Storm-Related Fatalities Natural disasters often impact different populations disproportionately because of where and how the storm hit, and where and how people were living before the storm. In New Jersey, 37 people died from storm-related causes, while 65 people died in New York and Connecticut.18 Many more people died from accidents—and secondary hazards-- in New Jersey than in other states, where the most common cause of death was drowning.19 Accidental deaths include stepping on live, downed power lines, debris removal accidents. Deaths from carbon monoxide poisoning are relatively common because people using emergency generators do not get adequate ventilation.20 Many of the people who died during or after Sandy were over 65.21 Studies and media report that older people are less mobile than younger adults, and may mistakenly believe that they can “ride out” the storm because they were spared by an earlier storm.22
Hurricane Sandy resistance, Ocean City, NJ / Animal New York
Sandy on the Shore In the aftermath of the storm, Governor Chris Christie “requested an expedited major disaster declaration” for “Individual Assistance and assistance for debris removal and emergency protective measures, including direct federal assistance under the Public Assistance program for eight counties,” including the four coastal counties of Monmouth, Ocean, Atlantic, and Cape May.23 The FEMA Modeling Task Force, a group of risk analyst experts, assessed impacts in these counties based on “surge, wind, precipitation and snow impacts,” the composite of which provides information to render recovery assistance.24 The impact assessments indicate the extent to which populations and critical infraChapter 2| Why Sandy Was So Damaging
structure in each county were exposed to storm surge, high winds, and flooding associated with precipitation, building damage based on structure debris, and Individual Assistance program applications. Impacts were highly variable across the Mid-Atlantic and along the Jersey Shore.25 Approximately 43% of all New Jerseygenerated Individual Assistance claims were attributed to the four-county study area.26 Ocean County alone accounts for approximately onefifth of the total number of claims.27 This indicates not only the large number of residents exposed to storm hazards, but also the extent of damage within the county; Ocean County alone accounts for over half of the damaged private structures in the study area.28 Estimated
costs are approximately $1.6 billion for private property damage.29 Nearly one-third of Shore-county residents were exposed to storm impacts from surge, wind, or flooding attributable to rain.30 The damage associated with these impacts translated to 85,500 inundated National Flood Insurance Policies and nearly 70,000 damaged structures, which add up to approximately $4 billion in private damages.31 Police and fire stations, schools, hospitals, communications facilities, and infrastructure such as utilities and roadways, were also damaged, and estimates to reconstruct and protect these critical facilities reach over $130 billion statewide, “including $80 billion in transportation costs and $40 billion for wastewater and drinking water.” 32 9
Climate Trends
The damage caused by Sandy brought renewed attention to climate change and the likelihood of storms affecting the New Jersey coastline in the future. While the scientific community has made no concrete predictions, climate change is having a measurable impact on the factors that contribute to hurricane formation, intensity, and their trajectory along the Atlantic Coast, increasing the likelihood that similar storms will occur in the near future.1 Along with hurricanes, sea level rise has also become an increasing concern for the intensity and impact of future storms.2 In the words of climatologist Adam Sobel, “Every hurricane is a fluke, to some degree.”3 Hurricanes are the result of a number of environmental factors that combine to produce an average of 6 named hurricanes in the Atlantic basin every year.4 The relative rarity of hurricanes each year makes it difficult to make significant statistical findings about the likely intensity, storm track or frequency of storms in the future.
Hurricane Formation & Intensity
Sea surface temperature and the force of wind shear in the atmosphere influence hurricane formation and intensity. Sea surface temperature has been increasing in recent decades due to climate change. Increasingly warm waters in the Atlantic contribute to more frequent and intense storms because “warmer surface water dissipates more readily into vapor, making it easier for small ocean storms to escalate into larger, more powerful systems.”5 The strength of upper tropospheric wind shear has also been increasing in recent decades, but this factor inhibits the formation of hurricanes. Wind shear is a phenomenon Chapter 3| The Impacts of Climate Change
likely to be more intense than typical storms of the past.9 The predictive models run by NOAA found that by the end of the 21st century, the number of category 4 and 5 storms may nearly double, while the total number of hurricanes formed each year may decline.10 Strong hurricanes (category 3 or higher) already account for “86 percent of all US damage despite constituting only 24 percent of United States landfalls.” 11 The implications of this trend would be increased overall damage even with the reduction in total hurricanes because the potential damage of each hurricane “roughly doubles” at every increased hurricane category.12
Storm Track/ Hurricane Alley
where air currents at different levels of the troposphere (the layer of the atmosphere closest to the earth’s surface) travel in different directions.6 These conflicting air currents dissipate storm systems within them by pulling the storm in different directions, rather than pulling them consistently in one direction.7 On the whole, the conflicting forces of wind shear increase and rising sea surface temperatures have left inconclusive evidence as to whether we will see increasing or decreasing numbers of hurricanes in the future.8
Temperature increases at the North Pole/ NOAA
General consensus among scientists had been that the hurricanes that do form are 11
Storm Paths The other major concern with hurricanes is their trajectory once formed. Storms that track along the eastern seaboard usually deflect back out into the Atlantic near southern states such as the Carolinas or Virginia.13 Hurricanes have not historically directly affected Mid-Atlantic states such as New Jersey and New York very often.14 Climate factors are changing the potential future path of hurricanes along the east coast.15 The two factors that influence storm path are both related to overall warming trends in the Arctic.16 Arctic amplification refers to the amplifying affect of climate change at the poles.17
As reflective ice surfaces melt, there is less surface to reflect energy back into the atmosphere. Instead, energy is absorbed by the darker surfaces that were once covered with ice.18 Over certain parts of the globe, As a result, the jet stream forms deeper troughs and moves more slowly effectively pushing storms (such as Sandy) closer to parts of the east coast of the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States.19 The slowing of the jet stream causes storms (such as Sandy) to stay for longer periods over certain areas, subjecting particular areas to prolonged winds, rain, and flooding.20
NOAA
Sea Level Rise
Jet stream amplification/ NOAA
12
Although sea level rise is increasingly becoming a concern for coastal cities all over the globe, sea level has actually increased more and faster along the Mid-Atlantic coast than almost anywhere else, making its current and future impacts on the New Jersey Shore especially concerning.21 Sea level rise is a threat to coastal development and a harbinger of things to come worldwide.22 The parameters of estimates of future sea level rise are broad, largely because future rise is heavily dependent on how much the climate continues to change due to greenhouse gas emissions.23 Chapter 3| The Impacts of Climate Change
Introduction to Indices Risk assessment is a “process to identify po-
tential hazards and analyze what could happen if a hazard occurs,” and is a critical component in planning for the future, especially in places facing dramatic consequences from climate change. Risk assessment is a three-step process: (1) hazard identification, (2) vulnerability assessment, and (3) impact analysis.1 Hazard identification catalogues the various hazards a community or region might face, and determines the probability and magnitude of a hazard event occurring.2 Vulnerability assessment examines the assets at risk, including people and property, and how susceptible these assets are to the identified hazards.4 Finally, impact analysis identifies the potential consequences of the hazard event, including casualties and injuries, property damage, and financial losses.5 For the purposes of this studio, we defined our hazards as storm surge and flooding associated with severe storm events. Our scope is narrowed to the environmental and social characteristics that put assets at risk, and we do not analyze the impacts of hypothetical emergencies. These indices are one step, albeit a vital one, in a comprehensive risk assessment, and are intended to serve as models, indicative of many factors that could and should be considered in a risk assessment.
Atlantic City: Before Sandy
NOAA
Atlantic City: After Sandy
Methods
Although the indices asses vastly different vulnerability criteria, the overall approach is similar. Using spatial data freely available from public sources, specific vulnerability factors were defined and calculated in ArcGIS. These factors were combined to produce interim indices, representing the full continuum from the worst to the best possible situation within the study area. The indices were scaled down into five vulnerability “zones” and rough edges were smoothed out, resulting in a simplified index useful in guiding policy decisions.
Chapter 4| Vulnerability Along the Jersey Shore
NOAA
15
Factors
Mantoloking: Before Sandy
Mantoloking: After Sandy
Inundation/Flooding Flooding and storm surge are more likely to affect places of lower elevation, whereas higher elevations tend to be less vulnerable. This model scales elevation data between one (least vulnerable) to five (most vulnerable), and reveals that the most vulnerable areas are, understandably, closest to the coastline and on the barrier islands. Our study area is, in general, at relatively low elevation, and changes are gradual along the coast, so vulnerable areas extend inland somewhat.
Distance from Inlets Rising waters in the inland bays of the Shore caused extensive flooding in places like Mantoloking because water had no way to recede and instead washed over the top of the island, recreating extinct inlets and taking homes and infrastructure with it. According to Doug Jerolmack, Assistant Professor in the Department of Earth and Environmental Science at the University of Pennsylvania, inlets help relieve the pressure from storm surges and allow water to recede quickly and effectively, reducing the physical extent and time over which flooding occurs. Based on this information, and observations indicating a correlation between high-damage areas and distance from inlets, this criterion measures distance from inlets along the barrier islands, scaling between two (closest to inlets) and five (furthest from inlets), with the mainland being assigned a one.
Chapter 4| Vulnerability Along the Jersey Shore
NOAA
NOAA
Narrower parts of the barrier islands tended to have more significant damage than their wider counterparts, possibly due to the ease of total inundation and overtopping in a storm event. This criterion, then, measures the relative width of islands, scaled from one (wide) to five (very narrow).
Land subsidence risks are exacerbated by steeper slopes. While much of our study area is sloped gradually, some areas have more dramatic slopes that may be prone to landslides in severe storm events. This criterion takes the elevation data and converts it to slope measured in degrees. The slope is then scaled from one (very gradual slopes) to five (steeper slopes).
Island Width
Land Subsidence
17
Factors Seasonal Homes There is a high concentration of homes classified by the Census Bureau as “vacant, for seasonal use” in many Jersey Shore municipalities, especially on the barrier islands in traditional resort towns. In some census tracts, as many as 84% of housing units are seasonal. Areas with a higher percentage of seasonal homes were considered to be more vulnerable, since the owners of such houses may reside elsewhere, which may inhibit them from taking precautions in the event of a storm. Also, since these housing units are likely second homes, making repairs may be more difficult because they are not covered by government subsidized flood insurance.
Housing Stock Age Age of housing stock was considered a factor because older houses may have structural issues, while newer ones may have been constructed with cheaper construction methods and materials. Homes built either before 1950 or after 1990 were selected. In general, urban communities at the Jersey Shore tend to have older housing.
Homeowners over 65 Percentage of elderly homeowners was considered a factor because senior citizens are likely to be on a fixed income or have physical limitations, such as difficulty ascending a staircase. Areas with higher percentages of homeowners over 65 were ranked more vulnerable. The reason homeowners were examined rather than renters is because a greater proportion of the Shore’s elderly population own rather than rent. Chapter 4| Vulnerability Along the Shore
Homes in Holgate / Flickr user JFK Photography
Language other than English/Low English Proficiency The percent of people who speak a language other than English was used as a factor because it shows locations in which it may be necessary to produce emergency information in other languages. Of those who speak a language other than English, there is a subset that speaks English “less than very well.” The implication of low English proficiency is that some residents may not be able to understand evacuation warnings and other storm-related information. As such, low English proficiency was used as a separate factor.
Poverty Poverty rates were examined as well. While the average poverty level among the census tracts in the study area is relatively low, at 8.76%, (less than the state level of 9.4%), there are a few outliers where the percentage of people in poverty is much higher; these areas received a higher vulnerability ranking for this factor.
Zero-Car Households The next factor incorporated into the index was a measure of car ownership. Households without access to a car may have difficulty evacuating in case of an emergency and 19
thus were considered more vulnerable. While owning at least one car is the norm in the shore region, there are a few municipalities, such as Wildwood, Atlantic City, Asbury Park, and Long Branch, where as many as 30% of households lack access to a vehicle.
Evacuation Route Congestion Certain major roads in New Jersey are designated as evacuation routes. Using American Community Survey population figures, geospatial analysis was undertaken to estimate the degree of traffic congestion along these routes. Areas located in proximity to more congested routes were ranked as more vulnerable, since traffic could potentially cause delays in evacuation in case of an emergency situation.
While the previous factors are indications of vulnerability, the following four represent assets that may reduce a community’s vulnerability. As such, lower distances to bus stops and emergency services were categorized as less vulnerable, while higher per capita income and flood insurance coverage were similarly categorized.
Access to Bus Stops Distance to New Jersey Transit bus stops was calculated for all locations within the study area. The closer to a bus stop one is, the greater the level of access, and the lower the location falls on the vulnerability scale. Ideally, the appropriate distance from a bus stop is Âź mile. While NJ Transit bus service is more highly concentrated in North Jersey, there is also a confluence of bus routes around the Atlantic City region.
Access to Emergency Medical Services In the same way that access to bus stops was determined, distance from emergency medical services was prioritized on a 1 to 5 scale, with areas closer to EMS falling lower on the vulnerability scale (for various reasons, greater distances were deemed more acceptable for EMS access than for bus stop access). While most of the shore is relatively well-served by EMS, emergency medical services are more sparse in the central shore area.
Per Capita Income Higher per capita income values indicated less social vulnerability. Presumably, those with higher incomes would have more dispensable money to spend on repairs or relocation. However, it must be noted that their expenses may be greater in proportion with higher housing costs.
Flood Insurance Coverage The Community Vulnerability Index uses National Flood Insurance Program take up rates as a measure of flood insurance coverage. The take up rate is the number of NFIP policies held divided by an estimate of the number of households in a municipality. As would be expected, take up rates are higher in oceanfront communities.
Community recovery efforts/ US News
20
Chapter 4| Vulnerability Along the Shore
Federal Legislation Coastal Barrier Resources Act
The Coastal Barrier Resources Act (COBRA) has limited federal investment on barrier islands and their associated aquatic habitats since 1982.20 President Reagan and a conservative Congress enacted COBRA to limit public expenditures used for non-emergency disaster relief, building infrastructure to these locations, and to protect barrier islands’ sensitive natural resources.21 The Department of the Interior implements COBRA through the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Island Resource System (CBRS) and developing criteria for the two types of units covered by COBRA—System Units and Other Protected Areas.22 System units are typically private lands that were undeveloped when they were designated within CRBS.23 Structures within System Units are not eligible for federal flood insurance and investments.24 Other Protected Areas are typically lands held by a qualified public or private organization for wildlife conservation and other environmental purposes, and are intended to coincide with national wildlife refuge boundaries.24 Federal flood insurance is prohibited within Other Proers, (2) additions of excess Federal property to tected Areas.25 the CBRS, and (3) the CBRA 5-year review re quirements that evaluate changes in areas due In 1982, CBRS included 186 undevelto natural forces.28 oped island units, covering 453,000 acres and 666 miles of shoreline.26 As of 2013, CBRS covCOBRA in New Jersey ers approximately 3.2 million acres of land and associated aquatic habitat---including 585 sys There are 21 CBRS units in New Jersey, tem units covering 1.3 million acres of land and including 9 System Units and 12 Otherwise Proaquatic habitat, and 272 Other Protected Artected Areas.29 The CBRS system covers 65,070 eas covering approximately 1.8 million acres of acres, consisting of 58,390 Associated Aquatic land and aquatic habitat, and to have saved Habitat Acres, 6,680 Upland acres, and 44 miles the federal government over $1 billion from of shoreline.30 CBRS units stretch along the At1982 to 2010.27 Congress may add or remove lantic Coast and Delaware Bay. These protectplaces from CBRS with three exceptions: (1) voluntary additions to the CBRS by property ownChapter 5| Assessment of New Jersey’s Coastal Management Policies
ed areas complement other protected lands in New Jersey, including Long Beach Island State Park, the Pinelands, and a number of Coastal Blue Acres sites.
