Journal of International Affairs
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Fall 2022
Patrick Henry College Volume 2, No. 1
Cover Image by Kathryn Eiler.
Cover Image by Kathryn Eiler.
VOLUME II, No. 1
Patrick Henry College | Purcellville, Virginia | www.phc.edu
The John Jay Journal for International Affairs is published twice during the academic year by the Caspian Project, a student run organization affiliated with the International Politics and Policy Program of Patrick Henry College.
John Jay was an American statesman who helped lay the foundation for America’s judicial system and foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the War for Independence. A key diplomat in the American founding, Jay secured wartime loans to the U.S. government from Spain and was a central negotiator to the Treaty of Paris, which formally conceded the United State’s independence. He would later negotiate the infamous Jay Treaty in 1794 with mixed results. An author of several of the Federalist Papers, Jay’s contributions discuss the dangers foreign influenced posed to the fledgling republic as well as the role of each branch of government in crafting foreign policy. Later, he was appointed the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court by President Washington, strictly upholding the high court’s political neutrality during his tenure. This journal takes his name in light of these immense contributions and the guiding role he played in pioneering American foreign policy during the nation’s founding.
Copyright © 2022. All rights reserved. Papers published in the journal do not necessarily reflect the view of Patrick Henry Colleges or the Caspian Project. Any correspondencecanbedirectedto:
Patrick Henry College 10 Patrick Henry Circle Purcellville, VA 20132 (540) 338 1776 caspianproject@phc.edu
Ian
A study of key aspects of Russia’s Africa strategy that makes it superior to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy: The synthesis of military and economic expansion.
Emma Fenton
A study of the Catalonian separatist movement and the possible roads to an independent Catalonian state.
Ellen Fischer
The paper will discuss the Israeli Palestinian conflict with data gathered from lectures, meetings, and interviews with various people on a month long research trip to Israel and the West Bank.
Elaina
Examining the impact of the loss of the single market with the EU by looking at trade data before and after Brexit. In addition, the impact Brexit has on businesses in the UK and outside the UK is also used to measure the effect. The impact of the COVID 19 pandemic on trade is considered as well.
Dear Readers, It is my honor to introduce the Fall 2022 edition of the John Jay Journal of InternationalAffairs. Upon reading the studies for this edition, I am reminded of the beautifully complex and multifaceted nature of international relations. One of the most fascinating, and perhaps most daunting, aspects of studying and writing about international affairs is the reality that each country has a rich history and unique culture that affects their every decision and interaction. The study of international relations requires an ever increasing interest in a wide range of disciplines. The authors of these studies did not hesitate to immerse themselves in the many disciplines that were intrinsically intertwined with their topic of interest. Thus, as you read these studies, you will not just be learning about the ways in which countries approach domestic and international issues, you will be gaining a better understanding of how history, economics, religion, traditions, and cultural values affect international relations.
The first study in this edition, authored by Ian Ishiyama, seeks to elucidate the motives behind Russia’s recent
involvement inAfrica and the methods it has used to increase its presence in the continent. Ishiyama describes Russia’s success in gaining influence among manyAfrican nations and the simultaneous decline in the United States’dominance inAfrica. This study provides a detailed analysis of the causes and effects of Russia’s interest inAfrica and presents multiple recommendations for United States foreign policy responses to this issue.
The author of the second study, Emma Fenton, provides a compelling analysis of the Catalonian separatist movement. Fenton utilized both quantitative and qualitative data to describe Catalonia’s controversial and tumultuous fight for independence. She examines the Spanish constitution, international law, and Kosovo’s similar journey toward independence. Fenton’s thorough analysis provides clarity on the legitimacy of Catalonia’s claim to independence from Spain.
Ellen Fischer, the author of the third study, investigates the root of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Fischer’s study contains fascinating first hand data gathered during a month-long trip to Israel and the West Bank. Her
qualitative study explores the religious, cultural, and political elements of the longstanding dispute.
The final study was written by Elaina Kilker. In contrast to the previous study, Kilker’s approach is primarily quantitative as she discusses the impacts of Brexit on the United Kingdom. She provides a detailed history of the UK’s economy over the years and concludes with the assertion that, overall, Brexit has had a negative impact on the UK’s business and trade.
I would like to thank theAssociate Editor of this journal, Emma Fenton, for her hard work and dedication to this semester’s publication. Her innovative ideas, excellent communication skills, and many hours of planning have been an essential part of bringing this journal to fruition.
I would also like to thank Howard Newman and James Hodson for their commendable efforts in editing these studies. Their thoughtful feedback and diligence as editors for this journal has been invaluable.Additionally, I greatly appreciate the meticulous work of our Copy Editor, Kathryn Eiler. This
journal would not have been possible without her creativity and perseverance.
This letter would not be complete without thanking the one who supervised and authorized the publication of this journal, Dr. Michael Haynes. The team is incredibly grateful for his continuous support.
My deepest gratitude extends to everyone reading this semester’s edition. I am honored to present these studies, and I hope that you are inspired to continue discussing the ideas and analyses introduced in this journal. Sincerely, ValkyrieArmstrong
Editor-in-ChiefHistorically, Russian interests in Africa have been limited to strategic Cold war objectives such as protecting communism’s international sphere of influence. In recent years, however, Russia has returned to its old expansionist policy in Africa with a new objective: To reinstate the Kremlin as a global superpower (Russell & Pichon, 2019).To realize this goal, Russia has had to weaken Africa’s relationship with the West, specifically the U.S. counterterrorism efforts in various African countries harboring Islamic extremists. Despite a lack of ties to Africa since the Cold War, Russia has made great headway in commandeering the political, military, and economic assets of many smaller African nations. By contrast, the United States has been gradually losing its dominance in Africa with two decades of counterterrorism failing to produce substantial results. The research in this paper suggests one key aspect of Russia’s Africa strategy that makes it superior to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy: The synthesis of military and economic expansion.
Key Words: Russia, United States, counterterrorism, Wagner Group, arms deals.
On February 24th, Russia began a full scale invasion of Ukraine (Newsy, 2022).
A week later, Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his war goals in a conversation with French President Emmanuel Macron. Putin’s primary objective is “the demilitarization and neutrality of Ukraine” (Opejobi, 2022). This would require the Ukrainian government to end its strong relationship with NATO and, by extension, with the Western powers that threaten Russia’s national security (Hodge et al., 2022). Although Russian advances in Ukraine and Africa may have different motives, the current war in Ukraine demonstrates Putin’s willingness to take extreme measures to defend Russian interests against Western military alliances. This Russian foreign policy bodes ill for other regions in which Russia has growing influence like Africa. The research question is how should the United States respond to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in Africa in light of Ukraine. The United States could double down on training native African security forces to conduct local counterterrorism operations. Alternatively, the United States could revert back to American led counterterrorism, deploying U.S. troops to support failing anti terrorist regimes. However, if the United States could diversify from its purely militaristic strategy, it may be able to kill two birds with one stone by discouraging African countries from accepting Russian aid while simultaneously combatting terrorism.
The issue of Russian expansion into Africa has been documented by both the European Parliament and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). Additionally, the importance of Western counterterrorism has been recorded by both the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) and the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
AFRICOM’s overview includes China in its threat analysis while the briefing provided to the European Parliament focuses solely on
Russia. The ACSS merely concluded that acts of terrorism are on the rise in Africa while the ECFR held specific Islamic extremist groups responsible for increased violence in certain African countries.
Analysis done by Grey Dynamics, a private intelligence firm, confirms that slackening U.S. involvement in Africa will encourage Russia to further expand (Baloi, 2020). Notably, an article in Sputnik International explains that the United States has already begun to shift the burden of counterterrorism onto local African security forces as Russia and China become the preeminent threats to American national security (Artyukhina, 2021). The irony of transferring U.S. forces out of Africa to defend against these two superpowers is that it gives Russia and China more freedom to expand into Africa. This highlights the importance of discussing the proper U.S. response to Russian expansion in Africa.
This research will provide a brief history of Russia’s post Cold War involvement in Africa. This historical preface will be split into two parts: the first will deal with Russia’s military operations and arms deals while the second will cover Russia’s trade pacts and seizure of African resources. This structure will allow this paper to analyze both the military and economic components of Russia’s Africa policy and what makes it so effective.
Following the preface, the research will cover the decline of Western counterterrorism in Africa by exploring AFRICOM’s most recent counterterrorism strategy. Additionally, the research will show that the amount of African terrorism has grown despite AFRICOM’s efforts. For sake of contrast, the research will examine the activities of the Wagner Group, a Russian Private Military Company, in stabilizing terrorist infested regions of Africa. Lastly, the Brookings Institution’s answer to the research question will be examined.
Source: PragueRussia has a singular goal: to regain influence in Africa. By early 2020, Russia had forces stationed in Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mozambique (Baloi, 2020). It is estimated that 2,300 Russian military personnel reside in the CAR alone. (McGrory, 2022). That same year, Russian armed forces, in conjunction with Russian PMCs, attempted to expand their operations by acquiring military bases in six additional African countries and by securing military alliances with 28 African states. (Lochnerer, 2020). Although Russian PMCs are unconnected to the Kremlin on paper, they nonetheless operate under its authority (Russell & Pichon, 2019). A PMC known as the Wagner Group has been especially effective at advancing Russian interests in Africa. Under the guidance of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Russia’s intelligence branch, Wagner Group forces backed CAR President Faustin Archange Touadéra when revolutionary threats against him peaked in 2018. Moreover, the 2,300 Russian soldiers currently present in the CAR are suspected to be Wagner mercenaries serving as Touadéra’s security force. (McGrory, 2022). Similarly, the Wagner Group is strongly suspected of cutting a recent deal with the African country of Mali in order to restore political stability to the region (Faulkner, 2022).
Russia’s military influence is further strengthened by its history of arms deals with Africa. From 2013 to 2017, 39% of all munitions imported into Africa were purchased from Russia, making Russia the premiere foreign arms dealer in Africa (Locherer, 2020). Algeria and Egypt, specifically, bought a total of $11.1 billion in weapons from Russia between 2009 and 2018. Russian armaments are durable yet competitively priced, making them an attractive option for African states with small or weak economies. Additionally, countries like Algeria and Angola prefer doing business with Russia due to their prior connections to the Soviet Union (Russell & Pichon, 2019).
