint project of International Alert, Saferworld and Bradford University that monitors statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; implementation of the ANNEX - III

Page 12

ANNEX - III

UN Programme of Action on small arms. The ‘Red Book’ – the only global review of states’ progress in implementing the UN PoA – is published on a biennial basis to correspond with the Biennial Meeting of States. Two such reports have been published to date. The latest version can be accessed at http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/ red_book_2005.pdf

Saferworld

Working for effective international controls on the proliferation and misuse of weapons is key part of Saferworld's work. Saferworld is working with governments and civil society to ensure that the UN Programme of Action is effectively implemented and strengthened.

Saferworld and other NGOs are also working to build support for a global Arms Trade Treaty that will create a legally binding framework for international arms controls. Saferworld is also a leading member of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) that encourages regional and global action on small arms issue. http://www.saferworld.co.uk/iac/index.htm

Small Arms Survey (SAS)

SAS is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the principal international source of public information on all aspects of small arms, and as a resource centre for governments, policy ANNEX - III

Page 13

ANNEX - III

makers, researchers, and activists. SAS is also an independent monitor of governmental and non-governmental policy initiatives on small arms, and disseminates best practice measures on small arms issues. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/index.html

ANNEX - III

Page 14

ANNEX - III

Box 5 - The Role of Parliament in SALW Control The Role of Parliament in SALW Control

The parliament which is the legislative arm of government should; • engage actively in efforts to combat SALW proliferation and misuse as a key element for national strategies for conflict prevention,

peace-building,

sustainable

development,

the

protection of human rights and public health and safety; • promote and ensure the adoption at the national level of legislation and regulations required to control effectively SALW throughout their "life cycle" and actively to combat SALW proliferation and misuse; • ensure the adequate control of SALW production, brokering, transfers and stockpiling, and to ensure that there exist adequate sanctions, including criminal sanctions, for those violating such controls; • promote the development of an international arms trade treaty (ATT) to strictly regulate arms transfers on the basis of State obligations under international law and internationally accepted norms and human rights standards; • promote greater international and, where appropriate, regional efforts to develop common standards to control strictly the activities of those brokering or otherwise facilitating arms transfers between third countries; • ensure that adequate national legislation exists on the production, acquisition, possession, transfer and use of SALW ANNEX - III

Page 15

ANNEX - III

and firearms, and that such legislation is strictly enforced; • ensure the existence of strong legal sanctions for those who provide SALW to children, who recruit and use children in conflicts or armed operations, or who commit atrocities against children; • ensure the existence of legal sanctions at the national level for those who commit atrocities against vulnerable sections of society such as the elderly, women and children, as well as the existence of measures to prevent such atrocities; • ensure that national legislation is complemented with adequate capacities for the national authorities, including training and equipment, to ensure the strict enforcement of national controls; • work towards the harmonization of national controls on SALW on the basis of high common standards while ensuring that national controls are an adequate response to the national and regional realities of each State; • consider ratifying, if they have not already done so, the multilateral SALW control treaties their governments have signed, to incorporate their provisions into appropriate and timely domestic legislation in accordance with the aims of these treaties, and to see to it that they are duly implemented; • ensure that the provisions of the recently adopted International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons are fully

implemented

under

national

legislation,

and

that

ammunition for SALW is covered by national legislation to trace ANNEX - III

Page 16

illicit SALW;

ANNEX - III

• where appropriate, develop together with governments national action plans on preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit SALW trade in all its aspects, and assist in the implementation of national action plans; • where necessary, ascertain their right and obligation to scrutinize government practice and policy on SALW controls, to ensure respect for their countries' international commitments, and to work towards a high degree of transparency allowing for such scrutiny; • where such bodies do not already exist, to designate or create at the national level a parliamentary committee to engage with the government in a regular debate on national SALW policy and control practice; • in this context promote regular reporting by governments to national parliaments on SALW transfers to allow for informed debate on whether government practices are in conformity with stated policy and legislation; • invites the relevant parliamentary committees to seek regular exchanges of views and information with governments in a debate on government policy and action at both the national and multilateral levels, and to request their governments to include parliamentarians in national delegations to regional and international meetings between States on combating the illicit trade in SALW; • support the participation and active role of women in ANNEX - III

Page 17

ANNEX - III

disarmament and peace-building activities, and stresses the need to incorporate a gender perspective in disarmament and peace-building strategies and activities; • urge governments involved in DDR programmes to pay particular attention to the unique circumstances of child soldiers and the reintegration of former child soldiers into civilian life to prevent such children from falling into armed crime; • urge their governments to destroy in public view, wherever possible, all illicit SALW that are recovered by the national authorities in the context of armed conflict and crime, including SALW recovered in the context of DDR programmes; • continue to strengthen efforts, and work together with civil society, to prevent the outbreak of conflict in regions and States prone to tensions and to resolve social and economic problems underpinning such tensions and armed conflict, including efforts to fight poverty, social exclusion, trafficking in human beings, drugs and natural resources, organized crime, terrorism and racism; • in this context to adopt and support adequate national measures to limit demand in their societies for SALW and firearms, and in particular to eradicate the demand for illicit SALW and firearms; • promote full implementation by their governments of their pledges made under the United Nations Millennium Declaration to ensure the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); ANNEX - III

Page 18

ANNEX - III Figure 3 - Key Commitment Areas of the PoA Commitment Area

Explanation

(a)

(b) Transfer controls refer to the import, export, transit and retransfer of SALW across and within national borders. The

Transfers

PoA commits governments to regulate all transfers under their jurisdiction by establishing proper standards, and checks and balances.

Arms brokers are individuals who coordinate the transfer of arms between two or more parties. The PoA commits

Brokering

governments to regulate the activity of brokers through registration, authorization and international coordination, among others, to prevent SALW from being used in illegal activities.

Stockpile management & destruction

ANNEX - III

The PoA commits governments to establish adequate standards and procedures for stockpile management and destruction. These standards are needed to prevent the diversion and theft of weapons from government stocks into the illegal market.

Page 19

(a)

ANNEX - III

(b)

The PoA commits governments to disarm soldiers and civilians after a war has Disarmament

ended through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R) and voluntary civilian disarmament programs.

The PoA calls on governments to ensure the adequate marking and record-keeping of SALW and to cooperate with other

Marking & Tracing

states in tracing weapons found in the illegal sphere. This measure is meant to help identify the point of diversion of a weapon in order to prevent future diversion.

The PoA calls on governments to assist other countries in implementing the

Cooperation, Assistance and Transparency

provisions of the PoA. Transparency is also encouraged through the submission of annual progress reports to the UN on the implementation of the agreement.

ANNEX - III

Page 20

ANNEX - III Figure 4 - Exemptions Granted by ECOWAS Under the Moratorium 2001-2002 Country

2001

2002 up to

Total

08/11 Benin

-

5

5

Cote dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Ivoire

-

19

19

Gambia

-

1

1

Ghana

1

3

4

Niger

-

1

1

Nigeria

4

3

7

Senegal

2

1

3

Serra Leone

5

2

7

Source: FOSDA, Focus on Small Arms in West Africa, Number 4, May 2003.

ANNEX - III

Page 21

ANNEX - III Figure 5 - Selected Arms Destruction in West Africa, 1996–2002

Country

1996-1999

2000

Ghana

19000

Mali

3000

Nigeria

2002

8,000

Liberia

Niger

2001

530

1243

200

500

1,581

100

50

2000

Sierra Leone Togo

Source: PCASED Annual Programme Report, 2001–2002

ANNEX - III

Page 22

ANNEX - III

Figure 5 - Status of National Commissions in ECOWAS states as at November 2009 Srl

(a) 1.

Country Legally

Legal

Bank

Office

Budget

Estbl/Dat

/Administrative

Acc

Space

Allocation

e

Act (e)

(f)

(g)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

(b) Benin

(c)

(d)

Yes

Decree 2001 –

25 Apr 01

167/pres/pm/def of April 25, 2001; and Amended by Decree 2006 – 174/PRES/PM/MAE CR/DEF/SECU of 2006

2.

Burkina

Yes

The NATCOM was

Faso

20 Apr 06

established 2001167 Decree of 21 April 2001which was amended by decree 2006-174 of 20 April 2006.

ANNEX - III

Page 23

ANNEX - III (a) 3.

(b)

(c)

Cape

Yes

Verde

(d) -

(e)

(f)

(g)

Process Yes

Provided

18 Sep

on

for in the

08

course

text creating the NATCOM but yet to be effected

4.

Cote

Yes

dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Ivoire

30 Apr 09

-

Process Yes

Yes

on course

5.

Gambia Yes 7 Apr 09

-

Provide

Yes

Provided

d for in

for in the

the text

text

creating

creating

the

the

NATCO

NATCOM

M

but yet to

but yet

be

to be

effected

effected

ANNEX - III

Page 24

ANNEX - III (a) 6.

(b) Ghana

(c)

(d)

(e)

Yes

The legislation to

Provide

29 Aug

establish the

d for in

09

NATCOM has been the text

(f) Yes

(g) Provided for in the text

put in place,

creating

creating

(Act 706 0f 2007).

the

the

NATCO

NATCOM

M

but yet to

but yet

be

to be

effected

effected 7.

Guinea

Yes

The NATCOM is

Aug 00

established by

Yes

decree No, 0066/

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

PRG of 18/08/2000 8.

Guinea

Yes

The NATCOM is

Provide

Bissau

15 Jul 06

established by

d for in

Decree no. 5/2006

the text creating the NATCO M but yet to be effected

ANNEX - III

Page 25

(a) 9.

(b) Liberia

ANNEX - III

(c) Yes

(d)

-

Jan 10 10. Mali

Yes

-

1993 11. Niger

Yes

Created by

Nov 94

Presidential Decree

(e)

(f)

(g)

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

of November 28 1994 ; Amended by Presidential Decree of November 8, 1999 12. Nigeria

No

Presidential

Focal

Directives of May

Committe 7,2001established e 13. Senegal Yes

the NATCOM NATCOM,

20 Oct 00 established by presidential decree in October 2000 14. Sierra Leone

No Focal Committe

-

e

ANNEX - III

Page 26

ANNEX - III (a)

(b)

15. Togo

(c)

(d)

Yes

NATCOM created

2001

by decree 2001-

(e)

(f)

(g)

Yes

Yes

Yes

098/PR Adapted from: ECOWAS. Status of National Commissions in ECOWAS States. A Report on functionality mission conducted by ECOSAP Programme in conjunction with the ECOWAS Small Arms Unit from November 2006 to March 2007 to appraise the status of the various NATCOMs. Available at; http://www.parliamentaryforum.org/joomla/images/stories/4._status_o f_national_commissions.pdf

ANNEX - III

Page 27

ANNEX - IV

ANNEX IV – BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ANNEX - IV

Small Arms Control in Ghana, Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC).

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ANNEX - IV

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ANNEX - IV

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ANNEX - IV

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ANNEX - IV

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ANNEX - IV

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November

1997,

http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-63.html .

OAS, OAS Resolution on Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking in SALW, 10

June

2003,

http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres_1968.htm .

OSCE, OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 24 November

2000,

http://www.osce.org/docs/english/fsc/2000/decisions/fscew231.htm .

OSCE, OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, 19

November

2003,

http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2003/11/1379_en.pdf .

OSCE, OSCE Decision on Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2004/05/2965_en.pdf .

Oxfam, Amnesty International, and IANSA (2003), Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control, p.33. Available at: www.controlarms.org ANNEX - IV

Page 10

ANNEX - IV Paul George, ‘Assessing the Future Development of the ECOWAS Moratorium’, Paper prepared for International Alert, May, 2001 in Monitoring The Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC), West Africa Series No.1 (English Version), International Alert.

PCASED. Annual Programme Report, 2001–2002.

Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the Africa Union. Available at;

http://www.africa-

union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol_peace%20and% 20security.pdf

Ratification status as of July 2009. Available at; www.fosda.net Robert Muggah and Eric Berman (2001), Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Small Arms Survey.

Small Arms Survey: Rights at Risk, (2004), Oxford University Press.

Stability Pact, Combating the Proliferation of SALW: Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan for South Eastern Europe, 28 November 2001 (revised May 2006), http://www.stabilitypact.org.

Small Arms Survey (2003).

See the Counter Terrorism Committee’s (CTC) web site at http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/laws.html ANNEX - IV

Page 11

ANNEX - IV

See Humansecurity-cities.org, (2001) .

See ‘USA Support Needed for International Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers’; available at http://www.woaafrica.org .

Takwa Zebulon. Small Arms Proliferation Poses Challenges in West Africa

p8.

Available

at

;

http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/Newsletters/Focus/Vol3No1_04/Takwa.pdf

TRESA (Training and Education on Small Arms). Small Arms Basics Recognizing SALW & Ammunition. Training Module SB-R05A02 (2005). BICC. Available at: http://www.tresa-online.org/

The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS (July 1993).

UN DDA (2006). Small Arms Control, Security and Development.

Integrated Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) for details of the Guiding Principles of Small Arms Control programmes. Available at; http://www.unddr.org

UNDP. (2008) How to Guide Lines on the Establishment and Functioning Commissions.

of

National

Small

Arms

and

Light

Available

Weapons at;

http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/sa_control/SALWGuide_English. pdf

ANNEX - IV

Page 12

ANNEX - IV UNDP. ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP), Programme to Tackle the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in ECOWAS States. Programme Document August 2007.

P6.

Available

at;

http://www.ml.undp.org/html/projets/prodocs/ECOSAP.pdf

United Nations Security Council. Small arms Report of the SecretaryGeneral. UN Doc. S/2002/1053.,20 September 2002.

United Nations. 2001. Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking

in

Firearms,

Their

Parts

and

Components

and

Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. New York: UN DDA. Available at http://www.iansa.org/un/un-firearms-protocol.pdf .

United Nations. 2001. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

New

York:

UN

DDA.

Available

at

<http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html>.

UN, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Opening speech to the Small Arms Review Conference (2006).

UN, Report of the UN Secretary-General, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. “In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”, 2005.

ANNEX - IV

Page 13

ANNEX - IV

UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) .

UN Report of the Secretary General Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”, 2005.

UN report cites Ghana as major illegal weapons trader’. Available at; http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/200907/32411.asp

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, "Millennium Declaration, 2000.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa - UNRCPDA (2000), The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons.

Wilkinson, Adrian and John Hughes-Wilson, 2001. Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes: A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures, UNDP, New York, in UN DDA (2006).

Small

Arms

Control,

Security

and

Development.

Integrated

Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS).

Available at; UN DDR Resource Centre http://www.unddr.org

Wisdom Awuku, as cited in Nnamdi Obasi, 2002, Small Arms Proliferation and Disarmament in West Africa, Apophyl Productions, Abuja. P.66, in International Alert, Small Arms Control in Ghana, Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC).

Women

in

Peacebuilding

Network

(WIPNET).

http://www.wanep.org/programs/wipnet.html

World Health Organisation (2002), World Report on Violence and Health.

ANNEX - IV

Page 14

www.child-soldiers.org

ANNEX - IV

www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/63429/focus:-u.n.register-of-conventional-arms.html

www.globalwitness.org

www.hrw.org

www.iansa.org

www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/waansa.htm

www.saferafrica.org

www.smallarmssurvey.org

www.nisat.org

ANNEX - IV

Page 15

ANNEX - V ANNEX - V

TIMELINE ON SMALL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES IN THE WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION SRL

YEAR

EVENT

(a)

(b)

(c) Pre Cold War Era In June, the United Nation Charter was signed in San

1

1945

Francisco. It came to force on 24 October the same year.

Calls for pacific resolution of disputes.

The Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention of

2

1945

the same year directly apply to the control of small arms and light weapons.

In August, the Geneva Convention and the Protection of

3

1949

Victims of international Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) of June

1977

demand

respect

for

International

Humanitarian Laws (IHL).

In July, the main International Convention on small arms 4

1969

proof marking, the Convention for the reciprocal recognition of proof marks on small arms (CIP) was adopted in Montreal.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) signed the

5

1977

Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa; it came to force in 1985.

6

ANNEX - V

1987

The United Nations Human Rights Commission a Special Rapporteur on the use mercenaries as a means

Page 1

ANNEX - V

violating human rights. (a)

(b)

7

1989

(c) The United Nation adopted the Convention against the Recruitment, Use and Training of Mercenaries.

The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution establishing an annual UN Register of Conventional Arms. This register holds data submitted to

8

1991

the UN on national arms holdings as well as transfers.

Submission of data is voluntary. It contains information on battle tanks armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, combat aircrafts, warships and missile and missile launchers.

Post Cold War

9

1992

The first UN Register of Conventional Weapons published.

In October, the President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare

10

1993

requested the UN Secretary-General to assist in the collection of Small arms and general disarmament in northern Mali.

In January, the UN Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali, addressing the Advisory Board on Disarmament,

11

1994

stated the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Regional Register on conventional arms should now be the next step. They have the advantage of allowing the categories of weapons to be registered to reflect the security concerns felt in the region.

ANNEX - V

Page 2

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) Acting upon an initial request from the President of Mali, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, established an advisory mission on the

12

1994-

control and collection of small arms in the Sahara-Sahel

1995

region. The mission visited Mali (1994) as well as Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal (1995). (the beginning of the process towards the ECOWAS Moratorium of 1998).

The UNIDIR (Geneva) began publishing a series on

13

1994

SALW in peace keeping processes, for example Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

Michael Klare of the American Academy of Arts and

14

1994

Sciences organized the first international conference on small arms.

15

1994

16

1994

Two NGOs working on small arms, by the year 2000, the number had reached fifteen.

UN

General

Assembly

began

issuing

resolutions

including small arms and light weapons issues.

The UN Secretary General’s Supplement to Agenda for

17

1995

Pease’ advocated ‘micro disarmament’, the first time this term was used. It was an important milestone.

International Alert began its SALW project with generous

18

1995

seed capital from the Dutch intergovernmental agency NOVIB.

ANNEX - V

Page 3

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) The Wassenaar Arrangement of Arms manufacturing nations (then 28 states, now 33) adopted a new export regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. Membership criteria include; a.

19

1995

being a producer, exporter of arms or related industrial equipment,

b.

having

solid

non-proliferation

including adherence to the

policies, export

control regime and c.

adherence

to

effective

national

export

controls www.wassenaar.org/docs/IE96.html October: Pursuant of recommendations of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations advisory mission on the control and collection of small arms in the Sahara-Sahel 20

1996

region (1994-1995), an integrated and proportional approach to security and development ("security first") was elaborated and, in principle, endorsed at a high-level consultation of the UN/UNDP and donor countries held in New York on 21 October 1996..