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
Created as part of the Housing and Urban Development Act, the National Flood Insurance Act was established in 1968 in order to supply flood insurance to people living in floodprone areas.31 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provides these residents and 25
CAFRA Zone map
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
Coastal Zone Management in New Jersey Land use and building in coastal zone communities in New Jersey are regulated by a myriad of state laws and regulations. The enforcement of these laws is heavily decentralized, making for an overall coastal policy which is not as effective as it could be at protecting homeowners from damage. Coastal management in New Jersey is regulated by the State Department of Environmental Protection’s Coastal Management Program. The program manages coastal areas in 8 counties and 126 municipalities.43 Three laws regulate the NJ coastal area: the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA), the Waterfront Development Law, and the Wetlands Act of 1970.44
Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA)
In 1973, the state legislature passed the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA), which sets and enforces regulations for coastal
development (new construction or reconstruction) and designates areas of environmental interest for protection.45 The program has jurisdiction to regulate development within a designated CAFRA area. The Coastal Zone Management Rules set broad standards for coastal development and the use of resources within this area. Permits for proposed development are issued according to their compliance to these standards.46 The CAFRA area is divided into separate zones and regulates different types of development within each zone. Under CAFRA, the Department of Environmental Protection regulates residential, commercial, public, and industrial development, but only over certain unit thresholds in certain distances from the Mean High Water Line (MHWL).47 For example, within 150 ft of the MHWL, CAFRA has jurisdiction to issue permits to residential structures of 3 or more units, and commercial structures of 5 or more parking spaces. Additionally, these thresholds imply that not all development is regulated by CAFRA. Generally, only large development is regulated in the CAFRA area.
Certain development is not regulated,
Chapter 5| Assessment of New Jersey’s Coastal Management Policies
including elementary and secondary educational facilities, construction of residential patios or decks that do not result in grading, excavation, or filling of a beach or dune.30
The Waterfront Development Law The Waterfront Development Law authorizes the Department of Environmental Protection to regulate the construction of public infrastructure, including docks, wharves, piers, bulkheads, bridges, pipelines, cables or other similar development on or adjacent to tidal waterways throughout the state.48
Wetlands Act of 1970 Under the Wetlands Act, the Department has the authority to regulate activity which may affect delineated wetlands, including excavation, dredging, filling, or placement of a structure on a mapped coastal wetland.49 The Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act provides standards for activities that may impact freshwater wetlands, transition areas surrounding wetlands and open waters.50 Also, 27
Stormwater Management Rules implement Federal NPDES Phase II Stormwater Permit rules to regulate stormwater.51
Right-to-Rebuild Additionally, the CAFRA law includes a legal provision that upholds the Right-to-Rebuild doctrine, stating that any damaged development within the CAFRA area is not subject to permit approval, provided the new construction occupies the same footprint as the original structure.52
Public Trust Doctrine An additional relevant statute is the Public Trust Doctrine, which is a long standing legal tradition of ruling against actions which deprive the public of access to certain resources.53 In New Jersey, the Coastal Management Program preserves public access to coastal resources, especially beaches.54
State Coastal Zone Management Case Studies Case studies of coastal zone management in other states were examined to provide meaningful coastal development along the Jersey Shore. Using these case studies, specific policy and infrastructure recommendations will be made to promote more resilient development along the Jersey Shore.
Florida
Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection administers the Coastal Management Program, a multi-agency network that implements 24 statutes that “protect and enhance the state’s natural, cultural, and economic coastal resources.”57 These 24 statutes include minimum setbacks from the coast and management of inlets and other coastal infrastructure.58 Florida has a number of environmental policies that affect coastal development.
Home Rule: Zoning Districts Any private development that is not situated on a wetland and is below the unit and parking thresholds of the CAFRA zone are not regulated by the state coastal program.55 This type of development, of which this studio’s study area is mostly comprised of, largely includes small residential development, which are subject only to local regulations.56 This implies that there is significant development on the New Jersey Coast which does not comply with the state’s interest in preserving coastal resources or preserving public safety from flooding and erosion.
28
ward of the coastal construction control line (CCCL).60 Emergency armoring and beach maintenance is allowed as long as: the beach and dune system are protected, siting and design criteria for the protective structure, impacts on adjacent properties are considered, public beach access is preserved, and the native coastal vegetation and protected species are not harmed.61 Like New Jersey’s 1973 Coastal Facilities and Areas Act (CAFRA), this law sets
Cape Hatteras/ Salon.com
The Florida Department of Natural Resources established the Coastal Construction Control Line (CCCL) in 1974 to limit buildings’ proximity to the ocean, with exceptions for elevated dune walkways.59 The Florida DEP provides guidelines for “emergency temporary coastal armoring sea-
North Carolina barrier island/ Outerbanks.org
design standards for vulnerable properties.62 Florida’s policies need to be updated and strengthened to address coastal development pressure, environmental issues, and to withstand pressure from developers and government subsidies.63 More recent bills address environmental management issues. A 2006 bill regulates the placement management issues, such as the placement of large sandbags to prevent adverse beach and wildlife impacts.64 The 2008 Inlet Management Bill attempts to restore the natural movement of sand and water by implementing inlet management plans, which address erosion and shoreline maintenance problems exacerbated by hard and soft infrastructure.65 The Florida Forever land conservation program prioritizes barrier island habitat pro-
Chapter 5|Assessment of Current Coastal Management Policies
tection and land acquisition. Inland conservation, such as the purchase of large agricultural tracts and water conservation may help improve coastal environments by reducing pollution load and the volume of water entering ecosystems. The Beach and Shore Preservation Act prohibits hard infrastructure and related structures to be built within 50 feet of the mean high water line.66 This encourages communities to consider alternatives to hard infrastructure, such as coastal retreat, and allows communities with stronger regulations to enforce those without conflicting state or regional governance. A 1999 bill amended Florida’s hard infrastructure armoring policy to allow more coastal armoring, even on undeveloped private coastal property.67
Thousand Acre Marsh/ US Department of Transportation
Delaware Delaware’s Coastal Management Program was approved by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in 1979 and is managed by many different agencies, with the Division of Soil and Water Conservation, Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC) as the lead agency.68 Delaware’s Coastal Management Program has many goals and functions, including conducting research projects and education
Savannah, Georgia/ Pinterest
programs regarding coastal resource management, managing the Coastal Zone Federal Consistency Certification program, managing guidance to state and local governments for land use management, and organizing other special area planning.69 Delaware’s Coastal Management Program addresses problems relating to special zoning issues, with its main purpose being to “preserve, protect, develop and where possible restore and enhance resources of Delaware’s coastal zone.70 The entire state of Delaware is designated as a coastal zone, and is divided into two levels: the “coastal strip” and the rest of the state.71 Special zoning applies to the coastal strip, which protects it from industrial development. The Delaware National Estuarine Research Reserve is part of the state coastal management program. The Reserve, comprising 4,930 acres of protected land, manages education and outreach programs for the public, nonprofit organizations, school groups, and coastal management leaders.72
Chapter 5| Assessment of Current Coastal Management Policies
The Coastal and Estuarine Land Conservation Program (CELCP) was formed in 2002 to protect environmentally significant coastal and estuarine areas.73 Delaware’s Coastal and Estuarine Land Conservation Program provides grants to local governments to acquire conservation easements in coastal zones.74 The program therefore provides environmental protection for coastal areas by providing funding options to buy and conserve these lands.
Georgia
Georgia’s Coastal Management Program was based on existing state laws approved by NOAA in 1998.75 The Program formulated a system with state agencies in order to manage coastal resources. The borders of Georgia’s coastal zone are designated by six of the state’s coastal counties and five “inland tier” counties.76 Georgia’s Coastal Management Program has developed a new approach to smart growth planning: the Green Growth Guidelines. Georgia’s Green Growth Guidelines include strategies aiding sensitive land planning to protect environmentally significant areas.77 The 29
main goal of the Green Growth Guidelines is to show how low impact development (LID) approaches can affect the environment in positive ways, while also contributing to positive social and economic outcomes.78 The Guidelines also introduce alternative engineering that prevents erosion and improves the outcomes of storm water damage solutions.79 These policies are superior to traditional strategies because they provide environmental, social, and economic advantages to smart growth. The Georgia Coastal Management Program funded a project that wrote model ordinances about green development regulations for local governments and various state environmental agencies.80 These model ordinances include regulations created for the Coastal and Statewide Nonpoint Source and Georgia Coastal Management Program.81
Development on Sanibel Island/ Kootation.com
30
Louisiana and Mississippi’s Buy-out Programs The structural, economic, and social devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina on coastal communities in Louisiana and Mississippi exemplify the importance of political support to rebuild damaged communities. Many rebuilding efforts aimed to reduce the damage that future storms could inflict on such a vulnerable part of the country.82 However, two federal projects designed to fund homeowners’ permanent relocation from severely damaged areas have received much less attention than rebuilding efforts.83
Louisiana After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita hit the Gulf Coast in fall 2005, Louisiana received $9.2 billion in post-disaster assistance from the Department of Urban Development’s Community Development Block Grant Program.84 Some of these funds were used to support a program called “Road Home,” created by the state government to support homeowners who suffered the most devastating losses.85 Eligible homeowners had property that was either destroyed or suffered major damage.86 Major damage consisted of more than $5,200 in damage.87 They were then presented
Hurricane Katrina damage in New Orleans/ NOAA
Chapter 5| Assessment of Current Coastal Management Policies
with three options: 1) to receive financial assistance through the program to rebuild or repair their home in place, 2) to sell their home and purchase another residence within the state, 3) or to relocate out of state and purchase a new home elsewhere.88 As a result, 129,750 applicants received more than $8.9 billion in recovery assistance, but 92% of these applicants elected to rebuild.89 Relocation rates were highest within the most damaged parishes.90 The highest proportion of the total number of applicants who chose to relocate lived in the most damaged communities. The vast majority--93% of these applicants-lived within the five easternmost coastal parishes, which were among the six parishes with
the highest percentages of damaged housing units.91 Despite low participation, this program demonstrates that homeowners who have suffered the most significant property damage prefer relocation assistance programs.92
Mississippi Unlike Louisiana, Mississippi proposed a program which would offer relocation as the sole option after a disaster. In the aftermath of Katrina, Congress requested that the United States Army Corps of Engineers research ways that the federal government could use property acquisition to reduce costal development from flood risks.93 The result was the creation of the Mississippi Coastal Improvement Plan.94
This comprehensive plan covered 75 miles of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, and intended to permanently relocate development away from the coast.95 This plan included a Long-term High Hazard Risk Reduction Plan, which would acquire high-risk properties over a 30 to 40 year period.96 This program was designed to work in two phases. In the first phase, the state would acquire properties that had been “frequently flooded” or were at “a very high probability of future damage due to storm surge.”97 In the second phase, the state would wait for another significant storm event to occur to provide another opportunity to relocate homeowners affected by the future storm.98 This program ultimately failed and was never implemented because the public did not respond favorably to mandated large-scale relocation. In public meetings, homeowners expressed a preference for assistance retrofitting their homes and crafting better evacuation routes to prepare for disasters.99 Despite its failure, the Mississippi case suggests that relocation programs would probably be more successful if state government took a more cooperative approach with homeowners, helping them to assess their options for both rebuilding and relocation, instead of ordering whole communities to move.
Case Study of Municipal Policy Although state coastal management programs provide insight into ways New Jersey can promote more resilient coastal development, one municipality in the United States-the city of Sanibel, Florida--has developed a unique strategy.
Long Beach, Mississippi/ Picsweb.com
Chapter 5|Assessment of Current Coastal Management Policies
31
Sanibel Island Plan/ MyWebRollins.edu
Sanibel, Florida Sanibel, a barrier island community near Fort Myers, incorporated and adopted a city code based on environmental performance standards in response to growth pressure and environmental vulnerability.100 The Environmental Performance Standards section of their municipal code is divided into sections about each habitat zone found on the island, which describes the natural system and pertinent regulations.101 This code includes many provisions to protect natural systems and to increase the resilience of the built environment to storms. Sanibel’s environmental performance standards include ordinances to regulate uses within different habitats.102 Sanibel has nine ecozones, including beachfront, interior wetlands, mangroves, and uplands.103 These habitats 32
have unique hydrology, geology, vegetation, and habitat value that now guides development standards.104 Sanibel has adopted ordinances to maintain mangrove forests, which buffer inland areas from storms.105 Mangrove forests are used as a source of firewood and for fish farming, or removed to increase access to the ocean.106 Sanibel’s interior wetlands have been extensively altered by physical changes such as filling, hydraulic manipulations, and introductions of exotic plant species, which alter hydrology and the physical condition of the wetlands.107 Sanibel’s ordinance recommends interior wetlands be conserved so that they are “functionally intact.”108 A 1976 report identifies roads through wetlands as not adequately regulated and that enhanced recreational facili-
ties such as light-duty elevated structures could be acceptable.109 Building regulations include setbacks, design standards, and height restrictions that aim to maintain lot coverage ranges between 0 and 35%.110 Like the Jersey Shore, Sanibel is at risk of hurricane damage. Sanibel was damaged substantially during Hurricane Donna in 1960 and by Hurricane Charley in 2004.111 During the 1970s, Sanibel adopted strict building codes that limited the height, density, and number of building permits issued, and invested in critical infrastructure and emergency preparation.112 The main evacuation route – a causeway linking Sanibel with the mainland—often flooded during the early stages of a hurricane and was a recurring problem for public safety.113 Another problem that exacerbated storm damage was the presence of many non-native Australian pines, which fell over easily during storms and damaged infrastructure.114 Like with Sandy, many government facilities were damaged during storms, and the government temporarily used a hotel until utilities and other infrastructure were restored.115 Sanibel’s reforms have also addressed the process of planning by incorporating citizen guidance on and employing the consensus method to decide upon policy.116 Sanibel’s natural system-based code, and other changes were opposed by building companies.117 Recent challenges include trying to devise a master plan for the city and revitalizing the downtown commercial corridor.118 The American Planning Association awarded Sanibel the 2007 National Planning Landmark Award for their municipal plan.119
Chapter 5|Assessment of Current Coastal Management Policies
Protect
Mitigation Strategies The field of hazard
mitigation planning widely acknowledges three approaches to hazard mitigation: retreat, adapt, and protect. Retreat involves the abandonment of structures and infrastructure, and restoration or benign neglect to return the land to a natural state. The retreat strategy presumes the area is extremely vulnerable to future severe storm events and/or has few resources to maintain buildings and infrastructure, making retreat a viable option. Adaptation entails structure elevation, the migration of critical support systems to upper, flood-proofed floors of buildings, and other, generally site-specific, strategies to create a transparency to flow regimes. This strategy is most suitable in areas with lower vulnerability, little post-disaster damage, and longterm interest in maintaining current population and slower growth rates. Protection strategies require the armoring of shoreline with soft or hard infrastructure that diverts storm surge and floodwaters, negating the need to implement site-specific adaptation strategies. Protection tends to be most appropriate in areas that have seen considerable investment in infrastructure, large population densities, or historically, economically, or socially significant assets. 34
Adapt
This studio suggests using the retreatadapt-protect framework to guide investment and development priorities on the New Jersey Shore. By characterizing areas of the Shore for retreat, adaptation, or wholesale protection, New Jersey can more effectively target infrastructure funding, reduce flood losses over time, and fulfill development goals set out in the New Jersey State Plan. While we do not presume to delineate these areas, we suggest the following criteria to guide the designation of each strategy area:
Retreat Residents of the Shore have made significant social and economic investments in their homes and communities, and have contributed to the culture now associated with the Shore. This historic preference for coastal amenities has, however, endangered residents and demanded increased maintenance, repair, and replacement of property as sea levels rise and storms become more frequent and severe. Given this reality, some areas are appropriate for a phased retreat in which property is acquired and converted into parkland and other green infrastructure. This strategy effectively manages risk by removing residents from
Retreat Protect-Adapt-Retreat Conceptualization
Mitigation Strategies Retreat Reduce flood losses by converting high-risk areas to parks and green infrastructure. ◦◦ High-risk, environmentally sensitive areas; ◦◦ Historic depopulation trends; and/or ◦◦ (Severe) Repetitive Loss properties. Adapt Ensure long-term viability of stable communities by increasing resiliency. ◦◦ Stable population; and ◦◦ Significant NFIP takeup. Protect Identify significant resources to armor against climate change and rising seas. ◦◦ Social, economic, and historic resources; ◦◦ Low-risk, developed areas; and/or ◦◦ Centers with average densities over 1,000 people per square mile.
