Penn Asian Review Spring 2014 Edition

PENN ASIAN REVIEW VOLUME 4 | SPRING 2014

A UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA UNDERGRADUATE PUBLICATION

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Penn Asian Review especially thanks

The Center for East Asian Studies

for their continued support For more information, please visit www.ceas.sas.upenn.edu

Cover source: “Itsukushima Shrine� http://www.fotopedia.com/wiki/Itsukushima_Shrine#!/items/flickr-3721792508

Penn Asian Review

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editor’s note The Penn Asian Review editorial board consists of:

Editor in Chief Michelle Whang External Editor in Chief Menyuan Sun Internal Editor in Chief Elaine Song Editing Manager Stephanie Ho Online Manager Sean Hamamoto Business Mangers Emma Kaufman Scott Wang

Dear Penn Asian Review readers, It is our pleasure announce the launching of the fourth volume of Penn Asian Review, Penn’s only undergraduate publication that deals specfically with the Asia-Pacific region. In our annual issues, we provide a forum for academic discourse on numerous topics related to Asia, which is open to all students and faculties in the Penn community.

In choosing which articles to publish in this volume, we made an effort to ensure that they capture various aspects of the Asian societies and their people. The five articles presented here cover issues ranging from Asian cultures and their impact on international markets, to politics that examine internal and external conflicts in the region. We hope that by publishing this journal we can help you obtain a more balanced and thorough understanding of Asia.

We would like to thank the Center for East Asian Studies, which has continously spnosored our organization since its founding. We are also grateful for the Student Activities Council for providing us with most of the financial support that we needed during the publication process. Furthermore, we express our deepest gratitude for our student contributors who inspired us with their numerous high-quality works. It is my pleasure to have been part of this great organization during all four years of my college career. I hope you all show continuous interest and support for Penn Asian Review in the upcoming years as well.

Lastly, pleas feel free to contribute to our open blog at pennasianreviewonline.blogspot.com, where you can post your thoughts on any Asia-related issues and events that spakr your interest.

Graduate Advisor Francis Miller Editorial Assistant Tiffany Kang

Michelle Whang, Editor in Chief, on behalf of the Penn Asian Review Editorial Board

Volume 4

4 | Contents

table of contents southeast asia

Malaysia and Singapore: Two Worlds From One

5

Debating Under the Influence: The Impact of Lobbying and Lawsuits on Congressional Redress Debates

12

Varun K. Menon

east asia

Sean Hamamoto

southeast asia

Anti-Government Protests In Thailand: A Political Sociology of Elite and Class 18 Conflict Larry Liu

east asia

Blessed are They who are Open-Minded: An Analysis of the Beatitudes in the Union Edition of the Chinese Bible

24

The Gangnam Phenomenon: A Study of the Korean Wave in China

29

Gina Elia

east asia

Sheryl Li

Penn Asian Review

Menon | 5

Malaysia and Singapore: Two Worlds From One Varun K. Menon, CAS ‘16

Image: A mural depicting the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 prominently features Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew in the midst of great conflict.

ABSTRACT

A consideration of Malaysia’s historical experience and separation with Singapore as indicative of the modern struggle for national identity in a multiracial, multicultural world, present across the Pacific in the era of decolonization and the establishment of ethnic nation-states, as being divergent on two different models: multiplicity in the form of pluralism and singularity in the form of nativism.

At noon on the ninth of August, 1965, Lee Kuan Yew strode out to a room stuffed to capacity with reporters from across the world. “Singapore is out,” the front page of The Straits Times would boldly read, exposing to the world the tragic final scene of what had been called the “drama of Malaysia.”[1] And so Singaporeans had awoken that morning to learn that they were no longer Malaysian. The Parliament of Malaysia had voted unanimously without the presence of the Singaporean ministers to expel the tiny island city-state from the Federation. Now Lee, Singapore’s leader, was facing a nation in shock, anger, and disbelief; above all, a nation that no longer possessed an identity. After a strongwilled but agonizingly sorrowful speech, the feelings could not be held back: “For me, it is a moment of anguish. All my life… you see the whole of my adult life… I have believed in Malaysian merger, in the unity of these two territories,” Lee began, as tears slowly began to form in his eyes.

“You know that we are connected by geography, economics, and ties of kinship.... It broke everything we stood for,” he managed, and then buried his face in his hands, unable to continue.[2] At that moment, Malaysia stood at the crossroads of time. This newly formed federation of only two years was the gate between the Pacific

and Indian Oceans. It had always been the center of a unique cosmopolitan world, where east met west, and north met south. In many ways, Malaysia exemplified the greater Pacific, a massive region defined by intercultural exchange and migration across water. The Malay Archipelago is where so many of these interactions built a diverse and unique world. What does Malaysia’s anguishing story of separation say about these Pacific worlds in the twentieth century and beyond? In the era of decolonization and the rise of modern nation-states, Malaysia was and still is a microcosm of the tension and conflict that defines the struggle for national identity in the Pacific after centuries of historical interaction.

The push for unification of all the territories that made up this historical region would culminate in the collision of two visions of what identity this new nation of Malaysia should embrace and after only twenty-three months, the marriage between one of its states, Singapore, and the rest of the Federation was over. The largely non-Malay island had refused to adopt the Malay vision for a nation that would first serve its bumiputra or “sons of the soil,” preferring instead equal citizenship for all peoples in the Federation, without regard to purportedly indigenous status. As a result, Malaysia and Singapore went their separate ways, building two different worlds from what had always been considered one. What was “Malaysia” and why were there two radically different visions for this nation? The Federation of Malaysia was the modern expression of a special multicultural, multiracial world at the conflux of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the two visions of what Malaysia should be were born from two fundamentally different desires of what identity this special world should embrace for the future: one of multiplicity under pluralism or one of singularity under nativism.

To understand Malaysia and why it fissured, our frame of history must be expanded from beyond simply the twentieth century. Scholars of the Pa-

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6 | Malaysia and Singapore cific have long centered on maritime Southeast Asia, noting the sporadic interactions, exchanges, and intermingling of peoples that over millennia have formed a special cosmopolitan world in Maritime Southeast Asia centered on the Straits of Malacca, the vital link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Matt Matsuda includes this region as a centerpiece in his Pacific Worlds, which recounts the history of the Pacific in terms of patterns of interaction and cooperation across the vast region. Matsuda notes the vast influences that the massive civilizations of India and China had on the early Malay world.[3] Whether this was through the exchange of goods, services, ideas, or even people, the idea of a remarkable Pacific world may originate in the idea of multiculturalism and plurality through a long history of contact between peoples from far reaches of the globe.

[4] This tradition of pluralism in the Malay world would be the basis for the later strife over identity in modern Malaysia.

This ancient cosmopolitan world began entertaining a new actor in 1771: The British first became involved in Malaya with the attempted establishment of a trading post at Penang. With a growing presence in the region and strong economic and geopolitical interests, Sir Stamford Raffles established the Colony of Singapore in 1819, becoming the first official British holding in Malaya.[5] The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 legally separated the Malay world between the British and Dutch in two separate entities, modern Malaysia/Singapore and Indonesia respectively.

By 1826, the British had unified three of its colonies in the region into the centralized ‘Straits Settlements.’ Throughout the 19th century, the British engaged in diplomacy and war with the many local Malay sultans and rajahs of Malaya and Borneo to eventually form British Malaya (modern West Malaysia) and British Borneo (modern East Malaysia).[6] It was during this period of British rule that the immigration of people from China and India was encouraged to bolster the economy of the Malay colonies. The population of these two immigrant communities exploded in the 19th and early 20th century as the two groups began building their own distinct communities across Malaya.[7] As the demographics of the Malaya began to shift, the British had ensured the Malay rulers that they would preserve a policy that protected the rights of Malays as the rightful indigenous people of Malaya and uphold the Malay character of the states[8]; this agreement became the social contract of the British occupation of Malaya and the basis of Ketuanan Melayu, or Malay preeminence.

The system protected the native rights of Malays to hold certain privileges and opportunities over any immigrant groups, withstanding any length of time that these groups remained separate and distinct in Malaya. Four distinct groups thus arose in British Malaya and Borneo: the Malays, the Chinese, the Indians, and the Orang Asal/Orang Asli (the aboriginal peoples of the two regions).[9] During these colonial years, these groups remained segregated with no national unity or sense of common identity and the possibility of a united Malaya remained scattered with no national unity or sense of common identity.[10] Although the racial groups of Malaya remained separate for decades, the modern conflict over identity would only remerge as the British prepared Malaya for its eventual independence. In 1946, the British Colonial Office attempted to centralize Malaya by formally establishing the entities of the Malayan Union, the Crown Colony of North Borneo (consisting of Sarawak and Sabah), and the Crown Colony of Singapore.

[11] It was the first modern attempt to craft a united Malayan nation. In the spirit of postwar commitment to liberal democracy, the British made an attempt through the Malayan Union to grant Malays, Chinese, and Indians alike full citizenship in the country regardless of race or creed; to this, the Malay rulers balked.[12] This notion of equality of citizenship was seen by Malays as a renege of their age-old contract with the British

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and swiftly galvanized a virulent opposition from them, believing that their homeland was in danger from of domination by foreign nationals who until hitherto had been excluded from political matters.[13] As independence for Malaya seemed to be an eventuality in the postwar era, communal tension mounted between the Malays, Chinese, and Indians, who all established ethnic-based parties to fight for power under the new arrangement. These parties would form the dominant forces in Malayan (and later Malaysian) politics and would set the tenor of political conversation for the new nation along racial lines: the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).[14] The first battles over the two competing visions of Malaysia were seen in these early days, with Malays and Chinese and Indians involved in communal violence across the nation. Within the Indian and Chinese communities, there was also discord over whether it was right to fight for a place in the future Malaya, with internal debate over whether or not “Malaya was a multi-racial country.”[15] Deep resistance from the UMNO over the citizenship status of non-Malays and the centralization of power away from traditional rulers, to whom Malays pledged allegiance, led to the British reorganization of the country as the Federation of Malaya in 1948.[16] Though it was still a centralized arrangement, it was one in which the local Malay rulers retained their kingdoms and Malays were recognized with certain rights and privileges as the original inhabitants of the country. The Chinese and Indians, however, were given basic citizenship, albeit framed so that only those born after a certain date would be allowed to claim this privilege.

[17] At the same time that the British Colonial Office had decided to establish the Malayan Union, it had curiously decided that Singapore, which hitherto had always been considered the hub of Malaya, should remain separate from the Malayan Union. Correctly anticipating resistance from Malays to the inclusion of non-Malays in political life, the Colonial Office had calculated that Singapore’s inclusion would not mesh: “Singapore with its 700,000 inhabitants is almost entirely Chinese… the population just tips the balance [in the Malayan Union] in favor of the latter [Chinese]…,” H.T. Bourdillon of the Colonial Office wrote in the official report.[18] But the intention was not to forever exclude Singapore from Malaya, just delay its inclusion until the rest of the Union could stomach it. [19] Regardless, the British had attempted to form a pluralistic Malayan Union, but that plan had fizzled in the face of nativist Malay sentiments, an ominous sign for the future attempts to create such an arrangement.

The next decade in Malaya saw the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) form the ruling Alliance Party with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) to fight the threat of the communist insurgency and to slowly push for independence from the British. The Alliance and its racially-divided party structure has remained the ruling coalition in the country ever since. The man presiding over the UMNO and the Alliance was Tunku Abdul Rahman, a Malay prince “who was pitchforked into national politics by a coterie of personal friends and admirers.”[20] As expected of a Malay prince, the Tunku was a supporter of the status quo of Malay supremacy. In 1957, the Reid Commission was appointed from officials in both the British and Malayan governments to draft and recommend a Constitution for the Federation of Malaya. Vital to the discussions and recommendations of the Commission would be the character of the newly independent nation. The debate over the identity of Malaya would focus on four key areas: the question of official language, state religion, the status of Malay rulers, and the special position of the Malays, if any.[21]

Menon | 7 The debate over these four aspects of the Constitution of Malaya would represent one of the most important showdowns over the nation’s destiny, as the Constitution would remain largely unchanged later when Malaysia was formed. The Reid Commission recommended to the Malayan Parliament that Malay and English should be the languages of the new nation, with provisions made for Chinese and Indian languages, but this polyglot allowance was struck down by the Malayan Parliament. Instead, Malay would become the sole national language after ten years.[22] The Commission did not recommend the institution of any state religion, but here too the Malay-majority Parliament amended the Constitutional draft to establish Islam as the state religion. Although surprisingly not met with much resistance from the Chinese, there were Indians (Hindu or atheist) and British (embracing secularism or Christian missionary activity) who found this provision to be superfluous, even dangerous.[23] In full deference to the powerful Malay rulers, the Constitution provided that the head of state would be the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or “Supreme Lord of the Federation,” Malaysia’s king of kings who would be elected among and by the Malay sultans.[24] Here too, the Malays won headway on shaping the nation’s identity in their mold.

The Commission, well aware of the Malay backlash that had been instigated by the announcement of the Malayan Union scheme a decade earlier, recommended that the policy of Malay favoritism be continued temporarily to uplift the community from its “backward” state.

This provision was the most hotly contested in Parliament, but it was eventually agreed that it would be permanent indefinitely: “It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this Article.”[25] These privileges enshrined in Article 153 that maintained the special position of the Malays, termed bumiputra or “sons of the soil,” would later become the controversial magnifying point on which the battle for Malaysia would occur. In a nation with a long history of multiculturalism, the definition of bumiputra was a tenuous affair: ultimately, Article 160 of the Constitution was drafted to define “Malay” loosely as “a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and” and was born in the Federation or Singapore.[26] As the Constitution was written with that definition, the opportunity was given to non-Malays the opportunity to assimilate into the now legally established Malay-dominated national identity and thus become Malay —- a process termed by some critics as “Malayanization.”[27] Mahathir actively supported this assimilation, opining that “every barrier which tends to distinguish between racial, ethnic, or other origins must be broken.”[28] In his eyes and in those of the many who supported the new Constitution, this was the only way for the new nation to survive with a real sense of national unity; all others must surrender to the expressly Malay character of the state. And so in the first major showdown over the identity of the new nation, the Malays won all four battles over the new nation’s character. Ketuanan Melayu or “Malay preeminence,” the doctrine of nativist supremacy in response to a multicultural reality, was now licensed to continue onward by the new Constitution.

With the Constitution ratified, Malaya was granted freedom.[29] Singapore and British Borneo still remained under in colonial hands, however.

“The “battle for merger” with Malaya would be the driving force for the independence of all of Britain’s holdings in Malaya; merger was the idea that all of the former British Malayan colonies could come together to form a larger Pan-Malayan world, a Pacific world: “Malaysia.”[30] It is this final formation of Malaysia in 1963 with the unification of Singa-

pore, Sarawak, and Sabah that brings our historical examination to the focal point of the Malaysian question: it was during this era that the two visions of pluralism and nativism sufficiently matured and came to a head. As seen in the preceding decade to Federation in 1963, these two visions of this new Malaysia had developed separately in Malaya and Singapore under the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew, the young and fearless leader of Singapore and its ruling People’s Action Party who had led the struggle for independence and now spearheaded the battle for merger.

The two began negotiations, but even in the early struggle for unity, tension between these two visions was brimming under the surface of the country and within these two men who held the destiny of Malaysia in their hands. In the years preceding merger, however, these two worked remarkably well despite (or maybe because of) the communist insurgency and the pushback that both received in their respective countries over the prospects that merger would bring.[31] Until 1961, the Tunku had not been interested in merger with Singapore, mostly for because of the threat that Singapore’s non-Malay majority could pose to the status quo in Malaya. , until However, itit became clearly apparent in his mind that to completely defeat communism, end British colonialism, and bring Sarawak and Sabah on Borneo into a greater Federation of Malaysia, he would need to entertain the notion of uniting the soon- to- be- independent Singapore with his country to balance the political equation of Malaysia.;[32] Ffor him, merger never seemed to be about Singapore.

During the battle for merger, he would have to contend with those in his party who saw Singapore as a “Little China,” a dangerous barrier to maintaining Malay dominance.[33] Lee, on the other hand, would have to convince the Chinese and other non-Malays who had begun to get used to life without Malaya as to why reunification with the Malay-dominated Federation was necessary for Singapore. On tours across Singapore, Lee emphasized “national unity and national loyalty” among all races in the new Malaysia, an early iteration of the pluralistic model he would later fight for in the new Federation.[34] Despite all their ability to collaborate on Malaysia, the Tunku and Lee did have their sticking points, and one presented itself in the form of the Tunku’s initial proposition that the Singaporeans retain their own citizenship and simply become Malaysian “nationals.” So many Singaporeans were concerned with this language, that Lee had the Tunku agree to change that language to read “citizens.”[35] Unlike the Tunku, it was always Lee’s ambition to see both states united, and so he made sure that merger was Singapore’s only true option: the ballot presented to the residents of Singapore only gave three options, all representing a different plan for merger with Malaysia.[36] Needless to say, Singaporeans chose to merge with Malaysia for lack of any other option. Lee was now free to move ahead to fight for a Malaysia that he wanted, the pluralistic model he had championed in Singapore.

In the new Malaysia, race would continue to be the political force it had been since the Malayan Union scheme. Contriving racial identities in the new nation was punctuated with irony at every turn. One example was defining who Malay was and who was not. Singapore’s inclusion in the Federation was seen as more natural than the acceptance of Sarawak and Sabah, both on the north of Borneo; but it was suspected that the merger with these two states was in part to counter-balance the overall demographic majority that the Chinese would enjoy in Malaysia if only Singapore merged. Thus, the inclusion of Sarawak and Sabah was necessary for the Tunku and the UMNO to stomach merger with Singapore: astonishingly, these Malay leaders believed that the native Orang Asan groups that formed the majority of the population of Sarawak and Sabah were simply an extension of the Malays themselves, a sort of Proto-Malays;[37]

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8 | Malaysia and Singapore in the merger agreement, they were given full status as bumiputera under Article 153, and the increased usage of this term in favor of simply “Malays” was encouraged by the UMNO to build solidarity between these people and the Malays, who apparently formed a tenuous majority in the nation.[38] If this artificially created Malay solidarity failed to exist, the entire state of Malay dominance would be threatened by the inclusion of Chinese-dominated Singapore.

With all the details of merger set, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah acceded to the Federation of Malaya, which now renamed itself the Federation of Malaysia in honor of the new states by taking the general name for the greater Pan-Malayan world across maritime Southeast Asia.[39] At first, jubilation over merger crowded out any embattled feelings that there was on both sides over the inclusion of Chinese-dominated Singapore in the new nation of Malaysia. But as Lee and his People’s Action Party (PAP) would discover, every ambition that Singapore may have had for a different, more pluralistic Malaysia caused ripples and tension with the UMNO-dominated Alliance government. Being an ambitious man with plans for Malaysia, Lee ultimately did not accede to the wishes expressed by the Tunku that the PAP should not contest the Federal elections, and thus remain confined to Singapore; this was after the UMNO Alliance itself fielded candidates against the PAP in the Singapore elections.[40] In March of 1964, the PAP announced it would be contesting the 1964 Federal Elections, specifically intending to target the UMNO’s Alliance partner, the Malaysian Chinese Association, claiming that the MCA had not represented the Chinese of Malaysia well enough;[41] this sparked a fire that would set the country ablaze. The PAP manifesto for the elections promised candidates that would be “Pro-Malaysia,” seeking the fair inclusion of all races.[42] This was a slight on the Alliance’s racially-based leadership, and began a brutal campaign across the nation for votes. Ultimately though, the people of Malaysia remained loyal to the Alliance system, proving that communal-based politics on the mainland was strong and alive. On April 25, the final ballots were counted across the Federation and the PAP lost resoundingly, crushing Lee’s hopes of making the PAP a Pan-Malaysian party in the next session of Parliament.