ANNEX - V

Page 4

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) In November: In this spirit, a UNIDIR/UNDP conference on conflict prevention, disarmament and development in West Africa was convened in Bamako on 25-29 November 1996. Delegations from 12 West African countries sought common ground on options for future regional cooperation. The moratorium proposal drew

21

1996

particular interest throughout the conference. Delegates undertook to convey the suggestion to their respective governments for further consideration.

The former President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare (now President of the African Union) championed the proposal of

the

moratorium

on

the

import,

export

and

manufacturing of small arms for West Africa at a UN conference in Bamako.

22

ANNEX - V

1996

Nearly 3000 small arms were decommissioned in the ancient city of Timbuktu on 27 March.

Page 5

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) In May, UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice adopted a resolution sponsored by 33 countries. It states that ‘…the Secretary General to promote, within existing resources technical co-operation projects that recognise the relevance of small arms

23

1997

regulation in addressing violence against women, in promoting justice for victims of crime and in addressing the problem of children and youth as victims and perpetrators

of

crime

and

in

re-establishing

or

strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict peacekeeping projects’.

International Alert and Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) organized the first pan-African Conference on 24

1997

small arms in Cape Town. Minister Kadel Asmal of South Africa and Colonel Kahinda Otafiire, Director of Uganda’s external intelligence service, addressed the conference.

On August 27, the UN Panel of Governmental Experts

25

1997

on Small Arms (A/52/298) legitimised the problem of small arms and light weapons.

Preparatory conference was held in Brussels on the

26

1997

formation of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).

ANNEX - V

Page 6

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms transfer (NISAT) was launched. It contributed to building the capacity of

27

1997

some civil society groups in West Africa between 1999 and 2000 through the NDP office in Bamako. Tory Rose, a Norwegian was instrumental in the mobilization of resources for West Africa.

March: In its communiquĂŠ of 12 March 1998, the ECOWAS meeting of foreign ministers held in Abidjan

28

1998

instructed the ECOWAS secretariat to prepare a draft text for the declaration of the moratorium proposal with a view to its adoption and announcement at the upcoming summit of ECOWAS. March: Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was established

by UNDP with estimated budget of US $13m to support ECOWAS facilitate the implementation of the West Africa Moratorium. France Belgium, Canada, Sweden,

29

1998

Switzerland, Norway, Holland, Japan and Mali had contributed financially or in kind by December 2002. The Group of Interested States established pursuant of the UNGA Resolution 52/38 (9 December 1997) began supporting disarmament at the local and national levels.

The Good Friday agreement of Northern Ireland included the decommissioning of small arms and light weapons.

ANNEX - V

Page 7

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) The OAU established a newsletter on small arms. It is

30

1998

published in South Africa by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

31

1998

Churches and NGOs met on small arms and issued the Accra Declaration on SALW. In October, the Center for Democratic Empowerment (Cede), the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) and

32

1998

Africa Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSRAG), funded by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms (NISAT) lobbied West African leaders in Abuja on the eve of the adoption of the ECOWAS Moratorium.

In October, At the twenty-first ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, meeting in Abuja, Nigeria on 30-31 October 1998, all 16 Heads of State of ECOWAS "solemnly

33

1998

declare(d) a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS member states which shall take effect from the first day of November 1998, for a renewable period of three (3) years." It was renewed in 2001 for another three years.

In November, Notice was made of the Moratorium in

34

1998

Security Council Resolution 1209 of 19 November 1998, which commends the ECOWAS members for their subregional initiative in combating illicit arms flows.

ANNEX - V

Page 8

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) March: At the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers meeting in Bamako, Mali, 24-25 March 1999, a plan of action was

35

1999

agreed for measures to be undertaken within the framework of the moratorium, to create a secure environment for development. Four areas were singled out for immediate financial assistance.

March: PCASED was officially launched in Bamako on 25 March on the occasion of the Foreign Ministers meeting.

The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms

Transfers (NISAT) promote international support for 36

the Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), which was established under UNDP auspices to facilitate the implementation of the Moratorium and its associated measures.

In July, the OAU adopted a resolution on the illicit

37

1999

Proliferation, circulation and Trafficking in of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

38

ANNEX - V

1999

The

Southern

African

Development

Community

(SADC) established a Working Group on Small Arms.

Page 9

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) In September, the EU-SADC working group was

39

1999

established in a seminar on Implementation of the Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Trafficking. The working meets twice a year.

September: ACCRA. The Vice- President of Ghana, John Evans Atta Mills, today opened a two-day United Nations workshop in Accra on the Modalities for the

40

1999

Establishment of an Arms Register and a Database in Africa with a call for the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa to be expanded to all of Africa and transformed into a convention.

December 10, ECOWAS leaders adopted the Code of

41

1999

Conduct for the Moratorium in LomĂŠ, Togo. The Code has 18 articles dealing with issues such as Arms Register for peace keeping.

The Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) presented a

42

1999

Prototype of Arms Register and database to ECOWAS in their annual summit in LomĂŠ, Togo. Seven category of weaponry were identified for inclusion.

ANNEX - V

Page 10

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) The

Economic

and

Social

Security

Council

(ECOSOC) of the UN drafted a Protocol Against the 43

1999-

Illicit Manufacture of, the Trafficking in Firearms, and

2000

Other

Related

Materials,

attached

to

the

UN

Convention on Transactional Organised Crime (May 2001).

In May, African Governmental Experts met in Addis 44

2000

Ababa and

recommended

preventive measures,

reduction strategies on SALWs. The first draft of the Bamako Declaration was produced.

In December, the OAU Ministerial Conference adopted the Bamako Declaration on African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of

45

2001

Small Arms and Light Weapons following a meeting of African Governmental Experts, coordinated by the institute for Security Studies (ISS), the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the OAU Conflict Management Center.

ANNEX - V

Page 11

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) In

March,

the

Foundation

for

Security

and

development in Africa (FOSDA) organised the first public meeting on the proliferation of small arms in Ghana. Following the election of President John A 46

2001

Kufuor in 2000, armed robbery and widespread usage of small arms became a threat to public safety. The Minister for Justice, Nana Akufo-Addo, launched FOSDA’s Newsletter, ‘Focus on Small Arms in West Africa’.

In June PCASED, ASDR and FOSDA organised a Civil

47

2001

Society

consultation

on

the

ECOWAS

Moratorium: Beyond the UN Conference, in Accra. It called for the renewal of the moratorium for another three years.

In June FOSDA released the first research paper on the

local

craft

production

entitled:

Between

Indifference and Naiveté: the Problematique of the 48

2001

Local Manufacture of Small Arms. This report was produced jointly by the Commonwealth Human Rights initiative in preparation for the UN conference on SALWs which too place in July 2001.

ANNEX - V

Page 12

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) In July, the UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects adopted the United Nation Programme of Action to Prevent,

49

2001

Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. African States, supported by NGOs, demanded the Small Arms should not be supplied to non0state actors. The United States opposed the proposal.

50

2001

July, A model convention on SALWs was presented at the UN Conference in New York by Fund for Peace.

In October, as part of activities marking Disarmament Week, the Togolese Government and the Un Regional

51

2001

Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) organised the first ceremonial arms destruction in LomĂŠ.

In December, the IANSA Facilitation Committee took the first radical steps to decentralize the biggest NGO

52

2001

Network on SALWs. Regional offices will be opened in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The secretariat will move to Geneva in 2004.

ANNEX - V

Page 13

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) The UN Convention against Transactional Organised Crime (UNGA 2001) was adopted as a supplement to

53

2001

the Protocol against the Manufacture of, and trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and components and Ammunition. It is the only legally binding instrument on small arms.

In January, ceremonial arms destruction took place in Lunge Garrison, Makeni, Bo and Kenema in Sierra

54

2002

Leone, marking the end of the ten-year civil war in which up to a 50000 people were killed, and half the population became IDPs. It was organised by the Un Mission in Sierra Leone and PCASED. The UNDP-Niger and the bureau for Crises Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) began a project called â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Radios

55

2002

for the consolidation of Peaceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; with the objective of encouraging Nigeriennes

to exchange illicit SALWs

for free-play radios.

In February, the Social Science research Council 56

2002

(SSRC)

organised

a

three-day

workshop

Washington Dc in International Law and Small Arms Proliferation.

ANNEX - V

in

Page 14

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) In February, more than one thousand people were killed when explosion took place at the Lagos military

57

2002

Cantonment, leading to what the Nigerian media called ‘a canal of death’. Bad Stock pile management was responsible. United States experts were flown in to deal with the situation.

In February, the Institute of Security Studies

58

2002

launched a newsletter ’Focus on Small Arms in Africa’.

In March, saferAfrica, led by Virginia Gamba, one of the leading pro-action researchers on SALWs

59

2002

globally, organised the first African Conference on the on the implementation of the UN Programme of action (UN PoA) in Pretoria, South Africa. ‘Needs and Partnership was the team for the conference’.

60

2002

In March, The Eminent Persons Group on small arms (EPG) appointed 14-member NGO Advisory Group.

In April in Dakar, International Alert, Saferworld and a

61

2002

group of West African NGOs organised a four-day workshop on ‘A Manual on Small Arms and Light Weapons’.

ANNEX - V

Page 15

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) In May, the foundation conference of the West

62

2002

African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA) took place in Accra, Ghana. It was organised by the Center for Democratic empowerment and FOSDA. In June, UNDESA and PCASED organised a threeday capacity building workshop in Conakry, Guinea

63

2002

for

the

National

Commissions

against

the

proliferation of Small Arms. The NATCOMs are mandatory for the ECOWAS Moratorium.

August: Two Consultants lead by Dr Ogunbanwo commissioned 64

2002

to

conduct

assessment

of

the

Moratorium implementation, to determine the levels of observance, its general impact, and any obstacles to smooth implementation.

December: Experts Group Meeting was held from 1-

65

2002

5 December 2002 to review the Evaluation Report submitted by the consultants.

In December, saferworld and FOSDA organised a workshop for the national commissions of Ghana,

66

2002

Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Tanzania and Namibia in Pretoria on development of National Strategies on Small Arms.

ANNEX - V

Page 16

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) In January, West African Heads of State meeting in

67

2003

Dakar authorized the Executive secretariat to set up a Small arms Unit in Abuja to increase the regional body’s capacity to deal with small arms.

68

2003

June: IANSA members organised a week of action to raise awareness on the UN PoA. In June, a European Union Common Position on

69

2003

Arms Brokering was adopted.

This is the most

progressive international agreement on brokering.

July, The German Federal Office, GTZ, and The Bonn

International

Conversion

Centre

(BICC)

organised a workshop in Yew York “Training Programmes for Lesser Developed Building 70

2003

Capacity

for

Small

Countries –

Arms

Control”.

Presentation focus on; (i) The necessity of training government officials in weapons control, (ii) Training non-governmental organizations in raising public awareness, (iii) Promoting a ‘gendered’ approach to small arms action.

ANNEX - V

Page 17

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) July 7-11, the United Nations biennial conference took place. (lANSA)

71

2003

The International Action Network

International

Alert,

Saferworld,

and

University of Bradford published ‘IANSA Report: Implementing the programme of Action 2003.’ The reports say there is very little success to celebrate about the United nations programme of Action (UN PoA). See www.iansa.org August: Liberian Comprehensive Peace Agreement –Accra. IANSA welcomes the signing of the Liberian Comprehensive Peace agreement on the 18th of

72

2003

August and welcome this Agreement as an important step towards peace in West Africa. However, we note with concern that the issue of what happens to the small arms used in the conflict in the longer term has not been addressed.

ANNEX - V

Page 18

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) October: Today, the 31st October 2003 is ECOWAS MORATORIUM DAY. The day marks the 5th anniversary of the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons within the borders of

73

2003

ECOWAS countries. The ECOWAS Moratorium was signed on 31 October 1998 by the 15 Heads of State of the ECOWAS countries as a mechanism for diminishing and eliminating the scourge of violent and destructive civil wars that have rained havoc on several countries within the sub-region.

Apr:

74

2004

Nigeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s police are cracking down on illegal

firearms which, they say, are threatening Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most populous country.

November: Nigeria Action Network launched. The Nigeria Action Network on Small Arms was launched on November 17 2004. As the largest nation in

75

2004

Africa, and one of the countries worst affected by the global scourge of guns, it is very appropriate that Nigeria should have its own national network on small arms.

ANNEX - V

Page 19

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) February: The Ghanaian Action Network on Small Arms (GHANSA) launched a Week of Action against the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons on 14 of February 2005. The launch ceremony in the Northern Regional capital, Tamale,

76

2005

attracted

some

Parliament,

Northern

security

Region

persons,

Members

traditional

of

rulers,

religious leaders, students, youth groups, youth chiefs and opinion leaders among others. Small arms have had devastating consequences in Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Northern Region. In March 2002, the King of Dagbon was assassinated and forty others were murdered.

October: WAANSA hands over Draft Convention on SALWs to ECOWAS Secretariat. The Chairman of West

Africa

Action

Network

on

Small

Arms

(WAANSA), Mr Baffour Dokyi Amoa, on 5 October 2005 in Abuja, Nigeria handed over a Draft Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons 77

2005

proposed by civil society of West Africa to HE Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.

The

Chairman

of

WAANSA

was

accompanied by the Secretary of WAANSA, Ms Afi Yakubu. The document was received on behalf of the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS by Major General Charles Okae (Rtd), Director of Defence.

ANNEX - V

Page 20

(a)

ANNEX - V

(b)

(c)

January: The Control Arms campaign launched the report Voices from Sierra Leone simultaneously in seven countries: Ghana, Guinée Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria,

Sénégal

and

Sierra

Leone.

The

campaigners are demanding the creation of a binding ECOWAS Convention on small arms and 78

2006

light weapons, and that their governments support the call for an international arms trade treaty. The launches included reports, action cards, and TV / radio spots. Among the artists and celebrities lending their support to the launches was: Sénégal: Oumar Pène, Nix, Philippe Monteiro and Youssou Ndour, Côte d'Ivoire: Tiken Jah Fakoly and A'Salfo, Nigeria: Dakore Egbuson and Bénin: Angélique Kidjo.

ANNEX - V

Page 21

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) Dr Sola Ogunbanwo, Representative of Nigeria at the January 2006 Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2006 UN Review Conference on Small Arms in

New

York

has

been

designated

as

lead

international consultant and Mr. Ilhan Berkol of GRIP as consultant, for the transformation of the ECOWAS 79

2006

Moratorium on Small Arms into a legally binding ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Draft ECOWAS Convention is expected to be considered first at a meeting of experts from ECOWAS Member States, then at a meeting of ECOWAS Ministers; and a final decision is expected to be taken during the 2006 ECOWAS Summit of Heads of State and Government. . West Africa: Charles Taylor arrested for war crimes.

IANSA welcomes the arrest of Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious

80

2006

violations of international law such as using child soldiers. Taylor was President of Liberia between 1997 and 2003, after which he was given asylum in Nigeria. He was notorious for the use of child soldiers, armed with AK-47 assault rifles.

ANNEX - V

Page 22

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) April:

Liberia

Revised

Draft

of

Firearms

Act

Presented to Technical Working Group on Small Arms. The Center for Democratic Empowerment (CEDE)on Friday April 21 presented a final draft of the proposed National Firearms Control Act to the 81

2006

Technical Working Group on Small Arms Control.

The document, which is a revision of the 1956 Firearms Traffic Act, was contracted to CEDE by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through its Small Arms Control unit. The revision fulfills part of the United Nations Plan of Action (UN PoA) on small arms and light weapons May: A WAANSA delegation met the Chair of the Burkina Faso National Commission on Small Arms in Ouagadougou, 3 May. They presented a petition on

82

2006

the urgent need for West African Leaders to declare their support to Global Principles on international Arms Transfers and to the process leading to the adoption of the ECOWAS Convention.

ANNEX - V

Page 23

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) June:

Gunrunner

embargo.

A

convicted

Dutch

arms

for

violating

UN

Guus

van

broker

Kouwenhoven was sentenced to eight years in 83

2006

prison on 7 June 2006 for arranging arms supplies to Charles Taylorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s regime in Liberia. His conviction is a rare and welcome instance of an arms broker being held accountable for violating a UN arms embargo.

June: Fifteen West African countries have signed a binding regional Convention intended to reduce the

84

2006

armed violence that has ravaged the region. The Convention is the culmination of a process to transform the 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms into a legally binding instrument.

June: ECOWAS President: West Africa will support global Arms Trade Treaty The President of the

85

2007

ECOWAS Commission today called on West African states to support the global move towards an Arms Trade Treaty. He was speaking at the ECOWAS Heads of State Summit in Abuja, Nigeria.

ANNEX - V

Page 24

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) July: Côte d’Ivoire: Guns burned in peace ceremony.

Former rebels in Côte d'Ivoire surrender their guns for destruction as part of the peace process. The weapons were burned in a football stadium in Bouaké on Monday 30 July 2007 to symbolise the end of the country’s five year conflict. President Gbagbo traveled to the formerly rebel-held north of

86

2007

the country for the first time since the war started to attend the ceremony. As he lit the pile of guns, the President declared that the war was over. Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, a former rebel leader, also attended. 'By setting fire to these guns which were the seeds of destruction, we are marking the end of the war,' he said. The ‘flame of peace’ is now being carried to all 19 regions of Côte d'Ivoire to symbolise the country's reunification.

ANNEX - V

Page 25

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) October: Conflict cost Africa $300 billion since 1990.

The cost of conflict on African development was approximately $300 billion between 1990 and 2005, according to new research by Oxfam International, IANSA and Saferworld. This is equal to the amount of money Africa received in international aid from

87

2007

major donors during the same period. The study Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Missing Billions is the first time analysts have estimated the overall effects of conflict on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across the continent. The report shows that on average a war, civil war or insurgency shrinks an African economy by 15%. The continent loses an average of around $18 billion a year due to armed conflict.

October Guinea Bissau, West Africa .1 MILLIONTH BULLET DESTRUCTION. British NGO Cleared Ground Demining and its national NGO partner in Guinea Bissau LUTCAM (Lutamos Todos Contra As

88

2007

Minas), announced on the 30 Oct 07 that their ERW (Explosive Remnants of War) Removal Program had reached the milestone of destroying a total of one million

bullets

collected

from

excess

military

munitions stockpiles.

ANNEX - V

Page 26

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) February: FOSDA Calls on President Bush to Support Arms Trade Treaty. The Foundation for Security and Development in Africa is calling on

89

2008

President George Bush to support the Arms Trade Treaty as he visits Ghana from February 19-21, 2008. The United States is currently one of the key states strongly opposed to the Treaty.

September: Advisory Board for Small Arms in West Africa. The President of the ECOWAS Commission Dr

90

2008

Mohamed

Ibn

Chambas

inaugurated

an

ECOWAS Advisory Board on Small Arms and Light Weapons on 17 September. The Board is chaired by Dr Sola Ogunbanwo, the Nigerian expert who drafted the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on small arms.

