Penn Asian Review: Volume 9

PENN ASIAN REVIEW

VOLUME 9 | SPRING 2019

Letter from the Editor Dear Reader, I am proud to present the Spring 2019 edition of the Penn Asian Review. This edition reflects the hard work of the PAR executive board, the intellectual and academic rigor of the five accepted articles, and the demonstrated interest across the University of Pennsylvania undergraduate and graduate communities in the study of Asia.

The goal of the Penn Asian Review is to promote undergraduate and graduate academic writing on political, economic, cultural, and social topics relevant to continental Asia. As a student peer-reviewed journal sponsored by an American university, PAR aims to support regional studies and interest in Asia’s diversity and role in the global order. Continuing to have dialogue about international relations and cultural exchange is vital for expanding perspectives as American students. The range of topics included in this year’s publication include slave trade in pre-modern China, the role of women in 20th century China, cultural explanations for male preference in Punjab, the use of Confucianism to consolidate power in China, and re-dating a Buddhist temple based on historical analysis.

This year, we accomplished two goals that will continue to help the journal grow and become stronger in prestige, community, and quality. First, we further expanded our executive board from a largely undergraduate body to one inclusive of graduate students with professional experience in copy editing certification, writing experience with the BBC, language translation, and teaching under a Fulbright grant. Bridging this experience with that of our undergraduate board members, who are experienced designers, research assistants, and conference organizers, has been a valuable opportunity for productive interdisciplinary teamwork.

Second, we broadened the scope of our campaign for recruiting new board members as well as soliciting articles for publication beyond the focus on East Asia as a commonly-held stereotype of the word “Asia.” In recognizing the vast diversity of continental Asia, we sought to focus our efforts to communicate an equal acknowledgement and desire to publish articles on South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Indo-Pacific region.

This yielded more variety among the articles submitted for consideration, from a concentration of focus from China to include more on South Asia. I consider this progress to be just the beginning of a much-hoped-for trend towards greater inclusivity for non-East Asian representation in the Penn Asian Review.

Through support from the Penn Student Activities Council and Penn Publications Cooperative, as well as cooperation with the University’s Departments in South Asian Studies, East Asian Studies, language studies, and student and religious groups, this journal has continued to have brand awareness within the Penn community. I am grateful to every reader, prospective article author or board member, and faculty member who has been a part of endorsing the mission of the Penn Asian Review. Thank you for your interest and support, and congratulations to this year’s board and authors.

Sincerely, Elaine Lee Editor-in-Chief, Penn Asian Review

Executive Board Editor-in-Chief Elaine Lee

Deputy-Editor-in-Chief Sabrina Ochoa

East Asia Section Leader Susan Radov

South Asia Section Leader Jawan Shir

Content Editor Lisa Chang Megan Everts Bryce Heatherly Morgan Thweatt

Copy Editor

Daniel Lapinski

Associate Copy Editor Patricia Cabuso

Finance Manager Czarina Lokin

Layout Manager & Graphic Designer Yuwen Wong

Table of Contents

05 16 24 31 37

A Study to Re-date the Samantabhadra Pavilion in Shanhua Monastery Wei Chen

The Silent Immigrants: The Sogdian Slave Trade in Early Tang China Di Wang

Wang Qiyao: Miss Shanghai in China’s Twentieth Century, 1945–1990 Jiarong Wang

Xi Jinping’s Use of Confucian Kinship to Consolidate his Power Susan Radov

An Analysis of Sex-Selective Abortion in Punjab Ankur Makani

A Study to Re-date the Samantabhadra Pavilion in Shanhua Monastery Wei Chen Wei Chen is a second-year Ph.D. student from the Department of East Asia Languages and Civilizations in the School of Arts and Sciences. He comes from China and his interests are the Chinese & Tibetan Buddhist architectures. Wei Chen is a second-year Ph.D. student from the Department of East Asia Languages and Civilizations in the School of Arts and Sciences. He comes from China and his interests are the Chinese & Tibetan Buddhist architectures.

This paper sets out to challenge the established dates of the Samantabhadra Pavilion, which is a building in Shanhua Monastery, south of the city of Datong in Shanxi Province.1 The monastery itself was constructed in 709 CE, during the reign of Kaiyuan of the Tang dynasty. Historical records note that Shanhua Monastery was rebuilt and renamed several times. It is perhaps the only surviving example of four compact timber-frame buildings that date to eleventh-century China.2 The Gate, the front hall (called Three Saints Hall 三聖殿), and the main hall (Buddha Hall, or Daxiongbao Hall 大雄宝) stand along the main axis.

On the two rear sides of the Buddha Hall once stood two pavilions used for the worship of the Bodhisat-

tvas Samantabhadra and Manjuśri. Unfortunately, the east pavilion, known as the Manjuśri Pavilion, was destroyed by fire in the early twentieth century.3 Only the west-facing pavilion, used to worship the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra, survives. This paper asserts a new construction date and the original function of the building complex for the Samantabhadra Bodhisattva.

The first professional architectural plotting of the Samantabhadra Pavilion is credited to Liang Sicheng in 1930, when he and his team photographed and completed the architectural drawings after detailed examination and survey of Datong. According to the “Survey report on the ancient buildings in Datong” 大 同古建築調查報告, Liang dated the Samantabhadra Pavilion and Daxiongbao Hall to the eleventh century (the middle of the Liao dynasty), and the remaining buildings (the gate and front hall) to the Jin reconstitution.4 They were not able to determine with certainty the construction dates for the “ear halls” and the side hall because of the limitations of various pieces of evidence available (Figure 1).

The second architectural survey was conducted in 1953 by the Shanxi Cultural Relics Bureau 山西文 物局 as part of a national archaeological survey and restoration.5 During the restoration, an inscription was discovered stating: “In the second year of Zhenyuan, Yixing made the construction” (貞元二年一行造).

An official report was presented a year later, asserting that Zhenyuan refers to an era name of Prince Wanyan Liang 完顏亮 of the Jin dynasty (1153–1156). Based on the inscription and subsequent reports, Liang’s supposition was modified, and the Samantabhadra Pavilion was ascribed to the Jin dynasty. The inscription is on the top of the uppermost of the four rafter beams

1 Luo Zhewen 羅哲文, Zhongguo ming bian 中國名寺 (Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing House, 2002), 249.

2 Luo, Zhongguo ming bian, 254.

Figure 1. Master plan of Shanhua Monastery. (Liang Sicheng, “Survey report on the ancient buildings in Datong,” Datong, 1933.)

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3 The stone platform (foundation) of the pavilion is well preserved. In 2009, the Manjuśri Pavilion was reconstructed based on the model of the Samantabhadra Pavilion.

4 Yingzao Xuezhe 營造學社, Datong gu jian bao gao 大同古建 報告 (Beijing, 1933), 285. The monastery was largely destroyed during the war between Jurchen and Khitan. Reconstruction was carried out by Yuanman between 1128 and 1143.

5 Li Zhenming 李振明, “Datong Shanhua si ‘Zhu Bian Bei’ ji qi xiang guan wen ti” 大同善化寺 “朱弁碑” 及其相關的幾個問題, Journal of Datong University大同大學學報 24 (2010): 29–31.

and is not visible to anyone standing on ground level, which explains why there are no published pictorial material (images or drawings).6 As the inscription was officially reported by a government body following a national survey by top experts in the field and its authenticity confirmed by Pan Guxi 潘穀西, the possibility of forging by others in a later dynasty can be excluded.7

In the following years, most scholarship on Chinese architectural history (in both Chinese and English) held to the conclusion set out in the second survey. Since then, it is widely accepted that Samantabhadra Pavilion was a Jin building.8

This paper takes a contrary position, arguing that it is possible that the inscription found during the second survey was misunderstood and the Samantabhadra Pavilion could have been built earlier than the Jin dynasty, which would suggest that Liang’s claim was partially correct. Specifically, I set out to address several research questions. Firstly, the misreading of the inscription. Secondly, the analysis of the craftsmanship of the timber frame. Thirdly, the development of the U-shaped building complex. Fourth, the layout of deities in Shanhua Monastery.

From my findings, I conclude that the inscription on the beam was probably misread by scholars in the 1950s. According to Li Chongzhi’s 李崇智 studies of the era names of Chinese emperors, the era name of Zhen Yuan was not exclusive to the Hailing prince of the Jin dynasty and was reused twice.9 Actually, it was first associated with Emperor Dezong during the Tang dynasty (785–805), four centuries before the Hailing prince. Obviously, scholars noticed Dezong, but excluded the Tang option because the rest of the buildings in the monastery were all reconstructed during the Liao and Jin periods, and the bracket sets of the Samantabhadra Pavilion suggested features later than the twelfth century. Logically, it made sense to place the Samantabhadra Pavilion into the Jin category.

Nevertheless, if we search deeper, it becomes apparent that the assumption contains several logical fallacies which will be discussed in the following sections.

the Shanhua Monastery

Firstly, the other inscriptions in the monastery cannot support the assertion that the pavilion was built in the era name “Zhenyuan.” In the monastery there are four steles in total that have been preserved (of which two stand within the Three Saints Hall) and that have been traced to the Jin period.10 The higher stele was named “The record of the reconstruction of the Buddha Halls of the Great Pu’en Monastery in the Western Capital of Great Jin.”11 The stele was erected in 1176—thirty years after the inscription was written.

The inscription was written by a famous Song scholar, Zhu Bian 朱弁, leading some Chinese scholars to term it the “Zhu Bian Stele.”12 According to the “Gaozong benji” 高宗本紀 of the History of the Song Dynasty 宋史, Zhu Bian was as a Song envoy sent to Jin to negotiate the peace treaty following the Jingkang Accident 靖康之變.13 However, he failed in his assignment and was detained in Shanhua Monastery (which was then known as Pu’en Monastery 普恩寺) by the Jin emperor Xizong for sixteen years. During this time, Zhu Bian witnessed the hardships experienced by the abbot, Yuanman 圓滿 who had tried to collect donations to reconstruct the monastery. In 1143, (the year Zhu Bian returned to Song), the project was completed, and he wrote the inscription, probably at the request of Yuanman.

In the inscription, Zhu Bian confirmed that the abbot Yuanman had led his disciples to fulfill the construction: The monk Yuanman, the venerable in the monastery, made up an intrepid will and obtained un-regressing mind. He donated clothes and daily uses, in total two hundred thousand liang. He and his disciples worked together to overcome all the difficulties.14

1. Contradictory inscriptions from other steles in

10 Li, “Zhu Bian Bei,” 29.

11 大金西京大普恩寺重修大殿記。 All translations from Chinese by the author.

12 Zhang Bing 張兵 and Bai Xuefeng白雪峰, “Datong Shanhua si” 大同善化寺,” Journal of Arts and History 文史月刊, 12 (2016): 15.

13 Toqto’a 脫脫, Song shi 宋史, vol. 132.

14 寺之上首通玄文慧太師圓滿者…發勇猛心得不退轉舍衣盂 凡二十萬與其徒合謀協力化所難化。

6 I visited the upper level in 2018 and carefully examined the beams. The inscription is not visible without a ladder.

7 Luo, Zhongguo ming bian, 256.

8 Nancy Shatzman Steinhardt, “Liao: An Architectural Tradition in the Making,” Artibus Asiae 54 (1993): 5–39.

9 Li Chongzhi 李崇智, Zhongguo li dai nian hao kao中國歷代年 號考 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2001), 145.

In addition, he recorded the date of the reconstruction project and left a detailed description of the layout of the monastery: The construction project began in the Wushen year of Tianhui era [1128] and was completed in the

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Kuihai year of the Huangtong era [1143]. There is the main hall, the left and right ear halls, the cave of arhats, the pavilion of Samantabhadra and Manjuśri, the front hall, gate, and corridors—in total eighty bays of buildings.15

is thus also known as the Enlightenment Stele). The inscription was written by the famous poet Wang Bo 王勃 in the early Tang and erected in 1190.19 This list updates the names of the high-ranking monks in the monastery; for example, the abbot Fahui 法暉 whose name also appears in the Zhu Bian Stele, is given a prominent position on the Enlightenment Stele. (He was not a high-level monk in 1170, though he became the abbot before 1190). The final list also contains the epitaphs of the monk cemetery in Shanhua Monastery, which used to be located to the south of the monastery.

The site was destroyed in the 1960s, though more than forty pagodas, including those of Xingwan (the chief monk during the Zhu Bian Stele construction) and Dao Xian 道顯, the leaders’ monk 都維那named in the Enlightenment Stele”) were preserved.

The three lists share at least five names, which means the inscriptions corroborate each other. Interestingly, none of the lists contains the name “Yixing.”

No other evidence exists to reasonably explain why Yixing, presumed to be the builder of the Samantabhadra Pavilion, is not included on any of the three lists. Therefore, it is likely Yixing was not a monk who lived during the time of the Hailing prince.

Lastly, in the Zhu Bian Stele, the inscription records that after the war between Jurchen and Khitan, “the buildings that survived were less than thirty to forty percent” (所僅存者, 十不三四). According to the assumption made by the second survey, the Daxiongbao Hall was the only Liao building. In Chinese writing, it is unusual to describe a single building as “less than thirty to forty percent.” Admittedly, we cannot exclude the possibility that the annex buildings could have survived, but this reference is still important to note.

As neither the date nor the name of the monk matches other Jin materials, if “the second year of Zhenyuan” were to be read as referencing 1143, we have to review the possibility excluded by earlier scholars that Zhen Yuan refers to an earlier era name rather than the Hailing prince.

The halls, pavilions, and gates Zhu Bian had noted in the inscription were all still on the site when Liang surveyed Datong in the 1930s and have remained intact till today. (Manjuśri Pavilion was all but destroyed by fire in the early 1910s, though the foundation survived.) As Zhu Bian’s descriptions match exactly the layout of the monastery today, Liang believed that Zhu Bian had witnessed the completion of the reconstruction in person.16 Thus, he surmised, the date of the reconstruction project mentioned by Zhu should be reliable. However, if the construction of Samantabhadra Pavilion had really been completed before 1143 (the year Zhu Bian recorded), why then did the main beam of Samantabhadra Pavilion refer to 1156, thirteen years later?

Secondly, it is not reasonable that the builder Yixing was a person living in Jin. The inscription on the beam states, “Yixing made the construction.” The builder “Yixing” is likely the name of a monk, since Yi 一 was not a family name in China. As the monk Yixing was accorded the privilege of having his name inscribed on the beam, that suggests he was at least a high-ranking monk in the Shanhua Monastery (possibly the abbot who succeeded Yuanman) during the era of the Hailing prince. However, his name does not appear in the list of monks on Jin steles that were preserved in the monastery nor at the monk cemetery of Shanhua monastery. At the bottom of the Zhu Bian Stele is a list of monks. The list records the abbot Huicu 惠躅, the chief monk Xingwan 行完上座, and 108 other monks.17 But Yixing is not on the list.

The second list is from the other Jin stele which, as noted in the previous section, is also preserved in the Three Saints Hall. The stele is slightly shorter than the Zhu Bian Stele as the top part has been lost. The inscription bears the title “Restoration of the Great Pu’en Monastery in the Western Capital of Great Jin and the enlightenment of Buddha Shakyamuni.”18 (It 15 經始於天會之戊申、落成於皇統之癸亥。凡為大殿及東西 朵殿、羅漢洞, 文殊、普賢閣及前殿、大門、左右斜廊, 合八 十餘楹。 16 Yingzao, Datong gu jian, 297.

17 As Yuanman was born in 1070, it is likely he was no longer alive when the stele was constructed in 1176.

18 大金西京大普恩寺重修釋迦如來成道碑。

2. Analysis of the craftsmanship and structure of the Samantabhadra Pavilion

This section asserts that the craftsmanship and structure of the pavilion also does not support the assumption that it was constructed during the Jin

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19 Qu Wangjing 屈王靜 and Zhao Qi 趙琦, “Da jin Xijing da Puen si chong xiu da dian ji” 大金西京大普恩寺重修大殿記, Journal of Datong University大同大學學報 28 (2014), 58.

era. While it can be said that Samantabhadra Pavilion bears similarities to several features from the Jin—for instance, the most distinctive Jin feature, the xiegong 斜拱 (fan-shaped bracket set) in the lower level and the decorative components, and the xiangyugong 祥雲 栱 (auspicious cloud-shaped arm) in the upper level—

Figure 2. Section of Samantabhadra Pavilion. (Liang, “Ancient buildings in Datong;” illustration modified by author.)

Figure 3. Timber-frame pavilions before the thirteenth century. (Drawing by author.)

