Penn Asian Review, Vol. 7 (Spring 2017)

Penn Asian Review Volume 7 Spring 2017

A University of Pennsylvania Undergraduate Publication

Penn Asian Review especially thanks

for their continued support.

For more information, please visit www.ceas.sas.upenn.edu

2 | Penn Asian Review

A Message from the Editor-in-Chief

The Penn Asian Review Board Editor-in-Chief John Grisafi Copy-Editor Anissa Tang Associate Editors Jesus Alcocer Patricia Cabuso Erika Hao Sabino Padilla Kevin Quimbo Treasurer Czarina Lokin

Asia is more than just a continent, a landmass. It is also more than just a region of countries or a collection of cultures, languages, and histories. Asia is much more than the sum of its parts and our understanding of Asia must extend beyond temporal, geographic, and linguistic boundaries. This is why Penn Asian Review brings you works of scholarship and analysis on Asia which go beyond the scope of any one region and address people and issues in global context. Though largely centered on China and India, the content of our Spring 2017 issue – all written by Penn students – is truly transnational in scope. These articles discuss international relations (historic and current), address issues for the diaspora, or contextualize their case globally.

This issue begins with a paper on the changing status and conditions for women in China in context of modernization. Second is an analysis of the limitations of the United States’ involvement in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Next is a discussion of how innovation provides benefits for Beijing in contemporary economic and trade relations between China and Israel. Our fourth article looks at the historiography of Indian independence movements in a global context, examined alongside the histories of other such movements globally. We conclude this issue with a study of the issue of ethnic identity among Chinese-born students in America. As always, we are delighted and proud to share writing about Asia by Penn students with the broader community.

Before closing this letter and moving on to our content, we must first acknowledge those who make Penn Asian Review happen. We thank the Center for East Asian Studies for their continued guidance and assistance through provision of space and resources supporting our efforts. We thank the Student Activities Council for the funds which make this publication possible and PubCo for the general support which comes from a community of publications at Penn and the ability to make our publication easily accessible around campus. We thank our contributors for their articles and you, the readers, for participating in a community of discourse on Asia at Penn. Finally, please note the hard work of the PAR editorial board, who volunteered their time and energy amidst their studies to put this publication together.

On behalf of the editorial board, enjoy!

John G. Grisafi Editor-in-Chief

Volume 7 |3

Table of Contents 5

China’s Search for Modernity: Women and the Family Hannah Fagin

10

American Concerns in Aiding India During the Sino-Indian War of 1962

15

The Sino-Israeli Economic Relationship: Relations Based on Innovation

Parker Abt

Daniel Nathan

21

Towards A Global History of India’s Marginal Independence Movements

26

Ethnic Identity Preservation among Chinese-Born Female College Students

4 | Penn Asian Review

Aswin Mannepalli

Susan Radov

Women and the Family

China’s Search for Modernity: Women and the Family Hannah Fagin, C’17

China’s search for modernity, precipitated by the Opium Wars in the nineteenth century, continues to today. Over the course of the century, China’s political system transformed from an empire under the Qing Dynasty that had survived since the 1600s, to a republic consecrated in the 1911 Revolution, into an authoritarian Communist state after Mao Zedong’s 1949 revolutionary takeover. While these huge upheavals procured political, economic, and militaristic change, modernization that instigated social change affected the day-to-day lives of all Chinese people, with a particular effect on women.

China defined modernity on its own terms, and although the Western world is a significant influence, modernization is not synonymous with Westernization. Rather, China’s search for modernity involved a complex negotiation between adhesion to a traditional past, adaption in the wake of political and economic upheaval, and a desire to compete on the world stage. In this framework, modernity will be defined as a shift towards an equalization of opportunities, where birth condition is not the sole determinant of one’s future. China’s search for modernity is exemplified in One Day in China: May 21, 1936, a compilation of short vignettes from Chinese individuals across the scope of society on one particular day, and Eating Bitterness: Stories from the Front Lines of China’s Great Urban Migration from 2012 that recounts real stories of Chinese migrants, placed into historical context. Both primary sources evidence that increasingly equal opportunities for women and a restructuring of the family unit away from its restrictive rigidity of the past were integral aspects of China’s search for modernity.

In One Day in China, many stories depict extreme versions of exploitation and oppression against women, situations that were permissible within the traditional Chinese patriarchal system. Some of these incidents include forced prostitution, arranged marriages with large age gaps between spouses, lack of legal protection against abusive husbands, and bound feet. These aspects of Chinese culture were hindrances to its quest for modernity and ones that

an increasingly progressive Chinese society would attempt to shed. These examples are all expressed in the stories in One Day in China, such as “The Ghost of Injustice in a Grand Family,” in which the wife committed suicide because of the abuse and oppression she faced at the hands of her husband and his family.1 It was not uncommon for arranged marriages to end in suicide, since women had little agency in these transactions. Lower class women were especially vulnerable to the authoritarianism of their husbands.

In “A Hearing at the Public Bureau,” a woman who was clearly beaten by her husband sought legal aid, as her husband demanded a divorce to marry another woman. She was especially enraged because of her tolerance towards his maltreatment described as how “He beats me to death, scolds me, and causes trouble from dawn to dusk.”2 It seems likely that this woman would not receive the justice that she deserved, since she was quickly told she had no evidence to prove his abuse. This type of unequal power structure in which the husband became the literal owner of the wife and her body took precedent in the Chinese traditional social hierarchy that was promoted by Confucianism. These blatantly oppressive and violent practices against women that were evident in the 1930s in One Day in China would become increasingly inacceptable as China modernized throughout the century.

One modern development in the institution of marriage was the rebellion against arranged marriages in favor of “free love,” or being able to marry by choice and for the sake of love rather than as a familial arrangement or financial transaction. In the lecture “May Fourth and Party Politics,” Professor Fei explained how the famous and beloved marriage between the intellectual poet Hsu Chi-mo and the well-educated Lu Xiaomen helped popularize the idea of marrying for the sake of love.3 Another change in marriage was the permissibility of women’s increasing economic freedom. In two chapters of Eating Bitterness, “The Nowhere Nanny” and “The Opportunity Spotter,” both protagonists are married women who provided the main source of income for their families. Although there was little differentiaVolume 7 |5

Fagin tion between genders in the workforce within the Communist state, as China began to favor market competition and Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” gender distinctions in labor reappeared, although they arguably never truly disappeared in the first place.4 Although the poorest women in China never had the privilege not to work, women who had previously been confined to the home began placing a greater emphasis on financial independence in an attempt to move upwards in their class standing through their own labor. For migrant women like Xiao Shi and Yazhen in these two stories, both of them worked laborious hours, especially in comparison to their husbands. For Yazhen, she and her husband were in business together, yet she was frequently frustrated by her lazy husband, who she felt deterred from their business’ success.5 This relationship shows a reversal in the traditional dynamic between husband and wife, since she was the one who exerted authority. In another chapter in Eating Bitterness, titled “The Teenage Beauty Queens,” uneducated young women who are not yet well-established in their careers also rejected the idea of marriage as a means to achieve financial success, exemplified when Jia Huan remarked, “I don’t want to depend on my husband…I want to have a really good career of my own.”6 In a modern economy, women felt like they could achieve autonomous financial security.

While women gained greater independence from their husbands as China modernized, the relationship between daughter sand their parents/inlaws transformed more subtly. The Sacred Edicts and Confucian teachings that hierarchized the bonds of human relationships exemplify the extreme importance of filial piety, or reverence for one’s elders, as the basis of traditional Chinese culture and familial structure.7 In the case of marriage, parents often had authoritarian control over the fate of their daughters with the power to arrange marriages and influence child rearing. In a commonly oppressive system of marriage, ownership from a wife’s own family was transferred to her husband’s. The story “The Pickup” from One Day in China depicts such familial control, through its telling of a prisoner who was widowed and forced into remarrying an older man by her brother-in-law. She was jailed for running away from her husband and his family with her child, after 6 | Penn Asian Review

suffering abuse from them.8 She was under the impression that she would be freed after her sentence, yet begged to remain in jail when she discovered that her husband’s family had come to pick her up and reclaim her.9 Her in-laws demonstrated complete ownership over her and in such an unequal power dynamic, she became a commodity for transaction.

Although such extreme examples of literal ownership diminished, the heavy influence of elders over the decisions of their children, and the responsibility children had over their parents well being and care in old age is a trend that continued as China modernized. In the chapter of Eating Bitterness titled “Nowhere Nanny,” Xiao Shi recalled how her obligations to her in-laws placed a severe restriction on how she conducted her family. Her husband’s paychecks were turned over to her mother-in-law, who used them to pay off her other son’s debts, leaving Xiao’s family impoverished.10 She also maintained much control over Xiao’s own body through influencing her childrearing. When Xiao bore a daughter, her mother attempted to forcibly give her away with the hopes that she may still have a son, only giving up when a fortune-teller instructed her to.11 Xiao remarked that this way of life in the countryside is “just like being in a feudal society.”12 While respect for elders still exists in contemporary China, Xiao’s story addresses how she created a more equalized position for her own children by proving them with the skills and education to seek autonomy from her in the future.

With progressive modernization, children had increasing opportunity outside of the influence of their elders. While Xiao’s in-law represented the attitudes of an older generation, she demonstrated the growing prioritization of creating a better life for her children. The relationship between parents and children changed dramatically with the One-Child Policy that mandated that parents could only have one child per household.13 This increased the pressure to have a boy and with a shrinking household, it intensified the expectations that parents set on their children. This included emphasizing academic success, since education was viewed as a means of achieving a successful modern life. This is reiterated in One Day in China, since the editors clearly distinguished between the experiences of educated and uneducated women by segmenting their stories into

Women and the Family different sections.14 This division often fell along class lines, since wealthier families had increased access to resources that would allow for children to succeed in school, since the universal education system only guaranteed nine years of schooling and entrance into high school and university was competitive. Education often wedged a physical separation between children and parents as boarding away from home was common. In an entry from a schoolteacher that includes snippets from his students’ diaries, one entry read, “Mother hasn’t written for over a month.

I’ve been having dreams night after night, and haven’t been able to sleep!” expressing the breakdown in the tight-knit family in preference for children receiving a modern education.15

Beyond schooling, another reason for the physical separation of children from their parents was because of work. The working poor in One Day in China and the migrant class in Eating Bitterness mediated their economic positions by working excruciating hours away from their homes and living independently from their families. An uneducated working women expressed this dilemma in 1936 when she wrote, “In order to raise her myself, I should stay with the family and take responsibility for being a mother. But for the sake of my own independence and because of the need to make a living, I can’t help but leave the family every day and go to my job.”16 This tension between commitment to family and work is a commonality in modern society, but the story of Xiao in “The Nowhere Nanny” in Eating Bitterness exemplifies the toll of longterm separation between mother and daughter. Xiao worked as a maid and caretaker for a wealthy family in Xi’an around the clock. Although she was able to provide for her family, she sacrificed the ability to live together by leaving her children in the countryside and her husband to work outside of the city.

When her daughter came to visit, she reminded her, “Don’t think your parents have gone to the city to forget about you…We’re in the city to create opportunities for you.”17 However, her daughters inevitably felt isolated, expressed in one of their personal diaries in which she condemned her mother for her absence.18 This separation of the family unit demonstrates another means of decay in the traditional Chinese family structure. In this context, modernization increased Xiao’s children’s access to an ed-

ucation and opened up more opportunities to them than she ever had. However, although she was able to work outside of the home and made more money than her husband, her subservience to her boss and her inability to control her time or seek outside opportunities shows the sacrifices she had to make in order to engage in urban society and provide for her family.