The prime motivation for Russia’s military expansion is the economic payoff. For instance, there is a strong correlation between the increase in Russian arms deals and the increase in Russo African trade. Over an 8 year period, trade between Russia and Africa increased threefold, “from $6.6 billion in 2010 to $18.9 billion in 2018” (Locherer, 2020). This statistic represents the diversification of Russia’s economic interests in Africa. Russian overseas companies have already obtained oil, gas, diamonds, gold, aluminum and nickel from their operations in Africa, and increased military intervention promises to give Russia greater access to similar resources (Russell & Pichon, 2019). For example, during the Wagner Group’s initial campaign in the CAR, Moscow successfully petitioned the UN to allow Russia the exclusive right to conduct arms deals with the CAR despite the UN’s ban on CAR weapon imports. The Wagner Group then took possession of CAR diamond and gold mines as payment for the purchased Russian munitions and military support (McGrory, 2022). A similar deal was struck with Zimbabwe which gave Russia cheap access to the country’s platinum mines (Russell, & Pichon, 2019). The Wagner Group has also been active in Mozambique which is estimated to contain billions of dollars of natural gas. Moreover, the Kremlin agreed to support Libyan general Khalifa Haftar’s seizure of rich oil deposits in Southern Libya as long as Russia received kickbacks in oil (Baloi, 2020).
Russia has also made military treaties with Nigeria and Ethiopia, the two largest African countries in terms of population (McGrory, 2022). As of 2018, Nigeria boasted the 7th largest population in the world as well as a growing economy that was ranked 31st largest in the world (“Nigeria’s Location,” n.d.). Despite the global economic downturn due to COVID, Ethiopia’s economy showed remarkable resilience, growing by 6.1% in 2020. (African Development Bank Group, n.d.). Russia intends to further cement
John Jay Journal of Internationalcommercial ties with these expanding African economies at the second Russia Africa summit scheduled for November 2022 (Klomegah, 2022). During the first summit, Russia signed trade deals with 55 African nations. The ensuing treaties promised Nigeria a dozen Russian attack helicopters and offered to construct a Russian nuclear power plant in Ethiopia (The Exchange Africa, 2019). Although these agreements have yet to yield substantial effects, the second summit could further solidify Russo African relations (Klomegah, 2022)
Another factor driving Russian expansion is the failure of U.S. counterterrorism efforts to quell Jihadist violence in Africa. To understand this phenomenon, a brief review of the U.S. strategy in Africa is required. As of 2018, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has pursued a policy of counterterrorism through forming military partnerships and conducting joint exercises with Western and African partners (United States Africa Command, 2018a). Rather than involving U.S. forces directly, AFRICOM has opted for a more passive role by training local African security forces so that they can combat violent extremist groups (VEOs) more effectively (United States Africa Command, 2018b). The Flintlock training exercises hosted by United States Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), a sub-branch of AFRICOM, are an attempt to implement this policy in the Sahel region. Occurring once a year, the Flintlock project invites Western militaries to train with African armed forces in order to create local troops capable of suppressing Islamic insurgents (United States Africa Command, 2022).
AFRICOM’s 127 Echo program takes a similar approach, and its funding ballooned from $10 million to $100 million from the mid 2000’s to 2020. $100 million represents the current maximum amount that may be spent on “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” opposing terrorism according to
U.S. Code Section 127e, the namesake legislation that founded 127 Echo. The main goal of the project is to gradually transfer the burden of African counterterrorism from the U.S. to the local African countries (Rempfer, 2019). Reducing U.S. intervention in Africa is becoming an increasingly important issue as Russia and China become more active on the European and Pacific fronts. Should the 127 Echo project succeed, it would allow the U.S. to divert forces from Africa to more strategic areas on either front (Artyukhina, 2021). Nevertheless, statistics show the Western counterterrorism strategy has failed to prevent the rise of VEOs. Incidents involving African Islamic terrorist groups rose an astonishing 43% in 2020 alone. This trend of increasing violence began in 2016 and reached its peak in 2020 at 4,958 recorded acts of terrorism. That same year, the number of death due to terrorism in Africa increased 33% from 2019, totaling 13,059 deaths. Areas affected by this rise in terrorism include Somalia, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and Mozambique. Due to worsening political tensions in Somalia, conflicts between Somali forces and al Shabaab, an ISIS affiliated organization, increased from the previous year by 47% in 2020. Somalia’s statistics alone account for 66% of all violent altercations involving al Shabaab. In the Sahel, the number of terrorist related incidents in 2020 totaled 1,170, an increase of 44% from 2019. Similarly, the Lake Chad Basin has seen a 60% rise in terrorist incidents in 2020, an increase of 457 cases from the previous year. With the number of deaths spiking to 4,801, the Lake Chad Basin had the highest number of casualties of any African front as of 2020. While the Lake Chad area had the most terrorist related fatalities, Northern Mozambique had the largest spike in both terrorist events and fatalities rising by 129% and 169% respectively, the majority of terrorist activity targeting civilians. These numbers reveal that VEOs have grown increasingly violent and more confident in challenging state authorities. Thus, U.S. training programs have failed to bolster African militaries to the point where
they can suppress terrorism (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021).
Russia, the Counterterrorism Alternative With U.S. counterterrorism on the ropes, Russia sees an opportunity to compete with AFRICOM’s military influence by presenting itself as an alternative ally. Indeed, Russia’s numerous military alliances with African countries in addition to its extensive experience in arms dealing make it a viable competitor. Mali is a clear example of Russia’s competitive edge over Western military aid. Both the EU and France decided to withdraw their forces stationed in Mali on February 17th, 2020 (The Associated Press, 2022). In the withdrawal announcement, French president Emmanuel Macron blamed the Malian government for being unsupportive of Western counterterrorism efforts. “Victory against terror is not possible if it’s not supported by the state itself,” said Macron to the press (The Associated Press, 2022). The French withdrawal signaled the EU to recall Takuba, an EU task force stationed in Mali, on the same day (The Associated Press, 2022).
International grievances against Mali were further exacerbated when the Malian regime contracted the Wagner Group to add to their security forces. Macron believes that at least 800 Wagner personnel are currently in Mali and labels them a tool of Russian economic imperialism. He sees them as a lawless and violent group that contributes to Mali’s political instability (The Associated Press, 2022). Although Macron may be correct, Russia was able to replace Western forces in Mali by marketing the Wagner Group as a counterterrorism replacement. The Russian Foreign Ministry made a revealing statement in December 2021 that summarizes this tactic:
Russia will continue to support collective efforts geared to combat terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel region, to offer practical assistance to the countries of this region, including Mali, in terms of enhancing combat effectiveness of their armed forces, training servicemen and law enforcers. (Bhadrakumar, 2021)
While the Kremlin does not mention displacing the West, the result is the same. When Western counterterrorism in Africa fails, Russia is prepared to take its place through effective PMC infiltration.
Russia has used this strategy against the U.S. to keep potential African allies from falling under AFRICOM’s influence. For example, Nigeria and Ethiopia signed military contracts with Russia after similar U.S. deals were rejected. The U.S. Nigeria arms agreement would have sold $1 billion worth of weapons to Nigeria, while the U.S. Ethiopia agreement would have increased military aid to Ethiopia. However, concerns over Nigerian civil rights abuses and Ethiopian war atrocities caused the U.S. to back out. Over the next two months, Russia obtained military alliances with both countries. Through these treaties, Nigeria and Ethiopia compromised their sovereignty by surrendering their national security and resources to Russian control. Thus, Russia has gained a modicum of political influence in these nations through one sided military alliances (McGrory, 2022).
Since 2009, various studies have critiqued the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Africa. Skeptics have often argued that current policy actually increases, rather than curbs, terrorist activity. Recently, the opinion of U.S. legal experts has grown increasingly critical of AFRICOM’s strategy, labeling it as overly reliant on militaristic solutions. One suggestion is that the United States must diversify its counterterrorism strategy to include democratic reform for African governments and an increase in diplomatic relations with VEOs. While improving and cooperating with local governments has been at the core of most AFRICOM initiatives, critics are demanding a more holistic approach to counterterrorism involving greater political accountability, economic stability, and Western partnerships for struggling African nations. These three tactics would help prevent corrupt African governments nullifying U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, the prevailing model of
military action first, governance later makes any major changes to U.S. counterterrorism policy nearly impossible to accomplish (Minter & Schmidt, 2021). Nevertheless, the United States must increase its economic involvement in Africa in order to strengthen its influence throughout the continent. From 2010 to 2017, Russo African trade skyrocketed while US. African trade was cut in half. Likewise, the United States is no longer Africa’s largest trade partner, losing its spot among the top three in 2017. While the United States has retained unparalleled foreign investments in Africa, those investments grew little from 2010 to 2016 (Coulibaly, 2019). This U.S. stagnation stands in stark contrast to the increasing influence of non-Western actors in Africa’s economy. This data highlights the need for a more active U.S. economic policy in Africa.
To this end, Dr. Brahima Coulibaly, a senior fellow and director of the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution, offers three potential solutions. First, the United States must set forth a straightforward but thorough policy regarding its long term goals in Africa. Such goals must prioritize bolstering commercial trade by maximizing the potential economic benefits for both countries. Coulibaly sees U.S. investment in African infrastructure as an important step toward realizing this new pro business policy. Second, the U.S. must fully utilize its African holdings under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the president must appoint a federal official capable of overseeing African economic development. As of 2019, the USAID owned three trade centers in Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa. Coulibaly suggests that expanding these centers could better inform U.S. businesses of investment opportunities in Africa, thereby reducing investing risk that deters potential commerce. A U.S. Africa policy overseer would help coordinate the USAID’s activities and prevent unfair African business practices from hurting American investors. Third, U.S. Africa summits must occur regularly. The first and last U.S. Africa
Leaders Summit occurred back in 2014 and boasted $14 billion in investment deals between U.S. businesses and African leaders. These positive results highlight not only the effectiveness of summits but the potential of follow up summits to reaffirm commercial commitments (Coulibaly, 2019). In fact, the Biden administration announced that they were going to hold the second U.S. Africa Leaders Summit sometime in 2022 (The White House, 2021).