ANNEX - V

Page 27

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) July: Small arms high on the NAM agenda. Over 100 heads of states and governments present at the NonAligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Sharm El Sheikh (Egypt) re-affirmed their commitment to peace, disarmament and security. The Summit’s theme was “International Solidarity for Peace and Development”. At

90

2009

Secretary-General disarmament

the

opening

Ban

among

ceremony,

Ki-moon

developing

UN

called

for

countries

to

contribute to world peace and development. “It is not only weapons of mass destruction that demand a concerted international response. Conventional arms continue to destabilise our world. Small arms and light weapons are overwhelmingly the weapon of choice in violent conflicts,” he said.

July: Seven West African countries, out of the eight required, have so far ratified the Convention and deposited their instruments of ratification at the ECOWAS Commission. The seven countries include 91

2009

Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo. Just one more ratification is needed to facilitate transformation of the 1998 Moratorium on Light Weapons into a legally-binding instrument.

ANNEX - V

Page 28

ANNEX - V (a)

(b)

(c) September: The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government on the 14th June 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria, enters into force with the deposit of the 9th instrument of ratification by the

92

2009

Government of the Republic of Benin on the 29 September 2009.In addition to the Republic of Benin, the following Member States have and deposited their instruments of ratification: Burkina Faso, Republic of Liberia, Republic of Mali, Republic of Niger, Republic of Nigeria, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Sierra Leone, Republic of Togo.

93

ANNEX - V

2009

March: Ghana ratifies the ECOWAS Convention on SALW.

Page 29

ANNEX - VI ANNEX - VI

AFRICAN GROUPS WORKING ON SALW CONTROL CAMPAIGN Name of

Serial

Remarks

Organisation

(a)

(b)

(c) South Africa Saferworld

is

an

independent

non-

governmental organisation that works to prevent armed violence and create safer

1

SaferAfrica. www.saferafrica.org/

communities in which people can lead peaceful and rewarding lives. Saferworld works in a number of regions affected by conflict and the proliferation of arms and currently have programmes in Africa, Europe, and South Asia.

Institute for Security 2

Studies. http://www.iss.co.za/i ndex.php

The ISS is a regional research institute operating across sub-Saharan Africa. It provides capacity building which includes research and develops national action plans for governments.

A campaign for free gun society is to

Gun Free South 3

Africa

provide an open forum where members can discuss firearm ownership and related

http://www.gunfree.c issues in South Africa. o.za/

ANNEX - VI

Page 1

ANNEX - VI

East, Central Africa and The Horn of Africa (a)

(b)

(c) Africa

Peace

Forum

independent,

(APFO)

is

not-for-profit

an non-

governmental organization registered in and based in Nairobi, Kenya. It facilitates research and advocacy on areas of peace and security at national, regional and international level. APFO was established in 1994 to contribute to the effective management

of

conflicts

and

the

promotion of peace and security in the Africa Peace Forum, Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region 4

Kenya http://www.amaniafri ka.org/page.php?8

(this includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Uganda,

Somalia,

Tanzania,

Rwanda,

Democratic

Sudan, Burundi

Republic

of

Kenya, and

the

Congo).

Africa Peace Forum currently serves as a National Research Institute (NRI) for the IGAD conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN), as well as a resource partner for various national, regional, international organisations and governments in research, training, capacity building and advocacy in areas of Conflict early warning and response, small arms ANNEX - VI

Page 2

ANNEX - VI and

light

weapons

control,

conflict

prevention, mitigation and resolution, good governance, democracy, development and security.

An institutional framework arising from Regional Center on

Nairobi Declaration to coordinate the joint

Small Arms and Light effort by National Focal Points in Member 5

Weapons (RECSA).

States to prevent, combat and eradicate

http://www.recsasec. stockpiling and illicit trafficking in small org/index.htm

arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa.

Centre for Conflict Resolution Group, 6

Nakuru, Kenya. http://www.copafrica. org/normpartners.ht ml International Resource Group

7

Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA) is a membership Network of individuals and organizations

working

for

sustainable

peace in Africa. As a network, COPA facilitates linking and sharing between practitioners and stakeholders to ensure the building of sustainable peace in Africa.

Formed in 1994, it is one of the bestresourced informal groups on small arms.

(IRG), Kenya. http://www.irgltd.com /index.php

ANNEX - VI

Page 3

ANNEX - VI (a)

(b) Security research and Information

8

Centre, Nairobi. http://www.srickenya. org/ Inter-Africa Group,

9

Ethiopia.

(c) SRIC is an independent non-profit making think tank, committed to providing data and information on human security and security sector dynamics in Kenya and the subregion of the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa Region.

The InterAfrica Groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s mission focuses on advancing peace, justice and respect for

http://www.interafrica humanitarian law in the Horn of Africa. group.org/ West Africa African Strategic and Peace Research Group, Nigeria.

10 http://www.iansa.org/ab out/members/africa/afstr ag_popup.htm

ANNEX - VI

Africa Strategic and Peace Research Group Description: AFSTRAG (Nigeria) is the Nigerian

chapter

of

a

continental

research/action network. The SALW unit works to make Nigeria gun-free as a necessary condition for peace, security and development in Africa as a whole.

Page 4

ANNEX - VI (a)

(b)

(c) PANAFSTRAG,

as

an

international

organization, is managed by a Board, the composition of which reflects regional,

11

Pan African Strategic

linguistic and gender representation. The

and Policy Research

President

presides

over

the

Board.

Group (PANAFSTRAG) PANAFSTRAG have national chapters, which are run in line with the Constitution of

the

organization.

The

current

http://www.panafstrag.o International Secretariat of PAN AFSTRAG rg/pages/

is in Lagos-Nigeria, and it is run by an Executive Secretary, Programme Officers and Administrative Support Staff.

Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) is

Campaign for Good

a

Governance, Sierra

organisation (NGO) advocating for good

Leone.

governance in Sierra Leone. Leaders of

12

the

registered

national

pro-democracy

non-government

movement

formed

http://www.slcgg.org/ab CGG in 1996 after the first multi-party outCGG.html

ANNEX - VI

elections in three decades.

Page 5

ANNEX - VI (a)

(b)

(c) The Center is an independent, nonpartisan and nonprofit research-based and policy-

Centre for Conflict

oriented think tank in Accra, Ghana.

Resolution, Ghana.

Founded in 1998, it is dedicated to the

13

promotion of democracy, good governance http://www.cddghana.or and the development of a liberal political g/

and economic environment in Ghana in particular and Africa in general.

West Africa Action

WAANSA

serve

as

a

collaborative

Network on Small Arms (regional chapter) civil society instrument (WAANSA) 14

for non-proliferation and against the illicit manufacture, trade, circulation and use of

http://www.iansa.org/reg small arms and light weapons in West ions/wafrica/waansa.ht m.

Africa.

The International chapter of WAANSA is the IANSA

ANNEX - VI

Page 6

ANNEX - VI

To examine the causes of conflict and Foundation for security and Development in Africa (FOSDA), Ghana.

15 http://www.fosda.net/

poverty in Africa by initiating thematic studies in Africa. The outcome of such studies will be documented in all forms that will facilitate the generation and circulation of knowledge; the maintenance of visible presence of civil society in Africa; and progress towards the entrenchment of constitutional processes and the rule of law.

Engendering the Peace Processes in West Africa. Femmes Africa Solidarité was created in 1996 from a brainstorming

Mano River Women’s Peace Network, Guinea.

16

Femmes Africa Solidarité.

www.fasngo.org

session with a group of women lawyers, judges, academics, and entrepreneurs, along with representatives from other NGOs and international organizations, to promote, ensure, and give a voice to women in resolving conflicts and building peace. It functions within existing and emerging structures in Africa and as a communication link between African women.

ANNEX - VI

Page 7

ANNEX - VI (a)

17

(b)

(c)

Movement Contre Les

http://www.grip.org/rafal/membres/malao.h

Armes Legeres En

tml

Afrique Lâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Quest (Malao), Senegal Open Society Initiative

Helping West Africa Society to build open

for west Africa

Society.

18 (OSIWA), Dakar.

http://www.osiwa.org/ AllAfrica Global Media is a multi-media content service provider, systems technology developer and the largest electronic distributor of African news and AllAfrica Global Media.

19 allAfrica.com

information worldwide. Registered in Mauritius, with offices in Johannesburg, Dakar, Lagos and Washington, D.C., AllAfrica is one of a family of companies that aggregate, produce and distribute news from across Africa to tens of millions of end users.

ANNEX - VI

Page 8

ANNEX - VII ANNEX - VII

BAMAKO DECLARATION ON AN AFRICAN COMMON POSITION ON

THE

ILLICIT

PROLIFERATION,

CIRCULATION

AND

TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

I. WE, THE MINISTERS of the Member States of the Organization of African Unity met in Bamako, Mali, from 30 November to 1 December 2000, to develop an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in preparation for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, scheduled to take place in New York, from 9 to 20 July, 2001, in accordance with the relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. Our meeting was held in pursuance of: The Decision AHG/Dec. 137 (LXX), adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999, which called for an African approach on the problems posed by the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and for the convening of a Ministerial preparatory conference on this matter prior to the holding of the United Nations Conference; and the decisions adopted on this matter by the Council of Ministers, at its 68th Ordinary Session held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from 1 to 6 June 1998 (CM/Dec. 432 (LXVIII), the 71st Ordinary Session held

ANNEX - VII

Page 1

ANNEX - VII

in Adonis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 6 to 10 March 2000 (CM/Dec. 501 (LXXI), and the 72nd Ordinary Session held in LomĂŠ, Togo, from 6 to 8 July 2000 (CM/Dec. 527 (LXXII); II. WE HAVE CONSIDERED the reports of the Secretary General on the preparation for the Ministerial Conference on the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, as well as the report of the first continental meeting of African Experts and the International Consultation on the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 17 to 19 May 2000, and from 22 to 23 June 2000, respectively.

III. In reviewing the situation of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, WE RECOGNIZE the progress made at national and regional levels in developing action programmes for the reduction, prevention and management of small arms and light weapons proliferation. In this regard, we welcome in particular, the ECOWAS Moratorium of 31 October 1998, its accompanying Code of Conduct of 1999 and its plan of Action under the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED); the Nairobi Declaration adopted by the Ministers of the countries of the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa regions on 15 March 2000, and its Coordinated Agenda for Action and Implementation Plan, the progress towards the signature of a SADC Declaration and Protocol on Firearms and Ammunition and its Implementation Programme as discussed in August 2000; the Djibouti Declaration of the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf ANNEX - VII

Page 2

ANNEX - VII

of Aden on antipersonnel landmines, of 18 November 2000; as well as the efforts made by ECCAS Member States, within the framework of the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa on the proliferation and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons in Central Africa.

IV. WE REAFFIRM our respect for international law and principles as contained in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular, the respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States, the right to individual and collective selfdefense, as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the right of self determination of peoples and the right of Member States to develop their own defense systems to ensure national security.

V. WE HAVE DELIBERATED extensively on the various aspects of the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and HAVE AGREED on the following African Common Position on the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons:

1. WE EXPRESS OUR GRAVE CONCERN that the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons continues to have devastating consequences for stability and development in Africa. We recognize that this problem: i. sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement ANNEX - VII

of

innocent

populations

and

threatens Page 3

ANNEX - VII

international humanitarian law, as well as fuels and encourages terrorism; ii. promotes a culture of violence and destabilizes societies by creating a propitious environment for criminal and contraband activities, in particular, the looting of precious minerals and the illicit trafficking in and abuse of, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and endangered species; iii. has adverse effects on security and development, especially on women, refugees and other vulnerable groups, as well as on infrastructure and property; iv. also has devastating consequences on children, a number of whom are victims of armed conflict, while others are forced to become child soldiers; v.

undermines

good

governance,

peace

efforts

and

negotiations, jeopardizes the respect for fundamental human rights, and hinders economic development; vi. relates to the combating and the eradication of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and control of their proliferation; vii. is both one of supply and demand, transcends borders and calls for cooperation at all levels: local, national, regional, continental and international.

2. WE THEREFORE AGREE that, in order to promote peace, security, stability and sustainable development on the continent, it is vital to address the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and ANNEX - VII

Page 4

ANNEX - VII

trafficking of small arms and light weapons in a comprehensive, integrated, sustainable and efficient manner through: i. ensuring that the behaviour and conduct of Member States and suppliers are not only transparent but also go beyond narrow national interests; ii. the promotion of measures aimed at restoring peace, security and confidence among and between States with a view to reducing the resort to arms; iii. the promotion of structures and processes to strengthen democracy, the observance of human rights, the rule of law and good governance, as well as economic recovery and growth; iv. the promotion of conflict prevention measures and the pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts; v. the promotion of comprehensive solutions to the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons that: - include control and reduction, as well as supply and demand aspects; - are based on the coordination and harmonization of the efforts of Member States at regional, continental and international levels; - involve civil society in support of the central government, in this regard. vi. the enhancement of the capacity of Member States to identify, seize and destroy illicit weapons and to put in place measures to control the circulation, possession, transfer and use of small arms and light weapons; ANNEX - VII

Page 5

ANNEX - VII

vii. the promotion of a culture of peace by encouraging education and public awareness programmes on the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, involving all sectors of society; viii. the institutionalization of national and regional programmes for action aimed at preventing, controlling and eradicating the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in Africa; and ix. the respect for international humanitarian law.

3. WE RECOMMEND Member States should: A. At the National Level i) put in place, where they do not exist national coordination Agencies

or

bodies

and

the

appropriate

institutional

infrastructure responsible for policy guidance/ research and monitoring on all aspects of small arms and light weapons proliferation, control, circulation, trafficking and reduction; ii) enhance the capacity of national law enforcement and security Agencies and officials to deal with all aspects of the arms problem, including appropriate training on investigative procedures, border control and specialized actions, and upgrading of equipment and resources; iii) adopt, as soon as possible, where they do not exist, the necessary legislative and other measures to establish as a criminal offence under national law, the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, and illegal possession and use of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other related materials; ANNEX - VII

Page 6

ANNEX - VII

iv) develop and implement, where they do not exist, national programmes for: - the responsible management of licit arms; - the voluntary surrender of illicit small arms and light weapons; - the identification and the destruction by competent national authorities and where necessary, of surplus, obsolete and seized stocks in possession of the state, with, as appropriate, international financial and technical support, - the reintegration of demobilized youth and those who possess small arms and light weapons illegally. v) develop and implement public awareness programmes on the problem of the proliferation and the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons; vi) encourage the adoption of appropriate national legislation or regulations to prevent the breaching of international arms embargoes, as decided by the United Nations Security Council; vii) take appropriate measure to control arms transfers by manufacturers, suppliers, traders, brokers, as well as shipping and transit agents, in a transparent fashion; viii) encourage, where appropriate, the active involvement of civil society in the formulation and implementation of a national action plan to deal with the problem; ix) enter into binding trilateral arrangements, on a voluntary basis with neighbouring countries, so as to put in place an effective common system of control, including the recording, licensing and collection of small arms and light weapons, within common frontier zones.

ANNEX - VII

Page 7

ANNEX - VII B. At the Regional Level i) Put in place, where they do not exist, mechanisms to coordinate and harmonize efforts to address the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons; ii) Encourage the codification and harmonization of legislation governing the manufacture, trading, brokering, possession and use of small arms and ammunition. Common standards could include, but not be limited to, marking, record-keeping and controls governing imports, exports and the licit trade; iii) Strengthen regional and continental cooperation among police, customs and border control services to address the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. These efforts should include, but not be limited to, training, the exchange of information to support common action to contain and reduce illicit arms and light weapons trafficking across

borders,

and

the

conclusion

of

the

necessary

Agreements in this regard; iv) Ensure that the manufacturers and suppliers of illicit small arms and light weapons, who violate global or continental regulations on the issue, shall be sanctioned. Known brokers and States which act as suppliers of illicitly acquired arms and weapons to combatants in Member states, should equally be sanctioned by the International community.

ANNEX - VII

Page 8

ANNEX - VII

4. WE STRONGLY APPEAL to the wider international community and, particularly, to arms supplier countries, to: i) Accept that trade in small arms should be limited to governments and authorized registered licensed traders; ii) Actively engage, support and fund the efforts of OAU Member States in addressing the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the continent; iii) Seriously consider ways to discourage and eliminate the practice of dumping excess weapons in African countries and in violation of arms embargoes; iv) Enact appropriate legislation and regulations to control arms transfers

by

manufacturers,

suppliers,

traders,

brokers,

shipping and transit agents; v)

Enact

stringent

lays,

regulations

and

administrative

procedures to ensure the effective control over the transfer of small arms and light weapons, including mechanisms with a view to facilitating the identification of illicit arms transfers; and vi) Take full advantage of the forthcoming United Nations Conference to make these commitments known.

5. WE CALL for international partnership to curb the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in Africa. In this regard, i) WE APPEAL to international institutions to support initiatives and programmers aimed at eradicating the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. In ANNEX - VII

Page 9

ANNEX - VII

this regard, WE REITERATE the call as contained in the relevant United Nations General Assembly Resolutions for financial and other appropriate support for the implementation of these programmes; ii) WE APPEAL to Governments, all sectors of civil society and donor Agencies for the financial and technical support to national programmes for the reintegration of demobilized youths and those in illegal possession of small arms; iii) WE CALL FOR close cooperation between the OAU, regional economic communities, the United Nations Agencies, other international organizations, in close association with civil society Organizations in addressing the elicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons; iv) WE URGE OAU Member States, the United Nations, Regional Organizations, Research Center, the civil society and the international community as a whole, to develop and fund action oriented research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding on the nature and scope of the problem, providing, whenever possible, a basis for continued advocacy and action on prevention measures, and evaluating the impact of these measures; v) WE REQUEST that competent international Organizations like INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, play a more important role in the fight against the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons; ANNEX - VII

Page 10

ANNEX - VII

vi) WE ENCOURAGE all the Member States of the United Nations, to accede to international legal instruments on terrorism and international organized crime.

6. WE CALL for a realistic and implementable programme of action during the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which will take place in New York, from 9-20 July 2001 and WE SUPPORT the efforts by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee in this regard.

7. WE UNDERTAKE to promote and defend this African common position on the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons during the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade In Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects.

8. WE REQUEST the Secretary General to follow up on the implementation of the present Declaration and to present regular progress reports to the Council of Ministers.