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Monastery (Daoist Temple) Construction Time Offset distance (diameter) Overhang Distance (meters) Balustrade Mezzanine level

Avalokiteśvara Pavilion Dule

Timber-frame Pagoda Fogong

Liao (984)

Avalokiteśvara Pavilion Kaihua

Pavilions of Sutra LiMaking- up brary

Sutra Library

Samantabhadra Pavilion Shanhua

Erxianmiao Qinglian

Longxing

Jin (late 12th C.) 1

Song (12th C.) 2

Song (11th C.) 1

?

0.5

Liao (1056) Jin (late 12th C.) 0.5 1

6.83

6.16

3.56

3.68

?

4.76

6.07

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

No No

No No

No No

No Yes

Yes Yes

0.5

Table 1 nevertheless, it also has characteristics of the craftspillars led to further development based on the Liao manship and structures from an earlier period. architecture. In the Manjuśri Hall in Foguang Mon Originally, the Samantabhadra Pavilion inastery 佛光寺and Amitabha Hall in Chongfu Monascluded a mezzanine level, which was less likely to be tery 崇福寺, the elimination of the pillars reached an designed in a pavilion in Jin or Southern Song (twelfth extreme situation—enlarging the interior space at the through fourteenth centuries; see Figure 2). As the expense of structural safety, with subsequent restoaccompanying maps show (Figure 3), there are ten rations having to add pillars under an extremely long multi-layer timber frame pavilions constructed before beam. Therefore, it is not unfathomable to understand the fourteenth century that have survived. Besides the multi-floor pavilions as post-Jin, with the mezSamantabhadra Pavilion, the Guanyin Pavilion in Dule zanine level being eliminated and the pillars on the Monastery 獨樂寺 and the timber-frame pagoda in upper level standing directly on the brackets sets (or Fogong Monastery 佛宮寺 are the only two others that beams) of the lower level (Figure 4). There is still an have a mezzanine level between the upper and lower ongoing debate among Chinese scholars as to whether levels. After the twelfth century, because of economic the craftsmanship mentioned above should be considdecline and timber shortages, Chinese architects were ered chanzhuzao 纏柱造 (the lower level bracket sets pressed to simplify the structure and frame.20 On the embracing the upper-level pillar).23 What is certain other hand, during this period, a national structure ren- is that the offset distance of the upper-level pillars is ovation was indirectly propelled by the Jurchen’s ocmore than a whole diameter of the section of the pilcupation of the Northern Song capital, Kaifeng, which lars. In later dynasties, the offset distance became even forced the workers to move north. As Liang contends longer. In the Qing dynasty, the distance sometimes in his report, in early Jin architecture, the number of spanned four or five times the diameter of the pillar; layers of beams were significantly reduced compared at times, the pillars were placed in the middle of the with Liao architecture.21 The interior bracket sets were baotouliang 抱頭梁 (tie-beam).24 On the other hand, also gradually reduced, and finally abolished during the Samantabhadra Pavilion applies a typical chazhu22 the Ming and Qing dynasties. The elimination of the zao 叉柱造 (the upper-level pillar inserted into the 20 Han Xiaoxing 韓曉興, “Shanxi Songjin jian zhu da mu zuo fa zhan yan bian yan jiu” 山西宋金建築大木作發展演變研究 (PhD diss., Taiyuan University of Technology, 2018).

21 Yingzao, Datong gu jian, 262.

22 Liu Dunzhen劉敦楨, Zhongguo gudai jian zhu shi 中國古 代建築史 (Beijing: China Industrial Construction Publishing House, 2002), 126.

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23 Zhang Shiqing 張十慶, “Gu dai lou ge jian zhu jie gou te dian—chanzhuzao bian xi” 古代樓閣式建築結構的形式與特 點——纏柱造辨析 Art Panorama 美術大觀 9 (2015), 28. Pan Guxi, however, believed that the surviving examples did not establish the chanzhuzao as a standard in the Yingzao fashi. He explained it as a transformed chazhuzao.

24 See, for example, Jingyuan Pavilion in Dai County.

Figure 4. Making-up Pavilion (twelfth century) and Guanyin Pavilion (tenth century). (Liang, “Ancient buildings in Datong.”)

Figure 5. Chazhuzao and chanzhuzao. (Drawing by author. Photos from Zhihu, https://www.zhihu.com/question/33883245.) lower-level bracket set) as the Yingzao fashi maintains, and the offset distance is the radius of the section of the pillars (Figure 5).

Moreover, in the Samantabhadra Pavilion, there is a balustrade surrounding the platform, termed pingzuo 平座. The balustrade was gradually replaced by corridors after the early Liao dynasty (late eleventh century). The reason for this change remains controversial among scholars.25 In my view, as the distance of the roof overhanging has been significantly reduced, the feichuan 飛欑 (flying eave rafter) is not long enough to cover the platform anymore. Thus, the balustrade has to be replaced by a covered walkway.

Besides this, in terms of appearance, the corridors 25 Zhang, “Chanzhuzao bian xi,” 29.

promote gradations on the façade. Liu Dunzhen argues that it became popular during the Jin to apply a double-layer roof.26 As the chart illustrates, all the Jin and Southern Song examples have already abandoned the balustrade (Figure 4). In addition, as Fu Xinian claims regarding the murals of Yanshan monastery, the double-layer roof applied to a pavilion was a new renovation concept in the early Jin.27 Therefore, the characteristics of the Samantabhadra Pavilion probably refers to a period that predates the Jin era.

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26 Han, “Shanxi Songjin jian,” 127.

27 Fu Xinian 傅熹年, “Shanxi Fanzhi xian Yanshan si Nan Dian Jin dai bi hua suo hui jianzhu chu bu fen xi” 山西省繁峙縣岩山 寺南殿金代壁畫中所繪建築的初步分析,” in Fu Xinian Chinese Architecture paper collections (Beijing: China Architecture Industrial Press, 2010).

Figure 6. Bracket sets. (Drawings by author.)

Figure 7. Bracket sets. (Drawings by author.)

Thirdly, the technology of the bracket sets of Samantabhadra Pavilion indicates a ninth-century style. As the sections drawn by Liang illustrate, in the upper level the tie-beams stretched out and transformed into the second-rank huagong (transverse bracket arm; Figure 6). Due to the known limitations of Tang architecture at that time (Liang discovered the Foguang Monastery two years after his visit to Datong), he did not pay sufficient attention to this point. However, after the surveys of the 1950s, the comparison becomes possible to make. All four of the Tang timber-frame buildings, as well as the Jade Emperor Temple 玉皇廟 in Zhangzi county, exhibit this technology, with the second-rank huagong directly connected to the tie-beam as mentioned above (Figure 7).28 The technology became extinct after the eleventh 28 The four Tang buildings are: the main hall of Nanchan

century, and there are no buildings that exemplify this craftsmanship after that. From the few examples in Tang, it is difficult to tell whether it reflects regional or national craftsmanship. By the end of the Northern Song period, such technology was totally abandoned and not mentioned in the Yingzao fashi. In Datong, the most popular style was that the tie-beams stretched out and shaped in the shuatou 耍頭 (mocking head) fashion.29 As Liang argues, although the shuatou has several possible forms—among them, split bamboo 劈 竹頭 and grasshopper head 螞蚱頭 are the most common—all the Liao and Jin buildings applied this style

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Monastery, the east hall of Foguang Monastery, the main hall of the Tiantai Monastery, and the main hall of the Guangren King Daoist Temple.

29 This style was popular in north China starting from about the twelfth century.

(Figure 7). At this point, the Samantabhadra Pavilion is different from other Jin buildings in Datong in terms of the structure of the bracket sets.

Finally, the Samantabhadra Pavilion applied timu 替木 (alternative brace) rather than linggong 令 栱 (order bracket-arm). While both have the exact same function, timu is a simplified linggong to some extent. Both are used as the highest arm of a bracket set to support the liaoyanfang 橑簷枋, (eave-raising joist; Figure 8). Unlike linggong, with timu it is not necessary to apply blocks as connections (though blocks may still be applied). For Shanhua Monastery, all four buildings from the Tang dynasty and the Liao-era Daxiongbao Hall applied the alternative brace.

However, the other Jin buildings in Datong, including Three Saints Hall, the gate and the Daxiongbao Hall of Huayan Monastery, all contained an order bracket-arm. (It should be noted that this conclusion can only apply to the northern region of Shanxi and Hebei; the making-up pavilions in the Two Immortal Temples in southern Shanxi Province were Jin dynasty buildings with alternative braces.)30 However, there is no evidence to suggest that Samantabhadra Pavilion did not follow the local rules or that workers were brought in from other regions. Therefore, it is safe to claim that the use of timu in the Samantabhadra Pavilion indicates a different construction period than other Jin buildings in Datong.

As Chinese architecture is mainly timber-framed, buildings have to be maintained and 30 The Two Immortal Temples here refers to xixi erxianmiao 西 溪二仙廟 in Lingchuan County, south of Shanxi.

appropriately restored every fifty years.31 Moreover, traditional restoration practices do not attempt to mimic ancient craftsmanship or style. Therefore, it is common to find a building with the craftsmanship of a later period because of restoration, but one is less likely to see a newer building with features from an earlier dynasty. Obviously, it would be a contradiction here if we classify Samantabhadra Pavilion as a Jin pavilion. Hence, it is not possible that the pavilion was built during the reign of the Hailing prince, as Chinese architectural concepts would not feature structures or craftsmanship reflecting an earlier period.

Following from the above discussion, I reevaluate the possibility that “the second year of Zhenyuan” refers to Dezong. However, this paper does not aim to prove that the Samantabhadra Pavilion was a Tang building—neither the flat tie-beam on the top of the pillars nor the timber frame are suggestive of Tang dynasty architecture. One of the possible assumptions is that the timbers were originally cut and curved in the Tang dynasty; the pavilion was probably rebuilt with Tang materials in the mid-Liao dynasty and restored during the reconstruction conducted by abbot Yuanman in the early Jin.

Chinese craftsmen never seriously intended to copy the ancient structures or styles. They copied paintings and calligraphy, but followed the doctrine that architecture changed as humans evolved.32 There was no need to rebuild a style or craft that had already 31 Zhang, “Chanzhuzao bian xi,” 28.

32 Wang Guixiang 王貴祥, “Zhong xi fa chuan tong jian zhu: Yi zhong fu hao xue shi jiao de guan cha” 中西方傳統建築：一種 符號學視角的觀察, Architects建築師 12 (2005): 46.

Figure 8. Alternative brace and order bracket-arm. (Drawings by author.)

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passed away. Thus, Chinese architecture cannot avoid displaying the characteristics of several dynasties due to the restorations. The Great Buddha Hall of Nanchan Monastery 南禪寺, which began construction in the eighth century, is considerably dated, as it has retained the pillars, beams, and sculptures from the Tang dynasty. Nevertheless, when it was first discovered in the 1950s, the façade and roof were found to be based on a style of architecture from the seventeenth century, largely because of numerous renovations after the Tang dynasty. The rafters were cut into half-lengths, and seven-tiao brackets (Qing Style) were added between the original five-puzuo brackets (Tang Style).

The same circumstances took place with Longxing Monastery 隆興寺. When the construction workers restored the Song dynasty architecture under Emperor Qianlong’s command, they simply applied the eighteenth-century Qing-style crafts onto the eleventh-century architecture. Being a royal construction, the funding and proficiency of the craftsmen was never a limitation. Obviously, the reconstruction workers who did the restoration did not try to preserve the old style of architecture.

In addition, reusing materials was also common because of the limited supply of timber. For example, carbon dating indicates that the beams in the Guanyin Pavilion of Dule Monastery probably date to the early ninth century; on the other hand, the pavilion was built in the second year of Tonghe (984), as the inscription suggests. Besides, in 1699, Emperor Kangxi commanded the demolition of Palaces in Nanjing and reused the timbers in the construction of the monastery on Putuo Mountain.33 33 The chorography of Putuo Mountain records that “tearing down the old Palaces in Nanjing and bestowed to the monastery” (拆金陵舊殿以賜). Wei-Cheng Lin, Building a Sacred Mountain: The Buddhist Architecture of China’s Mount Wutai (Seattle:

Based on similar circumstances, this paper posits that the Samantabhadra Pavilion was originally constructed in 786 under Emperor Dezong of Tang (as the inscription illustrates), rebuilt in the Liao dynasty with the addition of the Daxiongbao Hall in the monastery, and then restored in Jin.

Liao construction workers kept some beams and carpentries during the reconstruction, including the four-rafter beams and the bracket sets on the top of the pillars, and designed the components with Liao features, such as the flat tie-beam and the architrave.

The pavilion survived the war with the Jurchen troops at Datong. When Abbot Yuanman planned the reconstruction, he restored the Pavilion and added newly popularized features (the fan-shape-bracket sets and the auspicious cloud-shape arms). As those Jin features were all notably decorative (or at least not the key structural) components and could be removed and replaced without tearing down the structure, the pavilion probably was merely restored rather than rebuilt during the Jin dynasty.

University of Washington Press, 2014), 27.

Figure 9. Cave no. 225, Mogao Grotto, Dunhuang, Gansu Province. Early Tang (ninth century).

Figure 10. U-shaped plan. Huayan Monastery (left) and Shanhua Monastery (right).

(Drawings by author.)

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3. The U-shaped plan

Supposing the above assumption is correct, this provides a possibility to figure out the layout of the monastery in Liao- and Jin-era Datong. According to Zhu Bian’s inscription, the twin pavilions and the Daxiongbao Hall were connected by corridors. The twin pavilions and the main hall formed a U-shaped building complex, which was a typical plan for monasteries in seventh century China.34 However, in the U-shaped plan of Tang monasteries, the two pavilions on the two sides functioned as the bell pavilion and the sutra library. In the murals of Cave no. 225 in Mogao Grotto, there is an image of a monastery behind the Buddha’s speech (Figure 9). The monastery indicates a U-shaped plan: in the middle, there is a three-bay-wide Buddha Hall with a single-layer roof (probably a hip roof) and two double-floor pavilions with a hip-gable roof on the two sides. Like the layout of the Shanhua Monastery, the pavilions and main hall were connected by corridors (Figure 10). Unfortunately, China no longer has a physical example. On the other hand, two Nara monasteries, Hōryū-ji, and Yakushi-ji, built before the ninth century, still retain the U-shaped-plan. In Hōryū-ji, behind the konda and the pagoda, there is a sutra library to the left of the koda, and a bell pavilion on the right. This led me to wonder: Did the Samantabhadra Pavilion also serve as a sutra library, in addition to worship of the bodhisattva Samantabhadra? Different from the Guanyin Pavilion in Dule Monastery and the Maitreya Pavilion in Longxing Monastery, the Samantabhadra Pavilion was divided into two separate spaces by the mezzanine level. Although there is a mezzanine level between the upper and lower levels in the two pavilions mentioned above, they also feature a big hole in the center of the upper level to house the huge statues of the bodhisattvas. The rest of the space in the upper level was a walkway around the statues for worshippers to circumambulate the bodhisattva. As Samantabhadra Pavilion did not have a statue occupying two stories, the upper level probably had a different function when it was first designed. In Liang’s report, during his first visit to Datong in 1935, the upper level only contained a human-size statue of Samantabhadra with two attendants. The rest of the space was empty. It is entirely possible that this originally held the shelves of the sutras, perhaps with less carpentry as in the sutra library in Lower Huyan Monastery. In addition, Zhu Bian mentioned that there was a bronze bell cast in 34 Luo, Zhongguo ming bian, 23.

“the third year of Qingtai” (清泰三年; 936), but the bell was missing during Liang’s visit in the 1930s. Liang explained that the bell was probably hung on the Manjuśri Pavilion and was destroyed in the fire along with the pavilion. If his assumption is correct, the east pavilion (Manjuśri Pavilion) was a bell pavilion and the west pavilion (Samantabhadra Pavilion) should be the sutra library.

Another point of reference is the layout of the Huayan Monastery in Datong. During the Liao dynasty, the Huyan Monastery was a royal monastery which held images of the royal ancestors in Datong and the abbot in charge of the Department of Monks (Huayan Monastery was also largely destroyed and reconstructed in the Jin dynasty).35 In the inscription preserved in the sutra library in Lower Huayan Monastery, during the reconstruction the monks built a nine-bay wide Buddha Hall and a seven-bay wide front hall; two pavilions whose names were the Pavilion of Maitreya 慈氏閣and the Pavilion of Avalokiteśvara Conquering the Demons 觀音降魔閣; and the sutra library (not the one in the Lower Monastery), bell pavilion, gate, and ear halls (Figure 10).36 According to Chen Mingda, the “nine-bay-wide Buddha Hall” is the Daxiongbao Hall and the foundation of the Pavilion of Avalokiteśvara Conquering the Demons still remained in the 1980s.