Chapter 6 | Strategies for Moving Forward
increasingly vulnerable areas and using the land to manage storms and flooding without destroying the character of the Shore. Property acquisition can occur by donation or public purchase. Retreat-appropriate areas are, for a variety of reasons, generally unsuitable for further habitation. These reasons can be categorized as social, economic, and environmental, but are primarily characterized by higher risks in these categories. Retreat areas should target: ◦◦ Places with high risks associated with sea level rise and increased storm severity and intensity; ◦◦ Places with historic depopulation trends, as measured by the US Census Bureau’s decennial census; ◦◦ Repetitive and Severe Repetitive Loss properties identified by FEMA; ◦◦ Areas severely damaged and largely abandoned or otherwise unlikely to rebuild after major storm events; ◦◦ Places characterized as Environmentally Sensitive in the New Jersey State Plan. Places that meet one or more of these criteria should be considered in the designation of Retreat Areas. Such places may have a weaker social fabric and support structure, are demonstrably vulnerable to current conditions, or may become increasingly vulnerable in the future. Additionally, some of these places may have lower property values due to neighborhood abandonment or inability to maintain or repair structures. These are also areas targeted in the New Jersey State Plan as priorities for environmental protection, indicating a public interest in acquiring and managing such places as public open space.
Chapter 6 | Strategies for Moving Forward
Adapt While few areas are unfit for long-term habitation, many more communities are at low to moderate risk for sea level rise and increasingly severe storms, and have stable populations with densities too low to merit large-scale public investment in protective infrastructure. These places play a vital role in the Shore’s tourism economy and, with moderate investment on an individual basis, are places where adapting to changing conditions is far more appropriate than a retreat or fortification strategy. Such adaptation techniques include the elevation of houses or the use of flood-resistant materials, migration of critical support systems to higher floors, or installing barriers to water entry. Projects can be funded by individual homeowners, the use of NFIP compensation, or at the block or neighborhood level through grants. Adaptation Areas are expected to support communities through 2050 with minimum investment in large-scale infrastructure, instead relying on residents to storm-proof their homes and businesses. Adaptation Areas are: ◦◦ Places with low to moderate risk associated with sea level rise and increasing storm frequency and severity; ◦◦ Places with long-term population stability, as measured by the US Census Bureau; ◦◦ Small or low-density areas where public investment in protective infrastructure is not feasible; and/or ◦◦ Significant NFIP take-up. Places meeting one or more of these criteria or not meeting Retreat or Protect criteria should be designated as Adaptation Areas. Protect The designation of Protection Areas is bound to be politically and socially unpalatable, but economic realities demand a sensible approach
to long-term infrastructure investment. Places identified as Retreat Areas areat great risk as storm severity increases and sea levels rise. And yet, the Shore is composed of a wide variety of places, not all of which can be abandoned in the face of impending change. Instead, Protection Areas should be designated to help public officials target the limited infrastructure funding available to high-priority places. These places should include: ◦◦ Areas of significant historic, cultural, or social importance in the Shore economy; ◦◦ Areas of low to moderate risk associated with sea level rise and increasing storm intensity and severity AND already significantly developed; ◦◦ New Jersey State Plan-defined Centers with average population densities in excess of 1,000 people per square mile; and ◦◦ Areas targeted for future development or redevelopment that can both support this development and maintain safe evacuation procedures. Areas that satisfy the above criteria are the places where each infrastructure dollar will be spent most efficiently. Higher population densities, lower risks, and their cultural importance demands greater investment in protective infrastructure. These are also most likely to have the capacity to maintain infrastructure in the long-term. They will concentrate displaced people from Retreat Areas, maintaining the social fabric of the Shore and encouraging residents to participate in Shore life. By concentrating development into smaller, denser areas, municipalities can more effectively protect residents with targeted infrastructure investment. This strategy effectively manages risk by removing residents from increasingly vulnerable areas and using the land to manage storms and flooding without destroying the character of the Shore. Property acquisition can occur by donation or public purchase. 35
Development Regulation
The goals of the three Zones above coalesce into protecting the public health, safety, and welfare; given the uncertain future for climate change, sea level rise, and increasing storm frequency and intensity, these goals are challenging to achieve while also maintaining residency on the Shore when it is both reasonably safe and economically feasible. To do so requires new development regulations addressing reconstruction and further development: Reconstruction of storm-destroyed properties in Retreat Zones should be strictly prohibited. Residents will be offered just compensation for property loss in the form of a Transfer of Development Rights (discussed below) option or relocation assistance to a Protection Zone. This prevents expensive repetitive flood losses, while seeking to maintain the social fabric of Shore communities. Repair of properties with minor to moderate damage is permitted, but expansion of said properties is prohibited. Protection Zones should receive priority consideration for all large-scale infrastructure projects and available funding (not including maintenance of existing infrastructure). This is intended to provide infrastructure investment commensurate with population densities, while discouraging increased development outside of Protection Zones. Property owners wishing to retain use of their properties may request a Conditional Use permit for interim uses. These uses are specifically seasonal and temporary and may include but are not limited to resorts, amusement parks, restaurants and cafes, and entertainment plazas. These uses are permitted under conditional approval from the CAFRA Development Review Commission.
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Development outside of Retreat and Protection Zones must be restricted based on aforementioned carrying capacity and build-out analyses. Municipalities are responsible for these analyses and establishing growth rates and permit caps commensurate with these findings and policies laid out in the New Jersey State Plan. Developers subdividing and building in low- to moderate-vulnerability areas are required to provide Environmental and Social Impact Statements, including an assessment of evacuation route capacity. Municipalities are required to submit to the CAFRA Development Review Commission annual reports to assess cumulative impacts of development along the Shore.
Funding Mechanism After designating the Zones described above, property owners and residents will be expected to comply with new regulations. An unfunded mandate is politically undesirable, burdens residents with property loss or expensive retrofits, and opens public entities to legal action. However, public funding for implementing new regulations is limited, and providing grants and aid might overstrain government budgets. Instead, this studio proposes the use of a regional Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) program that manages flood losses according to the three Zones while sharing the burden of compliance or compensation between public and private sectors.
property. The right to use includes not only the exploitation of resources on the property, but also the right to build, or develop. A Transfer of Development Rights program recognizes that this right to develop is severable from the bundle of rights associated with real property, can be commodified and sold on the market, and can be attached to a different piece of real property. A TDR program requires the designation of sending areas, which are places the government wants to protect from development, and receiving areas, which are places that can support additional development. Transferring rights away from sending areas protects that land from development in perpetuity, and allows greater density in receiving areas. TDR programs have been used very successfully in King County, Washington and the Pinelands of New Jersey to protect open space resources and intensify existing development to support walkable, livable neighborhoods connected with mass transit.
General Description of TDR Programs
Real property (land) owned in fee simple (absolute title) comes with a bundle of property rights, such as the right to exclude non-owners from the property, the right to sell or transfer the property, and the right to use the
Land protected using TDRs/ Washington Department of Commerce
Chapter 6| Strategies for Moving Forward
Property Protection Strategy Municipalities must work with the CAFRA Development Review Commission to identify protection priorities for TDR acquisition. These might include properties identified in FEMA’s Severe Repetitive Loss or Repetitive Loss programs, those in the most vulnerable areas identified in the risk assessment, or those connecting other protected properties to avoid fragmentation. This strategy must be updated annually in response to public and private TDR acquisition.
Cumulative Impact Reporting
Lessons Learned These case studies demonstrate how certain legal instruments and planning tools can help lessen the financial and social costs of future storms, and help communities react favorably in the aftermath of such events. These case studies suggest that: • Strong state and county planning authority is needed to ensure a resilient pattern of development along the coast • State and county policy plans, comprehensive plans, and model ordinances
can help individual municipalities better prepare their communities for natural disasters • Voluntary relocation and property acquisition programs will be the most successful in significantly damaged areas
Policy Recommendations New Jersey could benefit from the adoption of new state policies and planning tools to make coastal planning along the shore more effective.
Municipalities are required to update the CAFRA Development Review Commission on permitted developments for analysis of cumulative impacts. This analysis can inform the permit caps established as a result of the carrying capacity analysis.
New Jersey Capitol/Ammoland
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Chapter 6|Strategies for Moving Forward
New Authority The most significant weakness of coastal planning in New Jersey is that local municipalities are ultimately in control of protecting their communities from damage through zoning and land use. In order to achieve greater consistency among each community, certain features of New Jersey’s coastal program need to change: • The CAFRA permitting unit and parking space thresholds should be overturned; The NJ Department of Environmental Protection should have the authority to review permits for all development within the CAFRA zone. • The Right-to-Rebuild doctrine should be overturned. As sea-level rises due to climate change, more areas along the coast may over time see increased incidence of flooding and stronger storm surges. These areas will become increasingly unfit for development. • Require local land use policies to comply with state coastal goals.
Policy Plan for Land Use and Protective Structures With stronger authority to regulate coastal land use, state and county government will benefit from crafting a plan document to outline specific goals and objectives. Municipalities can use this policy plan to modify local regulations to conform to a coastal-wide vision for resilient development. The document should include: • Model zoning codes, ordinances, and subdivision regulations. The plan would recommend the use of overlay zones (no build zones or reduced density zones in the areas the most vulnerable Chapter 6|Strategies for Moving Forward
to storm surge and flooding), impervious surface coverage limitations, setbacks, and building code regulations for floodproofing and structure elevation. The plan would provide examples of how to integrate these tools into local regulations. • Recommendations for protective physical structures. The list will include the benefits and drawbacks of each of the following physical interventions, encouraging each community to implement whichever structure is most appropriate for their community. The plan would include details about constructed inlets for barrier islands, seawalls, sea gates, dunes and wetlands, and resilient infrastructure.
addition to granting funds to rebuild damaged communities, FEMA also sponsors a Hazard Mitigation Assistance program for property acquisition, in which the state government negotiates with the agency on how much in federal money is needed to buy-out damaged properties which are unfit to be rebuilt on. These policy recommendations will help New Jersey create a more sustainable pattern of development along the shore. These recommendations would help state and county government create a comprehensive plan to protect the residents of the shore, while also preserving each township’s ability to implement the coastal land use planning tools that are most appropriate for each of the unique communities along the coast.
Buyouts for Relocation and Redevelopment A successful coastal planning program would be incomplete without policies and procedures for post-disaster recovery. New Jersey’s Coastal Planning Program should include a relocation and redevelopment policy to gradually move development away from the coast as part of a climate change adaptation strategy to accommodate sea-level rise. The Coastal Policy Post-Disaster Development plan should be implemented before a disaster to identify which communities are most vulnerable to storm surge and flooding, and begin working with targeted communities to purchase development rights through outright acquisition or easements to remove development and build protective structures in their place. In the aftermath of a disaster, New Jersey can negotiate with FEMA to appropriate federal funds to fund this post-disaster plan. In
Sample Ordinance Goals: 1. Reduce runoff 2. Protect the water supply 3. Regulate land uses and engineering to be consistent with environmental capacity. 4. Assist in the implementation of pertinent state laws 5. Conserve the natural features important to land and water resources 6. Work with floodplain, steep slope, and other ordinances that regulate environmentally sensitive areas 7. Conserve natural, scenic, and recreation areas for community’s benefit
Abridged sample Ordinance/ ANJEC Smart Growth Ordinance Guide
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Protect Long Beach Township
Mantoloking
Atlantic City
Seaside Heights
The Wildwoods
Point Pleasant
Chapter 7|Case Studies
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Long Beach Township
Sarah Richards
Chapter 7|Case Studies
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Houses along the back-bay in Long Beach Township are generally built on a fill that has been reinforced.
A NOAA image of Sandy damage to Long Beach Township, recorded on November 1, 2012./ NOAA
Long Beach Township scored a 5, which is the highest level of vulnerability to natural hazards. To demonstrate an adaptation strategy for Long Beach Island, an approximately onemile stretch was chosen, encompassing the municipal center and a large parcel containing a grocery store with parking and an adjacent mostly-vacant lot, which would be targeted for redevelopment, for illustrative purposes. Based
Background & Demographics
Long Beach Township is located on Long Beach Island, a barrier island off of the coast of New Jersey. According to the 2011 American Community Survey, Long Beach Township has 3,101 full-time residents. This population is aging, with a median age of 60.8 years. The township is mostly White (98%), with the other races (Black, Asian, Hispanic, and others) accounting for only 2% of the population.1 Like many other communities on Long Beach Island, most of the homes in the township are vacation homes. Only 1,480 of the 8,263 housing units in Long Beach are occupied full-time, according to the ACS.2 On the Environmental Vulnerability index, 48
The existing dune system in Long Beach township is uneven, providing inadequate protection from storm surge.
A map of the proposed adaptation strategy for the selected site, showing FEMA zones.
on the research that was done by the studio on numerous adaptation strategies and interventions, as well as the geographic, demographic, and environmental features of Long Beach Township, this proposal calls for a set of strategies that would provide maximum protection of the township from damage by future storms like Sandy or with an even higher intensity. Like most of the communities on Long Beach Island, Long Beach Township sustained serious flood damage during Sandy.3 Seawater overtopped the low dunes that run along the beach on the eastern side of the island, and water from the back-bay overflowed into roads, homes, and businesses on the western side. The storm surge high-water mark, close to the center of the island, measured at 7.72 Chapter 7 | Case Studies
Photograph of selected site and existing conditions.
Redeveloping an Underutilized Site In order to prevent as many permanent and seasonal residents as possible from being displaced by the buyout for the proposed inlet, the proposed adaptation strategy includes a redevelopment of the current Acme grocery store parcel and adjacent vacant lot at 97th Street and Long Beach Blvd into a mediumdensity mixed-use development. The redevelopment would include approximately 200 new apartments/condominiums, an updated grocery store, and about 50,000 square feet of small community-serving retail space. Parking would be available on the roof of the new grocery store, in an adjacent lot, and in a garage for residents and customers. This would support economic development for the community, attract new residents and investment, and serve as a community anchor.
in Long Beach Township to comply with FEMA’s new regulations, the baseline case that this proposal attempts to improve upon, would be about $413 million dollars. Elevating the homes in the selected site would cost about $87 million, or $50,000 per resident. In terms of the proposed adaptation strategy, building a completely new dune system along the approximately 9,270 feet of coastline in the site area would cost approximately $23,175,000, or $13,327 per resident. The up-front costs for the proposed inlet are high: the cost of dredging alone in estimated somewhere in the neighborhood of $6.5 million dollars. However, adding an inlet in Long Beach Township would have regional impact on flooding, and thus benefits multiple townships/municipality. The cost of buying out the 290 homes (based on market-rate mean home value from the 2011 ACS) where an inlet is proposed would be approximately $245 million dollars. In terms of the proposed seawall, the cost for the 13,866 feet of seawall within the boundaries of the site would be $138,660,000, or $79,735 per resident.
Massing and heights for proposed site redevelopment.
level of protection over the base-case scenario. However, a combination of adaptation strategies would achieve maximum protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the township and the region against the threat of storms and sea level rise exacerbated by climate change.
These strategies could be implemented separately, which would still provide some additional
Cost Estimates
The cost of elevating all of the homes
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Site plan for proposed redevelopment.
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Mantoloking
Daniel Bowen
Chapter 7|Case Studies
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Atlantic City Mantoloking
Corey Eilhardt
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Chapter 7|Case Studies
Seaside Heights Mantoloking
Alex Hosford
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The Wildwoods Mantoloking
Krista Guerrieri
Chapter 7|Case Studies
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The Wildwood beach at Cresse Avenue/ New Jersey Beach Profile Network, Cape May County
Background Several municipalities on Five Mile Island are known as “The Wildwoods” have been destinations for Philadelphia-area visitors for over a century. Five Mile Island is a barrier island a few miles north of Cape May. It is bounded by Wildwood Crest on the south, the Atlantic Ocean to the East, North Wildwood, and West Wildwood. These municipalities are known as “The Wildwoods,” and they have been a magnet for Philadelphia-area vacationers for over a century.