While these trends may express general patterns of familial change and the shifting role of women as China modernized, socioeconomic class and distinctions in status determined how “modern” women could be. Rural peasants were least affected

by China’s modernization, while urban elite had full access to Westernized commodity culture in major cities. In contrast, Eating Bitterness focuses on the growing class of migrants that mediated a liminal position between tradition and modernity. They often gaining exposure to the service industry through their work, yet were not able to fully engage in the commodity culture they promoted. While definitions of womanhood were partially determined by class divisions, socioeconomic distinctions also corresponded with geography, as the disparity between coastal urbanization and rural central China grew.19 The importance of class is addressed in the chapter “The Teenage Beauty Queens.” The workers in the beauty industry have an ephemeral class position, since they are engaged in an industry based on beauty and youth, and can easily slip back into economic deprivation if they do not rise amongst the ranks or find a new career path as they age. The fragility of their status is emphasized in a speech given to the girls by their boss, in which she says, “‘We women need our own source of money…If you have economic status, you have everything. Economic status determines your position in society and the position of your family.’ She looks out at the audience— composed almost exclusively of poor countryside girls.”20 While they may have been able to enjoy the new status modernity has provided them, they were aware that this was not necessarily permanent.

One opportunity for upward mobility in class status was in increasing entrepreneurial opportunities. As China’s economy began to move away from Mao’s Communist politics, a new consumer culture allowed for financial risk-taking in starting a business. All three chapters with female protagonists Volume 7 |7

Fagin in Eating Bitterness express stories of women with business-oriented sensibilities who engaged in a new job markets made possible through urbanization.

However, Yazhen’s story best fits an entrepreneurial model through the store and then hotel she created.

While she was able to earn a considerable income, her status remained stagnant with her choice to live aggressively below her means. Author Michelle Damon Loyolka remarks on the commonality of this sentiment, explaining that “a typical Chinese family saves up to 30 percent of its disposable income, among the migrant class the expectation is often to save as close to 100 percent as possible.”21 While modernization offered an increased opportunity for entrepreneurship and thus economic gain, it did not provide a direct path for the changing a woman’s status, evidenced in Yazhen’s story in which increased revenue did not change the living conditions of her family.

The rise of commodity culture also brought new possibilities for women as China modernized over the century. One was undeniably in regards to the impact of Western culture, such as the growing beauty industry exemplified in the chapter “The Teenage Beauty Queens.” In this story, young women were trained as technicians for beauty treatments and as saleswomen for products such as undergarments. Their salaries were dependent on commissions, fostering a competitive workplace environment in order to incentivize sales. These women promoted commodity culture and the beauty industry, yet were on its margins, without the means to actively engage in it. While this industry may be perceived as inherently modern, it was not the type of lifestyle that all of the women in the chapter desired. Their attitude towards the services that they were providing is expressed when Loyalka writes of one figure, “But though her time in the beauty industry has clearly had a impact on her appearance, her thoughts, and her life course, still can’t bring herself to get excited by it.”22 China’s modernization opened up the possibility for women to engage in commodity culture, but also circumscribed them to a Western model of a beauty industry that subjugated and sexualized women’s bodies.

Another essential consideration on gender roles in China is the influence of Communism. One Day in China and Eating Bitterness bookmark two 8 | Penn Asian Review

eras of Chinese history before and after the Communist Revolution of 1949 in which Mao Zedong was triumphant over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party.23 The Communist Revolution dramatically changed the family structure by attempting to forge a collectivized and egalitarian society, in which peasants were valued more highly then intellectuals and upper-class elites. Development such as the communal mess hall strained the intimacy of the family unit and events such as the Cultural Revolution literally tore families apart, as one family member could be labeled a “rightist” while another could be a Red Guard. Communism also broke down gender roles since it sought to create a gender-equal, and some would go as far to say a gender-free, society in which men and women alike were seen as vital in the workforce and in the sustained revolution of the party.

Although the time period of both primary sources does not lend itself to a direct illustration of Communism’s influence, the desire for both economic and gender based equality is expressed in the story “This Day on a Provincial Government Farm” from One Day in China. A child was forced to ask to borrow from a neighbor, but when she refused to help, the young girl thought to herself, “My elder brother has said that once the war begin all money will belong to the nation. I only hope such a day will come and then the money she hoards away in a box every month will be taken away!”24 This reference most likely refers to the future prospect of civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists, and the peasant girl regarded Communism as a means for alleviating the economic and gender-based despair she faced. In another story, “Two Letter,” a female journalist described how her friend went on a trip to the Soviet Union, and viewed their society as a remedy to the social ills women faced, observing that in the USSR women had the right to work, to chose their significant others, and to have access to daycare facilities.25 Nostalgia for Communism after Mao’s rule was also evidenced in Eating Bitterness, where Yazhen reacted to shady activity that was conducted in her hotel, remarking, “Mao was very good. He managed the country very strictly. Everyone was poor and working so hard every day in the collective that there was no time to do bad things.”26 While Maoist China may have brought economic deprivation, she still felt like it prevented sexual promiscuity and immorality that

Women and the Family she now witnessed. While Mao had to constantly negotiate whether it was possible to achieve a modern Communist society, women did see Communism as a modernizing force in terms of equalizing gender roles.

Increased opportunities for women, a push towards greater gender equality, and a breakdown of the traditional family system are all outcomes of China’s search for modernity. While modernization may have benefited women in a general sense, socioeconomic class and status circumscribed to what degree of equality and improved conditions women actually experienced. It is evident that in extreme cases of oppression and violence against women, modernization also brought about an attitudinal shift in which these were deemed increasingly socially inacceptable. However, it is essential to consider that although gender equality may be a “modern” social concept, like its Western counterparts, there is much to still be done in achieving equality for women in China.

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Loyalka, Eating Bitterness, 161.

Ibid., 163.

Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 376.

Loyalka, Eating Bitterness, 66.

Loyalka, Eating Bitterness, 186.

Loyalka, Eating Bitterness, 85.

Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 305.

Cochran, One Day in China, 36.

Loyalka, Eating Bitterness, 67.

Ibid.,199.

(Endnotes) 1 Sherman Cochran, Andrew C. K. Hsiech, and Janis Cochran, ed. trans. One Day in China: May 21, 1936 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 23.

2 Ibid., 30.

3 Siyan Fei, “May Fourth and Party Politics” (lecture, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, February 10, 2016) 4 R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History, 3rd ed.

(Prentice Hall, 2011), 376.

5 Michelle Dammon Loyalka, Eating Bitterness: Stories from the Front Lines of China’s Great Urban Migration (Berkley: University of California Press, 2012), 194 6 Ibid., 93.

7 Theodore De Bary and Richard Lufrano, ed.

Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 71.

8 Cochran, One Day in China, 31.

9 Ibid., 33.

10 Loyalka, Eating Bitterness, 159.

11 Ibid., 160.

12 Ibid.

13 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 386.

14 Cochran, One Day in China, 3.

15 Cochran, One Day in China, 53.

16 Ibid., 61.

Volume 7 |9

Abt

American Concerns in Aiding India During the Sino-Indian War of 1962 Parker Abt, C’19 After months of tit-for-tat military skirmishes and years of diplomatic discord, Communist China launched an invasion of Indian-held territory on October 20, 1962 at Ladakh in northern India and in the disputed territory in eastern India known as the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Of particular importance, in their invasion of NEFA, the Chinese forcefully asserted their belief that the McMahon Line, negotiated by the former British rulers of India and the Tibetan government to be the Sino-Indian border, was not in fact the true border because China recognized neither the Tibetan government nor the treaty they had signed. The Indian military had known for some time that they could not defend against a Chinese incursion,1 however Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru felt that the Chinese would never invade en masse.2 Consequently, the Indian army, under the command of General B. M. Kaul, rapidly lost territory to the Chinese, especially in NEFA, and by October 24, only four days later, the Chinese felt comfortable enough to halt their advance. After three weeks of sporadic fighting, the Chinese made a major push on November 14. By November 19, the Chinese had conquered all of the land they had laid claim to and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, declared a unilateral ceasefire.

On November 21, under no Indian military pressure, the Chinese withdrew from the NEFA front to a line twenty miles behind the contested border as it had existed before the start of hostilities. Ostensibly, China had complete control of the situation, being able to invade, conquer land, and leave as it pleased. The superiority of the Chinese military greatly embarrassed India, leading to the resignation of Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon even before the conclusion of hostilities and the resignation of General Kaul shortly thereafter.

There is evidence to support that the resulting Sino-Indian mistrust, unprecedented and lasting, 3 led India to develop nuclear weapons in contravention of common US strategic goals.4 This then begs the question: why did the United States not come to the immediate aid of India when China, a ma10 | Penn Asian Review

jor Communist power, invaded? Furthermore, would a faster US response have resulted in India trusting the United States to protect it against the formidable Chinese threat, as countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan do today? This paper will argue that important regional considerations led the United States to withhold military aid from India and that the Cuban Missile Crisis, which occurred at the same time as the war and occupied American resources to a greater degree, was not a limiting factor.

The greatest factor holding back US aid to India was Pakistan. When it gained independence in 1947, Pakistan wavered between siding with the United States or the Soviet Union. When the country came under the dictatorial regime of the decidedly pro-American general Ayub Khan in 1960, the United States was quick to pounce, turning Pakistan into an American ally. India, on the other hand, had tried its best since its independence to maintain a neutral position. The anti-American sentiments of the vocal and influential Krishna Menon dampened the Indo-American relationship further.

From an official standpoint, it was the duty of the United States to put Pakistani interests before those of India. Given Pakistan’s emotional, longstanding dispute with India over Kashmir, it is no surprise that the United States consulted Pakistan before providing aid to India. The Pakistani position was that any American weapons sold to India would inevitably be turned on Pakistan in the future, so the United States should match all sales to India with sales to Pakistan. Earlier in 1962, for example, Pakistan argued with the United States over the potential sale of supersonic interceptor aircraft to India that they argued would give the Indians a significant battlefield advantage over Pakistan. Ironically, India would acquire these aircraft elsewhere, only to keep them hangared for the war with China, leading the American Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, to quip that India was, “sending men to fight with highly advertised supersonic planes that do not exist.”5 In 1962, Pakistan could justifiably claim to be wary of India due to the latter’s incursion in Goa the

Sino-Indian War year prior.

However, as the Sino-Indian War continued, a series of letters between Ayub Khan and the American president, John F. Kennedy, reveals that the extent of Pakistan’s opposition to American aid bordered on intransigence. On the NEFA front in particular, Indian troops were outnumbered by the Chinese. Yet, most of the Indian army was concentrated on its western border with Pakistan; the Indians feared a Pakistani invasion should they have transferred these troops to the fronts at Ladakh and NEFA. Kennedy asked Ayub Khan on October 28 to assure Nehru and himself that Pakistan would not invade India while the latter had to commit resources to fighting China.6 In his November 3 response, Ayub Khan emphatically rejected the notion that Pakistan should do so. In addition, he implied that any change in the Pakistani position on this issue could only occur if India made concessions in Kashmir.7 The matter of Pakistani neutrality was so important, however, that after asking his ally Ayub Khan for it, Kennedy also asked Nehru to write a friendly letter to Ayub Khan requesting for the same thing.8 As United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk remarked, “If Pakistan… conspires with [Beijing] against India it would be crucially important for the American people to know that India has taken every possible step to avoid that result, otherwise our ability to help India would be severely circumscribed.”9 Ultimately, the Indian troops were never moved from the western border and the entire experience made Kennedy favor India over Pakistan for the rest of his term.10 Ayub Khan’s letter to Kennedy also contained his argument that the Chinese invasion would be limited to the border regions and that due to the mountainous terrain there, the Chinese would never be able to move further southwest into mainland India. He even went so far as to claim that aggressive Indian military movements in the disputed territories led to the war and that India’s purpose was to curry the world’s sympathy so it could gain weapons that would later be turned on Pakistan.11 While the Kennedy administration did not harbor negative feelings toward India to the degree that Pakistan did, the United States and Pakistan did agree on several points, which would explain a lessened sense of trust between India and the Unit-

ed States. For example, Nehru’s Forward Policy, by which Indian soldiers occupied military posts in the disputed territories with China, made it more difficult for the United States to believe that China’s attack was unjustified. From a practical point of view, the United States initially felt that the Chinese invasion would be a short skirmish like the rest of those from earlier in 1962.12 The Kennedy admisitration’s response was also tempered by its consideration of the American public opinion, which had a sour view of India due to its previous attack on Goa and the widely-televised raucous statements by Krishna Menon.13 For Ambassador Galbraith in India, an implicit requirement for large amounts of American aid was the removal of Menon from the government.14 This would have appeared to be a simple request to meet on behalf of India as Menon was almost universally blamed in the Indian parliament for the unpreparedness of the army for the Chinese attack.15 But given that he was Nehru’s closest friend,16 the Prime Minister fought hard to retain him, first demoting him twice before finally forcing him to resign. The removal of Menon from Nehru’s cabinet led to the first delivery of American supplies on November 3.