ANNEX - VII

Page 11

ANNEX - VIII ANNEX - VIII

Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 53/111 of 9 December 1998, in which it decided to establish an open-ended intergovernmental ad hoc committee for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive international convention against transnational organized crime and of discussing

the

elaboration,

as

appropriate,

of

international

instruments addressing trafficking in women and children, combating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components

and

ammunition,

and

illegal

trafficking

in

and

transporting of migrants, including by sea,

Recalling also its resolution 54/126 of 17 December 1999, in which it requested the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime to continue its work, in accordance with resolutions 53/111 and 53/114 of 9 December 1998, and to intensify that work in order to complete it in 2000,

Recalling further its resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, by which it adopted the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish ANNEX - VIII

Page 1

Trafficking

in

Persons,

ANNEX - VIII Especially

Women

and

Children,

supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants

by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,

Reaffirming the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend themselves, as well as the right of self-determination of all peoples, in particular peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and the importance of the effective realization of that right,

1.

Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the

Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on its twelfth session, 1 and commends the Ad Hoc Committee for its work; 2.

Adopts the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and

Trafficking

in

Firearms,

Their

Parts

and

Components

and

Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, annexed to the present resolution, and opens it for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York; 3.

Urges all States and regional economic organizations to sign

and ratify the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the protocols thereto as soon as possible in ANNEX - VIII

Page 2

ANNEX - VIII

order to ensure the speedy entry into force of the Convention and the protocols thereto.

101st plenary meeting 31 May 2001 Annex

Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing

the

United

Nations

Convention

against

Transnational Organized Crime

Preamble The States Parties to this Protocol, Aware of the urgent need to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, owing to the harmful effects of those activities on the security of each State, region and the world as a whole, endangering the well-being of peoples, their social and economic development and their right to live in peace,

Convinced, therefore, of the necessity for all States to take all appropriate measures to this end, including international cooperation and other measures at the regional and global levels,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 53/111 of 9 December 1998, in which ANNEX - VIII

Page 3

ANNEX - VIII

the Assembly decided to establish an open-ended intergovernmental ad hoc committee for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive international convention against transnational organized crime and of discussing the elaboration of, inter alia, an international instrument combating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition,

Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperationamong States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,2

Convinced that supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with an international instrument against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition will be useful in preventing and combating those crimes, Have agreed as follows:

I.

General provisions Article 1 Relation with the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

1.

This Protocol supplements the United Nations Convention

against ANNEX - VIII

Page 4

ANNEX - VIII

Transnational Organized Crime. It shall be interpreted together with the Convention.

2.

The provisions of the Convention shall apply, mutatis mutandis,

to this Protocol unless otherwise provided herein.

3.

The offences established in accordance with article 5 of this

Protocol shall be regarded as offences established in accordance with the Convention.

Article 2 Statement of purpose The purpose of this Protocol is to promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

Article 3 Use of terms

For the purposes of this Protocol: (a)

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Firearmâ&#x20AC;? shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that

expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899; ANNEX - VIII

Page 5

(b)

ANNEX - VIII

“Parts and components” shall mean any element or

replacement element specifically designed for a firearm and essential to its operation, including a barrel, frame or receiver, slide or cylinder, bolt or breech block, and any device designed or adapted to diminish the sound caused by firing a firearm; (c)

“Ammunition” shall mean the complete round or its

components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles, that are used in a firearm, provided that those components are themselves subject to authorization in the respective State Party; (d)

“Illicit manufacturing” shall mean the manufacturing or

assembly of firearms, their parts and components or ammunition: (i)

From parts and components illicitly trafficked;

(ii)

Without a license or authorization from a competent

authority of the State Party where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or (iii)

Without marking the firearms at the time of manufacture,

in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol; Licensing or authorization of the manufacture of parts and components shall be in accordance with domestic law; (e)

“Illicit

trafficking”

shall

mean

the

import,

export,

acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the terms of this Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol; ANNEX - VIII

Page 6

(f)

ANNEX - VIII

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Tracingâ&#x20AC;? shall mean the systematic tracking of firearms

and, where possible, their parts and components and ammunition from manufacturer to purchaser for the purpose of assisting the competent authorities of States Parties in detecting, investigating and analysing illicit manufacturing and illicit trafficking.

Article 4 Scope of application

1.

This Protocol shall apply, except as otherwise stated

herein, to the prevention of illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition and to the investigation and prosecution of offences established in accordance with article 5 of this Protocol where those offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group.

2.

This Protocol shall not apply to state-to-state transactions

or to state transfers in cases where the application of the Protocol would prejudice the right of a State Party to take action in the interest of national security consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 5 Criminalization

1.

Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other

measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences the following conduct, when committed intentionally: ANNEX - VIII

Page 7

(a)

Illicit

ANNEX - VIII

manufacturing

of

firearms,

their

parts

and

components and ammunition; (b)

Illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components

and ammunition; (c)

Falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing or altering the

marking(s) on firearms required by article 8 of this Protocol.

2.

Each State Party shall also adopt such legislative and

other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences the following conduct: (a)

Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system,

attempting to commit or participating as an accomplice in an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article; and (b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of an offence established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 6 Confiscation, seizure and disposal

1.

Without prejudice to article 12 of the Convention, States

Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their domestic legal systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition that have been illicitly manufactured or trafficked.

2.

States Parties shall adopt, within their domestic legal

systems, such measures as may be necessary to prevent illicitly ANNEX - VIII

Page 8

ANNEX - VIII

manufactured and trafficked firearms, parts and components and ammunition from falling into the hands of unauthorized persons by seizing and destroying such firearms, their parts and components and ammunition unless other disposal has been officially authorized, provided that the firearms have been marked and the methods of disposal of those firearms and ammunition have been recorded.

II. Prevention Article 7 Record-keeping Each State Party shall ensure the maintenance, for not less than ten years, of information in relation to firearms and, where appropriate and feasible, their parts and components and ammunition that is necessary to trace and identify those firearms and, where appropriate and feasible, their parts and components and ammunition which are illicitly manufactured or trafficked and to prevent and detect such activities. Such information shall include: (a)

The appropriate markings required by article 8 of this

Protocol; (b)

In cases involving international transactions in firearms,

their parts and components and ammunition, the issuance and expiration dates of the appropriate licences or authorizations, the country of export, the country of import, the transit countries, where appropriate, and the final recipient and the description and quantity of the articles.

Article 8 ANNEX - VIII

Page 9

ANNEX - VIII

Marking of firearms 1.

For the purpose of identifying and tracing each firearm,

States Parties shall: (a)

At the time of manufacture of each firearm, either require

unique marking providing the name of the manufacturer, the country or place of manufacture and the serial number, or maintain any alternative unique user-friendly marking with simple geometric symbols in combination with a numeric and/or alphanumeric code, permitting ready identification by all States of the country of manufacture; (b)

Require appropriate simple marking on each imported

firearm, permitting identification of the country of import and, where possible, the year of import and enabling the competent authorities of that country to trace the firearm, and a unique marking, if the firearm does not bear such a marking. The requirements of this subparagraph need not be applied to temporary imports of firearms for verifiable lawful purposes; (c)

Ensure, at the time of transfer of a firearm from

government stocks to permanent civilian use, the appropriate unique marking permitting identification by all States Parties of the transferring country.

2.

States

Parties

shall

encourage

the

firearms

manufacturing industry to develop measures against the removal or alteration of markings.

ANNEX - VIII

Page 10

ANNEX - VIII Article 9

Deactivation of firearms A State Party that does not recognize a deactivated firearm as a firearm in accordance with its domestic law shall take the necessary measures, including the establishment of specific offences if appropriate, to prevent the illicit reactivation of deactivated firearms, consistent with the following general principles of deactivation: (a) rendered

All essential parts of a deactivated firearm are to be permanently inoperable and

incapable of

removal,

replacement or modification in a manner that would permit the firearm to be reactivated in any way; (b)

Arrangements are to be made for deactivation measures

to be verified, where appropriate, by a competent authority to ensure that the modifications made to a firearm render it permanently inoperable; (c)

Verification by a competent authority is to include a

certificate or record attesting to the deactivation of the firearm or a clearly visible mark to that effect stamped on the firearm.

Article 10 General requirements for export, import and transit licensing or authorization systems 1.

Each State Party shall establish or maintain an effective

system of export and import licensing or authorization, as well as of measures on international transit, for the transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

ANNEX - VIII

Page 11

2.

ANNEX - VIII

Before issuing export licenses or authorizations for

shipments of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, each State Party shall verify: (a)

That the importing States have issued import licenses or

authorizations; and (b)

That,

without

prejudice

to

bilateral

or

multilateral

agreements or arrangements favouring landlocked States, the transit States have, at a minimum, given notice in writing, prior to shipment, that they have no objection to the transit.

3.

The export and import license or authorization and

accompanying documentation together shall contain information that, at a minimum, shall include the place and the date of issuance, the date of expiration, the country of export, the country of import, the final recipient, a description and the quantity of the firearms, their parts and components and ammunition and, whenever there is transit, the countries of transit. The information contained in the import license must be provided in advance to the transit States.

4.

The importing State Party shall, upon request, inform the

exporting State Party of the receipt of the dispatched shipment of firearms, their parts and components or ammunition.

5.

Each State Party shall, within available means, take such

measures as may be necessary to ensure that licensing or authorization procedures are secure and that the authenticity of licensing or authorization documents can be verified or validated.

6.

States Parties may adopt simplified procedures for the

temporary import and export and the transit of firearms, their parts ANNEX - VIII

Page 12

ANNEX - VIII

and components and ammunition for verifiable lawful purposes such as hunting, sport shooting, evaluation, exhibitions or repairs.

Article 11 Security and preventive measures In an effort to detect, prevent and eliminate the theft, loss or diversion of, as well as the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in, firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, each State Party shall take appropriate measures: (a)

To require the security of firearms, their parts and

components and ammunition at the time of manufacture, import, export and transit through its territory; and (b)

To increase the effectiveness of import, export and transit

controls, including, where appropriate, border controls, and of police and customs transborder cooperation.

Article 12 Information 1.

Without prejudice to articles 27 and 28 of the Convention,

States Parties shall exchange among themselves, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, relevant case-specific information on matters such as authorized producers, dealers, importers, exporters and, whenever possible, carriers of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

2.

Without prejudice to articles 27 and 28 of the Convention,

States Parties shall exchange among themselves, consistent with ANNEX - VIII

Page 13

ANNEX - VIII

their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, relevant information on matters such as: (a)

Organized criminal groups known to take part or

suspected of taking part in the illicit manufacturing of or trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; (b)

The

means

of

concealment

used

in

the

illicit

manufacturing of or trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition and ways of detecting them; (c)

Methods and means, points of dispatch and destination

and routes customarily used by organized criminal groups engaged in illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; and (d)

Legislative experiences and practices and measures to

prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

3.

States Parties shall provide to or share with each other,

as appropriate, relevant scientific and technological information useful to law enforcement authorities in order to enhance each otherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s abilities to prevent, detect and investigate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition and to prosecute the persons involved in those illicit activities.

4.

States Parties shall cooperate in the tracing of firearms,

their parts and components and ammunition that may have been illicitly manufactured or trafficked. Such cooperation shall include the provision of prompt responses to requests for assistance in tracing ANNEX - VIII

Page 14

ANNEX - VIII

such firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, within available means.

5.

Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system or any

international agreements, each State Party shall guarantee the confidentiality of and comply with any restrictions on the use of information that it receives from another State Party pursuant to this article, including proprietary information pertaining to commercial transactions, if requested to do so by the State Party providing the information. If such confidentiality cannot be maintained, the State Party that provided the information shall be notified prior to its disclosure.

Article 13 Cooperation 1.

States Parties shall cooperate at the bilateral, regional

and international levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.

2.

Without prejudice to article 18, paragraph 13, of the

Convention, each State Party shall identify a national body or a single point of contact to act as liaison between it and other States Parties on matters relating to this Protocol.

3.

States Parties shall seek the support and cooperation of

manufacturers,

dealers,

importers,

exporters,

brokers

and

commercial carriers of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition to prevent and detect the illicit activities referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

ANNEX - VIII

Page 15

ANNEX - VIII Article 14 Training and technical assistance States Parties shall cooperate with each other and with relevant international organizations, as appropriate, so that States Parties may receive, upon request, the training and technical assistance necessary to enhance their ability to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, including technical, financial and material assistance in those matters identified in articles 29 and 30 of the Convention.

Article 15 Brokers and brokering 1.

With

a

view

to

preventing

and

combating

illicit

manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, States Parties that have not yet done so shall consider establishing a system for regulating the activities of those who engage in brokering. Such a system could include one or more measures such as: (a)

Requiring registration of brokers operating within their

territory; (b)

Requiring licensing or authorization of brokering; or

(c)

Requiring disclosure on import and export licences or

authorizations, or accompanying documents, of the names and locations of brokers involved in the transaction.

ANNEX - VIII

Page 16

2.

ANNEX - VIII

States Parties that have established a system of

authorization regarding brokering as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article are encouraged to include information on brokers and brokering in their exchanges of information under article 12 of this Protocol and to retain records regarding brokers and brokering in accordance with article 7 of this Protocol.

III.

Final provisions

Article 16 Settlement of disputes l.

States

Parties

shall

endeavour

to

settle

disputes

concerning the interpretation or application of this Protocol through negotiation.

2.

Any dispute between two or more States Parties

concerning the interpretation or application of this Protocol that cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of those States Parties, be submitted to arbitration. If, six months after the date of the request for arbitration, those States Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those States Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in accordance with the Statute of the Court.

3.

Each State Party may, at the time of signature,

ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Protocol, declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of this ANNEX - VIII

Page 17

ANNEX - VIII

article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 2 of this article with respect to any State Party that has made such a reservation.

4.

Any State Party that has made a reservation in

accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 17 Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession 1.

This Protocol shall be open to all States for signature at

United Nations Headquarters in New York from the thirtieth day after its adoption by the General Assembly until 12 December 2002.

2.

This Protocol shall also be open for signature by regional

economic integration organizations provided that at least one member State of such organization has signed this Protocol in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

3.

This Protocol is subject to ratification, acceptance or

approval. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. A regional economic integration organization may deposit its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval if at least one of its member States has done likewise. In that instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, such organization shall declare the extent of its competence with respect to the matters governed by this Protocol.

Such organization shall also inform the depositary of any relevant modification in the extent of its competence.

ANNEX - VIII

Page 18

4.

ANNEX - VIII

This Protocol is open for accession by any State or any

regional economic integration organization of which at least one member State is a Party to this Protocol. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

At the time of its accession, a regional economic integration organization shall declare the extent of its competence with respect to matters governed by this Protocol. Such organization shall also inform the depositary of any relevant modification in the extent of its competence.

Article 18 Entry into force 1.

This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day

after the date of deposit of the fortieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, except that it shall not enter into force before the entry into force of the Convention. For the purpose of this paragraph, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by member States of such organization.

2.

For

each

State

or

regional

economic

integration

organization ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Protocol after the deposit of the fortieth instrument of such action, this Protocol shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit by such State or organization of the relevant instrument or on the date this Protocol enters into force pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article, whichever is the later.

ANNEX - VIII

Page 19

ANNEX - VIII

Article 19 Amendment 1.

After the expiry of five years from the entry into force of

this Protocol, a State Party to the Protocol may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to the States Parties and to the Conference of the Parties to the Convention for the purpose of considering and deciding on the proposal. The States Parties to this Protocol meeting at the Conference of the Parties shall make every effort to achieve consensus on each amendment. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted and no agreement has been reached, the amendment shall, as a last resort, require for its adoption a two-thirds majority vote of the States Parties to this Protocol present and voting at the meeting of the Conference of the Parties.

2.

Regional economic integration organizations, in matters

within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote under this article with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to this Protocol. Such organizations shall not exercise their right to vote if their member States exercise theirs and vice versa.

3.

An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1

of this article is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States Parties.

ANNEX - VIII

Page 20

4.

ANNEX - VIII

An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1

of this article shall enter into force in respect of a State Party ninety days after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of such amendment.

5.

When an amendment enters into force, it shall be binding

on those States Parties which have expressed their consent to be bound by it. Other States Parties shall still be bound by the provisions of this Protocol and any earlier amendments that they have ratified, accepted or approved.

Article 20 Denunciation 1.

A State Party may denounce this Protocol by written

notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such denunciation shall become effective one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.

2.

A regional economic integration organization shall cease

to be a Party to this Protocol when all of its member States have denounced it.

Article 21 Depositary and languages 1.

The

Secretary-General

of

the

United

Nations

is

designated depositary of this Protocol.

ANNEX - VIII

Page 21

2.

ANNEX - VIII

The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese,

English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Protocol.

ANNEX - VIII

Page 22

ANNEX - IX ANNEX - IX

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Document A/CONF.192/15)

I.

Preamble

1.

We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference

on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, having met in New York from 9 to 20 July 2001,

2.

Gravely concerned about the illicit manufacture, transfer and

circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world, which have a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and pose a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development at the individual, local, national, regional and international levels,

3.

Concerned

also

by

the

implications

that

poverty

and

underdevelopment may have for the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

4.

Determined to reduce the human suffering caused by the illicit

trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to ANNEX - IX

Page 23

ANNEX - IX

enhance the respect for life and the dignity of the human person through the promotion of a culture of peace,

5.

Recognizing that the illicit trade in small arms and light

weapons in all its aspects sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, undermines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism,

6.

Gravely concerned about its devastating consequences on

children, many of whom are victims of armed conflict or are forced to become child soldiers, as well as the negative impact on women and the elderly, and in this context, taking into account the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on children,

7.

Concerned also about the close link between terrorism,

organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and stressing the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this trade simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective,

8.

Reaffirming our respect for and commitment to international law

and the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity, the peaceful resolution of international disputes, nonintervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, ANNEX - IX

Page 24

ANNEX - IX 9.

Reaffirming the inherent right to individual or collective self-

defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

10.

Reaffirming also the right of each State to manufacture, import

and retain small arms and light weapons for its self-defence and security needs, as well as for its capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

11.

Reaffirming the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking

into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognizing the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of selfdetermination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

12.

Recalling the obligations of States to fully comply with arms

embargoes decided by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

ANNEX - IX

Page 25

13.

ANNEX - IX

Believing that Governments bear the primary responsibility for

preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and, accordingly, should intensify their efforts to define the problems associated with such trade and find ways of resolving them,

14.

Stressing the urgent necessity for international cooperation and

assistance,

including

financial

and

technical

assistance,

as

appropriate, to support and facilitate efforts at the local, national, regional and global levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

15. Recognizing that the international community has a duty to deal with this issue, and acknowledging that the challenge posed by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects is multifaceted and involves, inter alia, security, conflict prevention and resolution, crime prevention, humanitarian, health and development dimensions,

16. Recognizing also the important contribution of civil society, including non-governmental organizations and industry in, inter alia, assisting Governments to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

17.