Based on the description, it is possible to draw a U-shaped building complex with five elements. Compared with Huayan Monastery, Shanhua Monastery was simpler, as it compacted the pavilion and the sutra library into a single building.

4. Creating religious consciousness in the layout of the deities

Li Ruoshui argues that the layout of the deities of the monasteries in Datong region reflects the rhetoric of the Huayan (Flower Adornment) sect and the esoteric sect of medieval China. However, one of the concepts shared in the two sects is the Trikāya doctrine 三身佛 (the Three Incarnations of the Buddha). John Welwood translates them as follows: the dharmakāya 法身 represents the Buddha nature, saṃbhogakāya 報 身 refers to the Buddha fields, and nirmāṇakāya 應身 is the Buddha emanation.37

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35 Liu Xiangyu 劉翔宇, “Datong Huayan si ji Bojiajiaozang dian jian zhu yan jiu” 大同華嚴寺及薄伽教藏殿建築研究 (PhD diss., Tianjing University, 2015).

36 乃仍其舊址、而特建九間、七間之殿、又構成慈氏、觀音 降魔之閣、及會經、鐘樓、三門、垛殿。 37 Herbert Guenther, “The Philosophical Background of Buddhist Tantrism,” Journal of Oriental Studies 95 (1959): 45–64.

Figure 11. Layout of the deities (Three Incarnations of the Buddha), Muta (left) and Shanhua Monastery (right). (Drawings by author.)

Conclusion

I believe Shanhua Monastery illustrates the

This paper posits that the Samantabhadra Trikāya doctrine in its layout of the deities. The DaxPavilion may not be an early Jin building as scholars iongbao Hall shares similar features with the Timber have been led to believe. I base my assertions on the Pagoda (Muta 木塔) in Yingxian (Figure 11). In the Daxiongbao Hall, the five Tathāgatas were worshipped contradictions found on the inscriptions on the steles, as well as in the structure. Compared to the craftsmanin the center altar. The one in the middle refers to ship of the Liao architecture in north China and the Jin Vairocana, the dharmakāya Buddha. Similarly, in buildings in Datong, I am inclined to estimate this to the top floors of the Muta, Vairocana Buddha sits in be an eleventh-century building. this coincides with the center of the altar and the other four Buddhas are Liang Sicheng’s assessment in his report written alplaced on the fourth floor. In Shanhua monastery, the most ninety years ago. In addition, the U-shaped plan twin pavilions are used to worship Samantabhadra indicates an abandoned layout in medieval China. and Manjuśri. Along with the main Buddha Hall (the Daxiongbao Hall) they form a pair of Three Saints of Flower Adornment 華嚴三聖, which matches the third floor of the Muta. According to the Flower Adornment Sutra, the Three Saints of Flower Adornment represents the saṃbhogakāya incarnation of Buddha.

Lastly, the Buddha with two attendants in the front hall reflects the Gautama Buddha—the nirmāṇakāya— same as the Buddha in the second floor.

Therefore, the layout of the deities in the Shanhua Monastery reflects the religious consciousness in Datong region. As Yingxian is merely sixty kilometers south of Datong, it is reasonable that the worship system in the two regions share common points. I admit that my arguments are merely assumptions due to of the lack of literary inscription. But as the assumption also works in the Huyan Monastery, this idea provides a new suggestion for studying the layout of the monasteries under the influence of the Huayan (Flower Adornment) sect and the esoteric sect in the twelfth century China.

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The Silent Immigrants: The Sogdian Slave Trade in Early Tang China Di Wang Di Wang is an MA student in the East Asian Languages and Civilizations Department. Originally from Xi’an, China, she got her bachelor’s degree in History and Asian Studies from the George Washington University. After coming to Penn, she continues to study East Asian history and cultures with an interdisciplinary approach. Her research interests include medieval Chinese history, Dunhuang and Silk Road Studies, and medieval Central Asian civilizations.

Introduction Chinese and in English translations from the original

Archeological discoveries have provided Sogdian texts found in Turfan and Dunhuang, to depict enough evidence to Silk Road scholars that the Soga more comprehensive image of the Silk Road that dian merchants dominated the trade between Central contains the stories of a silent group. After examining Asia and China during the medieval period.1 With an the origin and the market of Silk Road slave trade and increasing number of Sogdian-style tombs discovered social functions of Sogdian slaves in China, this article in China, a clearer picture of Sogdian immigrants, will try to present a new image of non-elite Sogdians including merchants, envoys, and even civil and in both the Chinese frontier area and in the Central military officials serving the Tang court, reveals their Plains based on historical and literary sources. non-negligible roles in medieval Chinese society and

The study on the Sogdian communities on the the economic, cultural, religious, and political influSilk Road starts with French Sinologist Paul Pelliot’s ence brought with them.2 However, there is one group discoveries of the Sogdian manuscripts in northwest of Sogdian people missing from the story, even though China and his research on Sogdian communities in the they had a relatively large population in China and Puchanghai Region, which is modern-day Lop Nur.4 engaged more closely with Chinese people’s daily However, before the late 1990s, the study in the field lives: Sogdian slaves. As one of the most common was largely limited due to difficulty in interpreting the goods carried along the Silk Road, slaves from Central Sogdian-language manuscripts. From the mid-1950s Asia—Sogdian slaves, usually referred to as hu nu bi to the early twenty-first century, Western and Japa胡奴婢 in Chinese texts—are not discussed widely nese scholars like Nicholas Williams-Sims, Yoshida due to the lack of sufficient documents or material ev- Yutaka, W. B. Henning, and P. Oktor Skjaervo have idence.3 However, among the Dunhuang manuscripts contributed to the translation and interpretation of the found in the library cave and Turfan manuscripts so-called “Sogdian Ancient Letters,” a group of Sogdiscovered in the Astana Cemetery, slaves and the dian documents found by Aurel Stein in 1907. Chinese slave trade are frequently mentioned in the tallies and scholars, on the other hand, tended to focus on the contracts. Although these slaves never had the chance materials written in Chinese, including contracts found to write themselves into history, many of their names in Dunhuang and Turfan related to the local Sogdian were recorded in the documents with price tags, which trade and the bilingual inscription on the epitaphs remind people of the dark side of the inspiring stories of Sogdian tombs found in Chang’an and Luoyang.5 of economic interactions and cultural transmission Besides the linguists and archeologists, historians along the Silk Road. This article will primarily use the were also exploring the social and cultural influences business contracts, registration accounts, travel passes, of Sogdian immigrations in both Persian and Chinese and other commercial and legal documents, both in societies. Two leading historians on this topic are French historian Étienne de la Vaissière and Rong 1 For this article, “medieval China” signifies for the period beXinjiang, a history professor at Peking University. De tween the fall of the Eastern Han Dynasty to the Song Dynasty. la Vaissière’s Sogdian Trader: A History examines 2 Two of the most famous and important Sogdian tombs recently discovered would be Anjia Tomb discovered in 2000 and Wirkak the history of Sogdian merchants with a comprehenTomb discovered in 2003. sive survey on the political and economic history of 3 In this article, hu is directedly used to indicate the Sogdian in China. For further discussion on the definitions of hu and the Sogdians, see Xu Xuya 許序雅, “Sute, Suter re, yu jiu xing hu kao bian” 粟特，粟特人，與九姓胡考辯, [Discussion on the Sogdiana, the Sogdians, and the nine surnames hu],” Western Regions Study 2 (2007).

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4 Rong Xinjiang 荣新江, “Preface,” in Sute ren zai Zhongguo— lishi, kaogu, yuyan de xin tansuo粟特人在中国—历史，考古， 语言的新探索 [The Sogdians in China—a new exploration of history, archeology, and languages], ed. Rong X., Hua, L., and Zhang Z. (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 2005), 3.

5 Rong, Sute ren zai Zhongguo, 4.

Central Asia from the sixth century BCE to the tenth century CE. Rong Xinjiang then turns to the other side of the Silk Road and studies the settlement of Sogdian communities within China, mainly in Chang’an and Luoyang from Northern Dynasty to Tang. Thus, it is fair to say the studies of these scholars complement each other for, together, they provide a broader and more coherent picture of the Sogdian communities under a transnational context.6 A real cooperation between scholars from various disciplines and countries started in the early 2000s. An international conference held by French and Chinese scholars in 2004 and the publication of Les Sogdiens en Chine (The Sogdians in China) exhibit the possibility for more frequent communication and a closer cooperation between Chinese and Western scholars.

While an increasing number of scholars have realized the trend of transnational and interdisciplinary collaboration in the field of the Sogdian Study, and even in the Silk Road Study, as it is shown in Valerie Hansen’s The Silk Road: A New History, new issues in the field have also been noticed. The well-preserved Sogdian tombs that have been discovered, including the Anjia Tomb and Wirkak Tomb, usually belong to Sogdians with relatively high social status, mainly a group of elite Sogdians called Sabao 萨宝, meaning the chief caravanner and an official title granted to the leader of a Sogdian community. Therefore, it is hard to study the life of Sogdian people from the lower social classes due to the lack of material evidence.

The commercial contracts and travel passes found in Dunhuang and Turfan have already proven that one of the major commodities carried by the Sogdian merchants were slaves from Central Asia. However, the story of Sogdian slaves is still largely missing from the historical narrative. Compared with Western scholars like Frantz Grenet and Étienne de la Vaissière who are more interested in the burial art, religions, and commercial activities of the Sogdian community, there are several Chinese scholars who have studied the Dunhuang contracts related to the Sogdian slave trades.

For example, Zhang Xunliao analyzes a document listing the market prices of slaves and horses.7 Zhu 6 Valerie Hansen, “Review: New Work on the Sogdians, the Most Important Traders on the Silk Road, A.D. 500–1000,” in T’oung Pao, Second Series, 89, no. 1/3 (2003): 151.

7 Zhang Xunliao 张勋燎, “Dunhuang shishi nubi mapi jiamu canzhi de chubu yanjiu” 敦煌石室奴婢马匹价目残纸的初步 研究 [A preliminary study on a fragment of a price list of slaves and horses found in Dunhuang stone cave], Sichuan daxue zhexue shehui kexue xuebao 四川大学哲学社会科学学报 3 (1978).

Lei, using the same document, examines the market and government regulation of the slave trade in northwest China.8 However, this research mainly focuses on one market or one region using only Chinese sources.

Also, in many articles published before the 1990s, the authors tended to use the term shao shu minzu 少数民 族 (ethnic minority groups), to describe those non-Han slaves, no matter whether their hometowns at the time were under Tang control. One article published by Wu Zhen in 2000 offers a more comprehensive survey on the Sogdian slave trade along the Silk Road during the Tang dynasty. In the article, Wu manages to examine the origins, categories, and scale of the slaves from Central Asia and the slave trade in the Tang market.9 Although he tries to expand the issue to the Near East region, the discussion on the transnational connection is still weak. Therefore, the ultimate purpose of this article is to form a transnational narrative of the Sogdian slave trade by combining the stories of both its Central Asia origins and its destination in the Central Plains.

Sogdia is an ancient and medieval Iranian civilization located in modern-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The record of Sogdia can be traced back to the fifteenth century BCE. The name of Sogdia is mentioned on the Behistun Inscription as one province of the Achaemenid Empire.10 In the third century CE, the Sassanid Empire ruled the Sogdian region, but its rule in the area was soon interrupted by the expansion of the Turkic Khaganate. The center of the Sogdian civilization, Samarkand, became a Tang protectorate after Tang’s destruction of the Western Turkic Khaganate. In the seventh century, the Sassanid Empire fell victim to the Arab conquest, Sogdia became part of the Islamized Central Asian world, and Sogdian culture has been lost since then.

Sogdia has also been mentioned in many Chinese sources since the Han dynasty. Both Shiji史 記 (Record of the Grand Historians) and Hanshu 漢書 (Book of Han) mention civilizations like Daxia 大夏, Dayuan 大宛, and Anxi 安息 in Central Asia and the Han’s diplomatic, military, and commercial activities in these states. In the Record of the Grand Historian, it

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8 Zhu Lei 朱雷, Zhu Lei Dunhuang Tulufan wenshu luncong 朱 雷敦煌吐鲁番文书论丛 [A collection of Zhu Lei’s essays on Dunhuang and Turfan documents], (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 2012).

9 Wu Zhen吴震, Wu Zhen Dunhuang Tulufan wenshu yanjiu lun ji 吴震敦煌吐鲁番文书研究论集 [A collection of Wu Zhen’s studies on Dunhuang and Turfan documents], (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 2009).

10 Etienne de la Vaissière, Sogdian Traders: A History, trans.

James Ward, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 13.

is recorded that: Although the states from Dayuan west to Anxi speak rather different languages, their customs are generally similar and their languages mutually intelligible. The men all have deepest eyes and profuse beards and whiskers. They are skillful at commerce and will haggle over a fraction of a cent.11 自大宛以西至安息，國雖頗異言，然大同俗， 相知言。其人皆深眼，多鬚䫇，善市賈，爭分 銖。

were also common and essential.16 Turfan documents suggest that slaves and livestock were transported by merchants who traveled between Turfan, Dunhuang, and other oasis towns in Tarim basin and Dzungarian basin.17 Slavery existed in both Sogdian and Tang Chinese society. During the Sassanid era, the regulation of slavery could be found in Matikan-e-Hazar Datastan (Digest of a Thousand Points of Law).18 According to Sassanid law, non-Zoroastrians captured during the war, mainly the Romans from the west and the Turks from the north, would become slaves. After the Muslim conquest and the fall of the Sassanid Empire, the Samanid Empire, a Sunni regime that declared itself the descendant of the Sassanians, still issued licenses for trading Turkish slaves. Turkish slaves were important exports of Farghāna, which is called Dayuan 大宛 in early Chinese texts.19

The practice of slavery was also legal in Tang society. In Tang Code 唐律, slaves are categorized as jian kou 贱口 (outcastes) and were treated like livestock under the legal code.20 It was illegal to kidnap or enslave a free Chinese unless the heads of the households were selling their children or women due to poverty.21 However, exotic slaves from the Korean peninsula, Turkish, Persian, and southern tribes were common in Chinese noble and aristocratic families.22 In addition, documents found in Turfan and Dunhuang written in Khotanese, Tocharian, and Uighur suggest that slavery was also practiced in these regions.

According to Tang Code, it is required to draw up a contract and report to the local government when buying and selling slaves, horses, and other livestock.

Sogdian merchants followed this practice in Chinese market when dealing with the Han Chinese.23 In an

De la Vaissière argues that the people who lived between Dayuan and Anxi introduced in the text could be the Sogdians; thus, their commercial skills have already been well-known by the Han dynasty.12 In later historical records, including Weishu 魏書 (Book of Wei), Beishi 北史 (History of the Northern Dynasties), and Suishu 隋書 (Book of Sui), the Sogdians are mentioned more frequently, and they are referred to as Zhaowu jiu xing 昭武九姓 (the nine surnames of Zhaowu).13 Among the nine surnames, Kang 康 means Samarkand, the center of Sogdian civilization.

The documents written in both Chinese and Sogdian discovered in Turfan and Dunhuang since the early twentieth century offer more evidence on the connection between Samarkand and China and the settlement of Sogdian communities in Turfan, Dunhuang, and in the Central Plains. Henning dates the famous “Sogdian Ancient Letters” to the early fourth century.14 Letter II, translated by Williams-Sims, mentions a Sogdian “from inside (China),” the famine and fire in Luoyang, and the selling of linen cloth in Dunhuang and Jinzhou (present-day Lanzhou).15 Therefore, it is fair to conclude that by the medieval period, the Sogdians has established a commercial network connecting the Central Plains and oasis towns in the Tarim basin.

Slave Trade in Silk Road Commerce

Hansen has argued that silk was only one among other various goods carried between east and west Eurasia. Spice, metal, leathers, and paper

16 Valerie Hansen, Silk Road: A New History with Documents (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5.

17 Jonathon Karam Skaff, “The Sogdian Trade Diaspora in East Turkestan during the Seventh and Eighth Centuries,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 46, no. 4 (2003): 511.

18 K. D. Irani and Morris Silver, Social Justice in the Ancient World (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995), 87.

19 Edward H. Schafer, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study of T’ang Exotics, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 46.

20 “奴婢贱人, 律比畜产 [The slaves and the outcaste, according to the code, are equal as livestock.].” See Zhangsun Wuji 長孫無忌, 《唐律疏议》卷6《名例律· 官户部曲》 [The Tang Code with sub-commentary, vol. 6: Code on names: official household registration and qubu].

