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Journal of International Affairs
Fall 2021 Volume 1, No. 1 Patrick Henry College PATRICK HENRY COLLEGE
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Journal of International Affairs
A PUBLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND POLICY PROGRAM OF PATRICK HENRY COLLEGE
VOLUME 1, No. 1
Editor-in-chief: Ellen J. Fischer
Publication editor: Nicholas A. Storz Research editor: Valkyrie D. Armstrong Copy editor: Jessica G. Garlock Faculty supervisor: Dr. Michael L. Haynes
Patrick Henry College | Purcellville, Virginia | www.phc.edu
Copyright © 2021
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John Jay was an American statesman who helped lay the foundation for America’s judicial system and foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the War for Independence. A key diplomat in the American founding, Jay secured wartime loans to the U.S. government from Spain and was a central negotiator to the Treaty of Paris, which formally conceded the United State’s independence. He would later negotiate the infamous Jay Treaty in 1794 with mixed results. An author of several of the Federalist Papers, Jay’s contributions discuss the dangers foreign influenced posed to the fledgling republic as well as the role of each branch of government in crafting foreign policy. Later, he was appointed the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court by President Washington, strictly upholding the high court’s political neutrality during his tenure. This journal takes his name in light of these immense contributions and the guiding role he played in pioneering American foreign policy during the nation’s founding. The John Jay Journal for International Affairs is published each semester by the Caspian Project, a student organization affiliated with the International Politics and Policy Program of Patrick Henry College. Papers published in the journal do not necessarily reflect the view of Patrick Henry Colleges or the Caspian Project. Responsibility for any opinions expressed or factual claims rests solely with the individual authors. Any correspondence can be directed to:
Patrick Henry College 10 Patrick Henry Circle Purcellville, VA 20132 (540) 338-1776
caspianproject@phc.edu All rights reserved. Paper authors retain copyright privileges.
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CONTENTS VOLUME 1 | No. 1 | FALL 2021 Letter from the Editor
6
THE PECULIARITIES OF PEACEKEEPING: A Historical and Comparative Analysis
9
Josiah K. Ssempa An analysis of the United Nations’ failures in peacekeeping operations and problems with resolving sexual exploitation.
THE EU’S GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT WITH CHINA
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Abigail Wilson A summary of the European Union’s changing policy towards China and of a future transatlantic alliance with the United States.
GERMANY’S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY:
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Russian Soft Power Expansion in the Energy Sector Jessica Garlock Evaluating the increased dependency and international stability Germany has with Russia’s natural gas exports.
THE RISE OF EMPIRES:
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An Analysis of the Development and Maintenance of Athenian, British, and US Naval Power Edmund Hurty An investigation of Athenian, British, and United States development and sustainment of naval supremacy.
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Letter From the Editor Dear Readers,
It is my honor and delight to welcome you to the first edition of the John Jay Journal of International Affairs. The staffers working on this publication sought to revive the interest in the International Politics and Policy major on our campus through the establishment of this new journal, and we are proud to present the reality of our dreams. This journal idea was birthed in the fall of 2020, and after a long year of hard work here is the first edition.
The goal of our journal is to give you well researched papers that analyze international affair topics. These topics range from historical analysis to in-depth evaluation of a current situation. In this first publication, we have contributions from writers in the Strategic Intelligence, International Politics and Policy, History, and Economics and Business Analytics majors. Our goal in creating this journal is that it would rouse awareness in our readers on pressing global issues.
In the opening study, written by Josiah Ssempa, he analyzes the peacekeeping efforts and failures of the United Nations. His premise is that those in leadership have a duty to promote peace and security for vulnerable people groups around the world. Ssempa critically examines the United Nation’s failure to establish peace in Rwanda as well as thwart
the destructive problem of sexual exploitation within United Nations peacekeepers.
Abigail Wilson is the author of our second study that looks at the diplomatic strategy Europe is taking towards China. In her analysis, she covers the factors contributing to the European Union’s China approach and its future implications. Wilson’s paper is timely as there is a growing focus by Europe on the Pacific region and particularly China.
Jessica Garlock writes our third study that dives into Germany’s dependence upon Russia for energy and gas exports. With Russia controlling the energy supply to the strongest member of the European Union, Garlock assesses the existential threat this dependence has on the EU member’s energy needs and Russia’s attempt to expand its soft power. Finally, Edmund Hurty concludes the journal with his historical analysis of the Athenian, British, and United States’ maritime empires. His study of powerful naval empires is vital to understanding why these nations prioritized having such strong navies for their country. The in-depth research and analysis Hurty provides is extensive and a wonderful contribution to our first edition of this journal.
I would like to thank Jacob Montoya for initiating and developing the plan for this nascent journal — thank you for the long hours and preparation you put into making this a reality. Thank you, Nicholas Storz, for designing the layout of this journal — you did a beautiful job setting the foundation for our publication. Valkyrie Armstrong, thank you for
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spending the hours necessary to make sure the research behind these papers was accurate and reliable — your contribution is immensely appreciated. Thank you Jessica Garlock for editing these papers with me to make sure our audience receives the best quality work we could provide. And lastly, our deepest gratitude goes to Dr. Michael Haynes who supervised and authorized the publication of this journal — thank you for your encouragement and steadfast support!
Sincerely,
Ellen Fischer, Editor in Chief
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THE PECULIARITIES OF PEACEKEEPING: A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS JOSIAH SSEMPA
Abstract Peacekeeping is a staple in the global community today. It is relied on as a consistent avenue for countries to pursue resolution in intrastate and interstate conflict areas. This study explores the role of peacekeeping and then seeks to shed light on these research questions: firstly, what are some of the factors that result in failures on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (UNPKO)? And secondly, what is the nature of the United Nation’s problem with sexual exploitation? The paper finds that disinterest from the United Nations Security Council, the situational difficulty of the conflict, and or-
ganizational dysfunction in the UN Secretariat are key factors that greatly harmed the UN’s peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. The paper then turns to an analysis of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and finds the Zeid Report instrumental in catalyzing important reform for this issue.
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Introduction “Are you ready to die in a foreign country?” This was the question asked to Filipino Lieutenant Colonel Catherine Gadayan by the president of her country during her exit call. A simple yet scary question, it gave Gadayan serious pause as she realized she might actually perish during her first tour of duty as a UN peacekeeper.. The role of peacekeepers is filled with questions not unlike the one Lt. Col. Gadayan considered. This research paper looks into some of those questions and explores instances where peacekeeping failed and when peacekeepers fell short of the values of the United Nations charter they agreed to abide by. The purpose of this paper is to explore the role and failures of peacekeeping and overview one of the key peacekeeping problems - sexual exploitation. The research questions this paper seeks to delve into are twofold; firstly, what are some of the factors that result in failures on UN
peacekeeping missions? And secondly, what is the nature of the United Nation’s problem with sexual exploitation? This paper does not advance a scientific hypothesis but rather narrows its research to three elements 1) the nature of the role of a peacekeeper, 2) historical analysis of critical factors that catalyzed the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and 3) secondary analysis into peacekeeping’s problem with sexual exploitation and abuse. The paper concludes by recounting the research explored.
Literature Review The state of scholarship on this topic is mixed. While there has been substantive scholarship on some facets of peacekeeping, there has not been extensive research on the implications of the distinction between intrastate con-
flict and interstate conflict. However, in more recent years, there has been an increase in the scholarship on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) also known as “Blue Helmet Missions” (Isely, 2010). Furthermore, there is also more literature on the impact of peacekeeping. Current quantitative data from the United Nations Missions shows that, while not completely effective, UN peacekeeping does help make “bad situations better” (Andrews, 2007). This paper turns now to Alan James’s comprehensive, seminal work, Peacekeeping in International Politics. In this work James convincingly argues that peacekeeping is not exclusive to the United Nations. He provides multiple examples of peacekeeping that preceded the creation of the United Nations and traces the origins of the term back to the delimitation commissions which were established in the early 1920s to redraw several European borders post World War I (James, 1990). This scholarship is referenced by former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political
Affairs Marrack Goulding in his article “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping.” In that article, Goulding notes that while the UN has developed the concept of peacekeeping into what it is generally understood today, there is no widespread definition of peacekeeping (Goulding, 2002). In this respect, and as Alan James shows in his book, the concept of peacekeeping varies. In his book, James examines the position of a peacekeeper in four main areas: “personnel, values, function and context” (James, 1990). For James, a peacekeeping body is predominantly composed of military personnel. Their expertise is necessary for the high tension and difficult situations they are placed in and grants them rapport in
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dealing with foreign military or police members which also operate from a similar authority structure (James, 1990). Secondly, James contends that peacekeepers do not employ threatening force. The arms that peacekeepers utilize are to protect themselves rather than harm others (James, 1990). This notion ties into the concept of impartiality which peacekeepers are known for. As for the third category of function, James identifies the primary goals of peacekeepers as defusion, stabilization, and peacekeeper-provided assistance (James, 1990). The imposition of a nonhostile force between two hostile forces may elicit a cease-fire or inhibit other regional actors from joining the fray (James, 1990). The second function of peacekeeping is stabilization. This stabilization refers to the bodies that stop hostile parties from warring then monitors the situation or navigates a peace agreement. The third function of peacekeepers
is facilitating dispute resolution between the two parties. James points out some ways in which this goal can be achieved and provides a counter objection to this function which he dismisses: In any event, the function of such a body is then to assist in the maintenance of stability, which may be done in one of several ways. The peacekeepers may help in the reduction of anxiety; they may contribute to the prevention of incidents, and they may be able to alleviate or remove tension. However, they do it, they may be in for a long stay, as such operations seem particularly prone to longevity. This has sometimes led to the claim that they stand in the way of the negotiation of political settlements, diplomatic complacency being induced by the maintenance of calm. The argument, however, is less than compelling (James, 1990). The last factor regarding peacekeepers is context. The context behind the organization providing the peacekeeping operation is of particular importance, for there must be a “competent authority” behind the peacekeeping
operation (James, 1990). James does not limit his analysis to the United Nations. He notes how there can be other organizations or even coalitions of states with common interests in mitigating a neighboring state’s internal disputes. Under context, another variable that must be considered is the provisions needed for these operations, including personnel, resources, and finances. James next points to the consent of the host country to allow the peacekeeping mission. This consent is important for two reasons: 1) countries that donate are hesitant to jeopardize their lightly-armed troops at the hands of a strong heavily-armed host nation, and 2) the international organizations that commission these peacekeeping organizations (such as the United Nations) generally realize that the concept of peacekeeping is jeopardized when peacekeeping turns into foreign states overstaying their welcome and not acting in line with the impartial nature of their mission. James concludes by highlighting that it is of the utmost importance that there be political cooperation of all the immediate parties to the dispute which resulted in the operation. If parties in
the area do not allow the peacekeepers to do their job, the odds of the mission succeeding decrease. Ultimately, the values of personnel, values, function, and context that James elaborates on here are key for a proper understanding of peacekeepers.
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Data and Methods Peacekeeping is a complex and difficult affair. It has brought much good but is not without its tragedies. The purpose of this paper is to spotlight the role of peacekeeping and overview a key problem that peacekeeping has sexual exploitation. The research questions this paper explores are twofold; firstly, what are some of the factors that result in failures on UN peacekeeping missions, and secondly, why does the UN struggle with sexual exploitation? The research in this paper heavily utilizes secondary and historical analysis and compiles and assesses various pieces of research on this subject to further shed light on some of the intricate factors involved in peacekeeping. This paper does not advance a hypothesis but rather narrows its research to a historical analysis of critical factors that catalyzed the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. The paper has already assessed the broad view of peacekeepers and important factors regarding the nature of their role. The paper then performs historical and secondary analysis on several secondary sources that detail the Rwandan Genocide and reviews some major factors that furthered the crisis. This paper is divided into three major sections. Section one deals with the literature review which details several key factors regarding peacekeepers and then outlines the data and methods this paper utilizes. Section two overviews peacekeeping failures and then dives into a deeper analysis of the underlying factors behind the UN’s peacekeeping failures in Rwanda. Section three surveys the United Nation’s problem with sexual exploitation and details historic reforms that have been achieved in this area. The paper concludes by summarizing the research performed.
For the purposes of this paper, the variables examined are the United Nations, peacekeeping, the nation of Rwanda, and sexual exploitation. The paper proceeds by defining these terms: “The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945. Currently made up of 193 Member States, the UN and its work is guided by the purposes and principles such as a commitment to maintain international peace and security, uphold international law, and achieve "higher standards of living" for their citizens found in its founding charter” (UN, About Us). The term “peacekeeping” is slightly more complicated to define as there are many different alterations in what peacekeepers should do. A general definition this paper will elaborate further on is that peacekeepers are individuals who mediate conflict on an international scale. The nation of Rwanda is a small, landlocked East African country located just south of the Equator. While small, Rwanda boasts one of the largest populations in sub-Saharan Africa. This paper will examine Rwanda in the context of its horrific 1994 Hutu Tutsi genocide (Rwanda 2021). Shifting to the concept of “sexual exploitation and abuse”: for the purposes of this paper, this term will denote “a wide spectrum of misconduct much of which amounts to serious criminal behavior, including rape and sexual abuse of women and children, prostitution, trafficking, exploitative sexual relationships which include sex in exchange for money, food or medicine and/or with the promise of security” (Stern, 2015). The paper does not operationalize these variables but rather reviews them to gain perspective on the breadth of this issue.