However, likely to appease Pakistan’s Ayub Khan, the United States only initially supplied a small fraction of the arms that India requested.17 Simultaneously in the United States, the Indian Ambassador, B. K. Nehru, was lobbying Congress and the American public for all the aid India was requesting.18 This short lobbying campaign may have eased Washington into giving India aid towards the end of the war and into the post-war period. Most of the American aid to India arrived either right before hostilities ceased on November 21 or later, after the war had ended.

The topic of Kashmir was similarly sensitive.

Though Kennedy sided with Galbraith in determining that it could not be discussed during the Chinese attack,19 because the American aid to India had continued and Pakistan had to be given something in return, Kennedy did attempt to bring India back to the negotiating table to discuss Kashmir after the war ended, under the advice of Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot.20 This was a small price to pay for India. According to Ambassador Nehru, “Our chief delegate to the talks over Kashmir was Sardar Volume 7 |11

Abt Swaran Singh…[who] had an incredible, and in this instance very praiseworthy, ability to go on talking for ever without saying anything, which resulted in completely wearing out his opponents and their well-wishers.” 21 Another factor that must be taken into account when analyzing American aid to India is the rate at which the world realized the Chinese attack could turn into something far more serious than a swipe at disputed border areas. As of October 15, the State Department had predicted that an escalation in violence would be unlikely.22 Only on October 23, three days after the major Chinese attack, was Ambassador Galbraith recalled to India from a trip to London, and even then, when he met Nehru that day the topic of discussion was the Cuban Missile Crisis and not the Chinese attack.23 It took until November 8 for Galbraith to write that Chinese troop movements indicated that they were planning a large scale attack that could potentially take all of NEFA and not just the disputed border region.

Assessing Indian motives, had India felt that China was going to extend its invasion past the border regions, the former would have called upon their divisions stationed on the border with Pakistan and accepted the inherent risk in leaving that flank open.

Moreover, India understood the American position well enough to know that the latter would not tolerate a full-fledged invasion of India by its ally Pakistan given the Chinese attack. While it makes sense from an American perspective to see the Pakistanis and Indians negotiate directly instead of using the United States as a powerful mediator, it appears that the Indians would have been more suited to defend themselves from the large Chinese attack in November had Pakistan’s neutrality been guaranteed by the United States after the direct negotiations had failed. On this last notion, Galbraith believed that Pakistan had realized the seriousness of the Chinese attack at a rate comparable to the United States and would therefore never have invaded in November.24 By this logic, India would have to accept the blame for not moving its troops from the Pakistan border to the front in late November.

Finally, it is difficult to argue that the Chinese ceasefire and subsequent withdrawal is evidence of its intentions to not extend the war past the border regions. From the fact that China actually with12 | Penn Asian Review

drew past the land they claimed as theirs and to the original border, one can conclude that the purpose of the attack was not to acquire land. Some theorists argue that the Chinese attack was a response to a perceived threat to the Chinese national identity of a rising power.25 By this argument, one could say that China’s intent in the war was to prove to India that China could handily defeat it in war if necessary.

Imposing this mentality on India did accomplish the Chinese goal of stopping any Indian military advances in the disputed region, as had been performed under Nehru’s Forward Policy. In addition, the world witnessed the power of the Chinese army (or the disorganization of the Indian army), asserting China as the Himalayan, or even Asian, hegemon. With these goals accomplished, there would be no incentive for China to continue its incursion after it became clear in mid-November that the United States would be backing India. Any further fighting would have risked a protracted conflict with the United States that would have led to a more serious death toll on the Chinese side.

Regarding how the American analysis and response to the situation unfolded, one could argue that Galbraith, an economist by training, was not suited to make the important judgements about military developments in India. The natural question emerges: why did someone from Washington not take over? There is an argument to be made that Washington ignored the start of the Sino-Indian War due to its preoccupation with the Cuban Missile Crisis. It would also be possible to argue that Washington not only ignored the war, but that this neglect also had long-term repercussions in the United States’ relations with South Asia as a result.

Whether or not Galbraith was fit to be the ambassador that advised India in this situation is a debate outside the scope of this paper, but there is considerable evidence to believe that Washington did ignore the developing situation in South Asia.

The first piece of evidence is Galbraith himself. On October 26, Galbraith wrote “Washington continues totally occupied with Cuba. For a week, I have had a considerable war on my hands without a single telegram, letter, telephone call, or other communication of guidance.” 26 Moreover, in his letter to Kennedy written on November 13, Galbraith exclaims, “Dear Mr. President, I have been wanting for the past ten

Sino-Indian War days to give you a more detailed and intimate account of our affairs here.”27 Records also show that Kennedy did not discuss a response to the Sino-Indian War during the thirteen days that he convened EXCOMM, a group of national security advisers whose primary goal was to solve the Cuban Missile Crisis.28 Nevertheless, the argument that Washington’s comparatively large concern for Cuba impacted aid to India is flawed. If a party can be at all faulted for the late arrival of American aid to India, it is the Indian government. Early in the conflict, the United States determined that it would provide all necessary aid to India, but only if India requested it.29 As early as October 15, records show that plans were being made to provide extra military aid to India.30 On October 23, Galbraith wrote that he expected that requests for aid were “only a few hours away.”31 Proof of the American preparedness lays in the fact that it only took four days for the first shipment of arms to reach India. That the shipment was small is an indication of the arguably flawed American analysis of the situation, not the United States’ inability to provide the aid it thought was necessary.

Indeed, it appears that India dragged its feet in asking for American aid, either out of pride or because it had underestimated Chinese intent as discussed previously. Nehru was absolutely intent on retaining the neutral status of India that he had worked long and hard to forge. Even when Nehru did officially ask for aid on October 31, he was worried about being drawn into a military alliance with the United States.32 Krishna Menon, as Defense Minister until the end of October, was never intent on asking the United States for help, partially due to his preference for Soviet help but also because of his trust in the military apparatus that he had built (he personally appointed General Kaul). Therefore, Nehru’s reluctance to fire Menon affected the expediency of American aid, not only by coloring the American public’s perception of the aid, but also by delaying India’s decision to even request aid. It is also worth noting that because of the aforementioned pride factor, it is unlikely that enhanced American aid at the start of the conflict would have led to less militarization by India in the following years. It can be argued, given the facts as they occurred, that India felt unprepared and under-armed when fighting China,

resulting in an increased focus on militarization after the war. However, had the United States been more forceful in giving aid, India might have been embarrassed from having to ask a Western power to save them from the Chinese and might have built up their military so as to satisfy national pride.

In conclusion, the United States had to maneuver within a rapidly evolving situation with complex players in deciding when and how to aid India in its 1962 war with China. Though by present day standards it would seem that the American assertion of support came late in the conflict, the course of action taken by the Kennedy administration began much earlier, and can be explained by following the patterns left in the memoirs and records left by the participants from each party. Furthermore, though the Cuban Missile Crisis caused the Kennedy administration to communicate less with India than it normally would during a war, it is unlikely that the United States would have provided aid to India differently if more analytical resources were free to be used on the developing Sino-Indian conflict.

(Endnotes) 1 B. K. Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second: Memoirs of an Indian Civil Servant (New Delhi: Viking, 1997), 401.

2 Jawaharlal Nehru and Chester Bowles, “Memorandum of Conversations,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, August 8, 1961, 82.

3 John Kenneth Galbraith, “Letter From the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) to President Kennedy,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, November 13, 1962, 383; Jawaharlal Nehru, “Changing India,” Foreign Affairs 41, no. 3 (April 1963): 457–60.

4 Karsten Frey, India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security (Routledge, 2007), 17; David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation,” Survival 52, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 142; A. B. Vajpayee, “Indian’s Letter to Clinton On the Nuclear Testing,” The New York Times, May 13, 1998, sec. World, http://www. nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letter-to-clinton-on-the-nuclear-testing.html.

5 John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 384.

6 John F. Kennedy, “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, October 28, 1962, 359.

Volume 7 |13

Abt 7 Mohammad Ayub Khan, “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, November 5, 1962, 378.

8 Galbraith, “Letter From the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) to President Kennedy,” 382.

9 Dean Rusk, “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, November 18, 1962, 390.

10 Robert W. Komer, Oral History Interview, interview by Elizabeth Farmer, Audio, September 3, 1964, JFKOH-ROWK-03, JFK Presidential Library.

11 Ayub Khan, “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan,” 377–80.

12 William H. Brubeck, “Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, October 15, 1962, 341.

13 John F. Kennedy, “Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 19611963, February 28, 1962, 214; Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second, 377.

14 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, 378–79.

15 Stanley Wolpert, Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny, 1st edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 486.

16 Ibid., 487.

17 Carl Kaysen, “Shipments to India,” November 9, 1962, JFKPOF-123-005, JFK Presidential Library.

18 Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second, 406–7.

19 Bruce Riedel, JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and Sino-Indian War (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 125.

20 Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second, 408.

21 Ibid.

22 Brubeck, “Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 341.

23 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, 378.

24 Ibid., 405.

25 Lei Guang, “From National Identity to National Security: China’s Changing Responses toward India in 1962 and 1998,” The Pacific Review 17, no. 3 ( January 1, 2004): 399–422, doi:10.1080/055127404 2000261515.

26 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, 382.

27 Galbraith, “Letter From the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) to President Kennedy,” 380.

28 Riedel, JFK’s Forgotten Crisis, 117.

14 | Penn Asian Review

29 Brubeck, “Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” 343.

30 Ibid.

31 Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, 380.

32 Ibid., 390.

Sino-Israeli Relations

The Sino-Israeli Economic Relationship: Relations Based on Innovation Daniel Nathan, C’18 Introduction The 21st Century has seen many shifts in the international economic landscape, perhaps none so striking as the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) continued rise to economic prominence. In 2013, China officially became the number one trader on Earth, cementing its standing as one of the most crucial nations in international economics today.1 China enjoys healthy bilateral trading relations with the vast majority of the world; one of the most intriguing of these relationships is that of China and Israel, a burgeoning partnership that may very well prove critical to Chinese interests in the coming decades. In 2010, Chinese investments in Israel totaled US$70 million; just five years later, that figure stood at US$2.7 billion. The growth of the two nations’ trade balance mirrors that of investments, rocketing from US$30 million in 1990 to US$11 billion in 2015.2 Onlookers might see the overwhelming Chinese interest in Israel and reasonably be confused.

China has the largest population in the world, at almost 1.4 billion and counting,3 and the second largest economy, with a GDP of over US$11,181 billion in 2015;4 Israel, meanwhile, only has a population of 8.25 million,5 and its GDP in 2015 was just over US$299 billion.6 However, these numbers fail to encapsulate what is perhaps the greatest strength of the Israeli economy and one of the greatest weaknesses of the Chinese one: the ability, or lack thereof, to innovate. As Liu Ruopeng, the founder and chairman of the Shenzhen-based Kuang-Chi Group, which recently launched a startup incubator in Israel with US$50 million in capital and plans to sextuple that number within three years, stated, “Israel is a supermarket for innovation.”7 Meanwhile, Chinese consternation with the country’s comparatively weaker capacity for innovation has grown over the years; in the recently instituted 13th Five-Year Plan, Chinese policymakers made it their goal to transform China into an innovation powerhouse by 2020, a fact reaffirmed by Premier Li Keqiang, who has said that

the plan “fully demonstrates that we have given top priority to innovation.”8 Explaining the intricacies of Chinese policymaking is never easy, especially where the economy is concerned. Over the years, China has employed more strategies for economic development than a large portion of the modern world. Like much of China’s policy, the nation’s economic relationship with Israel is complex. This paper will advance the thesis that China’s goals in Israel are centered on the smaller country’s innovative capacity, and that China’s Israeli partnership is crucial to the Chinese governments’ objectives in the twenty-first century. It will also examine counterarguments to these claims, and explain why those counterarguments are ineffectual.