Recognizing further that these efforts are without prejudice to

the priorities accorded to nuclear disarmament, weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament, ANNEX - IX

Page 26

ANNEX - IX 18. Welcoming the efforts being undertaken at the global, regional, sub-regional, national and local levels to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and desiring to build upon them, taking into account the characteristics, scope and magnitude of the problem in each State or region,

19.

Recalling the Millennium Declaration and also welcoming

ongoing initiatives in the context of the United Nations to address the problem of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

20.

Recognizing that the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of

and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational

Organized

Crime,

establishes

standards

and

procedures that complement and reinforce efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

21.

Convinced of the need for a global commitment to a

comprehensive approach to promote, at the global, regional, subregional, national and local levels, the prevention, reduction and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace and security,

ANNEX - IX

Page 27

22.

ANNEX - IX

Resolve therefore to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit

trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects by: (a)

Strengthening or developing agreed norms and measures

at the global, regional and national levels that would reinforce and further coordinate efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; (b)

Developing

and

implementing

agreed

international

measures to prevent combat and eradicate illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons; (c)

Placing particular emphasis on the regions of the world

where conflicts come to an end and where serious problems with the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently; (d)

Mobilizing the political will throughout the international

community to prevent and combat illicit transfers and manufacturing of small arms and light weapons in all their aspects, to cooperate towards these ends and to raise awareness of the character and seriousness of the interrelated problems associated with the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in these weapons; (e)

Promoting responsible action by States with a view to

preventing the illicit export, import, transit and retransfer of small arms and light weapons.

ANNEX - IX

Page 28

II.

ANNEX - IX

Preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in

small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

1.

We, the States participating in this Conference, bearing in mind

the different situations, capacities and priorities of States and regions, undertake the following measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects:

At the national level

2.

To put in place, where they do not exist, adequate laws,

regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such weapons, in order to prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, or their diversion to unauthorized recipients.

3.

To adopt and implement, in the States that have not already

done so, the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offences under their domestic law the illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction, in order to ensure that those engaged in such activities can be prosecuted under appropriate national penal codes.

ANNEX - IX

Page 29

4.

ANNEX - IX

To establish, or designate as appropriate, national coordination

agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. This should include aspects of the illicit manufacture, control, trafficking, circulation, brokering and trade, as well as tracing, finance, collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons.

5.

To establish or designate, as appropriate, a national point of

contact to act as liaison between States on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.

6.

To identify, where applicable, groups and individuals engaged

in the illegal manufacture, trade, stockpiling, transfer, possession, as well as financing for acquisition, of illicit small arms and light weapons, and take action under appropriate national law against such groups and individuals.

7.

To ensure that henceforth licensed manufacturers apply an

appropriate and reliable marking on each small arm and light weapon as an integral part of the production process. This marking should be unique and should identify the country of manufacture and also provide information that enables the national authorities of that country to identify the manufacturer and serial number so that the authorities concerned can identify and trace each weapon.

ANNEX - IX

Page 30

8.

ANNEX - IX

To adopt where they do not exist and enforce, all the necessary

measures to prevent the manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and possession of any unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.

9.

To ensure that comprehensive and accurate records are kept

for as long as possible on the manufacture, holding and transfer of small arms and light weapons under their jurisdiction. These records should be organized and maintained in such a way as to ensure that accurate information can be promptly retrieved and collated by competent national authorities.

10.

To ensure responsibility for all small arms and light weapons

held and issued by the State and effective measures for tracing such weapons.

11.

To assess applications for export authorizations according to

strict national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade.

Likewise, to establish or maintain an effective national system of export and import licensing or authorization, as well as measures on international transit, for the transfer of all small arms and light weapons, with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

ANNEX - IX

Page 31

12.

ANNEX - IX

To put in place and implement adequate laws, regulations and

administrative procedures to ensure the effective control over the export and transit of small arms and light weapons, including the use of authenticated end-user certificates and effective legal and enforcement measures.

13.

To make every effort, in accordance with national laws and

practices, without prejudice to the right of States to re-export small arms and light weapons that they have previously imported, to notify the original exporting State in accordance with their bilateral agreements before the retransfer of those weapons.

14.

To develop adequate national legislation or administrative

procedures regulating the activities of those who engage in small arms and light weapons brokering. This legislation or procedures should include measures such as registration of brokers, licensing or authorization of brokering transactions as well as the appropriate penalties for all illicit brokering activities performed within the State's jurisdiction and control.

15.

To

take

appropriate

measures,

including

all

legal

or

administrative means, against any activity that violates a United Nations Security Council arms embargo in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

16.

To ensure that all confiscated, seized or collected small arms

and light weapons are destroyed, subject to any legal constraints ANNEX - IX

Page 32

ANNEX - IX

associated with the preparation of criminal prosecutions, unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorized and provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered.

17. To ensure, subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, that the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold small arms and light weapons establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons. These standards and procedures should, inter alia, relate to: appropriate locations for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security, accounting and control of small arms and light weapons held or transported by operational units or authorized personnel; and procedures and sanctions in the event of thefts or loss.

18.

To regularly review, as appropriate, subject to the respective

constitutional and legal systems of States, the stocks of small arms and light weapons held by armed forces, police and other authorized bodies and to ensure that such stocks declared by competent national authorities to be surplus to requirements are clearly identified, that programmes for the responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of such stocks are established and implemented and that such stocks are adequately safeguarded until disposal.

19.

To destroy surplus small arms and light weapons designated

for destruction, taking into account, inter alia, the report of the ANNEX - IX

Page 33

ANNEX - IX

Secretary-General of the United Nations on methods of destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives (S/2000/1092) of 15 November 2000.

20.

To develop and implement, including in conflict and post-

conflict

situations,

public

awareness

and

confidence-building

programmes on the problems and consequences of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, including, where appropriate, the public destruction of surplus weapons and the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons, if possible, in cooperation with civil society and non-governmental organizations, with a view to eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

21.

To

develop

disarmament,

and

implement,

demobilization

and

where

possible,

reintegration

effective

programmes,

including the effective collection, control, storage and destruction of small arms and light weapons, particularly in post-conflict situations, unless another form of disposition or use has been duly authorized and such weapons have been marked and the alternate form of disposition or use has been recorded, and to include, where applicable, specific provisions for these programmes in peace agreements.

22.

To address the special needs of children affected by armed

conflict, in particular the reunification with their family, their reintegration into civil society, and their appropriate rehabilitation.

ANNEX - IX

Page 34

ANNEX - IX 23.

To make public national laws, regulations and procedures that

impact on the prevention, combating and eradicating of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to submit, on a voluntary basis, to relevant regional and international organizations and in accordance with their national practices, information on, inter alia, (a) small arms and light weapons confiscated or destroyed within their jurisdiction; and (b) other relevant information such as illicit trade routes and techniques of acquisition that can contribute to the eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

At the regional level

24.

To establish or designate, as appropriate, a point of contact

within sub-regional and regional organizations to act as liaison on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.

25.

To encourage negotiations, where appropriate, with the aim of

concluding relevant legally binding instruments aimed at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and where they do exist to ratify and fully implement them.

26.

To encourage the strengthening and establishing, where

appropriate and as agreed by the States concerned, of moratoria or similar initiatives in affected regions or sub-regions on the transfer ANNEX - IX

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ANNEX - IX

and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, and/or regional action programmes to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and to respect such moratoria,

similar

initiatives,

and/or

action

programmes

and

cooperate with the States concerned in the implementation thereof, including through technical assistance and other measures.

27.

To establish, where appropriate, sub-regional or regional

mechanisms, in particular transborder customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law enforcement, border and customs control agencies, with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders.

28.

To encourage, where needed, regional and sub-regional action

on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to, as appropriate, introduce, adhere, implement or strengthen relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures.

29.

To encourage States to promote safe, effective stockpile

management and security, in particular physical security measures, for small arms and light weapons, and to implement, where appropriate, regional and sub-regional mechanisms in this regard.

30.

To

support,

where

appropriate,

national

disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration programmes, particularly in postANNEX - IX

Page 36

ANNEX - IX

conflict situations, with special reference to the measures agreed upon in paragraphs 28 to 31 of this section.

31.

To encourage regions to develop, where appropriate and on a

voluntary basis, measures to enhance transparency with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

At the global level

32.

To cooperate with the United Nations system to ensure the

effective implementation of arms embargoes decided by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

33.

To request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within

existing resources, through the Department for Disarmament Affairs, to collate and circulate data and information provided by States on a voluntary basis and including national reports, on implementation by those States of the Programme of Action.

34. To encourage, particularly in post-conflict situations, the disarmament

and demobilization of

ex-combatants and their

subsequent reintegration into civilian life, including providing support for the effective disposition, as stipulated in paragraph 17 of this section, of collected small arms and light weapons.

ANNEX - IX

Page 37

35.

ANNEX - IX

To encourage the United Nations Security Council to consider,

on a case-by-case basis, the inclusion, where applicable, of relevant provisions for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping operations.

36.

To strengthen the ability of States to cooperate in identifying

and tracing in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons.

37.

To encourage States and the World Customs Organization, as

well as other relevant organizations, to enhance cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to identify those groups and individuals engaged in the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to allow national authorities to proceed against them in accordance with their national laws.

38.

To encourage States to consider ratifying or acceding to

international legal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime.

39.

To develop common understandings of the basic issues and

the scope of the problems related to illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the activities of those engaged in such brokering.

40.

To

encourage

the

relevant

international

and

regional

organizations and States to facilitate the appropriate cooperation of ANNEX - IX

Page 38

ANNEX - IX

civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in activities related to the prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, in view of the important role that civil society plays in this area.

41.

To promote dialogue and a culture of peace by encouraging, as

appropriate, education and public awareness programmes on the problems of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, involving all sectors of society.

III. Implementation, international cooperation and assistance

1.

We, the States participating in the Conference, recognize that

the primary responsibility for solving the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects falls on all States. We also recognize that States need close international cooperation to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit trade.

2.

States undertake to cooperate and to ensure coordination,

complementarity and synergy in efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects at the global, regional, sub-regional and national levels and to encourage the establishment and strengthening of cooperation and partnerships at all levels among international and intergovernmental organizations and civil society, including non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions.

ANNEX - IX

Page 39

3.

ANNEX - IX

States and appropriate international and regional organizations

in a position to do so should, upon request of the relevant authorities, seriously consider rendering assistance, including technical and financial assistance where needed, such as small arms funds, to support the implementation of the measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as contained in the Programme of Action.

4.

States and international and regional organizations should,

upon request by the affected States, consider assisting and promoting conflict prevention. Where requested by the parties concerned, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, States and international and regional organizations should consider promotion and assistance of the pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts, including by addressing their root causes.

5.

States and international and regional organizations should,

where appropriate, cooperate, develop and strengthen partnerships to share resources and information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

6.

With a view to facilitating implementation of the Programme of

Action, States and international and regional organizations should seriously consider assisting interested States, upon request, in building capacities in areas including the development of appropriate

ANNEX - IX

Page 40

ANNEX - IX

legislation and regulations, law enforcement, tracing and marking, stockpile management and security, destruction of small arms and light weapons and the collection and exchange of information.

7.

States should, as appropriate, enhance cooperation, the

exchange of experience and training among competent officials, including customs, police, intelligence and arms control officials, at the national, regional and global levels in order to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

8.

Regional and international programmes for specialist training

on small arms stockpile management and security should be developed. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should support these programmes. The United Nations, within existing resources, and other appropriate international or regional organizations should consider developing capacity for training in this area.

9.

States are encouraged to use and support, as appropriate,

including by providing relevant information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, Interpol's International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System database or any other relevant database that may be developed for this purpose.

10.

States are encouraged to consider international cooperation

and assistance to examine technologies that would improve the ANNEX - IX

Page 41

ANNEX - IX

tracing and detection of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as well as measures to facilitate the transfer of such technologies.

11.

States undertake to cooperate with each other, including on the

basis of the relevant existing global and regional legally binding instruments as well as other agreements and arrangements, and, where

appropriate,

with

relevant

international,

regional

and

intergovernmental organizations, in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons, in particular by strengthening mechanisms based on the exchange of relevant information.

12.

States are encouraged to exchange information on a voluntary

basis on their national marking systems on small arms and light weapons.

13.

States are encouraged, subject to their national practices, to

enhance, according to their respective constitutional and legal systems, mutual legal assistance and other forms of cooperation in order to assist investigations and prosecutions in relation to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

14.

Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional

organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance in the destruction or other responsible disposal of surplus stocks or unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.

ANNEX - IX

Page 42

15.

ANNEX - IX

Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional

organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism.

16.

Particularly in post-conflict situations, and where appropriate,

the relevant regional and international organizations should support, within existing resources, appropriate programmes related to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

17.

With regard to those situations, States should make, as

appropriate, greater efforts to address problems related to human and sustainable development, taking into account existing and future social and developmental activities, and should fully respect the rights of the States concerned to establish priorities in their development programmes.

18.

States,

regional

and

sub-regional

and

international

organizations, research centers, health and medical institutions, the United Nations system, international financial institutions and civil society are urged, as appropriate, to develop and support actionoriented research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

ANNEX - IX

Page 43

IV.

ANNEX - IX

Follow-up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit

Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

1.

We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference

on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, recommend to the General Assembly the following agreed steps to be undertaken for the effective follow-up of the Conference: (a)

To convene a conference no later than 2006 to review

progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action, the date and venue to be decided at the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly; (b)

To convene a meeting of States on a biennial basis to

consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action; (c)

To undertake a United Nations study, within existing

resources, for examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons; (d)

To consider further steps to enhance international

cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons.

2.

Finally, we, the States participating in the United Nations

Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: ANNEX - IX

Page 44

(a)

ANNEX - IX

Encourage the United Nations and other appropriate

international and regional organizations to undertake initiatives to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action; (b)

Also encourage all initiatives to mobilize resources and

expertise to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action

and

to

provide

assistance

to

States

in

their

implementation of the Programme of Action; (c)

Further encourage non-governmental organizations and

civil society to engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, sub-regional and national efforts to implement the present Programme of Action.

ANNEX - IX

Page 45

ANNEX - X ANNEX - X

Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa Economic Community of West African States Twenty-first ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government Abuja, 30-31 October, 1998

We, The Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);

Considering the principles and objectives embodied in the revised ECOWAS Treaty, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, and the United Nations Charter;

Considering the fact that the proliferation of light weapons constitutes a destabilising factor for ECOWAS Member States and a threat to the peace and security of our people;

Considering the resolutions of the United Nations Conference on conflict prevention, disarmament and development held in Bamako in November 1996;

Considering the directives of the fourth extraordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government which took place in LomĂŠ, on 17 December, 1997, relating to the establishment ANNEX - X

Page 46

ANNEX - X

of a sub-regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security; Considering the recommendations of the meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs and Security held in Yamoussoukro on 11 and 12 March 1998;

Considering the reaffirmation of the commitment made by the ECOWAS Member States at the Oslo Conference held on 1 and 2 April 1998, and the declared support of the international community for the proposal to place a moratorium on light weapons in West Africa ;

Considering the repeated encouragement of the United Nations for disarmament in West Africa as stipulated in the relevant resolutions of the 50th, 51st and 52nd Sessions of the General Assembly;

Considering the outcomes of the meetings of Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Security and of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Banjul on 23 and 24 July 1998, and in Abuja on 26 to 29 October 1998 respectively, endorsed by us in Abuja on 31 October 1998;

Considering the unqualified approval demonstrated by Member States of the Wassenaar Arrangement and other arms manufacturers for a Moratorium on Light Weapons in West Africa;

Hereby solemnly

declare

a

moratorium

on the importation,

exportation and manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS Member ANNEX - X

Page 47

ANNEX - X

States which shall take effect from the first day of November, 1998 for a renewable period of three (3) years.

Direct the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, in collaboration with the United Nations system to convene a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of experts to launch the operational framework for the associated measures of the moratorium under the Programme for Coordination

and

Assistance

for

Security

and

Development

(PCASED).

Seeking to ensure the success of the Moratorium;

Hereby Solicit the assistance of the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and the international community in implementing the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED).

Direct the Executive Secretary, in collaboration with PCASED, to convene a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to access and evaluate the moratorium at the end of the initial three-year period.

In faith whereof, we the heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States have signed this declaration.

Done at Abuja, this 31st day of October, 1998 in single original in the English and French languages both texts being equally authentic.

ANNEX - X

Page 48

Signatures

ANNEX - X

Mathieu KEREKOU President of the Republic of Benin

Ablasse OUEDRAOGO Minister of Foreign Affairs for and of behalf of the President of Faso

Carlos Alberto Wahanon de Carvalho VEIGA Prime Minister of the Republic of Cabo Verde

Henri Konan BEDIE President of the Republic of C么te d'Ivoire

(Rtd) Flt.-Lt Jerry John Rawlings President of the Republic of the Ghana

Col. Yahia A.J.J. JAMMEH President of the Republic of Guinea

General Lansana CONTE President of the Republic of Guinea

Joao Bernardo VIEIRA President of the Republic of Guinea- Bissau

ANNEX - X

Page 49

ANNEX - X

Charles TAYLOR

President of the Republic of Liberia

Alpha Oumar KONARE President of the Republic of Mali

Mohamed A. Ould MOÏNE Ambassador, for and on behalf of the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

Ibrahim Maïnassara BARE President of the Republic of Niger

General Abdulsalami ABUBAKAR Head of State, Commander-in-chierf of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

Abou DIOUF President of the Republic of Senegal

Alhaji Ahmad Tejan KABBAH President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Gnassingbe EYADEMA President ANNEX - X

of

the

Togolese

Republic.

Page 50

ANNEX - XI

ANNEX - XI

The Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development

The uncontrolled accumulation and proliferation of small arms are a major threat to sub-regional security. Apart from causing destruction of lives and facilitating human rights violations, the phenomenon undermines development efforts. The diffusion of light weapons also fuels conflicts in Africa engendering increased criminality and banditry, and the emergence of the child solider.

To curb small arms proliferation, the Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) declared on 1 November

1998

a

moratorium

on

the

import,

export

and

manufacturing of light weapons in their region. The moratorium covers an initial period of three years which may be extended. The Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) has been put in place as a support to the moratorium.

Objectives and Priority Areas of PCASED PCASED has been conceived as a programme which aims to build peace in support of activities that will promote a secure and stable climate for socio-economic development.

In the execution of its activities, PCASED will seek the active collaboration of inter-governmental organisations, and civil society organisations, in particular womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s organisations.