The total year-round population for the four Wildwood municipalities is 13,231 people, of which the vast majority is white.2 Wildwood proper is more diverse, with a population that is 16.5% African American.3 Also, Wildwood has a significant percentage of people of Hispanic ethnicity (21.8% of the population, as opposed to less 3.8% in Wildwood Crest and less than 1% in the remaining municipalities).4 Except in the city of Wildwood, the percentage of people over 65 is over twice as high as the nationwide figure of 12.9%.5 With 36.4% of its population over 65, West Wildwood has the highest percentage of the four municipalities.6 Our Community Vulnerability index ranked Wildwood and West Wildwood as 5 (most vulnerable) and North Wildwood and Wildwood Crest as 4, which indicates that there is a significant need to ensure the welfare of their inhabitants, especially in the case of a natural disaster. Sandy caused extensive flooding in the Wildwoods, but no major property loss due to the sudden shift in the storm’s path before it made landfall.7 Sandy had a relatively low impact along New Jersey’s southern shore. Most of the damage that occurred was due to the high winds that accompanied the storm. The Wildwoods’ beaches act as a natural barrier to
Most early visitors arrived by boat; however, by the turn of the 20th century, railroad and ferry service also provided passage to the island. Most initial resort development occurred between 1881 and 1910, when a group of entrepreneurial Philadelphia businessmen bought up much of the land on the island and divided it into lots, which they then sold. Five Mile Island’s famed beaches, amusement piers, and unique doo-wop culture cemented the Wildwoods as a destination in the 20th century, and they continue to draw scads of visitors.1 Aerial photograph of Wildwood/ NJ DEP
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The Sea Serpent roller coaster at Morey’s Piers/ Flickr user John Donges
Chapter 7 | Case Studies
Point Pleasant Mantoloking
Sa Min Han
Chapter 7|Case Studies
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Background Point Pleasant is located between the Manasquan River and the Metedeconk River in Ocean County. The area is characterized by four lakes located between these two rivers. This area is composed of permanent residences and commercial buildings, most of which serve summer tourists. According to the 2010 Geography-Census Tract, 4,665 people are living in this community, with a median age of 45.7 years. Over 60% of households among the total 1,985 households are composed of 1-2 persons. Owner-occupied housing units are 64.5% of the occupied housing units, and only 21.7% are used as vacation houses. The region has had a stable population over the past 20 years.
Existing Landuse Map - Most area of Point Pleasant is composed of permanent residences and commercial buildings which are located along the waterfront area. There are a single railroad and a highway across the Manasquan River.
Point Pleasant
Aerial view of Point Pleasant/ Google Earth)
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The commercial and residential areas of Point Pleasant are at risk for natural hazards because they sit at a lower elevation than the beach side. Point Pleasant is vulnerable not only to storm surge, as seen during Sandy, but also to back-bay flooding. The north parts are 2~3 in our environmental vulnerability index, and need the adaptation techniques. A railroad and a highway connect the communities on either side of the Manasquan River.
This proposal demonstrates an adaptation strategy for Point Pleasant that focuses on the north part extending 0.74 miles from the Manasquan River Inlet. This area has a river inlet, lakes, and a population representative of Point Pleasant. Based on studio research, various adaptation strategies and interventions were proposed.
Zoning of the Target Area After Sandy, FEMA revised their flood maps for to include the flooding caused by the storm. In Point Pleasant, FEMA recommends Chapter 7 | Case Studies
elevating structures along the Shore by 4 ft and elevating structures inland by 11 ft buildings. As a studio, we used 2ft of sea level rise simulation to represent the worst-case scenario of global climate changes in 2050. Based on the FEMA maps and sea level rise scenario, the north part of Point Pleasant could be divided four zones according to the degree of risk. The highest risk area, marked in pink on the map, is less than 2 feet in elevation and is also in the FEMA V zone, which is the most risky area for flooding from future storms. The four zones have different risks of exposure to natural hazards. In terms of community safety, sustainability, and cost efficiency, this proposal identifies different strategies for each zone.
FEMA Flood Zone
Sea level rise simulation (2ft)
Zoning
Zoning Process - Using revised FEMA flood map (V,A zone which are represented the most risky area) and sea level rise scenario (2ft elevation sea level rise in 2050 which is the worst scenario), Point Pleasant was divided four zones according to the degree of risk.
Pink Zone - The area shown in pink on the map is the most vulnerable to storm damage. This proposal suggests that the existing commercial district should be relocated further inland. The area can be used as an ecological park for the education and also an open flood plain, free from development. Green Zone - Rather than redeveloping the entire region of Point Pleasant, reactivating the green area on the map can be the effective way. This district can be multi-functional, with a reorganized commercial district and protective infrastructure to prevent storm-related damage. Yellow Zone - The yellow zones on the map can be protected from storm damage by the green and pink zones; however, some mitigation techniques can be added for additional protection. Some additional regulation can be announced to the public. In order to protect this area, this proposal would entail reinforcing the existing dune system, adding sea gates in front of the Manasquan River inlet and Lake Louise, and building a sea wall along the shoreline. Chapter 7|Case Studies
The four zones - These zones have different risks of exposure to natural hazards. Different strategies according to the different zones should be proposed in terms of community safety, sustainability, and cost efficiency.
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Proposed Strategy Reinforcement of Existing Dune System Point Pleasant has a relatively wide beach (300~600ft), but has areas with either no dune at all, or a smaller, poorly vegetated dune system. Tidal surge and waves could easily cross inland from the ocean during storms. Storm surge washed over the entire beach and dune system along this segment during Sandy. Inflow of sand into the residential blocks caused much of the building damage in this region. Therefore, this proposal calls for the existing dune to be reconstructed on a larger scale to provide adequate protection. (source: Beach-Dune Perfor-
State Park Plan
mance Assessment of New Jersey Beach Profile Network (NJBPN), 2012.11.)
Constructed dunes should be of the same height, slope, width, and shape as the natural dunes in the area. There is no ideal standard for the dune dimension; thus, the dune size should be carefully determined by site conditions.
Existing Dune System - Point Pleasant has areas with either no dune at all, or a smaller, poorly vegetated dune system.
-tions. The Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) notes that the ideal dune width would be 300 feet wide and divided into three distinct sections. Based on this information, the adaptation strategy proposes a flat-topped dune on the inland side of the beach, 100 feet wide at its base and narrowing to 25 feet wide at the top. For the dune height, the studio decided various dimensions according to the site conditions. The northern part of Point Pleasant should have 17 ft height dune system. (FEMA recommended structure elevation 14 ft + Sea level rise scenario 2 ft + Extra protection 1 ft) The remainder would be flat berm and beach. All dunes can be combined with vegetation and a constructed walkway over them to better protect their shape. Proposed Dune System - Based on the Daily News articles , multi dune system (100 feet wide at its base and narrowing to 25 feet wide at the top, 17 ft high) with vegetation and a constructed walkway over them is proposed.
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Chapter 7 | Case Studies
State Park Plan
State Park Plan
Proposed Infrastructures - Combination of soft infrastructures such as flood plain and dunes and hard infrastructures such as seawall and sea gates could protect the entire area.
Construction of Sea Gate The second proposed protection strategy is the construction of sea gates. In FEMA map, the area located along Manasquan River is V zone, meaning that the current river edge has not been adequate for protection during storm and flood season. Thus, this specific area needs more protection against the natural hazards. A type of gate called a “rising sector gate” on the Manasquan River inlet could mitigate the damage during the flood, and also help improve the traffic conditions between to Point Pleasant and Wall Township. In order to mitigate flood damage in the lower residential area, a “tilting gate” is recommended on the Inlet of Lake Louise. A tiltinIg gate is cost effective, and normally the gate structure is hinged under the water, allowing boats to pass through. Chapter 7|Case Studies
Building Typologies combined with Seawall
Types of Sea Gates
Because the inland area is at a lower elevation than the waterfront, shoreline reinforcement should be considered. Based on analysis of the different zones, relocating the existing waterfront commercial district to the further inland should be considered. The flood plain could be extended and used as an ecological park during normal days, but it can absorb storm water during flood season. Proposed building typologies include the ground level parking space to serve the separate commercial building. The cost is lower than underground parking lots or separated parking garages. Moreover, the parking structures have a sustainable seawall functions. The infrastructure combined with commercial use can save the construction fee and manage81
ment cost. Public investment can support this development by providing the part of construction costs, or tax benefits in terms of increasing the public safety. The section shows the proposed changes. Parking lots are located on the ground level of each commercial building. Gently sloped outdoor place over the parking lots can be used outdoor café and gathering places for the community. Commercial spaces of 1-2 stories have a great view of combination of park and river. This concentration of investment makes Point Pleasant region sustainable and vital.
Cost Estimates In terms of the proposed adaptation strategy, reinforcing the new dune system along Point Pleasant beach would cost $8,500,000 (4,250 feet, $2,000/ft for a double dune system from the recent dune construction project by US army Corps of Engineers). Proposed dune system is mainly about reshaping rather than buying new sand, thus the cost can be reduced. Construction of sea gates would cost $6,800,000.
Commercial District Plan - New types of building structures makes special place with the locality and safety.
The cost estimates for redeveloping the commercial district are more complex. Cost can be divided to developing companies, building owners, and public investment. Total buy-out cost of the existing commercial district would take about $10,000,000 according to the current property value, and also redesigning the wetland would take $3,000,000. The total cost of the proposed strategies would be total $24 million and $12,300 per household which combines three methodologies. To comply with FEMA’s new regulations, the cost of elevating all housing units would be about $100 million (1,985 units, $50,000/units). In addition to this mitigation cost, the entire area should spend the additional money to build the protection infrastructure of sea level rise and flood. The cost of re-
Commercial District Section - Parking lots are located on the ground level. Gently sloped outdoor place over the parking lots can be used outdoor café and gathering places.
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Perspective of Commercial District - Special building typologies could provide the special moments and memories by proving the special landscape views.
constructing the entire residential units is about 4.2 times the cost of the proposed strategies. Moreover, the proposed strategies have the important meaning for enhancement of living condition, improving the environmental sustainability, and reactivating the local economy beyond the construction costs. These adaptation strategies would enhance the existing natural system and protect the area from storms and sea level rise exacerbated by climate change in a cost-effective way.The total cost of the proposed strategies would be total $28 million and $14,300 per household which combines three methodologies. Chapter 7|Case Studies
To comply with FEMA’s new regulations, the cost of elevating all housing units would be about $100 million (1,985 units, $50,000/units). In addition to this mitigation cost, the entire area should spend the additional money to build the protection infrastructure of sea level rise. The cost of FEMA regulation is 3.6 times more expensive than the cost of the proposed strategies. Moreover, the proposed strategies have the important meaning for enhancement of living condition, improving the environmental sustainability, and reactivating the local economy beyond the construction cost. Consequently, these proposed natural hazard adaptation strategies for Point Pleasant
would enhance the existing natural system and protection the entire region safely and cost effectively against the threat of storms and sea level rise exacerbated by climate change. Moreover, the proposed strategies have the important meaning for enhancement of living conditions, improving the environmental sustainability, and reactivating the local economy beyond the construction cost. Consequently, these proposed natural hazard adaptation strategies for Point Pleasant would enhance the existing natural system and protection the entire region safely and cost effectively against the threat of storms and sea level rise exacerbated by climate change. 83
Ocean Grove Mantoloking
Lauren A. Trice
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Victorian Architecture/ State of New Jersey
Tents/www.vintage2glam.blogspot.com
Map of Ocean Grove/ Rutgers University
History The Ocean Grove Camp meeting site was established in 1870 as a planned community. The innovative design features graduated setbacks that begin two blocks from the ocean, enabling each home to have an ocean view. This concept is reflected in Asbury Park where, instead of the buildings being set back, the roads are wedge shaped. This planned community was known for its various rules, Chapter 7|Case Studies
including the banning of bathing on Sundays and the prohibition of the sale of alcohol.1 In 1975, Ocean Grove was put on the State and National Register of Historic Places to recognize its many Victorian structures and pioneering community plan. The sense of place, and reliance on heritage for community identity, must be taken into account in a mitigation plan for Ocean Grove. 89
Asbury Park Mantoloking
Tracy Tzen
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Seaside resort, early 1900s /asburyboardwalk.com
Decline in the second half of the 20th century/ cyburbia.com
Background
between the years 1960 and 1970, and 2000
Asbury Park, the northernmost study area, is a city in Monmouth County. Asbury Park has a population of 16,1161 and an area of approximately 1.6 square miles,2 consisting primarily of residential and commercial land uses.3 Most commercial uses are concentrated along the boardwalk in the east, Cookman Avenue in the south, and Memorial Drive, which bisects the city and parallels the rail line. Asbury Park was first developed in the 1870s, as demonstrated by its Victorian houses. Its location along the historic New York and Long Branch Railroad attracted crowds to the oceanfront and downtown shopping areas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, by the second half of the 20th century, the city’s popularity declined. This was largely due to openings of the Garden State Parkway, a shopping mall in Eatontown, and a large theme park in Jackson Township, which changed visitors’ traveling patterns. In addition, offices built outside of the city decreased the number of professionals living and working in Asbury Park.4 The most substantial population decreases in the second half of the 20th century occurred
and 2010, with a population loss of 4.8% in each decade. From 1990 to 2000, the population increased by .8%.5
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The Asbury Park Riots of 1970 are significant historical events and were fueled by the lack of jobs, adequate housing, and recreational programs, the violent riots lasted for seven days.6 This event impacted the economic, political, social, cultural, and physical conditions of Asbury Park for decades to come. The once thriving town became characterized by abandoned buildings and lots.7 Throughout the years, Asbury Park’s culture has centered on music. The City serves as a destination for musicians and their fans, and to this day, is perhaps most closely associated with Bruce Springsteen. As the former Mayor Kevin G. Sanders of Asbury Park described, “Music has been the thread that has kept this city together through the good and bad times.”8 Asbury Park is home to the famous Stone Pony music venue, in addition to large annual music festivals such as Bamboozle. The
Bruce Springsteen at The Stone Pony/ backstreets.com
rich musical history of the City has contributed to its revitalization. The medium household income in Asbury Park is $33,663, and the majority of the residences are permanent, year-round residences. The city has 8,076 housing units, with 3.4% classified as “for seasonal, recreational, or occasional use.” Of the housing units that are occupied year-round, the majority are rental properties (80%) whereas the remaining properties are owner-occupied (20%). The median age of the population is 34, and the two most prevalent races are white (37%) and black or African American (51%).9 The city has recently experienced a growing gay and lesbian population, many of whom are entrepreneurs and shop owners who have contributed to the revitalization of Asbury Park.10 In 2007, developer Madison Marquette began a 10-year waterfront redevelopment project in Asbury Park. The project includes 500,000 square feet of retail and entertainment development and 3,000 residential units on the oceanfront. Madison Marquette also renovated and restored the historic Paramount Theatre, Convention Hall, Grand Arcade, and Chapter 7 | Case Studies
entertainment, similar to Madison Marquette’s original design, and 1,500 residential units. Parking would be available on the vacant lot north of Wesley Lake and east of St. James Place, the southeastern block of Asbury Avenue and Heck Street, and the northwestern block of Third Avenue and Kingsley. The commercial district is zoned at a higher density to encourage walkability, and the portion of First Avenue between Kingsley Street and Ocean Avenue are blocked off to allow for a mini-golf course. The internal walkway running along the north-south axis of the district would include a pedestrian bridge over the mini-golf course. Mural art by artists such as Shepard Fairey,19 who has worked in Asbury Park, would pay homage to the “rock and roll” culture of Asbury Park and enhance the pedestrian experience throughout the district. On the other side of the district, pedestrians can also enjoy a scenic walkway along Ocean Avenue, with views of the ocean. In addition, protected and elevated walkways with viewing platforms (similar to those in Seaside, Florida) would be perpendicular to the north-south pathway, permitting access over the dunes and leading to the beach.