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Research Peacekeeping Failures L.M. Howard identifies three sufficient conditions which can be found in the peacekeeping failures of Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As research for these countries is primarily historical, qualitative data in most of this section will be composed of historical accounts of the peacekeeping facts of the various countries. Due to space limitations, this paper will survey Rwanda as representative of the author’s argument and then proceed to an analysis of the characteristics of successful UN peacekeeping missions. A detailed historical analysis on these subjects, while appropriate, exceeds the size constraints of this paper.
To adapt, this paper will summarize the events of the various instances and then provide the specific aspects in which the peacekeeping failure fits with the three criteria provided by Howard. These conditions are situational difficulty, disinterest from the Security Council, and organizational dysfunction in the UN Secretariat.
Rwanda In October 1993, the United Nations launched its peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. The purpose of the UNPKO was to monitor a cease-fire agreement between the Rwandan Hutu government and the rebel Rwandese Patriotic Front (primarily composed of Tutsis). The mission, unable to use military force for its goals, was restricted to examining violations of the cease-fire, facilitating humanitarian aid deliveries, and contributing to the security of the
Rwandan capital, Kigali. The mission proved insufficient after the government slaughtered an estimated 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus following the downing of the Rwandan president's plane on April 6, 1994 (Winfield, 1999). Howard points out how the key failure for the UN in Rwanda was that “at the height of the genocide in late April 1994, the Council voted, counterintuitively, to reduce the size of the dysfunctional United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2,500 to 270” (Howard, 2008). While Howard notes this, she points to the root of the problem of why some UNPKO flounder and others thrive. Howard points to three factors that are present in this scenario and are also evident in the case of Angola, Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These factors are the situational nature of the conflict, the disinterest of the UN Security Council in the matter, and organizational dysfunction in the UN Secretariat.
Situational Difficulty. Situational difficulty refers to the problems regarding the nature of the conflict. With respect to Rwanda, this factor refers to the reluctance of the Hutu tribe to negotiate and reconcile with the Tutsi tribe. As Paul Diehl and Michael Grieg point out in the “Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma,” parties must be willing to come to the table for a lasting peacemaking resolution to begin. For Rwanda, this reluctance materialized in an unwillingness to cooperate from nearby regional actors. An emergent political faction, the so-called “Hutu Power” underscored this reluctance with belligerent resistance to political reconciliation with the Tutsi tribe (Greig & Diehl, 2005). Hutu Power
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had been a growing political force in the early 1990s and by 1993 it was a burgeoning political force that carried substantive power, albeit power that mostly went unrecognized by the government and the UN. As for the composition of the group, Howard writes, The movement, which culminated in a well-planned genocide, was made up of the following groups: members of Habyarimana’s government (an ethnic Hutu who served as the second president of Rwanda from 1973-1994) who were unwilling to open up the political sphere to other parties and most certainly not to the Tutsi-dominated RPF; Interahamwe and Ipuzamugambi militias numbering 50,000 (who had originally been trained mainly by the French); the Gendarmerie or rural police (also trained by the French); the government’s Forces
Armées Rwandaises who were less involved in the planning and execution, but did take part; and finally, ordinary peasants who carried out most of the genocidal killing after “years of indoctrination
in
the
‘democratic
majority’
ideology
and
demonization
of
the
‘feudalists.’” (Howard, 2008)
Disinterest from the UN Security Council. This factor functions in tandem with the situational difficulty of the Rwandan conflict. This factor relates to the lack of motivation and political wherewithal that Permanent Five members encountered in Rwanda. It is important to understand the context of this conflict. The Rwandan genocide came on the heels of another UN peacekeeping failure that is not dealt with in this paper – Somalia. The same year as the Rwanda conflict reached a climax, the U.S. led a peace-enforced mission known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Subsequently, a second group from the United Nations, UNOSOM II - The United Nations Operations in Somalia - encountered attacks from Somali militia forces resulting in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers (Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide - Refworld). These deaths were politically unfavorable within America and catalyzed disinterest in substantively contributing to other peacekeeping affairs. Understandably, the United States was not eager to throw its resources into another African civil war. A report from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) elaborates on this shift: Rwandan Tutsi, already victimized at home, now became the tragic victims of terrible timing and tawdry scapegoating abroad. The murder of the 18 American soldiers in Somalia indeed traumatized the US government. The Rangers died on October 3. The resolution on UNAMIR came before the Security Council on October 5. The following day the American army left Somalia. This coincidence of timing proved disastrous for Rwanda. From then on, an unholy alliance of a Republican Congress and a Democratic President dictated most Security Council decisions on peacekeeping missions. The Clinton Administration immediately began to set out stringent conditions for any future UN peacekeeping operations. Presidential Decree Directive 25 (PDD25) effectively ruled out any serious peace enforcement by the UN for the foreseeable future. This American initiative in turn deterred the UN Secretariat from advocating stronger measures
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to protect Rwandan citizens.[59] Washington's domestic political considerations would take priority over catastrophes abroad – unless the victims were lucky enough to make the television news (Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide - Refworld). Ultimately, when it comes to the interest that the United Nations bore towards civil wars at the time, the events in Sudan sorely impeded the motivation the UN needed to adequately deal with the crisis in Rwanda. Especially when considering how the reluctance of a Permanent Member of the Security Council like the United States influenced other potential sponsors.
Organizational Dysfunction in the UN Secretariat. Organizational dysfunction on a bureaucratic level is another significant factor in the failure of the Rwandan peace mission. As mentioned, when the Security Council considered UNAMIR, UN multidimensional peacekeeping was on the decline due to the failures in Somalia. Neither adequate funding nor troops were provided given the extensive mandate assigned to UNAMIR. UNAMIR was mandated under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes) to observe the cease-fire, contribute to the security of Kigali, monitor the integration of a new army, investigate non-compliance with the Arusha Agreement, oversee policing, monitor human rights, monitor refugee repatriation, assist with landmine removal, assist with the coordination of humanitarian aid, and assist with preparations for elections (Howard, 2008) (Gourevitch, 2015). The mission was to implement all of these tasks with a mere 2,548 military troops and 60 civilian police. The budget, from October 1993
through April 1994, was little more than a paltry 35,000,000 (Gourevitch, 2015). To add to the dysfunction, there were also serious inadequacies on the part of mission leaders. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNAMIR was Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, former Minister of External Relations of Cameroon, and the military commander was Canadian Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire (Howard, 2008). On January 11, 1994, Dallaire had sent an important fax noting the details of plans for genocide, which an informant within the government had relayed in exchange for the protection of his family. At worst it was disregarded and at best improperly assessed;regardless, there were serious breaks of communication between the UN headquarters and their people on the ground. As Howard explains, The informant explained that radical elements within Habyarimana’s government, over which Habyarimana had no control, were actively planning to re-ignite the civil war. They plotted to
kill Belgian peacekeepers to provoke Belgian withdrawal; were compiling extensive lists of Tutsis and political enemies for “extermination”; and were indoctrinating and training thousands of Interahamwe militia to do the killing. The informant also explained the location of a weapons cache, which Dallaire wanted to raid. This fax was all but dismissed at UN headquarters. A fax with the name of Kofi Annan, then head of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but signed by his aide Iqbal Riza, told Dallaire simply to notify Habyarimana of the information, notify the Belgian, French, and US governments of the warning, and not to raid the weapons cache (Howard, 2008).
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Less than four months later, the predictions of the information came true. The death of the president opened the door for radical forces to instigate a coup. Horrifically, the next day the Prime Minister Agathe Uwlingiyimana, who was being protected by Belgian peacekeeping troops and UN Volunteers, was killed along with multiple Rwandan government officials under UNAMIR peacekeeper protection. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were violently slaughtered, and consequently, the Belgian government decided to unilaterally leave completely, which devastated the remnants of the UNAMIR operation (Howard, 2008). The UN also substantially delayed in dealing with this issue as the news of the genocide in Rwanda spread like a fire across the world. Acting Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was in Europe when the news broke but waited a week to return to New York where he submitted three response plans to the Security Council, but even then,
he did not recommend an approach. The options Boutros-Ghali gave were to 1) withdraw altogether, 2) send in a massive operation under the mandate of Chapter VII, or 3) simply reduce the size of the operation on the ground in an attempt to maintain some kind of international presence while saving the lives of UN peacekeepers (Howard, 2008). Member States such as the United States and Belgium advocated for a swift withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces while New Zealand, Nigeria, and the Czech Republic strongly discouraged those actions. The Non-Aligned Movement also advocated for a more comprehensive peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. Due to the conflicting opinions, decision-making in this area was further delayed at the expense of the lives of the Rwandan people. The situation on the ground became so dire that eventually nearly a month later on May 13 th, the Security-General finally labeled the conflict in Rwanda a genocide, pushing the Security Council to take decisive action on the matter (Howard, 2008). The organizational dysfunction of the Secretariat and the indecisiveness proved to be an important reason behind this peacekeeping failure.
Peacekeeping and Sexual Exploitation Next, this section will explore aspects of the peacekeeper role by addressing the peacekeepers’ reputation for sexual exploitation that peacekeepers have regretfully accrued. Due to the depth of literature on this subject key points regarding this subject will be primarily explored. According to a September 2017 Report on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations by human rights organization REDRESS, “sexual exploitation and abuse” encompasses a wide spectrum of misconduct, much of which amounts to serious criminal behavior, including rape and sexual abuse of women and children, prostitution, trafficking, and exploitative sexual relationships, which include sex in exchange for money, food, or medicine and/or security. REDRESS derives this definition from the
2015 Report of the External Independent Review of the United Nations Response to Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Central African Republic. This definition was constructed by Marie Deschamps, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Yasmin Sooka, the Executive Director of the Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa, and Mr. Hassan Jallow, the Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). While retroactive, this definition broadly defines the acts that catalyzed global concern regarding sexual exploitation by peacekeepers (SG/SM/17425-AFR/3291-HR/5285, 2015).
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The first recorded instances of UN peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse date back to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the early 1990s, Cambodia and Timor-Leste in the early and late 1990s, West Africa in 2002, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2004 (A/59/710: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects 2005). As noted by print media at the time, the reputation of the UN suffered as evidence regarding the revolting behavior of UN peacekeepers emerged in a landmark study published by Jordan’s ambassador to the UN assembly, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, then Permanent Representative of Jordan. In 2005, the Guardian stated some of these shocking allegations showing the hypocrisy of peacekeepers. The report noted: “[UN] troops sent to police Liberia were regularly having sex with girls aged as young as
12, sometimes in the mission's administrative buildings. In the DRC, peacekeepers were said to have offered abandoned orphans small gifts - as little as two eggs from their rations - for sexual encounters. Used condoms, an inquiry by the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services discovered, littered the perimeter of military camps and guard posts. Alarm about the involvement of UN peacekeepers in sex trafficking first became widespread during the 1990s when investigators found soldiers were customers in brothels run in Bosnia and Kosovo which relied on women sold into forced prostitution. One recent estimate suggested up to 2,000 women have been coerced into sex slavery in Kosovo (Report reveals shame of UN peacekeepers 2005). A former peacekeeper himself, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan submitted several recommendations to reform the United Nations approach towards dealing with sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. His sug-
gestions ranged from “banning all sexual relations between local populations and members of resident UN military missions in high-risk areas to encouraging better recreational facilities for soldiers off duty. Sites could [include] sports areas, free internet facilities, and subsidized telephone lines to enable contact with family and friends. One of his more bold proposals suggested the creation of proposals to overhaul the investigation of allegations of rape and abuse. The report further advocates for the creation of a Court-martial within mission areas for ‘serious offences’ to maintain the integrity of witnesses and evidence” (Andrews, 2007). Although bolder in its conception, the Zeid Report was particularly impactful as it brought about numerous reforms that the UN benefits from today. Important reforms include:
•
‘Applying standards of conduct to all categories of personnel, including military contingents, and requiring wid-
er dissemination of standards throughout the mission’ (Stern, 2015).
•
‘Establishing a permanent professional investigative mechanism to investigate serious misconduct, including SEA, committed by all categories of personnel’ (Stern, 2015).
•
‘Holding the UN accountable for extensive training, effective community outreach and personnel quality of life’ (Stern, 2015).
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•
‘Incorporating the implementation of measures to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse into the performance goals and evaluation of civilian managers and military commanders’ (Stern, 2015).
•
‘Requiring individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability, including liability to victims and dismissal from UN service, for all categories of personnel’ (Stern, 2015).
•
‘Amending the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that regulates the relationship between the TCC and the UN to require TCC reporting of any action taken on cases referred through UN investigation’ (Stimson Center,
2007), (Stern, 2015).
These suggestions have led to 1) “clarification of the standards of justice for civilian and military peacekeepers, 2) the establishment of a Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU for training, monitoring and enforcement activities of military and civilian peacekeepers and the bolstering of investigation protocols. Furthermore, 3) standardized measures for outreach and training were formed across all categories of personnel, as well as procedures to improve peacekeeper morale and welfare. 4) Civilian managers and military commanders have instituted more rigorous measures, such as curfews, lists of off-limits establishments, off-duty uniforms, and abuse-reporting telephone hotlines. 5) Protocols for assistance and support to victims have been issued by the UN General Assembly and Secretariat to field missions, MOUs between the TCCs and the UN have been revised to unequivocally lay out the obligations of states regarding
conduct and discipline of their troops.” (Andrews, 2007) (Stern, 2015). Ultimately, the Zeid Report is an integral aspect of peacekeeping reform. Policymakers still strive to meet this high mark as they combat the pervasiveness sexual exploitation in peacekeeping today.