In the exercise of its functions, PCASED will benefit from the guidance and technical support of an advisory group consisting of ANNEX - XI

Page 1

ANNEX - XI

recognised regional and other international experts serving in their personal capacity.

Over an initial five-year period, PCASED will support a series of activities in priority areas such as: Priority Areas  Establishing a culture of peace  Training programmes for military, security and police forces  Enhancing weapons controls at border posts  Establishment of database and regional arms register  Collection and destruction of surplus and unauthorised weapons  Facilitating dialogue with producer/suppliers  Review

and

harmonisation

of

national

legislation

and

administrative procedures  Mobilising resources for PCASED objectives and activities  Enlarging membership of the Moratorium I. Establishing a Culture of Peace If sustainable peace is to be achieved in the subregion, appropriate programmes must be put in place to counter the growing culture of violence – which is buttressed by the proliferation of light weapons. In this connection, Member States, the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, PCASED, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, with assistance from their multilateral and bilateral partners, will endeavour to:

ANNEX - XI

Page 2

ANNEX - XI

 forge a peace culture in the region through community education programmes and advocacy campaigns whereby local constituencies would acquire knowledge about, and develop the requisite norms against, the possession and accumulation of this class of weapons;  assist in developing appropriate peace education material for pertinent segments of society such as students, law and order forces, and ordinary citizenry so that a critical mass of public awareness can be developed on the direct and indirect consequences of the accumulation, proliferation and use of small arms;  assist in capacity building for peace through seminars and workshops focusing on the issues of light weapons and sustainable development so as to enhance policy making and public awareness of the challenges involved;  develop youth initiatives on the problems of small arms and the potential hazards of the child soldier;  conduct seminars on civil–military relations that would focus on the military’s role in an emerging democratic political culture.

It will be necessary to develop formal and informal education programmes in respect of these activities. The formal approach will include devising and teaching appropriate peace education curricula in secondary and higher education institutions, and organizing workshops, roundtable discussions and training programmes for students, policy makers and the citizenry. The non-formal approaches ANNEX - XI

Page 3

ANNEX - XI

include sensitisation campaigns using the media and electronic means, sponsoring intra-Community relations.

To successfully carry out these activities, Member States, the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, PCASED, and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa will seek the active collaboration of inter-governmental organisations, UNESCO, civil society organisations, and women’s organisations.

The programme should be commenced as soon as possible, given the length of time it will take for a true culture of peace to gain a foothold.

II. Training Programmes for Military, Security and Police Forces

Effective light weapons control requires strengthening the present structure and improving the capacity of the military, security and police forces through training and improved access to modern arms control methods. PCASED, in partnership with the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and with assistance from the relevant partners will assist in:  training military, security and police forces in modern techniques of effective control of arms and ammunition as well as enforcement of pertinent laws;  developing joint training programmes for military, security and police forces as well as border guards;  training national trainers on the small arms proliferation question.

ANNEX - XI

Page 4

ANNEX - XI

To this end, the Executive Secretariat, PCASED and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa will develop a curriculum that will include:  general information on the diffusion problem including legal and human rights issues; and  modern techniques of maintenance of law and order; methods of collecting small arms, dealing with drug trafficking and crossborder crimes, effective ways of maintaining national weapons

arsenals;

demobilisation,

disarmament

and

reintegration of combatants into civil society, etc.  seek financial and technical assistance from partners.

Training the military, security and police forces should be a continuous activity and should commence within the shortest possible time.

III. Enhancing Weapons Controls at Border Posts

Light weapons are easy to conceal and this fact, coupled with the prevalence of porous borders and inadequate government control, works to frustrate arms control efforts.

PCASED shall, in collaboration with the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, and with the support of bilateral and multilateral partners, assist Member States in:  controlling frontiers so that the diffusion problem, particularly illicit flows (smuggling), might be stemmed; ANNEX - XI

Page 5

ANNEX - XI

 enhancing and/or developing an effective capacity to ‘police’ arms transfers and flows; and  developing a system for detecting and apprehending illicit transborder flows;  putting in place an effective legal and regulatory regime at identifiable points of entry or exit for light weapons;  conducting relevant studies on borders and related political and security issues (in particular, light weapons) in the region to understand the nature and gravity of the diffusion problem, and weapons flow routes so that relevant policy prescriptions may be formulated;  organising training sessions for border/customs officials on such issues as: monitoring end-user certificates, complying with arms embargo and sharing information; and the use of various border control technology;  seeking donor country assistance in providing up to date technology to assist border control efforts.

PCASED will seek assistance from inter-governmental and nongovernmental organisations with proven expertise in this domain,

and

which

have

traditionally

cooperated

in

the

identification of groups and individuals engaged in illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunition. Activities which target improved arms controls at borders will commence as soon as possible and will continue for the entire length of the project.

ANNEX - XI

Page 6

ANNEX - XI

IV. Establishing a Regional Light Weapons Database and Arms Register

The diffusion problem is also accentuated by the ineffective registration and licensing systems and by the absence of national filing systems.

To remedy these inadequacies, PCASED and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, in collaboration with the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, will assist Member States:  in

strengthening

and/or

establishing

national

filing

systems/registries on weapons flows so as to contribute to a timely identification and prevention of excessive and destabilising accumulations, as well as facilitate research and policy development;  creating a Light Weapons Information Management (LWIM) system; that is, a database reflecting compilation of national filing systems that would not only facilitate research on the issue but also promote transparency and safeguard weapons from loss especially through theft or corruption, in particular at weapons storage facilities; and  improving record-keeping and intelligence-gathering as well as creating a transparency regime in light weapons procurement that would facilitate information exchange and promote confidence building while respecting the rights and obligations of Member States of a regional cooperative security system.

ANNEX - XI

Page 7

ANNEX - XI

PCASED will, at the national level:

 assist national governments in setting up and/or enhancing their national filing systems especially for captured illegal weapons that would have been taken out of circulation, and ultimately destroyed;  assist governments to better organise national holdings and storage facilities;  facilitate access by civil society and national commissions to information on the movement of light weapons;  compile information on small arms proliferation issues and on potential policies and solutions for combating this scourge;  organise in collaboration with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, a workshop to define the operational modalities for a database and arms register.

The

cooperation

of

relevant

inter-governmental

and

non-

governmental organisations will be sought. Activities relating to the establishment of a database and a regional light weapons register will begin immediately and will continue even after the life span of PCASED.

V. Collection and Destruction of Surplus and Unauthorised Weapons

For there to be enduring peace and security in the subregion, all surplus weapons must be retrieved and destroyed. Such surpluses ANNEX - XI

Page 8

ANNEX - XI

are generally made up of the excess from national armouries, and arms collected from peacekeeping missions or as a result of peace accords. They are thus not needed for national security or law and order. Consequently, PCASED and ECOWAS efforts in this area will consist in support action to Member States:  in establishing a more secure environment which would facilitate post-conflict reconstruction by mopping up excess weapons in Member States through comprehensive Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes (VWCP)  to ensure reduction of flows by encouraging destruction of surplus weapons. PCASED will assist Member States in:  designing and implementing VWCP such as amnesties and in kind incentives;  developing and implementing sensitisation and persuasion programmes in the local media (radio, TV, press);  developing and encouraging inexpensive methods of weapons destruction;  working with peacekeeping operators to design effective strategies for the control of arms during the peace process following an intra or interstate conflict;  engaging civil society in arms collection efforts.

Activities to collect and destroy surplus and unauthorised light weapons shall commence immediately and should yield significant results during the initial three years of the moratorium.

ANNEX - XI

Page 9

ANNEX - XI

VI. Facilitating Dialogue with Producers and Suppliers (Wassenaar Arrangement and Others)

Close collaboration from arms producers and suppliers is a major determinant of success in the effort to control light weapons diffusion.

To ensure that ECOWAS producers respect the provisions of the moratorium, PCASED and the Executive Secretariat will seek to:  sensitise producers and suppliers of light weapons and ammunition, and evolve with them common export control strategies; in particular by encouraging them to check the activities of brokering agents so that the latter would provide relevant and critical information pertaining to financial and transportation arrangements in weapons transactions;  jointly develop codes of conduct that ensure transparency in the arms trade and the flows of weapons;  encourage producers and suppliers to establish a database on weapons transfers, and to mark light weapons at the time of manufacture for ease of tracing. These are attainable goals if PCASED, the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, and civil society organisations:  encourage dialogue between producers/suppliers and between them and buyers;  liaise with the Wassenaar Arrangement and others who are engaged in discussions about promoting supplier restraints.

In addition, PCASED, the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, and civil society will endeavour to ensure the adoption by producer suppliers ANNEX - XI

Page 10

ANNEX - XI

of codes of conduct on the arms trade that will address international arms brokering end-use, monitoring and licensed production.

Thus, PCASED, the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and civil society organisations will: t continue the dialogue with Wassenaar Arrangement, and other arms suppliers; t join efforts with the European Union and other regional organizations to establish politically binding, common arms export controls. These activities should be embarked upon immediately and should continue throughout the duration of PCASED.

VII. Revising National Legislation and Administrative Procedures

The effective application of the Moratorium is contingent on the existence of an adequate system of national laws, regulations and administrative procedures that will permit effective control of the export, import and manufacture of light weapons.

Member States will, with assistance from PCASED, the Executive Secretariat and multilateral and bilateral partners: ď ś review,

update

and

harmonise

national

legislation

and

regulations on light weapons bearing on civilian possession, use and transfer; ď ś apply legal instruments, such as export and import permits and end-user certificates; ANNEX - XI

Page 11

ANNEX - XI

 harmonise different national legislation with a view to developing a regime convention on light weapons that would relate to the control and reduction as well as humanitarian law issues;  set up or strengthen National Commissions that would develop strategies and policies relating to small arms diffusion, and coordinate the concerned technical services. Member States shall transmit to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and PCASED the names and addresses of members of their national commissions thus established.

In order to attain the above objectives, PCASED shall:  initiate a comprehensive study of the legislative and regulatory instruments relative to light weapons in the subregion;  organise

in

conjunction

with

the

ECOWAS

Executive

Secretariat and bilateral and multilateral partners, workshops and training sessions on legislative drafting and harmonisation;  work with the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat on the adoption of a regional convention to regulate arms flows within ECOWAS.

Member States can draw inspiration from similar initiatives such as:  The Declaration of Principles in the context of firearms control and trans-national organised crime (ECOSOC).

ANNEX - XI

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ANNEX - XI

 The European Union Programme on Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms (1997).  The OAS ‘Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing

and

Trafficking

in

Firearms,

Ammunition,

Explosives, and other Related Material’ (1997).  The 1997 Ottawa ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction’.

Activities relative to the review and harmonisation of national laws and administrative procedures should commence without delay and should be a continuous process throughout the life span of the project.

VIII. Mobilising Resources for PCASED Objectives and Activities

For PCASED to succeed, it must be assured of adequate and constant financial, moral and political support.

Member States and their bilateral and multilateral partners, along with the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, PCASED and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa shall endeavour to mobilise the necessary resources to:  sustain the PCASED activities as presently defined; and  provide a foundation for sustaining this light weapons diffusion control initiative beyond the initial life span of PCASED.

ANNEX - XI

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ANNEX - XI

Continued resource mobilisation will be carried out through an active awareness and public relations campaign designed to publicise PCASEDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s achievements and needs.

Bilateral and multilateral assistance will be sought to enable work to begin on this important aspect without delay.

IX. Enlarging Membership of the Moratorium

The moratorium regime will enjoy even greater success with an enlarged membership of African states. Other African countries are, therefore, encouraged to adhere to the moratorium or to embark on similar initiatives The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa will support OAU and ECOWAS efforts by providing nonECOWAS African Member States with regular information on the evolution of the moratorium and involving them in its activities.

The Centre will initiate immediate action in this direction by establishing

cooperation

ties

with

other

African

sub-regional

organisations.

ANNEX - XI

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ANNEX - XII ANNEX - XII

THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MORATORIUM

(NB. This text was adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS in LomĂŠ (Togo) on 10 December 1999.)

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Reaffirming our Declaration of 31 October 1998 of a Moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons for a period of three years renewable, effective from 1 November 1998; Recalling AHG/DEC.137

(XXXV) on

the

proliferation,

illegal

circulation and traffic of light weapons adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Conference of Heads of State and Government held in Algiers, Algeria in July 1999; Aware of the compelling need to encourage and promote actions to support the effective application of the Moratorium; Convinced that observance of the Moratorium can best be achieved through

transparency

and

concerted

effort,

and

that

the

establishment of a Code of Conduct is required for this purpose; Have hereby agreed as follows: Article 1 Binding Nature of the Code of Conduct The ECOWAS Member States shall abide by this Code of Conduct so as to implement the Moratorium signed in Abuja, Nigeria on 31 October 1998.

Article 2 Scope of the Moratorium ANNEX - XII

Page 1

ANNEX - XII

The Moratorium shall apply to the import, export and manufacture of light weapons as defined in the Annex I to this Code of Conduct.

Article 3 Ammunition and Components Import, export and manufacture of components and ammunition for the light weapons defined in Annex I shall also be subject to strict control in accordance with the spirit of the Moratorium. References to weapons or arms in this Code of Conduct shall be deemed to include ammunition and components.

Institutional Arrangements Article 4 Member States In order to promote and ensure co-ordination of concrete measures for effective implementation of the Moratorium at national level, Member States shall establish National Commissions, made up of representatives of the relevant authorities and civil society. The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, in collaboration with the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance (PCASED), shall prepare guidelines to assist Member States in the establishment of their National Commissions.

Article 5 ECOWAS Executive Secretary 1. Structures, staff, and procedures shall be established within the ECOWAS Secretariat, in order to: a) Assist Member Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; implementation of the Moratorium b) Monitor compliance c) Report progress to the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government at regular intervals.

2. Such structures and procedures may include: (i) The initial establishment of four Zonal Observation Bureaux ANNEX - XII

Page 2

ANNEX - XII

(ii) Missions to Member States to ascertain that existing national arms production is brought to a halt, in conformity with the spirit of the Moratorium (iii) Obtaining external funding and technical assistance to support Moratorium-related activities.

Administrative Mechanisms Article 6 Information Exchange In order to increase transparency, Member States shall provide the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat an annual report on the ordering or procurement of weapons, components and ammunition covered by the Moratorium, both from national and international sources. The ECOWAS Secretariat with the assistance of PCASED shall develop an arms register as a confidence building measure, with intention of developing an electronic database of all legitimate stocks of weapons, ammunition and components covered by the Moratorium.

Member States shall provide all necessary information to the arms register and database. The Executive Secretary shall include all this information in his annual report to the Heads of State and Government.

Article 7 Harmonisation of Legislation and Administrative measures Member States shall harmonise and adopt the regulatory and administrative measures necessary for exercising control of cross border transactions with regard to light weapons, components and ammunition relating to them. They shall train the law and order, immigration, licensing, customs, water resources and forestry officials required to put such regulatory and administrative measures into ANNEX - XII

Page 3

ANNEX - XII

effect. The ECOWAS Secretariat will provide the necessary assistance that Member States may require for this purpose. The ECOWAS Secretariat shall, in this regard, request appropriate assistance of PCASED. Article 8 Peace Operations Weapons Register At the beginning of international peace operations within and without the ECOWAS zone, all dedicated light weapons and ammunition shall be declared to the ECOWAS Secretariat so as to enable their effective control as well as removal upon completion of the operation.

Article 9 Exemptions 1. Member States may seek an exemption from the Moratorium in order to meet legitimate national security needs or international peace operations requirements. Such requests for exemptions shall be forwarded to the Executive Secretariat which shall assess them against criteria developed with the technical assistance of PCASED. 2. The Executive Secretariat shall circulate the request to Member States. Provided there are no objections, the Executive Secretariat shall issue a certificate confirming Member Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; assent. The document shall accompany the export licence application, together with other documentation on end-use as required by arms-exporting states. Should a Member State object the request for exemption shall be referred to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council.

3. Exemptions may be granted to permit individual ownership of a single weapon in categories 1,2, and 3A of Annex 1 for hunting or sporting purposes. Applications for such exemptions shall be processed by National Commissions and recommended to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat for approval. The Executive ANNEX - XII

Page 4

ANNEX - XII

Secretariat, with the technical support of PCASED, shall develop and issue guidelines to National Commissions on the exemptions procedure.

Article 10 Visitor Certificates Member States shall introduce arrangements requiring visitors to apply in advance if they wish to bring arms covered by the Moratorium into any ECOWAS territory, and to declare such arms on entry. If entry is approved, the competent authorities shall issue visitors with an entry certificate on arrival, and an exit certificate on departure. A register shall be kept of all such certificates.

Operational Aspects Article 11 Intra- and Inter-state Co-operation The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and PCASED, in partnership with National Commissions, shall develop procedures for inter- state co-operation between customs, law and order, and all other relevant officials involved in monitoring and implementing the Moratorium; and shall submit them for approval by Member States. The Executive Secretariat shall also with, the assistance of PCASED and in collaboration with Member States, develop guidelines for intra-state co-operation between these officials. The Executive Secretariat shall facilitate and obtain assistance for the training of officials in intra- and inter-state co-operation.

Article 12 Enhancing Border Controls The Executive Secretariat, in conjunction with Member States and with the assistance of PCASED, will develop more effective border control mechanisms, including improved equipment, and training and co-operation of customs and other border officials.

ANNEX - XII

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ANNEX - XII

Article 13 Collection and Destruction of Surplus Weapons Member States shall, in collaboration with the Executive Secretariat, PCASED and other relevant international organisations, carry out a systematic collection, registration and destruction of all weapons, ammunition and components covered by the Moratorium that are surplus to national security requirements, were under illegal possession or collection in the context of peace accords or upon completion of international peace operations.

Promotion and Expansion Article 14 Public Relations and Outreach The Executive Secretariat shall, in collaboration with Member States and PCASED, develop and implement an Information Strategy in support of the Moratorium, incorporating and building on the activities already underway. The strategy will enhance understanding of and support for the Moratorium within the ECOWAS region, throughout Africa, and among international organisations and potential external funding partners.

Article 15 Resource Mobilisation The Executive Secretariat, in partnership with PCASED, shall develop and implement a Resource Mobilisation Strategy, in order to secure long-term financial support for the Moratorium, and to enhance transparency and good financial management of resources.

Article 16 Dialogue with Suppliers and Producers The Executive Secretariat and individual Member States shall engage in dialogue with national and international arms producers and suppliers as well as relevant international organisations, in order to ANNEX - XII

Page 6

ANNEX - XII

secure their support for and adherence to the spirit and the letter of the Moratorium. PCASED shall assist in this effort.

Article 17 Expansion of the Moratorium Participation in the Moratorium regime may be extended to other interested African States. The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat shall take all necessary measures to encourage other OAU Member States to adopt the Moratorium and shall work with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa to facilitate this.