Lee bemoaned that this generation of mainland “Straits-born” Chinese and Indians did not understand that as the British had left, the rules had changed: “the Malays were now the rulers” and determined to see their supremacy transmitted throughout Malaysia and no amount of concession could appease them.[43] Following the tension that had amounted across the nation in the elections, the environment was ripe for communal tensions to erupt. In just a couple of months, Malaysia had lost sight of its peaceful inception. The summer of 1964 saw the scorn of the UMNO manifested in the stirring of Singaporean Malay distrust in Lee and his intentions. UMNO Secretary-General and Malay extremist Syed Ja’afar Albar personally canvased in Singapore, eliciting Malay fear of the Chinese, building Lee Kuan Yew up as an evil genius with the intention to take over Malaysia and crush the Malays with ‘pluralism.’[44] Communal fervor was reaching a boiling point. Malay publications streamed into Singapore with phrases condemning “the dictatorial Chinese PAP Government led by the wretched Lee Kuan Yew.”[45] On July 21, during the celebration of the Prophet Mohammad’s birthday, the Malays began mass protests on the streets of Singapore; the proceedings quickly turned violent: Malays attacked Chinese everywhere they could find them, looting and pillaging their shops, and setting fire to everything in sight. At the end of the day when the police were eventually able to get the upper hand, almost 454 people were injured, and 23 had died. The city was in shambles and an indefinite curfew was enacted, leaving the city a battleground along stalemate lines

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that traced the city’s racial neighborhoods.[46] The bloody incident was a grave forewarning to the Tunku and Lee. Something had to be done if the racial conflict in Malaysia was to be solved, but neither side wanted to budge on the Malaysian question.

The Tunku stood firm with the UMNO position in an August 1964 interview: “It is understood by all that this country by its very name, its traditions and character, is Malay…. In any other country where aliens try to dominate economic and other fields, eventually there is bitter opposition from the indigenous people. But not with the Malays.

Therefore, in return, they must appreciate the position of the Malays.”[47] The Tunku, however, was a moderate who was trying as hard as he could to hold back Malay extremism that would have even seen all non-Malays expelled from the nation. A newly-elected obscure backbencher from Kedah rose to prominence as a symbol of Malay resistance to Lee’s Malaysian Malaysia. Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, who would later serve as Malaysia’s fourth and longest-serving prime minister, was a man determined to uphold Malay nativism in the face of those who challenged it. He became known for his constant battles with Lee, who he marked as a dangerously ambitious Chinese man that posed a clear threat to the nation’s Malays.

In his seminal political manifesto The Malay Dilemma, which contains his most stringent views on Ketuanan Melayu and the need for special Malay reservation, Mahathir explored Malaya’s long and complex history and openly notes the vast array of influences that Chinese and Indian traders as well as the religions of Hinduism and Islam had on the native Malay peoples of the region. But unlike historian Matt Matsuda, who celebrated this diverse exchange, Mahathir, who ironically had an ancestor from Kerala in India,[48] interpreted this pattern of history as being degenerative to the survival of the Malays. Claiming that all other peoples who came to Malaysia had to accept the Malay way of life, Mahathir emphatically impressed upon his readers that “the Malays are the rightful owners of Malaysia.…” He highlighted the competing Chinese and Indian claim for joint-ownership of the nation, but ultimately rejected it: “Therefore, the claim that the Chinese and Indians are responsible for the development and prosperity of Malaya still does not confer on these immigrants and their descendants the same status as indigenous Malays.

They must satisfy a series of conditions before they can achieve that.”[49] The Malays thus must consent to giving Malaysian citizenship to these other groups.[50] Mahathir summarized just how important the nativist doctrine of Ketuanan Melayu was, in direct response to the idea of a pluralistic Malaysia: “For suddenly, it has dawned upon the Malay that he cannot even call Malaya his land… He is now a different person, a Malaysian, but a Malay Malaysian whose authority in Malaya — - his land — -is now shared with others, but shared unequally.”[51] For Mahathir, Lee’s pluralistic vision was to rob the Malay people of their homeland and their chances of survival in the world.

This was the deep tone of debate after the 1964 elections and entering 1965, and the angst and conflict was only going to be exacerbated. More differences began to emerge, including the Federal Government’s pursuance of the closing of the Bank of China in Singapore and the denial of Lee’s diplomatic engagements with nations like China that supposedly threatened Malaysia’s existence. Racial fears were beginning to unravel every aspect of Singapore’s relationship with the rest of the country led by the UMNO-Alliance government.[52] In February of 1965, Lee responded by calling on other non-communal parties to join the PAP and form a Malaysian Solidarity Conference (MSC) to oppose the Alliance and build what he called a “Malaysian Malaysia,” a title for his longtime

Menon | 9 vision of a truly pluralistic nation that would erase racial distinctions and embrace common nationalism.[53] The pluralistic vision had matured to its final form: according to the MSC, “A Malaysian Malaysia means that the nation and the state is not identified with the supremacy, well-being and interests of any one particular community or race.”[54] Now committed in battle, Lee was firm in his desire to combat Malay dominance as well as the racially-segregated party system that constituted the Alliance, demonstrating that Malaysia needed to move passed past racial identification and seize a future free from past divisions. He promised this “realignment of political forces” would aim to end “a communally segregated nation dominated by one of its constituent parts.” The Malaysian Solidarity Conference, he said, was to be “ranged on behalf of a multiracial nation” and dedicated to the proposition “that this shall be a Malaysian nation.”[55] Never before in the roughly two decades since the Malayans had gained democratic agency had there been such an open challenge to the status quo of Ketuanan Melayu. The battle for Malaysia was about reach its climax.

By the spring of 1965, the newspapers were playing host to a vituperative exchange of words between leaders that represented the zenith of the struggle for identity in a nation now torn more than ever along its communal lines. This battle spilled over from the papers into the Parliament and eventually onto the streets. Campaigning on behalf of the MSC, Lee Kuan Yew’s provoking statements began the exchange in the wake of the Convention, striking fear into the hearts of those petrified of the Malays being overrun in their own country: “According to history, Malays began to migrate to Malaysia in noticeable numbers only about 700 years ago.

Of the 39% Malays in Malaysia today, about one-third are comparatively new immigrants like the secretary-general of UMNO, Dato’ Syed Ja’afar Albar, who came to Malaya from Indonesia just before the war at the age of more than thirty. Therefore it is wrong and illogical for a particular racial group to think that they are more justified to be called Malaysians and that the others can become Malaysian only through their favour.”[56] Lee made a new open challenge to the bumiputra primacy enshrined in the Constitution while making it disturbingly indubitable that the Malays were outnumbered in Malaysia, and thus soon would lose the battle for supremacy.

With this jab, the UMNO had a fit; Syed Ja’afar Albar, who was personally targeted by Lee in the remark, bit back: “To say that the Malays are like the other races in this country and they have no extra right in calling this country their homeland is an insult to the Malay race. It is as if Harry Lee was saying the Malays were also vagrants, finding shelter in this country.”[57] Syed Ja’afar was a noted enemy of Lee, the latter having termed the former as a Malay “ultra-nationalist” or “ultra” for short. Although unintended, Syed Ja’afar’s visceral response seems to let slip a general disregard for the other “vagrant” non-Malays, apparently “finding shelter” in Malaysia. The Deputy Prime Minister Razak and the UMNO organized to refute Lee’s statements, and perhaps gloss over Syed Ja’afar’s less than courteous reply by painting Lee out to be a power-hungry politician: “Mr. Lee does not care what happens to the people so long as he gets into power. We never talk of one community dominating another. If there is racial trouble, all of us including Mr. Lee will suffer.” The statement was also addressed to the “people of Singapore,” concluding that if they wanted to maintain the relationship with the rest of Malaysia, “they must find another leader who is sincere....” [58] This was an ominous foreshadowing of the separation to come between the two territories as 1965 became worse for the Federation every day.

The acrimonious heat of May reached fever-pitch as the Second Session

of the Malaysian Parliament commenced on May 27, 1965. As the Yang di-Pertuan Agong gave his ceremonial opening address, he vaguely singling singled out an internal threat to Malaysia’s peace and security, adding that, “If those concerned achieved their objective, it would mean chaos for us and an end to democracy.” Lee sought clarification as to what or who this internal threat was, probably suspecting that it was him and the Malaysian Solidarity Convention that the King was referring to, and moved to amend the Speech of the Throne by expressing regret that the speech had not mentioned that the nation “would continue to progress with its democratic Constitution towards a Malaysian Malaysia.”[59] At once, backbenchers and ministers alike of the ruling party engulfed him in a “storm of protests,” beginning the Second Session on the inauspicious note of condemning Lee and his Malaysian Malaysia plot. Mahathir, who had been selected to give the “address of thanks” for the King’s speech, delivered an emotional oration on the House floor in front of Lee, denouncing him and his PAP colleagues as “Chinese chauvinists” who were “positively anti-Malay,” crying to the chamber that there were two types of Chinese: one that “appreciated the need for all communities to be well-off,” and one “insular, selfish and arrogant type, of which Mr. Lee is a good example,” that “have never known Malay rule and cannot bear the idea that the people they have so long kept under their heels should now be in a position to rule them.”[60] Lee was refused a right of reply, and instead had the Singapore Ministry of Culture produce his later speech of reply and the proceedings of his press conference response in a pamphlet entitled The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia; the publication was distributed en masse to the public for consumption, a state government’s open challenge to the central government’s status quo of Malay dominance.[61] This episode in Parliament and Lee’s response culminated the month of May 1965 that saw the eruption of strife along communal lines as communities were torn over the battle being waged in Parliament.

Lee spent the rest of that tortuous summer campaigning across Malaysia, attempting to convince people with The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia that all he hoped to prove was that Malaysia was the home for Malaysian Chinese and Indians too.[62] In a speech to Parliament late that summer, he implored the UMNO-Alliance to see him the only way he wished to be seen, demonstrating just how personal this issue of national identity could be to one man: “They (the Malay ultras) have triggered off something basic and fundamental. Malaysia — - to whom does it belong? To Malaysians. But who are Malaysians? I hope I am, Mr. Speaker, Sir. But sometimes, sitting in this chamber, I doubt whether I am allowed to be a Malaysian. This is the doubt that hangs over many minds, and the next contest, if this goes on, will be on very different lines. Once emotions are set in motion, and men pitted against men along these unspoken lines, you will have the kind of warfare that will split the nation from top to bottom and undo Malaysia.”[63] He warned that if the nation refused to recognize him and the other non-Malays as equal citizens and fellow Malaysians, then civil war would come. But before this predicted civil war could come, the Tunku would step in and make a decision that would change the course of history.[64] On the ninth of August 1965, the Tunku announced the separation of Singapore from Malaysia. Lee had learned of the Tunku’s intentions for separation when they met privately; as it became apparent separation could not be stopped, the Singaporean ministers had all left for home.

[65] On the evening of Lee’s sorrowful press conference in Singapore earlier that day, the Tunku went live to address united Malaysia for the last time in a farewell to Singapore: “Since the formation of Malaysia, and this year in particular, there have been so many differences with the Singapore Government and these differences take many forms; so

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10 | Malaysia and Singapore much so that it has now come to a breaking point.” Pouring his heart to the nation, the Tunku expressed his regret that the relationship of Singapore and in the Federation didn’t work out. He expressly singled out Lee with suppressed bitterness, finally coming to the point of it all: “Malaysian Malaysia, in particular, suggests that the Malaysia we have now is bad, for it gives all the advantages to one race while depriving others of their rightful place in our society.” This he denied with all his heart, believing that the nation he was building was good for Malays and all other communities alike. The Tunku expressed his regret that his “dream was shattered,” claiming he had been “hoping to make Singapore the New York of Malaysia…,” but that Singapore’s own leaders had gotten in his way. Commending Singapore’s fellow 1963 merger partners, Sarawak and Sabah, as loyal supporters of the central government and harping on his conviction that Singapore’s separation was the answer to Malaysia’s problems, the Tunku may have exposed the his real feelings, the true tragedy that stabbed at the hearts of all Singaporeans: the rest of their nation may never have intended for them to be Malaysian after all, and that the inclusion of Singapore was just an affront to the threat of communism and a stepping stone for a foothold on Borneo to prevent an Indonesian advance. The Tunku’s plea for Singaporeans not to “worry” or have “concern” and his best wishes for the new nation’s future was overlaid with visible indifference that had been revealed time and time again from the very first mention of merger. His final words to Singapore rang in complete irony of the last twenty-three months of attempted solidarity: “In diversity I am convinced we can find unity, or in ordinary every day parlance, ‘absence will make the hearts grow fonder.’”[66] For Malaysians and Singaporeans, 1965 marked a crucial year in accepting new destinies based on new national identities settled as a result of this split. As agonizing as the loss of Tunku’s “New York dream” may have been for Malaysia, it was believed that it really could not have affected Malaysia’s identity and solidarity further: Malaysia was now unified, an entity that both its citizens and the world alike now knew and acknowledged; even without Singapore, Malaysia could survive.[67] The real agony of separation lay on the other side of the causeway, on that island separated only one kilometer from the mainland: a tiny city-state with little chance of a future whose people had been robbed of their identity, what was now unmasked as a disingenuous attempt at a common existence, a prevarication of the highest order. All that was left for Singaporeans who had believed in the message of Lee was to build the Malaysian Malaysia in Singapore. And that is exactly what Lee and his followers set out to do without the “hinterland.”[68] In fifty years, they built one of the world’s wealthiest and most admired nations. But for all its commitment to equality, racial differences have not disappeared in the nation that claims to be the real embodiment of the Malaysian Malaysia.

As for Malaysia, the seemingly easy break with Singapore was not nearly as clean as initially anticipated. Just four years later, the “13 May Incident” of 1969 in the wake of the first Federal elections since the separation resulted in the largest communal riots in the nation’s history; the Malays were provoked by the election results to fear , fearing that they would lose their country to the Chinese.[69] Reminiscent of the 1964 riots in Singapore, Malaysia’s violence even spilled over into Singapore. Although now not having anything to do with Malaysia’s condition, the violence demonstrated just how inescapable and inextricably tied the past was for both nations. The riots resulted in the Tunku’s resignation, the suspension of Parliament for two years, and the adoption of Mahathir’s recommendations in The Malay Dilemma for an institutionalization of Malay reservations, embodied in the 1971 New Economic Policy.[70] More than four decades have passed since those fateful riots, and although the nation has

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rapidly developed and the policies adopted to help the Malays have been successful in many ways, Malaysia is constantly reminded of its decision to embrace Ketuanan Melayu. The complaint of the bumiputra policies has continued to force people to question their place in the nation.

Although the Tunku and Lee promised good relations between their countries, the roughly fifty years since separation has witnessed every sort of conflict between the two nations short of war. Consistently asked whether he believes Singapore will ever reunite with Malaysia, Lee has usually responded that that time has passed, and the two nations, although capable of having a future of good relations, will never be able to overcome the difference of decades. But every now and then, Lee has revealed that his Malaysian dream may still be alive and even attainable: “When [Malaysia] kicked us out [in 1965], the expectation was that we would fail and we will go back on their terms, not on the terms we agreed with them under the British. Our problems are not just between states, this is a problem between races and religions and civilizations. We are a standing indictment of all the things that they can be doing differently.

They have got all the resources. If they would just educate the Chinese and Indians, use them and treat them as their citizens, they can equal us and even do better than us and we would be happy to rejoin them.”[71] Lee still hasn’t entirely given up on creating his Malaysian Malaysia, for which he had fought so hard. Although a farfetched idea, especially in Lee’s eyes, it certainly is one that tugs at the heartstrings of Malaysians and Singaporeans alike.

Fifty years ago, the nation that had asked itself, “What does it mean to be Malaysian?” descended into communal conflict and ultimately fissured over this central question of identity. The basic human desire to belong means all peoples longing to call a nation their one and true homeland.

This simple predisposition to belong fueled the ferocious debate over national identity that gave birth to these two nations we are left with today. Malaysia’s struggle for an identity remains but one of many such stories of the twentieth century, a period marked by the fall of transnational colonial empires and the birth of ethnic nation-states. It has been repeated time after time in place after place: when a dominating foreign power removes itself from a historical region of many different peoples, these peoples once united against the foreign power will inevitably turn on one another with the temptation of power instigating the suspicions of communalism. It is the independence and formation of these new nation-states that have sparked these conflicts such as those in Malaysia all across the postwar Pacific, a region marked more than most by multicultural, multiethnic nodes where the answer to who belongs is just as blurry as it is in Malaysia. These many new nations formed by decolonization have had to contend with the same central questions that brought Malaysia to the brink.

Across the Pacific, destinies were conceived in a similar fashion; struggles over the deepest doubts of identity bred strife and separation, many times with significant loss of life and the same anguish of separation in one form or another. For so many peoples who had lived together for generations under the domination of a foreign power, the ultimate triumph of sovereignty bore the onerous burden of determining a national identity, something that many countries were not able to resolve successfully and still grapple with today. Forging a national identity for a group of people that may have very little in common is a tremendous task that requires the cooperation and compromise of all those involved: forging a national identity for a group of people made up of those unwaveringly claiming the land they live on to be their native homeland and those descended from immigrant communities who see themselves belonging

Menon | 11 just as much as the other group is even harder. An examination of the Malaysia-Singapore divorce demonstrates that the idealistic predication that different peoples can naturally exist together in a common nation is fraught with complication; ultimately, that ideal may not even be possible for some given history’s seemingly inerasable memories. In this circumstance and in circumstances across the Pacific worlds, allegiances to communal identities have warranted the desires for national purity and exclusive homelands to be more powerful than the conceptions of the modern nation-states in which people have found themselves living. As much as the Tunku may have willed it, absence has not made the hearts grow fonder. And no matter how hard he, Lee, their predecessors, and their successors tried and continue to try, the hauntings of the past can never truly ensure the promise of a future free of torment nor fulfill the longing for reunification.

NOTES

[1] The Straits Times, August 10, 1965 [2] “Diary Of A Nation (Episode 19 - Seperation From Malaysia)” [3] Matsuda, Pacific Worlds, loc. 674 of 10334 [4] Ibid., loc. 924 of 10334 [5] Annual Report on the Malayan Union for1947, 121 [6] Ibid., 3 [7] Mahathir, The Malay Dilemma, 134 [8] Annual Report on the Malayan Union for1947, 123 [9] Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia, 19 [10] Goh and Holden, Race and Multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore, 3 [11] Annual Report on the Malayan Union for1947,125 [12] Gullick, Malaysia, 104 [13] Ampalavanar, The Indian Minority and Political Change in Malaya 1945-1957, 82 [14] Ibid., xv [15] Ibid., 83-91 [16] Gullick, Malaysia, 106 [17] Banerjee, Constitutional Development in Malaya Since 1945, 97 [18] Bourdillon, Minutes CO 825/42 no. 55104, cited in Lau, A Moment of Anguish, 3 [19] Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Future Constitution, Cmd. 6724, 3, cited in Lau, 3 [20] Miller, Prince and Premier, 6 [21] Banerjee, Constitutional Development in Malaya Since 1945, 324 [22] Ibid., 331 [23] Ibid., 330 [24] The Constitution of Malaysia, Article 3 [25] Ibid., Article 153 [26] Ibid., Article 160 [27] Hanna, The Formation of Malaysia, 177 [28] Mahathir, The Malay Dilemma, 102 [29] Tunku Abdul Rahman, The Proclamation of Malaya [30] Lee, The Singapore Story, 366 [31] Ibid., 410-428 [32] Osborne, Singapore and Malysia, 13 [33] Lee, The Singapore Story, 417 [34] Ibid., 397 [35] Ibid., 438 [36] The Singapore National Referendum Ordinance of 1962, No. 19, Section 18 [37] Fletcher, The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia, 56 [38] Holst, Ethnicization and Identity Construction in Malaysia, 44

[39] Lee, The Singapore Story, 366 [40] Lau, A Moment of Anguish, 96 [41] Ibid., 108 [42] Ibid., 109 [43] Lee, The Singapore Story, 549 [44] Lee, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia, 28 [45] Lau, A Moment of Anguish, 162 [46] Ibid., 175 [47] Mahathir, The Malay Dilemma, 126 [48] Lee, From Third World to First, 275 [49] Mahathir, The Malay Dilemma, 132 [50] Ibid., 126 [51] Ibid., 121 [52] Lee, The Singapore Story, 570 [53] Lau, A Moment of Anguish, 233 [54] The Straits Times, May 10, 1965 [55] Lau, A Moment of Anguish, 233 [56] The Straits Times, May 5, 1965.

[57] The Times (London), May 10, 1965.