21 Schafer, Golden Peaches of Samarkand, 45.

22 Schafer, Golden Peaches of Samarkand, 45.

23 Li Jinxiu 李锦绣, Dunhuang Tulufan wenshu yu tangshi

11 Sima Qian 司馬遷, Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty, vol 2, trans. Burton Watson, 2nd ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 245.

12 De la Vaissière, Sogdian Traders, 27.

13 The nine surnames are Kang 康, Shi 史, Shi 石, Mi 米, Cao 曹, An 安, He 和, Huoxun 火尋, and Wudi 戊地.

14 W. B. Henning, “The Date of the Sogdian Ancient Letters,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 12, no. 3/4 (1948): 8.

15 De la Vaissière, Sogdian Traders, 44.

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example from a document excavated at Turfan, one important certificate dated 731 talks about the selling of a slave girl: In the year of 731, day, the prosperous hu Mi Lushan, now sells a female slave Shiman’er, aged 12, at the Xizhou (Gaochang, Turfan) market, to Tang Rong from Jincheng county, the Capital.…

Guarantor Caozhu from Gaochang county, aged 46 Guarantor Cao Suokan from the same county, aged 48 Guarantor Kang Bobi from the same county, aged 55 Guarantor Kang Sadeng who is lodging in the region, aged 59 Guarantor Luo Yimei from Gaochang county, aged 59 開元拾九玖年貳月 日，得興胡米祿山辭，今將 婢失滿兒年拾貳，於西州市，出賣與京兆府金 城縣人唐榮。 保人高昌縣石槽主年卌六 保人同縣曹娑堪年卌八 保人同縣康薄鼻年五十五 保人寄住康薩登年五十九 保人高昌縣羅易沒年五十九24

One Sogdian language contract dated 639 recorded the selling of a female slave named Upach: Thus, before the people in the bazaar of Gaochang, a monk [by the name of] Yansyan, the son of Uta, who is from the family of Chan, bought a female slave of Upach, who is from the family of Chuyakk and was born in Turkestan, from Wakhushuvirt, son of Tudhakk originating from Samarqank, for [the price of] 120 drachms [coins which are] very pure [and were] minted in [Sasanian] Persia.

Monk Yansyan is to buy the female slave Upach thus as an unredeemable salve who is without debt and without possessions, [and who is] unpersuadable and unreproachable permanent possession of his sons, grandsons, family, and descendants as well. Accordingly, the monk Yansyan himself and his sons, grandsons, family, and descendants may at will hit her, abuses her, bind her, sell her off, pledge her, give and offer her as a gift, and do whatsoever they may wish to [do to her]. [They are entitled to treat her] just as a female slave who was born in their house, born in their side, or born at home, or as permanent property purchased with drachm…

[The people] were present there [as witness]: Tishrat, the son of Chuzakk originating from Maymargh, Namdhar, the son of Khwatawch, originating from Samarqand, Pesak, the son of Karzh originating from Kushaniya.26

Xinghu 興胡, literally translated as “prosperous hu,” was what the Chinese called the Sogdian merchants at the time. The seller and four guarantors in this case carried zhaowu surnames Mi 石, Shi 石, Cao 曹, and Kang 康, suggesting that they were initially from the Sogdia area.

It is noteworthy that, in many other Dunhuang and Turfan documents, not only the sellers, buyers, or guarantors but also the slaves were always carrying hu names. The slaves did not have the surnames, and the names appearing on the documents were sometimes the transliteration of their Sogdian names. In a registration list of buqu, or “guest girls,” and slaves during the year of Wu Zetian’s reign found in Astana (hereafter referred to as the Slave Registry), there are names like Heli 訶利, Gehun 歌渾, Yebuchi 耶不胵, Zhebulu 遮不略 that indicate their foreign origins.25

yanjiu敦煌吐魯番文書與唐史研究 [Dunhuang and Turfan documents and the study of Tang history], (Fuzhou Shi: Fujian ren min chu ban she, 2006), 68.

24 Tang kaiyuan shijiu nian Tang Rong mai bi shi quan” 唐 開元十九年唐榮買婢市券 [Contract of Tang Rong buying a female slave in 631], Tulufan chutu wenshu 吐魯番出土文書 [Documents excavated at Turfan], vol. 9 (Beijing: Wenwu chuba, 1981–91), 26 25 “Wuzhou xianlou xinfu buqu kenü nubi mingji” 武周先漏 新附部曲客女奴婢名籍 [Appendix on registration list of buqu,

This contract directly points out that Upach, the slave girl, came from “the family of Chuyakk and was born in Turkestan.” Chuyakk is Samarkand, and at that time, it was under the rule of the Western Turkic Khaganate. Both this contract and the previous certificate of 731 show the form of purchasing a slave. The trade had to happen in the designated market, which was called kou ma hang 口馬行 (the slave and horse market) and should be conducted with the witness of guarantors. Once the trade was settled, the buyer had to report to the local government. The local officials then would seal the contract and make a copy to file it. There are also cases where Sogdian slaves adopted Han names, and some of their owners would use the term hu nu 胡奴 (male Sogdian slaves) or hu bi 胡婢 (female Sogdian slaves) in the documents to indicate their origins. For instance, an official certificate for a

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guest girls, and slaves in the year of Wuzhou reign], Tulufan chutu wenshu, vol. 7.

26 Hansen, “Review” 160.

contract dated 732 records: Today to sell a female hu slave the Green Jewel, aged 13, at the Xizhou market to madam Xue the Fifteenth. 今將胡婢綠珠年拾叁歲，於西州市出賣與女婦 薛十五。27

other contracts involving the sale of foreign slaves.

Thus, it does not carry the broad meaning of “foreign.”

Instead, it is indicating the origin of these slaves, like the mention of Sogdia, Turkestan, and Persia in other documents. If this is the case, then蕃should refer to 吐 蕃, the Tibetan Empire.30 Therefore, in this contract, terms like house-born and fan/bo do not emphasize the ethnicities, but the origins of the slaves. Moreover, in a region like Dunhuang, where hu and Han people closely engaged with each other and where there was a considerable amount of hu slaves, it is nearly impossible to deny the existence of house-born slaves whose parents were carried from Sogdia and made families in their new Chinese owners’ households.

Those who were imported by merchants and those who were born locally were not the only types of hu slaves in China. War prisoners, as everywhere else in the world, were one source. During the early Tang period, the Tang army engaged in several wars with the Western Turkic Khaganate. Records show that even the Turkic aristocrats became Tang slaves once they were captured.31 Moreover, those who traveled to China for business but eventually went bankrupt could also become slaves. The Ancient Letter II and III tell a story about a Sogdian woman named Miwnay who was abandoned by her husband in Dunhuang for three years. In Letter III, Miwnay wrote to her husband that if his male relative could not bring him back to her, she then would need to serve the Chinese.32 At the end of the letter, Miwnay’s daughter wrote: “Farnkhund (maybe the business partner of Miwnay’s husband) has run away; the Chinese seek him but do not find him. Because of Farnkhund’s debts, we have become the servants of the Chinese, I together with (my) mother.”33 Although these letters were written in the fourth century, taking those who failed to pay their debts as well as their relatives, especially those who were not Han Chinese, as slaves could still be practiced in the seventh and eighth century. However, whether it was lawful to trade these two types of slaves in the slave market is not clear.

As it is shown in the contracts, many of these hu slaves were carried from Central Asia at a young age. It should also be noted that after these slaves were purchased in Turfan and Dunhuang, they could be resold again by their new owner. Later on, in this certificate of Xue the Fifteenth buying the hu slave girl Green Jewel, there is this statement: Today with the witness of the guarantors in the market, give the former certificate (of buying this slave) like before, to the buyer to make a new market certificate. 今保見集，僅連元券如前，請改給買人市券 者。28

The emphasis on the existence of the former certificate means that this slave girl had been sold before. When her previous owner wanted to resell her in the market, he had to provide the certificate of his previous purchase to the buyer to prove that this slave girl was acquired legally. As a result, the buyer could then ask the local government to issue a new certificate on this purchase by providing the former certificate as valid proof.

Besides those who were brought by the Sogdian merchants, there is another type of slave found in Dunhuang and Turfan documents, which is called Jia sheng nu 家生奴, or the house-born slaves. One document found in the Dunhuang stone cave records the market price of slaves and horses in Shazhou (Dunhuang) market. It uses both the terms of houseborn slave 家生婢and fan slaves 蕃奴.29 The word fan usually means “foreign.” Therefore, some scholars suggest that the house-born slaves would refer to Han Chinese slaves and should be distinguished from the slaves exported from Central Asian states. However, Zhu Lei argues that the word fan蕃is never used in 27 “Tang kaiyuan ershi nian Xue shiwuniang mai bi shiquan” 唐 開元二十年薛十五娘買婢市券 [Contract of Madam Xue the Fifteenth buying a female slave in 632],” Tulufan chutu wenshu 9:31.

28 “Xue shiwuniang mai bi shiquan,” Tulufan chutu wenshu 9:31.

29 Tang Shazhou mou shi shi jia bu kou ma hang shi gu 唐沙州 某市時價簿口馬行時沽 [The price of slaves and horses at market], collected by Sichuan Library.

From Turfan to Chang’an

So far, the sources of hu slaves in Turfan and

20

30 Zhu, Dunhuang Tulufan wenshu conglun, 223.

31 Li Tianshi 李天石, “Dunhuang Tulufan wenshu zhong de nubi ziliao ji qi jiazhi” 敦煌吐鲁番文书中的奴婢资料及其价值 [The materials on slaves in Dunhuang and Turfan documents and their values],” Dunhuang xue ji kan 1 (1990): 12.

32 Sogdian Ancient Letters III, trans. Nicholas William-Sims.

33 Sogdian Ancient Letters III.

Dunhuang market have been discussed. The rest of this article will focus on the economic and social influence that the hu slaves brought to Tang China.

Xizhou and Shazhou were never the final destinations of hu slaves. A travel pass dated 685 shows that four Sogdian merchants planned to bring several Sogdian slaves directly to Chang’an for trade.34 In addition, a travel pass issued in 733 for a military official named Tang Yiqian, who wished to go back to Fuzhou from Xizhou, mentions the names of Shiman’er and Green Jewel, the two hu slave girls who were sold by Mi Lushan to Tang Rong in 731 and to Xue the Fifteenth in 732, respectively: His two female servants Shiman’er and Green Jewel were bought here. 其婢失滿兒，綠珠兩人，於此賣得。35

it is reasonable to assume that there were households at the time buying young slaves, raising them and teaching them certain skills, so that they could resell these slaves at higher prices when the young slaves reached a certain age. In the market, slaves were not only sold to wealthy local Chinese families, but there were also slave dealers who purchased slaves at Turfan and Dunhuang and carried them to cities in the Central Plains to sell them there. Tang documents on city planning and governing shows that kou ma hang did not only exist in Turfan and Dunhuang market but also in Luoyang and Chang’an.37 One document found in Astana Cemetery is a letter sent by a man from Luoyang to his parents who lived in Xizhou. In the letter, the son wrote that he bought a hu slave girl with seventy-five hundred wen 文 in 646.38 Wu Zhen compares this price with the price of buying Upach in 639, which was 120 drachms coin.39 Wu claims that by calculating the exchange rate between Persian coins and Chinese coppers, the price of a female Sogdian slave in the Luoyang market was at least twice as expensive as one in Xizhou; sometimes, it could be eight to ten times higher if inflation is considered.40 Such a huge profit from reselling slaves in the Central Plains market would encourage more slave dealers to participate in transporting Sogdian slaves from Turfan and Dunhuang to inner China. Therefore, Dunhuang played a role as a major transit station in the slave trade between Central Asia and China.

The total number of Sogdian slaves in early Tang society is unknown. However, household registration accounts show that in the mid-seventh century, slaves made up around one-tenth of the total population in Xizhou.41 In regions like Turfan and Dunhuang, it is hard to strictly distinguish the roles of Sogdian and Han slaves. Excluding those who were resold into inner China, Sogdian slaves who stayed in Turfan and Dunhuang had to bear the same duties as the local Han slaves. Li Jun argues that in the early Tang period, due to the private land ownership, powerful aristocratic families, or the so-called men fa 门阀, usually owned numerous slaves to work on their lands. Thus,

This document also mentions a female companion named Xue, who was the aunt of Tang Yiqian.

If the Xue in this travel pass is the same as Xue the Fifteenth who bought Green Jewel one year ago, then the story becomes clear. In year 731, Tang Rong, who could be a male relative or a servant of Tang Yiqian, bought Shiman’er from Mi Anlu for the Tang family.

A year later, Xue bought another hu slave girl named Green Jewel at the market. Finally, in 733, when Tang Yiqian decided to go back to his hometown of Fuzhou with his family, he had to report to the local government with a travel document that listed all the servants and horses he would bring with him. Therefore, Shiman’er and Green Jewel, the two Sogdian slave girls, were brought all the way to Fuzhou in southern China.

In the Slave Registry, the youngest slave on the list was only a year old.36 There were also several slaves, both male and female, who were under the age of five. One should not expect these young slaves to have engaged in any productive or domestic labors.

Moreover, when slaves were brought in from Sogdia or Turkestan by Sogdian merchants to China, they needed to learn Chinese so that they could better serve their new owners. Therefore, there should have been institutions in Turfan and Dunhuang that trained Sogdian slaves in Chinese languages and customs. Thus, 34 “Kang Weiyi, Luoshi qing guo suo an juan” 康尾義羅施請 過所案卷 [File on Kang Weiyi applying for crossing the pass],” Tulufan chutu wenshu 7:88–94.

35 “Tang Kaiyuan Ershiyi nian Tang Yiqian, Xue Guangci, Kang Zhida” 唐開元二十一年唐益謙，薛光泚，康大之請給過所 案卷 [Travel Pass for Tang Yiqian, Xue Guangci, Kang Zhida in 633], Tulufan chutu wenshu 9:36.

36 “婢者其年一歲” [The female salve Zheqi, aged one].

21

37 Zhu, Dunhuang Tulufan wenshu conglun, 215.

38 “Tang Li Hezi shang alang, apo shu” 唐李賀子上阿郎，阿婆 書 [Letter from Li Hezi to his parents during the Tang dynasty], Turufan chutu wenshu vol. 6.

39 See “Contract for the Purchase of a Slave Girl at Turfan and Dated 639.”

40 Wu, Dunhuang Tulufan wenshu yanjiu lun ji, 389.

41 Li, “Dunhuang Tulufan wenshu zhong de nubi ziliao jiqi jiazhi,”13.

most slaves in Turfan had to participate in agricultural work.42 A large number of contracts on purchasing and loaning fields that have been excavated also confirm that Dunhuang and Turfan were still predominantly agricultural at the time. Therefore, when Sogdian slaves were purchased as labor forces in Dunhuang and Turfan, their exotic character did not make them too different from the indigenous slaves.

There were Sogdian slaves like Shiman’er and Green Jewel who continued to serve as domestic servants in Chinese households after they were transported from Dunhuang and Turfan. However, the stories of many Sogdian slaves who were purchased in Chang’an, Luoyang, or other major Central Plain cities are different. Despite the lack of material evidence, literary pieces, especially Tang poems, portray a group of Sogdian slave girls who were usually called jiu jia hu 酒家胡 (wine shop Sogdians) or hu ji 胡 姬 (Sogdian ladies). One of the most famous Chinese poets, Li Bai, used to write hu ji in his poem: “The appearance of the Sogdian lady is like the flower / She sells the wine, laughing in the spring wind.”43 When Sogdian slaves, especially female slaves, were brought to the kou ma hang in Western Market 西市 in Chang’an, they were usually tasked to be waitresses in the wine shops and restaurants owned by the Sogdian merchants. Before the An Lushan Rebellion in 755, Sogdian culture, customs, art, and even fashion were popular in Chang’an. Thus, many Sogdian slave girls also had to perform in exotic shows, including musical and dance performances in Sogdian style, to entertain the guests. Some of them were trained in their homeland of Sogdia, and it is possible that there were others who trained in Dunhuang or Turfan in both the Chinese language and performative skills.

One major issue of the portrayal of Sogdian girls in Tang literature is that their stories were generally romanticized, and their exotic characteristics overshadowed their personalities and miserable experiences. However, as Edward Schafer wrote in The Golden Peach from Samarkand, the existence of the Sogdian girls in the Western Market “took hold of the Chinese imagination in a different way, altered the pattern of 42 Li Jun 李军, “Tangdai si nubi chutan” 唐代私奴婢初探 [A preliminary study on the private slaves in Tang], Dunhuang xue jikan 敦煌学辑刊2 (1984): 114.