Conclusion The research this paper details is primarily qualitative and by no means comprehensive, aiming instead to substantively overview crucial facets of the role of the peacekeeper. This paper concludes that when it comes to the failures of peacekeeping, the three conditions evident in Rwanda are considerations that must be recognized and
dealt with by future peacekeeping operations. These factors are the situational difficulty, the disinterest of the Security Council, and the organization of the Security General and the Secretariat in handling the matter. Secondly, turning towards the pressing matter of sexual exploitation, the proposals within the Zeid Report have catalyzed incredible change in interactions between peacekeepers and populations and in the management of sexual exploitation issues. As the analysis of these two issues shows, the role of a peacekeeper is by no means easy or convenient. It is stressful and full of risk and high-paced decisions. However, peacekeepers objectively do (at least marginally) help what would be even worse situations, and that is worth celebrating.
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Reference List
Andrews, K. (2007). Signs of Progress in Improving UN Peacekeeper Accountability. Stimson Center. Antonio, F. S. P. (2018). Peacekeeping: Global Perspectives, Challenges and Impacts. Nova Sci-ence Publishers In corporated. Criminalizing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers. United States Institute of Peace. (2013, August 29). https://www.usip.org/publications/2013/08/criminalizing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-peacekeepers. Deschamps, M., Jallow, H., & Sooka, Y. (2015, December 17). Taking Action on Sexual Exploita-tion and Abuse by
Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peace keeping Forces in the Central African Republic. Issuu. https://issuu.com/uniccanberra/docs/ taking_action_on_sexual_exploitatio. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. (2021, March 10). Rwanda. Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/ place/Rwanda. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. (n.d.). United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. Encyclopædia Britan-nica. https:// www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Peacekeeping-Forces. Global Policy Forum. (n.d.). UN Failed Rwanda. https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/201rwanda/39240.html. Goulding, M. (2002). The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping International Affairs. (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). doi:10.2307/2622309. Gourevitch, P. (2015). We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda. Picador Classic. Greig, J. M., & Diehl, P. F. (2005). The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma. International Stud-ies Quarterly, 49 (4), 621–646. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00381.x Guardian News and Media. (2005, March 25). Report reveals shame of UN peacekeepers. The Guardian. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/25/unitednations. Howard, L. M. (2008). Un Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. Cambridge University Press. Isely, E. R. (2010). United Nations peacekeeping in the 21st century. Nova Science Publishers. James, A. (1990). Peacekeeping in International Politics. St. Martin's Press. Koko, J. L., & C., E. E. J. M. (2012). Determinants of success in Un peacekeeping operations. University Press of America. Michael W. Doyle, Nicholas Sambanis. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations. Prince-
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ton University Press; 2006. Accessed April 22, 2021. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
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Sutterlin, J. S. (2005). Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peace-keeping. Political Sci ence Quarterly -New York-, 120(1), 151–151. U.N. Failed to Avert Angola Disaster. Human Rights Watch. (2020, October 28). https:// www.hrw.org/ news/1999/09/13/un-failed-avert-angola-disaster#. UN peacekeepers timeline. CRIN. (n.d.). https://home.crin.org/un-peacekeepers-timeline. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (n.d.). Rwanda: The Preventable Genoc ide - Refworld. Reliefweb. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d1da8752.pdf. United Nations. (1993, October 5). Resolution 872 (1993) /. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/ record/197341?ln=en. United Nations. (2005, March 24). A/59/710: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping opera tions in all their aspects. United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A% 2F59%2F710. United Nations. (2015, December 17). SG/SM/17425-AFR/3291-HR/5285 Secretary-General Vows Fast Action after Report Finds Misuse of Authority in United Nations Response to Central African Republic Abuse Claims | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. United Nations. https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ sgsm17425.doc.htm. United Nations. (n.d.). DATA Peacekeeping. United Nations. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data.
United Nations. (n.d.). Peacekeeper Fatalities Peacekeeping. United Nations. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/ peacekeeper-fatalities. United Nations. (n.d.). The situation concerning Western Sahara: United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/ record/94688. United Nations. (n.d.). United Nations Charter (full text). United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/uncharter/full-text. Winfield, N. (1999, December 16). UN Failed Rwanda. https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/ article/201-rwanda/39240.html.
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THE EU’S GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT WITH CHINA ABIGAIL WILSON
Abstract Europe is taking an increasingly negative diplomatic approach to China due to its growing realization and apprehension of the predatory nature of Chinese foreign policy. There are several different factors driving this disillusionment, including coercive Chinese tactics and the United States hostile stance towards China. This article will examine the differing viewpoints of several scholars on the subject and conduct an independent analysis on
the events leading to the EU’s changing stance. The research points to several key events and issues driving the EU’s changing orientation towards China. It is also finds that in analyzing EU foreign policy in the future, several factors that will be influential are the EU’s independent development of its hostile stance, the EU’s economic independence and leverage with China, and the possibility of a future transatlantic alliance between the EU and the US. ______________________________
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Introduction “Mask diplomacy,” “predatory liberalism,” “debt-trap diplomacy,” “diplomacy of generosity” has become synonymous with Chinese foreign policy, or rather, Chinese expansionism. Since its appearance on the world scene in the 1990s as an economic powerhouse, China has grown increasingly exploitative in its economic dealings with other countries. Europe has historically maintained a somewhat positive view of China, regarding them more as a partner in trade than as an enemy. However, beginning with the advent of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, it seems that as China continues to involve itself in European affairs, Europe is reluctantly coming to grasp the avaricious nature of Chinese foreign policy. The research question that this article will be examining: Is the EU taking an increasingly negative diplomatic approach to China because of its growing realization and apprehension of the predatory nature of Chinese foreign policy? Literature Review Europe has a history of misjudging China. Maximilian Ernst comments that the predatory nature of Chinese foreign policy has not historically been understood by the West (Ernst, 3). When China first emerged as a leading economy in the 1990s, it was thought that “China’s national interest was first and foremost aligned with its economic interest,” (Ernst, 3). “Prosperity and the expectation that the next generation would lead a better life” are a key part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic legitimacy, making “ an openly aggressive Chinese foreign policy unlikely” (Ernst, 3). The West supposed that the CCP would not want to risk jeopardizing its primary source of legiti-
macy (Ernst, 3). Additionally, the pervading expectation was that as China modernized, it would democratize and “ascend into the group of liberal democracies, and become a member of the Kantian foedus pacifcum, incapable of aggressive actions toward fellow democracies” (Ernst, 3). Scholars point to several different issues causing Europe’s shift from regarding China positively to viewing China as a systemic rival. In “Europe Changes Its Mind on China,” Thomas Wright comments, The driving force behind this shift is China’s behavior — its refusal to end practices of intellectual property theft and forced technology transfers, its failure to enhance market openness for European companies, its use of coercive economic tools and political influence in Europe, and its illiberalism on the world stage (Wright, 2020). Sebastian Santander and Antonios Vlassis note that it is not only China’s behavior, but also what they argue are “US mercantilist policies” that discourage US-EU integration (under former president Donald Trump) that made Europe realize its vulnerability and facilitated its growing distrust (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). Santander and Vlassis point out that COVID-19 exacerbated existing EU-China tensions and pushed Europe into action (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). Europe’s response to China may also mirror the change in presidential administrations in the US. Philippe le Corre writes, “Following four devastating years for the transatlantic relationship, which helped China to consolidate its power and influence in many parts of the world, European and U.S. leaders are back on track for more cooperation” (Le Corre, 2021). While on the campaign trail, President Biden stressed his desire to work jointly with the EU
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in addressing China (Le Corre, 2021). Ernst lends further support to such an alliance, stating that, “Against economic giants like the EU and the United States, Chinese coercion only works in absence of a unified transatlantic approach” (Ernst, 3). The EU and US combined made up over 25% of China’s total trade in 2019 (Ernst, 3). Santander and Vlassis also comments that the EU initially did want to unify with the US against China, but then-president Donald Trump distanced the US from such integration; the change in administrations might reignite the EU’s desire to form a transatlantic alliance against China (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). Other scholars argue that the EU’s increasingly negative stance towards China is not driven by US policymakers. Thomas Wright comments, “In some ways, the European shift is occurring despite American pressure, not because of it. If China were a responsible stakeholder, U.S. pressure would very likely lead to Europe hedging against the Trump administration and increasing engagement with Beijing” (Wright, 2020). This, Wright argues, is because much of Europe does not view Trump favorably and would likely be reluctant to join the US in a transatlantic partnership, toe-to-toe with China (Wright, 2020). Santander and Vlassis’s comments illuminate another facet of this argument, pointing out that the EU knows its single market is critical for China precisely because of the SinoAmerican trade war, and that it could potentially be used as leverage against Beijing (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). Data & Methods The data used in this article is openly-sourced and is a combination of primary and secondary documents found through various online databases. The articles were located by referencing organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and cross-referencing documents with official releases by the European Com-
mission. The “Literature Review” section compares the views of several different scholarly sources on the nature and source of the shifting European orientation towards China. The “Research” section delves into a brief analysis of the series of events that precipitated the change, providing background information through graphs and data points, news articles, and scholarly sources to provide background information. Research Events of the last five years highlight the volatility of EU-China relations. After its integration into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China focused on “indigenous innovation and core technologies in order to strategically manage interdependence with other countries and increase leverage” (Ernst, 3). Bilateral relations and close economic ties with other countries have been foundational to Chinese foreign policy, which usually adopts the form of coercive economic policies or “positive inducements” (Ernst, 3). While predatory economic coercion is typically relegated to Asian countries and usually does not typify China’s dealings with Europe, it has been employed in a few marked instances (Ernst, 3).
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Figure 1: Chinese Coercion in the EU Graph (Ernst, 3) Chinese Coercion in the EU Graph (Ernst, 3) In Europe, China more often engages a “subversive carrot system,” in which they pressure countries through bribes, preferential loans, investments, and other “positive inducements” (Ernst, 3). In 2016, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the EU peaked at €35.9 billion, compared to 2008 when Chinese FDI to the EU was €0.7 billion (Santander & Vlassis, 2021, as cited in European Commission, 2019b). Chinese FDI flows into the EU have
fallen every year since then. Notably, China was the biggest receiver of FDI in 2020, collecting $163 billion (Reuters, 2021)
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Figure 2: Chinese FDI in the EU fell further to a 5-year low (Merics, 2020) Several key alliances and policies are significant in the EU-China question. First, are the “memorandums of understanding” that China signed in 2012 with 16, later 17, European and Western Balkan countries. This partnership is known as the Cooperations Between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) or the “17+1” (previously, “16+1”) initiative (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). The second key policy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by Xi Jinping in 2013. The goal of the BRI is to facilitate trade and investments among the partnering countries, which encapsulates six different economic corridors (Seth, 2020). The BRI has several different
branches, including the Health Silk Road initiative, the Digital Silk Road initiative, and the Maritime Silk Road initiative. Finally, there is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Initially proposed in 2012, this agreement was not signed until November 15th, 2020, when it was adopted by the ten members of the Associations of Southeast Asian Association (ASEAN) plus Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and China. Some projections foresee the RCEP reducing 90% of trade barriers, creating the largest free trade region on the globe (Ernst, 3). The coercive nature of the “17+1” and the BRI render them sources of concern for many European leaders. In 2017, France, Germany, and Italy proposed to the European Commission a strategy to enhance EU investment
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and discourage Chinese FDI in strategic sectors (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). Portugal, Greece, Malta, and the Czech Republic, all beneficiaries of Chinese FDI, pushed against this proposition (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). In March of 2019, the EU released “The EU and China: A Strategy Outlook” which for the first time labeled China as a “systemic rival” and proposed ways Europe could improve the situation (Le Corre & Brattberg, 2020). French President Emanuel Macron poignantly stated, “The time of European naïveté is ended. For many years we had an uncoordinated approach and China took advantage of our divisions.” Europe’s perception of China soured further during the COVID-19 pandemic. China intended to positively restore global perception and enhance the Health Silk Road initiative by aiding with medical supplies and a coordinated approach to fight the pandemic (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). China’s “mask diplomacy” was rebuffed as many countries were disappointed when China either failed to deliver the promised goods or when they had to reject Chinese medical supplies because they were either defective or non-compliant with EU standards (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). This disappointment was compounded by the fact that many countries were already disillusioned with China from failed investment projects. Montenegro, for instance, was left to pay off an almost one-billion-dollar loan to China’s Export-Import Bank (EXIM), a loan part of a BRI investment project intended to finance the construction of a highway (Doehler, 2019). Europe’s response to China since the COVID-19 pandemic has been decisive. The European Commission immediately began enhancing the strategy recommendations of the March 2019 proposal, “discussing ways to strengthen trade defense instruments, condition Chinese companies access to the EU’s procurement market, and make European guidelines on 5G security risks more robust” (Le Corre & Brattberg, 2020). Additionally, the EU gave €3.3 billion as a COVID-19 relief fund to Western Balkan countries in an effort to intensify their affinity to the EU (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). On April 23, 2020, the European Council created a new economic recovery fund
worth more than one thousand billion euro (Santander & Vlassis, 2021). The European Commission also proposed the “Next Generation EU” initiative and allocated €750 billion to assist member states in its 2021-2027 budget proposal (Tagliapietra, 2020). On March 25, 2020, the European Commission set guidelines aimed at helping Europe take a more strategic approach in its interactions with China (Tagliapietra, 2020). As a result, the Italian government enacted Law Decree No. 23 on April 8, which “focused on special measures to safeguard Italian assets and expanding the 'golden power’ to previously excluded sectors” (Tagliapietra, 2020). Additionally, Germany, France, and Spain all pursued different measures which restricted Chinese FDI flows (Tagliapietra, 2020). Another dampener on EU-China relations came with the indefinite delaying of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). After 35 rounds of EU-China talks over the course of seven years, it was announced on December 30, 2020, that China and the EU had reached an agreement on the CAI investment deal (Le Corre, 2021). This came after commitments by China regarding international labor standards, sustainable development, and climate change (Le Corre, 2021). However, in March 2021, the EU sanctioned China for the first time in more than 30 years because of the human rights abuses in the Xinjiang district of China (Emmott & Brunnstrom, 2021). Euronews commented, “The raft of measures, designed in coordination with Western allies, targeted four Chinese officials and one entity believed to be involved in the human rights violations against the Uyghur minority” (Liboreiro, 2021). In response, China sanctioned 30 plus organizations and people (Liboreiro, 2021). Five of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that China targeted were from four main European political parties whose support is critical to the passing of the CAI (Brînză, 2021). In response, on May 20, 2021, the European Parliament (EP) passed a joint
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resolution, 599 in favor, 30 opposed, indefinitely halting the passage of the CAI and calling the Chinese sanctions "an attack against the European Union and its Parliament as a whole, the heart of European democracy and values, as well as an attack against freedom of research" (Liboreiro, 2021). In addition to shifting opinions of EU leaders, public opinion in the EU is also growing increasingly negative towards China. Hostility towards China is beginning to characterize European countries as a whole.