Made in China “Made in China” is probably one of the most recognizable phrases in modern production. Low wages (under US$3 per hour in even the most developed Chinese cities such as Shanghai), a highly productive business ecosystem that effectively utilizes supply chain efficiencies, low compliance with restrictive business regulations, favorable tax policies, and currency controls have combined to give China a real edge in production capacity.9 In 2011, China produced 90.6% of the world’s personal computers, 80% of its air conditioners, 70.6% of its cell phones, 63% of its shoes, and 60% of its cement,10 and these statistics do not even include China’s enormous quantities of manufacturing in everything from toys to kitchen appliances to artificial Christmas lights.11 This largescale production was fueled by almost eighty million urban Chinese citizens working in manufacturing in 2015, a number that totaled twenty percent of all urban employment in China.12 Understandably, over the course of this production boom, many in China came to refer to their home country as “the world’s factory.”13 However, despite the nation’s prowess at production, China has at times struggled to be more than simply a factory. Former US President Jimmy CarVolume 7 |15

Nathan ter unintentionally encapsulated the essence of this problem when he said, “I have an iPad and also an iPod, both of which are made in China. Although we have designed them here with Apple, for instance, they are manufactured overseas.”14 While proud of China’s production capacity, the Chinese government has been cognizant of this economic deficiency in innovation for some time, with papers dating to the early 2000s examining the government’s attempted transition away from “made in China” toward “created in China,” an evolution which is essential to ensuring that China remains indispensable to the global marketplace.15 Moreover, the Chinese government has been aware of the power of innovation for many decades prior to that, with economic innovations playing a paramount role in the Chinese economic reforms from 1978 through the early 2000s.16 However, the importance of improving China’s innovative capabilities has grown more urgent in recent years, largely due to perceived threats to China’s manufacturing industry. As noted in the South China Morning Post in 2014, “companies are increasingly moving their production bases to developing countries, especially [in] Africa, lured by an abundant and cheap workforce.”17 Such developments have forced Chinese policymakers and companies to turn outwards in search of the next stepping-stone of economic development.

Created in Israel If China has to date been the world’s factory, then Israel has been its think tank. Despite its diminutive size, Israel has played host to some of the world’s greatest creative minds. Israelis have invented and discovered across many disciplines; prominent Israeli innovations include hard science creations such as USB flash drives and coronary stents,18 apps such as Waze and Viber,19 board games such as Mastermind and Guess Who?,20,21 and countless military apparatus such as the Uzi submachine gun,22 the Iron Dome defense system,23 and the Python family of missiles.24 Israel also boasts eight Nobel Prize winners in the hard sciences or economics, three more than China despite the latter’s enormous population advantage,25,26 and is home to a plethora of startups, approximately six thousand by some estimates, as well as over three hundred research and develop16 | Penn Asian Review

ment (R&D) centers for global high-tech companies, many of which are aimed at creating innovative disruptive technologies.27 Sino-Israeli Economic Relationship Mutual Recognition The official year of the Sino-Israeli rapprochement is 1992, when Beijing formally recognized Israel as a sovereign state; however, it would be erroneous to assume that just because the two nations generally lacked formal diplomatic ties prior to then, they had no existing relationship. In fact, Sino-Israeli relations date back to at least 1950, when Israel became one of the earliest countries to recognize Beijing as the rightful seat of power in China.28 For the next several decades, Beijing refused to return the favor, effectively denying Israel’s right to exist; this was not out of some deep-seated hatred of Israel, but instead was an effort to appease the Arab world, with which China wanted to build relationships. Beijing began to soften its official stance in the early 1980s, with Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang declaring, “all the Middle East countries including Israel [should enjoy] the rights of independence and existence.” Soon, the Chinese regime formally recognized “the objective fact of Israel’s existence as a state.”29 A Booming Relationship in Innovative Technology In no time at all, the Sino-Israeli relationship began to develop at a surprising pace. Spurred in part by de facto military cooperation in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which both China and Israel opposed, the two nations began strengthening their ties, politically, militarily, and economically.30 In a 1985 article published in The New York Times, Thomas Friedman detailed the budding friendship, which even then was largely focused on the Chinese acquisition of Israeli innovations.

Quoting Israeli officials familiar with the burgeoning bilateral trade, Friedman writes, “The Chinese in the last seven months have shown an increasing appetite for Israeli skills in agriculture, solar energy, manufacturing, advanced technology, robotics, construction, road building and arms manufacturing.”31 In the same year, Israelis were officially granted vi-

Sino-Israeli Relations sas to China, a privilege previously reserved only for those holding dual citizenship. Nine representatives from various Israeli industries were invited to China to partake in economic talks, and Israel made official plans to reopen its embassy in Hong Kong.3 This rapid escalation in economic relations may seem surprising to some, but the Chinese government had several reasons to pursue such close ties with Israel. First, China was anxious to obtain Western technology, especially military technology, and was prepared to trade with any nation that could supply it.33 However, Israel also held a more specific appeal to China. According to Professor Harold Schiffrin, a China scholar and director of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute at Jerusalem’s Hebrew University in 1985, “Israel has the image in China of being strong in advanced technology and has a good reputation in scientific research, agriculture and irrigation.” The Israeli political weekly, Koteret Rashit, reported that year that Israeli companies had received over seventy project proposals from Chinese planning authorities, expounding that “The Chinese are hungry for know-how, ideas and investments.”34 Military Technology After 1985, Sino-Israeli bilateral relations continued in much the same vein, with a heavy focus on Israel-to-China idea exportation, and China-to-Israel R&D investment. This exchange was perhaps most pronounced in the military industry.

Following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, China was largely cut off from Western suppliers.

Israel eagerly filled the void.35 As US officials acknowledged in 1990, Israel had since June of 1989 been “the most important supplier of advanced military technology to China.” And even before then, China reputedly purchased billions of dollars of military technology from Israel throughout the 1980s, specifically in the fields of armor, artillery, electronics, and missiles.36 In recent years, political obstacles, namely opposition from the United States, have taken their toll on the Sino-Israeli trade in military technology.37 However, this facet of the two nations’ relationship has manifested in other ways. A prime example of the newest phase of Israel-to-China military technology flow occurred in late 2015, when Israel Aerospace Industries, the primary producer of both

military and civilian aircraft in Israel and one of the most advanced companies in avionics and engine design in the world, announced plans to establish a center in Guangdong.38 While the officially stated purpose of this complex is to strengthen China’s civilian aircraft industry, some onlookers, India (who fears Pakistani acquisition of advanced military technology via China) foremost among them, see the move as carrying with it inherent military consequences.39 The deal strongly calls to mind those of the 1980s, with China, unable to produce the advanced military (or civilian) technology it requires, relying on Israeli innovations to fulfill its goals.

The Age of High Tech Military technology is not the only industry in which China and Israel have engaged in trade. In fact, even as the military trade between the two countries slowed through the turn of the century, the Sino-Israeli bilateral economic relationship continued to experience unprecedented growth. Moreover, its rate only appears to be accelerating, with recent highlights including the Chinese investment of US$300 million for Israeli R&D purposes inked in May of 2014;40 formal visitations of over five hundred Chinese delegations to Israel in 2015;41 and the formation of the China Israel Innovation and Investment Summit, which met twice in 2016, once in Beijing and once in Tel-Aviv.42 Over the last decade in particular, the Chinese government and various Chinese companies have steadily increased investments in Israeli R&D initiatives, largely focusing on high tech innovation.

A popular spot for Chinese (and other international) investment in the Israeli high tech sector is Israel’s ‘Silicon Wadi.’ The ‘Wadi’ (Hebrew for ‘Valley’) was named in 2013 as the number two startup ecosystem in the world, with more companies listed on the NASDAQ at the time than Europe, Japan, Korea, and China combined.43 Prominent China-to-Israel deals from recent years include Baidu’s 2015 investment of US$5 million in Tonara, a music software startup;44 Alibaba’s 2015 investment of an estimated US$5 million in Visualead, a startup specializing in QR codes;45 and Qihoo 360’s opening of an early stage US$60 million fund in 2014, which will focus partially on investments in Israeli startups.46 The Volume 7 |17

Nathan quantity of investment is only increasing; according to the IVC Research Center, which tracks and analyzes the Israeli high tech sector, the average yearon-year growth rate of China-to-Israel investment between 2011 and 2016 was fifty percent. Moreover, investments to date have largely stemmed from the behemoths of Chinese industry, meaning that there is still ample room for growth as small and medium sized Chinese companies begin to enter the Israeli marketplace.47 Counterarguments There are two primary counterarguments to the assertions that China’s primary interest in Israel is centered on innovation and that the nations’ partnership may prove crucial to China’s goals in the near future. This section will address and debunk both.

Israel is Just Another Marketplace The first argument that could be raised is that China’s primary interest in Israel is identical to China’s interests in most foreign nations: selling to the consumer base. While it is certainly true that basic Sino-Israeli trade is crucial to the Israeli side (China is Israel’s second largest trading partner receiving 5.4% of Israeli exports48 and providing 9.4% of its imports),49 the same cannot be said from the Chinese point of view. Israel is responsible for a measly .19% of Chinese imports50 and .25% of Chinese exports.51 If China’s goals in Israel were simply to sell to the Israeli consumer base and import Israeli consumer goods, one would expect the government and companies of China to devote little effort to Israeli outreach (given Israel’s comparative insignificant in the global consumer market). However, the opposite has been true; as this paper has already expounded, Chinese entities have progressively dedicated increased resources to Israeli outreach, especially in the R&D and high tech innovation sectors, only explainable if China’s primary goals in Israel relate to the latter’s innovative capabilities.

Chinese government do not need any help innovating. It is certainly true that high tech companies such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent stand out as global leaders in the industry; however, these successes have not been as dependent on domestic innovation as those in Israel or the United States have been.52 All three of those examples built their businesses relying largely on Western technological innovations— namely those of Amazon/eBay, Google, and Facebook respectively.53 The Great Firewall of China, while quite effective at removing competition and allowing homegrown companies to thrive in China, also largely deprived Chinese companies of the incentive and opportunity to innovate.54 Israeli high tech companies, meanwhile, have generally been forced to compete at the highest echelons of international competition since inception.

These have included older mavericks such as Intel (which, while US-based has conducted much of its innovative work in its six locations in Israel, which together employ ten thousand workers)55 as well as the newer entrants dominating Silicon Wadi. While China certainly boasts several innovative international conglomerates, foremost among them companies such as Huawei, Lenovo, and Xiaomi, the nation’s other, less innovative high tech companies have been eager to partner with their counterparts in Israel in order to obtain the technology necessary to compete on the global playing field. One need look no further than the aforementioned partnerships of Baidu and Alibaba with Israeli startups, or the large quantities of capital pouring in from all corners of the Chinese technology industry into Israel as evidence of China’s dependence on the smaller country’s innovative capacity.

Conclusion

Moving forward, it will be interesting to see how the Sino-Israeli bilateral economic relationship develops. Cooperative efforts such as China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, of which Israel is a party state, might be useful for further strengthening ties between the two nations. At the same time, China Doesn’t Need Any Help with Innovation US opposition to a close relationship between its crucial ally in the Middle East and its frenemy in The other argument one could raise against East Asia might prove a stumbling block in the futhis paper’s thesis is that Chinese companies and the ture, especially if Israel seems as though it might ac18 | Penn Asian Review

Sino-Israeli Relations quiesce to China’s repeated calls for expanded trade in Israeli military technology.

Regardless of whether one chooses to focus on the military technology trade that characterized the Sino-Israeli economic relationship from the Chinese perspective for much of the late twentieth century, or the high tech trade, which, for the Chinese, has come to dominate the two nations’ bilateral relationship in the twenty-first century, it is clear that the nucleus of cooperation, from China’s point of view, between China and Israel has been the latter’s capacity for innovation. In continued trade with Israel, Chinese corporations and policymakers hope to further their goals in the twenty-first century.

For many, these goals are purely economic, utilizing Israeli innovations to better products produced in China and equip Chinese companies for competition on the international stage. However, for many in the Chinese government, trade with Israel will always be inextricably linked with the potential for military betterment as well.

(Endnotes) 1 Angela Monaghan, “China surpasses US as world’s largest trading nation,” The Guardian, January 10, 2014.