[58] The Straits Times, May 11, 1965 [59] Lee, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia (Book 2), 1 [60] Wain, Malaysian Maverick, 20-21 ; Lee, From Third World to First, 274-275 [61] Lee, The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia [62] Ibid., 41 [63] Lee, The Singapore Story, 615 [64] Tunku Abdul Rahman, Looking Back [65] Lee, The Singapore Story, 640-645 [66] Tunku Abdul Rahman, “Full Text of the Tunku’s Speech on Singapore’s Separation” [67] Fletcher, The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia, 77 [68] Lee, From Third World to First, 19 [69] Wain, Malaysian Maverick, 23 [70] Ibid., 97 ; George, Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore, 91 [71] Plate, “Pacific Perspectives- Full Transcript: Tom Plate and Jeffrey Cole interview Lee Kuan Yew.”

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12 | Debating Under the Influence

Debating Under the Influence: The Impact of Lobbying and Lawsuits on Congressional Redress Debates Sean Hamamoto, CAS ‘16 INTRODUCTION

During World War II, over 120,000 residents and American citizens of Japanese ancestry were subjected to evacuation by government orders.

Mumbling phrases like shikata ga nai (which means “It can’t be helped” in Japanese), they survived the camps and carried on without looking back at the miserable chapter of their lives. Then, in 1988, the Civil Liberties Act, or colloquially known as the redress bill, was passed, mandating $20,000 be paid to each surviving former internee of Japanese ancestry and a formal apology be issued. While it is generally accepted that the government was obligated to make reparations for the unjust, unconstitutional, and inexcusable internment of Japanese Americans, it is still worthy to wonder how the redress bill came to pass in Congress. This article addresses the following questions: What were the most significant issues discussed in Congress regarding the redress bill? To what extent were they affected by contemporary political and judicial developments?

It seems that the best way to answer these questions is to examine and analyze the debates that culminated into its passage. By reviewing the priorities and positions of congressional members in their debates over the redress legislation, it is possible to reveal the influence of historical developments at the time. Two phenomena are specifically addressed: lobbying and lawsuits. The former concerns the Japanese American activist organizations and political leaders who engaged in heavy lobbying efforts for redress in the 1980s. The main lobbying arms were the Japanese American Citizens League, the National Council for Japanese American Redress, and the National Coalition for Redress and Reparations; the Japanese American congressional members were Senator Spark Matsunaga, Senator Daniel Inouye, Congressman Norman Mineta, and Congressman Robert Matsui. The lawsuits are four cases: Hohri v. United States, Korematsu v. United States, Hirabayashi v. United States, and Yasui v. United States. The first one was a class-action lawsuit led by NCJAR leader William Hohri; the three others were coram nobis cases. In order to determine the influence of the aforementioned political and legal developments on the congressional debates over redress, the Congressional Record transcripts from the 1987 House debate and the 1988 Senate debate will be analyzed. This allows for a critical review of the thought process leading up to the passage of redress legislation. Thus this paper intends to explore the direction and development of congressional debate on redress in the historical context of JA activist lobbying and lawsuits during the 1980s.

BACKGROUND: LOBBYING

The political and institutional environment of the 1980s was initially not conducive to redress. For instance, the Japanese American electorate was small and had little influence over politics.[1] In a government system in which officials are elected by majority vote, politicians had little incentive to cater to Japanese Americans. However, activist groups stood up to the challenge of compelling Congress to pass redress. Three Japanese American activist groups were instrumental in promulgating and pushing for redress legislation: Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), National

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Council for Japanese American Redress (NCJAR), and National Coalition for Redress and Reparations (NCRR). They focused on one main plan “to wage a far-reaching campaign utilizing the media to educate the public about the World War II incarceration and to build coalitions of groups willing to support the legislative effort.”[2] In order for congressional members to notice and heed the call of Japanese Americans, the activists needed to expand their base. The following is a brief history, position, and actions of the aforementioned organizations.

Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) The JACL began as an umbrella organization of existing Japanese-American activist organizations. It played a significant role during the war and postwar periods especially regarding the representation and rights of Japanese-Americans. During the war, its Executive Secretary Mike Masaoka spearheaded a campaign to depict Japanese-Americans as loyal U.S. citizens. For instance, he presented cold, calculated logic to promulgate JACL support for and full compliance with internment.[3] At the time, Japanese Americans felt unassimilated and as a result, sought to hyper-identify themselves as Americans. JACL members believed that following government evacuation orders was the only safe way to prove loyalty to America and flaunt the authenticity of their citizenship.

Although JACL officially supported the government decision to relocate Japanese Americans, it became a significant lobbying arm for redress in the late 20th century. The JACL first proposed several recommendations for redress which, though not all implemented in the final legislation, became a foundation and framework for the redress movement. In order to achieve this cause, the JACL strived to define Japanese-Americans not only as loyal but also as super patriots. This time, it was to emphasize the indispensable function of the Nisei in the American military during World War II. Even while their parents were incarcerated, young Japanese Americans enlisted in the military and fought as, for instance, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team which became the most decorated American unit of its size in World War II.[4] The JACL emphasized the role of the Nisei, second generation Japanese Americans, who enlisted to fight for America during the war, and used them to represent the entire Japanese American community in the United States.

However, it took a rather conservative approach in their movement for reparations: the organization extensively lobbied Congress to create and maintain an investigative commission to determine the effects of the internment through compiling oral histories and official studies and to make legislative recommendations as needed.[5] Through this action, JACL initiated a positive feedback cycle towards redress legislation: Congress created the commission, and the commission’s proposals influenced Congress in turn by being written into the redress legislation that Congress debated and eventually passed.

National Council for Japanese American Redress (NCJAR) The NCJAR formed as a reaction to JACL’s conservative approach they

Hamamoto | 13 proposed. Led by William Hohri, the NCJAR was created in 1979 in opposition to JACL’s decision to lobby for a study commission. The members of NCJAR argued that internment itself was unjust and there was no need for an investigative commission.[6] Rather, the government should accept their wrongdoing, apologize, and pay reparations. The JACL promoted the relatively inexpensive cost of the commission as its strong point. However, once JACL successfully lobbied for the commission in 1979, NCJAR decided that the congressional route was a lost cause and that the best alternative was to argue in the courts for redress.[7] Seeing that Congress was supportive of JACL’s less expensive and more conservative approach, the NCJAR turned to the courts and spearheaded a class-action lawsuit. This lawsuit, Hohri vs. U.S., was filed against the federal government for its “forced exclusion” and placement of Japanese-Americans in “prison camps” during World War II.[8] The lawsuit played a significant role in shaping congressional debate on the redress and indirectly convincing Congress to affirm the redress legislation.

It was the greatest NCJAR influence on redress bill and was of great importance in the debates. Furthermore, in order to achieve their goal as a Japanese American representative activist group, the NCJAR under Hohri conducted other lobbying measures as well. By using the media, the NCJAR was able to accomplish two goals: 1) promulgate its name and stance on Japanese American issues, and 2) disseminate their actions and the rationale behind them. The NCJAR publicized the internment and redress issues to the public in an attempt to raise funds and political awareness.

National Coalition for Redress and Reparations (NCRR) On July 12, 1980, the National Coalition for Redress and Reparations was formed by a network of grass roots groups and activists in order to educate Japanese Americans and Asian Americans about the internment experience.[9] Like the NCJAR, the NCRR often challenged the strategy of the JACL with regards to redress. While the group as a whole officially agreed with JACL’s commission strategy, they preferred a more “publicized program of public demonstrations, angry confrontations, petition-and letter-writing and maximum media exposure”.[10] Therefore, put succinctly, the NCRR’s lobbying strategies involved protest, petition, and publications. These actions expedited and facilitated information flow to the general public and broadened the base of redress supporters.

To a great extent, members of the NCRR promoted their cause and garnered publicity for the unjust internment of Japanese Americans. In a canny resemblance to the purpose, plans, and action of the NCJAR, the NCRR sought monetary reparations from the legislative body and justice from the judiciary. Though the NCRR was a younger, less-structured organization, it succeeded in its goal and produced significant results. [11]

SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE AMERICAN ACTIVIST ORGANIZATIONS TO CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES

The lobbying efforts of the JACL, NCJAR, and NCRR were important, because they disseminated stories of actual internment survivors that previously could not have been widely available. They also campaigned vociferously for redress, which helped spread the issue to citizens and politicians. This was significant, because there were many Americans who had not studied the issue extensively or did not know much about it.

For instance, Senator James Exon of Nebraska claimed initial ignorance on the subject of Japanese-American internment during the debates over the redress legislation.[12] Though he did not directly attribute his understanding of the issue to the activist organizations, there is credence to the claim that he was influenced by their grassroots efforts. During his

floor time, Senator Exon mentioned that his colleagues Senators Spark Matsunaga and Daniel Inouye represent Japanese Americans and their loyalty.[13] During the Second World War, Matsunaga and Inouye had served in the 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. This is essentially the representation that the JACL was pushing for in the postwar years. JACL members, amongst other activists, emphasized the loyalty and “American-ness” of the Japanese Americans who served during the war.

Indeed, the organization with the greatest influence over Congress was the Japanese American Citizens League. Due to its political connections in D.C., the organization’s lobbying efforts were fruitful. The JACL’s influence came from the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment Camps (CWRIC), which is a group JACL lobbied extensively for. The redress legislation, The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, was primarily based off the findings of the CWRIC and included all of its recommendations.[14] This spurred Congress to admit that the internment was unjust and a grave mistake. Indeed, the text of the legislation refers to the commission and finds its findings to be true: “As the Commission documents, these actions were carried out without adequate security reasons and without any acts of espionage or sabotage documented by the Commission, and were motivated largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership.”[15] The aforementioned sentence is a powerful statement. These “real” reasons for internment laid out by Congress through this legislation contradict the military’s stance at the time of internment which was mired in the false anxiety of military necessity. They also determine these reasons for internment unsubstantiated presuppositions and unacceptable imprudence. This admission necessarily shaped the debates in the congressional chambers. A singular example of this effect is found in the words of Representative David Edwards Bonior of Michigan who asserted: “[T]he Civil Liberties Act of 1987 acknowledges the fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation and internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry during World War II.”[16] The congressional legislation that was heavily influenced by the investigative congressional commission is being used as evidence for the arguments of congressional members. In addition, the commission that JACL helped to establish influenced congressional debates in other ways.

By analyzing the vehement discussions over the redress bill, it is possible to identify several recurring themes of discourse.

MAKING AMENDS, MISTAKES AND PROGRESS

The very admission that the internment was a national blunder by CWRIC led to one of the themes present in the congressional debates: the redress legislation is the means through which Congress is able to admit its mistake, move forward, and not make the same mistake in the future. In the Senate chamber, there were several who openly admitted that the internment of Japanese Americans was a “mistake.”[17] Several senators called upon traditional American ideals of “justice”[18] and “freedom”[19] as a contrast to the internment decision. Although America was founded on the principles of “liberty and justice for all” and “equality under the law”, there was a denial of basic human and citizenship rights to Japanese Americans during the Second World War. The stark contradiction between the ideals professed and the actions actually taken amplified the extent to which America erred on the side of

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14 | Debating Under the Influence injustice. Senator Wilson captures the essence of the argument for redress by referring to America’s distinctly noble treatment of those within her borders: “[Congressional members] had lapse of judgment and, very candidly, a lapse of the mind, of spiritual courage that is necessary to right these wrongs in this country where we prize justice, in this country where we have welcomed succeeding waves of immigrants, recognizing that in each came the richest resource of this Nation, adding to our strength by adding to our diversity, even as these new generations of immigrants sought to be assimilated and take advantage of the opportunity that has been the fundamental meaning of this land for one wave immigrants after another.”[20] Particularly in his speech, Senator Wilson described the greatness and generosity of the United States as a contrast to the unjust and inhumane treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II. This magnanimous characterization of America is meant to portray the U.S. as a country with a heart large enough to admit mistakes, make amends, and move forward. Other congressmen have also made similar statements.

[21] Indeed, by expounding on the distinguished qualities of the United States, Senator Wilson, along with others, promulgates this particularly unpalatable chapter of American history as an aberration. The reasons described in such congressional narratives are similar to those declared by the commission that the JACL helped to create: racism and wartime hysteria. Due to the CWRIC report’s comprehensive research and blunt conclusions regarding the reasons for internment, Congress accepted these phenomena as true more than forty years later.

Moreover, as the American government could not prepare and prevent the internment decision after it had been implemented, the question pervading the chamber was how to repair and repent. Supporters of redress argued that reparations must be passed in an attempt to reconcile the principles America was founded on and the aforementioned ideals Americans live by. Indeed, the act looked to the future and contained wording with a precautionary tone.[22] Those congressmen who supported the redress bill thus declared that such legislation will prevent similar mistakes in the future. For instance, Senator James Exon of Nebraska used his floor time to express these sentiments: “The [redress] bill offered by the Senator from Hawaii may set the record straight that if we have made mistakes in the past we learned from them and will not let it happen in the future.” [23] In a sense, these statements made by Senator Exon and others in the redress debates could be interpreted as a way for the United States to legislatively and monetarily lower the curtains on a shameful chapter in history. However, it is perhaps more accurate to view this argument as the congressional adoption of a progressive view of history: the idea that the United States is a country that improves over time. Congressional members declared that the redress bill will allow America to accept and atone for such mistake in order to prevent similar ones in the future.

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF A CLASS-ACTION LAWSUIT

When Congress was won over by the JACL, which proposed the creation of a study commission, the NCJAR entered the redress movement in attempts to sway the courts. While the JACL motivated the passage of

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the redress bill through extensive lobbying and glorification of Japanese American loyalty and history, the NCJAR became a main driver through judicial means. In 1983, William Hohri, head of NCJAR, led his organization in a class-action lawsuit against the U.S. government for the internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War. It called for $27 billion dollars through a specific formula: the plaintiff found 22 causes of action and demanded compensation in the form of $10,000 per cause for 120,000 former internees.[24] Thus, the mammoth compensation of this NCJAR suit shaped congressional debates to revolve around the discussion of money.

FINANCE

The effects of the class action lawsuit on the congressional redress debate were substantial. This was due to the fact that the NCJAR lawsuit was significantly more aggressive in achieving justice through compensation.

With the lawsuit being heard in the courts, one of the main areas of contentious debate was money. Indeed, there was much discussion over the financial merits and demerits of the redress legislation. Rep. Barney Frank put the supporters’ viewpoint best when he uttered these words on the House floor: “Under this bill, people who accept the compensation offered-and should not say, “compensation,” because it is not meant to be and it is not by any means full compensation people who accept that settlement may not proceed with the lawsuit. So this might well save the Government money.

Nobody can be sure. I would not bet on the success of that lawsuit, but there is a lawsuit pending, and what we are saying is that here is an offer of a settlement, and if you accept that, then you are out of the lawsuit It is an absolute bar to people pursuing the lawsuit, where if they are allowed to sue the Government and the Government is admittedly at fault, the damages would be far greater than anything in here.”[25] Essentially, Frank compared the payout of the pending NCJAR lawsuit and the legislation at hand. He argued for reparations from a fiscal standpoint: the class-action lawsuit would require the government to pay more than it would under the redress bill. In the Senate, Stevens expressed similar sentiments regarding the financial aspect of the debate and explains why the cost of waiting for a court decision will be higher: “If you were in court—incidentally there is still one case pending, maybe two—in court, the jurors would have the duty of determining what the compensation should be not only in terms of actual compensatory damages, but in terms of punitive damages, too”[26] Stevens conveyed that, regardless of the court decision in the NCJAR lawsuit, a court decision in general would cost the U.S. government much more than the redress bill the Congress was debating. Knowing most senators have studied the judiciary system and understand the process of awarding damages, Senator Stevens used this information to express the prudency of an affirmative ballot for the redress legislation. In fact, he explicitly claimed that the bill is relatively less expensive than what the government would pay if the courts decided compensation.[27] Indeed, the threat of the $27 billion NCJAR lawsuit was not without its influence on representatives’ mindsets about the redress legislation.

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF CORAM NOBIS CASES

By the 1980’s, the judiciary was the only institution that did not revisit the internment of Japanese Americans.[28] However, this fact was about to

Hamamoto | 15 change with the reopening of Supreme Court cases related to internment.

The three cases involved three Japanese American citizens who knew they were innocent: Gordon Hirabayashi, Fred Korematsu, and Minoru Yasui. Their stories are as follows.

Instead of complying with evacuation orders, on May 16, 1942, Gordon Hirabayashi arrived at a local FBI office in Seattle with lawyer Arthur Barnett and a four page document listing reasons why he refused to obey the policy; he was subsequently arrested.[29] Like Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui purposely violated curfew orders and attempted to become a test case by turning himself in at a local police station.[30] Fred Korematsu was arrested on the streets of San Leandro, California for ignoring evacuation orders and faking his identity as a man of Spanish-Hawaiian origins.[31] Though in different ways, all were one in their spirit to fight injustice. Soon after their apprehension, Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu teamed up with a number of lawyers to appeal their cases to higher courts. In the three cases, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government and upheld its actions as constitutional. For decades, the Supreme Court decision was an albatross around the necks of these three men. However, in 1983, Peter Irons, a political science professor at the University of California, San Diego along with attorney Dale Minami, discovered government’s conscious mishandling of crucial evidence and filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis to reopen the cases.[32] After an arduous trial, more than forty years after the initial ruling, the Supreme Court vacated the conviction of the three plaintiffs (but failed to address the legal precedent of internment). While the issue of internment was largely unaddressed, the new ruling upheld the innocence of the plaintiffs, Korematsu, Yasui, and Hirabayashi, who were three of the numerous victims of an unjust government policy. The ruling also essentially emasculated the military necessity basis for internment that the military had clung to for years.

RESPONSE OF CONGRESS

The debate over redress in Congress was affected by the lawsuit filed by NCJAR as well as the coram nobis cases of Korematsu and Hirabayashi.

Analyzing the debates over the redress legislation reveals priorities and positions of the congressional members, the most crucial issues they discussed, and the rhetoric they employed. Indeed, as the Supreme Court cases resurfaced and with the class-action lawsuit being heard in the courts, congressional members reopened the forgotten, or rather ignored, constitutional wound that the internment decision had inflicted years before. Redress supporters specifically shaped their arguments to promote the Constitution as a reason to pass redress bill, portray Japanese American as loyal citizens who were denied constitutional rights, and hearken back to several moments in judicial history that were similar to the contemporary situation.

CONSTITUTION

With the Supreme Court hearing cases involving the internment, much emphasis was placed on the Constitution in the debates. This theme pervaded the congressional chambers: the forced relocation was a constitutional travesty, and reparations were one way to redress such wartime government wrongs. One goal of the congressional members was to emphasize the significance of Constitution in the redress debates. A specific, powerful rhetorical strategy came into fruition through the efforts of Congressman Mineta, when the House debate was scheduled to take place on the 200th anniversary of the Constitution of the United States, September 17, 1987.[33] Indeed, supporters framed their arguments around the fact that Japanese Americans were citizens who were denied their constitutional rights due to their internment. Several members of

congress explicitly articulated this point. Representative Hamilton Fish IV of New York extensively explained there was precedent for reparations in redressing grievances of citizens who have had their constitutional rights violated by the government.[34] He exuded his support for redress by speaking to the precedents of reparations and alluding to the constitutional grievances faced by Japanese Americans. In a more simplistic manner, other congressmen mentioned purposefully argued that the House should realize that they are debating the redress bill on the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution and that redress was one way to better reflect constitutional principles.[35] These congressional members who supported redress elevated the significance of both constitutional provisions as well as its existence. Indeed, the internment’s unconstitutionality and the value of the supreme law of the land were expounded numerous times in the debates.