Figure 3: Change of feeling towards China among Europeans in the past three years (% of respondents) (Turcsányi et al, 2020) Conclusion The March 2021 EU sanctions on China and the recent EP joint resolution to halt the approval of the CAI seem to be a culmination of a steady trend of European disillusionment with China’s predatory foreign policy tactics. The sequence of events does not seem to indicate that EU’s disparagement is dependent on pressure from the US but flows primarily from China’s coercive practices and over-involvement in European affairs. The independent development of EU thought in this area could mean that they will not shy away from independently taking a hardline approach to China in the future. This is compounded by the fact that the EU single market is critical for China, giving Europe leveraging power. EU-China relations, especially post-COVID, is a rapidly developing issue. Future researchers should follow closely how strict EU policy towards China becomes in the next few months. Researchers should also delve into the possibility of a transatlantic alliance between the EU and the US and how that affects the boldness of Europe’s bilateral relations with Beijing in the future.
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References Brînză, A. (2021). China’s EU Sanctions Are the Latest Proof: Beijing Doesn’t Understand Democracies. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/chinas-eu-sanctions-are-the-latest-proof-beijingdoesnt-understand-democracies/ Doehler, A. (2019). How China Challenges the EU in the Western Balkans. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https:// thediplomat.com/2019/09/how-china-challenges-the-eu-in-the- western-balkans/
Emmott, R. & Brunnstrom, D. (2021). West Sanctions China Over Xinjiang Abuses, Beijing Hits Back at EU. U.S. News. Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/ 2021-03-22/west-sanctions-chinaover-xinjiang-abuses-beijing-hits-back-at-eu
Ernst, M. (2020). Double Down on Liberalism: A Transatlantic Response to Chinese Economic Coercion. American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. Retrieved fromhttps:// www.aicgs.org/publication/doubledown-on-liberalism-a-transatlantic-response-to- chinese-economic-coercion/ Liboreiro, J. (2021). MEPs vote to freeze controversial EU-China investment deal. Euronews. Retrieved from https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/20/european-parliament-votes-to- freeze-controversial-eu-chinainvestment-deal European Commission, (2019). Foreign Direct Investment in the EU. SWD (2019) 108 final, 13 March European Commission. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/17585899.12899? campaign=wolearlyview Evans, M. (2020). Pandemic Slows China's Global Deal Making in 2020. Lexology. Retrieved from https:// www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e7f493d3-8b34-46ac- a7c5-9a78868db819 Le Corre, P. (2021). Europe’s Tightrope Diplomacy on China. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Re trieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/24/europe- s-tightrope-diplomacy-on-china-pub84159 Le Corre, P. & Brattberg, E. (2020). How the Coronavirus Pandemic Shattered Europe’s Illusions of China. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https:// carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/09/howcoronavirus-pandemic-shattered-europe-s- illusions-of-china-pub-82265 Reuters, (2021). China was largest recipient of FDI in 2020: Report. Reuters. Retrieved from https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-fdi/china-was-largest-recipient-of-fdi- in-2020-reportidUSKBN29T0TC Seth, S. (2020). One Belt One Road (OBOR). Investopedia. Retrieved from https:// www.investopedia.com/terms/ o/one-belt-one-road-obor.asp
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Tagliapietra, A. (2020). The European Union Won’t Be Fooled by China’s Health Silk Road. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Retrieved from https://www.gmfus.org/news/european-union-wont-be-fooledchinas-health-silk-road Turcsányi, R., Šimalčík, M. Kironská, K., Sedláková, R., Čeněk, J., Findor, A., Hruška, O.B.M., Brona, A., Esteban, U.A.B.C.M., Gallelli, B., Gledić, J., Ivanov, P.G.S., Jerdén, B., Julienne, M., Matura, T., Rühlig T., Summers, T. (2020). European public opinion on China in the age of COVID-19., Palacký University Olomouc & Cen tral European Institute of Asian Studies. Retrieved from http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/ connect/2252c7e2-7f33-4281-9384-fc6fa0703387/European-public-opinion-on-China-in- the-age-ofCOVID-19.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=2252c7e2-7f33-4281-9384- fc6fa0703387 Wright, T. (2020). Europe Changes Its Mind on China. Brookings. Retrieved from https:// www.brookings.edu/ research/europe-changes-its-mind-on-china/ Santander, S. & Vlassis, A. (2021). The EU in Search of Autonomy in the Era of Chinese Expansionism and COVID19 Pandemic. Global Policy Journal. Retrieved fromhttps:// www.globalpolicyjournal.com/articles/healthand-social-policy/eu-search-autonomy-era- chinese-expansionism-and-covid-19-pandemic
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GERMANY’S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY: RUSSIAN SOFT POWER EXPANSION IN THE ENERGY SECTOR JESSICA GARLOCK
Abstract Germany’s increased dependency on Russian natural gas exports has jeopardized its international stability by opening it to political interference from Moscow. Russia has demonstrated its belief that strategic manipulation of its energy supply to the European Union can extend its soft power through Europe, furthering its nationalistic foreign policy goals. To that end, Germany, as the current strongest member of the EU, has threatened the Union at large by its dependency. In deepening its ties with Russia through the recent construction of new pipelines, Germany continues to concede its regional authority to the East. This gives Russia direct, exploitable control over the German energy supply and creates a disturbing divide between Germany and its anti-Russian ideological counterparts in NATO and the EU, which Russia will use to increase its soft power. ________________________________________
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Introduction
Russia has long been the monster in the closet of Western society. From the Communist Revolution to the Cold War, Europe and the US have denounced the Soviet Union’s perceived backwardness, utilitarianism, and brutality. Yet Russia’s ruthless character did not vanish after the Berlin Wall fell—it merely went underground. As Putin walks the line between president and autocrat, Russia mounts a campaign to exploit the European Union’s fundamental weaknesses. The energy sector is a significant front for this conflict since Russia seeks to construct and manipulate strategic connections with Europe through natural gas exportation. Germany is the most problematic casualty of Russia’s campaign of influence. Already vulnerable to geopolit-
ical exploitation through its links to Russia, Germany continues to expand its energy trade and thereby further Russia’s political goals. Germany’s substantial dependency on Russian natural gas has opened it to manipulation by Russia—an opportunity that the Kremlin will likely leverage. As the strongest economic partner in the EU, a weakness in Germany jeopardizes the stability of the union at large, worsening ongoing crises caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and other systemic issues.
Literature Review Much of the literature used consists of objective news reports. However, political theorist Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power, when applied to Russia’s economic interactions, serves as a guiding principle for the political aspect
of this subject. Nye defines soft power as “a state’s ability to wield influence based on its culture, political values, and foreign policies, which must be perceived as legitimate and having moral authority” (Nye, 1990). In contrast, hard power is coercion through direct force. Except in response to natural security violations, the West rarely considers hard power acceptable; rather, soft power, or persuading through attraction, is the ideal in modern political relations. Effective soft power projection necessitates that a nation appears credible to its citizens and neighbors; it creates national cohesion and achieves foreign policy objectives (Banciu, 2016, p. 85). The “unevenly balanced mutual dependencies” in the globalist world disallow the easy exertion of hard power, meaning two nations must either work to their mutual advantage or to exploit the other’s vulnerabilities (Nye, 1990). Problems arise when the balance of power shifts toward anti-democratic actors. Western idealism claims that international difference can be settled through soft power; geopolitical tensions are exacerbated when this conflicts with Eastern realism. The foreign policy establishment agrees that soft power extension is the primary mode of operation for modern countries seeking to extend their influence; hard power is no longer permitted in the increasingly globalist and idealistic world climate. Yet this does not assume that all countries will behave in an acceptable manner. Russia has demonstrated extensive and current patterns of aggressively leveraging its influence, contrary to the principles of Nye or western thought. The second key piece of literature for this paper is an extensive 2018 study by the Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Parliament. It evaluates the use of energy as a tool of authori-
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tarian governments, primarily Russia. The analysis draws from extensive examples of offensive energy usage, supplementing with the EU’s natural gas dependency statistics. It looks at how nations strategically leverage exports themselves, rather than the effects of economic benefits gained after the trade is completed. Data and Methods The data for this paper is open-sourced, drawn from primary and secondary sources. Most of the historical analysis is pulled from official exploratory and recommendary publications by the European Commission; news articles have been chosen from reputable sources and cross-checked with other records. In the “Literature Review” section, this paper will discuss several scholarly sources utilized, including Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power in international relations, which will provide a framework for this discussion. In the “Research” section, this paper will first evaluate the status quo of the Russian energy sector and its relations with Eastern Europe; next, it will assess Russia’s actions through the theory of soft and hard power in international relations; and lastly, it will consider to what degree Germany’s current position exposes it to Russian exploitation. Research Russia’s Energy Sector Russia possesses vast natural gas reserves. Its 35 trillion cubic meters of natural gas account for 18.1% of the world’s total proven reserves (Temizer, 2018); petroleum materials comprise 58% of Russia’s total exports (Focus
Economics, 2014), with 250 bcm of gas exported in 2019 (Bofit, 2020). Its market adaptability is hindered by this lack of diversity coupled with its centrally planned economy, as the oil giant Gazprom, which produces two-thirds of Russia’s natural gas, is majority-owned by the government (EIA, 2017). Though Russia is a self-identified energy superpower, its deteriorating infrastructure and stagnated innovation necessitates foreign investment for industrial revitalization (Leidel, 2004). Though oil prices have recently plummeted, Russia remains Europe’s primary energy supplier. Despite warnings to diversify, the EU imported 70% of Russia’s gas in 201, with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) importing an additional 15% (Bofit, 2020). Eight major pipelines connect Europe and Russia, the most significant being Turk Stream, connecting to southeast Europe via the Black Sea, and Nord Stream 1 and 2, connecting to Germany via the Baltic (EIA, 2017). Russia thus relies on the European market to sustain its industry, while the EU depends on Russian gas. These exploitable geopolitical links between East and West are the subject of this analysis. Germany’s Energy Sector Germany is one of Russia’s most significant buyers. In transitioning to low-emissions fuels, it has shifted from coal to natural gas with the intent of becoming fully electric (Wettengel, 2021). However, concurrently decommissioning its nuclear reactors, which supply a third of its electricity, has exacerbated its interim dependence on gas (Karnitschnig, 2020a). As of 2020, Germany imports 40% of its natural gas from Russia, rendering its transition to renewables a Pyrrhic victory. The short-term costs of diversifying among suppliers weigh heavily against the long-
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term benefit of energy security, and given Germany’s underdeveloped transition plan, it is unclear when Berlin plans to sever itself from Moscow (Wettengel, 2021). The construction of the twin Nord Stream pipelines suggests that neither party intends to end the relationship soon. Nord Stream 1, completed in 2011, transports 59.2 bcm of natural gas directly to Germany beneath the Baltic Sea, lowering Germany’s energy cost by bypassing all transit states (Nord Stream AG, 2021). Russia used the bypass to divert gas from pre-existing transcontinental pipelines and thus divest Ukraine of the transit fees that accounted for 3% of its economy (Markind, 2021). The second string, Nord Stream 2, is nearly complete and has the same capacity as Nord Stream 1, allowing Germany to import 110 bcm of gas annually (Gazprom, 2021). An international outcry has paused construction, but Germany has voiced its intentions to complete the project (Stelzenmüller, 2021). Russia’s Projection of Power in the Energy Sector: Russia’s Soft Power Goals Post-Soviet Russia has demonstrated its desire to return as a world power. To that end, it has concentrated soft power in the former Soviet satellite bloc (sometimes through hard power, as in the 2014 annexation of Crimea), while enhancing its bilateral relations. The Kremlin has also launched a successful internal soft power campaign, promoting a nationalistic culture through its political, educational, and religious institutions (Karabeshkin & Sergunin, 2015, p. 356). Internal cohesion increases Russia’s attractiveness, facilitating cultural exportation and improving diplomatic relations to extend its influence (Hill, 2016, p. 341). Russia’s socio-political influence in the Eastern states also combats democracy. Democratic border regions threaten Putin’s authoritarian regime—one reason Russia despises the presence of a sovereign Ukraine. Russia also sees destabilized border states as contributing to its
own security (Goldgeier, 2021). To restore Russia’s “greatness,” Putin has pursued means that blur the lines between soft and hard power (Hill, 2016, p. 344). Post-Soviet Russia shifted the revenue from energy exports out of the military-industrial complex and to the economic sector, triggering a period of rapid growth amid climbing oil prices. Initially, “new oil wealth… turned more to butter than guns,” yet recently, Moscow has used soft power to prepare for hard power incursions (Hill, 2016, p. 341). A militaristic tendency joined with hostility towards democracy has aggravated tensions between West and East, drawing attention to Russia’s politically motivated actions in the energy sector. Russia’s Hard Power in Energy Authoritarian regimes utilize energy exports defensively to consolidate power and improve international relations or offensively control opponents. The government uses the state-controlled corporations as a geopolitical tool in supplier and transit countries, making economic gains, exerting political influence, and coercing customers through the market (Korteweg, 2018, p. 13). The first two typically manifest as soft power, while the third is hard power (Korteweg, 2018, p. 4). Low prices make Russia’s gas the most globally competitive, enticing new buyers and discouraging present customers from switching suppliers. Russia thus establishes mutually beneficial relationships with consumer and transit states, leveraging this positive influence to draw more into the Russian fold (Korteweg, 2018, p. 8). Though it must not drastically undercut soft power by damaging its image, the Kremlin can exploit these relationships for hard