43 Li Bai李白, “Qian you yi zun jiu hang er shou” 前有一尊酒 行二首, Quan tang shi 全唐诗 24, no. 45.

Original poem: “琴奏龍門之綠桐，玉壺美酒清若空。催弦拂 柱與君飲，看朱成碧顏始紅。胡姬貌如花，當壚笑春風。笑 春風，舞羅衣，君今不醉將安歸？”

Tang life, and was ultimately embodied in a poem, an edict, a short story, or a memorial to the throne.”44 It should be acknowledged that while the popularity of Sogdian culture in the Central Plains may have stimulated the market for the Sogdian slave trade, the presence of Sogdian girls in Chang’an in return encouraged increased literary creation by the literati class and the flourish of the entertainment industry at the time.

Although the lack of firsthand information makes it difficult to disinter the daily life of Sogdian slaves in Tang cities, their presence in literary pieces indicates that even the silent foreigners from the lowest social level could influence Tang Chinese society economically and culturally.

Conclusion

This article tries to explore the sources of Sogdian slaves in the Chinese market and the influence of the Sogdian slave trade in Chinese society during the early Tang era. Many of the slaves were directly brought from the Sogdian area, and others might have been born locally in Turfan and Dunhuang with Sogdian origins. In the border areas like Dunhuang and Turfan, many of the Sogdian slaves had to participate in agricultural labor. They had to learn the Chinese language, work in or for Chinese families, and some of them even had to adopt Han Chinese names. While some people would label these series of transformations as “Sinification,” those who were transported into Chang’an and performed in restaurants and entertainment venues also demonstrated how they participated in Chinese culture and the local economy with their foreign features and identities.

Due to time and space limitation and the lack of sufficient materials, there are many aspects of Sogdian slaves and the slave trade that are not discussed in detail in this article. For instance, the article mainly uses legal or business documents to study the slave trade in Dunhuang and Turfan, but there are several Dunhuang vernacular novels like Lushan yuan gong Hua 廬山遠公話 (The Story of Monk Huiyuan from Mount Lu) that also tell the stories of selling and purchasing slaves in the market. Also, when discussing the Sogdian slaves in Chang’an, the previous passage only focuses on the female Sogdian slaves active in public entertainment. The roles of male Sogdian slaves on such occasions and the situation of Sogdian slaves in private family lives are also exciting topics. These issues and questions also reveal the potential opportu44 Schafer, Golden Peaches of Samarkand, 2.

22

nity to develop and expand the study and discussion of the Sogdian slave trade along the Silk Road. After all, those who traded and held slaves and those who were enslaved and traded deserve equal attention in the historical narratives.

Note for the readers on geographic and administrative names: English/Romanization Chinese Dunhuang 敦煌 Dun huang 沙洲 Sha zhou Farghāna 费尔干纳 Fei er gan na 大宛 Da yuan Samarkand 撒马尔罕 Sa ma er han 康居 Kang ju Turfan 吐鲁番 Tu lu fan 高昌 Gao chang 西州 Xi zhou Turks 突厥 Tu jue Uighur 回鹘 Hui hu

23

Wang Qiyao: Miss Shanghai in China’s Twentieth Century, 1945–1990 Jiarong Wang Jiarong Wang is currently a first-year MA student in the East Asian Languages and Civilizations Department Her research focuses on gender history in Shanghai and China after the Qing Dynasty. Her passion for studying gender inequity for women comes from past professional and personal experience in translation and modeling industries.

Introduction received training from the China Writers Association

The novel Changhen ge was published in at the Lu Xun Literary Institute.4 1995.1 Under the title of Everlasting Regret, it was

In this paper, the status of the Shanghai woman adapted into a film directed by Stanley Kwan in 2005, after 1945 is investigated through a close reading of with Sammi Cheng starring as the protagonist. It was Changhen ge, analyzed through the theories of Foutranslated into English by Michael Berry and Susan cault, Bourdieu, and Susan Sontag, with a comparison Chan Egan as The Song of Everlasting Sorrow: A of Hershatter and Mann’s works as supplementary Novel of Shanghai in 2008. Since its publication, it has sources. Given the fictionality of the heroine, the aubrought its author Wang Anyi numerous praises, and thor has made Wang Qiyao the microcosm of a larger its heroine Wang Qiyao (王琦瑶) has consequently phenomenon when female social butterflies seemingly been recognized as a symbol of Shanghai women in led successful lives, but behind the scenes they sufpost-Mao China. This novel was listed by China Times fered in the mistress culture. Through the social class, as one of the “Top 10 Books of the 1990s” in 1999. family relationships, and personal characteristics of One year later, it won the fifth Mao Dun Literature Wang Qiyao, the author portrays the female protagoPrize, one of the most prestigious literary prizes in nist as a representative of ordinary Shanghai women in 2 China. Xudong Zhang, Professor of Comparative Lit- China’s macro-history. erature and East Asian Studies at New York University, commended Wang Anyi for “the sublime bird’s-eye Section I: Wang Qiyao and History view reminiscent of Victor Hugo,” “the unrelenting 1.1 A Life of Hopeless Love socioeconomic analysis worthy of Balzac,” and “the

Wang Qiyao was born in Shanghai in 1929. intimate unending chatters of a besieged class that are This novel begins in 1945 when she was a sixteencharacteristic of Proust.”3 Besides the critical acclaim year-old high school student. Her friend Wu Peizhen’s from domestic and international scholars, Changhen cousin worked at a film studio where Wang Qiyao ge offers its readers insights to investigate a detailed attended but failed her first audition. The director of regional gender history situated in Shanghai from the this film studio sensed Wang Qiyao’s coquettish eyes 1940s to the 1990s. resembled those of Ruan Lingyu’s, but soon found out

Born in 1954, Wang Anyi is the daughter of that her beauty was not so dramatic. “Her beauty will Ru Zhijuan, a Chinese writer known for her short be buried and lost to the world,” remarked the director, stories. In 1969, Wang Anyi was “sent down” to the because while her beauty was admired by her neighcountryside of Anhui after being traumatized by her bors and relatives, it was not enough to be a superstar.5 experience during the Cultural Revolution. She did Out of pity, the director introduced her to Mr. Cheng, not become a professional writer until 1980, when she a photographer, who submitted Wang Qiyao’s photo to Shanghai Life magazine. After her photo was select1 Wang Anyi 王安忆, 长恨歌 (Changhen ge) (Beijing: Zuojia ed as the inside front cover under the title “A Proper chubanshe 作家出版社, 1995). English translation: The Song of Young Lady of Shanghai,” Wang Qiyao became a Everlasting Sorrow: A Novel of Shanghai, trans. Michael Berry and Susan Chan Egan (New York: Columbia University Press, minor celebrity.

2008).

In 1946, with the help of Mr. Cheng and her 2 The Mao Dun Literature Prize is a prize for novels and adminnew friend Jiang Lili, Wang Qiyao reached the splenistered by the Chinese Writers Association (CWA). First awarded did pinnacle of her life by winning third place in in 1982, the prize was created by the will of Mao Dun (茅盾), a prominent Chinese novelist in the twentieth century. The purpose the Miss Shanghai beauty pageant. She then meets was to encourage fiction writing. The prize was usually awarded every five years.

3 Xudong, Zhang. New York University. Review excerpt on book cover.

24

4 Lingzhen Wang, “Wang Anyi,” in The Columbia Companion to Modern East Asian Literature, ed. Joshua S. Mostow (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 592.

5 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 38.

Director Li during a ribbon-cutting ceremony at a department store. Director Li was a “towering figure in military and political circles,” a man of power and authority.6 At the age of nineteen, Wang Qiyao became the forty-year-old Director Li’s mistress, and moved into Alice Apartments, marking her adulthood and departure from her natal family.

Her financially prosperous life soon ended in the fall of 1948, when “a crucial battle between the Nationalists and the Communists was being fought in Huaihai; the price of gold was soaring; the stock market collapsed; Wang Xiaohe was shot by the government; the Jiangya steamship running between Shanghai and Ningbo exploded; a plane flying from Shanghai to Peking crashed.”7 Wang Qiyao fled to Wu Bridge in Suzhou, but her attempt to escape was halted by the allure of the enthralling phantoms of Shanghai.

She came back and settled in Peace Lane in Shanghai.

She made a living by helping patients with their injections. She transformed from “A Proper Young Lady of Shanghai” and “Miss Third Place” to “Injection Nurse Wang Qiyao.”8

However, Wang Qiyao could not become accustomed to triviality and banality. She fell in love with Kang Mingxun, a son of a concubine but the only male progeny in a wealthy family. When she got pregnant, Kang Mingxun could not shoulder the responsibility. Reluctant to abandon his family wealth, he could not marry Wang Qiyao and live with her.

So, Wang Qiyao slept with Sasha, a mutual friend of theirs, and hoped he would take responsibility by claiming himself as the child’s father. Unfortunately, her hope was dashed when Sasha left for Peking and never returned. Wang had to raise the child named Weiwei alone. Meanwhile, Wang’s friend Jiang Lili died of liver cancer in 1965. Mr. Cheng, a suitor and protector of Wang, committed suicide in 1966 after he had been tortured under suspicion of espionage during the Cultural Revolution.

By 1976, Wang Qiyao was forty-seven and Weiwei was fifteen. Wang Qiyao did not get along well with her daughter because of mutual jealousy.

Wang was jealous of Weiwei’s youth, while Weiwei was constantly told that she was not as beautiful as her mother. The following year Shanghai witnessed prosperity and proliferation in designs and the clothing industry. Weiwei married and left for San Francisco.

6 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 99.

7 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 137.

8 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 163.

In 1985, Wang Qiyao met “Old Color,” who was a connoisseur of old Shanghai fashion. Regardless of the fact that “Old Color” was thirty years younger than her, they consummated their love, but for different reasons. For “Old Color,” Wang Qiyao embodied the aura of “Shanghai nostalgia.”9 For Wang Qiyao, “Old Color” accorded her esteem and quenched her thirst for companionship. However, after “Old Color” became disillusioned by her old age, he left. Wang Qiyao was eventually murdered in 1986 by a robber.

1.2 Historical Background

From a fatalistic perspective, the tragedy of Wang Qiyao was doomed from the beginning of The Song of Everlasting Sorrow. The heroine’s fateful passage is first revealed in chapter 2, part 1. “[They saw] a woman in a sheer nightgown lying on a bed with wrinkled sheets. She tried to lie in several different positions. . . In the end, the woman in bed stopped moving and stayed still in the same position for quite some time before the lights once again dimmed.”10 Wang Qiyao took a moment to realize the actress was pretending to be dead. With a strong sense of déjà vu, as if she herself were the actress, she wondered whether the actress was murdered or committed suicide.

As a realistic writer, Wang Anyi used symbolism to explicate Wang Qiyao’s life story along with the macro-history of China. The author narrates Wang Qiyao’s life story with detachment. The early revelation of her death indicates the waxing and waning of a nation. “Shanghai in late 1945 was a city of wealth, colors, and stunning women. After the Japanese surrender, revelry [took] place every evening.”11 The Sino-Japanese war formally ended on September 9, 1945, after eight years of resistance, and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East convened on April 29, 1946. All the territories that Japan annexed from China were restored. China’s international status was recognized as one of the Big Four of the Allies and became one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.12

However, the transient peace soon disinte-

25

9 Xudong Zhang, “Shanghai Nostalgia: Postrevolutionary Allegories in Wang Anyi’s Literary Production in the 1990s,” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 8, no. 2 (2000): 349–87.

10 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 31.

11 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 45.

12 Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013); Douglas Brinkley and David Rubel, World War II: The Allied Counteroffensive, 1942–1945, (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004).

grated in the subsequent Chinese Civil War. In 1949, the Communists announced their victory, unveiling the beginning of the People’s Republic of China. In 1958, Mao launched a five-year economic plan called the Great Leap Forward, and then 1966 witnessed the Cultural Revolution. Ten years later, “1976 was a year of epochal change; the impact it had on Weiwei lay allwithin the realm of the aesthetics of living.”13

The history which Wang Anyi endeavored to construct is a relatively personal one. For the majority of ordinary people, revolution is not represented by anti-government slogans or bloodshed with the cacophony of gunfire. Revolution takes place in ordinary households in a mild, quiet way. For Wang Qiyao, the ecstasy of the success of Sino-Japanese war was represented by the Miss Shanghai beauty pageant. On the other hand, during the war between the Kuomintang-led government (KMT) of the Republic of China and the Communist Party of China (CPC), Director Li died, and Wang Qiyao had to leave Alice Apartment.

Even the Cultural Revolution is depicted with disinterest and is left out of the narrative. The life in Shanghai for ordinary people seems remote as well as closely paralleled with Chinese macro-history.

1980s.”17 The narrative of Wang Qiyao is typical in how it reflects revolution in an implicit and even indifferent tone.

This paper relies on the theories of Foucault, Bourdieu, and Susan Sontag to compare and contrast how social power dynamics have influenced common people. Foucault asserts that power is omnipresent.

Power does not rest in an individual but permeates every aspect of life. Power is understood as “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization.”18 In this inextricable and labyrinthine web of power relations, there exists resistance. This resistance is everywhere and exists in different forms.19

According to Bourdieu, there are two types of power in society: official power and unofficial power.

Official power is attributed to men, while unofficial power is attributed to women. Official power is associated with “disinterested, collective, publicly avowable, legitimate interests.” Unofficial power is linked with “egoistic, private, particular interests.”20 In the case of Shanghai, official power is derived from the formal structure of patriarchy. The unofficial power of women is exercised “under the cover of official authority.” In this paper, I will examine Shanghai women’s power and the forms by which their power was exercised.

1.3 Literature Review and Purpose of this Study

Wang Qiyao is recognized as the symbol of Shanghai women in the post-Mao era by domestic and international scholars. Zhang Xi categorizes the tragic narrative of Wang Qiyao into the history of the “urban petty bourgeois,”14 Hai Wei emphasizes the prominence of “nobody” to construct historiography, and thus asserts Wang Qiyao as an active participant of Chinese history after 1945.15 Wang Fei supports Wang Anyi’s methodology to reflect historical revolutions in everyday households.16 “Through forty years of political and social upheaval, Qiyao serves as an unwitting guide as we observe Shanghai groaning under the weight of overwhelming forces. As Qiyao ages through relationships with five men, becoming a symbol of the old Shanghai, the city likewise declines from its colonial splendor of the 1940s to the crumbling longtang and polluted rivers of the industrial 13 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 294.

14 Zhang Xi 张茜, “探析王安忆《长恨歌》中王琦瑶的悲剧命 运,” 文教資料 (Wen jiao zi liao) 30 (2014): 91–93.

15 Hai Wei 海崴, “太阳光里有歌有舞的灰尘──自问自答 读解《长恨歌》,” 当代作家评论 (Dangdai zuojia pinglun) 3 (1998): 88–91.

16 Wang Fei 王绯, “王安忆: 理性与情悟,” 当代作家评论 (Dangdai zuojia pinglun) 1 (1998): 25–29.

Section II: Wearing Identity 2.1 Cheongsams and Social Identity

Cheongsams are straight dresses with a standup collar popularized in the 1930s by Chinese socialites and upper-class women in Shanghai. When Wang Qiyao first appeared in this novel, she was wearing a cheongsam. In the setting of the whole narrative, Wang Anyi tried to make Wang Qiyao a microcosm, a symbol, or a typification of the big city of Shanghai, so in this chapter “Wang Qiyaos” in the plural replaced “Wang Qiyao.” “Wang Qiyaos are always stunningly beautiful. They wear indigo blue cheongsams that set off their figure.”21 These indigo blue cheongsams lack creativity, because Wang Qiyaos always “blindly [follow] suit.”

26

17 Baochai Chiang and J. B. Rollins, “Wang Anyi. The Song of Everlasting Sorrow: A Novel of Shanghai.” World Literature Today 83, no. 3 (2009): 64.

18 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 92.

19 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 96.

20 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 38–43.

21 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 22.

Cheongsams are important symbols in this novel and represent Wang’s life trajectory and character. Wang Qiyao assumed her first social identity in 1945 through a photo published in Shanghai Life magazine. She was titled “A Proper Young Lady of Shanghai.” In this photo, Wang Qiyao wore “her casual cheongsam with a flowered pattern.” The title is tailor-made for Wang Qiyao. At that time, she was an innocent student and an ordinary daughter. She was an inexperienced social greenhorn. She was a virgin who had been protected within the inner quarters of the home, designated for women. Her social identity was “proper” and “casual.” In this photo, Wang Qiyao was perceived to be a “good girl.” This notion of “good girl” was written all over her casual cheongsam, which had “tiny delicate flowers.”22 This casual cheongsam also indicates her social class. She was from the working class; her family was not so poor as to “have no flowers at all,” but also was not wealthy enough to “have large flowers.” During her time as a student, besides this casual cheongsam with tiny delicate flowers, she wore two other cheongsams. One was “a white cheongsam” decorated only by “a red ribbon.”23 The other white cheongsam was described metaphorically as “white peony amid a sea of violet and crimson.”