2 Yoram Ettinger, “Israel’s Unprecedented Global Economic Integration,” The Jewish Press, December 7, 2016.

3 Worldometers, December 9, 2016.

4 International Monetary Fund, “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects,” 2015.

5 Worldometers, December 9, 2016.

6 International Monetary Fund, “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects,” 2015.

7 Jack Liu, “Chinese companies’ appetite investing in Israeli technology companies grows,” South China Morning Post, May 6, 2016.

8 Tian Shaohui, “Spotlight: Innovation becomes coveted city tag in China,” Xinhua, July 29, 2016.

9 Prableen Bajpai, “Why China Is “The World’s Factory,” Investopedia, October 22, 2014.

10 Matt Schiavenza, “China’s Dominance in Manufacturing—in One Chart,” The Atlantic, August 5, 2013.

11 “China’s Manufacturing Statistics,” Statistic Brain, September 4, 2016.

12 Nicholas R. Lardy, “Manufacturing Employment in China,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 21, 2015.

13 Prableen Bajpai, “Why China Is “The World’s

Factory,” Investopedia, October 22, 2014.

14 Jimmy Carter, AZQuotes.com, Wind and Fly LTD, 2016.

15 Michael Keane, “From made in China to created in China,” International Journal of Cultural Studies, Vol. 9(3), pp. 285-296, 2006.

16 Chenggang Xu, “The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development,” Journal of Economic Literature, May 2010.

17 Charlotte So, “China losing status as ‘world’s factory,’” South China Morning Post, February 3, 2014.

18 Fitz Tepper, “Israel is opening an innovation center to showcase Israeli technology and inspire young entrepreneurs,” TechCrunch, July 22, 2016.

19 ibid 20 Gary Darby, “Mastermind Game,” Delphi For Fun, 2016.

21 “Our History,” Theora Design.

22 JNi.media, “Betrayed by Obama in 2014, IDF Switching to Rafael Missiles in Case of Hellfire Embargo,” The Jewish Press, November 11, 2016.

23 Shlomo Cesana, “Report: Azerbaijan to acquire Iron Dome defense system batteries,” Israel Hayom, November 11, 2016.

24 David Donald, “Rafael Touts Range of Missile Solutions,” Aviation International News, June 9, 2016.

25 “Nobel Prize Winners By Country,” World Atlas, 2016.

26 The five Chinese prize winners refer to those who were Chinese citizens at the time of their winning (Chen-Ning Yang, Tsung-Dao Lee, and Tu Youyou) in addition to those of Chinese birth and origin who resided elsewhere at the time of their winning (Daniel C. Tsui and Charles K. Kao); excluded are Taiwanese laureate Yuan T. Lee, several laureates of Han descent who have never been Chinese citizens, and several non-Han laureates who were born in China but resided elsewhere at the time of their winning 27 “Deloitte opens Innovation Tech Terminal (ITT) in Tel Aviv to connect US and Global Organizations to Israeli Startups Focused on Disruptive Technologies,” Deloitte, November 17, 2016.

28 Xiaoxing Han, “Sino-Israeli Relations,” Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 62-77, Winter 1993.

29 ibid 30 Sandeep Dikshit, “Strategic setback. It’s Israel, China buy-buy,” The Tribune, January 13, 2016.

31 Thomas L. Friedman, “Israel and China Quietly Form Trade Bonds,” The New York Times, July 22, 1985.

32 ibid

Volume 7 |19

Nathan Jonathan Broder, “Israel’s China Trade Has Diplomatic Goals,” The Chicago Tribune, October 6, 1985.

34 ibid 35 Xiaoxing Han, “Sino-Israeli Relations,” Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 62-77, Winter 1993.

36 ibid 37 Sandeep Dikshit, “Strategic setback. It’s Israel, China buy-buy,” The Tribune, January 13, 2016.

38 David Shamah, “China looks to Israel to get its civil aviation industry off the ground,” The Times of Israel, December 25, 2015.

39 Sandeep Dikshit, “Strategic setback. It’s Israel, China buy-buy,” The Tribune, January 13, 2016.

40 Tova Dvorin, “China Inks Deal to Invest $300M in R&D in Israel,” The Jewish Voice, May 24, 2014.

41 Shoshanna Solomon, “Israel-China affair blooms even as culture gap weighs on rapport,” The Times of Israel, June 7, 2016.

42 China Israel Innovation Investment Summit homepage, 2016.

43 Peter Nguyen, “For Real Innovation, It’s Not Silicon Valley But Silicon Wadi,” Forbes, October 2, 2013.

44 Catherine Shu, “Music Education Startup Tonara Scores $5M Led By Baidu, China’s Largest Search Engine,” TechCrunch, April 14, 2015.

45 Simona Weinglass, “Alibaba goes all in on QR; Invests $5M in Israeli startup Visualead,” Geektime, January 20, 2015.

46 Gil Tanenbaum, “China’s Qihoo 360 To Invest In Israel,” Jewish Business News, November 17, 2014.

47 Shlomo Freund, “What’s Next For China-Israel Investments?,” Forbes, September 22, 2016.

48 “Where does Israel export to?,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2014.

49 “Where does Israel import from?,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2014.

50 “Where does China import from?,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2014.

51 “Where does China export to?,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2014.

52 Jethro Mullen, “Meet China’s tech behemoths,” CNN, May 17, 2016.

53 It is important to note that this sentence (and the remainder of this paragraph) should in no way be misconstrued as diminishing the accomplishments of the listed Chinese companies. A company such as Alibaba exists on a level far surpassing any of the Western companies that may have inspired it; however, the fact remains that much of the creativity that went into drawing up companies such as eBay and 33

20 | Penn Asian Review

Amazon was recycled by the masterminds behind Alibaba. The same holds true for the others examples mentioned.

54 Daniel Nathan, “The Great Firewall’s Silver Lining, China Hands Magazine, October 24, 2016.

55 “Intel in Israel,” Intel.

India's Marginal Independence Movements

Towards A Global History of India’s Marginal Independence Movements Aswin Mannepalli, GAS April 10, 1917 was a day like few had seen before in the district of Champaran. Thousands, mostly peasants, braved the April Bihari heat as the locomotive carrying Gandhi lurched to a halt at 3:00PM. It was rumored that this holy man could, as if by magic, alleviate the region’s economic plight.1 Forced to cultivate Indigo on 15% of the land they tilled, the tinakathia system had trapped the local peasant in a cycle of penury. “The situation is more serious than I imagined…it seems to be worse than in Fiji and Natal,” Gandhi concluded shortly after arriving.2 Eventually, this satyagraha would set parameters for the wider non-violent, mass participatory freedom struggle against British rule.3 That November 19th, as Gandhi was preparing to open a school on the outskirts of Amolwa, a different scene was unfolding in a San Francisco district court.4 Seven months after declaring war on Germany, American authorities charged Germans and Indians associated with the Ghadar Party of using U.S. soil to plot attacks against the British Empire. The defense attorney, to the outrage of the prosecutor, pointed to the Indians’ similarity to American founding fathers as he quoted the defendants using Washington and Lincoln in their nationalist publications.5 The sensational trial ended when one of the defendants murdered his associate in chambers and the judge meted out jail sentences to the survivors ranging from nearly two years to three months.6 Juxtaposing these two stories forces the reader to consider the vast range of responses that manifested as Indians sought to overturn British colonial rule in India during the 20th Century. Ultimately, the country would follow the Nehru-Gandhi articulation of the country’s aspiration for freedom and movements such as Ghadar would recede. Such success, however, can subsume these individual struggles into a large, non-existent political movement whose center is decisively held by the Indian National Congress (INC) until 1947. “Though [non-Congress struggles] were outside the Congress, most of them were not really separate from it,” writes Bipan Chan-

dra, ably articulating this position. “In fact, nearly all these movements established a complex relationship with the Congress mainstream and at no stage became alternatives to the Congress.”7 On that path, however, we risk hegemonizing the history of Indian Independence or subjecting it to an artificial inevitability.

I put forth that the lens of global history, especially with its sensitivity towards marginal movements’ robust connections to a wider, non-Congress world, can help loosen some of the strictures of the post ’47 nationalist ideological settlement. In this review essay, we will consider a few representative interventions from Sugata Bose, Harald Fischer-Tiné, Maia Ramnath, and Takeshi Nakajima that allow a researcher to access the rich tapestry of alternative possibility within the Indian freedom struggle.8 Since global history is nebulously defined, I must first fashion a workable definition of this term.

Global history, despite showing “no sign of abating” remains ill defined.9 I use it here in its simplest and perhaps crudest form: a global history of an event accepts that historical actors are not limited in their capacity for imagination or action by spatial categories such as nations. That is, by investigating networks of connection and contact that sometimes spanned the world, we can perhaps appreciate the range of possibility that motivated some Indians prior to de jure independence.

Global Exiles and Subversives Against the British Raj Global history has been used to understand diasporic freedom struggles separately from the Indian nationalist narrative. I have chosen to highlight a few authors who have destabilized the view that diasporic freedom struggles are somehow part of or anticipate the success of the INC: Sugata Bose, Harald Fischer-Tiné, Maia Ramnath, and Takeshi Nakajima.

Sugata Bose’s description of a vibrant Indian Ocean network that endured the irruption of Volume 7 |21

Mannepalli Western powers is a considerable intervention.10 The historian specifically points out that his perspective is the Indian Ocean interregional arena in the form of Fernand Braudel’s model. Therefore, the work is a complete history that considers the area’s economy, religion, military, society and politics. Bose also eschews perspectives which “view an omnipotent West as the main locus of historical initiative and are too diffuse to take adequate account of the rich and complex interregional arenas of economic, political, and cultural relationships” while avoiding micro-approaches such as subaltern studies since that has been “too engrossed in discourses of the local community and the nation to engage in broader comparisons.”11 Bose argues that the perimeter of the Indian Ocean, allowed for the imagining of India’s freedom in ways heretofore unseen. “The dreams and goals of the colonized were never fully constrained by the territorial frontiers of colonial states,” he writes.12 On voyages across the Indian Ocean, the solider, merchant or lawyer who was so inclined could ponder such futures. Gandhi, we should remember, was one of these transnational nationalists.

For our purposes, the story of the 43,000 strong Indian National Army is significant. The British Empire had stationed her Indian Armies across the Indian Ocean rim to protect imperial strategic interests. In 1942, Indian soldiers who surrendered to the Japanese in Singapore were reconstituted as part of a revolutionary Indian National Army (INA).

Did they consider themselves as being district from an Indian National Congress movement? Interpreting source materials such as participant narratives becomes an anxiety-laden exercise as “unravel[ing] the consciousness of ‘a true INA subaltern,’” through techniques described in the Prose of Counter-Insurgency untimely centralizes middle-class culture and consciousness.13 Specifically, Bose concludes that such understandings of the INA have “privileged territorial nationalism, finding its telos in the centralized nation-state and glossing over the extraterritorial or supraterritorial dimensions of anticolonialism.”14 In pursuing this line of reasoning, Bose creates a space to conceive of the INA foot soldier’s mentality in heterodox ways even if new modes of history telling need to be invented to access this information.15 Azad Hind, the state that the INA and Sub22 | Penn Asian Review

has Chandra Bose created was also able to better negotiate intra-Indian frictions. Sugata Bose speculates that distance from the daily reminders of difference in the homeland “contributed to a sense of Indian-ness among a people fractured by religion, language, local origin, caste, and class.”16 S. C. Bose’s polices further congealed this community. For example, 18,000 Tamils were welcomed into the INA despite not being “martial” under British rule.17 In a similar vein, the enthusiasm of female volunteers for an all-woman battalion was also a diasporic invention. 18 Also, S. C. Bose refused invitation to a Hindu temple since it had discriminated against non-Hindus and lower castes and would only go when this policy was changed.19 Sugata Bose renders this favorably in comparison to mainstream Indian nationalism:20 The secret and intimate path to a cosmopolitan anticolonialism among expatriate patriots was forged only when they were able to combat religious prejudice without making religion the enemy of the nation. Once the tide of oceanic anticolonialism had receded after the heady winter of 1945–1946, the politics of territorial nationalism ensured the partition of the motherland on August 14–15, 1947.