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power projection. This occurs primarily through the following ways: •
Price increase and decrease
•
Supply cuts
•
Asset control
•
Restrictive contracts (Korteweg, 2018, p. 14) Regarding prices: Through price decreases and increases, Russia rewards or punishes behavior in dependent
consumers. This is best seen in Eastern Europe, which Russia considers under its sphere of influence and therefore vulnerable to economic leverage. Gazprom frequently makes politically motivated price changes while citing busi-
ness reasons (Korteweg, 2018, p. 16). Regarding supply cuts: Supply cuts are primarily a weapon of last resort, as they undermine Russia’s soft power by damaging its image as a dependable, ethical partner. However, they are effective when used. For example: when Ukraine refused compliance with a three-fold price increase in mid-winter 2006, Gazprom halted all gas exports to Ukraine; when Prague constructed a US anti-missile radar system, Russia cut supply to the Czech Republic (Korteweg, 2018, p. 20). Regarding asset control: Gazprom and Rosneft, through which the Kremlin exerts its political power, own majority shares in most major European pipelines. Gazprom frequently conducts “debt-for-assets” agreements, where Russia forgives foreign debts in exchange for control of pipeline infrastructure. This, combined with the purchase of foreign production assets (e.g. in Venezuela), extends Russia’s monopoly on European oil (Korteweg, 2018, p. 22). Regarding contracts: Russian suppliers use long-term contracts with specified delivery points to fragment the European market, increasing dependency on Russia. These contracts tie buyers to Russian suppliers while also prohibiting buyers from changing pipelines or re-selling imports. This allows Gazprom to exert strategic leverage by setting different prices for different buyers (Korteweg, 2018, p. 23). Nord Stream 2’s Consequences for EU Stability: Deterioration of the EU The EU has recently suffered a downturn. Brexit marked the departure of the EU’s most politically influential and economically beneficial member; large states like Italy and France struggle with weak executive branches and internal tension; the southern region has a failing immigration system and a stagnated economy. The COVID-19 pandemic triggered the most drastic decline in the eurozone’s history, with GDP dropping 6.8% (Karnitschnig,
2020b). The adoption of the euro in 1999 created systemic economic issues that left many countries unable to cope with the debt and lockdowns caused by the pandemic. Calls for an EU-wide coronavirus recovery fund have been ignored, with prosperous countries reluctant to fund the dubious recovery of states that were already unsound before COVID (Karnitschnig, 2020b). Germany’s Role in the EU Britain’s exit left Germany the default political and economic leader of the eurozone. A thriving domestic and international market allowed it to contribute € 25.267 billion, or 0.73% of its economy, to the EU in 2018
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(Europa, 2020). It holds 96 of the 705 European Parliament seats, more than any member; it also holds the presidency of the European Commission and held the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU in 2020 (Europa, 2020). German politicians also have a plethora of roles in various committees and enjoy unofficial but influential leadership in the Council (Economist, 2020). Germany, therefore, is the natural choice for an EU hegemon—hegemon being “a country that uses its power to preserve a larger system, even at a cost to its more narrowly defined national interests” (Kluth, 2020). A hegemon is necessary to maintain unity among the frequently incoherent EU states, but Germany refuses to accept the role. Germany’s dark history makes it reluctant to blatantly leverage its natural authority, even as a beneficiary; it also will not risk the moral hazard of assuming economic liability for the south without precautionary conditions on that aid (Kluth, 2020). The soft power vacuum created by the lack of hegemony opens the region to the incursion of influence by less benevolent actors. Effects of Germany’s Energy Policy on the EU Germany’s internationally censured embrace of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline strengthens its relationship with Russia at the expense of Europe’s security. In bypassing the eastern and central transit countries, Russia increases its leverage over those states, as it can force problem countries to capitulate to political or economic demands by diverting exports to Nord Stream without losing revenue through a supply cut (Korteweg, 2018, p. 27). Russia has already demonstrated a decades-long pattern of offensive energy use, especially towards Ukraine; Nord Stream 2 allows hard power to maximize German revenue. The EU is also imperiled. Together, the two strings of Nord Stream carry 110 bcm of natural gas, over 70% of
Russia’s exports to Europe, which creates a chokepoint for Europe’s gas supply (Korteweg, 2018, p. 27). Russia could exploit this dependency with strategic supply and price manipulation just as it has exploited the east. In addition, Nord Stream strategically undermines EU soft power through internal division: consumer countries are incentivized to purchase cheap Russian fuel, while non-buyers condemn them for their increased dependence on Russia. This worsens the EU’s burgeoning fragmentation, preventing the formation of a common EU energy policy and allowing Russia to capitalize on the destabilization (Korteweg, 2018, p. 5). NATO is also jeopardized. While it ordinarily acts as an unofficial check on Russia’s power, it cannot do so effectively if Germany, one of its strongest partners, is dependent upon Russia. Recent events show this danger: Russia began an immense military buildup on the Ukrainian border, and Germany remained uncharacteristically silent in its support of NATO. Antagonizing its business partner would jeopardize its economy—Russia’s soft power extension worked with brutal effectiveness (Kramer, 2020). While Russia cannot exert much hard power without damaging its commercial reliability, its image would cease to matter in a military conflict. Suppose Russia pursues its aggressive tendencies to take military action against Eastern Europe or the EU. In that case, Germany is boxed in by Nord Stream: either a vulnerable Germany stands with NATO and faces its due punishment from Moscow, or Berlin distances itself from the EU and NATO to appease the Kremlin (Markind, 2021). This security threat to the already structurally unsound EU opens the region to risks of catastrophic proportions.
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Conclusion Moscow has won on both fronts. It has created commercial ties with Berlin while improving its image as a benevolent neighbor; Germany, however, has distanced itself from the US and the EU. If estranged from western powers, Germany will likely turn towards Russia and China, jeopardizing the security of the West by extending Russian soft power and imperiling the stability of NATO. This is predicated, however, on the assumption that West-East relations are always a zero-sum game. Every expansion of Russian influence is not automatically a loss for Europe, yet Russia does have a long and disturbing history of viewing democracy as antithetical to its national interests. The West—and Germany in particular—might be willing to extend the olive branch in the economic sector, but Russia may not view the situation with a similar benevolence. Germany and the European Union must acknowledge the instability of their position and devise a means of lessening their resource dependency before it is employed against them.
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References
Banciu, R. I. (2016). NORD STREAM 2 and its soft power - an unfolding playground for european union. Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 16(2), 83-91. Retrieved from https://ezproxy.phc.edu/login?url=https:// www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/nord-stream-2-soft-power-unfolding-playground/ docview/1795493477/se-2?accountid=13113 Bofit. (2020, February 28). LNG drives growth in Russian natural gas production. BOFIT. https://www.bofit.fi/ en/monitoring/weekly/2020/vw202009_4/.
BP Statistical Review. (2019). BP Statistical Review – 2019, Russia’s Energy Market in 2018: BP Energy Econom ics: 2019. BP.COM. https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy -economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019-russia-insights.pdf Economist. (2020, June 25). Germany is doomed to lead Europe. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/ europe/2020/06/25/germany-is-doomed-to-lead-europe. EIA. (2017, October 31). U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis. Int ernational - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/ country/RUS. Europa. (2020, July 31). Germany. European Union. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/ member-countries/germany_en. FocusEconomics. (2014, January 2). Russia Economy - GDP, Inflation, CPI and Interest Rate. FocusEconomics | Economic Forecasts from the World's Leading Economists. https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/ russia. Gazprom. (2021). Nord Stream 2. Gazprom. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream2/. Goldgeier, J. (2021, April 6). U.S.-Russian Relations Will Only Get Worse. Foreign Affairs. https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2021-04-06/us-russian-relations-will-only-get-worse. Hill, F. (2016, June 20). Moscow Discovers Soft Power. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/20061001.pdf Karabeshkin, L., & Sergunin, A. (November 2015). Understanding Russia’s Soft Power Strategy. Political Studies Association, 35(3-4), 347-363. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9256.12109. Karnitschnig, M. (2020a, September 11). Why Germany can't say no to Nord Stream. POLITICO. https:// www.politico.eu/article/why-germany-cant-say-no-to-nord-stream/.
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Karnitschnig, M. (2020b, April 27). The eurozone's problem country: Germany. POLITICO. https:// www.politico.eu/article/eurozone-problem-country-germany-coronavirus/. Kluth, A. (2020, April 30). Why Germany Will Never Be Europe's Leader. Bloomberg.com. https:// www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-04-30/coronavirus-crisis-why-germany-will-never-be-europes-leader. Korteweg, R. (2018, April 27). Energy as a tool of foreign policy of authoritarian states, in particular Russia. Policy Department for External Relations, Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. https:// www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603868/EXPO_STU(2018)603868_EN.pdf
Kramer, A. E. (2021, April 16). In Russia, a Military Buildup That Can't Be Missed. The New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/2021/04/16/world/europe/russia-ukraine-troops.html. Leidel, S. (2004, March 11). Germany Bound to Russia Over Energy Policy: DW: 03.11.2004. DW.COM. https:// www.dw.com/en/germany-bound-to-russia-over-energy-policy/a-1384065. Markind, D. (2021, April 7). Nord Stream 2 Proves To Be Geo-Political Disaster. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/ sites/danielmarkind/2021/04/07/nord-stream-2-proves-to-be-geo-political-disaster/?sh=37efe1447849. Nord Stream AG. (2021, January 22). Nord Stream - The new gas supply route for Europe. Nord Stream AG. https://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/press-releases/the-nord-stream-pipeline-transported-a-volumeof-592-billion-cubic-metres-of-natural-gas-in-2020-517/. Nye, J. (1990). Soft Power. Foreign Policy, (80), 153-171. doi:10.2307/1148580 Stelzenmüller, C. (2021, March 24). Nord Stream 2 impasse threatens trans-Atlantic ties. Brookings. https:// www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/23/nord-stream-2-impasse-threatens-trans-atlanticties/. Temizer, Murat. (2018, June 22). Russia Holds 18pct of Total Global Proven Gas Reserves. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/general/russia-holds-18pct-of-total-global-proven-gas-reserves/20579. Wettengel, J. (2021, March 19). Gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 links Germany to Russia, but splits Europe. Clean En ergy Wire. https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/gas-pipeline-nord-stream-2-links-germany-russiasplits-europe.
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THE RISE OF EMPIRES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF ATHENIAN, BRITISH, AND US NAVAL POWER EDMUND HURTY
Abstract This paper investigates the motivation for three maritime empires—Athens, Britain, and the United States—to initially develop and then maintain relative naval supremacy, as well as the dynamic between their na-
val forces and the land armies they opposed. The central finding is that the motivations were the same in all three cases: each developed naval power in response to an acute, major military threat and then maintained their naval power in peacetime due to the advantages that empire conferred. Secondly, it finds that the historical trend thus far has been for naval forces to have increased importance relative to land forces. ________________________________
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Introduction
Though the weapons of war change, the men who fight with them do not. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the development of three of history’s great naval powers—ancient Athens, the British Empire, and the current champion, the United States—and demonstrate that in all three cases, the motivations for developing and maintaining naval power were similar. However, technological development changed the balance of the relative importance of naval and land forces. More specifically, this author contends that in all three cases, the initial drive for naval power was an acute military threat, but the strategic advantages produced by naval dominance in three separate domains— economic, soft power, and hard power—encouraged them to invest in maintaining that naval dominance even once it was no longer strictly necessary from a military perspective. This author further contends that technological development over the last several centuries has shifted the balance of power away from land forces and towards naval forces. However, there is some evidence that this will be less and less true as the twenty-first century unfolds. To make this case, the paper is divided into three sections, one for each empire, with two subsections under each. The first subsection will address the motivations, and the second will address the technological changes and how that influenced the relationship between land and naval forces. The British and American sections include case studies to showcase these new dynamics at work. At the end of the US section, there will be a brief analysis of China’s rise in relative naval strength to the US, which will reference the strategic advantages traditionally associated with naval power to project the sorts of advantages the US can expect to cede to China if it does not make a substantial naval investment in the near future.