CITIZEN AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

In an effort to enhance the issue of constitutionality, redress proponents shaped the debate to focus on citizens and citizenship rights. The Japanese-Americans were represented by the heroic Nisei soldiers of World War II. They were contended to be loyal Americans who fought for the United States against the land of their ancestors while their families and relatives were relocated to concentration camps. While their loved ones were confined in camp behind barbed wire and security guards, these Japanese American soldiers fought valiantly overseas. In fact, these loyal soldiers were part of the most decorated army units in military history such as the 442nd Regimental Combat Team and the 100th Infantry Battalion. The emphasis on the Nisei soldiers was an attempt by congressmen to assimilate those Japanese American citizens who were estranged, abandoned, and violated by the U.S. government during the wartime internment. By glorifying Nisei soldiers and using them to represent the Japanese American populace, congressional members in affirmation of the redress bill made it easier for others to support reparations.[36] Americans had been denied the basic and constitutional rights they deserved, and it was the Congress’s prerogative to revisit and redress the wrongs. Furthermore, in a powerful use of rhetoric, the House legislation was named HR 442 in honor of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, a highly decorated, Japanese American military unit. Every time the House bill was brought up, the number ‘442’ rang throughout the chamber as a constant and emotive reminder of Japanese American loyalty. Overall, the tactics were significant and instrumental in garnering congressional support for redress.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

In light of the fact that the Supreme Court was reviewing the coram nobis cases, Senators and Representatives alike mentioned American judicial history to support the redress legislation.[37] One congressman in particular was Spark Matsunaga, a prominent Japanese American leader of the Japanese redress movement and former soldier of 100th Infantry Battalion. Matsunaga spent a considerable portion of his floor time arguing the history of reparations. In response to senators who argued that reparations were not the appropriate method of redress, Senator Matsunaga declared that our legal and justice system widely acknowledge and use the system of monetary redress and brought up several examples to prove his point: “It has long been regarded as proper for the courts to award monetary damages to individuals who have been unjustifiably injured. The amounts of damages vary widely, of course, ranging from several hundred dollars to well over $100,000, and the vast majority of such awards are for wrongful detentions of only a few days. To cite only a few exam-

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16 | Debating Under the Influence ples, in the case of Bucher v. Krause, a man wrongfully arrested following a barroom scuffle and held in jail for just 1 day was awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages… In Dellums versus Powell, the case stemming from the arrest and detention of demonstrators during the anti-war demonstrators during the anti-war demonstration in Washington, DC on May 1, 1972, compensatory damages in amounts ranging from $120 to $1800 were awarded to those detained for a few hours up to 3 days.”[38] There are at least two striking aspects of Senator Matsunaga’s oration.

One is the undeniable proof that reparations are judicious and have been ordered by the courts. The other outstanding argument was the ratio between length of unjust treatment and amount of reparation. Most of the government offenses were significantly shorter than the years Japanese Americans were forcibly confined in the camps; the monetary compensation was significantly more than what the redress legislation stipulates. By examining and analyzing the history of court rulings, Senator Matsunaga proved to the chamber before him that the redress bill was unquestionably reasonable, and argued for the bill’s passage from a historical standpoint. This emphasis on judicial history is important to note, because the ongoing court cases definitely influenced the debates.

In their own ways, senators and representatives attempted to predict what the courts will decide upon by analyzing past decisions on reparations.

This was primarily because there can be fewer inquiries into the constitutionality or intellect of Congress if it stood in accordance with the Supreme Court.

At this point, it is important to remember that by 1980s both Congress and the President renounced the internment decision or at least inquired as to its legitimacy; only the courts had not reconsidered their position on the evacuation.[39] However, with the reopened cases of Korematsu and Hirabayashi as well as NCJAR’s class-action lawsuit, Congressional members were compelled to pass the redress bill. There was no financial merit in waiting for the court’s decision in Hohri’s case, and court support for the military necessity of internment was no more after the vacated convictions of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui. The former was significant because the solatium sought by the plaintiff was crippling to the economic recovery of the United States. To the $27 billion that could have potentially been set by the courts, the 1.5 billion dollars in the redress bill seemed relatively inexpensive; thus fiscal merits were vigorously debated in both house of Congress. The latter was important because the courts acknowledged the innocence of the internees who had been denied constitutional rights and liberties by a wartime government that had erred on the side of injustice with its internment decision. Furthermore, redress rejecters placed great value on the Supreme Court’s support for internment.[40] Taking away the basis for their negation emasculated their position and efforts. Nonetheless, in accordance with the priorities, values, and considerations of the courts, the issues debated in Congress revolved around the related issues of constitutionality, citizenship, and judicial precedence. As if to predict the judicial position on reparations, congressional members on both sides of the aisle and in both houses of Congress highlighted the importance of acknowledging the rights of U.S. citizens, righting the wrongs they suffered, and ultimately staying on the constitutional side of history.

CONCLUSIONS

Former NCRR head, John Tateishi once wrote that redress was won because “Congress was convinced that this country has a moral obligation to correct constitutional abuses.”[41] This was essentially the case.

However, it is imperative to realize the many factors were involved in shaping congressional viewpoint on redress. By reading and analyzing

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the transcripts from the redress debates in the House and Senate, it is possible to glean several themes that seem to be under the influence of the political and legal developments of that time. While it is impossible now to delve into the psyche and psychology of congressional members, there is abundant evidence found in the Congressional Record to prove that they were responding to changing political environment of the time period. The Japanese American activist organizations gained traction in members, networks, and influence. The courts dealt with cases that involved American citizens who had their fundamental constitutional rights denied to them by the U.S. government; their sole crime was having a Japanese ancestry. At the end of the day, there was much more to the story than a moral obligation. However, in the era of the redress movement, what mattered most is that power shifted away from the government and into the hands of the people where it rightfully belongs.

NOTES

[1] “With a population that was only on-half of 1 percent of the total population of the country, it was clear that Japanese Americans alone could not win this campaign.” See Tateishi, John and William Hoshino.

“The Japanese American Incarceration: The Journey to Redress.” Human Rights (Spring 2000): 10-11.

[2] Tateishi, Yoshino, 10.

[3] Masaoka penned 12 reasons that the JACL used in justifying its support for internment, a few of which include: loyalty to America, contribution to the U.S. war effort, the consequence of inaction, the futility of protest, etc.

[4] Kennedy, David M. The Library of Congress World War II companion. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007.

[5] Hatamiya, 142.

[6] “Ultimately, the commission process cannot be considered a proper exercise of the democratic franchise, for the constituents lack control.

How many of us who went through the serious effort of gathering our thoughts, committing them to writing, and presenting them under great stress would accept the possibility that they would go unpublished? Were we speaking to the shelves of the National Archives?” Hohri, William.

“Redress as a Movement towards Enfranchisement.” In Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress, ed. R. Daniels, S. Taylor, H. Kitano, & L. Arrington, 196-199. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991.

[7] Hohri, William. Repairing America: An Account of the Movement for Japanese-American Redress. Pullman Washington State University Press, 1988. .

[8] Maki, Mitchell et al. Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese Americans Obtained Redress. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999.

[9] Maki, 90.

[10] Hata, Donald et al. Japanese Americans and World War II: Exclusion, Internment, and Redress. Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1995.

[11] “NCRR also contributed greatly to the movement’s education goal.

Its rallies often received coverage in newspapers and on television, and whenever an advance was made in Washington…they immediately held a press conference or made a public statement.” See Hatamiya, 164.

[12] See 134 Cong. Rec. S4386 (1988).

[13]Ibid.

[14] Daniels, Roger. “Redress Achieved, 1983-1990.” In The Mass Internment of Japanese Americans and The Quest for Legal Redress, ed.

McClain, Charles, 389-393. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994.

[15] See Civil Liberties Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383. 100th Congress, 2nd Session.

[16] See 133 Cong. Rec. 24274 (1987).

[17] Virginia Senator John Warner states that the internment was a “terrible failure of judgment.” See 134 Cong. Rec. S4326 (1988) S4325 He later

Hamamoto | 17 calls it “error in judgment” See 134 Con. Rec. S4328 (1988). In the same debate, Senator Stevens declared, “government made a mistake” in terms of the internment. See 134 Cong. Rec. S4328 (1988).

[18] Michigan Senator David Bonior demanded, “What sense of justice were we hoping to teach our children by this fact?” See 133 Cong. Rec. 24275 (1987). Further, Congressman Norman Mineta, a former internee himself, argued, “Congress enacted legislation in 1942 to implement and it is now up to Congress to demonstrate our national and natural capacity for justice and wisdom.” See 133 Cong. Rec. 24276 (1987).

[19] Representative Don Edwards of California asserted, “The country should rightfully mourn for how loyal American citizens and lawful residents were cruelly deprived of their freedom” See 133 Cong. Rec. 24284 (1987).

In addition, California Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi lamented, “Japanese Americans lost property, finances, and tragically, their freedom.” See 133 Cong. Rec. 24286 (1987).

[20] See 134 Cong. Rec. S4325 (1988).

[21] New Jersey Congressman Peter Rodino exclaimed, “A truly great nation is worthy of its greatness when it recognizes that it has made mistakes. We now have the opportunity to recognize and to redress this grave injustice by passage of H.R. 442.” See 133 Cong. Rec. 24278 (1987).

In the Senate, Washington Senator Daniel Evans stated, “the [redress] legislation would serve as a symbol to all that the United States can come to terms with its tragic mistake…By offering redress to the Japanese-Americans we will invest in a deterrent from future atrocities.” See 134 Cong.

Rec. S4387 (1988). In addition, Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank declared, “This is a great nation. It is a nation, more than any other country in the world, that is successfully struggling with the obligations of being a leading global power in the most human and democratic way.”

[22] One of the purposes of the act is to “discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and violations of civil liberties in the future.” See Civil Liberties Act, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383. 100th Congress, 2nd Session.

[23] See 134 Cong. Rec. S4387 (1988).

[24] See Maki, 125.

[25] See 133 Cong. Rec. 24279 (1987).

[26] See 134 Cong. Rec. S4327 (1988).

[27] Stevens further referred to the fact that it would cost the government hundreds of billions of dollars if a court awarded damages to the Japanese in terms of compensatory and punitive damages. See 134 Cong. Rec. S4329 (1988).

[28] Minami, Dale. “Coram Nobis and Redress” In Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress, R. Daniels, S. Taylor, H. Kitano, & L. Arrington, 200-203. Washington: University of Washington Press, 1991.

[29] Irons, Peter H. Justice at War. Berkeley: University of California, 1993.

[30] Ibid., 81.

[31] Ibid., 93.

[32] Hatamiya, 169-170.

[33] Hatamiya, 153.

[34] See 133 Cong. Rec. 24280 (1987).

[35] Representative Frank, Rodino, and Bonior all mentioned a variation of the following statement made by Congressman Bonior: “I cannot think of a more appropriate way for Members of this institution to celebrate the 200th anniversary of this Constitution than to be discussing this legislation which gets to the heart of that Constitution.” See 133 Cong.

Rec. 24277 (1987). For Congressman Frank’s statement, see 133 Cong.

Rec. 24279 (1987). For Congressman Rodino’s reference, see 133 Cong.

Rec. 24278 (1987).

[36] Senator James Exon of Nebraska, co-sponsor of redress legislation seemed to believe specifically mentioned the two Japanese American

congressmen: “Japanese Americans were just as good Americans as anyone else, and we have ample testimony of that rights here in the U.S. Senate in bot h Senator Matsunaga and his colleague, Senator Inouye, both wounded, decorated, veterans on the side of the United States, like so many Japanese Americans were in World War II.” See 134 Cong. Rec. S4386 (1988).

[37] For instance, California Congressman Tom Lantos argued, “in judicial history, there are examples of compensation being awarded where there have been assaults on civil rights of individual Americans” See 133 Cong. Rec. 24288 (1987).

[38] See 134 Cong. Rec. S4326 (1988).

[39] “Congress, by establishing the CWRIC, had questioned the evacuation. Earlier, President Gerald R. Ford’s Proclamation 4417 in 1976 had admitted the mistake mad in incarcerating Japanese Americans. Only the judicial branch of government had failed to reconsider relocation.”

See Minami, Dale. “Coram Nobis and Redress” In Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress, R. Daniels, S. Taylor, H. Kitano, & L. Arrington, 200-203. Washington: University of Washington Press, 1991.

[40] In her testimony before CWRIC, Lillian Baker, as a representative for Americans for Historical Accuracy, declared that the Supreme Court has the final legal determination and had not overturned their decisions regarding internment. It should be noted that her argument was made in 1981, two years before the Supreme Court vacated the convictions of Japanese American internees: Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui. Understandably, she argues that the lack of official court reversal in position meant the American government had not been wrong about its internment decision. See Baker, Lillian. The Concentration Camp Conspiracy: A Second Pearl Harbor. Lawndale: AFHA Publications, 1981.

[41] Tateishi, 11.

Volume 4

18 | Anti-Government Protests in Thailand

Anti-Government Protests in Thailand: A Political Sociology of Elite and Class Conflict Larry Liu, CAS ‘15 ABSTRACT

This paper shows that the dynamic class relations in Thailand offer some useful perspectives on the current political struggle taking place on the streets of Thailand. Rather than seeing a discontent minority in opposition, which views itself overwhelmed and steamrolled by a majority led by reformist business elites Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra, there is an active class struggle between two elite factions in Thailand, who are vying for political supremacy. In Thailand the struggle takes place among elites, whereby the workers and the farmers principally support one elite faction, the reformists. They stand in opposition to the conservative minority, which has supporters among some businessmen, the monarchy, the military, and the professional middle class.

INTRODUCTION

Since December 2013, an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 people from the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) led by Suthep Thaugsuban have been protesting against the government of Thailand, led by Yingluck Shinawatra, wanting her to resign her post (Peck and Wedel 2014). Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra dissolved the parliament on December 9, 2013, hoping to quell the anti-government protests, but so far it appears that the resolve against the ruling government has merely been strengthened. Political turmoil is nothing unusual in Thai history; there have been 11 successful and seven attempted coups since the country was founded in 1932 (Fischer 2013).

The interesting facts are the dynamics of class politics in Thailand. I argue that the leading driver of current political conflict in Thailand is the contest between conservatives around King Bhumibol, the military and some members of the business elite and the new rich around the Shinawatra family. The former are also supported by the professional middle class around Bangkok, and the latter by the farmers and workers in the populous north and north-east of Thailand.

My analysis seeks to show that there are two elite-based groups: the conservative businessmen in the south, and the populist and reformist businessmen (mainly Thaksin Shinawatra and his family) in the north. The former camp enlists the educated middle-class in Bangkok and surrounding regions, and the latter camp enlists the poor peasants and workers in the northern countryside. It is the inability of the conservative faction to gain power through democratic means that forces them to resort to street protests to overthrow the government of Yingluck Shinawatra that threatens conservative interests with its populist policies.

CLASS RELATIONS AND POLITICS IN THAILAND

This section of the paper is devoted to explaining the effect of class relations in Thailand on the current political tension. John Girling (1996, Chapter 2 and 3) argues that the current class structure in Thailand contains four countervailing powers: civil society, consisting of the urban and professional middle class; military leaders, who are largely beyond parliamentary control (as the history of coup d’états shows); domestic and foreign

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businesses, who constrain political action based on their level of investment confidence; and money-seeking politicians. Each political faction will be analyzed in part.

Civil society consists of the middle class, which includes civil servants, academics, salaried employees of businesses, small businessmen, shopkeepers, and independent professionals. It has generally grown with economic development. The big businessmen dominate the parameters for the subordinate middle class, whose values consist of pragmatism, materialism, and individualism (Girling 1996, 43). There are workers too, but they are generally weakly organized due to technological innovation, precarious work conditions, high labor mobility, unemployment (ibid., 47), and opposition from state power (Brown 2004, 113).[1] On the other hand, since the 1990s there have been some labor protests to organize better health and safety measures in response to many job-related accidents and illnesses, especially among unskilled workers (ibid., 114). But in 2008, only 2% of the Thai workers were members of a labor union.[2] In the decade since 2000 there had been an increase in the rate of profit from 5% to 11% to the detriment of worker wages, which declined as a share of national income (Mounier and Charoenloet 2010). While the middle class professionals mostly support the conservative opposition Democrat camp (Phongpaichit and Baker 2014), the working class solidly backs the reformist Shinawatra government.[3] Besides the workers, there is a class of peasants, who are described as a weak, disorganized entity and play only a small role in the political process (Girling 1996, 50; Neher 1972; Scott 1985), a result of the strictly hierarchical order in Thai society (Hanks 1962; Phillips 1966; Young 1968; Sharp and Hanks 1978). Karl Marx (1852, Chapter 7) had described farmers as a “sack of potatoes”, who generally command a very weak political and economic role, and the history of capitalism usually points to farmers as the losers of modernizing developments (e.g. Frieden 2006). The capitalist transformation of the countryside, indeed, undermined the material interests of the poor peasants. It led to a weakening in the moral authority of the wealthier peasants, as rational laws, property rights, coercion, patronage and market relationships increasingly pervade Thai society (Girling 1996, 51).

But Andrew Walker (2012, 6) would disagree with this account of farmer weakness. He argues that there has been a rise in the so-called ‘middle-income peasants’, whose livelihoods are relatively secure and who demand greater political power. He explains the rise of pro-Thaksin forces in terms of the middle-income peasants as his supporters. This statement has to be qualified by the fact that most peasants are still poorer than the urban middle class. Also, contrary to Marxists’ observation of a squeezed peasantry, the farmers have benefited from state subsidies going as far back as the 1970s (ibid., 8). Hundreds of peasant unions had formed, and they formed protest groups that went to the capital of Bangkok to resist rising rents, interest rates, and foreclosures (ibid., 14). These actions indicate some degree of organized political strength among the peasants. However, while 71% of the employment of the Thai economy was in agriculture in 1980,

Liu | 19 this proportion has decreased to 40% in 2012[4], which implies a greater shift to the urban proletariat and a manufacturing- and service-sector workforce (Aemkulwat 2010). Furthermore, even though livelihoods in the rural north and north-east have generally improved, they still lag behind those in central and south Thailand (Walker 2012, 219-20).

The military had long been a political stronghold in Thailand. It ruled the country for over half a century thanks to the control of the bureaucracy (Girling 1996, 25; Ungpakorn 2010). The military leaders have also benefited from owning state enterprises and banks, and receiving appointments to Thai-Chinese businesses (Cooper 1995, 379). Its most direct way of influencing the country’s politics was through the coup d’état (Girling 1996, 25). The military junta that then takes over generally gives first priority to maintaining their power and protecting corporate interests (ibid., also see Suksamran 1984). The military junta has generally opposed democratic principles, even though public statements made them appear that they favored democracy (Cooper 1995, 378-9).[5] From the late 1950s until the 1970s, repressive military regimes under Sarit Thanarat (Prime Minister, 1957-63) and Thanom Kittakachorn (Prime Minister, 1963-73) ruled Thailand. During the student protests of 1973, the students defied military power, and ultimately weakened it (Girling 1996, 27), forcing its removal from power. Its power was further decisively weakened in 1988, when the government under Chatichai Choonhavan removed General Prem Tinsulanond from power (Ganesan 2004, 26). But only three years later, in 1991, the military under General Suchinda Krapayoon carried out a coup against the government, leading to the takeover of a caretaker government lasting one year. The Chuan Leekpai government that ruled from 1993 to 2001 with some interruption in between passed several reforms to curb military influence (ibid., 28). The last military coup occurred in 2006, when Thaksin’s popular administration was overthrown. Though the most recent coup is an indication of continued military influence in politics, a better educated, professional, and commercially successful middle class arose from the student protests of the 1970s, and they successfully demanded more liberal democratic rights and more restrictions on military power (Cooper 1995, 344).

Business leaders, who are mostly of ethnic Chinese origin, have played an increasing role in politics, because private sector businesses, especially in banking and finance capital, account for much of the economic growth since the 1970s. There is a large degree of interlocking shareholding in trade and finance. As of the late 1980s, 220 of the 1,399 largest Thai companies were in banking, finance, and insurance, holding 70% of the country’s gross domestic product. Banking capital is controlled by 16 corporate and family groups in 550 enterprises (Girling 1996, 31-32; Hewison 1989). With greater economic concentration and with more perceived security about holding their wealth, bankers and industrialists increasingly asserted themselves politically (Siamwalla 1980), whereas prior to the 1970s, businesses were passive clients, submitting to the army general patrons in return for protection (Girling 1996, 32). Businessmen made up an increasing share of the government cabinet and province and municipal councils, lessening the share of career bureaucrats (Girling 1996, 33; Hewison and Thongyou 1993; Nicro 1993). Many businessmen join the government to secure and cement their property holdings (Girling 1996, 36). The Shinawatra family is the leading exponent of the reformist business elite, though parts of that elite may also fall in the conservative camp. King Bhumibol also features prominently as a business owner. The royal family owns banking, finance, property and industry businesses (Hewison 2004, 239).