Impacts The most significant costs associated with the proposal are the cost of dune construction and the costs of relocating the existing businesses along the boardwalk and constructing a new commercial district. The estimated construction cost of the double dune system along the Asbury Park shore, which is approximately 5,000 feet long, is $10 million, which excludes the cost of maintenance and replenishment. Additional costs include the cost of the pathways over the dunes leading to the beach, and the cost of mechanical system improvements to the lakes’ pipes and drainage controls. As for the relocation and construction efforts, the cost estimate is approximately $1.8 104
billion, using the cost estimates of the current redevelopment efforts as a baseline ($1.5 billion in 2006 dollars adjusted to 2012 dollars)20 and accounting for additional costs such as the acquisition of land, re-location of businesses, new construction, and new parking. Since the dune system consists of a continuous dune, home buyouts at pre-Sandy market values may also be required in the neighboring communities.
cost, private developers would coordinate the financing, with incentives from the City. Companies such as Madison Marquette and iStar Financial have already demonstrated that the investments are desired and financially feasible. This proposal provides redevelopment alternatives to support long-term resiliency and profitability for both private investors and the City.
The city has received more than $1 million from FEMA for debris cleanup and anticipates spending approximately $12 million on rebuilding. Although the cost of building the new commercial district would be the largest
This proposal transforms the vacant lots once associated with the decline of Asbury Park into a dense, active district with a mix of uses and attractions that would stimulate economic activity and attract investment during the summer season and also year round for its permanent residents.
Charlottesville, Virginia/ Forbes.com
Charlottesville, Virginia/ wikimedia.org
Bring back a carousel to the vacant carousel building/ lliberty.edu
Condos in Asbury Park/ wikimedia.org
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City of Cape May Mantoloking
Changyeon Lee
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As shown in above figure, Cape May’s population increased consistently until the1980’s.2 However, after that period, the population has been steadily decreasing. According to the 2010 census, the racial makeup of the city is 89.05% (3,212) White, 4.85% (175) African American, 0.30% (11) Native American, 0.67% (24) Asian, 0.11% (4) Pacific Islander, 2.30% (83) from other races, and 2.72% (98) from two or more races. Hispanics or Latinos made up 8.62% (311) of the population.3
Location of Cape May
Background & Demography Cape May is a city at the southern tip of the Cape May Peninsula in Cape May County, where the Delaware Bay meets the Atlantic Ocean. Cape May is one of the country’s oldest vacation resort destinations and is part of the Ocean City Metropolitan Statistical Area. 1
Cape May is located along about four mile beach. The beach is not only a tourism resource, but also an environmental resource that protects the city from stormwater and rising sea levels. However, the existing dunes and some narrow beach areas will not adequately protect the community from stormwater issues and sea level rise.
Existing Dune Width
Methodology
Based on the Comprehensive Analysis map, there are three issues involved in protecting Cape May from stormwater issues and sea level rise. Historic Population of Cape May/BureauUnited
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The first issue is reinforcing dunes along the shoreline. The existing dunes along the shoreline are too vulnerable to stormwater and
Comprehensive Analysis
sea level rise to protect the community. To reinforce the existing dunes, this proposal considers the highest flood frequency in the past 500 years, which was 16 feet. Combined with a sea level rise of 2 feet, and an extra 4 feet, this proposal includes the ideal height of the dune at 22 feet. According to the US Army Corps of Engineers dune proposal for this area, the seaward side would be a flat-topped dune, 100 feet wide at its base, 25 feet wide at the top, and 22 feet high.4 The dune, would extend seaward with 75 feet of relatively flat sand berm. Finally, another 100 feet or more of sloped beach would extend out from the berm to — and in some places into — the water. The second issue is making room for water to flow from back-bays to the ocean and reducing residential damage. Wetlands are located next to the back-bays, but their elevation is higher than the residentialareas. The former residential areas could be moved closer to the beach to reduce damage from rain, stormwater , and storm surge could be prevented. 109
Existing Dune Section
Proposed Dune Section
Elevation Map
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Land Use Plan
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Narrow beach
Detailed Plan
The third issue is the buyout program. According to the existing dune width, there are two narrow beaches. The first beach is located near to the living area, which is vulnerable to stormwater and sea level rise. To extend the beach’s width, the street near the beach, as well as some parcels, need a buy-out program.
Conclusion Reinforcing the existing dunes along the beach, applying a buy-out program to the narrow beach, and switching the community and hinterland room for water will help protect Cape May from sea level rise and stormwater issues. These interventions will be more financially economical than applying a buy-out program to all areas vulnerable to stormwater and sea level rise. Chapter 7 | Case Studies
Selected Properties for buy-out
Buy-out plan
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Retreat Beach Haven
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Mystic and Osborne Islands
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Beach Haven/Holgate Mantoloking
Kim Davies
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Proposal
State Park Plan
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The proposal for this part of Beach Haven is to buy out all homes on the site to create a state park. The creation of a state park would prevent future destruction, connect this highly vulnerable area to the existing wildlife refuge, and allow recreational access during the majority of the year, and eliminate the safety concerns of permanent residences in highly vulnerable areas. The area could remain a quiet vacation area, as it was conceived forty years ago, but it would no longer be vulnerable to the heavy damage it sustained during Sandy. When storms are predicted, the entire area could be evacuated and the park could be closed. At the northern end of the site, about four miles from the end of Long Beach Island, a new constructed inlet could be dredged to alleviate back-bay flooding. The island is very narrow in this area and there are only a few existing residences, making it ideally suited to locate an inlet. The bridge across this inlet could connect directly with route 35, the main road in the area, without disturbing any additional homes to the north. Additionally, because the end of the island is just four miles south, this bridge would not have to allow for the passage of large boats and could be fixed, reducing costs. The construction of a twenty-foot-tall dune system along the coastline would protect the interior from storm surge and connect to the existing dunes in the wildlife refuge. A full primary and secondary dune system would be constructed 300 feet back from high tide to provide adequate sand fetch. The dunes would be vegetated with native vegetation, including primary and secondary dune habitats that are primarily grasses. The thicket on the backside of the secondary dune has trees and larger shrubs, while the edge community between the thicket and road returns to grasses and ornamentals. The interior of the
island would become a re-established maritime forest around the proposed facilities. The bay side of the island would be re-created as tidal marsh and bayshore plant communities, both of which are dominated by grasses and low vegetation. This area would require more site grading to produce a naturalistic landscape as the existing edge is primarily hard due to the creation of private docks and decks. These plant communities are not only ideally suited to the climate and harsh coastal conditions, but the softening of this portion of the island could help alleviate future flooding as well. The park includes 280 RV camping spaces with electric hook-ups and approximately 75 tent camping spaces. These camp areas would be set within the proposed recreated maritime forest setting with vegetation that is native to Long Beach Island and provides privacy to visitors. The tent camping area includes three bath houses with restrooms, showers, and dish washing facilities. One of the existing large marinas would be restored to hold 150 boats, a small boat rental facility, and a marina service station. Space for two restaurants, two food trucks, and four commercial establishments would be built along the marina with ample adjacent parking. A nearby pool and beach club includes children’s areas. A temporary, rotating art installation at this central community area could commemorate the Holgate and Beach Haven history and allow the active engagement of the local art community. The main dune crossing is located here. Each of the four dune crossings along the length of the park has beach houses with changing- and rest-rooms and outdoor shower facilities adjacent to them. A large playground is near the southernmost dune crossing, adjacent to the tent camping area. The local community could be engaged to design and build this facility if the state desired. It is recommended that the entire park be designed by a landscape architect and built, as one project, for the State of New Jersey as a Chapter 7 | Case Studies
Detailed view of marina and commercial core
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state park.
Storm Preparation The entire area could be evacuated in the event of another hurricane or tropical storm like Sandy. These storms are often predicted days in advance, providing exacuation time. Still, the structures would need to be built in a resilient fashion to withstand hurricane forces. As such, structures built within the park would be supported by strong columns on deep foundations. The walls would be simple
breakaway walls. The interior contents would need to be secured and easily replaceable or packed and removed. Rolling kitchen carts could be used for the restaurants and removed on trucks with the furniture in the event of a severe storm. Food trucks could easily drive off the island and boats could be removed. All temporary inhabitants, including RVs would be evacuated. A detailed evacuation and communication plan would be created for the state park and clearly communicated to all users.
Cost Estimate Buying out the existing homes in southern Beach Haven is the biggest cost incurred to construct this State Park. Buying out the 154 homes occupied year-round at pre-storm value would cost almost $80 million. The remaining 972 vacation homes could be purchased at full pre-storm value for about $630 million. However, several recent news articles cite owners willing to sell vacation property for about half its pre-storm value, as they wish to
View at recreational vehicle campsite
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View at entry area
View at beach club
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get out of the area and not incur the cost of repairs.v In this case, the vacation homes could be purchased at half their pre-storm values for about $315 million. The homes in this area are modest compared to those in many other areas, including houses with an average of two bedrooms. It is very likely that their average prestorm value of about $700,000 is inflated and owners may accept less given the challenged shore conditions today.6 The Long Beach Island Motor Home Park, a vacation rental community which stood in a large area at the center of the study area, was completely destroyed during Sandy. The owner of this property does not intend to return and restore his property after the storm as cleanup is expected to cost over one million dollars, a fee he cannot afford. The land under this mobile home park was valued at $12.5 million prior to the storm. This is a common problem for the middle class community.7 Stories such as this one lead me to believe it may be possible to convince the community of a buyout scenario. If substantial portions of the community leave, little of the ‘community’ feel will remain. Raising homes in Beach Haven to FEMA compliance will cost over $50,000 per home, or over $60 million total for the community, and most of these homes suffered substantial damage that will add additional expense. Additionally, repairing the community infrastructure, like roadways and utilities, will be costly. Several roads are still impassable and there were numerous gas leaks when homes were ripped off foundations. While the full cost of buyout could be $400 million at least, it may be appealing to a community that cannot afford to rebuild. Efforts will need to be made to relocate existing residents nearby, but high vacancy rates in northern Beach Haven could accommodate this small population. The remainder of the park will include the cost of the one-mile-long dune system, at $10 million, the inlet system, at $25 million, and the reconstructed bay shore, at $5 million. The 123
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Mystic and Osborne Islands Mantoloking
Kristina Frazier
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Financial Implications Total buy-out for the whole of Mystic and Osborne Islands would cost $859 million for owner-occupied units, $89 million for renteroccupied units, and $216 million for vacant properties. The total estimated cost for buyout of both A and V zone homes is $1.2 billion. Federal and state funds as well as local public financing would be used to fund the buy-out procedure. Subsequent rebuilding for the new development would be covered through private investment. Additionally, since this plan calls for significant restoration of salt marsh, there would be potential to establish this area as a mitigation bank for wetland filling in surrounding communities. This may help Little Egg Harbor Township gradually recoup financial losses as future developers purchase mitigation credits based on the restored Mystic Island salt restoration project.
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$250,000 can expect an annual flood insurance premium of $7,000. Factoring in an increase to the homeowner’s monthly mortgage payment, this homeowner can expect to recover their foundation costs in about 14 months. However, this homeowner could opt to raise their home an additional 2 feet, raising the home to 10 feet, for an additional $1,000 dollars, or about $30,000 total. In this case, the annual flood insurance premium would be $3,500. The homeowner would recover their foundation costs in about 13 months and have an enhanced peace of mind from the increased flood protection. These figures were based on a FEMA Rebuilding after Hurricane Sandy: Building Safer and Stronger Pays Off study published in December 2012. However, a FEMA representative advised us to increase the cost of elevating a home to FEMA compliance to $50,000 instead of $30,000. Additionally, the homeowner could expect to save about $273,480 over 10 years due to lower flood insurance premiums, less an increase in monthly mortgage payments, over a homeowner that did not raise their home to the new base flood elevation. Homes in the V-Zone can expect a $30,000 annual increase in their flood insurance premiums. Based on this study, it is clear that it is in a homeowner’s best interest to meet the new BFE compliance regulations and capitalize on reduced insurance premiums to save money in the long term.
Long Beach Island Cost Estimates Located in Ocean County, LBI comprises the following six municipalities Barnegat Light, Beach Haven, Harvey Cedars, Long Beach Township, Ship Bottom, and Surf City. LBI suffered a direct hit by Sandy, sustained moderate damage relative to the remainder of the Jersey Shore, and contains communities with a mix of incomes. We initially thought LBI would make an ideal case study for the Jersey Shore because of these characteristics. 134
Our first LBI case study considered the cost to rebuild the shore as is in addition to raising individual homes to meet new FEMA flood zone guidelines. The seaside communities here were badly damaged by bay-side flooding and storm surge waves, which washed up to four feet of sand into the streets in places along the island. Preliminary estimates suggest clean-up and rebuilding may cost between $750 million and $1 billion on the island alone.5 It is important to keep in mind that if homes are not elevated to FEMA standards nor protected from future storm events, this cost could be occurred regularly in the future. The estimated total cost for residences on LBI to comply with FEMA’s Advisory Flood Hazard Zones guidelines is $486 million, given approximately 4,500 homes in Zone V and 14,500 homes in Zone A, calculated using residential parcel information in GIS.6 The center points of 24% of the 15,504 residential parcels fell within Zone V, and 76% fell in Zone A. This ratio was then applied to the total LBI housing count of 19,011 to determine likely estimates for the number of houses in each zone. 7 Based on this methodology, 4,563 houses are in Zone V and 14,448 are in Zone A. The discrepancy between the number of residential parcels and the total housing count is most likely attributable to parcels which contain multiple housing units. Additionally, we must consider the cultural value of keeping the Jersey Shore intact. There is value in preserving this sense of place and its unique character. While LBI does not include any boardwalks, Barnegat Lighthouse is a historic structure of value and the community culture in the towns has value itself. Our studio did not place a monetary value on this benefit, but a complete cost benefit analysis of rebuilding LBI would need to include this benefit.
Our second cost estimate based on LBI considered the costs and benefits associated with building a dune along the entire 15-mile length of its developed coast. While LBI is approximately 18 miles long, only 15 of these are developed; 3 miles at the southern end are parkland. Dunes cost approximately $1,050 per linear foot to construct, assuming a 100-foot wide base narrowing to a 25-foot wide top, a height of approximately 18 to 22 feet, and a fetch of at least 175 feet.8 These dimensions and cost estimates (adjusted for inflation) are based on the 14-mile US Army Corps of Engineers dune proposal from Manasquan to Barnegat inlets. This is the type of dune we propose, where applicable, on our sites along the Jersey Shore. A dune could protect homes behind it from storm surge during future storm events. In this case, a 15-mile dune along LBI would cost $83.2 million to construct. Constructing a dune may have some negative externalities as well, including a loss in perceived access to beaches, for which LBI is famous and around which LBI bases its summer tourism industry. Additionally, a dune may obstruct coastal views from some beach front
Image of existing dune on Long Beach Island.