Literature Review
As this project compared three separate empires, preparing it required an introductory-level investigation into a substantial number of subjects. It required understanding the sequence of events that surrounded each empire's rise, the security threats (perceived or real) that each faced at that time, the benefits that resulted from their relative naval power, and the interactions that each navy had with opposing land forces. Current research on these subjects is sufficient to provide a relatively clear picture of each of these issues at the low-level resolution required for this project. However, a deeper analysis would benefit from greater specifics on what methodologies Sparta used to move its supplies around and what prices it paid. Such information is easier to find for Athens because much of its imperial records have been found. Still, it was necessary to consider hypothetical methods and calculate the projected costs for Sparta's case. Additionally, regarding the modern era, there is emerging technology that warrants further research. The overall trend from Athens to the US has been an increase in the importance of naval forces at the expense of land forces, particularly as naval forces have gained the capacity to strike land forces. However, the pendulum may be swinging back towards land forces as countries, notably China, develop land-based, mobile anti-ship missiles. If matured and proliferated, these missiles can pose a substantial threat to expensive naval assets at a rela-
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tively affordable price. Emerging autonomy and hypersonic speeds are additional factors that can further complicate this picture. Current open-source material on this question is sharply divided. There are some who pronounce the Carrier Strike Group an obsolete relic (specifically for combat purposes), to those who say that US carriers have never been safer since WWII and will remain the primary vehicle for delivering ordinance for the foreseeable future. Given the uncertainties surrounding this question, it is left largely unaddressed in this project. Further research into the plausibility of effective countermeasures (such as electronic warfare, cyber, and direct energy weapons) would help assess the future dynamics between land and naval forces, and whether the reigning Carrier Strike Group paradigm will remain relevant.
Data and Methods
All information in this paper is open-source and acquired through a library, online database, Google search, or online purchase. They were found by raising specific questions, such as the number of tons of cargo an ancient merchant ship could carry and finding sources that answered those specific questions. The Literature Review section reveals some of those particular questions and the sufficiency of existing scholarship. However, repeated attempts to find reliable information on the threat posed by current anti-ship missiles to US naval assets were fruitless, so this project left the question largely unaddressed.
Research
Section One: The Athenian Empire Motivations: Military Threat, Then Empire Tracing the development of the Athenian navy, both in terms of time and purpose, can be somewhat challenging until the Themistoclean building campaign in the 480’s. However, Christopher Haas, arguing primarily from archeological finds, says that Athens should not be considered a naval power until after Themistocles, saying that prior to this, the Athenian “navy” largely consisted of penteconters, not triremes, and was held in private hands for
piracy purposes against Aegina, not in public hands for fighting a full-scale war (Haas, 1985). Haas further points out that even during Themistocles’ time, Athens did not build proper tackle or warehouses for its ships at either Piraeus or Athens’ own port, which were investments that seafaring people had been making in major ports for centuries (Haas), indicating that the initial naval build-up was likely intended as a temporary measure. However, once Aegina had been subjugated and the Persians driven out, the Athenians did not lay aside their ships and return to farming; they chose to invest in maintaining the naval dominance they had created, and one must ask why. The most straight-forward answer is that Athens’ involvement in the Delian League required the use
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of ships, but that then raises the question, did Athens intend to become an empire at the outset, or was it more of an accident? Some historians, such as Hunter Rawlings, argue from linguistics that Thucydides meant to say that Athens set up the Delian League as a mere pretext, intending to create an empire from the get-go (Rawlings, 2008). However, that explanation, in addition to ignoring Thucydides’ mastery of the Greek language, does not match the historical flow of events. Before the Delian League was established, a league was already in place, led by the Spartans. Athens only took command and founded the Delian League after the allies refused to submit to further Spartan command and asked Athens to take over (Thucydides et al., 2008). Moreover, initially the allies followed Athenian commands voluntarily; there is no record of force against an ally until Naxos revolted years later (Thucydides). As such, it seems unlikely that Athens founded the Delian League with the original intention of turning it into an empire. A better, but still incomplete answer, is that Athens did not start out with empire in mind because the alliance offered Athens enough power to warp its soul, turning it into a malevolent empire (Cynthia et al., 2015, p. 267). There is certainly evidential ground to argue that the League morphed in stages and that Athens’ moral fiber degraded with time. In 470, the allies voluntarily contributed money to Athens instead of ships and men, and Naxos rebelled against the League entirely. Rather than permitting Naxos to leave, Athens reduced the city and forcibly imposed the tribute model (Yale University, 2012). However, Athens did not move the treasury to Delos and begin spending the League's tribute on private interests until 454; unlike the Melians in 416, the population of Naxos was not harmed. This series of events—a slow moral decay across a substantial stretch of time—suggests that Athens' transformation was motivated at least in part by a lust for power. However, that desire for power was not solely based in national vainglory; legitimate, pragmatic interests were also at stake. By 454, Athens’ foreign policy tensions were high, spurred by the incident at Ithome in 461-2, the scuffle with Aegina and Corinth around 459, and a real conflict at Tanagra in 457 (Thucydides 1.1). Though none of these events were existentially threatening, they did reveal that Athens had legitimate strategic concerns. Moreover, Athens’ navy and the League offered advantages in the economic, soft power, and hard power spheres that addressed these concerns.
Economic Advantages of Naval Supremacy On the economic level, Athens had secured two advantages. The first was secure shipping lanes and rights to bring in grain from the Black Sea to supplement its food supply. This shipping lane was more than a convenience--it was a strategic necessity. While there is some question as to the degree of Athens’ dependency, multiple lines of evi-
dence show that it was a vital interest. The final cause of Athens’ defeat in 404 was that a blockade severed its access to this crucial resource and starved them out because they could not grow enough locally (Hanson, 2007). Moreover, after the war was over, Athens began taking steps in the early fourth century to reestablish that grain supply. They began assessing grain from the cleruch farmers on some of their colonial holdings (Sorg, 2015) and launching antitrust lawsuits to prevent grain hoarding and price gouging (Dunham, 2007). This indicates that Athens was sensitive to any disruption in its access to Black Sea produce and was motivated to secure that access. Possessing the largest, highest quality fleet on the water, backed by a tribute system to keep the crews going, and “Long Walls” to keep out invaders, was a sure way to do that. The second economic advantage was directly financial; Athens' fleet enabled it to
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raise money in a couple of different ways. While Mafia-style “security payment,” i.e. tribute, was one method to raise money, it is not the only one. Athens’s fleet enabled it to install regulators and tax assessors in ports all over the Aegean, which in turn assessed trade tariffs, even for third-party goods that were not being shipped to or from Athens. This was somewhat equivalent to Athens owning a private road and charging a fee to drive on it (Krotscheck, 2006). Athens’ naval dominance also afforded it a soft power advantage. With its ships roaming the seas and its assessors in most ports, Athens imposed the equivalent of economic sanctions telling port officials to accept trade from the sanctioned city. There is one such sanction extant, imposed on Megara, where Athens told every port inhabited by its assessors not to permit ships from Megara to dock. This allowed Athens to deny an offending city access to a substantial market share in the Greek world at will, which in turn gave it a tool to resolve smaller disputes without
military intervention, potentially saving substantial amounts in siege expenses (Finley, 2008). Moreover, in more extreme cases, Athens could have, if it so desired, allowed only its own approved ships to pass the Hellespont, limiting Black Sea trade to itself. As such, the stronger Athens’ navy was, the better for installing its regulators and assessors in ports, and the more potent its soft power.
Military Advantages of Naval Supremacy Naval supremacy also comes with a few hard-power advantages, which extend beyond the simple ability to sink the other side’s ships. First, Athens had substantially greater strategic maneuverability than its opponents. Sparta and its allies largely had to deploy and send messengers by land. This limited them to the speed at which men
could walk while weighed down by equipment, constraining the routes they could travel, running the risk of a blockade and siege (such as at Sphacteria), and effectively closing off entire destinations (such as islands) to their forces. By contrast, Athens could deploy soldiers from the sea at the speed of a trireme (between four and five nautical miles per hour, for a sustained six to eight hours, using oars), using a variety of routes, and avoid land-based chokepoints (Hanson). Those advantages are on clear display with Athens’ ability to assist the demos in the uprisings and revolts all over the Greek world such as Corcyra and Mytilene (Thucydides 3), compared to Sparta’s relative noninterference outside the Peloponnese. Indeed, Brasidas’ expedition in Thrace is noteworthy precisely because it is so exceptional. Second, Athens’ naval supremacy made resupplying forward positions substantially easier and less expensive, making maintaining sieges and forward operating bases, such as Pylos, more feasible. Whether they travel by
sea or by land, Resupply carriers must use some of the resources they are carrying to maintain themselves, so the amount received by the forward troops is not equivalent to what was originally sent out. This means that more efficient transportation decreases the cost of resupplying and maintaining forward positions. By comparison, ship travel is far more efficient than land travel, as evidenced by the following measurements. In the Classical period, the standard soldier on deployment needed three to four pints of barley-meal per day, and this same amount will be assumed for transportation workers (Spence et al., 2016). Three pints of barley-meal weighs approximately two pounds (Aqua -Calc, 2020), which means a supply weight attrition of two pounds per day per transportation worker. A modern soldier, using modern gear, can carry around one hundred pounds of equipment on a daily basis, which sets a reasona-
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ble upper limit as to what an ancient resupply carrier could move by foot (Murphey, 2011). On modern roads, the journey from Sparta to Decelea is approximately 136 miles (Google Maps, n.d.). Assuming twenty-four miles per day (three miles per hour for eight hours of travel), the resupply would take five and a half days, for a loss of eleven pounds out of the one hundred pounds of supplies, or an eleven percent loss. Using a pack horse does improve this picture somewhat. Modern animal science suggests that a horse should not carry more than twenty percent of its bodyweight on a consistent basis (Ozborn, n.d.). Greek horses are believed to be smaller than modern ones, but to be conservative, this comparison assumes a twelve-hundred-pound horse, which permits a carrying load of 240 pounds. If the human carries its own one-hundred-pound pack and that the horse gets all its food from grazing, feeding the human still uses three percent of the total resources. Using oxen
and a cart can provide a little more improvement, but not much. The traditional historical assessment is that using ancient cart technology, a yoke of oxen could increase the carrying capacity to approximately eleven hundred pounds, though some authors contend more (Burford, 1960). For sake of argument, this author will assume that ancient equipment would allow a yoke of oxen to pull the same amount of weight as modern draft animals, which is approximately three times that number (Burford). With rest breaks for feed and watering factored in, teams of oxen on the Oregon Trail averaged approximately one and a half miles per hour for a ten hour day, for a total of fifteen miles of travel per day (Ford & Kreutzer, 2015). This pace would extend the travel time from Sparta to Decelea from five and a half days to nine. A modern cow, not pulling a cart, eats approximately twenty-four pounds of dry matter feed per day (Selk, n.d.), which shall be the assumed consumption per ox per day for these calculations. Because Greece was an agriculturally poor area, oxen often had to have their diets supplemented with grains (Gagarin & Fantham, 2010, p. 107). Assuming that the oxen received just ten percent of its food from grains carried in the cart and that the human carried a one-hundred-pound pack, the oxen and human would consume almost two percent of the total resources carried. At this point, it is important to explain the functional difference between a trireme—the man-o-war of the day—and a merchant ship. The trireme was sleek, primarily oar-powered, and carried a complement of two hundred men, but only a few days of supplies to facilitate speed and maneuverability in combat (Rodgers, 1937). By contrast, a standard merchant ship had a large, round hull, primarily used sails, ran a skeleton crew of men, carried supply loads between seventy and 150 tons (Haas). The trireme was used in combat to achieve maritime control, and the merchant ship moved the supplies from place to place, which meant that both sorts of ships were crucial for managing a maritime empire and forward bases. However, the merchant ship was even helpful for supplying bases with a land connection to Athens, as Sparta had more control of the land, and the ship was more efficient than moving by either foot carrier or cart. Emmanouil Economou and Nicholas C. Kyriazis assume that the crew for a ship carrying one hundred and twenty tons of cargo was only ten men (Economou & Kyriazes, 2019). However, to err in favor of land travel, the following calculations shall assume a crew of twenty and shall further assume that these sedentary sailors consumed the same amount of food as the hoplites and baggage carriers. The merchant ship cruised between four and six knots with the wind (Casson, 1951). which, presuming an eight-hour sailing day, made a daily range between thirty-two and forty-eight knots and a weekly range of more than 220 nautical miles. For context, Athens is approximately 185 nautical miles from Myteline (Krivec, 2016) and 230 nautical miles from Pylos (Aquaplot Explor-
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er, n.d.), which puts most of the immediate Greek world within a week’s sailing distance. At the end of that week, the crew would have consumed 280 pounds of supplies, approximately one tenth of one percent of the cargo. Cargo ships are also more efficient when considering the wages that must be paid to the workers. Moving 120 tons of supplies to Decelea by foot would take twenty-four hundred men. Rounding the trip down to five days and assuming the workers were paid three obols a day--the rate paid to Athenian jurors to enable the poor to serve without suffering too much financial hardship (Markle, 1985)--the total cost would be six thousand drachmas (a drachma is six obols). If the Spartans used unpaid helots, sent along guards at a one-to-ten ratio to prevent escape, and paid the guards a hoplite’s standard wage of one drachma, this would still total twelve hundred drachmas. Using oxen, this same load requires seventy-three teams. Assuming the Spartans hired ox teams for four drachmas per
day as the Athenians did (Burford), the price is over twenty-six hundred drachmas. By contrast, for the Athenians to move that much cargo to Pylos required one ship, and one week, for a total cost of 140 drachmas. These numbers represent a conservative estimate of the efficiency gains. Though it does not factor in ship maintenance costs, or the costs of loading and unloading the supplies, it presumes a somewhat large ship crew, comparable resource consumption between a combat soldier and a sedentary sailor, and does not factor in the costs of the return journey. As such, Athens certainly had a substantial advantage over Sparta in terms of the price of resupplying forward operating stations, which helps explain why they were willing to establish so many more bases than Sparta. Before moving on, it is worth noting that this was the extent to which naval supremacy granted land-battle advantages at this point in history. The day had not yet come when ships were used with massive munitions to level forts or destroy inland armies with impunity. As Chester Starr argues, in the ancient world, ultimate victory usually still had to come from a pitched land battle (Starr, 1998), and that battle could be lost despite naval advantages. For example, despite possessing naval superiority, Thucydides records that Athens lost substantial inland battles against Thebes and Brasidas' forces at Amphipolis. As technology improved over the millennia, naval forces would continue to gain strength against land forces, but for now, ships were limited to fighting each other, deploying troops, ferrying messages, and bringing supplies. Despite that limitation, the economic, soft power, and hard power advantages conferred by naval supremacy rationalize why Athens, under pressure from Sparta and its allies, would be unwilling to part with its navy, even without considering the natural lust of power for its own sake. The ability to protect its grain supply, raise revenues, issue sanctions, move its soldiers, and resupply forward bases and sieges were tangible and identifiable abilities that any reasonable person would want to possess if he was about to put his country into a war. For proof, one only needs to consider its lamentable position after the losses at the Battle of Aegospotami, which starved it out and required her to give up her empire and economic dominance (Hanson).