In what Girling (1996) referred to as ‘money politics’, he refers to the tight connection between government officials and private-sector businessmen.

Politicians need campaign donations from private-sector businessmen in order to stay in power, and businessmen advance the money in the expectation of larger payback in the form of favorable tax policies (35-36; also cf. Dhiravegin 1992). It is ironically the coexistence of capitalism (the profit motive) and democracy (greater requirement for political competition funded by private campaign funding), which requires politicians to listen to the interests of businessmen rather than of the people, leading to corruption (Girling 1996, 39). Even worse, with the entry of businessmen into politics and their founding of political parties (like Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai), the businessmen’s dependence on traditional politicians decreases, which implies complete domination of business over Thai politics (Pathmanand 1998, 2001). Under the helm of Thaksin, ‘money politics’ turned into ‘big money politics’ (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 356).

The implication is that, overall, Thailand’s society is driven by the elites, who have the political and economic resources to gain their favors and shape the agenda. The common people, farmers and workers, are relegated to the role of the followers of either ruling faction. With the exception of a short time period from 1973-76 when students, workers and even professionals demanded a constitutional reform, common Thai people have no influence on their nation’s government (Girling 1981, 92) despite the claim of a democratic system. People of lower status and organizational ties generally accept their status of inferiority (Girling 1996, 26). The lack of political power of the masses is also reflected in the economic inequality within the country. Thailand is currently the 12th most unequal country in the world, and is the most unequal ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) country (Chin 2013). As I argue, the entrenched political elite generally resists any moves to redistribute wealth and reduce the income gap and wealth gap. But the division into two elite factions indicates that there is some potential for redistribution, because the reformist Shinawatra faction is quite willing to strengthen the rural poor even if only for electoral reasons and reasons of personal enrichment. It is the conservative opposition faction that is losing out strategically by resisting changes in wealth distribution. On the other hand, it is rather unlikely that Shinawatra, who are after all one of the richest families in Thailand, would give up their own wealth, nor would they want to alienate influential property holders, such as investors, who could take their capital out of Thailand in a matter of minutes. Two competing elite factions may have some positive consequences for the poor population, but they may contribute little to narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor in the absence of larger modes of activism among the poor in Thailand.

An examination of the electoral map of 2011 (Figure 1) shows quite clearly the political cleavage in the country. While the northern and north-eastern section of the country are Shinawatra backers, the south and the west are Democrats (conservative faction). Bangkok, which is much wealthier than the rural northeast (see Girling 1981, 87), is largely controlled by the Democrats. Since the northern and eastern portions of the country are more populous than the western and southern portion, there is a structural advantage for Shinawatra. Yingluck’s Pheu Thai Party received 48% of the vote, whilst 35% went to Abhisit (Democrat). Yingluck’s party won the election, even though her brother had been removed from office just a few years earlier. This displays some fundamental changes in rural society and the electoral strength of the peasant masses, who can determine the political outcomes amid the two contending elite factions (e.g. Walker 2012).

A consideration of the wealth distribution in the different regions of Thailand is also fairly instructive (Figure 2). Most of the nation’s wealth is geographically concentrated in the center around Bangkok, which is where much of the conservative opposition is claiming its base (green

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20 | Anti-Government Protests in Thailand and dark green shaded areas). Bangkok’s GDP per capita was $15,830 per capita in 2011. Rayong, to the southeast of Bangkok, is the richest province with $40,277 in GDP per capita, largely thanks to the rise of the car manufacturing sector in that province (Mellor and Suwannakij 2013). Poor people are concentrated in the northern, in particular in the northeastern part of the country. In the northeastern provinces, GDP per capita was less than $1,500 in 2011 (red shaded areas). The poor are solid reformist and Thaksin supporters, and the wealthy are conservative supporters (for Thai people’s voting patterns see Hewison 2013a, 193-4).

Figure 1: Electoral Map in Thailand Parliamentary Elections 2011 (Pheu Thai party in red, Democrat party in blue). Source: Wikipedia

< $1,500 $1,500 - < 3,000 $3,000 - < 5,362 $5,362 - < 10,000 $10,000 - < 15,000 $15,000 - < 20,000 >$ 20,000+

Figure 2: Thai Provinces by GDP per capita in US$ in 2011. National Average is $5,632. Source: Wikipedia

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES SINCE THE 1990s

The class nature of Thai politics arises from Thailand’s history, its social and economic policies since the 1990s, the actions of the Thaksin regime from 2001 to 2006, and the institutional framework guiding these policies.

Institutionally, the Thai economy has been built on cheap labor, a stable government, and a reasonably well maintained infrastructure. Weak environmental and labor safety regulations were another major source of attraction for foreign investments in the country, which would permit flourishing economic development. Cheap labor stayed cheap due to a lack of public investment in social services, pensions and health insurance (Terwiel 2011, 282-3). Thailand’s institutional framework was intended to keep the cost of doing business down in order to attract foreign investment, even if that meant accepting growing income inequality and continued

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disadvantage for the nation’s poor people. This framework is conducive to the populist policies, promulgating the interests of the poor, of Thaksin Shinawatra in the early-2000s.

But laying out the institutional context is not enough to explain the rise of Thaksin to political power. A particular set of economic circumstances made Thaksin’s turn to populism more favorable. The major economic event that dominated Thai politics in the 1990s was the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which hit Thailand particularly hard. Prior to that Thailand was celebrated as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The growth in real GDP from 1987 to 1996 was about 10% per year (Vines and Warr 2003, 440).

When the crisis hit, many troubled Thai banks had to call in their loans and declare losses on the savings of depositors, which forced many businesses into bankruptcy. When the government devalued the currency, imports became more expensive and living standards were lowered by 25% in 1997 (for a summary of the Asian financial crisis in Thailand see Balaam and Veseth 2008, 159-161). The positive consequence of baht devaluation was an increase in exports, which accounted for much of the economic recovery in the 2000s (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 127). Some banks were merged, whilst others were dissolved, but a few years after the crisis, the banks were performing better than during the crisis (Chansarn 2005).

The Democrat Party used state funds that were raised by taxing the poor to pay off the non-performing loans after the 1997 financial crisis (Ungpakorn 2007, 27). A total of 1.2 trillion baht of public money was set aside to save the Thai banking system (Ungpakorn 2010). An IMF bailout plan was accompanied by some structural adjustment, which involved principally a lowering of domestic consumption and living standards and imports, and attempts to increase exports by devaluing the currency. But empirical research shows that due to obstacles like investment in the wrong sector and declining demand for regional export did not really increase immediately after the crisis, which meant that the majority of the adjustment costs came out of a lowering in domestic living standards (Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier 2000).

These class-conscious government and IMF-induced policies had negative consequences on the living standards of Thai workers. The unemployment rate in Thailand was 8% in 1999. The government withheld contributions to the social insurance fund of private-sector workers, and prevented the passage of an unemployment insurance bill (Ungpakorn 2010). Workers faced a 12.6% decline in earnings in the first half of 1998, and a 4.4% decline in hours in the same time period (Kakwanee and Po-tong 1998).

Health authorities also reported an increase in underweight children born to low-income mothers during the crisis. The number of children dropping out of school also increased during the crisis (Ungpakorn 2010).

It was in the context of austerity for the poor that Thaksin’s political campaign on behalf of the poor gained traction (Ungpakorn 2010; Terwiel 2011, 287). Thaksin ran on the popular platform of improving city infrastructure, creating an affordable, universal medical insurance system, increasing subsidies into the rural areas, privatizing state companies, and fighting the war on drugs (Terwiel 2011, 288).

Thaksin’s political philosophy was to run the country as a business, rather than like a bureaucracy. He wanted to accelerate economic development by promoting domestic capital while attracting foreign investments. He promulgated the “new social contract” by which wealth could be spread, namely that welfare and credit should be extended to the poor; opposition shall be absorbed into his party or eliminated; authority needs to be cen-

Liu | 21 tralized within the government; media, intellectuals and civil society should be controlled and dispersed to prevent political turmoil; and the society shall be disciplined with cultural campaigns (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 355). His economic philosophy was to shift from an economy comprising solely cheap labor to a model that supports stronger internal demand and entrepreneurship (ibid., 104). Successful economic development in Thailand also meant an increase in state infrastructure investments, for which he set aside 2.4 trillion baht (ibid., 127). Thaksin also thought that introducing peasants and the poor to the market system would be crucial in maintaining development (ibid., 129). Support for rural areas was crucial for Thaksin from an electoral standpoint, because by fostering local elites and warlords (jao pho) in rural areas, Thaksin hoped to choke off the political influence of his opposition (Ganesan 2004, 31). Support for the poor had the objective of strengthening consumption. Besides a universal health insurance scheme, Thaksin also implemented cheap life insurance, low-cost housing, cheap computers and televisions, credit for buying taxis, and loans for bicycle purchases (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 107).

The downside of a loan-heavy policy was a substantial increase in private household indebtedness (ibid., 108-9, 130). Besides his popular campaign platform, Thaksin also benefited from a strong anti-incumbent mood following the 1997 Asian financial crisis (ibid., 29) Political observers and members of the opposition had denounced Thaksin’s effort for being overly populist and unrealistic to implement, but Thaksin achieved his goals. Medical care for the poor was implemented, subsidies for rural communities were increased and small entrepreneurs received more credit (Terwiel 2011, 288). He created a village fund and the ‘one Tambon, one Product’ campaign, which are rural subsidies from the government (Ungpakorn 2007, 24). The middle class and the conservative faction may have been opposed to expanding medical care to the poor, but Thaksin successfully implemented his agenda to endear himself to the rural poor, who enthusiastically supported his government.

When a major earthquake in Sumatra, Indonesia struck on December 26, 2004, Thailand’s west coast was hit with huge waves; 5,400 people died and another 2,850 went missing (Terwiel 2011, 289). Thaksin’s response was swift: he ordered and mobilized emergency units, cutting through red tape and avoiding delays. In the next election on February 6, 2005, Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party won 374 of the 500 seats compared to the Democrats’ 96 seats. Thaksin used the parliamentary majority for his own benefit by exempting certain businesses, including his own, from paying income taxes, thus saving himself $600 million in taxes (ibid., 290). Thaksin did serve his poor constituency, but he also used his political office for personal enrichment. Besides this, Thaksin was also attacked for his sharp anti-drug operations, which led to the deaths of 2,500 people (Cropley 2006). In the Tak Bai incident of 2004, Thaksin deployed the military to disperse anti-government protesters in southern Thailand, leading to the deaths of about 90 people.[6] Besides promoting populist policies for farmers, Thaksin was also a staunch supporter of big business (Ungpakorn 2007, 16). He negotiated a free trade agreement with the US (Ahearn and Morrison 2005), which critics allege works against the interests of Thailand’s farmers by reducing tariffs on agricultural products as well as against poor patients who have to spend more money over a longer period on patent- protected US drugs.[7] This agreement did not pass, because Thaksin was deposed, and the next government did not conclude the negotiations. Thaksin also advocated the privatization of state industries for the reduction of the state budget burden and the creation of revenue for his government programs. The state oil company PTT was privatized under Thaksin’s rule, a measure that

protesters demand to be reversed (Cartalucci 2013). During that privatization, some of Thaksin’s cronies acquired large holdings of the oil company (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 120).

The conservative opposition became impatient with Thaksin’s rule, and resented his pro-poor policies (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 357).

Enormous protests were organized by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which had its base in the south and in Bangkok, especially among wealthy people, Democrat party politicians, conservative factions of police, military, academics, doctors and lawyers (Terwiel 2011, 291). Small shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, NGO’s, civil society groups, state enterprise union activists, old democracy activists, journalists, intellectuals, poets, musicians and artists also supported PAD and opposed Thaksin (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 357). The movement was led and financed by the media tycoon Sondhi Limtongkul (Ungpakorn 2007, 34). This strong opposition caused Thaksin to call early elections for April 2006 (Terwiel 2011, 291).

But because the judicial court had discovered an irregularity in the ballot box, the April election was considered null and void, and new elections were called out for October 2006. In September, Thaksin traveled to New York for a UN plenary session, but the military carried out the coup during his absence from home (ibid., 292). In economic terms, Thaksin’s fall implied a slump in economic growth. GDP growth in 2007 was 4.5%, which was lower than in other comparable Asian countries such as Vietnam, China or India (Nidhiprabha 2009, 173).

What follows is an evaluation of the policies of Thaksin’s successors, especially those of prime minister Surayud, Abhisit and Yingluck. Under the Surayud regime, which was overseen by the military junta, the 30 baht treatment fee in the universal health care scheme was scrapped, at least for the very poor. But in return funds for health care were dramatically slashed, while military spending increased drastically (Ungpakorn 2007, 17). The latter move is not surprising since the military had lost influence, power and money during decades of parliamentary rule (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 359). Under the guidance of the military, the government also passed a significant increase in the salary of the junta.[8] The interim government of Surayud displayed a clear preference for propping up the military, while hurting the poor constituency of Thaksin. This political constellation may, in part, explain the continued popularity of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party, which was banned and later reconstituted as People’s Power Party (Terwiel 2011, 293).

Infrastructure and education spending were curtailed under the Democrat government (Nidhiprabha 2009, 187). Surayud carried out a merger of the state telecom companies TOT and CAT.[9] It repealed an excise tax for telecom use that was implemented by Thaksin.[10] In the field of education, Surayud cancelled Thaksin’s one-laptop-per-child program, which would have given a laptop to every school child, citing this expense to be ‘unrealistic’.[11] Surayud also cancelled Thaksin’s plans to install PCs in every public secondary school in Thailand.[12] Thaksin’s scholarship program for poor families was expanded with income eligibility requirements increasing from 100,000 baht to 150,000 baht.[13] In terms of economic policy, in 2007, Surayud created the first budget deficits since 2003, involving 146 billion baht. But the government blamed the deficit on the rice subsidies and health care program for the poor approved by Thaksin.

[14] Consequently, the new government canceled the subsidies for the rice farmers, a key constituency for Thaksin. Rice prices were lowered.[15] In response to farmer protests, the government added debt-relief measures for farmers.[16] Surayud also canceled the Million Cows project, which lent cows to farmers, who could make money from selling the cow milk.[17] The baht appreciated in value, which the government addressed with cap-

Volume 4

22 | Anti-Government Protests in Thailand ital controls. But Thai stocks had lost $22 billion in value as a result of the controls (Wong and Boey 2006). Despite foreign protests, Surayud amended the Foreign Business Act to limit media, telecom and aviation firms from having more than 50% foreign ownership.[18] Surayud approved of Thaksin’s plans to expand the mass transit rail system.[19] Censorship of the internet and other means of communication increased under Surayud, even more so than under Thaksin.[20] In December 2006, Surayud set up a 14,000 troop secret military division to crack down on anti-government activities.[21] Despite all the efforts by the military and the Council for National Security to discredit Thaksin’s faction, the first elections since the coup went to the PPP led by Samak Sundaravej (Terwiel 2011, 294). Significant anti-government protests led the PPP to depose him in September 2008, and replace him with Somchai Wongsawat (ibid., 296). In the ensuing protests, Chaovarat Chanveerakul became interim prime minister, and several PPP politicians broke ranks to support the Democrat, Abhisit Vejjajiva, to become prime minister. The three prime ministers, Samak, Somchai and Chaovarat, served too short time periods in office to evaluate their policies.

Abhisit Vejjajiva’s first duty in office was to address the economic crisis, which had led to a significant increase in the unemployment rate in Thailand, with two rounds of stimulus packages. The first round passed in January 2009, and involved a scheme where 2,000-baht checks were handed out to people with monthly income lower than 15,000 baht.[22] A second stimulus program in May injected 1.4 trillion baht into the economy through government infrastructure spending.[23] The ‘Ton Kla A-cheep’ program is a training program for 500,000 unemployed graduates.[24] The government also passed a 15-year free education guarantee for students.[25] Seniors, who previously had no pension, became eligible to receive 500 baht per month in pension money.[26] Abhisit also passed a farmer’s income guarantee by negotiating with farmers an adequate income for farmers, and if the market price of the crop was lower than the negotiated income, then government funds would be used to pay farmers for the difference.[27] Under a loan re-negotiation scheme, poor farmers, who were trapped with high-interest lenders, would be able to shift their loans to formal financial institutions at lower interest rates.[28] Abhisit subsidized the price of diesel, gas and electricity by reducing the excise tax on them and spending down the nation’s oil fund.[29] The most frugal 30 million households in terms of electricity consumption were given free electricity, which implied a subsidy from commercial and industrial users.

[30] Toward the end of Abhisit’s term, the government passed a permanent subsidy for free bus and train rides.[31] Abhisit also suggested building a high-speed rail connection with China.[32] Under Abhisit, the number of websites blocked by the government increased to over 50,000.[33] Military spending continued to climb under Abhisit, having doubled from 2006 to 2009 (from $2.4 billion to $4.8 billion) (McCartan 2010).

These policies were fairly progressive, and were summarized as the ‘people’s agenda’. Abhisit’s political intention was clear: the Democrat party is suffering from an electoral disadvantage, because it traditionally stuck to policies favoring the affluent to the neglect of rural groups. In order to gain more electoral support, especially from the poor farmers in the northeast, who harbored about one third of the total Thai population and who were swaying democratic election in the country, Abhisit had to appeal to those farmers with policies and handouts to benefit that constituency (cf. Hewison 2013a, 185-6).[34] This structural political dynamic is fairly exciting, because either party has to win the support of the farmers to win an election. But it did not appear that the voters were convinced. Benefiting farmers and the poor was also undergirded by significant crackdowns,

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as the number of lèse-majeste cases targeted at pro-Thaksin red shirts increased from 5 per year to 100 per year since the fall of Thaksin (International Crisis Group 2011). The red shirt protests against Abhisit continued to intensify, and the 90 people that the military had murdered under order from the Abhisit government, created sufficient public outrage to guarantee the political novice, Yingluck Shinawatra, a majority of the votes in the July 3, 2011 parliamentary elections.

Yingluck Shinawatra’s electoral strategy was very much in the spirit of her older brother, who had persuaded Yingluck to run for office: an emphasis on capitalist growth, but with a priority for developing the poorer north and north-eastern constituency. Yingluck’s premiership created a government subsidy program for the 17 million rice farmers in Thailand. This measure made Thailand’s rice exports somewhat less competitive due to the higher prices for the export markets. Yingluck’s government also increased the minimum wage to $10 a day; and fueled the property boom through a $64 billion infrastructure investment scheme, involving among others the building of high-speed rail to cut down on cross-country travel time. Yingluck has also been pushing for an EU-style common market with the other ASEAN countries by reducing border control on trade (Mellor and Suwannakij 2013). Yingluck’s populist policies had been criticized for benefiting a small share of the population, a clientele. A subsidy for first-time car buyers resulted in a benefit to relatively more affluent people and the car producers rather than the poor. Traffic congestion increased as a result of car subsidies (Warr 2013). But aside from this criticism, Yingluck rules Thailand in the spirit of Thaksin. While business interests are served

by Yingluck, the poor, the farmers and the workers also receive significant benefits. The snap elections set for February 2, 2014 predict an easy victory for the Pheu Thai party. As long as the military does not meddle again in politics, as it did in 2006, Yingluck will continue to remain in office.[35] As long as democracy holds in Thailand, Thaksin’s pro-poor, reformist agenda is prevailing, despite the conservative opposition.

CONCLUSIONS

The dynamic class relations in Thailand offer a useful perspective on the current political struggle taking place on the streets of Thailand. Rather than seeing a discontent minority in opposition, which views itself overwhelmed and steamrolled by a majority led by reformist business elites Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra, I observe an active class struggle between two elite factions in Thailand, who are vying for political supremacy.

The conservative faction, which is backed by the king, the military junta, wealthy businessmen outside Thaksin’s inner circle, a professional middle class and some other entrepreneurs, is the minority opposition movement.

Their interest is to keep the power and the wealth in the capital and prevent a further political empowerment of the rural masses, mainly workers and peasants. As the minority opposition they are forced with their leader, Suthep Thaugsuban, to use protests on the street in order to impose the kind of the rule that they see fit, currently in the form of the unelected “people’s council”.

