Community Policing in the Philippines: A Critical View Raymund E. Narag Michigan State University, School of Criminal Justice 26 Baker Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824 naragray@msu.edu Tel no: 517-355-9537
The Philippines The Philippines is located in South East Asia where neighboring countries include Taiwan in the north, Vietnam in the west, Indonesia in the south and the Pacific Ocean in the east. It is composed of three major islands (Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao) but a total of 7,107 islands compose the entire archipelago. The Philippines has a current population of 95 million people making it the 12th most populous country in the world. Filipinos speak 8 major languages and 87 dialects and English is also considered as an official language. The Philippines was colonized by Spain for more than 300 years (1565-1898) where the elitist political, economic and social system originated. The Philippines was also colonized by the United States of America for 48 years (1898-1946) where the modern form of government was patterned. The Philippines practiced self-governance after World War II until 1972 when strongman Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law. When Marcos was toppled through “People’s Power” in 1986, succeeding governments had initiated efforts to re-democratize the Philippine political system. Among the agencies that were democratized was the Philippine National Police which had been used as an adjunct of the Philippine Military. In the following sections, this paper will provide a brief description of the formal characteristic of the Philippine National Police and the efforts to introduce Community Policing in the Philippines. It will then highlight the challenges of implementing Community Policing in the light of the formal characteristic of the PNP and the Philippine socio-cultural context. Given
these challenges, the paper will highlight the Barangay Tanod, an indigenous form of policing that is consistent with the tenets of Community Policing.
The organizational structure of the Philippine National Police The formal organizational structure of the Philippine National Police is characterized as unitary, centralized and top-down (Pilar et al., 2001; Varona, 2010).1 There is only one overarching national organizational structure where a National Director presides over the 140,000-strong police personnel. Under the National Director are national-level officers that are assigned particular administrative tasks. Below the national level office are 17 Regional Offices headed by Regional Directors supported by their respective staff. Under the Regional Offices are 79 Provincial Offices headed by Provincial Directors with their corresponding line officers. Supervised by the Provincial Directors are the City or Municipality Police Departments headed by their respective Chiefs of Police. The size of the city or municipal police departments depends on their population and economic classification. In bigger cities, the Police Departments could be subdivided into Police Precincts or Police Stations that correspond to a cluster of Barangays (the smallest political-administrative unit in the Philippines). This organizational chart is similar for the 16 Administrative Regions, except for the National Capital Region which is not composed of provinces but is instead composed of highly urbanized cities. In the National Capital Region, there are five Police Districts where cities like Manila and Quezon City, with populations exceeding a million people, have their own Police Districts. Other cities are clustered to create three more Police Districts (De Guzman, 2004).
1
The unitary, centralized and top-down character of the PNP could be directly traced from its historical origins as an adjunct of the Philippine Military (De Guzman, 2004).
This unitary, centralized and top-down setup suggests that the different local police departments have more or less similar personnel systems and goal setting mechanisms throughout the country (CPRM, 2005). For example, there is one major academic and training center, the Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA) where most of the “commissioned” officers (with the rank of Inspector and above) are educated and trained.2 Graduates of the PNPA can be assigned to any geographical area of the country. A police officer from the northern part of the Philippines, who is an Ilocano (one of the eight major ethno-linguistic groups in the country), can be assigned to the southern part of the Philippines where the major language spoken is Bisaya. In terms of personnel promotions, police officers can be transferred from one city, province or region to another, depending on where the current vacancy is (CPRM, 2005). Early in their careers, the commissioned police officers are also promoted at least every three years and, as such, could be regularly transferred to different localities to assume higher posts (CPRM, 2005). Therefore, all the local city or municipal police departments experience the same leadership and personnel policies: these units could be headed by police superiors who gained experience from a unit other than their own (CPRM, 2005). Having a unitary, centralized and top-down setup, the local police departments reflect the formal goals of the national leadership. These goals and priorities are developed by a cadre of national level staff officers who are technically trained for this purpose (De Guzman, 2004). These national “peace and order goals”, as commonly referred to in the Philippines, are usually designed to support the long term economic and social goals set by the national government (CPRM, 2005). The National Director of the PNP can issue a directive to the lower units for them to adopt these identified goals and priorities. 2
The PNPA is under the Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC) which also provides training for the Jail and Fire Bureaus. “Non-commissioned” police officers are trained in the 17 Regional Training Centers of the Police National Training Institute (PNTI), which is also under the PPSC.
