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United States
Generals like to say that no plan sur vives fi rst contact with the enemy. Units able to improvise and devise alternatives should thus be able to seize opportunities. The notion was important in Iraq and Af ghanistan, where small units were often dispersed. It could be even more important in the vast expanse of the Pacifi c. China’s arsenal of medium and longerrange bal listic missiles makes large permanent bas es more vulnerable. American forces are moving towards more fl exible, dispersed forms of warfare. That will require the abil ity to detect enemy targets and strike them across long distances, and to push out sup plies to farfl ung units. It will also require those units to be more autonomous. America’s Marine Corps is keenest on the trend. Implementation, says Eric Flan agan, a spokesman for its commandant, David Berger, includes training recruits to “go out on a limb, think diff erently” and not fear failure. In November the marines announced a personnel revamp, Talent Management 2030. It tightens selection criteria to create a smaller, more indepen dent force. The incentives to reenlist have been expanded, with the aim of increasing its median age and therefore, it is hoped, military judgment. The plan also calls for recruiting midcareer professionals. The navy, too, sees mission command as central to its “distributed lethality” re confi guration: as antiship missiles prolif erate, the navy will operate in more scat tered fashion to avoid radio communica tions that can reveal its positions. The air force’s chief of staff told offi cers last year to “push decisions to the lowest competent, capable level”. Even the army is empower ing “privates and sergeants at the tip of the spear” to take action “without calling back to the mother ship”, says Mr Crissman. Control and command The war in Ukraine is a natural experiment in the value of mission command. Ukrai nian forces have used it well, partly thanks to three decades of democracy, however fl edgling, and years of training provided by Western allies. Some experts thought Rus sia’s army would embrace mission com mand with its modernisation, begun after its poor performance in Georgia in 2008. But the concept has proved anathema to an increasingly authoritarian system, says Nora Bensahel of Johns Hopkins Universi ty. Nor does it help, she adds, that many Russian soldiers are conscripts disinclined to give their “creative all”. Russia’s big mil itary exercises seem designed less for cul tivating problemsolving than for political signalling and propaganda. Rampant cor ruption and restrictions on speech dam pen, respectively, trust and critical thought—essential to mission command. What about China? As part of his quest to turn it into a “worldclass” military pow
The Economist July 9th 2022
Rebranding the Asian carp
Copicat NEW YO RK
To hook diners, an invasive species of carp gets a new name
W
hat’s not to like about Asian carp? Nutritious, mild and delicate in fl avour, it can be fi lleted, deepfried or minced into fi sh cakes—just mind the bones. But Americans do not care for it. For starters, they confuse the fi sh with the common (or European) carp that is a bottom feeder, a muchmaligned group. Yet tempting people to eat more Asian carp could boost biodiversity in rivers across America’s South and Midwest. With a new campaign, offi cials in Illinois hope to lure diners. The carp was brought from Asia in the 1970s to help clean aquafarms in Arkan sas. (They clear the water of plankton and algae, earning them the name of “fi lter feeders”.) From there they escaped into the Mississippi and propagated north ward, outcompeting native fi sh species for food. Now they are abundant in the Illinois River. Ecologists worry they will evade barriers in the waterways around Chicago and enter the Great Lakes, reduc ing the native fi sh diversity there.
Ceci n’est pas une carpe
er by 2049, President Xi Jinping has pressed for the introduction of modern weapons and the recruitment of more tal ented soldiers. But he also wants to step up their political education. Military com manders must ”ensure rigid adherence to party guidelines”, explains Blake Herzin ger, an American naval reserve offi cer who lives in Singapore. Should America ever fi ght China, a
In 2018 the Illinois Department of Natural Resources decided it would “recast” how Asian carp is perceived. Marketers were brought in. They cooked up a new name, which was released on June 22nd: copi (for copious). Nick Adam of Span, the agency behind the rebrand ing, says the goal was to shed the fi sh’s reputation as one only for adventurous eaters. Focus groups described copi as “cute” and “manageable”. Asian carp is not the fi rst to get a makeover. The Patagonian toothfi sh is marketed in America as Chilean sea bass (it is neither a bass nor native to Chile). The foulsounding slimehead has been much better known as orange roughy since the late 1970s. And managing in vasive species by harvesting them is not a novel idea either. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, a federal agency, exhorts people to eat lionfi sh, which threaten reefs along the Atlantic coast and in the Caribbean. Louisiana’s wildlife department off ers recipes for nutria, a semiaquatic rodent with an irrepressible breeding habit. Ragondin à l’orange, anyone? Lionfi sh is quite wellliked, notwith standing its 18 venomous fi n spines; the toothfi sh’s new name was such a hit that it arguably contributed to its overfi shing. But evidence is mixed about whether harvesting to control an invasive species is eff ective. With Asian carp, only larger fi sh are targeted for human consump tion. A study by researchers at Michigan State University recommended that fi shermen be given incentives to catch small ones too, for use in fertiliser and fi sh meal. But creating demand also risks im peding eff orts to reduce numbers. Prairie Rivers Network, an environmental group, has opposed the copi rebranding because it seems to “incentivise a long term sustainable carp fi shery in Illinois waters”. Much will depend on whether America’s gourmands cop on to copi.
more dynamic military culture should of fer an important edge. But as the confl icts in Iraq and Afghanistan showed, there is more to winning wars than eff ective mis sion command. What is more, says Jason Brown, a former airforce colonel, defence planners would be wise not to assume that every nondemocracy would perform as poorly as Russia’s army. China’s entrepre neurial spirit, he notes, runs deep. n