On the other hand, the reformist business group, led by Thaksin and now Yingluck Shinawatra, received the electoral backing of the poor farmers and workers especially from the populous north and north-east part of the country. Thaksin had promised economic development that would benefit the elites as well as the masses; this had been a fairly effective popular strategy to gain political power. The conservatives can simply not afford to support democratic elections, because the farming and working class majority guarantees electoral victory to the reformist Pheu Thai party.

Yingluck’s Pheu Thai party, in turn, has a strong interest to maintain democratic principles in Thailand. The current situation of intense elite political

Liu | 23 tensions bolstered by mass mobilization (red-shirts vs. yellow-shirts) makes democracy in Thailand inherently unstable, but there are few escape routes that can be offered. The election on February 2 might bring back the necessary legitimacy and, therefore, political stability in Thailand. But a stable democracy requires a political culture that is highly tolerant of the rule of law and accepting of the current ruling political faction.

Currently, there is no such elite consensus in Thailand. The old conservative powers led by the military have been actively trying to reverse democratic gains and undercut the Shinawatra support base by buying off voters with generous social policies, such as Abhisit did. The strategy met with little success—Thaksin and Yingluck’s grip on power remain fairly solid. Dialectically speaking, the conservative powers have to make significant concessions, political as well as economic, to the working masses if they have an interest to ever return back to power. The upward economic trajectory of Southeast Asia in general and Thailand in particular has the implication, on the one hand, that the average Thai person will be better off, and will be better able to independently assert their political and economic rights, perhaps even without the support of the Shinawatra policies, and on the other hand, might imply—at least in the short-run—a wider wealth gap between rich and poor, of which the poor Thai people will become less tolerant. The enormous political mobilization of the pro-Thaksin faction has made the workers and farmers conscious about their political rights in a way that had not existed before and can no longer be suppressed. The most effective elite faction is the one that capitalizes on the rise of the Thai working class and the support for the farmers, as shown by Thaksin Shinawatra.

The last remaining venerable and undisputed entity of Thailand, King Bhumibol, himself is showing signs of decline, and the public is speculating tongue-in-cheek what would happen if the 86-year old king passes away.

Whether the king’s death will be an important indicator of change is subject to debate, yet the fact that social change is already happening in Thailand is undisputed. The question for further research remains how fast these social changes will occur, and in whose interest.

NOTES

[1] Under Thai labor law, workers in the private-sector are generally allowed to join a union, but there are severe restrictions to membership. The union is tied to the employer, and if the union worker loses his job, he loses his union membership.

The numerous migrant workers are barred from joining and forming a union, and state-owned workers have a hard time being part in a union. Migrants must ask their employers to change their jobs or else they may be fired, blacklisted and deported.

Employers tend to ignore labor laws, because they fire workers, who are eligible to join a union and take steps to attain it. Fines for wrongful dismissal are under $300.

Jail sentences for firing union workers has never been enforced. Workers, who get severance pay, are often not reinstated. Human trafficking involving labor, and a poor world economic development have further weakening impacts on unions. http:// www.solidaritycenter.org/content.asp?contentid=902 [2] Solidarity Center, AFL-CIO. “Thailand.” http://www.solidaritycenter.org/content. asp?contentid=902 [3] Independent. “Thailand Anti-Government Protests: 31 People Injured in Bangkok Blast.” Janaury 17, 2014. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/thailand-antigovernment-protests-31-people-injured-in-bangkok-blast-9066205.html [4] World Bank. “Employment in Agriculture (% of total employment).” http://data. worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?page=6 (1980); http://data.worldbank. org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS (2012) [5] General Chavalit, for example, said , “...the army wil, fight against ill practices and injustices in the political, social, and economic spheres... in order to build, as the Thai people always wish, a perfect democratic system of government.” (cited in Bunbongkarn 1987, 68) [6] Justice for Peace Foundation. “The Outrage of Tak Bai.” October 25, 2010. http://

justiceforpeace.org/?p=1111&lang=en [7] Sajin Prachason. “Thailand=US Free Trade Agreement. ‘Whatever We Have to Sacrifice’.”

[8] Nation. “Junta Gets Fat-Cat Allowances.” November 8, 2006. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/08/politics/politics_30018384.php [9] Nation. “Call for End to Policy Corruption.” October 16, 2006. http://www. nationmultimedia.com/2006/10/16/business/business_30016254.php [10] Nation. “Telecom Excise Tax Revoked.” January 24, 2007. http://nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/24/headlines/headlines_30024946.php [11] Bangkok Post. “Education Ministry Axes 3 Schemes.” November 28, 2006.

[12] Bangkok Post. “Education Ministry Axes 3 Schemes.” November 28, 2006.

[13] Bangkok Post. “Scholarship Scheme to Continue.” January 5, 2007.

[14] Nation. “Massive Loss from Thaksin Projects.” November 15, 2006. http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/15/headlines/headlines_30018962.php [15] Nation. “Pridiyathorn Explains Sufficiency Economy Concept to Investors.”

November 10, 2006. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/10/headlines/ headlines_30018585.php [16] Nation. “Cabinet Approves Debt-Relief Measures for Farmers.” January 16, 2007.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Cabinet-approves-debt-relief-measures-for-farmers-30024286.html [17] Bangkok Post. “Ministry Scraps One-Million-Cows Project.” November 29, 2006.

[18] Nation. “Kularb Kaew is Nominee under Revised Act.” Jaunary 9, 2007. http:// www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/09/headlines/headlines_30023662.php [19] Nation. “Govt Set to Unveil 5 Rapid Rail Lines.” Nocember 6. 2006. http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/06/business/business_30018162.php [20] Freedom Against Censors Thailand. “RSF: Thailand- Annual Report 2007.”

February 5, 2007. http://facthai.wordpress.com/2007/02/05/rsf-thailand-annual-report-2007/ [21] Nation. “Secret Military Division Deployed.” December 27, 2006. http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/12/27/headlines/headlines_30022635.php [22] MCOT. “Bt2,000 Cheque Dispersals End at Bangkok City Hall.” March 28, 2009.

[23] AFP, Thailand to borrow $22.9 bln for stimulus: minister, 5 May 2009 [24] ChuaiChart, Stimulus Package 1, 7 October 2010 [25] Bangkok Post. “15yrs of Free Education Programme Launched.” March 18, 2009.

[26] Social Security Online, http://www.chuaichart.com/projects/old-age-pension/ International Update, September 2009 [27] ChannelNewsAsia, [9] Thai rural farmers benefit from new income guarantee programme, 4 May 2010 [28] AARoadsthailand Group Forum, [20] PM to inaugurate informal debt restructuring scheme on 19 Nov, 18 November 2009 [29] The Nation, Korn defends diesel tax reductions, 19 April 2011 [30] The Nation, Companies baulk at funding free electricity for low-income families, 20 April 2011 [31] Nation. “Gov to Extend Subsidies until July.” February 23, 2011. http://www. nationmultimedia.com/2011/02/23/national/Govt-to-extend-subsidies-until-July-30149307.html [32] Nation. “Rail Talks get Cabinet Go-Ahead.” September 8, 2010. http://www. thaivisa.com/forum/topic/396547-thailand-china-high-speed-rail-talks-get-cabinetgo-ahead/ [33] Bangkok Post. “Last One in, Again.” January 6, 2010. http://www.bangkokpost. com/tech/techscoop/30563/last-one-in-again [34] Economist. “Beware the Watermelons.” December 29. http://www.economist. com/node/17803639 [35] Guardian, Reuters. “Thailand’s PM Stands Firm on Election Plan.” January 15, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/15/shots-fired-in-bangkokprotests

Volume 4

24 | Blessed are They who are Open-Minded

Blessed are They who are Open-Minded: An Analysis of the Beatitudes in the Union Edition of the Chinese Bible Gina Elia, ???

Although Protestants constitute only three percent of the mainland Chinese population, in a country whose population measured 1.34 billion people in 2011 according to the website of the Population Reference Bureau, this percentage translates to over forty million people, a significant number.[1] Several scholars, mostly but not exclusively writing in Chinese, have begun to study the social and political dimensions of Chinese Christianity, though fewer studies concentrate on its underlying theology and how it compares to Western Christianity. For a much longer period—almost as long as translations of Christian scripture have existed in China, since the seventh century—much scholarship has been written, in all kinds of languages, examining the nature and methodology of Biblical translation in China.[2] However, few scholars have striven to combine these two fields of study by thinking about the manner in which Chinese translations of the Bible might affect the development of theological thought in China.

In this paper, I propose to study one passage of Chinese Biblical scripture, the Beatitudes (shānshàng bǎoxùn de bāfú 山上宝训的八福) in the Book of Matthew (Mǎtàifúyīn 马太福音).[3] I will examine the terminology used for several key words in the passage that carry implicit assumptions about the way Christians in the West conceive of their faith.

These include the words and phrases “God,” “poor in spirit,” and “Kingdom of heaven.” I will utilize dictionaries and several writings on Bible translation theory in China to first construct an idea of how the Chinese translatons of each of these terms might be conceived in Chinese as opposed to in an English-language Bible. I will then look at the interpretations of the Beatitudes of several Chinese scholars, along with one Western analysis for comparative purposes. With the help of these materials, I will examine the ways in which English-reading and Chinese-reading Christians conceive of the values described in the Beatitudes, and to what extent the translation of any of the terms above plays a role in these two reading traditions. The Chinese dictionaries that I will use, the Hànyīngdàcídiǎn 汉英大辞典 and the ABC Comprehensive Chinese-English Dictionary, were chosen for their ease of use and comprehensive coverage of the Chinese language. The English dictionary I will use is the Oxford English Dictionary, also for its comprehensive nature.

Chinese Protestants are not one homogenous group of people. Based on their background and experience, they inevitably come to the Bible with different expectations and interpretations. One clear example is that in China, both officially registered churches and unsanctioned, unofficial “house” churches exist within Protestantism. These churches do have certain differences in belief and outlook, though it is difficult to conduct studies on this, as the house churches must remain secretive.[4] The official Protestant churches tend to be composed of educated people and to take a more liberal stance on Biblical interpretation. Members of house churches, on the other hand, tend to consist mostly of uneducated people coming from rural areas where there is no strong tradition of orthodox Protestantism to be found.[5] Ironically, this means that house churches often practice a more folk-belief-inspired, heterodoxical form of Protestantism than the government-approved churches, which one might expect would normally be less likely to perpetuate a Western religious tradition in its original form.

[6] Furthermore, there of course exists a socioeconomic and educational distinction between different groups of Protestants. With this paper, I

Penn Asian Review

do not mean to suggest that one unified reading for the Beatitudes exists across all of these groups of people, which indeed is not the case anywhere in the world that the Beatitudes are read. My goal is to rather, through an examination of the translation of certain phrases, suggest a framework for how to conceive of the Beatitudes in a Chinese context, based mostly on the viewpoints of Chinese intellectuals from both the orthodox and unorthodox Protestant traditions. This could be of use for comparative purposes in studies of how more specific groups read the Beatitudes.

A Note on the Chinese Bible Edition Chosen and the Historical Trajectory of Bible Translation in China

There have been many translations of the Bible into Chinese. Evidence exists that some books or even the whole Bible may have been translated as early as the Tang Dynasty, though none of these specimens survive to the present.[7] The first so-called “modern” translation of the entire Protestant Bible was completed by Robert Morrison and William Milne in 1823 (43).

Many more translations followed in the wake of this one.

The makings of the Union Bible (Héhéběn 和合本), the edition referenced in this paper, began in the late nineteenth century (193). It is the most recent major Protestant Bible translation effort using Mandarin, undertaken by foreign missionaries and first published in its entirety in 1919 (328). Although some revisions have been made to the text in the years since it was published, mostly of an editorial nature, the most widely-available version of the Union remains the original translation. This is the primary edition of the Bible used by Protestants in contemporary China (Zetzsche “Work” 77).[8] The Union was translated primarily from the New Revised version of the Bible, with cross-referencing to the original texts in Biblical Hebrew and Ancient Greek.[9] However, in its New Testament translation, this edition of the Bible preserves the Greek meaning to a greater extent than the New Revised version does.[10] Therefore, in addition to using the New Revised text to compare the Chinese translation, I will also compare the original Ancient Greek terms.

Analysis of the Beatitudes

General Comments on the Translation Style of the Beatitudes Before I begin analysis of specific terms in the Beatitudes, I will provide several general comments on the nature of the Union translation that stem from Thor Strandenaes’s study on translation characteristics of various Chinese-language editions of the Bible. Strandenaes points out that whenever a theological or dogmatic issue was at stake in the translation of a phrase, the formal correspondence method of translation from the ancient Greek was employed. Overall, the text was a conservative, fairly literal translation of the Ancient Greek, with heavy reliance on the New Revised version.

[11] The translation attempted to stress the internal conviction of faith that is so important to Protestantism.[12] It also specifically emphasized the Beatitudes as a series of entrance requirements to God’s kingdom, rather than “eschatological blessings.”[13] Both of these effects of the translation may contribute to the fact that the Beatitudes are subtly secularized in the Union Bible, as will be explored in the analyses of specific terms below.

With these general comments in mind, I will now move on to analyses of the translations of some of the key terms of the passage.

Elia | 25

“shén 神” v. “shàngdì 上帝” v. “God” v. “Theos”

The word “God” is used twice in the Beatitudes, in the sentences “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God” and “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God.”[14] The translation of this word has been a matter of intense contention since the first attempts to translate the Bible into Chinese, justifiably—centrally important to Christianity, the translation of this word alone has the potential to direct the course of how the faith as a whole is interpreted and practiced by Chinese Christians. Because so much has been written about the translation of this word into Chinese, I will give a condensed history of the discussion here, paraphrased from Irene Eber’s convenient summary of the affair, and then move on to less-vehemently disputed terminology in the Beatitudes.

In the early days of Bible translation, there was no consensus on what term for God to use. A number of variations existed in various translations, including “shàngdì 上帝”, shén 神”, and “tiānzhǔ 天主”, among others. Over time, as missionaries began to develop arguments for the use of one term or another, “tiānzhǔ” came to be employed more often by Catholics, while Protestants continued to debate over the advantages and disadvantages of “shàngdì” and “shén.”[15] While the arguments between the missionaries were complex, they can be divided into two broad categories. Those who were in favor of the term “shàngdì”, such as missionary Walter Henry Medhurst, believed that the term “shén”, which connoted a group of spirits or ancestors as opposed to one God, was too close to the polytheistic beliefs of the Chinese to be used to refer to the one and only God of the Christian faith.[16] After conducting a thorough examination of the use of both of these terms in many Chinese classics, Medhurst observed that “shàngdì” seemed to always be used in the context of a supernatural being who had never been created, but had always existed, and from whom all creation had been born. He therefore argued that “shàngdì” was the obvious choice for the translation of “God,” or “Theos” in the Greek.[17] In response to arguments that the Chinese had never known a monotheistic God and therefore could not understand the concept of a single God as founder of all creation, James Legge, who supported the use of “shàngdì,” argued that the Chinese classics contained evidence that the Chinese had practiced monotheism at an earlier time in their history.[18] As already mentioned, those who supported the use of “shén,” such as missionary William Boone, argued that this term would be easier for the Chinese to relate to, since they believed the Chinese could only conceptualize of deities in the context of a polytheistic framework.[19] Boone did not agree with Medhurst’s interpretation of the “shàngdì” term, writing that “shàngdì” was simply the proper name of a high-ranking Chinese deity.

[20] In any case, he argued that as a generic term, rather than a proper one, “shén” was more appropriate than “shàngdì” because it implied that God is unnameable, and that only generic terms can be used to refer to him.

The original Greek word “theos,” he pointed out, was a generic term, not a proper one.[21] Eventually, missionaries began to perceive that they needed to ask Chinese people how they interpreted the terms, since it was their perspective as the intended audience that mattered the most, not that of the missionaries.

[22] When queried on the subject, however, the Chinese only added fuel to both arguments. It was concluded from their responses that generally, literate Chinese associated “shàngdì” with Heaven, while both literate and illiterate Chinese associated “shén” with ancestral spirits, both malevolent and benevolent.[23] This would seem to support the argument that “shàngdì” should be used to translate “theos” or “God.” However, the Chinese people queried also generally agreed that “shén” connoted the idea of an unnameable God better than “shàngdì,” which added weight to the opposing argument.[24] Ultimately, the Union edition did not attempt to solve this problem, but skirted the issue, simply publishing two editions of its translation, one with

“shén” as the translation of “God” or “theos” and one with “shàngdì” as the translation of choice. To this day, both Bibles are available in mainland China, and individual Christians can choose which translation they prefer to use. The fact that Chinese Christians are presented with a choice regarding how to refer to God is quite remarkable. This presumably opens up dialogue between Christians in China concerning how best to refer to God, which means that the Christian God’s very representation in language is less definitive than it is in English or ancient Greek. This has several effects.

On the one hand, it emphasizes the impossibility of perfectly representing the concept of God through the human construct of language, as Western Christians also believe. On the other hand, though, the choice also allows Chinese Christians to become divided in how they principally conceive of God, in one or the other of the manners described above. This allows them greater flexibility in how to conceive of God than Western Christians who use the English or ancient Greek texts have.[25]

“Xūxīn 虚心” v. “poor in spirit” v. “ptochos tō pneumati”

The sentence in which this expression appears is, in English, “Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”[26] At first glance, this passage seems strange to a native-level English speaker. The phrase “poor in spirit” conveys a sense of someone whose spirits are low—a description which could potentially refer to those who are miserly, those who are selfish, and those who remain in a state of perpetual depression, among other negative connotations. Yet, given Christian values of selflessness, compassion towards others, and joy in the holy spirit, it seems unlikely that Jesus would claim that people with such negative mindsets could be blessed

by God. In light of these tenets, it makes more sense to interpret this phrase as meaning “humble” or “modest.”

In Rector Robert Eyton’s nineteenth-century analysis of the Beatitudes, he explains that the phrase “poor in spirit” refers to those who are humble because they have been so faith-filled as to have “known God,” and therefore are more aware of their own inferiority in comparison. He further comments tha the reason this phrase is often misunderstood by English speakers is most likely because of the translation “poor” from the original Greek “ptochos.”[27] However, the original Greek word “ptochos,” according to Barclay Newman’s Greek-English Dictionary of the New Testament, is equivalent to the English words “poor; miserable; begging; pitiful or inferior.” “Inferior,” the most similar to “humble” or “modest” of this group of words, has nevertheless a more negative connotation. There is no avoiding the fact, then, that even the original Greek maintains the ambiguity of the phrase.

The choice of the missionaries to translate “poor in spirit” as “xūxīn” therefore reflects their bias that this term be interpreted as “humble” or “modest,” even though other interpretations are possible. According to the Hànyīngdàcídiǎn, the term “xūxīn” means “open-minded; modest; with an open mind.” Nowhere does the entry suggest that “xūxīn” conveys any of the negative connotations that “poor in spirit” does to a native-level English speaker. Thus, in one sense, it may appear that the interpretive bias of the missionaries that resulted in them translating “poor in spirit” as “xūxīn” consequently renders its meaning less vague in the Chinese Bible than in the English or Greek versions. Certainly, this is how it is unambiguously interpreted by many Christian Chinese Protestants, such as Lín Xiàngāo 林 献羔, also known as Samuel Lamb in English (1924-2013) (Lín 14).[28] Furthermore, the translation omits any specific mention of the word “spirit,” present in both the English and Ancient Greek renditions. This may have been done intentionally to avoid the complexity of translating the theologically-significant word “spirit.”[29] In mentioning the “spirit,” the English term references that part of human beings that Christians believe to be supernatural, linked to God. Eyton’s interpretation of the phrase as referring to those who “know God” further highlights the suggestion in the English phrase “poor in spirit” of a link between this world and the world beyond. By eliminating that word altogether, the Chinese expression

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26 | Blessed are They who are Open-Minded remains grounded in the reality of the everyday, and the link between this tangible world and the immaterial world of God fades significantly.