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Section Two: Great Britain, the Rise of Global Empire and Shoreline Shelling This section will showcase that England’s motivations for developing and maintaining its own naval dominance closely mirrored Athens’, even while technology changed the way war was conducted, shifting the balance in favor of naval forces at the expense of land forces.
Motivations: Military Threat, then Empire British naval dominance grew more slowly than Athenian dominance did, but it was established and then maintained for many similar reasons; an acute military emergency drove the initial development, and though no longer necessary, it was maintained for the wealth and strategic security it provided. As Dr. Richard J. Blakemore and co-author Elaine Murphy explain, the turning point was the English Civil War and the resulting military dictatorship under Cromwell. Prior to this point, there had been a brief point of state naval power under Henry VIII (who constructed a state navy capable of policing British territorial waters). Still, the bulk of Britain’s naval power was a fleet of privateers, made quasi-official through Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and a merchant-marine fleet that primarily engaged in trade (Blakemore & Murphy, 2018). Charles I began investing in developing a more robust navy, but during the English Civil War, that navy initially sided with Parliament and cost him the war, only for most of it to revert to Royalist forces once the army installed Cromwell as dictator (Blakemore & Murphy). Prior to the navy’s mutiny back to the Royalists, there had been a proposal to reduce overall naval strength, but now, just the opposite was necessary (Oppenheim, 1896). As N. A. M. Rodger explains, this put the Protectorate, and Cromwell himself, under an existential threat. Royalists were in control of many English colonies overseas, and most of the powers of Europe (including Ireland, Scotland, France, Spain, the Dutch, and others) were all Royalist sympathizers and had navies and armies ready at hand now that the Thirty Years’ War had concluded with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Rodger & National Maritime Museum Great Britain, 2006). These forces refused to recognize the dictatorship and intended to install Charles’ son on the throne. In response, Cromwell put the navy under the command of army officers to ensure loyalty and went on a massive shipbuilding campaign. For comparison, under Charles I, it was notable to launch between one and two ships a year. In 1654, the final year of the First Anglo-Dutch War, Parliament launched twenty-two ships (Oppenheim). These ships were badly needed, as initial naval resources were scant, and even projecting force in the backyard of Scotland and Ireland was a difficult, though successful, proposition (Blakemore & Murphy). However, winning those conflicts did not end Cromwell’s troubles. Royalist
forces still held key imperial colonies, and from these bases, attacked Protectorate shipping vessels all over the world; threatening to choke off imports and customs revenues and jeopardizing the regime’s long-term viability. This led to a multi-year campaign to reconquer these territories and force acknowledgment of the Protectorate's legitimacy from Europe's monarchs. The operation, which required enforcing two separate blockades, stretched naval resources to the breaking point but ultimately succeeded. By January of 1652, there was no remaining Royalist stronghold in any of the former kingdom’s territories, and Spain had acknowledged the legitimacy of the new republic (Rodger & National Maritime Museum).
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However, even this did not end Cromwell’s naval problems. Beginning in 1650, the same year that Spain recognized Cromwell’s legitimacy, Spain also signed a treaty with the Dutch that encouraged the revival of Dutch merchant dominance in the Mediterranean. By 1651, before the last Royalist stronghold had fallen, the ratio of Dutch to English merchant ships in the area hit fifty to one and only went up from there (Rodger & National Maritime Museum). Notably, this was not an existential threat to the English homeland; a potential Dutch invasion of the British Isles was not one of the disputes. However, Dutch shipping dominance did spell trouble for the Protectorate’s ability to finance and supply its empire (Rodger & National Maritime Museum). As was shown under the Athenian section, securing forward outposts requires more than man-o-wars; it also requires a well-developed merchant-marine fleet to supply those bases.
Moreover, if one’s own nation is not moving its trade, then others (such as the Dutch) must be hired instead, which cedes the wealth of transportation fees. With English ships no longer being used for trade, England’s shipbuilders, and its ability to produce its own merchant-marine fleet, were suffering badly, and the associated wealth was going to Dutch coffers. Military posturing between the two states over these and other maritime issues eventually led to a small-scale engagement, which, because of national pride, domestic politics, and religious zeal required a full-scale war to resolve (Curtler, 1967). This war over merchant marine ships necessitated the continued production of warships, which otherwise may have stopped with the close Royalist conflict. Moreover, though this conflict ultimately ended with a British victory and signaled England’s rise as Europe’s dominant naval power (Oppenheim). It did not cement that dominance in stone; there were two future Anglo-Dutch wars in the next twenty years, also over trade disputes, which England’s new position and ensured that naval investments continued (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018). England had had a taste of the benefits that naval dominance conferred and was willing to pay the price to keep them. Under this constant challenge to its naval supremacy (and consequently, its far-slung empire), British naval investments continued, and its sea power relative to the rest of Europe rose through the next century and a half. Though England lost individual battles (one notable example being the naval engagement adjacent to the Battle of Yorktown), by 1792, it was the dominant naval power by a healthy margin and enjoyed a strong commercial empire that could be measured by several vessels, cannons, or seamen (Hicks, n.d.). Moreover, this dominance afforded it new logistical advantages, which, though similar to the advantages Athens had, were vastly greater in terms of scale. During the turmoil of the French Revolution, Britain’s navy allowed it to seize far-flung French colonies in the Caribbean with a trade value of over three hundred thousand tons of commerce per year (Hicks). During Napoleon’s era, it successfully enforced a naval blockade not against a single island, but rather much of Europe. While this blockade did not starve Europe as England’s WWI blockade did a century later (Dunn, 2016), it forced commerce to use British vessels or travel overland; making it more difficult and expensive. Though land travel technology had improved since the ancient world, so too had merchant shipping technology, which meant that shipping by sea was cheaper and easier even for places connected by land. Napoleon recognized this and attempted, with only limited success, to force the merchants to go over land and deny England the shipping fees (The Editors of the Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.). This made the blockade more of a nuisance than a strategic necessity, but England’s ability to enforce something of this scale is noteworthy. It was this same overwhelming naval power that permitted England to create its
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global empire, which by 1913 covered twenty-five percent of the earth’s landmass such that the sun was always shining on a British possession (WorldAtlas, 2018).
Technology: Cannons and Ironsides for Shoreline Bombardment Though many of the advantages England enjoyed were simply large-scale versions of their Athenian counterparts, technological advancement changed both naval combat tactics and the interaction between naval and land forces. On the naval tactics side, the Anglo-Dutch Wars mentioned above, with its use of sails and cannons, gave rise to the "line" formation that dominated up to modern times (Palmer, 1997). However, more importantly for this pa-
per’s purpose, cannons also gave British ships a tactical feature that Athens would have greatly desired: the capacity to shell lands troops and fortifications. In Athens’ day, a fort did not need to be far from the water’s edge to be safe from on-board archers, and the ship itself did not provide a substantial advantage, except as a means of blockade, retreat, and resupply. This meant that short of starving an island fort, land forces were still needed for ultimate victory, and a disadvantage in the quality of one’s land troops could be decisive. While still true in the main, the addition of cannons allowed ships to shoot at forts from considerable distances, both directly engaging the enemy and providing cover for advancing marines. Moreover, since the ships were mobile targets, and the fortress was a massive, stationary one, ships often had an advantage, particularly in open waters where they could maneuver freely and employ larger ships, with more guns, which could shoot at greater distances. In some situations, the ships could out-range the fort entirely and shell
it with impunity, as happened to Fort McHenry in the War of 1812 (National Park Service, 2020). For conflicts within a couple of miles of the shore, this gave a definite, sometimes decisive, advantage to whichever land force was backed by the better navy. Blakemore recounts several sieges of shore-based fortresses during the English Civil War, which were made possible because of the navy's resupply capacity and ability to shell (Blakemore & Murphy). The innovation of iron ship construction tipped the balance even further in the ship’s favor since the ships could dodge cannonballs and take the hits, which made traveling in more confining spaces safer. The skirmish between the Merrimac and the Monitor in the U.S. Civil War was a somewhat comedic example of this advantage, as the two ships hit each other repeatedly, but without specialized armor-piercing rounds, were unable to sink each other as they could wooden ships (American Battlefield Trust, n.d.). However, when one side uses the ironside ship, and the other uses wooden ships or a fortress, the results are not so humorous.
Case Study: The First Opium War This First Opium War was the first combat voyage of the HMS Nemesis, a steam-powered, iron-clad ship decked out with cannons, and it was every bit as effective as the description implies. Fighting up the Yellow River, Nemesis, a small ship meant for shallow water engagements, single-handedly defeated fifteen wooden Chinese war junks in one engagement. In another encounter, it led an attack against a heavily fortified Chinese base, which was garrisoned with over three thousand men and equipped with three hundred heavy cannons. Even so, Nemesis,
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backed up with a couple of wooden gunships, shelled the fort while a mere one thousand marines assaulted it. Within two hours, the fort succumbed (Hourly History, 2018). This showcased a change in the dynamic between land and sea forces that had existed since ancient times. While the marines were still necessary to seize the fort, rather than simply acting as ferries and suppliers for the troops, the ships had acted as force-multipliers, enabling the marines to defeat an entrenched force three times their size, and in quick order no less. The time had not arrived yet, and would not for another century and a half, that naval forces could win the day largely by themselves. Still, this example showcased a step in that direction and tipped the balance of relative importance between land and naval forces towards the navy.
Section Three: The American Empire and Aircraft Carrier Strike Groups The United States created and maintained its maritime supremacy for much the same reasons as Athens and Britain. Yet, once again, a technological change introduced a new balance between land and naval forces. In a nowfamiliar pattern, the United States did not invest in naval supremacy until an acute military need arose, but it then kept that supremacy long after it was strictly necessary because of the advantages that it afforded. The result was another empire, albeit one based on commerce and security guarantees rather than coercion (Friedman, 2015). However, the rise of the aircraft carrier and its strike group gave navies the ability to dramatically degrade land armies many miles inward, given time. While there is evidence that the development of land-based anti-ship missiles may swing the pendulum back towards land forces, in the current environment, land armies are at a decided disadvantage to naval forces without their own heavy air support.