Community Policing in the Philippines Like many countries in the world, the Philippines had been receptive to the tenets of Community Policing (ICPC, 2005). Police scholars and practitioners from the United States visited the country to share and train Filipino police officers on the philosophy, goals, mechanics and administration of Community Policing. A number of Filipino police delegates had visited United States local police departments to have a feel of what this new policing paradigm had to offer (US DOS, 2010).3 The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), a civilian body overseeing the Philippine National Police (PNP), through its Technical Committee on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice System, pilot-tested Community Policing in the city of Valenzuela, Metro Manila to determine its viability in urban settings (ICPC, 2005). International agencies like the National Democratic Institute (NDI) with funding assistance from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had also coordinated with local governments in Mindanao to determine its viability in the rural and far-flung areas (NDI, 2006).4 As a result of these exchanges and pilot activities, the PNP had incorporated the tenets of Community Policing in its statement of philosophy and national goals. In 1993, the PNP and the NAPOLCOM launched the Community Oriented Policing System (COPS) as the overarching guide to the National Strategic Action Plan (ICPC, 2005). The PNP had also developed administrative structures within its rank to be the forefront in promoting Community Policing ideas and practices. Depending on their sizes, local police departments (municipality, city and province) have standing Community-Police Action Centers (COMPAC) offices (CPRM, 2005). Additionally, community members were incorporated as overseers of police misconduct through
3
One recent example is the three week exposure trip of nine police officers from Sulu province where they visited police departments in Virginia and New York, a program sponsored by the United States Department of State. 4 Police departments in three Municipalities in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) where recipients of this project from 2002-2005.
the creation of the People’ Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) in every police departments (De Guzman, 2004). The PNP had also incorporated Community Policing as a basic course that all new recruits had to undertake before becoming a police officer (CPRM, 2005). It was proposed that advanced courses on Community Policing has to be undertaken by police officers aspiring for promotions (CPRM, 2005). Finally, local governments (municipal, city and province) were mandated by law to develop their own Integrated Area / Community Public Safety Plan (IA/CPSP) in cooperation with their corresponding police units (ICPC, 2005). As such, it can be said that the “formal elements” of Community Policing is present, in some form, in the Philippines. The rhetoric of Community Policing was echoed in the pronouncements of different Philippine Presidents, from the time of President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) (ICPC, 2005) up until the current administration of President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino, III. The Philippine legislature also endorsed Community Policing when it mandated that the PNP be transformed into a community and service-based organization with the passage of the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998 (ICPC, 2005). The different National Directors of the Philippine National Police also made references to the Community Policing as the desired philosophy and way of doing things in the PNP (Sanidad-Leones, 2006). Civic organizations, especially those that clamor for better peace and order situations in the country, are also very vocal in their advocacy that Community Policing be fully implemented (SanidadLeones, 2006).
Challenges to community policing Despite the formal adoption of the structures and rhetoric of Community Policing in the PNP, however, Community Policing, as originally envisioned, has not been fully implemented.
This paper identifies two of the reasons why there are roadblocks in implementing the ideals of Community Policing in the PNP. First, this paper explains how the structure of a unitary, centralized and top-down administrative setup of the PNP discussed above (De Guzman, 2004; Varona, 2010) creates a considerable restraint with the localized, bottom-up conceptualization of Community Policing (Goldstein, 1987; Peak & Glensor, 2002; Trojonowicz & Bucqueroux, 1998). As will be discussed, this limitation operates at the formal level of the bureaucracy. Second, and more importantly, the political-culture of patron-client relationship (Hutchcroft, 1998; McCoy, 2009; Sidel, 1996; 1997; 1999) that so pervades the Philippine social system makes the bottom-up tenet of Community Policing vulnerable to exploitation. In contrast to the first limitation, this roadblock operates at the informal level. On the other hand, while the elements and rhetoric of Community Policing may not be fully attained in the policing structures of the PNP, a more indigenous structure, called the “Barangay Tanod�, roughly translated as Village Watchmen, maybe more consistent with the philosophy, goals, mechanics and administration of Community Policing. Though the Barangay Tanod was originally conceptualized as an instrument of Martial Rule (Ruland, 1984; Varona, 2010) and it is not immune to the problems that beset the PNP (Austin, 1988), it is more rooted to the community thus offering a better potential (Austin, 1995). As such, this paper will also highlight the unique attributes of this indigenous structure and argues that the future of Community Policing in the Philippines, if there is one, should be drawn upon this locally embedded structure.