“Xūxīn” was also one of the traits that was valued in ancient Chinese philosophies such as Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.[30] This connotation allows an entryway for other philosophies to meld with the message of the Beatitudes, which are considered distinctly Christian in the West. This characteristic encourages the intersection of different ideologies in a way that the Beatitudes as they are read in the West do not, at least not ideologies outside of the Christian framework. In fact, one of the striking features of Chinese Christians is the way in which many of them seem to seamlessly meld Christian and pre-Christian tradition and belief, without apparently thinking it problematic.[31] The fact that the translation of the Beatitudes into Chinese subtly encourages this combining of philosophies may help to explain why more Chinese Christians do not view mixing folk belief and Protestantism as observance in contradicting systems.[32] The ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary’s entry “xūxīn” adds another layer of complexity to the word. The second listing of its entry reads “timid; fearful.” This definition is noticeably absent from Eyton’s interpretation of the phrase “poor in spirit,” and also differs from the senses of “poor in spirit” in English, according to the Oxford definition of “poor,” and “ptochos” in Greek of “miserable; begging; pitiful.” Thus, the use of “xūxīn” also implies that Jesus approves the possession of a certain kind of fear or timidity, presumably of the Lord. Palpable fear of the world beyond this one is certainly evidenced in Chinese Protestantism. In general, non-orthodox sects believe in the possibility of possession by evil spirits and the necessity of exorcism, ideas which have fallen out of favor with many Western Christians.[33] Many of them also continue to practice ancient funeral rites alongside Christian ones, fearing that the Christian ones alone will not be enough to ward off evil spirits from attacking them.[34] This kind of mixing of traditional and Christian faiths is not uncommon, and marks one of the major differences between Protestantism in China and in the West. The second meaning of “xūxīn” could serve to validate this continued reliance on traditional rites out of fear.

Lín Xiàngāo’s perspective on the Beatitudes is unique of those examined in this paper. He was a pastor of one of the unorthodox house churches, and is famous for speaking out in his life against the orthodox church, which he saw as moving away from the spirit of Christianity, becoming a more bland, government-controlled organization.[35] He sees “xūxīn” as referring to the spirit, thus re-centering the word on the more abstract, theological meaning it conveys in its English rendition.[36] He argues that, though this instruction does not entail that good Christians must necessarily be financially poor, poverty in Ancient Greece may have had something of a correlation to the first Christians who were “xūxīn,” the ones who paved the way for others to follow their lead. He speculates that, having no material wealth to obsess over, they instead turned their entire minds, hearts, and spirits to the consideration of God.[37] Thus, he re-centers the meaning of “xūxīn” on the spirit, but he still connects the trait’s origin to the material world.

“Tiānshàng 天上” v. “heaven” v. “ouranois”

Thus far, I have argued that many of the terms in this passage have been subtly secularized in their Chinese translations. One major argument that might be made in opposition to this is to point out that, regardless of the way these words are translated, the passage is still framed as a list of traits one needs to possess in order to enter heaven, which is quintessentially abstract and otherworldly.

The word “heaven” is used multiple times in the Beatitudes, always translated the same way in English. The original Greek word, which is also the same in each instance it is used, means both “heaven” and “sky.” The Chinese translation uses “tiānguó” for the first mention of “heaven” or “ouranois” and “tiānshàng” for the other, rather than remaining consistent with

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the same word as the Ancient Greek and English texts do. In both Chinese dictionaries, “tiānshàng” is listed as meaning “sky.” It thus denotes the non-religious sense of “heaven” (or “heavens,” more commonly in English), as opposed to “tiānguó,” the usual translation of the word “heaven” when it refers to the abode of God. Using “tiānshàng”in the second instance creates an image of a “heaven” which is somehow entwined with and part of the physical sky, as opposed to being beyond it, as western Christians typically imagine heaven, and as the Oxford confirms.

This melding of spaces is reflected in one of the large difficulties missionaries experienced in trying to convey Protestantism to the Chinese. They noted that the distinction between sacred and secular space was more blurred in China than it was in the West. This made it difficult to convey to the Chinese one of the integral tenets of Protestantism, a conception of one’s relation to God and journey through life as individualistic, private, and cordoned off from one’s experiences in the secular world.[38] The use of the word “tiānshàng” for “heaven” in this passage reinforces this indistinction between secular and religious space.

The conception of heaven as both an abstract entity and a component of the familiar world is present in theologian Wú Léichuān’s (1870-1944) analysis of the Beatitudes. He understands the “Kingdom of heaven” as referring to a society of economic equality—in essence, heaven is for him Communist.[39] It is clear in his theological writings that he conceptualizes all of Jesus’ teachings as centering around one key message, much as the writings of Chinese sages do. He interprets the central message of Jesus’ teachings to be the glory of the “Kingdom of heaven” and the salvation it provides. Therefore, having concluded that the entire sermon is a description of the ideals of heaven, Wú argues that the text can also be read as instructions for how to create a heaven on earth. Reading in the context of the May Fourth Movement, Wú embraced an interpretation of the Beatitudes that would largely support the social and political aims of that movement, calling for an end to economic inequality, social injustice, and intolerance.

[40] In making this explicit connection between the current political and social situation of China and the Biblical text, Wú changes the focal point of the passage from a consideration of what will get people into heaven to a tract for social change in the here and now. His actions therefore clearly indicate that he conceives of the secular and the spiritual not as separate realms, but as inextricably intertwined.

Conclusion

Throughout the course of this paper, it has become clear that there is no neat way to label the alterations in the fabric of Protestantism that the translation of the Beatitudes in the Union Bible creates. If any one pattern emerges, it is the de-emphasis of the more abstract, cerebral aspect of Protestant belief, such as one’s relationship to God, the idea of heaven, and the presence of sin, and the greater focus on improving one’s everyday reality.

Many admirers and studiers of the Bible in China, such as Wú Léichuān, professed to be Christian but nevertheless did not hold Jesus’ teachings to be worthwhile because of his divinity as the son of God, but rather because his teachings were of high moral value, due to their similarity to the teachings of ancient Chinese sages. Wú wrote that the divinity of Jesus was “too mystical to fathom and too controversial to be helpful.”[41] Scholar Tang Yi, in his list of possibilities for what will become of Protestantism in China, includes one which describes a world in which Protestantism is integrated into Chinese culture, like Buddhism before it, and made both human-centered and sinless.[42] Hunter and Chan go on to predict that, in a similar vein, Protestantism in China may grow to be more concerned with social and political involvement than its predecessor in the West.[43] This certainly seems to describe the picture of orthodox Protestant Biblical interpretation in China that has emerged from this examination of the Beatitudes.

The emphasis in the Chinese translation of the Beatitudes on the more concrete, moralistic aspects of the text, rather than on the theological

Elia | 27 ideology underlying it, is reflected in Yieh’s essay, where he speculates that interest in the Beatitudes has actually fallen in recent years as scholars of Christianity in China move away from an interest in “humanity” to one in “divinity.”[44] Yieh points out that one feature that all the Chinese writers examined in his essay share is their tendency to think of the Beatitudes in the context of some kind of tract for how to harmonize with others.[45] One notable exception to this rule is the interpretation of the Beatitudes given by Lín Xiàngāo. His interpretation is, overall, more spiritual in focus than that of the other Chinese writers examined, and more in line with traditional Western interpretation. He announces at the beginning of his study of the Beatitudes that one of its primary goals is to “convey the good fortune of the spirit,” which automatically casts the passage into a more abstract framework.[46] Because he was a pastor in an unorthodox church, as opposed to the other thinkers critiqued in this paper, it is possible that unorthodox churches in China tend to maintain a greater focus on the more abstract, otherworldly, spiritual aspects of Protestantism than the orthodox church, with its emphasis on using religion as a tool to further political and social causes. This is contrary to what one would expect, based on Hunter and Chan’s statement that orthodox Chinese churches are more in line with traditional Protestant belief.[47] Their statement surely stems from the observation that many unorthodox churches combine Protestant and traditional Chinese religious and spiritual tenets, which is certainly heterodoxical in the strict sense of Western Protestantism. However, it is important to recognize that in absorbing traditional ceremonies concerning the afterworld into their Protestant beliefs, these supposedly heterodoxical churches place a greater emphasis on the spiritual dimension of the religion than the orthodox churches do, which in fact seem rather secularized. It may be necessary, therefore, to reconceive of how to define what constitutes “being more faithful to orthodox, Western Protestantism” in the study of these two branches of faith.

The translation of the Beatitudes into Chinese resulted in several nuances of translation that in general de-emphasized the otherworldly, theological aspects of the text and focused on its worldly value, as a set of instructions for living a morally superior life in the here and now. These findings reflect the missionaries’ desire to emphasize the moral and character-building qualities of the passage, rather than its implications about how to conceive of the cosmos and one’s relationship to God and heaven.[48] Most Chinese people who have written about the Bible, both proclaimed Christians and those outside of the faith, have interpreted it more as a guide for social change and character-building than as a revelation of the world beyond ours.[49] The subtly different translation of the Beatitudes in the Union edition fuels this response to the Bible, encouraging a more secularist, humanist approach to its teachings.

Nevertheless, at least one theologian, Lín Xiàngāo, reads the text mostly as a reflection and promise of the world to come, in spite of its translation.

His departure from the interpretations of others in the orthodox church suggests that further inquiry into how unorthodox churches read scripture, as opposed to the orthodox church, may reveal much about the way these two groups conceive of their faith. Hunter and Chan argue that unorthodox churches read the Bible more literally than the orthodox one does.[50] However, while the Beatitudes in Chinese emphasize a more secularized approach to Christianity, with an emphasis on improving the here and now, Lín Xiàngāo continues on reading spiritual meaning into the text. It is thus necessary to consider that, in some contexts, the scriptural reading practices of the orthodox and unorthodox churches in China may be the opposite of what Hunter and Chan suggest.

Appendix 1: The Beatitudes in Ancient Greek, English and Chinese (Matthew 5: 3-12) Ancient Greek 3 makarios ho ptōchos ho pneuma hoti autos eimi ho basileia ho ouranos

4 makarios ho pentheō hoti autos parakaleō 5 makarios ho praus hoti autos klēronomeō ho gē 6 makarios ho peinaō kai dipsaō ho dikaiosynē hoti autos chortazō 7 makarios ho eleēmōn hoti autos eleeō 8 makarios ho katharos ho kardia hoti autos horaō ho theos 9 makarios ho eirēnopoios hoti autos kaleō hyios theos 10 makarios ho diōkō dikaiosynē hoti autos eimi ho basileia ho ouranos 11 makarios eimi hotan oneidizō hymeis kai diōkō kai legō pas ponēros kata hymeis pseudomai egō 12 chairō kai agalliaō hoti ho hymeis misthos polys en ho ouranos gar houtōs diōkō ho prophētēs ho pro hymeis English 3 Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 4 Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted. 5 Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth. 6 Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled. 7 Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. 8 Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. 9 Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called sons of God. 10 Blessed are they that have been persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 11 Blessed are ye when men shall reproach you, and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. 12 Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you.

Chinese 3 虚心的人有福了！ 因为天国是他们的。4 哀恸的人有福了！ 因为他们必得安慰。5温柔的人有福了！ 因为他们必承受地 土。6饥渴慕义的人有福了！因为他们必得饱走。7怜恤人的人 有福了！因为他们比蒙怜恤。8清心的人有福了！因为他们必得 见神。9使人和睦的人有福了！因为他们必成为神的儿子。10 为 义受逼迫的人有福了！ 因为天国是他们的。11人若因我辱骂你 们，逼迫你们，捏造各样坏话毁谤你们，你们就有福了。12应 当欢喜快乐，因为你们在天上的赏赐是大的。在你们以前的先 知，人也是这样逼迫他们。

LIST OF WORKS CITED

ABC Comprehensive Chinese-English Dictionary: Alphabetically-Based Computerized, comp. John Defrancis. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003.

“Chinese House Church Leader Samuel Lamb Dies.” Christian Today (2013). www.christiantoday.com.

Eber, Irene. “The Interminable Term Question.” In Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact, edited by Irene Eber, Sze-kar Wan, and Knut Walf. 135-161. Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica, 1999.

Eyton, Robert. The Beatitudes. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd, 1895.

Greek and English Interlinear New Testament (NASB/NIV), edited by William D. Mounce and Robert H. Mounce. 12-13. United States: Zondervan, 2008.

Greek-English Dictionary of the New Testament: Revised Edition, edited by Barclay Newman. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2010.

Hàn yīng dà cídiǎn 汉英大辞典/Chinese-English Dictionary. Shanghai: Shànghǎi jiāotōng dàxué chūbǎn shè 上海交通大学出版 社, 1999.

Hunter, Alan and Kim-Kwong Chan. Protestantism in Contemporary China.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Lín Xiàngāo 林献羔. “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn 山上宝训.” Ye-su.cn, n.d.

New Revised Bible. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1885. Oxford English Dictionary, accessed 11/30/2013, www.oed.com.

Shèngjīng 圣经:/Holy Bible (dual-language edition). Nanjing: Zhōngguó jīdūjiào xiéhuì 中国基督教协会/China Christian Council, 2000.

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28 | Blessed are They who are Open-Minded Starr, Chloë. “Introduction.” Reading Christian Scriptures in China, edited by Chloë Starr. 1-9. London and New York: T&T Clark, 2008. --. “Modern Chinese Attitudes Toward the Bible.” Reading Chinese Scriptures in China, edited by Chloë Starr. 13-31. London and New York: T&T Clark, 2008.

Strandenaes, Thor. Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, as Expressed in Five Selected Versions of the New Testament and Exemplified by Mt 5:1-12 and Col 1. Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987.

Wenzel-Teuber, Katharina. “People’s Republic of China: Religions and Churches Statistical Overview.” trans. David Streit. Religions and Christianity in Today’s China 2.3 (2009), 35.

Worldscriptures.org. United Bible Societies, n.d.

Yieh, John. “Reading ‘The Sermon on the Mount’ in China: A Hermeneutical Inquiry on Its History of Reception,” in Reading Christian Scriptures in China, edited by Chloë Starr. London and New York: T&T Clark, 2008.

Zetzsche, Jost. The Bible in China: The History of the Union Version or The Culmination of Protestant Missionary Bible Translation in China. Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Sinica, 1999.

Zetzsche, Jost. “The Work of Lifetimes: Why the Union Version Took Nearly Three Decades to Complete.” Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact, edited by Irene Eber, Sze-kar Wan, and Knut Walf. 77-99. Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Sinica, 1999.

NOTES

[1] Katharina Wenzel-Teuber, “People’s Republic of China: Religions and Churches Statistical Overview,” trans. David Streit. Religions and Christianity in Today’s China 2.3 (2009), 35 [2] Chloë Starr, introduction to Reading Chinese Scriptures in China, ed. Chloë Starr (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 1.

[3] Note that after the first mention of a Chinese term, only pinyin will be used to refer to it. Also note that by “Chinese,” I mean “Mandarin” or Pǔtōnghuà 普通话 in the context of this paper. This is the language of most editions of the Bible in contemporary China, although there do exist earlier translations written in Classical Chinese, as well as several translations into other topolects of Chinese.

See the collection of essays edited by Irene Eber called Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact, for more information on the translation of the Bible into Chinese languages other than Mandarin. The website www. worldscriptures.org also contains publication information and a brief history for Bibles published in twenty-six Chinese topolects.

[4] Alan Hunter and Kim-Kwong Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3;64-65.

[5] Ibid., 7.

[6] Ibid., 254.

[7] Jost Zetzsche, The Bible in China: The History of the Union Version or the Culmination of Protestant Missionary Bible Translation in China, (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Sinica, 1999), 25.

[8] Jost Zetzsche, “The Work of Lifetimes: Why the Union Version Took Nearly Three Decades to Complete,” in The Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact, ed. Irene Eber, Sze-Kar Wan, and Knut Walf (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Sinica, 1999), 77-99. Upset that this translation of the Bible was done by foreigners, several Chinese scholars published new versions of the New Testament of the Union in the years immediately following its release, although these versions make such minor changes that it is more appropriate to call them “revisions” than new translations. They are not as popular as the original translation (see Zetzsche, The Bible in China, 360-361). In 1979, The Chinese government organized a committee that would have, for the first time, significantly altered some of the theologically-important terminology of the Union version, though these revisions were never published because the government, in its own words, became pre-occupied with the sudden resurgence of activity in the Protestant Church after the end of the Cultural Revolution (ibid., 336-361).

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[9] Zetzsche, “The Work of Lifetimes,” 9.

[10] Thor Strandenaes, Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, as Expressed in Five Selected Versions of the New Testament and Exemplified by Mt 5:1-12 and Col 1, (Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), 98.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., 98-99.

[13] Ibid., 93.

[14] 5 Matthew 8-9 (New Revised Standard Version, 1885, from this point on abbreviated NRSV).

[15] Irene Eber, “The Interminable Term Question,” in Bible in Modern China: The Literary and Intellectual Impact (see note 8), 138.

[16] Ibid., 140.

[17] Ibid., 139.

[18] Ibid., 142.

[19] Ibid., 141.

[20] Ibid., 142.

[21] Ibid., 141.

[22] Ibid., 152.

[23] Ibid., 153.

[24] Ibid., 160.

[25] While different terms for God do exist in English and Ancient Greek as well, it is not the same phenomenon. In English and Ancient Greek, an awareness exists that all terms for “God” are simply synonyms for that word, whereas the distinction between “shàngdì” and “shén” represents a disagreement about the fundamental way in which to conceive of God. It is somewhat akin to being undecided between whether to use “Zeus” or “God” to refer to the Christian entity in English, since “Zeus,” like “Shàngdì,” is the proper name of a supreme mythological deity (see Eber, “Interminable Term Question,” 142).

[26] 5 Matthew 3 (NRSV).

[27] Robert Eyton, The Beatitudes, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd, 1895), 16-19.

[28] Lín Xiàngāo 林献羔, “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn 山上宝训,” Ye-su.cn (n.d.)

[29] Eber, “Interminable Term Question,” 135.

[30] Strandenaes, Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, 93.

[31] Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, 163.

[32] Note, though, that given the vast array of different Protestant groups in China, this is an oversimplification. Most likely, orthodox churches would not approve of this behavior, given their qualities outlined above, on p. 1-2.

[33] Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, 7.

[34] Ibid., 163.

[35] “Chinese House Church Leader Samuel Lamb Dies,” in Christian Today (2013). www.christiantoday.com.

[36] Lín Xiàngāo, “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn,” 12.

[37] Lín Xiàngāo, “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn,” 14-15.

[38] Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, 145.

[39] Yieh, “Reading ‘The Sermon of the Mount’ in China,” 148.

[40] Ibid., 149.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, 265-266.

[43] Ibid., 269.

[44] Ibid., 159.

[45] Yieh, “Reading ‘The Sermon on the Mount’ in China,” 156.

[46] Lín Xiàngāo, “Shānshàng Bǎoxùn,” 11.

[47] Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, 254.

[48] Strandenaes, Principles of Chinese Bible Translation, 93; 98-99.

[49] Chloë Starr, “Modern Chinese Attitudes Toward the Bible” in Reading Christian Scriptures in China (see note 2), 13-31.

[50] Hunter and Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China, 254.

Li | 29

The Gangnam Phenomenon: A Study of the Korean Wave in China Sheryl Li, CAS ‘16 INTRODUCTION

The Korean wave is characterized by the surge in popularity of South Korean cultural products such as music, television dramas, fashion, and food over the past decade. This phenomenon is attracting attention from the media, government officials, and young adults all over the world due to its explosive expansion in recent years [1]. The Korean Wave contains immense economic potential for South Korea through the increase in tourism and cultural exports [2]. Some studies have even indicated evidence of a diplomatic advantage, such as a boosted South Korean image abroad, resulting in a type of soft power [3]. Although nothing new for consumers in the East Asian market who have already been experiencing this cultural renaissance for over a decade, South Korean entertainer Psy’s Gangnam Style’s explosive popularity in 2012 brought much needed exposure of Korean pop culture to America [4]. His success resulted in a new milestone for the Korean Wave in the era of social media, by increasing globalization and highlighting the transnational and transcultural qualities of this phenomenon.

The inception of the Korean Wave occurred in the early 1990s when Korean television programs became popular in countries such as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore [1]. There, they served as a cheaper alternative to Western and Japanese productions. At that time, the Chinese media coined the term Hallyu (han liu) to describe the wave of obsession with all things Korean [5]. In the 2000s, the success of the 2nd generation of Korean pop (K-pop) boy bands renewed the infatuation with South Korean culture in various other Asian countries. A prime example of this is boy group TVXQ (東方神起); their achievements include the Guinness World Record for largest official fan club (2008) [6] and most photographed celebrity (2009) [7]. Since then, other Korean solo artists and groups have held sold-out concerts in multiple continents [8], spurred viral flash mobs and YouTube dance covers [6], brought BB Cream to the radar of the American cosmetic industry [9], and collaborated with well-known American producers like Akon and Teddy Riley [10]. In fact, Hallyu films and dramas have surpassed the popularity of Hollywood films in East Asia in terms of box office sales [11]. This signals a transformation in cultural consumption patterns and an increase in diversification of global entertainment preferences.