The relationship between Gandhi and Subhas Chandra Bose is fraught, alternating between respect and disappointment. Sugata Bose does not try to directly ask if S. C. Bose was a Gandhian, but historicizes the appropriation of S. C. Bose by the Indian political establishment. Despite being president of the INC twice, Sugata Bose notes that Nehru seems to have presided over a form of damnatio memoriae.

“Only during the 1990s, when under Narsimha Rao,” did Congress recognize S. C. Bose.21 The Hindu right takes S. C. Bose’s militarism while conveniently forgetting his Hindu-Muslim unity. Even the Communists garland statues of S. C. Bose despite deriding him as an “imperialist stooge.”22 In light of this, one needs to heavily caveat any claim that associates the Indian National Army with the Indian National Congress.

Harald Fischer-Tine maps the diasporic networks that emerged starting with Japan’s victory in

India's Marginal Independence Movements the Russo-Japanese War. He notes that this period was fertile ground for “transnational nationalists” to emerge since Bal Gangadhar Tilak or Aurobindo Ghose were out of politics and Gandhi was still in South Africa. In that space, others stepped into the vacuum only to be “quickly marginalized, when the phase of Gandhian mass mobilization began.”23 But in that decade from 1905-1914, they constructed a space in London, New York, and Tokyo for agitating against British rule.

For example, Shyamji Krishnavarma founded the first India House in London with the express purpose of offering an alternative to the INC. Krishnavarma, a lecturer at Oxford, spent considerable time creating alliances not only with the Indian community but with English radical socialists, Irish Republicans and Pan-Islamic anti-imperialists.24 He was contemptuous of the INC, writing, “It is painful to observe that the funds provided by Indians are wasted on delegates of the Indian National Congress in England, on the British Committee of the Congress [...], and such other fads which do more harm than good.”25 Eventually the British security state clamped down and forced Krishnavarma to flee to Paris, effectively ending diasporic nationalistic activity in the imperial metropole.

Fischer-Tine then explores the alliance formed by diasporic Indian and Irish nationalists in New York. Given America’s freedom of the press, Krishnavarma and his associates could not only publish his nationalist tracts, his organization could distribute them to various parts of the world. The association between Irish republicans and Krishnavarma’s group was strong enough their respective mouthpieces would cross-publish articles. Yet, New York would lose importance as the Indian community in the San Francisco Bay Area would emerge as the locus of this movement.26 The third such India House would be established in Tokyo by students who apparently revered Krishnavarma. Hearing of Japan’s victory against Russia at Port Arthur, Viceroy Lord Curzon apparently fretted that Indian students studying in Japan would tend towards “discontent and even disloyalty.”27 In 1907, Indians openly celebrated Tilak’s Shivaji-Festival and even managed to attract former prime minister Count Okuma to the event. The British Raj lodged a protest reminding the Japanese gov-

ernment that Britain and Japan were treaty allies.28 In these developments, Fischer-Tine argues, we see transnational-nationalist belief that a “small, well-educated” revolutionary vanguard could find common cause with other anti-imperialist agitators to realize self-rule in India. He concludes the story of Krishnavarma distances us from “nationalistic solipsism often disguises the complex set of global historical constellations, transnational political interaction and translocal ideological exchanges that are constitutive factors of most national movements.”29 Maia Ramnath’s Haj to Utopia explores the Ghadar Party, a global anti-colonial group once headquartered in Berkley, California. Founded during the “first wave of globalization” in the 1900s as Indian migrants traveled to various parts of the world and carried with them seditious notations against Empire, this movement consolidated under the leadership of Har Dayal. Even though it was suppressed by the Anglo-American security apparatus and never regained its former influence, its legacy has been claimed by both Indian Nationalists and Communists. Ramnath argues that we should see Ghadar in its own terms as a “mode distinct from other more unequivocal [freedom movements] during the prewar and interwar periods.”30 Ramnath’s use of diasporic history is particularly useful since Asian-American history is fundamentally concerned with linkages and entanglements between origins and destinations. The Oxford Handbook of Asian American History charts the growth of the discipline to the “social movements during the 60s and 70s” in that were related to a “deeper effort to transform the academy and to be involved with a production of knowledge engaged with local and global communities.”31 By balancing its narrative on the tension inherent in the hyphen, we can appreciate heretofore unacknowledged lineages.

Though at times variously called a farmer’s party or laborers party, Ghadar existed in a more nebulous configuration. Ramnath posits that we treat the Gadhar movement as an anarchic international movement that is a “missing link in the genealogy Indian radicalism.”32 Like Anderson’s Filipino anarchists, the Ghadarist existed in a wider world that allowed them to “participate and contribute to a richly cross-fertilized radical discourse that was less easily available to their fellows inside British India.”33 The Volume 7 |23

Mannepalli result was an ideology that merged political libertarianism with economic socialism.34 Complicating the claims of both Communists and Nationalists is the observation that the party underwent transformations throughout its lifetime as it interacted with a wider world. It was an American movement before World War I, as it drew upon utopian socialism and syndicalism to gain support from American audiences.35 In wartime, it increasingly associated with more nationalist anti-imperialist movements. This includes coordinating with German officials at the University of Berlin to form the Berlin India Committee for fomenting revolution across the British world.36 The association would lead to Hindu-German Conspiracy trail described in the introductory remarks. Ghadarites also associated themselves with revolutionaries from Ireland and Egypt like Krishnavarma had done. In later years, they began to be increasingly influenced

by Marxist Leninism and moved away from the utopian socialism advocated by Har Dayal. 37 After independence, remnants of the Ghadar movement maintained their distance from either Marxist or nationalist discourses in Indian politics. For example, survivors gave support to Charu Mazumdar and the Naxalites in the 60s.38 Given this ideological distinctness Ramnath cautions against viewing the Ghadar party as a nationalist movement in the mold of the Indian National Congress. Specifically, “in both geographical and ideological terms they overspilled the purview of mainstream nationalism…moreover, they increasingly envisioned a comprehensive social and economic restructuring for postcolonial India rather than a mere handover of the existing governmental institutions.”39 Most of all, its experience in multiple subalternaties in the United States and elsewhere give it a multihued quality that cannot simply be appropriated and hegemonized.

To dispel the notion that global history is a Eurocentric enterprise, I would like to briefly discuss work on Rash Behari Bose by Japanese scholars. In Nakamurya’s Bose: The Indian Independence Movement and Japanese Asianism, Takeshi Nakajima that seeks to understand R.B. Bose’s intellectual development from terrorism in India to right wing Japanese ideologue and supporter of the Japanese imperial project.40 Bose worked at the Forest 24 | Penn Asian Review

Research Institute before attempting to assassinate Lord Hardinge in 1912. Since his flight to Japan in 1915, he ensconced himself in right-wing circles and became something of a public intellectual writing in Japanese.

It is important to understand what R.B. Bose thought about Gandhi and Satyagraha. R. B. Bose was vocally against the Second Round Table Conference and the Gandhi–Irwin Pact of 1931.41 Despite his low opinion of Gandhi as a politician, R.B. Bose seems to have appreciated Gandhi as a holy man who embodied the spirit of sacrifice.42 He also credited Gandhi with making the Indian independence movement a mass struggle. Nakajima notes, however, in an article titled “India and Gandhi” R.B Bose was adamant in arguing that “India cannot become free through a non-violent movement.” 43 In fact, he seems to have employed a view of history based on the Vedic notion of yugas. That is, Mughal weakness, the British arrival and subsequent colonization had marked the dawn of the kali yuga. In such an epoch, the Hindu and Muslim (who were set against each other in the first place due to British scheming, per R.B. Bose) were justified in taking up arms to expel the British from their motherland.44 Rash Behari Bose’s entanglement with the Japanese Imperial project in Korea is also worth considering. Nehru, in his Letters From A Father To His Daughter, wrote that “the suppression of the Koreans by the Japanese is a very sad and dark chapter in history.”45 Furthermore, Gandhi wrote 1909 “in subjugating Korea, [the Japanese Governor General of Korea, Ito Hirobumi] used courage to a wrong end.”46 In contrast to these positions, R. B. Bose did not see the Indian and Korean struggles in the same light since Britain was a white nation. “In tune with Bose,” writes Satoshi Mizutani, “[the Japanese right wing] argued that Koreans should not fight against Japan, but fight with Japan against Britain, which they should view as the common enemy of Asian peoples.”47 In this sense, a global lens allows us to depict Rash Behari Bose as a non-Gandhian.

Conclusion We have tried to document the ways historians are using global history to question the nationalist Indian Independence narrative. Be it the Indian

India's Marginal Independence Movements National Army, Krishnavarma’s India Houses, Ghadar Party, or Rash Behari Bose’s Pan-Asian mission, each movement held world views that were radically at odds with what obtains in 1947. Therefore, we cannot say that these struggles as anticipating the success of the Indian National Congress. More significantly, this renders any effort by the INC to hegemonize these movements problematic. While these selection is by no means exhaustive, they have irrevocably undermined the intellectual edifice that scaffolds nationalist Indian historiography.

(Endnotes) 1 Amin, Shahid, ‘Gandhi as Mahatma: Gorakhpur District, Eastern UP, 1921-22’ (1984), p. 5-6 2 Gandhi, MK, “Letter to Maganlal Gandhi”, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol 14: October 1917 p. 363 3 Alternatively, this could be interpreted as a Gramscian war of position as in Chandra, Bipan, Strategy of Nationalist Movement, (1988), p. 23 4 Mahatma Gandhi Events Chronology Champaran - November, 1917: https://www.gandhiheritageportal.org/chronology/event-chronology-listing/ MjU= 5 Assails Britain’s Rule in India, San Francisco Chronicle, 1 March 1918. The paper spent much of the trial fixating on the fact that a Stanford student (among other white women) had fallen in love with some of the Indians. (Former Stanford Girl Lifts Veil from Hindoo Plotters, San Francisco Chronicle, 22 December 1917) 6 San Francisco Consuls, New York Times, 1 May 1918, 10.

7 Chandra, Bipan, India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947 (1989) 8 Fischer-Tiné deals with India Houses across the world, Ramnath addresses the Ghadar Party, Nakajima considers Rash Behari Bose while Sugata Bose grapples with Subhas Chandra Bose 9 http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/89866/5/Potter%20Saha%20Connected%20Histories%20FINAL.pdf 10 Bose, Sugata, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean In The Age Of Global Empire, (2006), p. 6 11 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 7 12 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 31 13 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 145 -146 14 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 147 15 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 147 16 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 148 17 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 175

18 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 177 19 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 180 20 Bose, Sugata, (2006), p. 192 21 Bose, Sugata, His Majesty’s Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose And India’s Struggle Against Empire, (2011), p. 326 22 Bose, Sugata, (2011), p. 326 23 Fischer-Tine, Harald, Indian Nationalism and the ‘world forces’: transnational and diasporic dimensions of the Indian freedom movement on the eve of the First World War, Journal of Global History (2007) p. 327 24 Fischer-Tine, Harald, (2007), p. 339 - 343 25 Fischer-Tine, Harald, (2007), p. 331 26 Fischer-Tine, Harald, (2007), p. 335 27 Fischer-Tine, Harald, (2007), p. 336 28 Fischer-Tine, Harald, (2007), p. 336 29 Fischer-Tine, Harald, (2007), p. 325 30 Ramnath, Maia, Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global Radicalism And Attempted To Overthrow The British Empire, University of California Press, (2011) p. 6 31 Azuma, Eiichiro, ed., Oxford Handbook of Asian American History (2016), p. 1 32 Ramnath, Maia, (2011), p. 33 33 Ramnath, Maia, (2011), p. 237 34 Ramnath, Maia, (2011), p. 6 35 Ramnath, Maia, (2011), p. 237 36 Ramnath, Maia, (2011), p. 72 37 Ramnath, Maia, (2011), p. 12 38 Ramnath, Maia, (2011), p. 236 39 Ramnath, Maia, (2011), p. 3 40 Nakamurya’s Bose: The Indian Independence Movement and Japanese Asianism, Hakusuisha (2012).