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as previously, we now have 3,929 homes in the V Zone, each costing about $50,000 to elevate, and 13,814 homes in the A Zone, each costing about $18,000 to elevate.14 The dune would provide ecological benefits based on its ecosystem services. However these figures are difficult to quantify and figures vary widely; we found figures as low as $33 per person15 and as high as $1,574 per household.16 Both of these estimates are based on the number of visitors per year. Three million people visit LBI beaches annually.17 We adjusted the lowest estimate for environmental services, $33 per person, for inflation, bringing it to $46 per person and used the estimated three million annual visitors to calculate the ecological benefit of the dune. Building a dune the length of LBI would provide almost $150 million in environmental value. Additionally, every time there is a storm, a dune would prevent storm damage, adding the benefit of avoided cost of damage and rebuilding costs. Building a dune provides protection to the homes and communities on LBI which provides a level of certainty to these residents and communities. Our studio did not attempt to value this benefit, but a full cost benefit analysis would need to include the benefits of increased safety and protection provided by the dune. Regardless, a dune would pay for itself in avoided damage costs after just a few storms. Our third and final cost estimate for LBI looks at the cost to buy out the entire island and restore it to an ecosystem like the one that may have existed prior to development. Here, we would need to purchase all of the existing properties and relocate residents and businesses. Additionally, we would need to deconstruct the existing development, construct a dune, similar to the one discussed in the previous section, and reconstruct the natural setting 136
on the remainder of the island. By maintaining this island as a park, we could still collect some tourism income from visitor fees. We would also gain additional value from the enhanced ecosystem services and storm protection. Based on our previous discussion, full LBI buyout would cost nearly $16 billion. Additionally, it would cost almost $142 million to deconstruct the homes on the island. There are 17,879 homes on LBI, and deconstruction costs an average of $635 per home.18 This figure is based on data from a study conducted at MIT comparing rebuilding scenarios for New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. In this case, the study assumes an 80% diversion rate of demolition waste, which saves on average $2.540 in disposal costs per typical 2,000 square foot home. A home this size would produce about 127 tons of demolition waste. Without this diversion, demolition and disposal of demolition
waste could cost $3,175. Our studio has used this lower figure of $635 per home, assuming an 80% diversion rate for demolition waste and a 2,000-square-foot home average.19 We are also assuming that not all utilities would be removed from the island. If LBI were to function as a park, it may need basic service provisions. We have included the conversion of existing overhead transmission lines to underground to provide basic electricity to the core of the park. This would cost about $54 million, based on a study done in 2005 in Florida. These utilities would be weatherproofed to protect them from storm damage.20 We now have a combined cost of $16.2 billion for buyout, demolition, and utility modifications to LBI. Our next step would be to reconstruct the island as a natural setting. We use the same dune construction cost as our previous estimate for a dune running the length of the shoreline.21
Damage to homes and walkways on Long Beach Island.
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The remainder of the island could be restored to a constructed nature for approximately $80 million based on a study by the Evergreen Funding Consultants, completed in 2003 for the Puget Sound Shared Strategy group.22 This means our total cost of constructed nature for LBI is approximately $163.2 million. Our final cost is based on a loss in annual tourism revenue. Removing the community fabric of LBI will have significant detrimental impacts on tourism revenue for the area. The island currently makes $1.2 billion annual from tourism.23 We are assuming a ninety percent loss in tourism due to our drastic proposed island changes. Buyout and deconstruction would result in a complete loss in tourism revenue from overnight guests staying at hotels, motels, and the like. Additionally, local businesses would no longer contribute to this total. Finally, beach visitation would be significantly reduced due to a decreased population and a decreased ease of access. The island could still generate some tourism revenue for the state from visitor fees to the park and its beaches. Therefore, we estimate the annual loss in tourism would be about $1.08 billion. Based on this analysis, our one-time costs for total buyout and reconstructed nature come to about $16.4 billion. Annually, LBI would lose $1.08 billion in tourism revenue. However, this scheme has significant benefits as well. The environmental value of a dune ecosystem would be similar to our last estimate, of $140 million. Additionally, we could add the environmental benefit of the reconstructed habitat, at approximately $120 million. This figure is based on a study of ecosystem service to rebuilding New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, which values ecosystem services at $6595 (adjusted to today’s dollars) per acre.24 LBI is 18,080 acres, making its total ecological value almost $120 million. This means the ecological value totals about $260 million. Chapter 7|Case Studies
Damage to a home on Mystic Island.
An uninhabited LBI has additional value with each storm event. Here the value of human safety and the additional protection of property provided by an ecologically functioning barrier island would need to be considered in a full cost benefit analysis. Our studio has not valued these costs for this study. The deconstruction of LBI also means that homes do not have to be modified to comply with new FEMA BFE elevations nor do they need to be reconstructed after storms due to storm damage. These additional benefits may be added to a full cost benefit analysis. Our three LBI cost estimates clearly convey the cost to recover from Sandy. Buyout of individual homes is the biggest obstacle to implementing large scale resiliency techniques in the second two studies; this cost quickly aggregates to become cost prohibitive. While the
ecological benefits of the environmental additions, such as dunes or constructed nature, are important, their value does not quickly overcome the cost of buyout. However, if storm events are to occur more frequently or more intensely in the future, these options become more sensible and feasible long-term.
Mystic Island Case Study For comparison purposes, our studio will also analyze the cost implications of various property buyout and FEMA compliance options on Mystic Island, a census-designated place (CDP) located in Little Egg Township, Ocean County. The waterfront community of Mystic Island serves as an interesting case study against LBI due to the severe level of damage from Sandy impacting the area rather uniformly, perhaps due to its location, size, and development patterns. In November 2012, Mayor John Kemp 137
declared that approximately 500 homes, nearly 10% of the houses in Mystic Island, were so badly damaged that they may be considered inhabitable.25 This level of damage, in addition to a high percentage of land falling within FEMA designated Zone V, will affect if residents choose to rebuild, or simply leave. Furthermore, the lower household incomes and property values of Mystic Island (compared to LBI)will affect the feasibility of total buyout, cost to buyout just homes in Zone V, and the cost of FEMA compliance for homes in both Zone V and Zone A. 26 Mystic Island has a population of 8,493 people and a household count of 3,490, many of which live in waterfront developments. 27 Using the same center point methodology described for LBI, approximately 62% of Mystic Island’s 5,227 residential parcels are located in the FEMA Advisory Flood Hazard Zone V, and approximately 6% are located in Zone A.28 According to the ACS 2007-2011 5-year estimates, Mystic Island has 5,214 housing units.29 Applying the aforementioned ratio to this housing count, an estimated 3,224 houses fall within Zone V, and 323 houses within Zone A.
Complete Buyout
Mystic Island is in a high-risk flooding area, and one possible scenario is a complete buyout of all residences within the CDP. Since true values of real property are published for Little Egg Township and not specifically the Mystic Island CDP, the buyout cost was derived from the ACS 2007-2011 5-year estimates property values. Although the ACS housing values are self-reported values, the team assumes that they are comparable to buyout values in this case study. ACS provides the number of owner-occupied units for different housing value ranges (i.e., Less than $50,000; $50,000 to $99,999, etc.). The midpoint of each range was multiplied out by the number of houses in each range, and 138
then aggregated to calculate the total value of owner-occupied houses. However, for the “less than $50,000” category, the value $50,000 was used, and for the $1,000,000 or more category, $1,000,000 was used, leading to potentially underestimated housing values, and therefore, underestimated buyout values. The estimated property values of these 3,515 owner-occupied units is $859 million.30
The aggregate value using ACS (for all residences on Mystic Island, including owneroccupied units, rental units, and vacant units) is $1.2 billion. Assuming that this is an accurate representation of market value, this is the potential cost of a complete residential buyout in the entire CDP.
For the rental properties, the property values were calculated based on the following equation:
Another possible scenario for Mystic Island is to purchase all of the residences in Zone V. By dividing the $1.2 billion calculated above by the number of total housing units, the mean housing value is $223,000. Using this value as the buyout value per home in Zone V leads to a cost of $719 million (for 3,224 homes).
(monthly rent * 12) / property value = capitalization rate ACS provides the monthly rents in ranges, so the number of houses falling within each range was multiplied by the midpoint of each range. However, for the “less than $300” category, the value $300 was used, and for the $2,000 or more category, $2,000 was used, leading to potentially underestimated rents and buyout values. The aggregated rent of all rental properties was then divided by the number of rental properties to calculate the mean rent. The mean rent was then multiplied by 12 and divided by a single-family rental capitalization rate of 8.6%, the 2012 national average for single-family rentals, and multiplied by the number of total rental properties to reach an aggregate property value of rental properties. 31 The estimated property values of these 510 renteroccupied houses is $89 million. Out of the total 5,214 housing units on Mystic Island, 1,699 are classified as vacant.32 In order to account for the value of these properties, which include vacation and occasional use homes, the median value of the owneroccupied housing units was multiplied by the number of vacant houses. The estimated property values of these 1,699 vacant properties is $216 million.
Buyout of Residential Properties in Zone V
FEMA Compliance – Zones V and A The third scenario for Mystic Island encompasses FEMA compliance for all of the homes in Zone V and Zone A. Assuming 3,224 homes in Zone V and a compliance cost of $50,000 per home, in addition to 323 homes in Zone A and a cost of $18,000 per home, this scenario would cost a total of $167 million. Similar to the LBI scenario, property buyout leads to the highest cost. However, these options should be carefully evaluated in light of scientific predictions of when another serious storm will hit, in addition to the likelihood of increased storm intensities in the near future. If another storm such as Sandy hits the area causing severe damage, the $1.2 billion or $719 million buyout programs may not seem as expensive when compared against the total cost of damages or ongoing mitigation and prevention plans. The buyout programs, although capital-intensive, provide a longer-term solution for the high-risk area, whereas FEMA compliance provides a shorter-term solution. In contrast with the residents of LBI, the residents of Mystic Chapter 7 | Case Studies
Photovoltaic Systems According to the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s annual report, Tracking the Sun V (2012), the installed price of grid-connected photovoltaic (PV) systems has been decreasing throughout the years. The price represents the “up-front” cost, and includes module and non-module, or “soft” costs, such as installation labor, marketing, and permitting. Although both module and non-module costs have been decreasing, module costs are dropping more rapidly. In 2011, the median installed price of a grid-connected PV system was $6.10 per watt (W) for residential and small commercial systems smaller than 10 kilowatts (kW). Larger commercial systems (100 kW or more) cost a median of $4.70 per W. 41 Using the $6.10 unit cost per watt, the installation cost of a PV system to power a 5 kW system is over $30,000. Even with utility or government subsidies as high as 50%, the payback period could last over 20 years,possibly longer than the payback period of a home’s mortgage. 42 A residence located on the coast can purchase solar panels to generate electricity in the case of another power outage. However, the costs are again high. It may take 9,600 watts to power a refrigerator for half of a day (800 watts/hour). If a home owner buys 10-watt panels for $40 each, the total cost would be $38,400 for the 960 panels required. This price covers only the solar panels and does not include the price of equipment or a battery for electricity during the remaining 12 hours of the day that are dark.43 Solar projects in the State of New Jersey are no longer eligible for rebates.44 However, the state has a Solar Financing Model that consists of a high Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and the use of Solar Renewable Energy Certificates (SRECs). The RPS requires “each electricity supplier/provider serving retail cus140
tomers in the state to include in the electricity it sells at least 20.38% qualifying renewables by 2021 and 4.1% solar-electricity by 2028.”45 All PV systems in New Jersey must be approved through the Renewable Energy Incentive Program, grid-connected to the distribution system, and registered through the SREC Tracking System. The tracking system reports revenuegrade meter readings, and allows SREC’s to be placed in the customer’s electronic account. For every 1,000 kWh of electricity generated, an SREC is earned. The SRECs can then be sold for 15 years, generating revenue. Electricity suppliers are one of the main purchasers of SRECs as a way to meet their RPS requirements.46
Underground Cisterns The costs of cisterns vary greatly depending on material and the size of the system. A single, assembled rain barrel for residential use could cost around $200, whereas cisterns can cost $1,500 or significantly more for commercial cisterns. Since a minimum 5,000 gallon cistern is recommended for residential use47 ,the cost could be $10,000 or more for a large system.48 A range of estimates are listed below, although they exclude the costs of maintenance, the water treatment system, labor costs of excavation, and additional infrastructure.
Composting Toilets
The estimated price of a composting toilet for use in a coastal New Jersey home is approximately $1,500. Self-contained composting toilets are typically $750-1,500, and composting toilets with a central system can cost around $13,000.49 According to the EPA, a composting toilet for a year-round home of two adults and two children could cost $1,200 to $6,000, and a system for a seasonal use cottage could cost approximately $700 to $1,500.50 Since a large percentage of the coastal homes are used for
recreational or occasional use, $1,500 is a suitable estimate for the cost of a composting toilet. This excludes other costs and savings such as maintenance costs, which are $200-300 every other year, and water savings. Since onethird of household water use is for flushing toilets, this cost will be avoided with the use of a composting toilet.51 The incremental costs associated with making individual homes resilient add up quickly. Solar panels are an expensive solution for supplying off-grid power after storm events. Additionally, while composting toilets may not cost much for vacation homes with occasional use, they can quickly become more expensive for primary residences. Adding the initial expense to the potential inconvenience may make this a difficult option to sell to Jersey Shore residents. However these solutions may have select applicability in low-density areas. Protecting larger areas with sea walls and inlets, while initially expensive, may have select applicability in higher density communities; as would the option to make utilities resilient with reinforced poles. These options will need to be explored in more detail at a community scale moving forward. Our cost estimates have provided a look at some of the challenges associated with a variety of resiliency techniques for the Jersey Shore. None of the options are perfect or cheap, but each may be applicable in the appropriate setting. Next, we will be looking at individual communities in more detail to begin to determine where each technique might be most applicable.
Chapter 7 | Case Studies
Notes Chapter 1
US Environmental Protection (EPA). “Ecoregions of New Jersey.” <http://www.epa.gov/ wed/pages/ecoregions/nj_eco.htm> 2013. Accessed 01/15/2013. 2 Ibid. 3 Conserve Wildlife Foundation of New Jersey. “Endangered and Threatened Species Field Guide – Piping Plover.” http://www.conservewildlifenj.org/species/fieldguide/view/Charadrius%20melodus/. 2013. Accessed 01/15/2013. 4 Hasse, J. and R. Lathrop. “Tracking New Jersey’s Dynamic Landscape: Urban Growth and Open Space Loss 1986-1995-2002.” Rutgers University. July 29,2008. http://www.crssa.rutgers. edu/projects/lc/urbangrowth/. 5 Ibid. 6 US Environmental Protection (EPA). “Ecoregions of New Jersey.” <http://www.epa.gov/ wed/pages/ecoregions/nj_eco.htm> 2013. Accessed 01/15/2013. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Navarra, T. The New Jersey Shore: A Vanishing Splendor : Text and Photographs. Philadelphia: Art Alliance, 1985. Print. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Berg-Andersson, Richard E. “New Jersey Localities: Civil Divisions and Municipalities.” The Green Papers. TheGreenPapers.com, 19922013. Web. 17 Navarra, T. The New Jersey Shore: A vanishing splendor,. Cornwall Books: New York, 1985. 18 “Atlantic City Expressway: Historic Overview.” PhillyRoads.com. Eastern Roads, n.d. Web. 19 Marjorie Breder, “Interview with Former Shore Homeowner” Telephone interview. 18 Feb. 1
Appendix
2013. 20 NJ Division of Travel and Tourism, “2008-2012 Tourism Economic Impact Studies”. New Jersey Tourism Research and Information. New Jersey Department of State, 2008-2012. Web. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Roberts & Youmans, Down the Jersey Shore. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1993. Print. 24 National Research Council Committee on Beach Nourishment and Protection, “Beach Nourishment and Protection.” Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 1995.