In my research, I qualitatively evaluated the anthropological factors of the Korean Wave situation in China. Beijing served as a good case study of Hallyu because this city recently became a direct target of K-pop’s expansion [12]. It is also the home to a vast number of urban young women, a primary consumer of this cultural export. Due to China’s large market and geographic proximity, Korean entertainment companies are moving to capture potential profits there, after many years of experience in the Japanese market. Through the inclusion of Chinese members in Korean boy bands [13], Chinese sub-groups, and collaborations with Chinese celebrities such as Hong Kong action star Jackie Chan [14], the Korean entertainment industry is making an obvious effort to attract Chinese audiences. In my study, I am interested in a typical Chinese consumer’s reception of the Korean Wave, her response to the recent changes like Psy and directed Chinese marketing, as well as her perception towards the future of Hallyu in China. I am also curious about the specific expansion efforts in China made by Korean entertainment companies and their general outlook towards future globalization plans. Thus, I present the

findings of this project in two-fold: through the consumer’s perspective and through the producer’s perspective. I hope to gain a greater understanding of Hallyu’s transcultural properties and further globalization potential.

METHODS

I executed a mixed method to approach this project, including structured and unstructured interviews, observations, and literature reviews.

Field research was conducted in Beijing, China and Seoul, South Korea during the summer of 2013. I selected seven interviewees from Beijing and conducted in-depth interviews in May 2013. Most participants were female college students, in their early twenties at Beijing Foreign Studies University. A short survey, printed in Chinese, was also distributed to random high school students at Zhongguancun Primary and Secondary School. I received 20 responses. In Seoul, I conducted a semi-structured interview with the assistant producer/director of MNet’s MCountdown, a popular music show. Other observations were made during the pre-recording of the show and around a popular South Korean tourist district, Myeongdong. I conducted one additional phone interview with a past producer/director of Yin Yue Tai, the largest music station in China.

The structure of the in-depth interview included several phases of contextualizing the interviewee’s perception of Korean pop culture in China. They were: (1) the interviewee’s personal extent of participation in the Korean Wave as a fan or observer, (2) what aspects made Korean pop culture attractive to a Chinese consumer, (3) their perception on the current popularity of K-pop in China, (4) their thoughts on how K-pop compares to pop music from mainland China and Taiwan, (5) their views on the recent incorporation of Chinese members in Korean groups, and (6) their exposure to or interest in cultural commodities from Japan, the Americas, or Europe. Questions from the survey inquired about the participant’s interest in Korean pop culture, usage of social media websites for Hallyu related news, and exposure to different cultural commodities such as K-pop, K-dramas, variety shows, cosmetics, and K-fashion.

Results from Consumer’s perspective

Prior to the project, I hypothesized that only a limited number of Chinese youth have gained exposure to Korean pop culture. I though that for most people, K-pop was an unconventional and slightly eccentric passion, like the way it was here in the States pre-Gangnam Style. This was hypothesized due to the language and cultural barriers, the indiscrete expansion efforts from the Korean entertainment industries [6], and China’s historical conflicts with her neighboring countries [15]. However, my interviewees were consistent in emphasizing that almost all of the younger generation, especially those born after 1990, are highly aware of the Korean wave, with many even being fervent consumers of its cultural products. The second Korean Wave, starting from the mid-2000s, played a huge role in the globalization and brought a new era to K-pop with artists such as TVXQ, Big Bang, and Girl’s Generation [16]. Informant X, a bubbly young woman, described her initial exposure to K-pop in 2008 during her middle school years:

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30 | The Gangnam Phenomenon Since a long time ago, I’ve been the biggest fan of TVXQ. Therefore, I’m always up to date on their latest news, music, and dramas. There was a magazine store near my home where I will often buy their CDs, albums, and magazines. I would hide them under my bed from my parents and read the magazines when I was supposed to be studying for my high school entrance exam.

She later detailed her experience attending TVXQ’s penultimate concert (prior to their split in 2010) in Beijing, where she flew in from another city. There were 30,000 security officers at the venue and all the attendees were wearing red, TVXQ’s official fan club color. She described the atmosphere at the event as crazy, with many people crying that night, overwhelmed with emotions. Experiences like those from Informant X are not uncommon because most of the survey participants reported that their first exposure to Hallyu was in the mid to late 2000s, from mega-popular boy bands like TVXQ or dramas like Boys Over Flowers.

However, the male interviewee, Informant Q, stated that his interest in K-pop only spiked after Psy’s Gangnam Style, a more recent release. For interviewees of both genders, I wanted to know which specific aspects of K-pop attracted them the most, enough to overcome the language barrier and compete with their interest in Chinese popular music. Informant X explained passionately: I found TVXQ members handsome and their songs and dances attractive. As I researched more about them, I became very sympathetic when I learned about the hard times the members experienced when they were promoting overseas in Japan. That was when I realized that I shouldn’t love them in a superficial way.

On the other hand, male informant Q was not nearly as affected by the stories of overcoming hardships and admitted without hesitation that visual aspects and catchy beats attracted him the most: For me personally, I’m not necessarily a fan but I do think the phenomenon is quite interesting. If I happen to hear a catchy song, I will look it up to see which artist or group it belongs to. This started after the popularity of Psy’s Gangnam Style. Before Psy, there were a few girl groups that I was interested in. To be honest, as a guy, I look at girl groups because the members are quite pretty.

Whatever the reasons are, K-pop is clearly attractive to many Chinese teens and young adults. However, I was curious as to why some Chinese people prefer K-pop to Chinese pop music. How did K-pop differ from music produced in mainland China and Taiwan? After all, the latter is more easily accessible and is in their native language. The interviewees cited two main problems with the local music situation. In the past, some Taiwanese artists were very hot in mainland China as well; however, those artists have aged since then and there has been a lack of new hits for a long time. Informant T described: When we were younger, we also listened to Taiwanese artists like Jay Chou and Jolin Tsai, but they are getting older and older, well into their 30s, and there hasn’t really been any younger artists replacing them in terms of popularity. This is different in the Korean music industry because they are constantly recruiting, training new trainees, and debuting new groups.

Therefore, they can continuously produce high quality and popular groups.

Another problem was that new Chinese groups often imitated established Korean or Japanese groups in terms of music styles and concepts.

To many interviewees, this move seems cheap and redundant. Often, Chinese entertainment companies will even hire Korean or Japanese

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composers to write their music. Informant Q recounted a particular disastrous attempt: At first we were all very excited [about the debut of a Japanese-style Chinese girl group]. However, when we saw their debut MV, we were extremely disappointed.

Because they had a Japanese composer for the song but were singing in Chinese lyrics, the rhythm was off and it became extremely weird. My reaction was like Wow, I never knew Chinese could be spoken like this!

However, some have pointed out that many of the newly debuted Korean bands have also mimicked the styles of other well-established groups.

Even through analyzing the explosive popularity of Psy’s Gangnam Style, it is evident that some degree of originality or fresh perspective is essential to make a global hit. It will be difficult for the popularity of Chinese music to catch up to K-pop without the inclusion of some new elements.

Similarly, for Korean artists like Psy, it will become increasingly difficult to produce another hit that will surpass the popularity of Gangnam Style.

Finally, I asked the interviewees about what they thought about the recent trend of incorporating Chinese members into K-pop groups. Produced by mega-giant record labels SM and JYP Entertainment, popular groups such as Super Junior M, EXO-M, Miss A, and F(X) are all groups composed of at least two Chinese members to target the Chinese market.

This type of targeting is especially apparent with Korean rookie group EXO. EXO is composed of two sub-groups, one Chinese (EXO-M) and another Korean (EXO-K). All of their singles, albums, and MVs are released twice, once in each language. The interviewees’ responses to this phenomenon were mixed. Some thought that the inclusion of Chinese members was effective because the members became more relatable.

This is easy to understand because one of the participants even went to high school with a Chinese EXO-M member, a Beijing native. Others had a neutral opinion of this. They thought that regardless of ethnicity, members were all trained under the rigid Korean system so there was no obvious difference. Informant X explained: For some people, they think Chinese members are more attractive. But for me, this move seems strange and too strategic for my liking, as if they are making an obvious approach to gain Chinese fans.

For now, entertainment companies are carefully monitoring the reception of these mixed ethnicity groups. If the responses are favorable, we will likely observe more and more groups debuting in the near future with the hope of targeting the Chinese market.

Results from Producer’s perspective

On the other hand, Korean entertainment companies are facing a new set of challenges by choosing to expand into China. I talked with Sarah Lee, the past producer/director of the overseas department at Chinese music station YinYueTai. During her time there, she witnessed the expansion of the overseas department and the inclusion of Korean music as part of their regular broadcasting content. One of the reasons why K-pop became such a large part of YinYueTai’s foreign music content is because the process of inviting American artists is too complicated, with some of the artists even blacklisted. Sarah described the process of promoting a Korean artist in China: First, we buy their music copyrights. Then we get the artists to come to China for promotions and ask them to guest on talk shows. [At YinYueTai], we do a real-time broadcast online so that Chinese fans all over the country can watch them in real-time and chat with other online fans during the show.

However, building relationships with Korean entertainment companies is not easy. Although the Korean companies are eager to capture the large Chinese market, there are also characteristics of the market that made them very cautious. Firstly, the Chinese political system is a big barrier

Li | 31 because of the limitations it imposes on foreign artists. Hidden rules and regulations that prohibit promotions are not unheard of. Additionally, it is commonly known that the copyright protection laws in China are largely ineffective, so companies will not be able to receive copyright royalties. Finally, the current structure of music programs in China do not allow for regular artist promotions. For newly debuted foreign artists, this really limits their screen-time in China and prevents adequate exposure. In Korea, the three main broadcasting stations and smaller cable networks all produce weekly music shows in which promoting artists can perform their new releases before live studio audiences on TV. Sarah talked about YinYueTai’s attempt to also establish a weekly music show: We were planning to launch a music program on weekly basis. At the launch, we were trying to copy the framework of the Korean music shows. In Korea, they have high budgets, a small studio with over 10 cameras, and an experienced production team that will put on a high quality show. This doesn’t work in China. We have a low budget and we have to make a profit with ads. After working on this for half a year, it never worked out.

received and is optimistic about the outlook of K-pop in the future. With a combination of the Korean Wave producers’ efforts in expansion and the fans’ eager consumption, K-pop will continue to tie the countries together through its path of globalization.

Sarah was also involved in the initial Chinese promotions of Korean boy band EXO-M in 2011. After working closely with them, she detailed the challenges they faced as they targeted the Chinese market:

After standing in line for a few hours, the leader of the official EXO fan club, in charge of admissions, climbed up on a bench and shouted something in Korean. All of a sudden, all of the fans started running to the other end of the street, destroying the orderly lines that they had camped overnight for. The remaining people, non-Korean speakers like myself, stood there puzzled for a moment, then joined the stampede down the street. Before we could get very far, more instructions were given in Korean and the main group of fans made a U-turn and started running up the street again. This type of chaotic and seemingly counter-intuitive activity repeated for a couple more times, until a fan fainted from all the excitement while the rest of the fans screamed, shouted, and shoved near the entrance of a parking garage. Around 10:00 am, 40 fans were finally chosen to go in while the remaining fans remained huddled outside the studio, perhaps hoping to catch a glimpse of EXO when they enter or exit the studio.

There were no music programs on a regular basis, no big stages for EXO-M to practice their performances on, and not enough variety shows [in China]. EXO-K team continuously improved [in Korea] but EXO-M team’s progress remained stagnant.

This observation is consistent with SM Entertainment’s move with EXO’s following album in 2013. Instead of letting the each subgroup promote separately within each respective target country, EXO-M and EXO-K now promote together as one unit mainly in Korea, where both subgroups can take advantage of the ample performance opportunities.

Despite these problems, Sarah emphasized that major Korean entertainment companies are still optimistic about expanding into China. In the past fiver years, JYP and SM Entertainment have each established a branch in Beijing. In reference to the current lax copyright protection laws in China, Sarah explained that Korea also experienced a similar problem ten years ago. However, the Koreans took measures to fix this problem and she is confident that the Chinese will eventually go through the same steps as well.

Many Korean broadcasting stations are aware of the positive foreign reception of K-pop and are taking measures to cater to these audiences as well. For example, popular Korean cable channel M.net produced a special music show in Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, and L.A in 2012 and 2013. M.net in particular is popular among foreign fans because they are the only network that does not require audiences of their weekly music show to have a Korean social security number. I interviewed the assistant producer/director (PD) of M.net’s music show M!Countdown and asked about the company’s view towards the globalization of K-pop. He explained M.net’s approach: We want to be more global and different compared to the other major broadcasting stations. [The music shows abroad] were at the right timing during the Korean Wave. We are trying to tie the cultures of the Southeast Asian countries together. The higher-ups decide which countries to expand to, by taking into account which countries might have the best response, etc.

He mentioned that the explosive popularity of Psy had a huge impact in the pursuit of globalization. He is still amazed by the popularity Psy has

Discussion: A Fan Account on May 30, 2013

In Seoul, I tried to attend a taping of M!Countdown. Coincidently, the day I chose to attend happened to be EXO’s comeback week, the release of their second album “XOXO” after a yearlong hiatus. When I arrived at the CJ E&M Center Studio in Mapogu district of Seoul at 6:00 am, I found hundreds of fans in a line that wrapped around the street three or four times. Most of the fans had started queuing overnight because only 40 lucky fans would eventually be allowed to enter the studio. Everyone was clutching EXO’s albums, either the Chinese or the Korean version, and I heard rumors that priority selection would be given to those who had both. The fans were mostly Korean, but there were many Chinese, Japanese, and even some European fans as well. I spoke to a German fan, an exchange student at Korea University, who told me she was skipping her morning classes to secure a seat at the show later that night.

What amazed me the most was the first-hand experience of the insuppressible passion and dedication of Korean and foreign fans on a Thursday morning to support their favorite K-pop artist. Even the Japanese and Chinese fans were willing to dedicate an entire morning of standing in line. For those fans that failed to enter the studio that day, they were likely to try again the next day and continue this process through the weekend at music shows produced by various other broadcasting stations. This experience also made it obvious how immensely profitable it is for SM Entertainment to split their popular group EXO into two subgroups. By releasing albums once in Korean and another in Chinese, truly dedicated fans have to buy double the albums to collect the unique photobook and photocards contained in each album.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

From my field research, one can make a preliminary conclusion that the Korean Wave has succeeded in exposing itself to Beijing teens and young adults. Most of this target audience has had some exposure to a cultural product of Hallyu, with varying degrees of consumption. The lack of a competitive Chinese popular music culture increased the likelihood of young people turning to foreign music. All of the participants agreed that Psy’s Gangnam Style increased their exposure and interest in Korean pop culture but opinions differed on the effectiveness of including Chinese members in K-pop bands. From the producer’s perspective, Korean entertainment companies are facing new challenges as they expand into the Chinese market, including the lack of music shows and inadequate copyright protection. However, producers are eager to continue expansion efforts and are optimistic about the outlook in the Chinese market.

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32 | The Gangnam Phenomenon Appendix 2: Chinese and Japanese fans waiting outside the headquarters of JYP Entertainment in Cheongdamdong district of Seoul, hoping to catch a glimpse of their favorite artist.

In the future, I am interested in studying Korea’s government intervention and policies regarding the commodification of its pop culture.

In Korea, there are currently many government actions related to the increase in tourism from Hallyu [3]. Figure skater Yuna Kim, girl group Girl’s Generation, and popular actor Bae Young Joon were ambassadors of Visit Korea Year in 2012, during which visitors to South Korea with foreign passports could receive top-notch hospitality, such as free airport shuttles, train tickets, and bilingual tour guides [17]. Even when I was in Seoul during the summer of 2013, I spotted a giant banner in popular tourist district Myeongdong with Chinese characters that translated to “Welcome to Myeongdong!” Almost all store associates in tourist destinations spoke either Mandarin or Japanese, removing language barriers.

When I stood in the middle of a subway station looking confused, a worker from the Korean Tourism Organization helped me find my station in English. Additionally, I am interested in researching more about Korea’s investments in creative industries, how it is extracting economic benefits from these industries, and how it is supporting its cultural infrastructure.

Appendix 3: Chinese tourists on the flight from Seoul to Beijing, with their purchases of Korean cosmetics from duty free at Incheon Airport.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research would not be possible without funding received from the University Scholars program. I am also grateful for the guidance from Professor Jaesok Kim from the Department of Anthropology and the contacts he provided. I would like to thank Jiye Bahng for her English translations in Seoul and encouragements at M.net. I wish to thank Joyce Liu for the contacts she provided me in Beijing. Finally, I would like to thank all the interviewees for their time and participation.

APPENDIX

Update: March 09, 2014 Since the field research conducted in May 2013, there have been some new advancements of the Korean Wave in China that are worth mentioning. Korean drama “You Who Came from the Stars,” which featured Hallyu stars Kim Soo Hyun and Jun Ji Hyun and aired during the winter season of 2014, is currently all the rage in China [18]. The episodes, uploaded with Chinese subtitles on two main Chinese video websites, have been watched 14.6 billion times on just one of the websites [19]. Additionally, Wang QiShan, the anti-corruption chief and one of the most influential politicians of the Chinese government, mentioned during the annual legislative meeting in Beijing in front of delegates from the National People’s Congress that he had watched the drama. Wang, in his mid-60s, pondered upon why Korean dramas have always attracted the Chinese and praised the South Koreans for their ability to incorporate traditional Korean culture and values into the core of their dramas. Interestingly, “You Who Came from the Stars” is a romantic-comedy with supernatural elements about a fictional Hallyu star falling in love with an alien from another planet.

Appendix 1: “Welcome to Myeongdong!” sign spotted in Chinese characters in Seoul.

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Appendix 4: Sign promoting Korean style fashion was spotted in the Hai Dian district of Beijing. The Chinese characters roughly translate to “Your closet from the far away land of South Korea.”

NOTES

The author translated Chinese interviews and took all pictures. Jiye Bahng translated the Korean interview with M.net PD. [1] Shim, Doobo. “Hybridity and the Rise of Korean Popular Culture in Asia.” SAGE: Media, Culture, and Society. no. 1 (2006): 25-44.

[2] Russell, Mark. “The Gangnam Phenom.” Foreign Policy, September 27, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/27/the_gangnam_ phenom (accessed January 14, 2013).

[3] Otmazgin, Nissim. “A Tail that Wags the Dog? Cultural Industry and Cultural Policy in Japan and South Korea.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. no. 3 (2011): 307-325.

[4] Fischer, Max. “Gangnam Style, Dissected: The Subversive Message Within South Korea’s Music Video Sensation.” The Atlantic, August 23, 2012.

[5] Kim, Ji Eun. “The Korean Wave in China: Its Impact on the South Korean-Chinese Relations.” 2010.

[6] Friedrichsen, Mike. Handbook of Social Media Management. Berlin: Springer, 2013.

[7] Bracey, David. “Korean Band Fad goes Global.” Tokyo Journal, May 17, 2013.

[8] Cha, Hyunhee, and Seongmook Kim. “A Case Study on Korean Wave: Focus on K-POP Concert by Korean Idol Group in Paris.” Korea Media Journal (2011) [9] “Perfect Your Look in Korea” The Korean Herald, September 2, 2009.

[10] Greenwald, David. “Wonder Girls Debut ‘Like Money’ Single, Video Featuring Akon.” Billboard. July 09, 2012.

[11] Oh, Ingyu. “Hallyu: The Rise of Transnational Cultural Consumers in China and Japan.” Korea Observer. no. 3 (2009): 425-459.

[12] Onishi, Norimitsu. “A rising Korean wave: If Seoul sells it, China craves it”. New York Times, January 2, 2006.

[13] “EXO-K and EXO-M to Hold Joint Fan Signing Event.” Allkpop. May 25, 2012.

[14] “Jackie Chan managing K-pop Group.” Belfast Telegraph, March 11, 2014.

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Printed April 2014. A University of Pennsylvania publication