Challenges from the formal set-up of the Philippine National Police The unitary, centralized and top-down characteristic of the PNP that was discussed earlier poses considerable restraint to the realization of the tenets of Community Policing at the formal
level. For example, Community Policing emphasizes that the police personnel should be familiar with the local community conditions in order to effectively communicate with the people (Goldstein, 1987; Peak & Glensor, 2002; Trojonowicz & Bucqueroux, 1998). Community Policing also emphasizes that the police, as a department, and the police officers, at an individual level, need to be able to identify the most pressing problems in the community (Goldstein, 1990). While this Community Policing rhetoric are formally adhered to by the local police departments, and well-meaning efforts are instituted to meet this imperative, as described above, still, the realities of a unitary set up pose unique hindrances. For one, the leaders of the police departments (chief of police and the line staff) usually do not rise from the ranks of the unit but enter the police departments “laterally” (CPRM, 2005). The leaders of the police department are by design “newcomers” on the job. As such, the police leadership usually does not have a working knowledge of the conditions of the local jurisdictions that they are administering. A common feedback from police officers is that while they may have knowledge about the general peace and order problems like drugs and Jueteng (illegal gambling) that beset some communities, the knowledge they developed usually comes from jurisdictions that are not similar to their current appointments (CPRM, 2005; NDI, 2006).5 Additionally, the recurrent shuffling of commissioned officers, where they are regularly transferred to their next assignments, usually in a different city, province, or region as part of their system of promotions, indicate that they usually do not mature in their jobs (CPRM, 2005). A usual complaint among commissioned officers is that when they finally learned about the ins and outs of their current assignments, it is the time they are transferred to a new one (CPRM, 2005). Finally, there may be ethno-linguistic mismatch wherein the commissioned police officers do not speak the language of the local population. As previously mentioned, Ilocano-speaking police officers can 5
These claims are generally anecdotal. However, these are generally acknowledged in the Philippine media.
be assigned in non-Ilokano communities. Though English and Filipino (based on Tagalog) had been generally accepted as the language of government offices, including the Police, the local population still manifests preference to police leaders whom they consider to be part of their own ethno-linguistic communities (CPRM, 2005). Given these inherent mechanics in a unitary, centralized and top-down set up, the police departments may be continually challenged to establish relationships with the local communities they are serving. Local community leaders, on the other hand, need to continually adapt to the leadership styles of a newly installed chief of police whom they assume will be not stay long in their current appointments (CPRM, 2005). Finally, the formal programs that are co-managed with the community leaders are disrupted midway in their implementation once the police leaderships are assigned to their new jobs (CPRM, 2005). Community Policing likewise advocates that the goals set by the police departments must be articulated with the active involvement of the community members (Goldstein, 1987; Peak & Glensor, 2002; Trojonowicz & Bucqueroux, 1998). Community Policing encourages the community members to have an active ownership of where the police department is headed to. Having an ownership of these goals will increase the community members’ stake and will likely empower them to do their roles for the informal control of the community. Again, this Community Policing rhetoric is formally adhered to by the PNP. For example, the PoliceCommunity Relations offices conduct regular meetings with the community leaders and seek their inputs in setting the goals and priorities of the police departments. The local chief of the police departments are also “ex-officio” members of community-based “councils’ “boards” and “committees” that intend to integrate the police with other local government agencies and civic
organizations.6 However, the extent in which these formal inputs from the community generally become part of the actual local police department agenda is stifled by the unitary, centralized and top-down setup. As mentioned, police goals and priorities are identified in the national level and they simply trickle down to the local level. While some police departments maybe able to tweak the nationally imposed goals to meet the needs of the local communities, the national goals and priorities, with its attendant funding and personnel, still become the de-facto goals and priorities. Additionally, the formal merit and promotion systems are tied with the accomplishments of the national goals (for example, number of arrests per month) giving the local police personnel more pressure to achieve the nationally identified goals. Also, the pool of leadership of the PNP is concentrated to the commissioned officers, a class of personnel who are groomed to occupy national positions. By virtue of the higher posts they occupy in the local police department hierarchy, the achievement of the national goals is, by default, the priority. Finally, the adherence to the national goals, where the emphasis is usually on crime reduction, can turn the elements of Community Policing to suit the aims of traditional policing instead. There are instances where community based initiatives, like the Neighborhood Crime Watch, had been used by some police departments in their efforts to round out petty thieves and drug users. The police used the community volunteers as spies, or in Filipino parlance “aset� to dismantle the local crime organizations (Leones-Sanidad, 2006). Instead of empowering the community members in addressing the issues that cause crime (that is improving social relations among the residents; developing the community’s collective efficacy), volunteers are put in the forefront of directly combating crime, or pitting the volunteers against members of the insurgent groups, thereby promoting a heightened sense of community vigilantism, (Austin, 1995; Kraft, 2010; Kowalewski, 1992). 6
One such mechanism is the Peace and Order Council that is organized in every municipality, city and province.