In brief, when she was still “A Proper Young Lady of Shanghai,” she wore light-colored cheongsams with a simple flowered pattern, which represent her virginity as well as innocence.

The cheongsam she wore at the Miss Shanghai beauty pageant was a pink satin cheongsam with embroidered flowers. The pink was appropriate for Wang Qiyao back then, and the color was in accordance with her purity, delicate elegance, and vivacity.24 Wang Qiyao was not a “beautiful” woman, but a “pretty” girl. Beauty is awe-inspiring; it implies isolation and has the power to hurt.25 But prettiness is warm, sincere, and unthreatening. This pink somehow suggested Wang Qiyao would not win first place, because pink is not as eye-catching as crimson. Her second social identity, “Miss Third Place,” was symbolized by this pinkness, which was comfortably pretty, yet rustic and parsimonious.

When Wang Qiyao began to date Director Li, she still wore white cheongsams. One was “a beige short-sleeved silk cheongsam,” and the other one was 22 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 42.

23 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 49.

24 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 71.

25 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 43.

“a white cheongsam with white piping.”26 At this moment, Wang was still unsophisticated. However, she paid more attention to her clothes. The design of her cheongsams showed a studied casualness with which she tried to impress Director Li.

Her third social identity brought dramatic changes to her life as well as to her clothes. Wang Qiyao became Director Li’s mistress and moved into Alice Apartment in the spring of 1948. This time, Wang Qiyao wore a pink dressing gown with a border embroidered with large flowers. Besides her clothes, the sofa and the lampshade were all covered with large flowers.27 Compared to the tiny flowers on her past cheongsams, these large flowers have a sense of grandiosity. These large flowers imply Wang Qiyao’s financial prosperity, adulthood, and sexual maturity.

She was not a small girl any longer. As a mistress, she was now a big woman. Meanwhile, flowers have the connotations of ephemeral splendor, because flowers will eventually wither. These flowers hint at Wang Qiyao’s bloom and foreshadow the subsequent narrative.

After the blossom, the flowers are going to wither.

After the fall of 1948, Shanghai underwent massive changes. Wang Qiyao also had to assume a new identity as “Injection Nurse Wang Qiyao.” After her period as a mistress, Wang Qiyao wore simple cheongsams again. In the 1950s, cheongsams became rare on the streets of Shanghai. They were considered “a symbol of nostalgia as well as style, at once old-fashioned and modern.”28 Wang Qiyao’s simple cheongsams were apparently not for a nostalgic style, but to represent or reflect her economic conditions.

She lost her financial support after the death of Director Li. However, Wang Qiyao also used these simple light-color (probably white) cheongsams as her disguise. Wearing these simple cheongsams makes her look very much like a professional nurse, and she can still conceal her economic conditions by claiming she pursued Shanghai nostalgic style. These simple cheongsams resembling nurse uniforms mark Wang Qiyao’s economic independence.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Wang Qiyao wore pants for the first time. She wore “a gray jacket with a poplin facing over a pair of matching wool pants.”29 The revolution was depicted on Wang Qiyao’s body by a change of clothes. Pants were important because women were

27

26 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 96, 103.

27 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 121.

28 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 163.

29 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 190.

encouraged to work outside their homes by the newly founded government in the Republican era. Compared with cheongsams, pants were considered better clothes for jobs, and thus symbolized the mobilization of women’s labor.

In this new era, cheongsams went out of fashion, just like Wang Qiyao, who was a relic of Old Shanghai. However, regardless of her age, Wang Qiyao still tried to maintain her self-esteem by chasing fashion within her means. When meeting her daughter’s friend Zhang Yonghong, she wore “a cotton overall, [which is] actually a men’s overall with vented sides and the front buttons on the opposite side.”30 This overall won Zhang Yonghong’s admiration. Zhang said: “when it comes to fashion, [Wang Qiyao is] the real thing. We [young generations] are all fakes compared to [her].” I perceive the practicality of Wang Qiyao’s clothes may lie in her pragmatism and endeavors to make her life as decent as possible.

Throughout her life, when she assumed a new social identity, Wang Qiyao dressed differently. She was wearing her identity. These cheongsams sometimes betray her disguise, yet other times show her arrogance. These garments were speaking for Wang Qiyao. They were the soul of Wang Qiyao.

Every seam and stitch, slight variances in colors, and the texture of the fabric served as outlets of self-expression. It was a right granted to them by society to be as critical as they wished about their clothes. Wang Qiyao exercised her agency, expressed her desires, and personally subverted the patriarchy with the fastidiousness of her cheongsams.

Wang Qiyao was able to make her own choices through clothing. Her close friend in Peace Lane, Madame Yan, said: “Nothing is more important for a person than the clothes they wear; these demonstrate better than anything else a person’s spirit and taste. . . . [even the food you eat] is not as important as face, which is what announces you to the world. You rely on it for respect and credibility.”32 Wang Qiyao made a similar statement where she compared concubines to the inner lining of clothes (心子), and wives to the fabric sewn on the outside of the clothes (面子). Wang Qiyao chose not to be a housewife. A comparison was also manifested by the way housewives wear cheongsams. Housewives wore “wrinkled cheongsams, the seams of their stockings running crookedly up the back of their legs,” which gives them a disheveled look. Therefore, Wang Qiyao has exercised her agency to be a concubine.

Wang Qiyao believed herself to be the deci2.2 Self-Expression through Cheongsams sion maker, because of her nascent consciousness of

Wang Qiyao demonstrated a nascent conindividualism and feminism. Her understanding of sciousness of individualism and feminism through her individualism can be traced through cheongsams, her dress over different periods. Her cheongsams were choice of lovers and her perceptions of love. When body paintings that expressed her selfhood. questioned which one she would choose, a steadfast

First, Wang Qiyao expressed her desire through relationship with mutual suffering or an evanescent her cheongsams. She clearly knew what clothes meant love with only happiness, she chose to love. While to women. Clothes are the heart of true women, and Madame Yan asserted women lived for men, Wang 31 clothing to them is life itself. This manifestation of Qiyao disagreed, saying: “I live for myself.”33 Her women’s external beauty is supported by an inner tenacious pursuit of love is a symbol of individualism, strength other than vanity. Women in the 1980s were and of stubborn resistance to the social norm. Her aware of their exclusion from the decision-making of rejection of the role of wife antagonized the society the world’s destiny as counterparts of men. But it is which married all women to men without romance. untrue to suggest they were not ambitious. Women’s

As for her feminist perceptions, Wang Qiyao desires were reflected in their adornment. Women claimed that “competing in the pageant is the very negotiated with their extravagant dreams by wearing symbol of a woman’s liberation. The Miss Shanghai the glory of Shanghai. Their conscientiousness and pageant confers social status on a woman.”34 Compemeticulousness in dressing themselves played as an tition in Miss Shanghai, therefore, has socio-political outlet to subvert the construction and confinement of meanings for Wang Qiyao. It was a method by which male-dominated society. When it comes to cheongshe could upgrade her social status. sams, women could be extremely demanding, and

Wang Qiyao expressed her desire through considered every aspect of these articles of clothing.

30 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 308.

31 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 311.

28

32 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 197.

33 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 169.

34 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 67.

cheongsams, which can be deemed a nascent consciousness of individualism and feminism. However, as Foucault reminds us, “Where there is desire, the power relation is already present.”35 This power dynamic will be further scrutinized in the following section. Moreover, Wang Qiyao’s fastidiousness about clothes and lovers is merely personal defiance that brings misfortune. Nevertheless, Foucault adds, “Where there is power, there is resistance.”36 In the next section of this paper, the power dynamics between Wang Qiyao and her four men, as well as society, will be examined.

her second means to express her selfhood—namely, her cheongsams—provides her with an outlet, yet simultaneously limits her from other forms of expression. As readers can perceive, after the cheongsams went out of fashion with the founding of the PRC, Wang Qiyao seems to lose her voice and identity by half-forcedly choosing other clothes as alternatives. Yet in this new era, she was still regarded by her surroundings—especially by her last lover “Old Color”—as a symbol of Old Shanghai.

Besides the construction and confinement on her method of exercising her agency, Wang Qiyao reveals a society accommodated to concubinage. The commodification of women’s bodies served as an approach for men to show off their power. The most powerful man, Director Li, had more than one concubine. “Director Li’s first wife stayed at the old family residence. It was a marriage arranged by his parents through proper matchmakers. Besides her, Director Li had two other wives, one in Peking and one in Shanghai.”39 Everyone in this society has a certain connection with concubinage. For example, Kang Mingxun is the son of a concubine, and Jiang Lili’s father had a concubine in the interior and rarely came home. He only returned to Shanghai twice a year for his children’s birthdays.40 Despite its rampancy, the Shanghainese working class held mixed feelings towards concubinage. When the neighboring couples in Peace Lane quarreled, their dialogue revealed their jealousy. A wife said: “I might just as well go off and live like that woman Wang Qiyao over in no. 39!” Whereupon the husband would sneer: “Really? Have you got what it takes?” That would always silence the wife. Sometimes a husband would instigate, saying: “Take a look at yourself in the mirror!

And then go look at Wang Qiyao in no. 39!” The wife would resort, saying: “Can you afford someone like her?”41 This heated exchange indicates how concubinage in Shanghai was viewed not with contempt, but with a smidgen of envy, which echoes Wang’s decision to be a concubine herself under the framework of the larger culture of mistresses.

Section III: Construction and Confinement 3.1 A Tragedy from Patriarchy

Wang Qiyao was a victim of patriarchy. Her forty-year life story was centered around four men: Director Li, a man who made decisions; Kang Mingxun, an irresponsible man; Sasha, a man who never came back; “Old Color,” a so-called connoisseur of antiques who abandoned her for her “antiquity.”

In the previous section, I argued that Wang Qiyao possessed a nascent awareness of individualism and feminism. By exercising her agency through cheongsams, she is conscious of her identity as a woman and the power brought about by her beauty.

Wang Anyi writes of “girls like Wang Qiyao, who know all too well that they are pretty.”37 Because of their consciousness of their prettiness, her gradual sophistication and manipulation of her sex and relationships reveal the development of Shanghai women’s emerging consciousness.

However, it is important not to overstate the rising position of Shanghai women, for Wang Qiyao’s very means of excising her agency is constructed and confined under patriarchy. First and foremost, Wang Qiyao’s beauty is constructed under a male gaze.

Wang Qiyao was encouraged to examine her body as fragments instead of as an organic whole. According to Susan Sontag, “the ideal of beauty is administered as a form of self-oppression. Women are taught to see their bodies in parts, and to evaluate each part separately. Breasts, feet, hips, waistline, neck, eyes, nose, complexion, hair, and so on—each in turn is submitted to an anxious, fretful, often despairing scrutiny. Even if some pass muster, some will always be found wanting. Nothing less than perfection will do.”38 Moreover, 35 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 81.

36 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 95.

37 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 41.

38 Susan Sontag, “A Woman’s Beauty: Put-Down or Power

3.2 Shanghai Women Face to Face

In this section, I will blur the boundaries and limits of Wang Qiyao’s fictionality. By regarding her as a typification of Shanghai women in the working class, I examine her prototype to investigate the nuances be-

29

Source?” Vogue, 1975.

39 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 100.

40 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 59.

41 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 239.

tween the reality of Shanghai women and the general picture depicted by scholars. Two sources I rely on are Women in China’s Long Twentieth Century and Gender and Sexuality in Modern Chinese History, which provide the larger landscape of the living conditions of Chinese women, especially Han women.42 By comparison and contrast, I will present a regional study of Shanghai women from the mid-1940s to the 1990s.

As Yunxiang Yan has observed, young men under the post-Mao reforms “are valued for the ability to articulate emotions and to make money;” conversely, young women were praised “for beauty, adornment, and a sweet temperament.”43 In the 1990s, urban Shanghai women felt pressure to “marry up the social scale defined in the terms of the market economy.”44 The notion of an ideal lover was both romantic and mercenary. For Wang Qiyao, she chose Director Li instead of Mr. Cheng because she was influenced by this notion as well as the pressure to “marry up.”

In the post-Mao era, adornment was presented as “a natural female desire, with its necessary commodities to be supplied by an expanding consumer market.”45 Accordingly, Wang Qiyao was one of the young women born and bred in this reform era, who regarded fashion and beauty as “arenas for newly permitted self-expression and experimentation with fantasies of self”.46 Her fastidiousness in cheongsams expressed her selfhood, which is a sign of her nascent individualism and feminism. But meanwhile, “it is important not to overstate the break between Maoist and reform era representation of femininity,” because the major role for women was still confined to the domestic labor as “good mothers and wise wives.”

In 1950, the PRC’s Marriage Law changed the notion of marriage from feudalism to socialism—in other words, from family-based oppression to limited individual choice. Where previously women’s bodies were viewed as property by their husbands and marital family, women gained limited agency to match their own marriage. Divorce rates increased. Two reinforcements of the Marriage Law were later undertaken, in 1980 and in 1990. This law made a difference for 42 Gail Hershatter, Women in China’s Long Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Susan Mann, Gender and Sexuality in Modern Chinese History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

43 Yunxiang Yan, “Courtship, Love and Premarital Sex in a North China Village,” China Journal 48 (2002): 28–53.

44 Hershatter, China’s Long Twentieth Century, 10.

45 Hershatter, China’s Long Twentieth Century, 46-47.

46 Hershatter, China’s Long Twentieth Century, 47.

Shanghai women. Madame Yan, a friend of Wang, said: “If it were not for the Party’s prohibition, our Mr. Yan would have taken on a concubine. He [wanted] a taxi dancer over at the Paradise Club.”47 But then came Liberation, and he did not ultimately succeed.

Before the promulgation of the law, concubines were prevalent, as I discussed in the previous section.

Even though Hershatter depicted the diversity of marriage forms after 1945, patrilocality still predominated. Many feminist scholars have addressed the disadvantages of patrilocality for women. After becoming married, “rural women literally lost their childhood names and were known henceforth mainly by kinship terms, denying them the full personhood attainable by men.”48 The name of Madame Yan was erased. As a wife, she was designated by the family name of her husband. Marriage meant getting cut-off from one’s natal family and childhood social networks. Even if wifehood has been denied to Wang Qiyao, she was still forced to leave her natal family by becoming a mistress.

Although some scholars assert that there was a “waning of the patriarchal order” and “the emergence of an ethos of individual development,” Wang Qiyao exemplified a pseudo-individualism and covert patriarchy.49 When Wang Qiyao slept with Sasha in an attempt to trap him into supporting Weiwei, she trapped herself by commoditizing her body under patriarchal oppression. Therefore, even though the PRC’s 1950 Marriage Law took effect and benefited wives, it failed to protect women who did not have legal husbands, including concubines, prostitutes, and widows. Notwithstanding the aim of the law to criminalize selling daughters and wives, in reality, the inveterate notion that “men trade money for sex and women sex for money” still existed.50 However, it is necessary to realize the temporality of a specific gender pattern, because women themselves were and are ambitiously participating and negotiating within the power dynamics. Popular discourse on Shanghai wives and husbands encompassed a profusion of contradictory themes: “women were reportedly both more mercenary and more romantic than men when

30

47 Wang, Song of Everlasting Sorrow, 168-169.

48 Hershatter, China’s Long Twentieth Century, 11.

49 Yunxiang Yan, Private Life Under Socialism: Love, Intimacy, and Family Change in a Chinese Village, 1949–1999 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 29–53; Hershatter, China’s Long Twentieth Century, 23.

50 James Farrer and Sun Zhongxin, “Extramarital Love in Shanghai,” China Journal 50 (2003), 1–36.

seeking a mate; husbands were both privileged and henpecked.”51 As it is depicted in the lives of Wang Qiyao and many Shanghai women, there are pinnacles and misfortunes.

In summary, Wang Qiyao’s prettiness is constructed by society’s notions. Mistresses are symbolic of men’s power; even Wang Qiyao’s choice to be a concubine instead of a wife is defined by the notions of society. The notions are subtle, often just hints rather than explicit statements in the book. Although Hershatter suggested miscellaneous new marriage patterns including uxorilocal marriage without stigma, delayed-transfer marriage, and encouragement for widows to remarry—all of which provides liberal possibilities—the traditional “patriarchal, patrilocal, and patrilineal” marriage pattern predominated in seemingly modernized and westernized Shanghai from 1945 to 1990.52 The PRC’s 1950 Marriage Law protected most “good wives and wise mothers,” but failed to protect women who were not wives. Under these circumstances, “Wang Qiyaos” used adornment as an outlet of selfhood to negotiate their social status. With the study of texts like The Song of Everlasting Sorrow, we can see how Shanghai women were both liberal and confined. Confronted with the forces of Western colonization, Communist “liberation,” and contemporary capitalism, they showed a nascent consciousness of feminism and individualism by a consumption-driven identity. Meanwhile, they were limited by the domestic labor and constructed by a male gaze.