Chapter 2
AP. “Superstorm Sandy Deaths, Damage And Magnitude: What We Know One Month Later.” The Huffington Post. Associated Press, 29 Nov. 2012. Web. <http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2012/11/29/superstorm-hurricane-sandydeaths-2012_n_2209217.html>. 2 Drye, Willie. “A Timeline of Hurricane Sandy’s Path of Destruction.” News Watch. National Geographic, 2 Nov. 2012. Web. <http://newswatch. nationalgeographic.com/2012/11/02/a-timeline-of-hurricane-sandys-path-of-destruction/>. 3 Ibid. 4 AP. “Gov. Christie: Sandy Cleanup to Cost New Jersey $29.4 Billion.” NBC New York. Associated Press, 23 Nov. 2012. Web. <http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Superstorm-SandyNew-Jersey-Cleanup-Costs-Christie-Announcement-180644661.html>. 5 AP, “Superstorm Sandy Deaths, Damage And Magnitude,” 2012. 6 Independent Press. “New Jersey.” NJ.com. NJ.com, 29 Nov. 2012. Web. <http://www. nj.com/independentpress/index.ssf/2012/11/ damage_sustained_in_new_jersey.html>. 7 AP, “Superstorm Sandy Deaths, Damage And Magnitude,” 2012. 16 AP. “Hurricane Sandy Debris Threatens Tourism In New Jersey, New York, Connecticut.” 17 The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/18/hurricane-sandy-debris1
new-jersey_n_2706830.html>. FEMA MOTF. Hurricane Sandy Impact Analysis. 11 Nov. 2012. Raw data. N.p. 11 Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA-4086DR: New Jersey - Hurricane Sandy. N.p., Dec. 2012. Web. <http://www.fema.gov/library/ viewRecord.do?id=6724>. 12 FEMA MOTF. Hurricane Sandy Impact Analysis. 11 Nov. 2012. Raw data. N.p. 13 Ibid. 14 Johnson, Tom. “New Jersey’s Aging Infrastructure No Match for Superstorm.” NJ Spotlight. N.p., 6 Nov. 2012. Web. <http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/12/11/05/new-jersey-s-aginginfrastructure-no-match-for-superstorm/>. 15 AP. “Hurricane Sandy Debris Threatens Tourism In New Jersey, New York, Connecticut.” 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Anonymous. “Mapping Hurricane Sandy’s Deadly Toll.” New York Times. Nov. 17, 2013. Accessed 01/10/2013. 19 Regnier, E. “Public Evacuation Decisions and Hurricane Track Uncertainty.” Management Science. Jan. 2008. Vol. 54(1):16-28. 20 Sadeghi, N. “Strategic Planning in Disaster Management; How to Face the Unexpected in Natural Disasters.”Risk Management research Center. International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology. Tehran, Iran. 21 Pacific Gas and Electric. “News ReleasesPG&E To Send More Than 150 Electric Personnel to New York to help restore power in aftermath of Hurricane Sandy.” October 29, 2012. Accessed 01/15/2013. 22 American Red Cross. “What We Do- Disaster Relief.” <http://www.redcross.org/what-wedo/disaster-relief>. 2013. Accessed 01/17/2013. 12 PR Newswire US. “Robin Hood Announces Another $4.9 million in Hurricane Sandy Relief Grants; Total Granted Thus Far Exceeds $50 million.” 23 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). “State of the Coast- U.S. Hur10
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22 Regnier, E. “Public Evacuation Decisions and Hurricane Track Uncertainty.” Management Science. Jan. 2008. Vol. 54(1):1628. 23 FEMA MOTF. Hurricane Sandy Impact Analysis. 11 Nov. 2012. Raw data. N.p. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Johnson, Tom. “New Jersey’s Aging Infrastructure No Match for Superstorm.” NJ Spotlight. N.p., 6 Nov. 2012. Web. <http:// www.njspotlight.com/stories/12/11/05/ new-jersey-s-aging-infrastructure-nomatch-for-superstorm/>.
Chapter 3
Oremus, W. (2012, October 30). Is Climate Change Turning New York into a Climate Change Hotspot? Retrieved February 6, 2013, from Slate.com: http://www.slate. com/blogs/future_tense/2012/10/30/ irene_sandy_and_climate_change_why_ do_hurricanes_keep_hitting_the_northeast.html 2 NOAA. (2010). Tropical Cyclone Climatology. Retrieved February 19, 2013, from National Weather Service National Hurricane Center: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/ 3 Oremus, W. (2012, October 30). Is Climate Change Turning New York into a Climate Change Hotspot? Retrieved February 6, 2013, from Slate.com: http://www.slate. com/blogs/future_tense/2012/10/30/ irene_sandy_and_climate_change_why_ do_hurricanes_keep_hitting_the_northeast.html 4 Bender et al “Modeled Impact of Anthropogenic Warming on the Frequency of 1
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Intense Atlantic Hurricanes” Science, 22 January, 2010 Vol. 327 5 National Geographic. (2013). Sea Temperature Rise: Warmer Oceans have FarReaching Effects. Retrieved February 19, 2013, from National Geographic: The Ocean: http://ocean.nationalgeographic.com/ocean/critical-issues-sea-temperature-rise/ 6 Richard A. Kerr “Modeled Impact of Anthropogenic Warming on the Frequency of Intense Atlantic Hurricanes” Science, 22 January, 2010 Vol. 327 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Jennifer Francis and Steven Varvus, “Evidence linking Arctic amplification to extreme weather in mid-latitudes,” Geophysical Research Letters, 17 March 2012: Vol. 39 Issue 6, 18 February 2013 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/10.1029/2012GL051000/abstract> 10 Rahmstorf et al, “Comparing climate projections to observations up to 2011,” Environmental Research Letters, 27 November 2012: Vol.7 No. 4. 11 Benjamin Horton and Ken Miller, “Understanding Sea Level Rise in the Mid-Atlantic,” New Jersey Marine Sciences Consortium, Spring/Summer 2010: Vol. 6 No. 4, 18 February 2013 <http://www.njseagrant. org/jersey-shoreline/vol26_no4/articles/ understanding-sea-level-rise.html> 12 Barry Chalofsky, “Opinion: As climate change causes sea level to rise, New Jersey must adapt,” Times of Trenton, 27 October 2012, 18 February 2013 <http://www. nj.com/times-opinion/index.ssf/2012/10/ opinion_as_climate_change_caus.html> 13 Ning Lin et al, “Physically based assessment of hurricane surge threat under climate change,” Nature Climate Change, 14 February 2012, <DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE1389> Appendix
Chapter 5
New Jersey Office of Emergency Management. “New Jersey State Mitigation Plan.” < http://www.state.nj.us/njoem/programs/ mitigation_plan2012.html>. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. “Coastal Blue Acres Program.” <http://www.nj.gov/dep/greenacres/ blue.html>. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 N.J.A.C. 7:7E (New Jersey State Administrative Code: Coastal Area Facility Review Act of 1973) 12 New Jersey Department of State. “New Jersey State Plan.” <http://www.nj.gov/ state/planning/plan.html>. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 United States Fish and Wildife Service. “Coastal Barrier Resources Act.” <http:// www.fws.gov/CBRA/>. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 United States Fish and Wildlife Service.”CRBS.”<http://www.fws.gov/ CBRA/Act/index.html#CBRS>. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 United States Fish and Wildlife Service. “Coastal Barrier Resources Act.” <http:// www.fws.gov/CBRA/Act/index.html>. 1
Appendix
Ibid. United States Fish and Wildlife Service. “CBRS Units in New Jersey Map.” < http:// www.fws.gov/CBRA/Maps/Locator/ NJ.pdf>. 30 Ibid. 31 “National Disaster Recovery Framework”. FEMA: Response & Recovery. 19 Feb. 2013. Web. 20 Feb. 2013. <http://www.fema. gov/national-disaster-recovery-framework>. 32 “Recovery Support Functions”. FEMA: Response & Recovery. 14 June 2012. Web. 15 Jan. 2013. < http://www.fema.gov/recovery-support-functions>. 33 Ibid. 34 “Code of Federal Regulations: Section 44 of Emergency Management and Assistance”. Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration. 1 Oct. 2002. 35 Ibid. 36 “Managing Floodplain Development Through The National Flood Insurance Program”. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Web. <http://www.fema. gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2108>. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 “Coastal Management Program.” New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. N.p., 19 Dec. 2007. Web. 20 Feb. 2013. < http://www.state.nj.us/dep/cmp/ czm_program.html> 43 N.J.A.C. 7:7E (New Jersey State Administrative Code: Coastal Area Facility Review Act of 1973) 44 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 210 N.J. 478, 45 A.3d 983, 2012 N.J. LEXIS 734 (N.J., June 5, 2012) 45 Huba, Nicholas, and Kirk Moore. “Harvey Cedars Homeowners Demand Payment 28 29
from Town for Spoiling Ocean View.” Asbury Park Press. Gannett Company, 20 Dec. 2012. Web. 20 Feb. 2013. 46 N.J.A.C. 7:7E (New Jersey State Administrative Code: Coastal Area Facility Review Act of 1973) 47 Ibid. 48 New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. “Coastal Zone Management.” < http://www.state.nj.us/dep/cmp/czm_ enforcepolicies.html>. 49 Ibid. 50 Association of New Jersey Environmental Commissions. “The NJ Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act.” <http://www.anjec. org/html/EasementCD-IntroductionNJAct. htm>. 51 N.J.A.C. 7:7E (New Jersey State Administrative Code: Coastal Area Facility Review Act of 1973) 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Florida Department of Environmental Protection. “Coastal Management Programs.” <http://www.dep.state.fl.us/ cmp/>. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Natural Resources Defense Council. 2006. “Florida’s Coastal and Ocean Future.” < http://www.nrdc.org/water/oceans/florida/flfuture.pdf>. 64 The Surfrider Foundation. Florida Coastal and Ocean Coalition. The 2009 Florida Coastal and Ocean Report Card. 2009. 65 Ibid. 66 Florida Department of Environmental Protection. “Florida Forever.” <http://www. dep.state.fl.us/lands/fl_forever.htm>. 147
Ibid. “Ocean and Coastal Management in Delaware”. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Ocean & Coastal Resource Management. 14 Nov. 2012. Web. 25 Jan. 2013. <http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/mystate/de.html>. 69 “Delaware Coastal Program”. State of Delaware: Delaware Coastal Programs. Web. 4 Feb. 2013. <http://www.dnrec.delaware.gov/coastal/Pages/CoastalMgt. aspx>. 20 Feb. 2013. 70 “Ocean and Coastal Management in Delaware”. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Ocean & Coastal Resource Management. 14 Nov. 2012. Web. 25 Jan. 2013. <http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/mystate/de.html>. 71 “Delaware Coastal Program”. State of Delaware: Delaware Coastal Programs. Web. 4 Feb. 2013. <http://www.dnrec.delaware.gov/coastal/Pages/CoastalMgt. aspx>. 72 “Delaware National Estuarine Research Reserve”. National Estuarine Research Reserve System. Web. 15 Feb. 2013. <http:// nerrs.noaa.gov/Reserve.aspx?ResID=DEL>. 73 “The Coastal and Estuarine Land Conservation Program”. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Ocean & Coastal Resource Management. Web. 18 Feb. 2013. <http://coastalmanagement. noaa.gov/land/welcome.html>. 74 Ibid. 75 “Ocean and Coastal Management in Georgia”. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Ocean & Coastal Resource Management. Web. 10 Feb. 2013. <http://coastalmanagement.noaa. gov/mystate/ga.html>. 76 “Georgia Develops Green Growth Guidelines”. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Ocean & Coastal Resource Management. 2006. Web. 20 67 68
148
Jan. 2013. < http://coastalmanagement. noaa.gov/nonpoint/ss/urban06.html#32>. 77 “Green Growth Guidelines”. Georgia Department of Natural Resources. Web. 8 Feb. 2013. < http://www.coastalgadnr. org/cm/green/guide>. 78 “Model Ordinances”. Georgia Department of Natural Resources: Coastal Resources Division. Web. 2 Feb. 2013. <http:// www.coastalgadnr.org/cm/green/mo>. 79 7 N.C. Admin. Code 133A.0100-0134 (North Carolina State Administrative Code: 80 Coastal Area Management Act of 1974) 81 Lewis, David A. “The Relocation of Development from Coastal Hazards through Publicly Funded Acquisition Programs: Examples and Lessons from the Gulf Coast.” Sea Grant Law and Policy Journal. 5.1 (2012): 98-139. Web. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 “Hazard Mitigation Assistance - Property Acquisition (Buyouts).” Federal Emergency Management Agency. N.p., 27 Dec. 2012. Web. 20 Feb. 2013. 100 Vegetation Committee of the City of Sanibel. The Environmental Reference Handbook for Sanibel, a Barrier Island Sanctuary. Second Edition. 2009. 101 Clark, John. “The Sanibel Report: Formulation of a Comprehensive Plan Based on Natural Systems.” The Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C. 1976. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid.
Ibid. Clark, John. “The Sanibel Report: Formulation of a Comprehensive Plan Based on Natural Systems.” The Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C. 1976. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Vegetation Committee of the City of Sanibel. The Environmental Reference Handbook for Sanibel, a Barrier Island Sanctuary. Second Edition. 2009. 115 The Surfrider Foundation. Florida Coastal and Ocean Coalition. The 2009 Florida Coastal and Ocean Report Card. 2009. 116 Ibid. 117 Lousiana Resiliency Assistance Program. “Comprehensive Land Use Plan for the City of Sanibel Florida.” < http://resiliency. lsu.edu/content/comprehensive-land-useplan-city-sanibel-florida>. 118 Linette, J. “Workshop ‘first step’ in redevelopment.” Captiva Sanibel Island Reporter. <http://www.captivasanibel. com/page/content.detail/id/521360/ Workshop--first-step--in-redevelopment. html?nav=5051>. 119 American Planning Association. “National Landmark AWard Winners.” <http:// www.planning.org/awards/landmarks. htm>. 110 111
Appendix
Chapter 7 Long Beach Township
American Community Survey (2010) American Community Survey (2010) 3 NOAA 1 2
Mantoloking
American Community Survey (2010) American Community Survey (2010) 3 American Community Survey (2010) 4 Stockton University. New Jersey Beach Profile Network. http://intraweb.stockton.edu/ eyos/page.cfm?siteID=149&pageID=125 5 Borough of Mantoloking. Beach Easements and Replenishment. http://www. mantoloking.org/?page_id=1208 1 2
Atlantic City
American Community Survey (2010) American Community Survey (2010) 3 American Community Survey (2010) 4 “NJ Tourism took in Record Revenue of nearly $40 Billion in 2012”. Daily Record: A Gannett Company. 21 March 2013. 5 “NJ Tourism took in Record Revenue of nearly $40 Billion in 2012”. Daily Record: A Gannett Company. 21 March 2013. 6 Berstein, Lenny. “On Jersey Shore, a Line in the Dunes”. Daily News. 8 April 2013. <http://www.dailynews.com/ci_22978645/ jersey-shore-line-dunes?source=most_ viewed>. 1 2
Seaside Heights
American Community Survey (2010) Chaney, A. Seaside Heights, NJ. 2011. 10 April 2013 <http://www.princeton. edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Seaside_Heights,_New_Jersey.html> 3 Tourism Economics. The Economic Im 1 2
Appendix
pact of Tourism in New Jersey. Annual Review. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Division of Travel and Tourism, 2012. 4 Govistics. “Spotlight on Seadie Heights, NJ: The “Snooki Effect” on Local Coffers.” September 2011. Govistics. 10 April 2013 <http://www.govistics.com/blog/2011/09/ spotlight-on-seaside-heights-nj-the-snookieffect-on-local-coffers/> 5 NJDEP. Geospatial Data for Hurricane Sandy Flood Height. Trenton, 2012. Seasideheights-nj.com. Welcome to Seaside Heights. 10 April 2013 <http://www. seasideheights-nj.com/>
The Wildwoods
Cawley, Maureen. “Wildwood Days: The “Doo Wop” Era.” Wildwood History. Wildwood Historical Society, n.d. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. 2 American Community Survey (2010) 3 American Community Survey (2010) 4 American Community Survey (2010) 5 American Community Survey (2010) 6 American Community Survey (2010) 7 Joyce, Jennifer. “Officials Say Minimal Damage in Cape May, Wildwood.” 6abc Action News. WPVI-TV/DT, 2012. Web. 8 Psuty, Norbert P., and Douglas D. Ofiara. Coastal Hazard Management: Lessons and Future Directions from New Jersey. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2002. Print. 9 Cawley, Maureen. “Wildwood Days: The “Doo Wop” Era.” Wildwood History. Wildwood Historical Society, n.d. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. 10 Kocieniewski, David. “And the Sand Won’t Burn Your Feet.” The New York Times. The New York Times Company, 22 Apr. 2007. Web. 11 Deutsch, Tony. “New Seawall Extension Project in North Wildwood.” Watchthetramcarplease.com. Boca Cape News & Blog Inc., 22 Nov. 2012. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. 12 Gilfillian, Trudi. “North Wildwood Plans to 1
Improve Its 1970s Seawall.” PressofAtlanticCity.com.