It must be noted that this unitary, centralized and top-down characteristic of the PNP operates at the formal level. While this characteristic is important in understanding how the formal structures of the PNP collide with the localized and bottom-up tenets of Community Policing, a more important political-cultural trait that operates at the informal level poses a greater challenge to Community Policing.
Challenges from the culture of patron-client relationship While the formally defined unitary, centralized and top-down characteristic of the PNP runs in direct contrast with the localized and bottom-up tenets Community Policing, the political culture of patron-client relationship that so pervades the Philippine society, on the other hand, makes the localized and bottom-up tenet of Community Policing vulnerable to exploitation by some favored sectors. To have a better grasp of this dynamic, a brief description of the Philippine political culture is provided. While the police agency and other government entities in the Philippines are unitary and centralized, it is continually preyed upon by socio-economic elites whose power lies outside the government bureaucracy. Centuries of colonialism under Spain and United States created an elitist socio-economic class based initially on ownership of vast tracts of land (Agoncillo & Guerrero, 1974; Constantino & Constantino, 1978; Sidel, 1996). This landowning class eventually diversified into manufacturing and service industries as the country became integrated into the global economy (Hutchcroft, 1998). Most historians and political scientists attribute the longevity of this elitist class on their ability to capture governmental positions, the presidency and both houses of congress in particular, through the electoral contests (Kerkvliet, 1995; Sidel, 1996; 1997). Once a particular elite segment is in power, they would aspire to control the
governmental bureaucracy by appointing individuals who are sympathetic to their interests. To maintain power, elite families from different regions and provinces forge alliances with other elite families (McCoy, 2009). In the process, a hierarchy of elite power, as manifested by whether a family is national, regional, provincial and municipal elite, emerges. For aspiring bureaucrats, their appointment to desired governmental positions depends on the strength of the endorsement they can muster from the elites that are dominant in a particular jurisdiction. To be appointed as Chief of Police of a municipality, for example, a police officer needs the personalistic endorsement of a powerful politician, usually a town mayor, the congressperson or a provincial governor (CPRM, 2003; NCPAG, 2006). Without this favored political backing, the most meritorious applicant usually will not be able to get the job. In exchange of this political endorsement, the appointees are indebted to their patrons and will serve their patrons while they are in power (Sidel, 1996; 1997). This is not to say that all appointees work as a minion of the political patron, and there are individual variations in how appointees pay back the support. In general, however, the common expectation is that the appointees will remember the political favor initially given when intra-elite struggles necessitate the appointees to take sides. For some appointees, it is beneficial to nurture their relationships with the political elites since they can be assured of support as they aspire to go up in the administrative hierarchy. As they climb higher in the administrative totem pole, they can also develop the careers of lower level officers by serving as their patrons. In the process, they develop their own political base that could even propel them to higher positions. This political culture of patron-client relationship, while used to describe the Philippine National Police, can equally be used to describe other organs of the Philippine bureaucracy, including the judiciary and the military institutions (Bakker, 1997; Hernandez, 2002). In general, while Philippine bureaucracy have the formal outward appearance
of being unitary, centralized and top-down, the political, economic and cultural base dictates that its informal structure is decidedly localized and bottom-up. Given this patron-client relationship, local elites can manipulate the tenets of Community Policing to forward their particularistic interests. For example, a local city mayor may groom an aspiring police officer to be the Chief of the City Police Department. Despite the passage of the PNP law that instructs the Police hierarchy to appoint only from those who are qualified, the endorsement of the City Mayor usually counts as the more dominant criteria for appointment (CPRM, 2005; NCPAG, 2006; Varona, 2010). Not adhering to the endorsement of the local elites does happen and a growing number of professionalized police officials are clamoring for