While Coulibaly’s analysis could be incorrect, it does highlight the importance of expanding the U.S. strategy in Africa beyond mere military intervention and into the realm of economic competition. In these terms, Russia has a leg up on the United States as its military and economic strategies are inherently linked. When African countries accept Russian military assistance, they are forced to pay in natural resources, creating economic ties to Russia in the form of debt. Thus, Russian arms and PMCs effectively compromise African sovereignty by exploiting the economic and military needs of weak governments. The United States has already tried overthrowing these governments to no avail. U.S. trained operatives changed the Malian regime twice only to have the EU pull out as the Wagner Group took control of Mali’s security forces (Artyukhina, 2021). The Mali debacle exposed the flaws of Western counterterrorism, justifiably bringing U.S. strategy in Africa into serious question. Until the United States incorporates a broader economic component into its Africa policy, it will be at a disadvantage when combating Russia’s synthesis of military and economic exploitation.
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This is a study of the Catalonian separatist movement and the possible roads to an independent Catalonian state. Events of the past 20 years have greatly increased tension within Catalonia. Separatist leaders like Puigdemont have harnessed this pressure to take the Catalonian independence claims international. Between appeals to the Spanish Constitutional Court and to international law, Catalonia has been unable to find a path to legal secession. Moreover, it is questionable whether all of Catalonia’ s population supports secession as the region becomes more diverse. This concern and the lack of a legal route to independence demonstrate that Catalonia does not have a clear claim to independence.
Key Words: Catalonia, Separatist, Secessionism, International Law, Puigdemont
The ethnocentric European state has flourished since the dawn of statehood c. 700 AD. Humanity naturally groups with those who share their culture, language, and heritage. Groups like the Franks used their shared culture to become sovereign nations. As the role of ethnocentric nationalism dwindles in Europe, people groups such as the Catalonians, the Scottish and the Crimean Tatars live in perpetual flux between self government and forced submission to the reigning government. The journey of Catalonian independence began several hundred years ago and still makes headlines with moving demonstrations and large protests. The legitimacy of their potential secession resides in a few specific clauses under international law that would allow them to unilaterally secede from Spain. Another path might entail joining the European Union. Additionally, the Spanish Constitution also offers the possibility of secession through grueling constitutional reform. This paper will discuss the available pathways for Catalonian independence from Spain and the possibility of their success. The research question is whether Catalonia’s claim to secession is viable by the standards of Constitutional or international law. The hypothesis is that Catalonia does not have a viable claim to independence under the current Spanish Constitution or the modern holdings of international law.
The tumultuous story of Catalonian statehood begins with Catalonia’s first attempt at unilateral independence in 1931. This claim was crushed by dictator Francisco Franco in 1938 as he swept across Spain unifying all the nationalistic ethnic groups. Because his oppressive regime removed Catalonia's historically protected right to self government, Catalonian anger and resistance grew. Upon the death of Franco in 1975, Catalonia reestablished the Generalitat or Catalonian Parliament. In the following years, Catalonia gained the distinctions of an Autonomous Community and Historic Region in Spain as
enumerated in the Spanish Constitution. These key designations gave Catalonia the power to self govern and the stability from the Spanish constitution to protect this right (Anderson, 2017). The Statue of Catalonia or their regional constitution was amended by the Catalonian Generalitat in 2006. This was submitted to the Spanish Government for approval and later struck down by the Constitutional Court of Spain in 2010. This denial sparked social upheaval and large demonstrations by over a million Catalonians (BBC News, 2010). This protest was called, “La Via Catalana (the Catalan Way) [and] linked an estimated 1.7 million people in a huge human chain calling for independence” (Anderson, 2017, p. 59). In the following elections, the separatist movement gained traction, and eventually they won a parliamentary majority in 2015. In 2017, tensions mounted as the newly separatist Generalitat held a referendum across Catalonia voting on independence (Anderson, 2017) This action is democratic; however, referendums of this nature were ruled illegal and unconstitutional by the Spanish constitutional court after a similar independence referendum in 2014 (BBC News, 2019).
In September 2017, the Spanish government “stressed that such a vote would be illegal and unconstitutional, so would be blocked” (Anderson, 2017, p. 59). The Catalonian parliament proceeded anyway. This action was met with a show of force by the Guardia Civil or Spanish police. Unfortunately, this police force was asked to stop the vote, and they used aggressive force to, “[confiscate] ballots and even beat people who tried to vote” (Casey& Minder, 2021). This deepened the fissure between the Spanish government and the Catalonian government. The President of Catalonia at the time, Carles Puigdemont, encouraged the separation, and eventually on October 10th, 2017, Puigdemont signed the Catalonian declaration of independence from Spain. This forced the hand of the Spanish government, and they invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution (Anderson, 2017). This clause allows Spain to “take all measures necessary to compel [an Autonomous]
Community to meet said obligations, or to protect [Spain’s] general interest” (Constitute Project, 2022, p. 37). The Catalonian reaction was unsurprisingly negative, and across the country, “Catalan politicians encouraged officials to defy takeover attempts” (Anderson, 2017, p. 60). Many separatist politicians were charged with sedition and rebellion, and were given large amounts of jail time by the Spanish government. President Puigdemont fled from Spain to Belgium to seek asylum and appeal his extradition to Spain in Belgian court (Anderson, 2017, p. 60). Despite the dramatic and decisive events of this Catalonian revolt, “the response from the European Union was indifferent to the Catalonian claims, respecting the judicial independence of legal system in Spain” (Troitiño& Kerikmäe,2021, p. 14). Considering this international indifference, the current Catalonian regime has focused on bargaining internally with the Spanish government for release of prisoners. More importantly, they also wish to obtain amnesty for Puigdemont. This fight is headed by Catalonian President Pere Aragonès (Casey& Minder, 2021). Talks between President Pere Aragonès and Prime Minister of Spain Pedro Sánchez have resolved some tensions between Spain and Catalonia; however, they are far from reconciliation. During Puigdemont’s exile to Belgium in 2017, he began a movement that dovetailed off the migrant crisis in 2016 using the motto, ‘Shame on you, Europe’. Puigdemont gathered a large parade of people in Brussels to march for the independent Catalonian state with the above motto written across a large banner (Troitiño& Kerikmäe,2021). This appeal was obviously pointed at the European Union; however, the EU has remained largely unbothered by the Catalonian Crisis. The EU has respected and acknowledged other separatist movements like that of Kosovo in recent years. Comparisons were drawn between Kosovo which recently broke from Serbia in 2008 and Catalonia as “warnings about the possible bloody conflict in Spain similar to Balkan ones became very popular” (Metodiev, 2018, p. 280). These
concerns for a violent uprising in Catalonia have largely disappeared as the COVID 19 pandemic took over the news cycle. Kosovo is undergoing the process of joining the European Union which would offer profound economic stability for their fledgling country (European Commission, 2021). Catalonia also hopes to gain EU membership. Membership has been viewed as a fast track to Catalonian independence; however, the EU “became part of the problem when the EU institutions, or any member state, did not support the self proclaimed independence of Catalonia” (Troitiño& Kerikmäe,2021, p. 15). However, even to this day, Catalonian separatist leaders use “this strategy of an ideal Catalonia, democratic, prosperous, tolerant, and open to the European ideals . . . [to provoke] the moral obligation of the European Union to interfere” (Troitiño& Kerikmäe, 2021, p. 12). Additionally, Catalonia has turned to history to support its cause. “The Catalan Way” demonstration in 2013 was “an imitation of the Baltic Chain” (Troitiño& Kerikmäe,2021, p. 13). This allusion to the oppressed Baltic states under the Soviet Union proved ineffective in achieving their goal of stirring sympathy in the hearts of the EU members. Through the EU’s consistent support of the federal and legal role of the Spanish government, the EU has eliminated another pathway to Catalonian independence.
Analyzing the validity of a separatist movement is a difficult task as it balances the cultural history, in this case, constitutional law of the governing country, and international law surrounding sovereignty. This collection of information was completed through examining the history of Catalonia as an autonomous community, the political situation in Catalonia as it has developed over the past 15 years, the international precedents for separatist movements found by comparing Catalonia and Kosovo, the possibilities under international law, and the current demographics of Catalonia. Other information was collected by examining
the words of the separatist leader Puigdemont and assessing the current political climate between Spain and Catalonia. Additionally, Spanish constitutional clauses surrounding the rights of autonomous communities were examined and compared to the constitutional holdings of the Spanish Constitutional court in reference to Catalonia.
Through comparing Kosovo and Catalonia, helpful data was gleaned in assessing the Catalonia claim to independence. Although Kosovo and Catalonia are very different, they were both led at one point by separatist leaders wishing to create an ethnocentric nationalist state in Europe and both attempted secession between 2000 2010.
Data was also collected from the international law clauses discussing colonies. This is relevant because separatist leaders have considered Catalonia a colony of Spain due to Dictator Franco’s suppression of Catalonia. Demographics of Catalonia are also important to consider as the ethnic background of the people might indicate the need for a Catalonian state. Also, the fervor of the people is crucial to the life of a secession movement. This data will be collected by analyzing opinion polls.
To test the hypothesis, the information was examined. Qualitatively, the Spanish Constitution, a comparison to Kosovo, and international law were studied to evaluate the legal possibility of secession. Quantitatively, demographics and opinion polls were examined to determine the outlook of the Catalonian people.
Within Spain, Catalonia retains many rights. These rights include “self government for the management of their respective interests” (Constitute Project, 2022, p. 31). The Catalonian government violated a constitutional clause with their referendum in 2017. The federal role of the Spanish government includes “authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums” (Constitute Project, 2022, p. 35).
This explains the reasoning behind the invocation of Article 155 which allowed Spain to take over the Catalonian government. While this proves the referendum itself is unconstitutional, there remains the question of whether the content of the referendum, the question of Catalonian independence, should be considered legal or illegal.
When Catalonia Generalitat produced a ‘Declaration of sovereignty’ in 2012, the members of a conservative party, Partido Popular or Popular Party “challenged the Declaration before the Constitutional Court, which found the Declaration’s sovereign assertions to be unconstitutional” (Ragone, 2017). The main issue with unilateral independence of Catalonia lies in the fact that Catalonia is a part of Spain according to the laws and Constitution of Spain. If Catalonia wishes to become independent, they cannot appeal to the court of international political opinion to establish their claim. They must make an internal agreement with their fellow Spaniards to secede from Spain. For example, on the issue of the referendum of 2017, “many scholarly commentators agree that such a consultative process must engage the entire Spanish population” (Ragone, 2017). The best possible pathway to begin this conversation between Spaniards and Catalonians is to open a dialogue to eventually propose an amendment to the constitution under article 168 . This would require a two thirds majority; however, it remains the only viable option for a legally independent Catalonia (Ragone, 2017).