In faith whereof we, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States, have signed this code of conduct in two originals in English and French both texts being equally authentic.

Done at Lomé, this 10th day of December, 1999 H.E. Mathieu KEREKOU President of the Republic of BENIN Hon. Alexandre Dias MONTEIRO Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy (for and on behalf of the President of CABO VERDE) H.E. Mrs. Isatou NJIE-SAIDY Vice-President, Secretary of State For Health, Labour, Social Welfare And Women’s Affairs (for and on behalf of the President of the Republic of THE GAMBIA) Hon. Zaïnoul Abidine SANOUSSI Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Presidents Office (for and on behalf of the President of the Republic of GUINEA) ANNEX - XII

Page 7

Hon. Enoch DOGOLEAH

ANNEX - XII

Vice-President (for and on behalf of the President of LIBERIA) Hon.Sidi Mohamed Ould BOUBACAR Minister, Secretary-General at the (for and on behalf of the President of the Islamic Republic of MAURITANIA) H.E. Olusegun OBASANJO President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of NIGERIA H.E. Alhaji Ahmed Tejan KABBAH President of the Republic of SIERRA LEONE H.E. Blaise COMPAORE President of Faso Chairman, Council of Ministers of BURKINA FASO H.E. Henri Konan BEDIE President of the Republic of COTE D’IVOIRE H.E. (Rtd) Flt.-Lt. Jerry John RAWLINGS President of the Republic of GHANA Hon. José Pereira BATISTA Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (for and on behalf of the President of the Republic of GUINEA-BISSAU) H.E. Alpha Oumar KONARE President of the Republic of MALI H.E. Squadron Leader Daouda Malam WANKE President of the Council for National Reconciliation, Head of State of the Republic of NIGER H.E. Abdou DIOUF ANNEX - XII

Page 8

ANNEX - XII

President of the Republic of SENEGAL H.E. Gnassingbe EYADEMA President of the TOGOLESE Republic

ANNEX - XII

Page 9

ANNEX - XIII ANNEX - XIII

ECOWAS CONVENTION ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, THEIR AMMUNITION AND OTHER RELATED MATERIALS

PREAMBLE

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);

Mindful of Articles 7, 8, and 9 of ECOWAS Revised Treaty relating to the creation, composition and function of the Conference of Heads of State and Government:

MINDFUL of Article 58 of the revised ECOWAS Treaty relating to Regional Security which stipulates that Member States undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region and to establish and strengthen appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of conflicts;

MINDFUL of Article 77 of the Treaty relating to sanctions applicable in cases where a Member State fails to fulfill its obligations to the Community;

ANNEX - XIII

Page 1

ANNEX - XIII

MINDFUL of the relevant provisions of the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice adopted on 16 July 1991, the ECOWAS conventions on mutual legal assistance and extradition, signed respectively in Dakar on 29 July 1992 and Abuja on 6 August 1994;

MINDFUL of the Protocol on Non-aggression signed in Lagos on 22 April 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters signed in Freetown on 29 May 1981, and more particularly our determination to provide mutual assistance in defence matters in the event of armed aggression or threat of aggression against a Member State;

RECALLING the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the principle that States shall have the right to defend themselves both individually and collectively, the principle of nonintervention and non-interference in internal affairs of another State, and the principle that each Member shall avoid recourse to the threat or use of force;

RECALLING also the relevant provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, including the decision by the Executive Council of the African Union requesting the African Union Commission to take necessary measures to establish a legal instrument to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in Africa;

ANNEX - XIII

Page 2

ANNEX - XIII

RECALLING equally the ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security signed in LomĂŠ on 10 December 1999, particularly Articles 3, 50 and 51 relating to the control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and illegal circulation of such arms;

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT resolutions of the United Nations Security Council imposing arms embargos on countries in the West African sub-region;

ALSO TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the Bamako Declaration of 1st December 2000 on the common African position on the proliferation, circulation and illicit trade in small arms and light weapons;

EQUALLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT other international, regional and sub-regional initiatives aimed at curtailing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the decision relating to the common African position on the review of the United Nations programme of action on small arms and light weapons adopted in Khartoum in January 2006;

CONSIDERING that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons constitutes a major destabilising factor in ECOWAS Member States and poses a serious threat to the peace and stability of our peoples;

DEEPLY CONCERNED about the uncontrolled flow of small arms and light weapons into Africa in general and West Africa in particular, ANNEX - XIII

Page 3

ANNEX - XIII

and aware of the need to effectively control the transfer of arms by suppliers and arms brokers; AWARE of the need to build peace and prevent conflicts in West Africa, and the disastrous consequences the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has on the prolongation of armed conflicts and illegal exploitation of natural resources;

AWARE OF THE NEED to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons, trafficking, detention and use of such arms, which have been seen to have negative effects on the security of each country in the sub-region, human security, international humanitarian law, sustainable development, and human rights;

DETERMINED to achieve the objectives outlined in the Declaration on the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in ECOWAS Member States signed in Abuja on 31 October 1998 and in the Code of Conduct for the implementation of the Moratorium adopted in LomĂŠ on 10 December 1999;

DETERMINED ALSO to consolidate the gains of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons and its Code of Conduct, and to take into account the shortcomings observed, with a view to taking corrective measures;

RECOGNISING in this regard the progress achieved in the implementation of the Moratorium, thanks to contributions by the Plan ANNEX - XIII

Page 4

ANNEX - XIII

of Action of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED); CONSCIOUS of the need to strengthen the institutional and operational capacity of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat in order to enable fight more effectively against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, with a view to obtaining the desired results;

CONSIDERING the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects adopted in 2001;

CONSIDERING the United Nations international instrument adopted in 2005 which seeks to enable States to identify and rapidly trace small arms and light weapons, and the UN Protocol on the manufacture and illicit trade in fire arms, spare parts, components and ammunition adopted in 2001;

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT Security Council Resolution 1325 (2002) on women, peace and security which recognises the specific role of women in peace building;

DEEPLY CONCERNED by the use of children in armed conflicts, and taking account of the United Nations Security Council resolutions on children and armed conflicts;

ANNEX - XIII

Page 5

RECOGNISING

the

ANNEX - XIII

important

contribution

of

civil

society

organisations in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; BEARING IN MIND the Final CommuniquĂŠ issued at the end of the Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held in Dakar on 30 January 2003 which directed the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat to examine the possibility of transforming the Moratorium into a Convention;

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS

CHAPTER I DEFINITIONS AND OBJECTIVES Article 1 DĂŠfinitions

For the purpose of this Convention:

1. LIGHT WEAPONS: Portable arms designed to be used by several persons working together in a team and which include notably: - heavy machine guns; - portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted; - portable anti-aircraft cannons; - portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil guns; - portable anti-tank missile launchers or rocket launchers; - portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; - mortars with a calibre of less than 100 millimetres; ANNEX - XIII

Page 6

ANNEX - XIII

2. SMALL ARMS: Arms used by one person and which include notably: - firearms and other destructive arms or devices such as an exploding bomb, an incendiary bomb or a gas bomb, a grenade, a rocket launcher, a missile, a missile system or landmine; - revolvers and pistols with automatic loading; - rifles and carbines; - machine guns; - assault rifles; - light machine guns.

3. AMMUNITION: Devices destined to be shot or projected through the means of firearms including among others: - cartridges; - projectiles and missiles for light weapons; - mobile containers with missiles or projectiles for anti-aircraft or antitank single action systems;

4. OTHER RELATED MATERIALS: All components, parts or spare parts for small arms or light weapons or ammunition necessary for its functioning; or any chemical substance serving as active material used as propelling or explosive agent;

5. ILLICIT: Covers all that is carried out in violation of this Convention;

ANNEX - XIII

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ANNEX - XIII

6. MARKING: Inscriptions permitting the identification of arms covered by this Convention;

7.

TRACING:

Indicates

the

systematic

monitoring

of

the

movements of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition and other related materials, from the manufacturer until the end user, with a view to helping member States competent authorities to detect illicit manufacture and trading;

8.

BROKERING: Work carried out as an intermediary between

any manufacturer, supplier or distributor of small arms and light weapons and any buyer or user; this includes the provision of financial support and the transportation of small arms and light weapons;

9.

TRANSFER: Includes import, export, transit, transshipment and

transport or any other movement whatsoever of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other related materials from or through the territory of a State;

10.

NON-STATE ACTORS: Such as any actor other than State

Actors, mercenaries, armed militias, armed rebel groups and private security companies.

11.

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

In this Convention this shall be deemed to include ammunition and other related materials.

ANNEX - XIII

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ANNEX - XIII

Article 2 Objectives

The objectives of this Convention are:

1.

To prevent and combat the excessive and destabilising

accumulation of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS;

2.

To continue the efforts for the control of small arms and light

weapons within ECOWAS;

3.

To consolidate the gains of the Declaration of the Moratorium

on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and its Code of Conduct.

4.

To promote trust between the Member States through

concerted and transparent action on the control of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS;

5.

To build institutional and operational capacities of the ECOWAS

Executive Secretariat and the Member States in the efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, their ammunitions and other related materials; ANNEX - XIII

Page 9

6.

ANNEX - XIII

To promote the exchange of information and cooperation

among the Member States.

CHAPTER II TRANSFER OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS Article 3 Prohibition of transfer of small arms and light weapons

1.

Member States shall ban the transfer of small arms and light

weapons and their manufacturing materials into their national territory or from/ through their national territory.

2.

Member State shall ban, without exception, transfers of small

arms and light weapons to Nonâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;State Actors that are not explicitly authorised by the importing Member.

3.

Small arms and light weapons as defined in this Convention

shall not be deemed to be goods for the purpose of Article 45 of ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 Article 4 Conditions of Exemption 1.

A Member State can request exemption from the provisions of

Article 3 (b) in order to meet legitimate national defence and security needs, or to participate in peace support or other operations in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations, African Union, ECOWAS, or other regional or sub-regional body of which it is a member.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 10

2.

ANNEX - XIII

For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this article, Member States

shall establish and maintain an effective system of export and import licensing or authorisation, as well as of measures on international transit, for the transfer of small arms and light weapons.

4.

Each Member State shall take such measures as may be

necessary to ensure that licensing or authorisation procedures are secure and that the authenticity of licensing or authorisation of the documents can be verified and validated.

Article 5 Procedures for Exemption

1.

The request for exemption for an arms transfer is transmitted

for examination to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and must contain information on:

a)

Details of the arms to be transferred- the quantity, exact

type and kind of arms using ECOWAS classification system, including all serial numbers and other marks;

b)

Details of the supplier â&#x20AC;&#x201C; full details (name of company and

representative, address, and full contact details) of all companies and individuals involved, including brokers where relevant;

ANNEX - XIII

Page 11

c)

ANNEX - XIII

Details of the supply process â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the number and period of

shipments, the routes including transit locations, the type of transport to be used, all companies involved in importing, freight forwarding and handling, details of the storage and management of the weapons whilst being transferred, the time period covered by the activity for which the exemption is requested;

d)

Details

of

the

final

end

user

â&#x20AC;&#x201C;

name

of

individual/company/institution and representative responsible, confirmation from relevant national authority that the end user is authorised to import weapons;

e)

2.

Details of the end use.

The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall apply the criteria for

Article 6 of this Convention for exemption requests as well as those of paragraph (a) of this Article. Reasoned opinion of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall be sent confidentially to the Member State in order to confirm or refuse the opinion given. The final decision of Member States shall be taken by consensus. In the absence of a consensus, the exemption request as well as the reasoned opinion of the Executive Secretary shall be submitted for a final decision to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council.

3.

The granting of an exemption shall be transmitted to the

Member State concerned by the ECOWAS Executive Secretary ANNEX - XIII

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ANNEX - XIII

through the issuing of an exemption certificate. The exemption certificate once issued must accompany the request for an export licence as well as the End-User-Certificate.

4.

The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall forward to the

Member States information on exemptions and refusals granted within 90 days. The Executive Secretary shall also compile and publish a comprehensive annual report detailing all international arms transfers granted exemptions, and a list of refusals.

Article 6 Cases for Refusal of Exemptions for Transfers

1.

A transfer shall not be authorised if: a)

Authorisation on export, import, transit, transshipment or

brokering considered as donation has not been provided by all States directly concerned with the transfer;

b)

All the required information has not been supplied to the

ECOWAS Executive Secretary;

c) The arms have not been marked according to requirements under this Convention.

2.

A transfer shall not be authorised if its authorisation violates

obligations of the requesting Sates as well as those of Member States, under international law including: ANNEX - XIII

Page 13

a)

ANNEX - XIII

Obligations under the Charter of the United Nations â&#x20AC;&#x201C;

including: i.

Binding resolutions of the United Nations Security

Council such as those imposing arms embargoes; ii.

The prohibition on the use or threat of use of force;

iii.

The prohibition on intervention in the internal affairs

of another State.

b)

Universally

accepted

principles

of

international

humanitarian law.

c)

Any other treaty or decision by which the Member States

are bound, including:

i.

binding decisions, including embargoes, adopted by

relevant international, multilateral, regional and subregional bodies, such as the African Union Peace and Security Council, to which a State is party;

ii)

Prohibitions of arms transfers that arise in particular

treaties which a State is party to, such as OTTAWA Convention on Antipersonnel Mines, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols.

3.

A transfer shall not be authorised if the arms are destined to be

used: ANNEX - XIII

Page 14

a)

ANNEX - XIII

for the violation of international humanitarian law or

infringement of human and peoplesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; rights and freedoms, or for the purpose of oppression; b)

for the commission of serious violations of international

humanitarian law, genocide or crimes against humanity;

c)

to worsen the internal situation in the country of final

destination, in terms of provoking or prolonging armed conflicts, or aggravating existing tensions;

d)

to carry out terrorist acts or support or encourage

terrorism;

e)

other than for the legitimate defence and security needs

of the beneficiary country;

4.

A transfer shall not be authorised if it is destined to:

a)

be used for or to facilitate the commission of violent or

organised crime;

b)

adversely affect regional security; endanger peace,

contribute to destabilising or uncontrolled accumulations of arms or military capabilities into a region, or otherwise contribute to regional instability;

ANNEX - XIII

Page 15

c)

ANNEX - XIII

hinder or obstruct sustainable development and unduly

divert human and economic resources to armaments of the states involved in the transfer; d)

involve corrupt practices at any stage â&#x20AC;&#x201C; from the supplier,

through any middlemen or brokers, to the recipient; 5.

A transfer shall not be authorised if it is likely to be diverted,

within the transit or importing country or be re-exported, to unauthorized uses or users or into the illicit trade;

6.

The Executive Secretary and all Member States shall provide

elements of proof to apply the criteria enunciated in paragraphs a, b, c, d and e of the present article and to indicate the refusal of exemption request made by a Member State.

CHAPTER III MANUFACTURE OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS ARTICLE 7 Control of the Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons

1.

Member States shall undertake to control the manufacture of

small arms and light weapons within their national territories;

2.

Each Member State shall regulate the activities of local small

arms and light weapons manufacturers and shall undertake to adopt strategies and policies to the reduction and/or limitation of the manufacture of small arms and light weapons so as to control the local manufacture as well as their marketing in ECOWAS region.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 16

ANNEX - XIII 3.

Member States shall undertake to draft an exhaustive list of

local manufacturers of small arms and light weapons and the registration of each of them into the national arms registers; 4.

Where production and/or assembly capacities of small arms

and light weapons exist within the ECOWAS region, Member States shall submit to the Executive Secretary. This data shall include the type of the arms and their quantity on their annual production.

ARTICLE 8 Measures of Control for Small Arms and Light Weapons Manufacture

Without prejudice to the other measures that Member States will undertake to ensure the effective control of the manufacturing of smalls arms and light weapons on their national territory, a request for the manufacture of small arms and light weapons will not be granted if the requesting person has not given information relating to :

a)

Details of the arms to be manufactured â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the quantity,

exact type and kind of arms using ECOWAS classification system, including all serial numbers and other markings;

b)

The procedure for marking; the procedure for entering

details of each small arm and light weapon into the national small arms and light weapons register; information on the storage and management of the weapons after manufacture.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 17

ANNEX - XIII CHAPTER IV TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION Article 9 National Database and Registers of Small Arms and Light Weapons

1.

Member States shall establish where they do not exist already,

national computerised registers and database of small arms and light weapons.

2.

The following information shall be recorded in the national

registry: a)

Description of the product (type or model, calibre) and

quantity (if it concerns a batch);

b)

the content of the marking;

c)

the names and addresses of the former and current

owners and, when possible, successive owners;

d)

the date of registration;

e)

information concerning each transaction including: i.

the name and address of the shipper, the

intermediary (where applicable), the consignee and the user indicated on the end-user certificate; ANNEX - XIII

Page 18

ANNEX - XIII ii.

the point of departure, transit and destination, as

well as the customs references and the dates of departure, transit and delivery to the end-user.

iii.

the export, transit and import license (quantities and

batches corresponding to the same license as well as the validity of the license);

iv.

full details concerning the method of transport and

transporter(s);

v.

the controlling agency or agencies (at point of

departure, transit and entry);

vi.

the nature of the transaction (commercial, non-

commercial, private or public, conversion, repair); vii.

where applicable, the insurer and/or the financial

institution intervening in the transaction.

3.

Records shall be permanently kept in the register.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 19

ANNEX - XIII Article 10 ECOWAS Small Arms and Light Weapons Database and Registers

1.

Member States undertake to establish a sub-regional database

and register of small arms and light weapons under the ECOWAS Executive Secretary as a way of promoting confidence.

2.

The

ECOWAS

Executive

Secretariat

shall

develop

in

collaboration with the Member States the procedures for the setting up and management of the database and register as well as the issues to be covered.

3.

The Member States shall provide the ECOWAS Executive

Secretariat with all the necessary information for the operation of the sub-regional database and register of small arms and light weapons.

Member States also undertake to transmit an annual report to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary detailing their orders or purchase of small arms and light weapons.

4.

The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall present an annual

report on the workings of the sub-regional database and register of small arms and light weapons at the Summit of Heads of State and Government.

5. Records shall be kept in the register permanently.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 20

ANNEX - XIII Article 11

Register of Arms for Peace Operations

1.

Member States undertake to:

a)

Establish a register of small arms and light weapons, their

ammunition and other related material destined for use in peacekeeping operations both inside and outside the ECOWAS territory under the ECOWAS Executive Secretary as a way of ensuring the control of movements of small arms and light weapons and their effective withdrawal at the end of peace operations in which Member States are participating.

b)

Declare in this regard to the ECOWAS Executive

Secretariat all small arms and light weapons used in peace operations.

c) Declare to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary all the small arms and light weapons seized, collected and/or destroyed during peace operations on their territory and in the ECOWAS region.