independence of the police from political meddling (CPRM, 2005). However, most police officers still report that they cannot afford to lose the support of local politicians. For one, the local City Mayor may withdraw financial support to the police department which may hinder the police from performing their day to day tasks (CPRM, 2005). More importantly, a Police Provincial Director who sidesteps the endorsement of the City Mayor may have his attention called by the Provincial Governor or District Congressperson who is an ally of the City Mayor. The Police Provincial Director may then risk the relationship he had with his own patrons. Upon appointment of a favored official, the local politicians may now use the police in the furtherance of their political interests. The local politicians may use the strong arm of the police to harass the businesses interests of their competitors (Sidel, 1996; 1997). For example, they can order the police to close known illegal gambling, prostitution centers and drug dens owned or operated by their competitors but at the same time, instruct the police not to meddle in the own illegal activities. In some extreme cases, the police serve as the personal bodyguards or private armies of the local politicians (Quimpo, 2009; Sidel, 1996; 1997). While there is a wide variation on the
involvement of local politicians in the illegal activities, and there is also a growing number of “enlightened politicians� who aspire to implement a clean and honest bureaucracy (Santos, 2010), still the widespread acceptance of the patron-client relationship ensures that the police is at the service of the local politicians. If the bottom-up tenet of Community Policing is adhered to, a more intractable problem of patron-clientilism is likely to evolve. For example, in Community Policing, police officers are encouraged to exercise discretion in the beat that they are assigned to. Community Policing assumes that every situation is unique and that police officers are given wide-latitude in finding solutions to the problems that they face (Goldstein,1990). Community Policing encourages police officers to tie up with the local community members and work closely in the identification of problems and implementation of solutions (Trojonowicz & Bucqueroux, 1998). While this setup works favorably in social systems that are more or less based on merit and rule of law, these tenets exacerbate the problems associated with patron-clientilism. For example, as police officers mingle with the community, they are likely to be enticed by some community residents to exercise favor in their behalf. Local business may provide gasoline for transportation, food and other resources to the individual police officers (CPRM, 2003).7 In exchange of these personalized favors, the police officers can offer their individual informal protection to the businesses from competitors or to turn a blind eye to their illegal activities (Sidel, 1996). Thus, in the guise of Community Policing, the individual police officers may develop favored relationship with certain members of the community and serve as their patrons. In the process, individual police officers can develop a power base of their own which can now challenge the formal police hierarchy. Errant individual police officers, known locally as scalawags,
7
One of the acknowledged problems facing the PNP is the lack of financial resources provided to its personnel, which forces them to engage in corrupt practices (CPRM, 2005; NDI, 2006);
(Moratalla, 2000) who have deeply embedded themselves in the protection of illegal gambling, drug dealing, prostitution and other criminal activities are quite difficult to be disciplined by the formal mechanisms of the police hierarchy. Given the acknowledged political culture of patron-clientilism, efforts to reform the Philippine National Police had entailed the strengthening of the unitary setup, centralization of power and the un-weaning of the police from the local politics (see generally the recommendations in the Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) of the Philippine Supreme Court, CPRM, 2003; 2005; 2006). Advocates of professionalism within the Philippine National Police push for the regular shuffling of the Chiefs of Police and other heads of department with the assumption that regular transfer would shield them from the corrupting influence of the local politicians. Advocates of professionalism also call for the strict adherence to formal procedures and the lessening, if not removal of police discretion. In the socio-cultural context of patronclientilism, therefore, there is an inherent assumption that to professionalize the Philippine National Police, it must strengthen the formal elements of centralization and top-down approach. As previously discussed, these formal elements of the bureaucracy also collide with the substantive tenet of Community Policing.