There remain concerns over the Spanish Constitutional Court presiding over the possible secession of Catalonia. As Catalonia is a very economically profitable state, the loss of Catalonia would hurt the Spanish economy. Therefore, the possibility of bias by the ruling Court is concerning. The Spanish Constitutional Court has ruled against Catalonia's independence consistently, and in order to enforce their decisions, the Court is now “assigning what appear to be disproportionate fines to individuals supposedly disregarding its findings” (Weller, 2017). One of these landmark decisions was
the rejection of the new Catalonian Statue in 2010. This story begins in 2006 when Catalonia was given more powers over healthcare and education in negotiations with the Spanish Government. They were even given the title, ‘nation.’ The Spanish Constitutional Court redefined this agreement and denied their status as a ‘nation.’ They were relabeled as a ‘nationality.’ This caused large protests across Catalonia (Metodiev, 2018).
The Kosovo Comparison
There have been additional comparisons between Kosovo and Catalonia as Kosovo successfully although painfully declared unilateral independence from Serbia in 2008. The Declaration of Independence of Kosovo was considered justified by the International Court of Justice as “the declaration was not issued by the elected representatives of Kosovo acting as an organ of the state from which secession was sought” (Weller, 2017). This is not the case in Catalonia as the Catalonian government acts as agents of the Spanish Government to carry out their economic and political goals. Therefore, Catalonia cannot claim the right to unilateral secession. The divide between Spain and Catalonia will only exacerbate Catalonia’s ability to make peace and detach from Spain. Similar to the situation in Kosovo, both the Spanish and Serbian (Yugoslavian) governments overextended their reach and removed rights from the hands of their autonomous communities. This removal of rights cost the Spanish government a large amount of political capital, perhaps too much (Metodiev, 2018).
International Law
Catalonia wishes to claim special status international more specifically, privileged secession. Privileged secession is bestowed upon countries under a historically imperialistic rule. This entitles them to rights of self determination afforded exclusively to colonies as enumerated in Part 1, Article 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights. This gives them the ability to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and
cultural development” (United Nations, 1966). This would be an effective tool to secede from Spain securely and efficiently; however, the simplistic nature of the clause is juxtaposed “by its restrictive field of application in the colonial context . . .and by the fact that the doctrine generally only applies at one single moment in time” (Weller, 2017). Catalonia experienced this in some form during Dictator Francisco Franco’s reign over ‘United Spain’. During his rule, Franco abolished self government in 1938 (Anderson, 2017). He suppressed the cultural aspects of the Basque and Catalonian nationalities. He outlawed the Catalonian language from being learned officially and forced cultural assimilation (Metodiev, 2018). This suppression ended after Franco’s death in 1975. Under the current Spanish government, Catalonia is an autonomous community with additional freedoms in comparison to other ethnic groups or regions in Spain. This distinction merely shows that the time of Catalonia colonial suppression has passed, and the new Spanish regime should not be considered an imperialist state because of Franco’s policies. However, the current Spanish government can repress and exclude the Catalonia government to enact this clause (Weller, 2017). It is questionable at best to believe that the oppression of Catalonian culture has reached heights of colonialism.
Demographics of Catalonia However, the central Spanish government has failed to protect the interests of Catalonian citizens as separatist leaders have divided the region. The political makeup of Catalonia is deceiving as the vocal separatist leaders of Catalonia do not dictate the thoughts of all the people. For example, el Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, the polling agency of the Catalonian regional government, found that in 2014 only forty percent of Catalonian residents supported separatist political parties (Tobeña, 2021). This is likely due to the large number of migrants to Catalonia from other Spanish regions who are Spanish but not Catalonian. These two groups create deep division in Catalonia as Catalan speakers “tend to have
majority support for secession, and places with a clear predominance of native Spanish speakers or mixed speakers . . . tend to have a majority that prefer to remain a part of Spain” (Tobeña, 2021, p. 9). This conundrum reveals the many nuances of the Catalonian crisis. The Spanish government has neglected to react quickly and decisively to this crisis. Before the inaction of Article 155 or direct governmental involvement, the Spanish government left the Catalonian problem up to the Spanish Constitutional Courts instead of directly addressing the concerns of both the separatists’ parties and the greater population. Ideally, Spain should have opened a dialogue with the separatist leaders of Catalonia to find a noncompulsory peaceful path to separation or used federal power to preserve unity. Catalonian separatist leaders may not have the opportunity to create more momentum for their cause as support for independence dwindles in the younger generations. Opinion polls report that the percentage of Catalonians in age groups 18 24 and 25 34 largely supported independence in 2014. 64.6% of 18 24 year olds and 68% of 25 34 year olds supported independence. This took a drastic turn in 2021 as only 39.1% of 18 24 year olds and 42.7% of 25 34 year support independence. As these generations will soon become the leaders of Catalonia the current pro secession sentiment may dissipate (Beizsley, 2021).
The claims of the Catalonian secession movement were evaluated by examining the Spanish Constitution, a comparison to Kosovo, and international law. Additionally, demographics and opinions of the next generation of Catalonians were analyzed to examine the sentiment of the people. This research was intended to display whether Catalonia has a legitimate claim to declare independence from Spain under the current Spanish Constitution and the holdings of international law.
Through the analysis of the autonomous communities clauses in the Spanish Constitution, Spain was within its full legal
right to take control over Catalonia because it was in active violation of the Spanish Constitution. Unless Catalonia submitted an amendment to the Constitution there is no clause in the Constitution that would allow them to legally secede. This invalidates the claim that Catalonia is entitled to the complete right of self determination under the Spanish Constitution. They remain a part of the Spanish state.
The contrast between Kosovo and Catalonia displays that Catalonia lacks the support of the international community to unilaterally secede from Spain. Only through the recognition of the International Court of Justice could Kosovo make viable and legal claims.
Through the examination of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Catalonia’s claims to the right to self determination as a colony are invalid as Catalonia was never a colony under the current Spanish government.
When analyzing the demographics and opinion polls of the current residents of Catalonia, it was found that separatist sentiment has died down considerably as the region has become more diverse. As the people of Catalonia change, so shall the political situation. Considering the legality of the Catalonia independence movement under the Spanish Constitution and international law, it can be concluded that Catalonia does not have a viable claim to independence. Catalonia has no option to secede legally under the current Spanish Constitution and international law does not expand the right to self determination to regions that were not victims of imperialism. Additionally, Catalonia does not have viable international support as in the case of Kosovo. Finally, the general sentiments of the Catalonian people have changed dramatically over the past ten years, and the separatist movement may not have a future in Catalonia.
Looking forward, Catalonia may never become an independent state as the population of Catalonia grows more diverse and less ‘Catalonian’. The Catalonian culture and language will surely stand the test of time as
this region has been able to capture the attention of the world through their fervor for independence. This failure of this ethnocentric nationalist state is surprising as one’s ethnicity was once a crucial building block to creating a functional state. Ethnicity unified the Italian states in 1870 and the German states in 1871; however, this age of ethnocentric nationalism has slowly ended. Kosovo might be one of the last successful secessionist movements in Europe for some time. As globalization makes its mark on Europe, one can only wonder how this will affect the United States, a country not based on ethnocentric devotion but patriotism. This leaves the world to ponder if ethnocentric cultures will truly stand the test of time.
If further research was undertaken there should be an examination of the role of ethno centric nationalism in state building or a study in the decrease of ethnocentric nationalism in Europe. A study of this nature would benefit the study and performance of international politics as the wave of globalization overruns European nationalism.
Anderson, A. B. (2017). Commentary: The roots of Catalan identity and ethno nationalism. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 16(3), 55 63. https://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/ publications/JEMIE/2017/Anderson3.pdf
Casey, N., & Minder, R. (2021, September, 23). In bid to end secession dispute, Spain tries talking with Catalonia. The New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/2021/09/15/world/ europe/catalonia spain sanchez aragones.html
BBC News. (2010, July 10). Catalan protesters rally for greater autonomy in Spain. Retrieved theeee March 12, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/news/10588494
BBC News. (2019, October 18). Catalonia’ s bid for independence from Spain explained.
Retrieved March 12, 2022, from https:// www.bbc.com/news/world europe 29478415
Beizsley, D. (2021, June 18). Young Catalans wanted a country. They'll settle for a steady paycheck. POLITICO. Retrieved March 15, 2022, from https://www.politico.eu/article/ spain catalonia independence movement youth unemployment identity nationalism/ Constitute Project. (2022, April 27). Spain’ s Constitution of 1978 with amendments through 2011. https:// www.constituteproject.org/constitution/ Spain_2011.pdf?lang=en
European Commission. (2021). Kosovo. https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood enlargement/enlargement policy/negotiations status/kosovo_en Metodiev, K. (2018). Catalonia and Kosovo cases (comparative analysis). In D. Prorokovic (Ed.), Kosovo: Sui generis or precedent in international relations (pp. 273 298). http://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/ pdfknjige/2018_Kosovo_Dusan_Prorokovi c.pdf#page=274
Puigdemont, C. (2017, October 31). Speech of President Carles Puigdemont Brussels 31st October 2017. POLITICO. https:// www.politico.eu/wp content/ uploads/2017/10/Speech of President Carles Puigdemont Brussels 31st October 2017.pdf
Ragone, S. (2017). The Catalan referendum on independence: A constitutional conundrum. American Society of International Law, 21(16). https:// www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/16/ catalan referendum independence constitutional conundrum
Tobeña, A. (2021). Fragmented Catalonia: Divisive legacies of a push for secession. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers/Policy Network.
Troitiño, D. R., & Kerikmäe, T. (2021). Catalonia, Spain, and the European Union: A quest for legitimacy. Trames Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 25(1) 3 18. https//doi.org/10.3176/tr.2021.1.01
United Nations. (1966, December 16). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. https:// www.ohchr.org/en/instruments mechanisms/instruments/international covenant civil and political rights
Weller, M. (2017, October 18). Secession and self determination in Western Europe: The case of Catalonia. EJIL:Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law. https://www.ejiltalk.org/secession-and-selfdetermination-in-western-europe-the-caseof-catalonia/
The paper will discuss the Israeli Palestinian conflict with data gathered from lectures, meetings, and interviews with various people on a month-long research trip to Israel and the West Bank. Based on this data gathered from a diverse range of viewpoints, this paper will explore the root cause of the conflict and if there is hope of solving year dispute. The research reveals a struggle running far deeper the root of the conflict being the Palestinians fear that their culture and very identity is on the brink of cultural extinction.