51 William L. Parish, “Sexual Practices and Sexual Satisfaction: A Population Based Study of Chinese Urban Adults,” Archives of Sexual Behavior 36, no. 1 (2007): 5–20.

52 Hershatter, China’s Long Twentieth Century, 168.

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Xi Jinping’s Use of Confucian Kinship to Consolidate His Power Susan Radov Susan Radov is a senior from Baltimore, Maryland majoring Cultural Anthropology and minoring in Chinese Studies. She has a keen interest in international affairs, as it relates to politics, cultural, ideology, and immigration. Regarding experience with Asia, she translates and gives tours in Mandarin at the Penn Museum, has attended 2 China conferences, and interned with the East Asia/Pacific subcommittee for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Introduction self as a benevolent and familial leader. Thus, I argue

Since his ascension to General Secretary of the that Xi Jinping uses Confucianism’s system of kinship Communist Party of China on March 14, 2013, Xi Jin- to legitimize his moral authority, to cement his politiping has actively advocated Confucianism for political cal power, and to create unified Chinese citizens under purposes. Xi is the first Communist President to have him. visited Confucius’s birthplace, Qufu, in over twenty years and the first to have attended a birthday party for Methodology Confucius.1 Xi’s revival may seem perplexing to those I used both primary and secondary sources who have studied twentieth century Chinese philosoin my paper to deeply analyze Xi Jinping’s Confuphy and religion. In 1973, Mao Zedong, founder of the cian rhetoric. The combination of quotations from Xi People’s Republic of China, formed the “Criticize Lin, Jinping’s own speeches and books and the academic Criticize Confucius Campaign,” which endorsed pubreviews and newspaper articles on Xi Jinping’s politilic criticism of Confucianism and encouraged Maoist cal promotion of Confucianism enabled me to pinpoint interpretations of Chinese history.2 The Communist the unique ways in which Xi Jinping uses kinship to Party long denounced Confucianism in the twentieth promote his power. century, yet this Communist leader supports it. Inter My paper is arranged as follows: First, I pronational news sources have noted that Xi frequently vide an overview on kinship and Confucian filial piety quotes Confucius in his speeches and books, stressing in China. Then, I analyze Xi Jinping’s rhetoric in three traditional culture as the “foundation” and “wellparts: Xi as Confucian sage, Xi as father, and the State 3 spring” of the Communist Party. as family.

This paper explores the motivations and nuances of Xi Jinping’s use of Confucian rhetoric and Kinship and Filial Piety terminology. Specifically, I ask: How has Xi Jinping

In order to better understand how Xi Jinping used Confucian rhetoric to promote his twenty-first uses Confucianism’s system of kinship, it is important century political ideology? By answering this questo provide context on the meaning of kinship more tion, I seek to explore how Xi Jinping relies on tradibroadly. Kinship is defined by anthropologist Alfred tional Confucian systems of kinship. I will examine Reginald Radcliffe-Brown as the “arrangement of how Xi Jinping uses the traditional social relations of persons in relation to each other,” which makes up the filial piety and evokes kinship in order to market him- essential social structure in society.4 As a student of anthropology, I have learned that unpacking intricate 1 “Confucius Says, Xi Does,” Economist, July 25, 2015, https:// webs of relationships helps to better understand how www.economist.com/china/2015/07/25/confucius-says-xi-does.

2 Hsüan Mo, “The 1974 ‘Criticize Lin Criticize Confucius’ Cam- humans classify, organize, and interpret social groups paign of the Chinese Communist Party,” Chinese Law & Govern- (such as generations of family, networks of friends, ment 8, no. 4 (1975): 84–127. groups of colleagues, etc.) and society as a whole.

3 Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping Thought Explained: A New Ide Kinship is deeply ingrained in Chinese culture, ology for a New Era,” New York Times, February 26, 2018, as family serves as the central social unit of life.5 In https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-Jinpingthought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html; Nathan Gardels, “Xi Launches Cultural Counter-Revolution to Restore Confucianism as China’s Ideology,” Huffington Post, September 29, 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/xi-Jinping-confucianism_b_5897680.html; “Xi Jinping: How to Read Confucius and Other Chinese Classical Thinkers,” China Daily, May 12, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/xismoments/2017-05/12/content_29324341.htm.

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4 Paul A. Erickson and Liam Donat Murphy, Readings for a History of Anthropological Theory, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 178.

5 Rubie Watson, “Families in China: Ties that Bind?” (conference paper, Harvard University, 2007); Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

Confucianism, filial piety (xiao), which is based on patrilineal descent, emphasizes love for the father and the established familial, social, gender, and political hierarchy.6 This respect for family, which starts in the home, rests upon virtue and leads to social harmony and peace. Filial piety is based on the maintenance of relationships that Confucius advocated.7 Through this paper, I will explore the ways in which Xi Jinping coopts certain kinds of relationships and virtues of filial piety in order to legitimize his rule.

the modern sage by promoting the political ideology of the ancient sage. While Xi presents himself as the most virtuous man of the people, he also showcases himself as the most well-versed man in the Confucian classics, which gives him legitimacy to command respect from his subjects. An article from the Economist, titled “Confucius Says, Xi Does,” even states: “Two emerging cults are on display in Qufu. . . One surrounds the ancient sage himself. . . The other culture in Qufu surrounds the country’s president, Xi Jinping.”12 This passage reveals the large degree to which Xi has reimagined the birthplace and cult of Confucius; it highlights how Xi’s public promotion of Confucius links Xi closer to the ancient sage. By casting himself as a Confucian sage, Xi Jinping asserts his model of authority and displays himself as the rightful, worthy ruler.

Xi Jinping also relies upon the relationship of ruler and subject to elevate his high rank as President.

He takes advantage of the value of hierarchy embedded in the virtue of filial piety and applies it to rulers: “If you govern with the power of your virtue, you will be like the North Star. It just stays in its place while all the other stars position themselves around it.”13 The North Star in this quote seems to evoke the traditional concept of the son of heaven (tian zi), in which heaven, representing the will and order of the universe, selected the most ethical, fair ruler to preside over the people.14 Just as tian zi was used as a justification for rulers in imperial China, Xi seems to align himself with tian zi to legitimize his power and raise himself above the rest of Chinese citizens who are governed.15 By referencing filial piety’s relation between ruler and subject during the imperial era, Xi Jinping advocates for specific kinds of power dynamics, in which he can maintain and lead a hierarchy as the ultimate moral ruler. He adapts this sense of tradition to emphasize the importance of a tradition of virtue by the ruler, a tradition of order in government, and a tradition of deference by subjects to the ruler. Xi’s practice of grounding his political motivations in the ancient practice of tian zi and in the historical focus on virtue, a concept referred to as neo-traditionalism in sociology and political science, allows him to promote his moral

Xi Jinping as Modern Sage

Xi Jinping uses the value of virtue rooted in filial piety to validate his high degree of morality. In his book, How to Read Confucius and Other Chinese Classical Thinkers, Xi writes that: “Before entering politics and governing a country, one should cultivate one’s temperament, sentiments, and morality.”8 This reflects the connection between the character and the duties of a ruler; filial piety maintains that the ruler can lead people and promote social harmony due to the ruler’s high sense of moral self-cultivation.9 Xi conveys to the public his understanding of how filial piety applies to and can be adopted for rulers, who can use personal virtue as a basis for their power.

By focusing on the individual morality of a ruler, Xi promotes himself as having the “temperament, sentiments, and morality” worthy of a ruler in order to lay claim to his political position and governance.10 Beyond elevating himself as the most honorable leader by focusing on moral cultivation, Xi highlights himself as the wisest leader by quoting Confucius: “If you were to lead the people correctly, who would not be rectified?”11 By drawing upon Confucius, Xi puts himself in conversation with the moral authority of imperial times. He seems to highlight himself as 6 Sik-Liong Ang, “Filial Piety and Good Leadership” (PhD dissertation, University of Brunei Darussalam, 2012; Goossaert and Palmer, Religious Question in Modern China; Paul Michael Linehan, The Culture of Leadership in Contemporary China: Conflict, Values, and Perspectives for a New Generation (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017); Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression? (New York: Routledge, 2015).

7 Ang, “Filial Piety and Good Leadership;” Goossaert and Palmer, Religious Question in Modern China; Linehan, Leadership in Contemporary China; Lam, Era of Xi Jinping.

8 Fenzhi Zhang, Xi Jinping: How to Read Confucius and Other Chinese Classical Thinkers (New York: CN Times, 2015), 69.

9 Ang, “Filial Piety and Good Leadership;” Linehan, Leadership in Contemporary China.

10 Zhang, How to Read Confucius, 69.

11 Zhang, How to Read Confucius, 83.

33

12 “Confucius Says, Xi Does.”

13 Zhang, How to Read Confucius, 55.

14 Ang, “Filial Piety and Good Leadership;” Goossaert and Palmer, Religious Question in Modern China.

15 Ang, “Filial Piety and Good Leadership;” Goossaert and Palmer, Religious Question in Modern China.

authority.16 By portraying himself as the only one with the power of virtue, Xi reinforces the inherent hierarchy and loyalty in this relationship of subject and ruler.

ment officials, Xi showcases himself as someone who knows best for those below him, just as a father knows best for those younger than him.

Xi Jinping also showcases himself as the father of the people to enter into a relationship with the people based on respect and deference. In his book, On Governance, he includes a photo that shows him as a faithful father and son. This photo shows Xi as a filial son pushing his father in a wheelchair and as a responsible patriarch walking beside his wife and daughter (Figure 1).21

Xi Jinping as Father

Xi Jinping extends the Confucian tenet of filial piety to state piety in order to stabilize his political position. In his How to Read Confucius and Other Classical Chinese Thinkers, Xi states that “Government officials who are good at governing a country will treat the people like parents caring for their children.”17 By drawing the connection between government and family, Xi seems to implicitly present himself as the father of the children, where the father stands as a symbol of the ruler and kids stand as the symbol of the subjects. This link between government officials and parents harkens back to imperial China, as Confucian statecraft based social order on filial piety’s focus on caring for the family and respecting the parents.18 Just as Xi clearly conveys his understanding of the Confucian association between virtue and moral legitimacy (as noted earlier), here he conveys his understanding of the Confucian association between paternal respect and political legitimacy. Similar to his quotation on virtue, Xi showcases himself as wise by publicly promoting ancient Confucian thought; however, he promotes a kind of parental, as opposed to scholarly, sagacity. Xi seems to espouse this kind of fatherly wisdom when advising government officials. He tells them that they “spend too much time on entertainment and socializing” and should instead focus more on studying history, as “this will help them raise their cultural level as well as their aptitude in thoughts and policies.”19 This advice, while passed from ruler to government official, could also be passed from father to son. In this sense, Xi seems to showcase himself as what author Willy Wo-Lap Lam in Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping has referred to as “fumuguan,” which means “an official who is like a father and mother.”20 By transmitting knowledge to his govern16 Zi Yang, “Xi Jinping and the Restoration of Traditionalism in China,” AsiaNews, July 11, 2017, http://www.asianews.it/newsen/Xi-Jinping-and-the-Restoration-of-Traditionalism-in-China-41252.html.

17 Zhang, How to Read Confucius, 32.

18 Ang, “Filial Piety and Good Leadership;” Goossaert and Palmer, Religious Question in Modern China; Linehan, Leadership in Contemporary China.

19 “Xi Jinping: Cadres Need to Study History,” Chinascope, October 2, 2011, http://chinascope.org/archives/6393.

20 Lam, Era of Xi Jinping.

21 Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, Volume 2: English Language Version (Shanghai: Shanghai Press, 2018).

This photo reinforces the idea that Xi watches over the Chinese people, just as he watches over his wife and child. By highlighting himself as a dutiful son and a “doting” father, Xi suggests that, he too, engages in the practice of filial piety by respecting his father, and in turn, gains respect from his daughter and wife.22 While Xi uses the quote in the section above to present himself as a wise father, he uses this picture to display himself as a compassionate father worthy of praise. Ostensibly, Xi solely promotes himself as this benevolent father. By highlighting himself as a father figure, he conveys to the Chinese people that he is trustworthy, caring, and loving, which seems in line with how, according to news sources, Xi is promoted as a “Confucian patriarch who runs the country as if it were his own family.”23 However, it is important

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22 Tom Phillips, “Xi Jinping: The Growing Cult of China’s ‘Big Daddy Xi,’” Telegraph, December 8, 2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11279204/Xi-Jinpingthe-growing-cult-of-Chinas-Big-Daddy-Xi.html.

23 Buckley, “Xi Jinping Thought Explained.”

to take note of the other actors in these pictures. By including this scene of Xi with his family members, he stresses the importance of other people’s duties in this collective relationship of father and son. This picture not only reveals Xi Jinping’s fatherly role but also implies the people’s obligation as his symbolic sons.

According to Rubie Watson, the Curator of Comparative Ethnology at the Harvard Peabody Museum, sons “owed unconditional obedience and respect to their fathers” from the Qing Dynasty to the Republican Period.24 Xi’s reliance on filial piety’s hierarchical relationship between father and son and its framework of patrilineal descent and patriarchal authority clearly serves as his framework for the hierarchical relationship between himself and the Chinese people.25 Thus, Xi cements his political power by verbally and visually presenting himself as a father figure.

to stress jia (家) in guo jia (国家): He yearns for the citizens’ love to begin in and focus on the country. Xi in essence models contemporary national love off of ancient familial love by linking State with home.

Xi Jinping also uses the central kinship unit of family to galvanize the Chinese people. When speaking at Confucius’s birthday celebration, Xi states: “To understand present-day China, to know the present-day Chinese, one must delve into the cultural bloodline of China, and accurately appreciate the cultural soil that nourishes the Chinese people.”30 This quote highlights Xi’s stress on family bonds to legitimize his rule. While filial piety rests on morality and respect for parents, it also advocates for a sense of ren ai, human love.31 Here, Xi extends his Confucian rhetoric beyond just Xi as sage or Xi as father. By applying Confucian rhetoric to the Chinese population as a whole, Xi focuses on community, trying to spur a shared sense of familial love among the people. Based on the Confucian values of family virtue and communal love, Xi casts community members as family members. Xi also seems to use Confucian philosophy to make a case about Chinese people’s ethnic blood, stressing that following Confucianism naturally connects to Chinese people’s ethnicity. Encouragement of a strong Chinese national identity rooted in a strong commitment to community seems to support the analysis of A. T. Nuyen, a philosopher of social science, who characterized modern-day Chinese citizenship as “constructed through the community.”32 Xi’s method differs from those of past rulers, such as Mao, who stirred nationalist sentiment through the idea of class struggle.33 Xi’s kind of nationalism does not appear as outwardly authoritarian or dangerous because he promotes unity based on shared love for the home and family, as opposed to Mao, who promoted unity based on shared opposition to the bourgeoisie. By making use of domestic and familial symbols in his speech at Confucius’s birthday celebration, Xi reinforces that Chinese citizens should respect the country as the home.

While family bonds can connect Chinese citizens, generational and genetic references can reinforce national senses of longevity and strength. Xi, in the same speech, advocates that: “Reflecting the Chinese

China as Home and Chinese Citizens as Family

Xi Jinping equates the Chinese country with the Chinese home in order to create national unity.

In his speech at Confucius’s birthday celebration, Xi references “China as a big harmonious family of dozens of ethnicities.”26 This quote from his speech underscores Xi’s use of semiotics, the practice of meaning-making and the use of “symbolic acts or clusters of symbolic acts. . . in the analysis of social discourse.”27 Xi tries to reimagine and reconstruct China’s national identity by relying on the Confucian foundation of domestic sphere. By using China as a symbolic sign of the home, he connects the modern conception of China as a country with the traditional notion of the Chinese family. This use of neo-traditionalism (mentioned earlier in the paper), implicitly reminds the Chinese people to honor the idea of one nation, just as Confucianism espouses that people should honor the aspects of home.28 Confucianism promotes the idea that a family’s love begins in and focuses on the home.29 Xi adapts this Confucian idea 24 Watson, “Families in China.”

25 Ang, “Filial Piety and Good Leadership;” Linehan, Leadership in Contemporary China.

26 Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping’s Speech in Commemoration of the 2,565th Anniversary of Confucius’ Birth,” China US Focus, September 24, 2014, http://library.chinausfocus.com/article-1534. html.