Point Pleasant
Division of Natural Sciences and Mathematics. Beach-Dune Performance Assessment of New Jersey Beach Profile Network Sites at Northern Ocean County, New Jersey After Hurricane Sandy Related to FEMA Disaster DR-NJ 4086. Rep. no. NJBPN155-156. The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, 18 Nov. 2012. Web. <http:// intraweb.stockton.edu/eyos/coastal/content/docs/sandy/NorthernOcean.pdf>. 2 Division of Natural Sciences and Mathematics. Beach-Dune Performance Assessment of New Jersey Beach Profile Network Sites at Northern Ocean County, New Jersey After Hurricane Sandy Related to FEMA Disaster DR-NJ 4086. Rep. no. NJBPN155-156. The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, 18 Nov. 2012. Web. <http:// intraweb.stockton.edu/eyos/coastal/content/docs/sandy/NorthernOcean.pdf>. 1
Ocean Grove
Historical Society of Ocean Grove. A History of Ocean Grove. n.d. 8 April 2013 <http://www.oceangrovehistory.org/Histories/OGHistory.htm>. 2 Chester, Caren. “Fema Won’t fund New Boardwalk for Ocean Grove.” 8 February 2013. NJ Spotlight. 23 March 2013 <http:// www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/02/07/ fema-won-t-fund-new-boardwalk-forocean-grove/>. 3 John A. Tiedemann, Michael Witty, Stephen Souza. The Future of Coastal Lakes in Monmouth County. Study. Monmouth County: Monmouth University and Princeton Hydro, 2009. 1
Asbury Park 1
“US Census: 2010 Demographic Profile.” 149
New Jersey Music Hall of Fame Is Launched in Asbury Park. PR Newswire. 2005. 10 April 2013 9 “American Community Survey 2007-2011 5-Year Estimates.” American FactFinder. 10 March 2013. 10 Kuhr, Fred. “There goes the gayborhood.” 6 July 2004. The Advocate. 17 April 2013. 11 “Asbury Park Fact Sheet.” Madison Marquette. 5 March 2013. 12 “Sections of Asbury boardwalk torn off, buildings flooded.” 31 October 2012. Asbury Park Press. 15 March 2013. 13 National Register of Historic Places. 2013 March 15. 14 Nicquel, Terry. “Asbury Park’s feud between the city, developer poses threat.” 10 April 2013. Asbury Park Press. 15 April 2013. 15 Mulshine, Molly. “Dunes suggested only at north, south ends.” 17 January 2013. Asbury Park Sun. 10 March 2013. 16 Bernstein, Lenny. “After Sandy, Jersey shore looks for protection.” 6 April 2013. The Washington Post. 15 April 2013. 17 “The Changing Landscape of Monmouth County, New Jersey.” Rutgers Special Collections and Archives. 5 April 2013. 18 “Deal Lake Master Plan 2013.” Deal Lake Commission. 25 March 2013. 19 “Asbury Park artist creates mural for ‘All Tomorrow’s Parties’ music festival.” 2 October 2011. NJ.com. 12 April 2013. 20 “Madison Marquette Named Developer of Asbury Park Oceanfront Retail and Entertainment Development.” 22 May 2006. Madison Marquette. 17 April 2013.
American Community Survey (2010) Office, Texas General Land. “Dune Protection and Improvement Manual for the Texas Gulf Coast (Fifth Edition).” 8 2005. 10 2013 <http://www.glo.texas.gov/whatwe-do/caring-for-the-coast/_publications/ DuneManual.pdf>.
8
3 4
Beach Haven / Holgate
NJDEP. Geospatial Data for Hurricane Sandy Flood Height. Trenton, 2012. 2 Press, The Associated. “Holgate Residents Can Return to LBI This Morning.” 27 November 2012. www.nj.com. April 2013. <http:// www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2012/11/ holgate_residents_can_return_to_lbi_this_ morning.html>. 3 American Community Survey (2010) 4 American Community Survey (2010) 5 American Community Survey (2010) 6 American Community Survey (2010) 7 Amercan Community Survey (2007-2011) 1
Mystic and Osborne Islands
Wood, Susan. “Toot’n Towns USA.” The Beachside Aura of Mystic Island, NJ. Tootn Towns USA, 9 Feb. 2013. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. <http://www.tootntownsusa.com/enjoythe-beachside-aura-of-mystic-island-newjersey/>. 2 American Community Survey 5 year estimates (2011) 3 Stephen W. Broome; Ernest D. Seneca; William W. Woodhouse Jr. Tidal salt marsh restoration Aquatic Botany. 1988;32(1-2):122. 4 Advisory Base Flood Elevations 1
City of Cape May Johnson, Charles P. Many Drive to Resorts on Atlantic: Coast Places Draw Drivers From Pittsburgh District. The Pittsburgh Press, 2011. 2 American Community Survey (2010) 1
150
Cost Estimates “Christie Administration Releases Total Hurricane Sandy Damage Assessment of $36.9 Bil-
1
lion.” State of New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, 28 Nov. 2012. Web. Feb. 2013. 2 “The Economic Impact of Tourism in New Jersey.” Tourism Economics, 2011. Web. Feb. 2013. 3 “2012 County Equalization Tables.” NJ Division of Taxation, August 2012. Web. Jan. 2013. 4 Kaplan, Thomas. “Cuomo Seeking Home Buyouts in Flood.” The New York Times, 3 Feb. 2013. Web. Feb. 2013. 5 Lassonde, Victoria. “Long Beach Island Damage Could Reach $1 Billion, Mayor Says”. The Sandpaper. 2 November 2012. Web. Jan. 2013. 6 “Parcels by County/Muni: Ocean.” New Jersey Geographic Information Network Information Warehouse. Web. Jan. 2013. 7 US Census 2010: American FactFinder. Web. Jan. 2013. 8 Bernstein, Lenny. “On Jersey Shore, A Line in the Dunes.” The Washington Post, 8 April 2013. Web. April 2013. 9 Huang, Ju-Chin, George R. Parsons, Min Qiang Zhao, and P. Joan Poor. A Combined ConjointTravel Cost Demand Model for Measuring the Impact of Erosion and Erosion Control Programs on Beach Recreation. Valuation for Environmental Policy: Ecological Benefits. US Environmental Protection Agency Workshop. 23-24 April 2007. Arlingtion: National Center for Environmental Economics and Research, 2007. 10 Haddon, Heather. “Shoring Up NJ Tourism.” The Wall Street Journal, 30, Nov. 2012. Web. Jan. 2013. 11 Tyrrell, Joe. “Putting New Jersey’s Historic Sites Back on the Map.” NJ Spotlight. September 11, 2012. Web. Jan. 2013. 12 “2012 Equalization Table, County of Ocean.” NJ Division of Taxation, March 2012. Web. Jan. 2013. 13 Lassonde, Victoria. “Long Beach Island Damage Could Reach $1 Billion, Mayor Says”. The Sandpaper. 2 November 2012. Web. Jan. 2013. 14 US Census 2010: American FactFinder. 15 Colt, Steve. “The Economic Importance of Healthy Ecosystems.” Institute of Social and Economic Research. Anchorage: Alaska ConAppendix
servation Foundation, 2001. Barbier, Edward B., Sally D. Hacker, Chris Kennedy, Evamarie W. Koch, Adrian C. Stier, and Brian R. Silliman. “The Value of Estuarine and Coastal Ecosystem Services.” Ecological Monographs. The Ecological Society of America. 2011: 81(2): 169-193. 17 LBI Business Alliance. “Long Beach Island, NJ Official Beach Guide.” Web. Jan. 2013. 18 ACS 2007-2011 5-Year Estimates: American FactFinder. Web. Jan. 2013. 19 MIT. “Mission 2010: New Orleans.” Web. Jan. 2013. 20 Florida Public Service Commission. “Preliminary Analysis of Placing Investor-Owned Electric Utility Transmission and Distribution Facilities Underground in Florida.” March 2005. 21 New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. “Project Cooperation Agreement Between the Department of the Army and the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Barnegat Inlet to Little Egg Inlet, Long Beach Island, NJ, Shore Protection Project”. August 11, 2005. Web. Jan. 2013. 22 Evergreen Funding Consultants. “A Primer on Habitat Project Costs.” Puget Sounds Shared Strategy. Spring 2003. 23 Bates, Todd B., Michael L. Diamond, Jean Mickle, Shannon Mullen, Ken Serrano, and David P. Willis. “What Sandy Will Cost You.” Asbury Park Press. November 19, 2012. Web. Jan. 2013. 24 Costanza, Robert, William Mitsch, and John W. Day. “Rebuilding New Orleans: Applying Ecological Economics and Ecological Engineering.” Cutler Cleveland, Ed. August 3, 2007. The Encyclopedia of Earth. Jan. 2013. 25 Weaver, Donna. “500 homes in Mystic Island section of Little Egg Harbor Township may be uninhabitable.” Press of Atlantic City, 8 Nov. 2012. Web. 21 Feb. 2013. 26 ACS 2007-2011 5-Year Estimates: American FactFinder. 27 US Census 2010: American FactFinder. 28 “Parcels by County/Muni: Ocean.” 16
Appendix
ACS 2007-2011 5-Year Estimates: American FactFinder. 30 ACS 2007-2011 5-Year Estimates: American FactFinder. 31 Khater, Sam. “What Markets Offer the Best Return for Single-Family Rental Investors?” Core Logic, Vol. 1, Issue 4, April 2012. Web. Jan. 2013. 32 ACS 2007-2011 5-Year Estimates: American FactFinder. 33 Lassonde, Victoria. 34 Gregory, Phil. “In N.J., Opinions Divided on Either Side of Seawall Proposal.” Newsworks. January 22, 2013. Web. Jan 2013. 35 “Old Mason’s Inlet Closed After New Inlet Opened.” March 21, 2002. Web. Jan 2013. 36 North Carolina Division of Coastal Management. “NC Terminal Groin Study Final Report.” March 2010. Web. Feb. 2013. 37 Van Den Reek, Ben. “Overdiepse Polder: River Expansion Project Along the Maas in the Netherlands.” Provincie Noord-Brabant. December 2009. Web. Jan. 2013. 38 Hochman, Louis C. “Assemblyman wants tougher utility poles, not sure how much good they’d do or how much they’d cost.” NJ.com, 12, Dec. 2012. Web. Feb. 2013. 39 “Assemblyman wants tougher utility poles, not sure how much good they’d do or how much they’d cost.” Composite Technology Investors, 25 Sept. 2012. Web. Feb. 2013. 40 Caroom, Eliot. “Sandy decimated N.J. power systems far worse than Irene, data shows.” NJ.com, 14, Nov. 2012. Web. Feb. 2013. 41 Barbose, Galen, Naïm Darghouth, and Ryan Wiser. “Tracking the Sun V.” Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Nov. 2012. Web. Jan. 2013. 42 Devlin, Lee. “How Much Does it Cost to Install Solar on an Average US House?” Solar Power Authority, 20, April 2012. Web. Feb. 2013. 29
45 “Solar Renewable Energy Certificates (SRECs).” Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency. Web. Feb. 2013. 46 “SREC Registration Program.” 47 Sharpe, William E., and Edward S. Young, Jr. Rainwater Cisterns: Design, Construction, and Water Treatment. Penn State. Web. Feb. 2013. 48 “Rain Barrels and Cisterns.” Urban Design Tools. Web. Feb. 2013. 49 Edmonds, Molly. “How green is a self-contained composting toilet?” TLC. Web. Feb. 2013. 50 “Water Efficiency Technology Fact Sheet Composting Toilets.” EPA, Sept. 1999. Web. Feb. 2013. 51 McClellan, Chris. “What are composting toilets?” Mother Earth News, 1, Oct. 2010. Web. Jan. 2013.
“Solar Power - How Many Watts, Panels & Batteries Do You Need?” Solar Power World, 7, Jan. 2010. Web. Feb. 2013. 44 “SREC Registration Program.” New Jersey’s Clean Energy Program. Web. Feb. 2013. 43
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Studio Members Daniel Bowen is a Master of City Planning with a concentration in Land Use and Environmental Planning. A graduate of Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island, Bowen has a background in real estate, land use, and urban issues.
Krista Guererri is a Master of City Planning with a concentration in sustainable transportation and infrastructure. As a native of the Philadelphia region, she has long been interested in finding ways to make the area more livable. Krista is especially partial to the idea of using public transportation to revitalize urban communities and reduce traffic congestion. Krista graduated from Virginia Tech in 2011 with a BA in Public and Urban Affairs.
Kim Davies is a fourth year dual degree graduate student pursuing a Masters in Landscape Architecture and a Masters in City Planning with an environmental planning concentration. Prior to attending PennDesign she worked at Walker Macy, a landscape architecture firm in Portland, Oregon. She received a B.A. in Studio Art from Wesleyan University in 2007. Kim has a passion for sustainability, green infrastructure, and urban landscape systems.
Dearbhail (Derby) Halligan is a Master of City Planning with a concentration in Land Use and Environmental Planning. Derby has a BA in Environmental Studies from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Derbyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s planning interests include regional governance, zoning, land conservation, and urban environmental problems.
Corey Eilhardt is a Master of City and Regional Planning candiate. Her interests include economic development, real estate, and environmental land issues. A native to New Jersey, Corey has an especially strong affiliation to work in her home state.
Kristina Frazier is a Master of City Planning with a concentration in Land Use and Environmental Planning. Also holding a Certificate in Landscape Studies, Kristinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s academic interests include sustainable site design, green infrastructure planning, and urban forestry. Upon graduating, she hopes to pursue a career that mixes planning and design in an effort to build environmentally sustainable and aesthetically pleasing public spaces. 152
Sa Min Han studied Landscape Architecture (Master degree) and Urban Design (Certificate) at the University of Pennsylvania. She worked as a registered landscape architect and urban planner in Korea and Hong Kong for 6 years. Sa Min is interested in Urban Design related with natural interconnection.
Cristina Haworth is a Master of City Planning in the Land Use and Environmental Planning concentration. Cristina hails from Seattle and has a BA in Community, Environment, and Planning from the University of Washington. She is interested in using GIS and other innovative analytical tools to address environmental problems, especially hazard mitigation planning and coastal management.
Studio Members
Alex Hosford is a Master of City Planning with a concentration in Land Use and Environmental Planning. She is especially interested in environmental planning and its connection to the social and economic structures that define the places we live. She is a happy resident of West Philadelphia and hopes to always live within walking distance of 17 coffee shops and at least 2 farmers markets. Changyeon Lee is a Master of City Planning with a concentration in Land Use and Environmental Planning. Changyeon has a BS in urban engineering and a Master in Urban Plan degree from Hongik University in South Korea. Changyeon worked as an Assistant Master Planner at Cheil Engineering Co., Ltd.
Lauren A. Trice is a Master of City Planning with a concentration in Urban Design. She graduated in 2008 from the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia with a Bachelorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s of Arts in Historic Preservation. Before returning to graduate school, Lauren was as architectural historian on the eastern plains of Colorado and in the Washington, DC region. Lauren hopes to pursue a career community engagement and people based urbanism.
Sarah Richards is a Master of City Planning with a concentration in Land Use and Environmental Planning, and holds a BA in Architectural History from Virginia Commonwealth University. She loves the built and natural environments with equal fervor, and wants to dedicate her career to ensuring their peaceful coexistence far into the future.
Tracy Tzen is a Master of City Planning. She is concentrating in public / private development and has a passion for environmental and climate change issues. She received a Bachelor of Business Administration from Emory University and previously worked in the business development department of an architecture and engineering design firm.
Studio Members
153