The Barangay Tanod as indigenous form of Community Policing The structure of Barangay was initially created by the Marcos regime in 1973 to strengthen the hold of the dictatorship among the local populace (Austin, 1988; 1995; Ruland, 1984). In the early seventies, a social movement in the cities and in the countrysides that clamored for reforms against the elitist nature of Philippine polity was threatening to topple the Marcos government. The Marcos dictatorial government countered by creating the Barangay
(villages) as the lowest political and administrative level of the government and used it as the mechanism to enlist the support of local community leaders (Ruland, 1984). Political analysts concede that this ploy had been largely successful: it tapped the Filipino attachment to the Barangay, where a cultural and religious identity had been previously fostered by centuries of Spanish colonialism (Austin, 1988). A Barangay is usually composed of tightly-knit extended families, with its own patron saint and fiesta. Additionally, local landowning elites embraced the creation of the Barangay as it provided them with the structure to provide altruistic services to the “masses�. The Barangay served as a structure to win over the hearts of the masses that had been politicized by the social movements that demand for land redistribution (Ruland, 1984). The Barangay Tanod, on the other hand, was created as the police auxiliary of the Barangay. As previously noted, the formal police structure was organized only at the municipal or city level where services were largely concentrated at the centro or municipal or city proper. As such, the police presence could be rarely felt in the Barangay level. During the Marcos dictatorship, however, the Barangay Tanods did not only serve as a police auxiliary, but also as the eyes and ears of the military against the activities of the insurgent communist groups operating in the rural and urban areas (Ruland, 1984). With the toppling of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 and the democratization efforts of the Corazon Aquino administration (Yu, 2005), the Barangay structure was weaned of its repressive role. The Barangay was reconceptualized to be the grassroots arms of the new government to provide basic services to the local population. In this structure, a town or city maybe composed of 10 to 100 Barangays with population averaging around 900 to 1500 residents. The Barangay officers were popularly elected rather than appointed by the town or city Mayors as practiced during the Marcos time. The Barangay Tanods, officially renamed as
Barangay Security and Development Officers (BSDO), were volunteers recruited from among the residents of the community (Sanidad-Leones, 2005). In most cases, they were representatives of the families or clans living in the Barangay. The Barangay Chairperson usually selects the members of the Barangay Tanod (Austin, 1995). To become a Barangay Tanod, community volunteers have to undergo a brief training and orientation of their roles and functions as a police auxiliary. The number of Barangay Tanods depends on the size of the Barangay but cannot exceed more than 20 in each Barangay (Caparas, 2000). In bigger Barangays, the Tanods could be subdivided to purok or neighborhood blocks. Most Tanods are provided with a chaleko or vests as basic uniforms. Some Barangays have also introduced a small amount of allowance which ranges from Php100 to Php500 (US$ 2 to US$10) per month. Barangay Tanods are also allowed to carry batuta or night sticks, usually made of rattan. They can conduct ronda or night watch and question strangers and teenagers roaming the streets (Caparas, 2000). They are the first to respond in cases of medical emergencies, floods and other disasters. They also assist the Lupon ng Tagapamaya or Peace and Order Committee, a special committee under the Barangay, which is tasked to mediate conflicts among residents. They can effect citizen arrests against those actually committing crimes (Sanidad-Leones, 2006). In urban areas, they are deputized to manage the flow of traffic (Caparas, 2000). In rural areas, the barangay tanods are usually called upon to control the behavior of local drunks (Austin, 1995). In its post-Marcos Martial law form, the Barangay Tanod is more consistent with the philosophy, structure, administration and mechanisms of Community Policing. They are more likely to generate support from the community residents due to their intertwining family and friendship networks (Austin, 1995). Unlike the Philippine National Police, the Barangay Tanods are considered members of the community and thus are more likely to be trusted. They can serve
as articulators of the needs and aspirations of the community residents. With their rootedness to the community, the Barangay Tanods are more knowledgeable about the crime situation that beset the Barangays. Thus, the Barangay Tanod can be considered as localized and bottom up in formal structure, a structure that corresponds to the tenets of Community Policing.
Conclusion The future of Community Policing in the Philippines must therefore incorporate this local structure. The Philippine National Police must design ways where it could incorporate the Barangay Tanods in their organizational set up. Currently, Barangay Tanods are managed exclusively by the Barangay leadership and they coordinate with the PNP only on an intermittent basis. For example, while some Barangay Tanods do receive training from the PNP (conducting patrol, mediating conflicts, dealing with drunks, etc), these training depend on the individual initiatives of the Barangay leaders and local Chiefs of Police. What is needed is a systematic and programmatic approach that will make these initiatives sustainable. Institutionalizing a relationship with the Barangay Tanods will maximize the rootedness of these volunteers to the community, enhancing the Community Policing philosophy in the PNP.
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