27 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

28 Zi, “Restoration of Traditionalism in China.”

29 Ang, “Filial Piety and Good Leadership;” Goossaert and Palmer, Religious Question in Modern China; Watson, “Families in China.”

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30 Xi, “Xi Jinping’s Speech.”

31 Ang, “Filial Piety and Good Leadership;” Linehan, Leadership in Contemporary China.

32 A. T. Nuyen, “Confucianism and the Idea of Citizenship,” Asian Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2002): 127–39.

33 Goossaert and Palmer, Religious Question in Modern China.

world outlooks, philosophies of life, values and aesthetics that have been shaped and inherited from one generation to another, the core elements of Chinese ideology and culture have formed the fundamental cultural genes of the nation.”34 Rooting his rhetoric in tradition, Xi focuses on the ancestral element of Confucianism in this quote. From the Qing Dynasty to the Republican Period, filial piety was supported by and practiced through ancestor worship, in which people could create bonds between the deceased and the living.35 Here, Xi relies on filial piety’s sense of “generational continuity” to bolster a sense of continuous national identity, and he relies on filial piety’s basis in relationships to connect people together.36 It seems that Xi’s stress on longstanding and strong relations between the deceased and the living reflects his desire for a longstanding and robust Chinese identity.

This kind of ancestral reverence, according to past scholarship, also reminded men in the imperial era of their strict duties to honor their earlier lineage.37 Thus, by mentioning ancestral worship, Xi implicitly reminds Chinese citizens of the hierarchy, where he, the ultimate father of the nation as extended family, rests on top. Xi also relies on filial piety’s basis in descent through blood to support a sense of strong shared identity. Since filial piety is based on blood relations, Xi seems to promote unity based on genetic links. By evoking a sense of collective past with ancestry and by referencing a genetic basis with blood relations, Xi tries to connect the unity of citizens (through love for their country) with the unity of family (through love for their ancestors).

motivations on the surface. By co-opting these aspects of filial piety, Xi emphasizes the state as an extension of family life, through which community members treat the ruler as the father and recognize others as family members. By outwardly promoting these Confucian values of morality and relationships, while inherently supporting the rigid hierarchical Confucian framework, Xi seems to cling to Confucian kinship as a cultural resource for political gain.

Conclusion

At first glance, Xi’s rhetoric does not seem nefarious or sinister when couched in the framework of Confucian kinship. However, I have uncovered the ways in which Xi Jinping’s rhetoric reveals, rather than masks, his political agenda. Through this paper, I have analyzed how Xi legitimizes ethical authority by presenting himself as a proper sage, cements his rule by showcasing himself as a caring father, and unifies citizens by displaying the country as a home and Chinese citizens as a family. Xi appears to rely on the aspects of virtue, benevolence, family, and home to promote his rule, making it hard to discern hidden 34 Xi, “Xi Jinping’s Speech.”

35 Goossaert and Palmer, Religious Question in Modern China; Watson, “Families in China.”

36 Watson, “Families in China.”

37 Watson, “Families in China.”

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An Analysis of Sex-Selective Abortion in Punjab Ankur Makani Ankur Makani is a senior in the College of Arts and Sciences majoring in Health and Societies with a concentration of Health Care Markets and Finance. He is additionally minoring in South Asian Studies and Biological Basis of Behavior. He is originally from Petersburg, West Virginia and after graduating from Penn he will be attending medical school. As a future medical doctor, Ankur hopes to combine his medical degree with his health policy education to enact meaningful change and act as an advocate for underserved patient populations.

Cultural Injections Lead to Skewed Gender PerIntroduction

India, the second most populous country in the ceptions To fully understand why sex-selective abortion world, faces a widening gender ratio due to the rise of sex-selective abortion. While politicians and organiza- is necessary to families who choose to ensure their child is born a boy, one must first understand the role tions stand against feticide, laws such as the national females play in the society of India. Today, women in Preconception and Prenatal Diagnostics Techniques (PNDT) Act have proved to be only mildly successful India have more power than ever before, are more educated, and pursue more career opportunities than the in targeting the increased male to female sex ratio.1 generations that preceded them. It is natural for a sociSex-selective abortion continues in India and has created a $244 million industry, mainly targeting the poor ety to progress this way; as liberalization and globalization increase over time, gender norms change and and those who already have female children.2 While professional opportunities often increase. However, sex-selective abortion is present throughout India, the gender ratio between males and females is particularly while these opportunities have increased, women still fill a remarkably small proportion of the jobs available skewed in the state of Punjab. In this article, I use the in India.3 While over time families have started to uncase-study of Punjab to argue that increasing rates of derstand the need for providing the same education to sex-selective abortion is a glimpse into the widening males and females, after marriage, a large number of gender gap in India. As evidence, I offer the influence females often stay at home, filling the role of a homeof an agrarian economy in Punjab, skewed literacy ratios, and deep-rooted sentiments of male preference. maker.4 In 2015–16, only 27 percent of working-aged women held paid jobs.5 If a family considers educaI argue laws and policies aimed at combating sex-setion to be an investment, and if females—educated lective abortion will only be successful if they target or not—continue to fill the role of a homemaker, then the larger gender differences that exist in India today.

The consequences of sex-selective abortion be- families begin to rationalize educating males rather than females as being a greater return on investment. came evident in recent history due to the implications Education in a traditional Indian society plays different of a widening gender gap in China. Many attribute roles for males and females. Education allows men to an increased rate of sex-selective abortion to the one child policy as well as the male preference that contin- provide for their families; for females, however, eduues to exist in many Asian societies. One may suspect cation becomes a last resort if she is unable to marry that sex-selective abortion is only present in countries or is forced to work to support her family.6

In some sectors of Indian culture, mothers are where governments limit the number of children each family can have in an effort to control growing popula- thought to be the determinant of her baby’s sex; these tion sizes; using the example of Punjab, this is proven 3 “Culture and the labour market keep India’s women at home,” to not be the case.

1 Arindam Nandi and Anil B. Deolalikar, “Does a legal ban on sex-selective abortions improve child sex ratios? Evidence from a policy change in India,” Journal of Development Economics 103 (2013): 216–17.

2 Alka Gupta, “Female foeticide in India,” UNICEF, http://unicef. in/PressReleases/227/Female-foeticide-in-India; Janmejaya Samal, “The unabated female feticide is leading to bride crisis and bride trade in India,” Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care 5, no. 2 (2016): 503. The monetary value is stated in terms of United States Dollars.

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The Economist, July 5, 2018, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/07/05/culture-and-the-labour-market-keep-indias-women-at-home.

4 Subodh Varma, “Why Indian women are out of work,” Times of India, September 19, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ home/sunday-times/why-indian-women-are-out-of-work/articleshow/60713816.cms.

5 Varma, “Indian women.”

6 Charity Troyer Moore and Rohini Pande, “Why Aren’t India’s Women Working?,” The New York Times, August 23, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/24/opinion/why-arent-indias-women-working.html.

women are held accountable for birthing a daughter and are often pressured to have an abortion or otherwise risk a divorce from their spouses if they have already had more than one female child.7 This is evidenced by elevated rates of foeticide in families who already have one daughter.8 In some extreme cases, females are even physically punished by their in-laws for birthing multiple female children.9 In other cases, couples can only afford to raise one child so they want to guarantee that their child is male. These aspirations of having male children to the point where families believe it is morally sound to abort a child are markers of larger cultural differences between males and females. For example, even in some parts of India today males and females play different roles in their families.

In traditional Indian culture, males are thought to be a form of post-retirement care for their parents, while females are raised from birth to get married and leave her parents to join the family of her husband’s parents.

The birth of a boy is thought to bring security to his parents, while a girl is thought to be an expense in the form of a dowry to her new husband and his family.10 This is reflected by census data which confirms that there is a negative correlation between feticide and wealth.11 Because of the increased pressure to secure assets for life post-retirement, many families primarily focus on the education of their sons. This contributes to not only a gender gap, but it also leads to an education gap evidenced by an astonishingly low number of females in the Indian workforce relative to the total population of the country. For a country whose predominant religion refers to baby girls as Lakshmi, the Hindu Goddess of prosperity and wealth, very few substantial measures have been taken to combat the deep-rooted cultural oppression.

Sex-Selective Abortion in Punjab

Male preference and sex selection are considered to be cultural practices in Punjab dating to the Rajputs and the Jats.12 Prior to the development of sex detection techniques, female fetuses were terminated as they were born rather than prior to birth.13 The development of techniques that made it possible to detect a child’s sex prior to birth were celebrated by physicians and parents. Physicians aimed to profit off of this development, while families were excited at the newfound ability to guarantee their children were born male.14 Scholars claim the dowry system increased the amount of infanticide that occurred in Punjab; during marriage, the bride’s family would have to present the groom’s family with gifts to prove their status.15 To the poor, the birth of a daughter meant the loss of not only monetary assets, but also a houseworker.16 It is stated in the literature that mothers who produced a son were given higher status than mothers who produced only daughters. In fact, only the births of male children were celebrated during the north Indian festival of Lohri, further contributing to the celebration of birthing a son and the disappointment of birthing a daughter.17 Many of these ideas of male preference and superiority continue to contribute to the sex ratio difference today.

The Indian state of Punjab is a largely agrarian society whose economy is mainly centered around farming and manufacturing. Societies that are centered around manual labor tend to develop into patriarchal societies over time, due to the notion that manual labor is traditionally completed by males. Agrarian societies tend to be less focused on education, and in Punjab today, education is only mandatory from ages six to eleven.18 The difference between female and male literacy narrowed from 2001 to 2011; however, there remains a difference of 10 percent between male and female literacy.19 With increased technological advancements and increased sex screening capabilities, child sex ratios have decreased in all parts of India

7 Gethin Chamberlain, “Where a baby girl is a mother’s awful shame,” The Guardian, November 22, 2008, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/23/india-gender.

8 Prabhat Jha, Maya A. Kesler, Rajesh Kumar, Faujdar Ram, Usha Ram, Lukasz Aleksandrowicz, Diego G. Bassani, Shailaja Chandra, and Jayant K. Banthia, “Trends in selective abortions of girls in India: analysis of nationally representative birth histories from 1990 to 2005 and census data from 1991 to 2011,” Lancet 377, no. 9781 (2011): 1921–28.

9 Chamberlain, “A mother’s awful shame.”

10 Therese Hesketh, Li Lu, and Zhu Wei Xing, “The consequences of son preference and sex-selective abortion in China and other Asian countries,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 183, no. 12 (2011): 1374–77.

11 Jha et al., “Trends in selective abortions.”

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12 Gurjeet K. Gill, “Female feticide as a contemporary cultural practice in the Punjab,” Dialectical Anthropology 23, no. 2 (1998): 203–9.

13 Gill, “Female feticide,” 204.

14 Gill, “Female feticide,” 204.

15 Gill, “Female feticide,” 204.

16 Gill, “Female feticide,” 205.

17 Gill, “Female feticide,” 203.

18 Surinder Bhardwaj and Manmohan Singh, “Punjab,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica. com/place/Punjab-state-India.

19 “Punjab Population 2011–2018 Census,” Census 2011, https:// www.census2011.co.in/census/state/p unjab.html.

since 1991.20 Punjab’s sex ratio decreased the most out of all states.21 Punjab has a particularly unbalanced male-to-female child ratio, and this changed from 798 females per thousand males in 2001 to 846 per thousand males in 2011.22 While there seems to be a narrowing child ratio, it is evident that there is still a large male preference in Punjab today. The United Nations International Child Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reported that Punjabi men sometimes travel over three thousand kilometers to find a bride due to the decreased number of females in the state.23 The demand for brides in the northern states has created a new market for brides to be purchased from their parents and then sent to live with their grooms’ parents, often under poor conditions. This form of human trafficking, created by the lack of females, increases the psychological and physical violence that women are forced to endure.24 Some political scientists believe a shortage of females in these societies could lead to an increase in sexual violence, depression, and overall violence.25

While Punjab has a decreasing number of females due to sex-selective abortion, the Preconception and Prenatal Diagnostics Techniques (PNDT) Act of 1994 seems to have done little to combat foeticide.

Private physicians aim to profit from sex-selective abortions. It has been reported that some doctors offer package deals where they conduct the sonogram and then terminate the pregnancy if the fetus happens to be female.26 While increasing efforts have been placed to penalize physicians who aim to profit off of these practices, corruption and loose governmental regulations allow for these practices to continue. Today, activists aim to spread a message of female equality by reminding people that Lohri is a holiday that celebrates females as well as males.27 They also aim to spread the message that all children should be celebrated and treated as equals. While these activists are gaining 20 Gupta, “Female foeticide in India.”

21 Gupta, “Female foeticide in India.”

22 Gupta, “Female foeticide in India.”

23 Gupta, “Female foeticide in India;” Samal, “Bride crisis and bride trade,” 503.

24 Samal, “Bride crisis and bride trade,” 503.

25 Ravinder Kaur, “Mapping the adverse consequences of sex selection and gender imbalance in India and China,” Economic and Political Weekly (2013): 38.

26 Bhattacharya Sudip and Amarjeet Singh, “‘The more we change, the more we remain the same:’ female feticide continues unabated in India,” BMJ Case Reports 2017.

27 Satinder Singh, “Lohri of newborn girls celebrated,” Hindustan Times, January 11, 2013, https://www.hindustantimes.com/ pu

traction, it is unfortunate that foeticide continues to occur and will likely continue until cultural change is introduced over several educated generations.

Analysis and Future Policy Directions

Over the past three decades, it is estimated that India has suffered the loss of between four and twelve million female children through sex-selective abortion.28 This means that between 365 and 1,095 female fetuses have been terminated daily over the past thirty years. Sex-selective abortion is truly a horrific practice, and I argue that it is the bloodiest genocide that continues to occur in plain sight of the Indian government, physicians, and global society only to sadly produce no change. While occasional movements may spark temporary change, unless cultural reforms are made and the government becomes much more serious about prosecuting families and physicians without being swayed by monetary bribes, millions of females will continue to be terminated in plain sight. In fact, scholars argue that the criminalization of sex selection has not been successful in either India or China.29 This is most likely because it is hard to target individuals who seek abortions at a separate time than when they learn the sex of their child.30 I argue that future efforts should be redirected to increasing the amount of educational opportunities that are provided for females.

India should not be content with literacy rates that underperform other nations in the Asian continent. While Indian families believe education is more important for males, I argue the contrary. I believe that education is much more important for females, and with a strong education, females in India will no longer play a subservient role and will be able to provide for themselves and leave abusive spouses and in-laws. With more educated females in the workforce, there is hope for a future India where men and women are treated equally, and parents will not be forced to terminate their female fetuses in desperation for financial security.

Conclusion

While many activists call for an immediate end to sex-selective abortion, I argue progressive cultural change is never easy nor fast. There is no law that, if enacted today, would totally rid India, China, and

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28 Samal, “Bride crisis and bride trade,” 503.

29 Lisa Eklund and Navtej Purewal, “The bio-politics of population control and sex-selective abortion in China and India,” Feminism & Psychology 27, no. 1 (2017): 34–55.

30 Eklund and Purewal, “Bio-politics of population control.”

other Asian countries of sex-selective abortions while still allowing families to seek legal abortions. Because of loose governmental regulations and corruption that plague India, it is unlikely that increased legislation would create meaningful change to correct skewed gender ratios. Instead, India must invest in increased efforts to educate and empower females to challenge societal norms. India must pave a path forward for gender equality by working towards equalizing opportunities offered to both males and females while protecting females from abuse in their homes.

Future inquiries of sex-selective abortion should be conducted by multidisciplinary teams focused on detailing the economic, sociological, and political factors that contribute to skewed gender ratios. While this investigation primarily focuses on Punjab, future inquiries should compare factors contributing to skewed gender ratios across all states of India. Furthermore, a larger comparison study examining the similarities and differences between societal pressures that lead to sex-selective abortions across different Asian countries would allow researchers the ability to further dissect and extrapolate the interplay between cultural norms and skewed gender ratios.

Future research should be conducted with the goal of providing policymakers with underlying factors to target with legislation, which would have the best chance of decreasing the amount of sex-selective abortion.

Additionally, research should be conducted again after the next census data is released to determine whether recent policy measures are associated with a less skewed gender ratio.

By ignoring the issue of feticide, the Indian government is condoning the societal pressures that are placed on a mother to terminate her pregnancy.

Since these societal pressures come from outdated cultural norms, it is time for the women of India to rise and stand together against this genocide. Without females, India has a bleak future, and the most populous democracy in the world will become crippled while the gender gap continues to grow over time.

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