41 Nakajima, (2012), p. 240 42 Nakajima, (2012), p. 240 43 Nakajima, (2012), p. 240 44 Nakajima, (2012), p. 241 45 Quoted in Skand R. Tayal’s India and the Republic of Korea: Engaged Democracies, 46 Quoted in Skand R. Tayal’s India and the Republic of Korea: Engaged Democracies, 47 Satoshi Mizutani, Anti-Colonialism and the Contested Politics of Comparison: Rabindranath Tagore, Rash Behari Bose and Japanese colonialism in Korea in the inter-war period Journal of Colonialism & Colonial History, (2015)

Volume 7 |25

Radov

Ethnic Identity Preservation among Chinese-Born Female College Students Susan Radov, C’19 Introduction Identity is a crucial means of self-development and understanding, especially among college students. Recent studies have shown how ethnic identity is based on examining ancestry and analyzing its relevance in an individual’s life.1 I am interested in ethnic identity attitudes and preservation specifically in Chinese-born female college students. I chose this topic because of the debate regarding the salience of ethnic identity for immigrant children.2 While researchers have long studied ethnic identity for immigrant parents, they have only recently examined the new second generation – comprising both children who were born in the United States and who arrived at a young age.3 In studying immigrant children and ethnic preservation, I seek to understand how they navigate and perform their ethnic identity.

My research topic of ethnic identity was guided by questions such as: Do immigrant children preserve their ethnic identity? What might affect how or why they preserve their ethnic identity? To what degree does ethnic identity seem salient or important to them?

Are their ethnic habits and their cultural practices consistent with how they identify?

Regarding the degree of ethnic identity expression, past research cites categorization, culture, institutions, and interests as factors influencing ethnic identity salience.4 Through my research, I strive to examine the degree to which the respondents preserved their ethnic identity through language, ethnic customs, and self-identification.

Guided by Mia Tuan’s work regarding ethnic identity practices and identification and by Dhingra and Rodriguez’s factors contributing to ethnic identity salience, I analyzed how the respondents perceived their identities. Consistent with other findings about ethnic identity, I found that time of arrival mattered for ethnic identity.5 Specifically, I observed that the time of arrival shaped whether they maintained a strong ethnic identity or whether 26 | Penn Asian Review

they navigated multiple identities.

I argue that the difference between the respondents’ generational statuses impacted their degree of ethnic identity preservation and salience. In order to assess their relative levels of ethnic identity salience, I explored how the respondents preserved their native language, practiced their cultural habits, and categorized themselves in terms of ethnicity.

Methodology In order to study ethnic identity in immigrant children, I collected data from three semi-structured interviews with three Chinese-born college students at the University of Pennsylvania.

The first respondent, Catherine, arrived to the United States at age three, lived in a white-dominated neighborhood in New Jersey with her family, and attended a homogenous school throughout her childhood. The second respondent, Carly, arrived to the United States at age five, lived in a white-dominated neighborhood in Virginia with her family, and went to a homogenous school throughout her childhood. The third respondent, Dana, arrived to the United States at age sixteen, lived with a host family in a white-dominated neighborhood in Florida, and attended a homogenous school for the remainder of high school. While not intending to seek out students of different generational statuses, I found that this distinction influenced their levels of ethnic identity salience.

In order to distinguish the respondents based on their generational status, I used Pyke and Dang’s model from their study, where American-reared children who arrived before the age of fifteen are categorized as the new second generation, whereas those who arrived starting at the age of fifteen are categorized as the first generation. In my study, Carly and Catherine are considered members of the new second generation, while Dana is considered a member of the first generation.

Similar to Shiao and Tuan’s reasons in their study with Korean adoptees, I chose to conduct

Ethnic Identity Preservation semi-structured interviews because it allowed the respondents to elaborate upon on my questions in more detail. I interviewed each respondent in a quiet apartment and recorded the dialogue with the standard recording application on my phone. Each interview lasted approximately one-and-a-half hours.

My interview procedure was largely based off of Mia Tuan’s, as her study dealt with second generation Asian-Americans’ ethnic practices and identities.

Motivated by Tuan’s interview framework, I focused my questions on themes regarding early experiences, family influences, ethnic practices and habits, and self-categorization.6 First, I found that these questions helped answer what impacted the degree of their ethnic identity: Please tell me about the place or places where you grew up. Please tell me about the schools you attended. Do you remember experiencing any discrimination when growing up? How did you respond to this discrimination and how did it make you feel? Did you interact a lot with other Chinese people? How aware were you of being Chinese as a child?

Second, I found that these questions helped understand how they preserved their ethnic identity: Do you speak your ethnic language and how comfortable are you speaking it? What meanings do you impart onto your native language? How knowledgeable are you about your language? Do you ever feel a pull to be more ethnic? Do you practice cultural holidays? How knowledgeable are you about them? How significant do you think it was to your parents that you understand and be comfortable with Chinese culture? Do you ever explore cultural-related activities?

Third, I found that these questions helped measure how they self-identified: How would you describe or categorize yourself ? What does it mean to you, to consider yourself as [how you identified above]? Do you think your parents perceive you as more Chinese or more American? Has being [insert identity they chose] been important to you?

In order to analyze my data, I transcribed the interviews on my laptop. First, I listened to the recordings of the interviews. Second, I coded the transcripts. Third, I extracted and synthesized their most pertinent answers. Finally, I examined my coded transcripts, which led me to focus on language, cultural holidays, and self-identification. These three topics provided me with the richest data and under-

lined how early experiences and familial influences impacted these elements of ethnic identity.

While analyzing my data, I found that Carly and Catherine, whom I consider the new second generation, had similar responses, whereas Dana, whom I consider the first generation, had different responses.

Specifically, I found that Carly and Catherine had to navigate multiple identities through cultural customs and identification, while Dana preserved just one identity through cultural customs and identification.

Similar to how Shiao and Tuan separated their data based on those who did and did not explore their ethnic identity, I categorized my data based on those who did and did not preserve their ethnic identity.

For each heading regarding language, traditions, and identification, I grouped Catherine and Carly together and compared them to Dana in order to better examine ethnic identity salience among different generations.

Language Preference: ‘Mother-Tongue’ versus English English For Carly and Catherine, I found that their childhoods in America shaped their desire to speak English over Chinese. Research on early development cites how young children compare themselves in relation to those who most directly affect their experiences.7 This extends to Carly and Catherine, as they compared themselves to the white Americans in their neighborhoods and schools.

When arriving to the United States at ages three and five, they mentioned that they were self-conscious of their potential accents and did not want language ability to prevent friendships. Highlighting her language insecurity, Carly stated: “At school I was a lot more careful at first because I didn’t want to mess up any pronunciation or grammar.” When asked why she was insecure about an accent, she explained: “I really think language is the first thing. I think language especially with like Asian accents is made fun of a lot.” This shows how Carly equated language with incorporation into American society, and how she believed that eliminating an accent would allow her to blend in with peers. Her response builds upon prior research, which notes that language is one of the most essential components to Volume 7 |27

Radov large-scale integration into the host society.8 Catherine reinforced how she did not want to appear as an outsider to others: “On the first day of preschool, my parents sent me without knowing any English. I was so embarrassed. It was awkward not being able to communicate with kids.” Catherine echoed Carly’s discomfort with a language barrier and a desire to fit in with others in early childhood. Clearly, as young children, they feared being perceived as foreigners, so they coped by adopting to English. This finding reiterates past research on how young immigrants are shaped by growing up in America and by mainstream expectations to speak English.9 Their preference for English underscores the lack of importance that Chinese played in their lives.

Studies have shown that later generations tend to acculturate more than the first generation because they live in a predominantly American setting and speak English as their native language.10 Carly and Catherine’s loss of Chinese highlights that they, unlike their parents, did not feel Chinese was crucial in their everyday lives. Catherine said: “My parents want me to speak Chinese to them but I don’t really…I respond in English or maybe sometimes Chinglish.” Her desire to speak English reveals a common element of weak ethnic identity: knowing an ethnic language but choosing not to speak it.11 This attitude remains consistent with Mia Tuan and Dhingra and Rodriguez’s findings of how earlier arrival to the United States leads second generation Asian-Americans to prefer monolingualism. Carly reaffirms a generational gap with her parents: “When I was younger, they would push me to learn Chinese more but because I’ve been Americanized and really can only speak English, I think they’ve given up on it for me.”

Her response reveals how immigrant children often feel pushed to speak their native language by their non-English speaking parents.12 However, while their parents tried to push them to speak Chinese, Carly and Catherine’s earlier exposure to American life led them to abandon Chinese for English. This seems consistent with how immigrant parents and immigrant children view their host societies in different ways and how the younger generation often feels more influenced by American mainstream expectations.13

28 | Penn Asian Review

“Mother-Tongue” For Dana, on the other hand, I found that her later time of arrival influenced her to preserve her native language.

Unlike Catherine and Carly, Dana’s earliest language experiences were formed in China.

She mentioned how she grew up speaking the local Shanghainese dialect with her parents. Because she spoke Chinese growing up, she realized that coming to America would prove difficult for her regarding language. She mentioned that in the United States: “It was hard to not be aware of my Chinese identity, especially when I had my own accent.” This reinforces past studies of how international students often feel as though language and accent differences separate them from Americans.14 When asked how her accent impacted her, she stated: “I came over as an international student and had spoken Chinese all my life so I already felt separated from the people here.” Her reaction differs from those of Catherine and Carly, as Dana’s self-consciousness led to cultural awareness rather than cultural assimilation. This highlights how a dissonant experience can lead to ethnic awareness and ethnic consciousness.15 Because Dana grew up in China, she did not feel Catherine and Carly’s American expectations to adopt English over Chinese. Her background of speaking Shanghainese in China and her mindset of being a foreigner in America led her to preserve her ethnic language. Thus, Dana’s childhood in China and her experience of speaking Shanghainese did not result in what past studies have deemed acculturation through language loss.16 Rather, she embraced the Chinese language: “I love when I get the chance to speak Chinese with anyone.” Her desire to hold onto her language emphasizes a main component of strong ethnic identity according to Dhingra and Rodriguez.17 Beyond speaking the language, Dana displayed a deeper commitment to the written language.

She beamed when saying: “I’m proud of the fact that I can read and write ancient Chinese, like poems and such.” This highlights that she maintained her language as a way to connect with her Chinese roots and childhood, as opposed to Catherine and Carly who adopted English as a way to connect with their American peers and lifestyle. Dana’s tie to Chinese supports past research of how retaining ethnic language can be linked to sustaining ethnic culture.18

Ethnic Identity Preservation Her desire to speak, read, and write Chinese reflects Mia Tuan’s findings of how those living in an ethnic setting preserve more of their Asian culture than those who grow up in a white-dominated area.19 Cultural Traditions: Maintenance versus Erosion Erosion Catherine and Carly did not engage in ethnic habits such as practicing holidays and interacting with co-ethnic peers. Their childhood in the United States seemed to impact how they distanced themselves from Chinese food and customs.