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I had known she was going to do a suicide attack that morning I would not have let her take a butter knife, I would have given her a gun.” The alleyway in the West Bank grew still as everyone absorbed the shocking statement just made by the man sharing the story of how his children died, “Violence is the only way to peace, there is no other way” (Father in the West Bank, personal communication, July 19, 2022). The group of Americans quietly followed the tour guide away from the printing shop to a private corner where he turned around and said, “No one believes me, but you just heard it with your own ears. These people are serious the only solution they believe in is violence” (Romi, personal communication, July 19, 2022).
The Palestine Israeli conflict, a conflict now lasting over 70 years, continually faces the imminent threat of a war. This conflict, the most widely known conflict in the Middle East, has led to countless seminars, diplomatic meetings, and the loss of those who died trying to bring peace to the region. To a Westerner, it seems absurd that whole generations have come and gone and people still hold on to grudges and refuse to agree on peace terms, but this is the error of approaching international politics with the goal of immediate peace. The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is not something new in the last 70 years, but a deep dislike spanning back centuries. Peace is only possible when both sides decide to find a way to let go of their hate and ensure the other’s culture and identity is preserved.
What is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? A brief history lesson is necessary before diving into why this conflict is of interest to the world. Palestinians commonly refer to the land that now consist of Israel as the original Palestine territory. After the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D., no Jews have ruled over the land, though they claim it has belonged to them since the time of Abraham over 2,000 years before. After 135 A.D., the land became known as Palestine; in reference to the Philistines from long ago (Miller, 2021). Never
once has Palestine had the opportunity to become a state of its own, but rather it was constantly occupied by Muslims, Crusaders, Ottoman Turks, and finally the British before Theodor Herzl created the first Zionist Congress in 1897 (Gordis, 2016). Herzl is credited with creating the Zionist movement and planting the seed for Jews to begin wanting a homeland of their own.
After defeating the Ottomans, Britain occupied Palestine from 1918 1948 before they decided to leave and avoid getting involved in the rising conflict between the Arabs and Jews in the territory. On May 14, 1948, before Shabbat descended on the land that evening, Israel declared herself an independent state. On May 15, 1948, Britain left Israel and 5 countries declared war on the day-old state. The following years saw multiple wars from the War of Independence (1948 1949), the Six Day War (1967), the Yom Kippur War (1973), the First Intifada (1987), and various other skirmishes (Gordis, 2016).
Today, there is a small territory called the West Bank that is sectioned off into three areas: Area A, controlled entirely by the Palestinian Authority where no Jews are permitted (signs along the road threaten penalty of death to Jews who disobey), Area B, under shared controlled between Israelis and the Palestinian Authority, and Area C (60% of the West Bank), controlled by Israel but with a mixed population of Palestinians and Jewish settlers (Anera, 2022).
50% of Jews came to Israel from Arab speaking countries this is often why the politics of the region are confusing. Despite Israel being classified as a Western country, much of its population is from the east and came with very different sets of values, traditions, and ideals. Thus, the research question of the paper is analyzing the root cause of the conflict between Israel and the territory of Palestine.
The content of this paper is entirely derived from a month long trip spent in Israel with an organization called Passages Israel on
their Alumni Advance trip. All sources and material are directly from notes taken during the trip or lectures from professors at Israeli universities. Where necessary to ensure data accuracy, dates and numbers have been researched and cited.
Throughout the month on the ground in Israel, nearly the entire state was visited: from Beersheba, Jerusalem, the Galilee, Tel Aviv, and many places in between. Each stop was led by a tour guide native to the region and full of information regarding the history and present day circumstances. Almost every day contained a lecture with topics and expertise ranging from all over the political and cultural spectrum.
The trip was planned intending to instill a deep understanding of the cultures in the region not only of Israelis but of Palestinians, Bedouins, ethnic Jews, Arab Christians, the Druze, Ethiopian Jews, and other smaller minorities. Topics consisted of the water crisis in Israel, agriculture, technology, the history of the Jews, Zionism, and Christianity, the modern Jewish state, the Gaza border, US Israel relations, the situation in the West Bank, the history of the conflict with Lebanon and Syria, and how to partake in peace building and conflict resolution. The expert lecturers ranged from Hebrew University professors, media, government officials, historians, and perspectives from all sides of the conflict.
This paper will explore the various opinions, ideas, and history encountered on the trip to present a holistic view of the presentday conflict. Each section will explain a topic discussed during the trip and present the views of the people informed of the situation. The goal with this approach is to offer information and opinions expressed by individuals living in Israel and not to present the researcher’s personal opinions. By the end of the paper, an analysis of common themes will tie the research together and present the core reason this conflict has lasted for over 70 years. The data collected in this paper is primarily
qualitative research collected while on the ground in Israel. With the exception of historical facts and details, all thoughts expressed were spoken and transcribed with the intention of putting this paper together afterwards. The broad diversity of lecturers throughout the trip will show the different angles of the Palestinian Israeli conflict. Data was collected by attending all the sessions in the program and taking detailed personal notes from each speaker. Comparing and contrasting the various views of the individuals enables the reader to come to their own conclusion with the facts presented.
Some important terms to define in this paper are Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab. Israeli is a definition of citizenship Jews, Muslims, and Christians can all be referred to as Israeli. When needed, it will be specified to what religion the individual holds, i.e., Jewish Israeli, Muslim Israeli, Arab Israeli. Most commonly, the term Israeli will refer to Jewish Israelis. Palestinian is a term of identity since it is not a legitimate state it is often describes individuals living in the West Bank area occupied primarily by the Palestinian Authority under the supervision of Israel. Non Jews, who are native Christians, will refer to themselves as Arab Christians. Legal identity and personal/cultural identity can easily be confused, so when needed, this paper will make those distinctions clear to the reader.
One of the most significant problems Israel faced over the years was the dwindling supply of available water. In the 1970s, realizing that if they did not come up with a solution soon the country would be out of clean drinking water. In the 1970s, Israel introduced reverse osmosis desalination plants into the country a plant that takes sea water and turns it into drinkable water for society.
A rare tour of the Sorek Desalination Plant in Palmachim, Israel, allowed for firsthand account of the work Israel is doing to ensure its citizens and agriculture receive potable water. Currently, Israel has five plants
along the Mediterranean Sea with plans to open two more. The goal is to have its citizens completely detached from the rainwater sector and drinking 100% of their water from desalination plants. They see this goal becoming a reality in the next 4 5 years. However, desalination plants have several problems: large energy consumption, cost, potential environmental contamination, and lack of essential minerals in the drinking water.
Israel is a first world country and naturally uses more water than Palestine, a territory classified as developing. Palestine is not a state and does not have the ability to create an independent water source and is therefore dependent on Israel for water. With the creation and future expansion of desalinated water, Israel is currently very water secure and therefore enabled to help their Palestinian neighbors receive clean drinking water. Unfortunately, the water problem cannot be separated from the conflict. Currently, 3 4 million Palestinians are under Israeli control and rely on the state for help with basic necessities, such as water and energy. According to Dr. Clive Lipkin, it is in Israel’s best interest to promote a 2 state solution so the constant disputes over water can cease (Dr. Clive Lipkin, personal communication, July 6, 2022). Many have criticized Israel for their lack of compassion and support to ensure Palestinians receive proper drinking water. Others push back and say Israel is doing all it can in trying to work with the Palestinian Authority who have been known to keep resources from their people.
Personal Accounts: Students: At Hebrew University, five students (three Jewish and two Muslim) shared their experiences in Israel and what it is like being a young person in college. They all agreed that no one talks about politics it is too depressing and exhausting. One student said that “talking about politics is like grinding water” (Student at Hebrew University, personal communication, July 6, 2022). The
most common topics among the younger generation are the economy and rising expenses or the potential next war and terrorist attacks.
While speaking with Michael Oren, a former ambassador from Israel to the United States (2009 2013), he shared his thoughts on the reasons for why Israel and Palestine cannot come to an agreement. He believes Palestinians biggest fear is that “in recognizing Israel as a country they will lose their identity to the land and their family history” (Michael Oren, personal communication, July 12, 2022). Over the years, while working to negotiate solutions, he was constantly blocked by the Palestinian Authority. The argument for it is if the Palestinian Authority begins helping their people, they will lose their status of victimhood. In maintaining a humanitarian disaster status for Palestine, it will allow them to keep receiving support and sympathy from the world. Currently, he is of the opinion that there is no realistic solution to the crisis, but there are ways for better management. Palestine currently does not have any elections for fear that Hamas would win the majority and make matters worse for everyone. Organizations and governments around the world keep slapping a band aid on the problem by giving the West Bank money without addressing the root cause: the Palestinians hate the Zionists who took away their land. Oren says that the biggest mistake the world is making in regard to this conflict is leaving the negotiation table and resorting to monetary gifts that in turn incentivizes the Palestinians to stay away from negotiations. However, he believes the actual situation is not as bad as the Palestinians make it out to be Israel allows Palestinians into Israel to work and is not entirely occupying the territory, allowing them ruling authority over certain regions. The two main issues with the situation are that the Palestinian Authority must be committed to bettering their people and the world must realize how desperately the Palestinian people need assurance that their identity will be preserved.
Yisrael Klitsner served as the former Advisor Minister of Diaspora Affairs and gave a brief history on his work with the Palestinian people. Being naturally an optimist, he sees the good that is being accomplished by Israel caring for their neighbors. However, he is of the opinion that despite a large amount of energy being focused into this conflict, lots of people are saying the current situation does not allow for a time of diplomacy right now (Yisrael Klitsner, personal communication, July 13, 2022). Unfortunately, a solution does not look to be in the near future.
An expert in the Middle East politics, Tal Becker, gave his thoughts regarding the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The Abraham Accords is the first time Arab states are recognizing the inherent Jewish claim to the land of Israel. But there is a sense in the Jewish world that it does not matter what is done, hostility against the Jews will always exist. However, Becker believes that for the first time there is hope for change as the world seems to have stopped contesting whether Israel is a legitimate state.