2.

The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall take the necessary

measures to ensure the adequate recording of the information transmitted by the Member States participating to peace operations.

3. Records shall be permanently kept in the register.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 21

ANNEX - XIII Article 12

Dialogue with Manufacturers and Suppliers

1.

The ECOWAS Executive Secretary and each Member State

shall strengthen cooperation and dialogue with national and international manufacturers and suppliers of arms as well as with the competent international and regional organisations in order to ensure their support, respect for and compliance with the spirit and the letter of this Convention.

2.

The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall take the necessary

measures to take advantage of the information available from Member States of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the European Union and other manufacturers and suppliers of arms, in order to strengthen the effective implementation of this Convention.

Article 13 Prevention of and the Fight Against Corruption

Member States shall institute appropriate and effective measures for cooperation between administrative departments concerned and law enforcement agencies to curb corruption associated with the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, illicit possession and use of small arms and light weapons.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 22

ANNEX - XIII CHAPTER V OPERATIONAL MECHANISM

Article 14 Control of Possession of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Civilians

1.

Member States shall prohibit the possession, use and sale of

light weapons by civilians.

2.

Member States shall regulate the possession, use and sale of

small arms by civilians.

3.

Authorisations may be granted to permit individual possession

of one or more small arms and their ammunition in line with the legislation of each Member State. Applications for such authorisations shall be processed by relevant national authorities. All applicants must the relevant national authority in person. The Executive Secretary shall develop and communicate authorisation procedures to the relevant national authority.

4.

Member States undertake to implement a strict control regime

for civilian possession of the small arms. The authorisation procedure will involve issuing a license from the relevant national authority for each small arm used by a civilian. Member States shall not grant an authorisation if the applicant does not meet the following criteria: ANNEX - XIII

Page 23

ANNEX - XIII

a)

The required minimum age;

b)

Applicant does not have criminal record and has not been

subject to morality investigation; c)

Proof of a legitimate reason to possess, carry or use for each

small arms;

d)

Proof that the prospective owner has undergone safety training

and competency training including training in the relevant laws regarding small arms;

e)

Proof that the weapon will be stored in a safe place and

separately from its ammunition.

5.

Member States shall impose a limit on the number of weapons

a licence may cover and require a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;cooling offâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; period of at least 21 days before an authorisation is granted for the possession of each weapon. Member States shall include an expiration date on each licence and authorisations shall be subject to periodic review.

Contravention of regulations concerning possession of small arms in private hands will allow the small arms to be seized by the authorities, the licence /authorisation revoked, and adequate sanctions including penalties applied.

6.

Member States shall include information regarding the civilian

possession of small arms within the national small arm database and register established under Article 9 of the present Convention; ANNEX - XIII

Page 24

7.

ANNEX - XIII

Member States undertake to introduce minimum penal

sanctions for the illicit possession and use of small arms and light weapons and the carrying of unlicensed small arms.

Article 15 Visitorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Certificates

1.

Each Member State shall take the appropriate measures

demanding that visitors wanting to import temporarily small arms covered by this Convention for the duration of their temporary stay in the ECOWAS region, prepare in advance an application including information about the purpose, type and marking of small arms to be imported into one of the ECOWAS territories and to declare the arms on their arrival. Such application shall be addressed to the relevant authorities of the Member State concerned for decision.

2.

ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall issue guidelines on the

procedures to be followed and communicate them to the relevant authority.

3.

If the request is agreed, the competent national authorities shall

issue to the visitors an entry certificate and an exit declaration at the visitorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; arrival and departure.

4.

All certificates shall be recorded by the Member States

concerned in the national small arms register referred to in compliance with the above mentioned Article 9.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 25

ANNEX - XIII Article 16

Management and Security of Stockpiles

1.

Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure

the safe and effective management, storage and security of their national stocks of small arms and light weapons;

2.

To this effect, Member States shall establish effective

standards and procedures for stockpile management, storage and security. These standards and procedures shall include:

a)

appropriate site;

b)

physical security measures of storage facilities;

c)

inventory management and record keeping;

d)

staff training;

e)

security during manufacture and transportation;

f)

sanctions in case of theft or loss.

3. Member States shall ensure that stockpiles of small arms and light weapons by manufacturers, dealers as well as individuals are securely stored in accordance with the appropriate standards and procedures; ANNEX - XIII

Page 26

ANNEX - XIII 4.

Member States shall undertake to regularly review, in

accordance with national laws and standards, the storage facilities and conditions of small arms and light weapons held by their armed and security forces and other authorized bodies in order to identify, for disposal, surplus and obsolete stocks; 5.

The Executive Secretary shall ensure, in collaboration with

Member States, that effective standards and procedures for stockpile management of weapons collected in the context of peace operations are duly observed.

Article 17 Collection and Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons

1.

Member States shall undertake to collect and/ or destroy:

a)

the arms which are surplus to the national needs or have

become obsolete;

b)

seized weapons;

c)

unmarked weapons;

d) I

llicitly held weapons;

e) arms collected in the implementation of peace accords or programmes for the voluntary handing in of weapons.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 27

2.

ANNEX - XIII

All weapons so collected must be registered and securely

stored and or destroyed.

3.

Member States undertake to promote and/ or carry out

programme of voluntary handing in of weapons.

Article 18 Marking

1.

For identification purposes, all small arms and light weapons,

their ammunition and other materials, considered as essential by the supplier, shall be assigned a unique and specific marking upon manufacture; this marking shall include the following elements:

2.

For small arms and light weapons covered under this

Convention,

a)

“Classic marking” shall include a unique serial number,

the manufacturer’s identity, as well as the identification of the country and year of manufacture. Information concerning the purchaser’s identity and the country of destination should also be included if known at the time of manufacture. The markings shall be expressed alphanumerically. They must be legible and should be featured on a maximum number of main parts of the weapon, and at the very least on the part designated by the manufacturer as essential as well as on one other important part of the arm; ANNEX - XIII

Page 28

ANNEX - XIII b)

A â&#x20AC;&#x153;Security markingâ&#x20AC;? shall be applied to all weapons

produced after the entry into force of this Convention. This will permit the identification of the weapons in the event that classic markings have been destroyed or falsified. Security markings must be undertaken on component parts that are not easily manipulated

after

the

weaponâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s

manufacture,

and

the

falsification of which would render the weapon unusable;

c)

Member States that import a small arm that is not marked

in accordance with the provisions outlined under paragraph a) and b) above shall:

i

Apply a classic marking if the weapons were

manufactured before the entry into force of this Convention;

ii

Apply a classic marking and a security marking if

the weapons were manufactured after the entry into force of this Convention; failing this, the weapons cannot be imported or must be destroyed.

iii.

If the importing country and the year of import are

not known at the time of manufacture, the acronym of the importing State and the year of importation are marked by a competent institution in the importing country.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 29

3. For ammunition:

a)

ANNEX - XIII

The markings shall include a unique lot number, the

manufacturerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s identity, as well as the country and year of manufacture. Information concerning the purchaserâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s identity and the country of destination should also be included if known at the time of manufacture. These details must feature at least once on the jacket (i.e. cartridge) containing the powder or liquid used in the ammunition or explosive. The markings shall be expressed alphanumerically.

b)

The

smallest

ammunition

packaging

shall

include

information outlined under 2(a).

Article 19 Tracing

1.

Member States shall exchange information on illicit small arms

and light weapons and on seized small arms and light weapons, as well as trafficking in weapons that contravene international law or the internal laws of the States in which the operations take place (condemnation of the person or institution implicated, sanctions, disposal, destruction methods, neutralisation).

2.

In the case of other small arms and light weapons, Member

States shall exchange the following data on a regular basis: ANNEX - XIII

Page 30

a)

ANNEX - XIII

on manufacture (the marking system and techniques

used, and authorized manufacturers); b)

on transfers (exports to and/or imports from all other

States, transits, information available concerning national legislation, existing practices and controls, authorised dealers and brokers);

c

on existing stockpiles (management, inventory, security,

surplus, losses, theft, destruction).

3.

The Executive Secretary shall receive request for exemption

and shall act in accordance with Article 5 of this Convention.

4.

A Member State may initiate a tracing request through the

ECOWAS Executive Secretary in relation to small arms and light weapons found within its territorial jurisdiction that it considers to be illicit.

5.

To ensure smooth and effective cooperation in tracing, requests

for assistance in tracing illicit small arms or light weapons will contain sufficient information including, inter alia: a)

Information describing the illicit nature of the small arm

and light weapon, including the legal justification thereof and circumstances under which the small arm and light weapon was found;

b) ANNEX - XIII

Markings, type, calibre and other relevant information; Page 31

c)

6.

ANNEX - XIII

Intended use of the information being sought.

Member States receiving a tracing request shall acknowledge

receipt within a reasonable time frame.

7.

Member States shall provide reliable responses to tracing

requests made by other Member States within one month from the date of receipt of the said request.

8.

In responding to a tracing request, the requested Member

States shall provide all available information sought by the requesting Member States that is relevant for the purpose of tracing illicit small arms and light weapons.

9.

The requested Member States may seek additional information

from the requesting Member States where a tracing request does not contain the information required in Paragraph 3 (b) above.

Article 20 Brokering

1.

Member States shall register all citizens and all companies

incorporated in their territory that are brokering small arms and light weapons, including financial agents and transportation agents on armament and shall make such registration a requirement for their licit operation.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 32

2.

ANNEX - XIII

Member States shall ensure that all registered small arms and

light weapons brokering agents obtain an explicit authorization for each individual transaction in which they are involved irrespective of where the arrangements take place.

3.

Member States shall require that all small arms and light

weapons brokering license applications for authorisation provide full disclosure of relevant import and export licences or authorisations and associated relevant documents, the names and locations of all brokering and shipping agents involved in the transaction and the transit routes and points of the small arms and light weapons shipments.

4.

Member States shall adopt such legislative and other measures

to punish and establish as a criminal offence the illicit brokering of small arms and light weapons.

5.

Brokering activities may be assessed under Article 1 and 6 of

the present Convention.

Article 21 Harmonization of Legislative Provisions

1.

Member States shall undertake to revise and update national

legislation to ensure that the provisions in this Convention are minimum standards for small arms and light weapons control and their ammunition as well as other related materials.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 33

2.

ANNEX - XIII

Each Member State shall adopt legislative and other necessary

measures to establish as a criminal offence in the following cases:

a)

any activity carried out in violation of the provisions of this

Convention;

b)

any activity carried out in violation of an arms embargo imposed

by the United Nations, the African Union or ECOWAS;

3.

The Executive Secretary shall elaborate and propose to

Member States guidelines for harmonization of legislative provisions.

Article 22 Strengthening of Border Controls

Member States, in collaboration with the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, shall:

a)

Strengthen sub-regional cooperation among defence and

security forces, intelligence services, customs and border control officials in combating the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons. b)

Enhancing the capacity of national defence and security

forces, law enforcement and security agencies, including appropriate training in investigative procedures, border control and law enforcement techniques, and upgrading of equipment and resources; ANNEX - XIII

Page 34

ANNEX - XIII Article 23

Public Education and Awareness Programmes

1.

In the interest of promoting a culture of peace, Member States

shall design public/community education and awareness programmes at local, national and regional levels in order to involve the population in the efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

2. Member States in this regard shall undertake to develop and/or strengthen their partnership with civil society organisations at local, national and regional level including women, youth and others, for better information and raise public awareness on the dangers of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

3.

Member States shall encourage civil society organisations to

play a leading role in creating awareness and education of the population.

CHAPTER VI INSTITUITIONAL AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS Article 24 Member States

1.

Within the framework of the implementation of this Convention,

the States Parties which have not yet done so, shall establish through regulation or legislation a National Commission in accordance with Article

51

of

the

Protocol

on

mechanisms

for

prevention,

management, resolution of conflict and keeping peace and security ANNEX - XIII

Page 35

ANNEX - XIII

and with the enforcement of the decision of the Conference of Heads of State and Government on December 10th, 1999 on the establishment of National Commissions for the fight against the illicit proliferation and circulation of light weapons.

2.

The National Commissions shall be established according to

the existing ECOWAS guidelines contained in the National Manual prepared by ECOWAS.

3.

Member States shall allocate a budget line to ensure effective

functioning of National Commissions

4.

The Member States shall elaborate their National Action Plans

on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

5.

Such action plans shall be developed through national

information

gathering

process

involving

all

relevant

national

stakeholders including civil society, and the convening of a national forum of all stakeholders to deliberate on the elements to be included in the National Action Plan.

Article 25 The ECOWAS Executive Secretary

1.

The

ECOWAS

Executive

Secretary

is

responsible

for

supporting and supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention. To this end the ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall: ANNEX - XIII

Page 36

a)

ANNEX - XIII

define and carry out the policy for mobilising the

necessary resources for the implementation of this Convention;

b)

provide the Member States with the necessary financial

and technical support for the realisation their activities;

c)

ensure the monitoring and implementation of this

Convention;

d)

present an annual Report to the Summit of Heads of

State and Government on the status of implementation of the Convention.

e)

if ECOWAS Executive Secretary deems it necessary,

refer a specific urgent and/or serious question regarding the application of this Convention to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council.

2.

The Executive Secretary shall develop a Plan of action for the

implementation of this Convention and submit it to the appreciation of the Member States for adoption. Such a plan shall outline key activities that need to be implemented (such as Capacity Building, harmonization awareness

of

national

raising,

Commissions,

legislation,

information

strengthening

the

border

exchange capacity

control, among

of

civil

public National society,

organisations, etc).

ANNEX - XIII

Page 37

3.

ANNEX - XIII

Member States shall take the necessary measures to endow

the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat with the institutional and operational capacities appropriate to the responsibilities given to the Executive Secretary by this Convention.

Article 26 Cooperation Within and Among States

1.

Member States undertake to promote intraâ&#x20AC;&#x201C; and inter-state

cooperation in the implementation of this Convention. To this effect: a)

the

ECOWAS

Executive

Secretary

shall

prepare

procedures for interstate cooperation between security forces, the services in charge of border controls and all other services concerned, in the spirit of this Convention. b)

The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall facilitate and

seek assistance for the training of officials in intra- and interstate cooperation.

Article 27 Complaint Procedure Concerning Violation of this Convention

1.

All concerns relating to the violation of this Convention shall be

brought to the attention of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary who would then submit such a complaint to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council;

ANNEX - XIII

Page 38

ANNEX - XIII

2.

If the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council considers that

there is a breach of the obligations under this convention, it shall decide on the appropriate measures to be taken such as sanctions, inquiry, study or refer the matter to the ECOWAS Court of Justice;

3.

This review procedure of complaints shall not mean the

impossibility for a State or an individual to refer to the ECOWAS Court of Justice if it notes a failure in the application of this Convention.

Article 28 Monitoring the Implementation of this Convention

1.

In order to ensure the monitoring of and compliance with the

provisions of this Convention, the Executive Secretary shall appoint a Group of Independent Experts who supports him. The Group of Independent Experts shall submit a report to the Executive Secretary.

2.

Member States, upon the request of the Executive Secretary,

shall provide the Group of Independent Experts with all information at their disposal on exemption request.

3.

The Group of Independent Experts may seek any other

information it shall deem useful for its work in relation with Member States and through cooperation with Member States of the Wassenaar Arrangements, the European Union and suppliers of arms.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 39

4.

ANNEX - XIII

Each Member State shall submit an annual report to the

ECOWAS Executive Secretary on its activities related to small arms and light weapons as well as other matters in relation with this Convention, in accordance with the format of report developed by the Executive Secretary.

5.

A Conference of all Parties to the Convention shall be

convened by the Depositary as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Convention. The Conference of Heads of State and Government of member States shall review the implementation of this Convention and shall have further mandates as decided by Member States. Other Conferences of Member States shall be held as needed.

CHAPTER VII GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS Article 29 Interpretation and Dispute Settlement

1.

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation and/or the

implementation of the Convention shall be settled by way of negotiation or by recourse to the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council.

2.

In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the dispute shall be

brought before the ECOWAS Court of Justice.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 40

ANNEX - XIII Article 30

Special Provisions

The undertakings ensuing from the provisions of this Convention shall not be interpreted as being in contradiction to the spirit and letter of the Conventions or Accords linking a Member State with a Third State as long as these Conventions and Accords are not in contradiction with the spirit and letter of this Convention.

Article 31 Sanctions

Sanctions mentioned in Article 77 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty are applicable to all Member States whom the ECOWAS Court of Justice would have found to be in violation of this Convention.

Article 32 Final Provisions

(a)

Signature, Ratification, Accession and Entry into Force

1.

This Convention shall be open for signature to ECOWAS

Member States. It shall be subject to ratification.

2.

It shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the ninth

instrument of ratification.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 41

3.

ANNEX - XIII

For a signatory that ratifies this Convention after the date of the

deposit of the ninth instrument of ratification, it shall enter into force for that signatory on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

4.

Any ECOWAS Member State that has not signed this

Convention shall be able to accede to it. In this case, this Convention shall enter into force for that State upon the date of the deposit of the instrument of accession.

b)

Amendments

1.

Any amendment to this Convention proposed by a Member

State shall be submitted to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary who shall notify the Member States.

2.

Decision on the adoption of such an amendment shall be taken

by the Conference of Heads of State and Government by a twothirds majority of the Member States.

3.

An amendment so adopted shall enter into force for all Member

States who are party to this Convention after receipt by the Depository of the instrument of ratification by the majority of Member States.

ANNEX - XIII

Page 42

ANNEX - XIII (c)

Withdrawal

1.

Each Member State shall, in exercising its national sovereignty,

have the right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of this Convention, have jeopardised its supreme interests.

2.

Withdrawal shall be effected by a Member State giving notice,

which includes a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interest, twelve months in advance to the Depositary. The Depository shall circulate such notice to all other Member States.

3.

During the period of twelve months referred to in the preceding

paragraph, such Member State shall nevertheless continue to observe the provisions of this Convention.

d)

Depository Authority

1.

This Convention shall be deposited with the Executive

Secretary of ECOWAS, who is hereby designated as the Depository of the Convention.

2.

The Depositary shall:

ANNEX - XIII

Page 43

ANNEX - XIII

a)

Receive instruments of ratification;

b)

Register this Convention with the African Union, the

United Nations, as well as any other organisation as may be decided by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council;

c)

Transmit authentic copies of this Convention to all States

in the ECOWAS region, and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications and accession of this Convention.

IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) HAVE SIGNED THIS CONVENTION. DONE AT ABUJA, ON THE 14TH JUNE 2006, IN THREE ORIGINALS IN THE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE LANGUAGES, ALL TEXTS, BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC

ANNEX - XIII

Page 44