When asked about early experiences of discrimination, they mentioned that they stopped bringing Chinese food to school due to personal insecurities and comments from other kids. Carly specified that in preschool, she realized her food was “too pungent or had too strong of a smell for the other kids in class.” Catherine mentioned that she did not want to eat Chinese food after she was asked in preschool “do you eat dog?” or “do your parents own a restaurant or something?”. These interactions mirror the same kinds of cultural discrimination regarding food experienced by the second generation Asian-Americans in Mia Tuan’s findings.20 Carly and Catherine’s early events reveal how a dissonant experience can lead to acculturation, as they chose to adapt to the customs of those around them, such as only eating American food at school.21 Besides adopting to the norms of food traditions around them, Catherine and Carly did not celebrate cultural holidays in college. Their early childhoods in America influenced their erosion of cultural traditions. When questioned why they did not practice these holidays, Carly explained that “culture is not as large a part of my life as it is for other Chinese kids here – like the international students.” Her response displays a growing distance from co-ethnic peers and even an assumption that international, but not American-born Chinese kids, hold onto Chinese traditions. This proved consistent with Mia Tuan’s findings of how second generation Asian-Americans chose not to preserve cultural habits, viewing them as outdated and inconsistent with their lifestyle.22 Catherine reinforced this erosion of cultural practices by stating that she wished her family had celebrated “more American holidays like

Thanksgiving – that’s what all my friends growing up celebrated.” This response emphasizes a desire to acculturate based on the practices of her non-Asian peers. Thus both Carly and Catherine’s early experiences and their white frame of reference shaped their erosion of cultural traditions. This lack of cultural practice reveals what Dhingra and Rodriguez would consider to be an aspect of weak ethnic identity.23 While Catherine and Carly were heavily shaped by American expectations, they also had to navigate their parents’ expectations regarding traditions. Both mentioned that phone calls to relatives were always stressed during holidays, and that these phone calls served as a source of pressure to be more connected with their ethnic identity. When asked about her interactions with family during holidays, Carly articulated that: “My parents will call and ask what I’m doing for the holiday. Usually I’m just studying--not doing anything to celebrate so I feel like from their tone they want me to be out with Chinese kids.” Although her response echoes Mia Tuan’s findings of how most second generation Asian-Americans did not view traditions as integral to their lives, it also reflects how some felt mild guilt for their lack of celebration.24 Catherine also stated that “I don’t go out to Penn Taiwanese Society or the Chinese club but when my parents call I’ll be eating a mooncake at least.” This highlights that she felt a pressure from her family to celebrate the holidays, and that similar to Mia Tuan’s research, she was not as conscious as her parents of ethnic holidays.25 Past research supports these findings by citing how younger generations focus on their current lifestyle and adjustment to American life while their parents tend to focus on more traditional and ethnic practices.26 Maintenance For Dana, on the other hand, she preserved her cultural traditions by practicing holidays and celebrating with co-ethnic peers. Just as with language, she was shaped by her life growing up in China and did not use whites as her frame of reference.

Her childhood of celebrating holidays with friends and family in China formed her early experiences with traditions. When coming to America at a later age, she mentioned that: “I missed practicing the holidays in high school” reaffirming how she was Volume 7 |29

Radov influenced by Chinese, not American, cultural expectations. Furthermore, her interactions with Americans led her to engage more with her ethnic identity.

She cited that being surrounded by Americans who neither understood the customs nor practiced the holidays deepened her commitment to Chinese traditions. This confirms a past article by Lee and Rice on international students citing how constant questioning about culture can lead international students to gravitate more to their own cultural customs.27 When asked how the questions about her cultural customs made her feel, Dana specified: “It didn’t really bother me that much because I do celebrate other holidays and I did grow up in China so I guess I already saw myself with a different culture.” Instead of acculturating, as Catherine and Carly did, Dana responded to an example of dissonance by seeking out ethnic solidarity in college. Thus, her response highlights how she already viewed herself as a foreigner, which was shaped by her ethnic traditions and childhood in China.

Dana’s fifteen years of cultural practices in China, a lack of cultural practice in America, and her peers’ curiosity about her culture, led her to practice cultural holidays in college. Unlike Catherine and Carly, Dana cited phone calls as a source of excitement rather than stress. She mentioned that: “My parents always call me up for the holidays and I get excited to be able to talk with other Chinese people about the holidays”. This displays a desire to discuss culture with co-ethnics and a similar outlook with her parents regarding traditions. While Catherine and Carly felt a generational gap with their parents, Dana did not, because she grew up practicing holidays with friends and family. Her cultural practice, like her language retention, seems to result from a difference in host society perceptions — where living in a primarily ethnic setting influences one to hold onto cultural elements.28 This is expressed in how Dana sought out ethnic friends to practice the holidays, reminding her of her childhood in China and filling the void from high school in America.

She recounted that: “For the Mid-Autumn festival I went to a show hosted by Penn Chinese Students’ Association and for Chinese New Year I went to a real Chinese restaurant…that I vetted…with other Chinese friends in Chinatown.” These practices of joining with co-ethnics to practice cultural traditions 30 | Penn Asian Review

emphasizes a component of strong ethnic identity29.

The desire to engage with people in the Chinese Student Association and to seek out a more traditional Chinese restaurant underscore how she wanted to restore her roots through cultural practice. This reinforces how as a later immigrant she felt more connected to her Chinese roots and felt tied to Chinese rather than American expectations.

Identification: Obligation versus Choice Obligation While Catherine and Carly showed deterioration of Chinese language and erosion of cultural traditions, they chose to identify as hyphenated Americans. However, their self-identification was by no means absolute – rather it draws out the degree of role conflict they felt regarding their ethnic identity.

When asked how they identified, Carly and Catherine both reluctantly stated “Asian-American.” Carly followed up with “I guess I would say I’m Asian-American” and Catherine stated “Asian-American but it’s hard to tell if I’m more American or Chinese but yeah still Asian-American.” Both of these responses highlight the degree of reluctance in identifying as Asian American. However, the fact that they even considered identifying as hyphenated Americans reveals the role of parental pressure in lives.30 Thus, their self-selection highlights this push-pull effect of American expectations in how they behave and parental expectations in how they identify.31 This seems consistent with Mia Tuan’s findings that second generation Asian-Americans possess a degree of choice in practicing cultural customs but feel a sense of external pressure in identifying in ethnic terms.32 While in Mia Tuan’s study, the external pressure to identify as Asian-American comes from whites, my study shows that the external pressure comes from the respondents’ parents.33 This highlights that while Carly and Catherine exhibit choice regarding their language and traditions, they feel a sense of obligation regarding their identity due to the generational difference with their parents. In other words, their identification aligned more with their parents’ expectations rather than their American expectations, proving the relevance of role conflict and multiple identities in their lives.34 It is worth noting, however, that they showed great difficulty in trying to

Ethnic Identity Preservation categorize themselves and that their identification stemmed from pressure not choice. This disconnect between how they practice their culture and how they identify calls into question the salience of ethnic identification, which will be explored further in the conclusion.

Choice

While Catherine and Carly’s identification as Asian-American seemed inconsistent with their American expectations and lack of cultural practices, Dana’s identification accords with her Chinese expectations and preservation of cultural practices.

Dana when asked, firmly stated that: “I am Asian of course – I mean I speak Chinese, practice the holidays and will probably even go back to China after college.” This reveals her strong ethnic identity as Asian and how her upbringing in China and Chinese expectations guided how she perceived herself.

Furthermore, unlike Catherine and Carly, she considered cultural customs to be heavily tied to how she identified–citing language and traditions as reasons for categorizing herself as Asian. This reaffirms how factors such as cultural traditions and holidays influence ethnic identification and highlight elements of strong ethnic identity.35 Therefore, Dana does not feel a push-pull of two worlds or expectations leading to multiple identities. Due to a later arrival to the United State, she already perceived herself as a foreigner carrying her Chinese language and cultural traditions with her. Her last sentence solidifies the strength of her ethnic identity by stating that she may return to China, which Dhingra and Rodriguez may cite as the strongest form of a transnational tie.36 Thus, Dana does not feel a pressure to be more ethnic as she retained her Chinese language and practiced the holidays; her sense of identification as Asian highlights how she was shaped mainly by her Chinese expectations.

Conclusion

Catherine and Carly both exhibited a degree of conflict with their ethnic identity. Individually, they did not celebrate the holidays or retain the Chinese language, as they were shaped by American mainstream expectations. However, they felt pressure to be “more ethnic” or “celebrate Chinese culture

more” by their parents’ expectations. Therefore, their American expectations and their family pressure played a role in how they had to navigate multiple identities. Conversely, Dana practiced holidays and preserved the Chinese language, as she was shaped by her Chinese upbringing. Because she arrived to the U.S. later, she did not feel as though she had to straddle multiple worlds of American and Chinese expectations.

Reflecting upon language, cultural traditions, and self-identification, it is important to understand how these elements contribute ethnic identity salience. According to Dhingra and Rodriguez , self-identification leads to strong or weak ethnic identity.37 However, my study has highlighted problems with this thinking for Carly and Catherine.

Rather, I believe that my data reveals how ethnic identification does not reveal ethnic salience for everyone. For Catherine and Carly, they assimilated through a deterioration of Chinese language and erosion of cultural traditions, yet they still held an “Asian-American” ethnic identity. While my data was consistent with Mia Tuan’s that Catherine and Carly felt a pressure to identify ethnically, my data also possesses different elements. For instance, Mia Tuan’s study and Dhingra and Rodriguez’s research on ethnic identity assume that identification as Asian American implies strong ethnic identity.38 However, Catherine and Carly did not exhibit a salient ethnic identity because there was an inconsistency in their practices and identification.

Thus while they may identify as “Asian-American”, they did not act upon this identity by embracing the Chinese language or by practicing the ethnic holidays. Therefore, this low degree of ethnic identity salience seems to indicate that ethnic identity does not always correlate with ethnic identity salience.

As Richard Alba articulates through his idea of the twilight of ethnicity, ethnic identity salience may be declining for later generations.39 This may be the case for Catherine and Carly, members of the new second generation.

Dana on other hand, representing the first generation in my study, seems to be consistent with Dhingra and Rodriguez’s notion that ethnic identification reflects salience.40 Her commitment to the Chinese language and her practice of cultural holidays led her to consider herself as Asian, and she Volume 7 |31

Radov believed that these practices reflect her ethnic identity. Her commitment to the Chinese language and customs appears more in line with Catherine and Carly’s parents, as they were all shaped by experiences in China and considered language and customs important markers of their identity.

Based on three interviews, it is difficult to conclude how identity salience correlates to ethnicity. However, the data does reflect a difference between generations of Chinese-born female college students with regards to language, cultural practices, and self-categorization. Perhaps these generational differences can be explored in the future in order to better understand how language, cultural traditions, and identification connect to ethnic identity salience.

(Endnotes) 1 Jiannbin Lee Shiao and Mia H. Tuan, Korean Adoptees and the Social Context of Ethnic Exploration, (2008), 1023-1066.

2 Dhingra, Pawan, and Robyn Magalit Rodriguez.

Asian America: Sociological and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ( John Wiley & Sons, 2014).

3 Karen Pyke and Tran Dang, “FOB” and “Whitewashed”: Identity and Internalized Racism Among Second Generation Asian Americans, (2003), 147-172.

4 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America.

5 Richard D. Alba. The Twilight of Ethnicity Among Americans of European Ancestry: The Case of Italians, (1985), 134-158; Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America; Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, Self-esteem, and Segmented Assimilation Among Children of Immigrants, (1994), 748-794; Min Zhou, Growing up American: The Challenge Confronting Immigrant Children and Children of Immigrants, (1997), 63-95.

6 Tuan, Forever Foreigners.

7 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America; Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within, 748-79.

8 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America; Milton Myron Gordon, Assimilation in American life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins, (Oxford University Press on Demand, 1964); Min Zhou, Growing up American, 63-95.

9 Ibid; Ibid; Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within, 748-79; Tuan, Forever Foreigners.; Min Zhou, Growing up American, 63-95.

10 Gordon, Assimilation in American life; Min Zhou, Are Asian Americans Becoming “White”?, (2004), 29-37.

11 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America;

32 | Penn Asian Review

Gordon, Assimilation in American life.

12 Min Zhou, Growing up American, 63-95.

13 Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within, 748794; Min Zhou, Growing up American, 63-95.

14 Jenny J. Lee and Charles Rice, Welcome to America? International Student Perceptions of Discrimination, (2007), 381-409.

15 Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within, 748794.

16 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America; Gordon, Assimilation in American life; Tuan, Forever Foreigners.

17 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America.

18 Min Zhou, Growing up American, 63-95.

19 Tuan, Forever Foreigners.

20 Ibid.

21 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America; Gordon, Assimilation in American life; Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within, 748-794.

22 Tuan, Forever Foreigners.

23 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America.

24 Shiao and Tuan, Korean Adoptees, 1023-1066.

25 Tuan, Forever Foreigners.

26 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America; Min Zhou, Growing up American, 63-95.

27 Lee and Rice, Welcome to America?, 381-409.

28 Tuan, Forever Foreigners.

29 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America.

30 Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within, 748794.

31 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America.

32 Tuan, Forever Foreigners.

33 Ibid.

34 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America; Min Zhou, Growing up American, 63-95.

35 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America; Tuan, Forever Foreigners.

39 Alba, The Twilight, 134-158.

40 Dhingra, Pawan, and Rodriguez, Asian America.