Becker would often sit in on peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians since he is fluent in both Hebrew and Arabic. During one such peace negotiation he overheard an Arab say “we can’t let them [Israel] take away our victimhood. We need that to keep getting the sympathy of the world” (Palestinian, personal communication, undated). Unfortunately, both sides see victimhood as an asset and have a hard time separating their identities from the conflict. Because of this there has arisen a competition of victimhood whoever has more power is the suppressor over the weaker and therefore not the victim. To solve this, Becker says that “both sides have a right and responsibility to let go of victimhood through empowerment” (Tal Becker, personal communication, July 17, 2022).
Media:
The current Editor in Chief of the Jerusalem Post, Yaakov Katx, spoke on the international stances Israel takes to ensure its security. The signing of a peace deal between Israel, the United States, United Arab
Emirates, and Bahrain (dubbed the Abraham Accords) changed the atmosphere of the Middle East region. Since then, Israel began opening new relationships with surrounding nations as well as the European Union; nations that were formerly hostile are now willing to settle on peace terms and recognize Israel as a legitimate state. The best way to continue such progress is for the United States to continue bringing people to the negotiating table and forcing them to talk. He believes that the next steps should be finding ways “to create alliances with more minority audiences and garnering additional support for Israel” (Yaakov Katx, personal communication, July 14, 2022).
Civilians:
Speaking with a Palestinian Jerusalem shopkeeper in the Old City, he bluntly stated that “there is going to be a war people will die, someone will lose and that will be the end of it, but a war is coming” (Palestinian shopkeeper, personal communication, July 19, 2022). He then proceeded to tell a recent story and show a video in which he and his cousin got accosted and arrested by Israeli police. In his opinion they did nothing to begin the conflict, but the police officer held a grudge against these two shop owners. After both were held in jail for twelve hours, he was banned from the Old City for one week and his cousin was banned for two weeks.
Menachem Gilboa was awarded a high ranking military medal for his bravery in stopping a terrorist from blowing up civilians three soldiers died and Gilboa sustained massive injuries but lived to tell the tale. A few months prior, his wife alerted authorities of a suspect terrorist and was able to clear the hotel lobby before the man detonated himself. In Gilboa’s story, he suspected was off when a man refused to respond to a question at his gas station. Gilboa successfully tackled him to the ground and someone else shot the man in the head after seeing the belt of explosives. Unfortunately, a solider ran over and ended up causing the explosives on the attacker to go off before Gilboa could get out of the way. Attacks like
these are common in Israel; they happen most often near Muslim holidays and during large protests, so civilians are trained to look for such suspicious activity. However, it must be made clear that these are extremist Muslims those who believe Allah wants them to kill to obtain peace. A significant majority of Muslims do not hold to this belief and are peaceful followers of Allah.
Efrat is a Jewish settlement built right next to the West Bank border (settlements are places into which Jews move to build communities and establish homes). They are often not in the state of Israel but in occupied territories or disputed lands. The Mayor of Efrat spoke about the settlement he oversees and the continuing conflict and hate between the Palestinians and Jews.
The mayor talked about the difficulty of planning a city bordering Palestine that requires a fence and yet will not recall memories of the ghettos for the Jews. The fence creates a sense of security rather than actual security for the people. He notices a significant disconnect between the local and federal government and finds that local politics are much more effective in bringing about change to communities. In one comment, he said “just because people have reached an agreement on paper does not mean that it’s implemented on the ground” (Mayor of Efrat, personal communication, July 17, 2022). The Palestinian Authority is benefiting from the continuing conflict and are unhappy when the media portrays them as getting along with their neighbors. He warns against viewing the conflict through a Western point of view and set of values and advises examining the conflict and people from their point of view.
Yosef Haddad is a Christian Arab activist who wants to see Jews, Muslims, and Christians work together. He grew up playing football with Jews, Muslims, and Christians, and says they “all felt united through their common bond of being Israeli citizens nothing else mattered” (Yosef Haddad, personal communication, July 20, 2022).
Unlike Jewish citizens, Arabs are not required to join the Israel Defense Forces, yet Haddad volunteered because he wanted to defend his country. He, as an Arab, commanded Jewish soldiers. To those that accuse Israel of being an apartheid state he asks “why it was possible for him to command Jews?” (Yosef Haddad, personal communication, July 20, 2022).
Haddad says the solution lies in partnership to merge the way Arabs and Israelis live together by forcing them to interact with each other. No segregated schools, towns, stores. Unfortunately, the extremists hate each other and thus end up hurting the people in the middle. Segregation is not mandated by the government but rather is a choice of the people to preserve their language and culture. Haddad’s goal is to bring Arab and Jewish communities together to cultivate understanding and respect.
According to Haddad, Arabs are 20% of the population in Israel and yet are 30% of the doctors, run 50% of the pharmacies, and a Muslim man oversees the largest bank in Israel. An Arab judge sentenced a Jewish prime minister and a president to jail (Friedman, 2010). Haddad remarked that “since the creation of Israel in 1948, every Arab town has increased its population… therefore, how can Israel be accused of committing genocide against non Jews?” (Yosef Haddad, personal communication, July 20, 2022). Haddad believes external forces will not help end the conflict, rather, the conflict can only be solved by slow progress in the Arab Israeli society. They are the only ones who can breach the divide between the two groups. Unfortunately, Arab Israelis only represent 1% of the seats in the Knesset (Israel’s parliament government). Furthermore, Arab Israelis are never a part of the conflict resolution, which only ever consists of Jews and Palestinians. Haddad believes the solution is learning how to speak the language and understand the culture of the other, to show the Palestinians that Israel values their people’s history and is willing to work with them to arrive at peace. Sadly, so many are taught to hate the other group from
the day they are born that they have never considered they are hurting people just like them.
In touring the West Bank, the conflict becomes much more personal and complicated as the locals tell their stories of suffering at the hands of the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis. One such story was from a father who lost his daughter in a suicide attack and his son only 45 days later in a violent protest. When asked to tell the story the father said: “We want the frozen bodies returned so we can bury our children Israel just wants us to suffer. I refused to take the case to the International Criminal Court and Israel is acting like Hitler and the Nazis. The occupation needs to end so our youth can have a future and we will do anything to protect the Al-Aqsa Mosque. There is no way a 2 state solution will happen; the only answer is to wipe the Israelis out because we are fighting for our freedom and liberty. We are not fighting against Jews but against Zionism and against Israel. Even the young generation knows there will never be a solution or peace until the occupation is over. We have heard stories of them conducting organ harvesting on the frozen bodies. I truly just want to live in peace and establish a future for my family. We, the Palestinians, will use any means to liberate our people and you may hear of me in the news one day carrying out such an attack” (Palestinian father, personal communication, July 18, 2022).
Hearing the father’s passionate speech declaring his
hatred for Israel, it became apparent that he truly believes violence is the only method that will work. He was immensely proud of his children and their sacrifice and is willing to commit similar acts of terrorism against Israel himself.
Israel is holding the bodies of his children and others who commit suicide attacks for unknown reasons. In Muslim culture, if someone is a martyr for the faith, they receive a big celebration and honor among the people. Perhaps one reason for withholding the bodies is to discourage further suicide attacks. The father also claimed that if someone dies in person, their frozen bodies are forced to finish out their sentence before being released to the families for burial.
The father was asked his sentiments regarding Americans and what he would like to see from the people and country. He praised certain congresswomen, such as Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib, who are strong Muslim and Palestinian supporters as well as human rights movements such as Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS). The goal is to have Americans push Congress to stop sending guns to Israel and vocally supporting them. He says the Palestinians are the people who are suffering, not Israel. Towards the end of the discussion, the father said, “it is our duty, to respect all religions and people we don’t care if you are Christian or Jew but no Zionists” (Palestinian father, personal communication, July 18, 2022).
Another Palestinian shared about his brother who committed a suicide attack killing three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and a pregnant woman. Not until after the attack did they realize he was working with the terrorist organization, Hamas. When asked if he thought his brother would regret killing the pregnant woman the man replied, “no, he would not regret any of his actions and neither do I. Anyone in support of Israel, whether a solider or a citizen, deserves to die” (Palestinian, personal communication, July 18, 2022). They claim that other Arab countries only care about their own people and no one is listening to the Palestinians anymore.
Later that same day, another man shared the story of the home he and his family have lived in for over 800 years, going back many, many generations. Unlike the grieving father, this man wants to live in peace with the Israeli settlers who constantly attack him and his family. He believes violence is not an option and the Palestinian Authority is entirely corrupt. Unfortunately, the tribal and clan rule in Palestine is so big (there are over 250,00 people in one family) that there is no way around their authority. He said that “a two state solution where all can live at peace with each other will be best” (Palestinian, personal communication, July 18, 2022). Despite these peaceful sentiments, he and his family face threats of violence from the Israeli settlers only a wall away.
In the alleyway next to his house is an area where Israeli settlers dump their trash and junk over the wall into Palestinian territory. Halfway along the main street of the market is a barbed net to protect the citizens from objects thrown down by Israeli settlers. Now, after a local massacre in 1994, Israel controls 60% of the Tomb of the Patriarchs and forces Palestinians to go through various checkpoints to worship in their mosque adding further restrictions upon the people by the Israeli police.
During one of the last stops on the trip, residents of a kibbutz (a Jewish living community) in Akko explained the education system. Currently, there are four different tracks parents can choose in where to send their children to school: Orthodox Jewish school, a state school, a state school with emphasis on Jewish religion, and independent Arab schools. One of the main problems is that Muslims and Jews both want their specific religion taught in the schools and are unwilling to integrate the people together. Trying to mix the communities is complicated due to the decades-old hatred. With only a limited number of people willing to put the effort in, the integration of the communities is not in the near future. One teacher there recommended continuing to segregate the schools so the two groups can learn their respective religions but then force Jews and Muslims to participate in activities together (School Teacher from Akko, personal communication, July 25, 2022). Overall, it seems that until the community begins to understand each other and learn to work together, the hate on both sides will not change.
In the middle of Jerusalem, in the Old City of David, is the 1948 memorial to commemorate the civil war between Jews and
Arabs and the place where Israel surrendered to Jordan. There is a prophecy in Zechariah 8:4 -5 that says, “old men and old women shall again sit in the streets of Jerusalem…and the streets of the city shall be full of boys and girls playing in its streets…” 1967 saw the fulfillment of this prophecy when Israel took back the Old City and Jews could walk through the streets of their history again. In this square, children are running by on their way to school and grandfathers bent down to tickle their grandchildren. The fulfillment of the prophecy is living and active in Jerusalem today.
Analyzing the conflict raises questions as to why one should support Israel what is the goal in offering financial, diplomatic, and military aid? A Christian shopkeeper in Jerusalem said that “Israel today is not the same Israel as in Jesus’s time...Israel is not here to bring about the end times Jews want to create a place for their people to live in peace” (Zak, personal communication, July 20, 2022). Israel is not a Christian nation; though the roots of the Christian faith stem from the land, the Jews and Muslims of the Abrahamic faith have a different religion than the Christians (Dr. Faydra Shapiro, personal communication, undated). The religious problem as to whose faith has more historical ties than the other cannot be solved, but Israelis can try to solve the political problem how to co exist with the different cultures and faith backgrounds. With the signing of the Abraham Accords, Palestinians feel betrayed that the Arab states are legitimizing Israel while ignoring Palestine but the political problem has almost been solved and allowed for neighboring Arab countries and Israel to live in peace.
The shopkeeper went on to explain that though Palestinians do not say they want peace, they desperately do, and they want to work for its establishment. Unfortunately, the Palestinians often do not fulfill their side of the bargain, but neither do they completely break the agreement. Though the authorities are corrupt, the people want a solution and with the grassroots work of those who try to bring about reconciliation between the two groups,
the atmosphere is slowly changing. For Palestine to come to the table there needs to be trust between Israel and themselves they need to have faith that Israel is not attempting to destroy their culture and history but trying to arrive at a solution that benefits the people. Unfortunately, this is a religious war, a war based on land, on family, and God it is not about politics. And in religious wars, people are more motivated and dangerous as they carry out their strong convictions. Is a solution possible? Maybe, but most likely another conflict will arise first. Solving old and deep hatred lasting for centuries requires many small acts of love, of respect, and valuing the culture that made the people the way they are. Until that day, it is necessary to continue praying for the peace of Jerusalem.
Reference List Anera. (n.d.). What are Area A, Area B, and Area C in the West Bank?. Retrieved August, 8, 2022, from https:// www.anera.org/what are area a area b and area c in the west bank/
Gordis, Daniel. (2016) Israel: A Concise History of a Nation Reborn. Harper Collins Publisher.
Friedman, Ron (2010). Moshe Katsav convicted of rape faces long jail term. Retrieved August 8, 2022 from https://www.jpost.com/National -News/Moshe-Katsav-convicted-of-rapefaces long jail term
Miller, Daniel. (2021). The History of ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’: Alternative Names, Competing Claims. Retrieved August 8, 2022, from https://theconversation.com/the history of israel and palestine alternative names competing claims 163156#:~:text=In%20AD%20135%2C% 20following%20a,Philistines%2C% 20enemies%20of%20the%20Israelites%20
Sproul, R., 2021. ESV Reformation Study Bible, Student Edition. [S.l.]: Ligonier
The European Union (EU) was formed as a way to unite a fractured Europe following World War II. After several rough years financially, the United Kingdom (UK) joined the EU in 1973. The UK’s financial system began to improve as part of the single market system. In 2016, after 40 plus years as a member of the EU, the UK voted to leave in what would be called Brexit, with the economic transition period beginning in 2020. The loss of the single market with the EU has affected the economy of the UK. This effect is examined by looking at trade data before and after Brexit. In addition, the impact Brexit has on businesses in the UK and outside the UK is used to measure the effect. The impact of the COVID 19 pandemic on trade is also considered. Overall, it can be concluded that Brexit has a negative impact on the UK.
Keywords: European Union, Brexit, United Kingdom, imports, exports
After the devastating destruction that swept across Europe during WWII, many European countries desired stronger connections economically and militarily with their neighbors for their own growth and the cultivation of peace. Several organizations were formed with those goals in mind, such as the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Economic Community, among others. They eventually evolved into one body now known as the European Union (hereafter referred to as EU). The European Union was formally created by the Maastricht Treaty, which took effect on November 1, 1993 (Gabel, n.d.).
Membership in the EU gives member countries many advantages. One of the largest benefits is entry into the single market economy. Goods and services move throughout Europe easily because there are no trade barriers within the EU. In addition, the EU can make trade agreements with other countries more easily than an individual country could. Some countries are more drawn to making an agreement with the EU than the individual countries because they receive access to the entire system (Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs, 2020). The single market system has increased trade significantly. According to CEPII, a French economic research center, the single market economy has “increased trade between EU members by 109% on average for goods and 58% for tradable services” (Mayer et al., 2018, p. 4). This increase in trade has benefited the member countries.
Following WWII, the United Kingdom (UK) was struggling economically. Former German ambassador to the UK, Rudolf G. Adam, states that in the 1960s,
The United Kingdom was shedding its erstwhile greatness at a rapid rate. It not only lost its Empire, but the pioneer of industrialisation was also losing its competitive edge in global markets. The pound staggered from devaluation
to devaluation. Waves of strikes paralysed vital industries. Foreign industrial products made deep inroads into the British domestic market. Mercedes and BMW began to push out Rolls Royce, Bentley and Humber (Adam, 2020, pp. 10 11).
The UK sought economic relief by joining the European Economic Community (EEC, a predecessor to the EU). The UK applied in 1961 for membership. The application was vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle who saw the UK as a threat to France’s place of power in the EEC. While in office, de Gaulle would continue to deny the UK a place in the EEC. In 1970, Edward Heath became Prime Minister of France. He, along with President Georges Pompidou, began to see the advantages in pulling the UK away from its relationship with the US and instead into a closer relationship with Europe. For example, it would help to counterbalance Germany’s growth (Adam, 2020).
By this point, the UK’s economy was struggling significantly: “Productivity was down, competitiveness was evaporating, the pound had lost a third of its value since the end of the war, and public debt was spiraling out of control” (Adam, 2020, p. 19). With the French on board, the accession treaty to allow the UK to join the EEC was negotiated in 18 months. Although the treaty was unfavorable to British interests in areas like agriculture and budget contributions, they nonetheless signed on and were admitted into the EEC on January 1, 1973 (Adam, 2020). While in some ways it was worse for the British, “A Lord remarked during the accession negotiations: ‘You do not haggle over the subscription when you are invited into a lifeboat!’” (Adam, 2020, p. 19). It indeed proved to be a lifeboat.
In the beginning, the UK struggled with the influx of new products and competition entering the market. But Nick Bloom, professor of economics at Stanford University, argues that “[c]ompetition forced these guys to improve or exit. The single European market
increased competition and forced British firms to increase the level of innovation” (as cited in Giles, 2017). Either they would improve with market demands or they would leave the market. The UK met the challenge and was better off for it. Figure 1 demonstrates the UK’s GDP per capita growth in relation to other European nations since 1958. Overall, the UK has progressed since its entrance into the EU (Figure 1). Mike Matthews, a managing director at a car manufacturing company, notes the advantages of EU membership that he has seen over his 28 years in the business. Additionally, “Britain’s membership has made it dramatically easier to sell products across borders while pushing companies to become more productive. That is the EU effect that has transformed not just one car parts manufacturer in Teesside but the UK economy as a whole” (Giles, 2017). Despite these
advantages, EU membership was not to last.
In 2016, after more than 40 years in the EU, the people of the United Kingdom voted with a majority of 51.9 percent to leave the EU (“Results,” 2019). So, on January 31, 2020, the UK officially left the EU (“Brexit,” 2020). With its withdrawal came the removal of its immediate access to the single market over the following year. This exit of the UK from the EU was given the name “Brexit.”
Though the UK left the EU in 2020, trade did not automatically stop as soon as they withdrew. There was an eleven month transition period under which the UK still followed the EU rules, which gave them the opportunity to establish new trade deals with the EU as an outsider country. “On December 24, 2020, one week before the end of the transition period, UK and EU negotiators
concluded an approximately 1,200-page TCA [Trade and Cooperation Agreement], along with two other accords on nuclear cooperation and the protection of classified information” (Congressional Research Service, 2021). This set up a path forward for the UK and the EU as separate entities.
Pulling out of the EU has affected trade in the UK. Shortly after the break, the UK had record setting low trade numbers. Euronews reports that “Goods exports plunged by 41% and imports by 29% as the UK’s departure from the EU’s single market had a major impact, as did additional bureaucracy and sometimes unexpected costs and taxes” (Sandford, 2021b). Even trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland (both part of the UK), has been complicated due to Ireland’s membership in the EU (Sandford, 2021b). Another report details the seafood stopped in ports and the empty shelves. It includes testimonies from several business owners regarding the new costs and red tape that have complicated their lives (Sandford, 2021a). When talking about the new TCA, Euronews reports that
The reality . . . is that the new trading regime has brought a mountain of extra bureaucracy and costs. Firms now need to fill out customs declarations. The process involving codes and new IT systems can lead to significant delays. Slower procedures mean higher costs. There are also new regulatory checks for food, with meat, dairy and fish products needing health certificates (Sandford, 2021a).
Trade still occurs with the EU, but the new requirements severely slow down or even halt trade in some cases.
The effects of Brexit were not only felt in the UK. The EU lost “about one sixth of its economic power and a far greater share of its foreign and security policy weight with the exit
of a country which has considerable global influence” (Flach, 2022). It also lost a large trading country. The effects of Brexit are widespread.
These effects are also seen in the transit of goods. Many lorries [the name for semi tractor trailer drivers in the UK] from the EU have stopped making the trip back and forth from England because there are not enough goods. The chief executive Richard Burnett of the Road Haulage Association, a commercial vehicles policy group from the UK, remarked that typically the trucks that bring products into the UK are not British. Due to the new trade complications, “There is not normal demand from exporters, which means around 40 per cent are returning to the Continent empty. They are also worried about being stuck in port if they don’t have the right customs paperwork” so fewer are making the journey (Burnett, as cited in “Empty,” 2021). Regarding the customs changes, Petar Loba, a Polish lorry driver said "this situation, for me it’s too much paperwork, too much wait, wait, all the time is wait. This is not good” (Armstrong, 2021). The negative effects of Brexit can be seen in the transport of goods.
A common theme in news articles that discuss the problems with trade post Brexit is what they call a “teething problem.” The system is new, so of course there will be issues. While some agree that it is just an issue with the system being new, others argue that government involvement is necessary to cure the problem (British Meat Processors Association, 2021; “Empty,” 2021; Sandford, 2021a). Regardless of whether government involvement is necessary, there is a consensus that there is an issue that needs to be resolved one way or another.
To measure the effects that Brexit has had on trade internally and externally in the UK, several aspects of trade and trade relations
must be examined. First, there must be an understanding that this type of examination is difficult due to surrounding world events at the time such as the COVID 19 pandemic. The pandemic began shortly after the beginning of the 11 month transition period in which a new trade deal was negotiated. The pandemic had significant impacts on the supply chain and trade. So, while the effects on trade specifically related to Brexit will be examined, some of the results may be affected by other factors such as COVID 19.
In a quantitative approach, trade in the years before Brexit was compared to more recent post Brexit trade numbers. If there was a significant decrease in trade post Brexit, then it could be an indication that Brexit has had a large negative impact on trade in the UK. If there was not a large change or rather trade has increased, then it may mean that Brexit has had a positive impact on the UK.
Next, the effect on businesses in the UK was examined. Many business owners have been vocal about how their businesses are doing post Brexit. They explain how the new trade agreement has altered how they conduct business. If the new requirements make trade better, easier, and more convenient for business owners, then Brexit has had a positive effect. But, if it has made it more difficult to conduct business due to trade requirements, then it has had a negative impact on British businesses.
This also applies to businesses outside of the UK. Many businesses pre-Brexit conducted trade with the UK regularly. The goal is to determine if Brexit has had a negative effect internally and externally and to determine that, outside businesses must also be examined. If trade has become more efficient, then Brexit has had a positive effect, but if it is more difficult, then Brexit has had a negative effect.
Quantitative and qualitative approaches were taken to test whether Brexit has had a
negative effect on trade internally and externally in the UK. While the results are examined it must always be kept in mind that the COVID 19 pandemic has affected the supply chain and trade, so some of the results may not be exactly what they appear. This is carefully noted throughout.
First, trade before and after Brexit was examined. By scrutinizing the volume of trade before Brexit, during the transition period, and after the transition period, it provides a clearer picture of how trade has or has not been affected. The United Kingdom Office for National Statistics has two graphs that explain this perfectly (Figure 2 and Figure 3). The first shows the imports to the UK from both EU and non EU countries from January 2019 to January 2022 (Figure 2). The second shows the exports from the UK to both EU and non EU countries from January 2019 to January 2022 (Figure 3). They clearly label the Brexit deadline period, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Brexit transition period.
In terms of imports, it is worth noting that at the beginning of the Brexit deadline period (the period in which the UK officially decided to leave the EU), imports to the UK from the EU dipped (Figure 2). This occurred again at the end of the deadline period when they had decided to leave. Both of these occurrences were before the COVID 19 pandemic and thus were likely not related to it. As expected, there is another dip at the beginning of the pandemic, but the import numbers begin to climb again. Within less than one year after the beginning of the pandemic, the EU import numbers are back up to where they were before the end of the deadline period. Then, the final significant dip to EU imports occurs at the end of the transition period. Because of the severity of the dip following a relatively significant climb after the initial COVID 19 shock, it is probable that the dip is a result of the new trade agreement following Brexit. Only now, a year later, is the UK recovering from that drop in EU imports
(Figure 2). According to the UK Office for National Statistics, “Total imports of goods increased by £4.7 billion (11.0%) in January 2022, because of increasing imports from EU countries. . . Imports from EU countries were £0.6 billion higher than from non EU countries in January 2022,” which is a reversal from 2021, where non EU imports were higher for most of the year (“UK trade,” 2022). “Total imports of goods increased by £12.2 billion (10.1%) in the three months to January 2022, compared with the three months to October 2021” (“UK trade,” 2022). EU imports to the UK were affected but they appear to be on a path to recovery.
What has not yet been considered is the non EU imports. They were also affected by the shift of Brexit but not to the same degree. The dips are less dramatic and are more like small hills and valleys. The most significant decrease is due to the COVID 19 pandemic. Beyond that, it has largely followed the same trajectory as the EU imports. A significant
switch to take note of is that after the Brexit transition period non EU imports were greater than EU imports. The EU is back to being the highest importer to the UK, but just barely. It will be interesting to watch that trajectory going forward. Maybe non EU imports will continue to play a more important role in the British economy in the future. Overall, it appears that Brexit had an initial negative impact on imports being brought into the UK, but the market has bounced back and is growing (Figure 2).
Exports from the UK tell a similar but slightly different story than that of imports (Figure 3). First, an interesting note is that exports to the EU and non EU countries started at nearly the same amount prior to the Brexit deadline period. During the Brexit deadline period, exports to the EU were not affected much. Following the deadline period, there was a small decline. COVID 19 saw a major decrease in exports to the EU, but the sharpest, most abrupt dip came after the transition
(“UK trade,” 2022).
period. During this time, many businesses struggled with the new system that was suddenly forced on their exports. Some of their stories will be discussed later. Towards the end of 2021, EU exports returned to pre-end of transition period numbers, but they began decreasing again right before 2022 (Figure 3). The UK Office for National Statistics reports that “Total exports of goods decreased by £2.5 billion (8.7%) in January 2022, driven by a decrease in exports to EU countries” (“UK trade,” 2022). These issues will be explored more later.
Like imports, exports to non EU countries have a less dramatic history. The Brexit deadline did not have a negative effect on exports to non EU countries. Exports actually slightly increased to these countries. The most significant dip on this graph was caused by the COVID 19 pandemic. The exports have not returned to their pre pandemic numbers, but they have increased slightly and leveled out with small
fluctuations. The end of the Brexit transition period had no noticeable effect on non EU exports (Figure 3). “In the three months [prior] to January 2022, compared with the three months to October 2021 . . . exports of goods . . . increased by £3.6 billion (4.6%), because of increasing exports to both EU and non EU countries” (“UK trade,” 2022). “Exports to non EU countries were £2.5 billion higher than exports to EU countries” (“UK trade,” 2022). UK exports were negatively affected by Brexit, but this was mainly exports to the EU with non EU exports being affected far less.
Both imports and exports were affected negatively in one way or another by Brexit. This is especially true of the goods and services being exchanged between the UK and the EU. It makes sense that those trades would be hit hardest since the new trade barriers are between those two groups. While it appears that Brexit has had a negative effect on trade, it must be kept in mind that the supply chain disruptions that occurred due to the pandemic
are not completely fixed. Some of the data that shows fluctuations in trade may still be a result of that. Assuming that what the data shows is correct, it does appear that Brexit has negatively impacted trade internally and externally.
Since the Brexit transition period, businesses in the UK have struggled with new trade regulations. For instance, the significant amount of paperwork has discouraged new trade partnerships. Meanwhile, other products are going bad before they can reach consumers due to new requirements.
With the new Brexit trade deal came a mountain of paperwork that traders must complete in order to export their goods. For instance, a wine exporter in the UK is struggling with the new paperwork requirements. He said, “My regular logistics partner has suspended their service completely from the EU to the U.K. until February. These guys operate in 31 countries & know how to move stock quickly, but the paperwork nightmare is just too much for them. They don’t have the time to waste frankly” (Lambert, 2021). This is only one part of Lambert’s 22 thread post complaining about the troubles that Brexit has laid upon his business.
The new regulations are particularly difficult for exporters of perishable goods. The British Meat Processors Association has reported a high volume of calls related to trade issues at the borders. The longer the fish or meat is held up, the closer it is to spoiling and the money lost. Nick Allen the CEO of the British Meat Processors Association explains the problem,
One of our members reported on 11 January that he had 6 lorry loads of product [value around £300,000] all waiting for customs clearance into the Republic of Ireland. At the time, one of those loads was about to be returned to the processing company after waiting 5
days for clearance. Drivers have been reporting long delays as they wait for HMRC [Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs] to process the customs documents (British Meat Processors Association, 2021).
The delay in processing these exports can lead to the loss of thousands of pounds (£) in products. This is a significant loss for the company, especially if it becomes a recurring problem. British cheesemaker Mr. Mehta remarks that a shipment that used to take 48 hours to get to Ireland now takes five days under the new customs processes. The product is no longer fresh by the time it reaches its destination. Therefore, shipping to Ireland is no longer an option for him, and his company stands to lose about one million pounds in sales a year (Campbell, 2021). These are just a few examples of how Brexit has made imports and exports harder for businesses in the UK. Effects on businesses outside of the UK
Businesses that rely on business from the UK have also been affected by Brexit. As mentioned earlier, lorries from outside the UK are deciding it is not worth the wait and the paperwork to pick up loads to import into the EU from the UK (“Empty,” 2021). A freight forwarding agent explains why some lorries may choose to not deliver goods to Britain: "The drivers are often paid by the kilometre. So if they’re sitting over there [at the border crossing], as they are right now, they’re just going to hand in their notices, or say to their bosses ‘I don’t want to go any more to Britain, I’m going to only take loads you give me within Europe’, and that’s what’s going to happen" (Armstrong, 2021). Brexit has made it more difficult to trade across borders which has a negative impact on the UK.
By comparing trade data from before Brexit and after, a more complete picture of its effects is obtained. Firstly, in terms of imports, there have been few long term effects. The amount of imports that the UK brings into the country now is just about the same amount that
was brought in before Brexit. Exports are where the difference is seen. Exports to the EU and even non-EU countries have not recovered. This is likely due to the new customs regulations. Brexit has had a negative effect on UK trade.
Secondly, many business owners have made clear the hardship that the new regulations place on their businesses. UK businesses are facing difficulties with wait times and additional paperwork. Food spoilage is a real concern with the delayed transport and passage across borders. EU businesses are also feeling the hardship as the extended wait times mean they get paid less for more work or are put through too much hassle to make it worth the trip. All around, Brexit has negatively affected businesses.
One final reminder is warranted that although the data collected and analyzed appears to show that Brexit has caused the hardship and reduction in trade, COVID 19 continues to impact the supply chain which could be influencing the data. However, it is worth noting that most of the testimonies from business owners are specifically about new policies that were instituted post Brexit. While some of them could be COVID 19 related, it appears that many of them have to do with new customs regulations because the UK is no longer part of the single market system of the EU. In terms of further research in this area, an examination of the effects of Brexit years down the road will give a more complete picture of what was a result of Brexit and what was influenced by COVID 19. With all of that in mind, the data does appear to show that Brexit has had a negative impact on trade internally and externally for the UK.
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