Motivations: Military Threat, Then Empire In 1938, before the US was at war with Japan, it had fifteen battleships, five fleet carriers, zero escort carriers, thirty-six cruisers, over one hundred destroyers, and fifty-eight submarines. This made it the undisputed naval master of its own backyard, but it was still smaller than the Royal Navy, had no colonial forces to draw on, and had to defend two oceans. By comparison, the Royal Navy had the same number of battleships, two additional fleet carriers, thirty additional cruisers, fifty-seven additional destroyers, two additional submarines, and the navies of its colonial holdings--these totals given includes Anglo commonwealth ships but excludes non-commonwealth colonies (Smith, 2011). With its global deployment, the Royal Navy was still the world’s premier naval power in 1939. However, by 1945, the situation had changed markedly. Counting only active ships and disregarding those that had sunk, the US fleet had increased to twenty-three battleships, twenty-eight fleet carriers, seventy-one escort carriers, seventy-two cruisers, almost four hundred destroyers, and over two hundred submarines (Naval History and Heritage Command, n.d.). Though the Royal Navy also underwent a dramatic increase, in part using US LendLease assistance (History.com Editors, 2018), the USN still eclipsed them. Many of Britain's warships were in bad need of repair due to neglected (and necessary) maintenance from both battle damage and standard wear-and-tear (MSW, 2017). These numbers show that practically overnight, the US went from a regional naval power to indisputa-
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bly the world’s dominant navy, in response to the acute military threat posed by the Axis powers. Despite a lack of acute military threats to the homeland, the US also maintained its naval supremacy for broader strategic reasons. Though there was a brief demobilization beginning in 1946, the US reactivated many of these ships for the Korean War just a few years later, and ship levels remained high for the duration of the Cold War (Naval History and Heritage Command). Notably, Korea is halfway around the world from the US, and North Korean communists overrunning South Korea did not pose any immediate military threat to the US the way that Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany had. Moreover, though the Soviet Union maintained many submarines suitable for shoreline defense, they never possessed the power-projection tools, such as aircraft carriers, to contest US naval strength or put the homeland under conventional threat (Naval Encyclopedia, n.d.). By contrast, the US fleet was oriented
around power projection and global supremacy, not simply protecting the homeland, which a robust submarine fleet could have accomplished. This reveals that the US began adopting a similar mindset to Athens and Britain during the Cold War, namely that far-flung territories were of vital strategic importance and that naval assets were the only means to secure them. A brief survey of the justifications provided today by naval advocates mirrors Athenian and British concerns quite closely; economic interests, soft power projection, and hard power projection (Masters, 2019). The point is not to say that the US’ imperial attitude is perfectly analogous to Athens or Britain. Whereas Athens utterly destroyed those who refused to submit to its rule and Britain forcibly repressed dissenters in India, the US has the opposite problem. Virtually no country wants the US to withdraw its troops from its borders since they provide stability and allow that country to spend defense dollars on other priorities, with Germany as a chief
example (Oltermann, 2020). Indeed, some countries that do not yet have US troops are openly petitioning to be the next host of US forces, such as Palau (Katz, 2020), and Poland is even offering to pay moving expenses (Adamowski, 2019). Even so, the US is not offering its strength solely out of sacrificial devotion to any of these countries; the US’ desire to maintain naval supremacy is also motivated by the same combination of economic and strategic interests that motivated its predecessors. Moreover, it is fair to say that these three concerns, economic, soft power, and hard power, are not illegitimate. On the economic side, ninety percent of global commerce travels by water, often through strategic chokepoints, and is at risk of being cut off by unstable regional powers if not actively protected (Eaglen, 2015). The COVID pandemic offered a small glimpse of the US’ dependence on global trade; during China’s shutdown, most shipping from its ports to the US stopped, including key pharmaceuticals, such as cancer treatments and anesthetics, and pa-
tients almost ran out (Woods, 2021). That near-crisis would be a relative walk in the park compared to the fallout that would occur if even more central shipping access, such as the Straight of Malacca, were to be closed down. On the soft power side, US naval assets can police waters to prevent smuggling of sanctioned items into rogue states, such as the case with North Korea (U.S. Coast Guard Area Pacific, 2019), and can use the sale of advanced technology, foreign aid, trade agreements, and security guarantees to influence another nation’s policy. On the hard power side, naval dominance provides policymakers with the option to enforce a blockade against hostile ports, which may cause an opponent to capitulate with relatively little bloodshed. China is particularly vulnerable to such a maneuver. The CCP’s stability depends on keeping the people of China fed and employed. The wealth that enables them to do
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that depends on robust exports while running a civil society requires massive energy imports. It is not unfair to say that a naval blockade could be an existential threat to the CCP, which is why some national security experts have recommended it as a preferred course of action in the event of a war with China (Axe, 2020). While some may attempt to claim that they can secure these interests without naval superiority, that claim does not survive scrutiny; having a global military posture capable of intervening wherever necessary, whenever necessary, requires a naval advantage. For comparison, Russia has approximately thirty substantial military bases in other countries, all connected to Russia by land (Dyner, 2020). China currently has one foreign base, which is in Africa (Tweed & Leung, 2018). By contrast, the US has around eight hundred bases of various sizes in over seventy countries (Glaser, 2017). This unparalleled strategic flexibility is a direct result of two facts: countries want to host
US troops, not Russian or Chinese, and the US Navy, enabled by overwhelming firepower (Mizokami, 2020b), can simultaneously supply these bases and deny access to Russian and Chinese forces. With the advent of Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), naval forces can now enforce a blockade against enemy cargo planes, trucks, and trains, in addition to the traditional maritime blockade capability. If, hypothetically, the Russians and Chinese were to put bases in faroff territories, as Russia is considering (Peck, 2021a), US naval forces would be capable of isolating it, even more so than ancient navies could do to ancient ground troops. This technological innovation, the CSG, has revolutionized the dynamic between naval and ground forces, putting the advantage squarely in favor of naval units, at least for the time being.
Technology: Carrier Strike Groups, Creating Prowling Navies and Helpless Armies A US CSG typically consists of a carrier, three to four guided-missile ship escorts, and an attack submarine (Mizokami, 2020a). US carriers are often referred to as "supercarriers" on account of their massive size. At the same time, other nations utilize carriers displacing between twenty and sixty-five thousand tons and carrying twenty to thirty strike aircraft while US carriers displace over one hundred thousand tons and carry approximately fifty strike aircraft (Mizokami). The carrier typically holds additional aircraft that can perform surveillance and reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and electronic warfare (Gordan IV et al., 2006). The guided missile ships are equipped with silos for anti-air and land-attack missiles, which both protect the carrier from incoming air threats and can augment the carrier’s strike capacity. The submarine provides both protection against other submarines, and in the case of the Virginia-class subs, the ability to carry Tomahawk missiles to further augment land-attack capacity (Majumdar, 2016). This gives the strike group two primary offensive weapons—the aircraft and land attack missiles—and two primary defensive weapons—the aircraft and anti-air missiles. They are incredible platforms for both soft and hard power projection, as they do not require the permission of a host nation from which to fly air missions and can be readily moved, making them more difficult to target. They can perform a wide array of missions from disaster relief in peacetime to military demonstrations when tensions rise to high-power strikes when the tension snaps. CSGs have revolutionized warfare against both naval and land targets. An analysis of all capital ship “kills” since 1939 reveals that the number one cause of “death” was aircraft (Peck, 2021b). On the land attack side, under the right conditions, naval groups can defeat conventional land armies with only minimal assistance from ground forces and re-
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main largely untouched themselves. However, this advantage is mitigated in some environments and is almost completely absent in confronting irregular forces. Three examples will illustrate the tactical new balance: Desert Storm, the Korean War, and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Case Study: Operation Desert Storm When Saddam invaded Kuwait and US military leaders were preparing a response, the situation appeared quite challenging. Saddam had amassed over four hundred thousand troops and thousands of armored vehicles (New World Encyclopedia, n.d.). Moreover, his forces were seasoned from almost a decade of war with Iran, whereas
US forces had not seen major combat since Vietnam. U.S. military estimates suggested that coalition forces would suffer tens of thousands of casualties. However, that is not how the battle played out. The US brought over half a million men and placed six carrier strike groups and two amphibious assault ships (small aircraft carriers utilized by the Marine Corps) in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea to augment USAF assets in Turkey, effectively surrounding Saddam’s army.
US craft attacked Saddam’s forces while they were in an open desert, without bunkers or civilians to hide behind. This allowed aircraft to easily pick out and target their command-and-control networks, preventing Iraqi army units from communicating with each other, causing a collapse in morale, and making Iraqi units easy pickings for US aircraft (Global Security.org, n.d.). A week into the attack, coalition ground forces finally engaged, and when they did, they faced no stiff opposition. Saddam’s forces either ran or were so disorganized that they were easily routed when they resisted. In one such example, US ground forces defeated three hundred Iraqi tanks in a matter of hours (U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.). The end result was the wholesale defeat of Saddam’s military in
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forty-three days, with only 147 US combat deaths, much from friendly fire (New World Encyclopedia). This demonstrates that CSGs offer strategic flexibility, permitting the rapid mobilization and deployment of substantial firepower to distant battlefields, and can do the bulk of the work in defeating opposing ground forces.
Case Study: Korean War However, this does not mean that the dynamic between land and naval forces has rendered ground forces obsolete. Indeed, as the Korean War shows, even with aircraft carriers, there are encounters where ground forces are needed both to hold strategic positions and to reclaim entrenched ground from determined opponents. The North’s
invasion of the South caught both the US and the South unprepared. At the outset of the war, the allied forces on the peninsula were vastly outgunned and at risk of being pushed into the sea. North Korean forces traveled freely on the roads, bringing masses of men and material to frontline positions without having to slow down or conceal themselves from long-range strikes. In response, the US sent the Seventh Fleet up from the Philippines to control the surrounding waters, resupply UN troops, and provide air cover. Within a week, the USN had successfully blockaded North Korean waters (Warnock, 2000), keeping out Soviet and Chinese troops and supplies. Once on scene, Navy and Marine Corps aviators struck North Korean forces operating on inland roads, while naval ships utilized their heavy guns, akin to oversized artillery pieces, on forces using coastal roads, disrupting enemy movements (Holland, 2002). Despite this assistance, North Korean forces had overrun the entire peninsula in less than two months, save a small perimeter held by outgunned UN forces at Pusan, which held due to extensive close air support and reinforcement and resupply brought in by ship (Warnock).
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(Millett, 2019). To alleviate the pressure on Pusan, the Navy and Marine forces conducted an amphibious landing at Inchon in late September (Warnock). They were preceded by air and naval gun strikes to soften the North’s defensive fortifications, much like Britain had done against Chinese forces on the Yellow River a century prior. This forced the North Koreans to take troops away from the frontlines to guard the shore on both sides of the peninsula, taking pressure off Pusan, allowing UN forces to begin retaking territory (Holland, 2002). By the end of September, just a few days later, UN forces were operating in North Korean territory, and by the end of October, they had reached the Yalu River, bordering China (Warnock). At this point, the situation reversed, however. The USSR sent a group of MiG-15 fighters, which were more
advanced than anything the US was using at the time except a small handful of F-86 Sabres, to provide air cover. At the same time, the Chinese army attacked, flooding hundreds of thousands of new ground troops into the battle and forcing UN forces to retreat down the peninsula. As they did, the Air Force lost its forward operating bases and the Sabres, which were unable to launch from carriers, had to retreat to airstrips in Japan, which prevented them from reaching some battlefields. The resulting loss of air superiority forced MacArthur to make a hasty retreat out of "MiG Alley" and back to the support of naval guns (Correll, 2010). Once in range, naval assets provided extensive fire support, disrupting enemy movement and making a more orderly retreat possible.
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Moreover, once these beleaguered ground forces reached the shoreline, they were evacuated on ships which allowed them to regroup at the 38th parallel (Holland, 2002). This series of events makes it clear that while naval assets, including guns, aviators, and amphibious ships, were essential to the war effort, providing fire support and acting as force-multipliers, they could not successfully hold or retake the peninsula without ground forces. It also shows, by absence, the comparative advantage of aircraft carriers. Had the Sabres been able to operate from carriers (as later carrier-capable variants could), the loss of forward bases in Korea would not have been a problem. The US forces had overwhelming naval supremacy and could have moved the carriers where necessary to keep the Sabres in the fight, wherever the front line was. The differences between the Korean War and Desert Storm cannot be accounted for by advancements in na-
val and air technology alone, however important those considerations are. A substantial part of the difference comes down to terrain and mission differences. US forces in Desert Storm had the advantage of a wide-open battlefield—an empty desert—with nothing for Saddam’s forces to hide behind and comparatively little collateral damage to risk, whereas the Korean Peninsula is heavily mountainous, and those mountains are covered by forests (Seol, 2005). Such terrain provides some cover from strikes, but more importantly, it also provides concealment. Contemporary war planners recognize that even with modern technology, it would be difficult to locate large formations of North Korean troops (Mizokami, 2021), making precision strikes and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) more difficult. Moreover, while airpower can inflict substantial casualties, it cannot physically halt the advance of a determined enemy that is willing to absorb those casualties without truly massive numbers. Consider again that Saddam's forces held out against coalition forces for over forty days despite US forces' advantages. Without any coalition land forces standing in his way, had Saddam and his men had been willing to accept the astronomical casualties, nothing would have physically prevented him from continuing his march south or from digging into Kuwait City.
Urban Combat and Limitations on Air and Naval Power Once an enemy has dug into an urban environment, not only is it harder to identify and strike them from the air, strikes also begin costing more civilian casualties. Israeli air strikes in Gaza are useful as a point of comparison. Despite Israel’s well-documented efforts to use highly precise airstrikes to take out Hamas assets, each conflict inevitably results in more civilian casualties than terrorist casualties (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2017). Part of this is due to the populace’s willingness to stand with Hamas, but that same effect can be achieved by an occupying force that embeds its troops with the locals against their wills. Returning to Korea for comparison, the entire Korean Peninsula is just over three hundred miles measured on the diagonal. Assuming a traveling speed of only sixteen miles per day on account of mountainous terrain, the North Koreans could have seized the entire peninsula in under twenty days if they were not slowed down by ground forces and were willing to endure the losses from naval strikes. After this, North Korean forces could have dug into population centers, such as Seoul, to hold the territory. An analysis of civilian deaths in Iraq between 2003-2008 reveals that small-arms use by ground forces results in a relatively low civilian casualty rate due to the precision of force (Hicks et al., 2011). Since air units and naval guns cannot go doorto-door to clear out a city, defeating North Korean ground troops without ground forces would have required level-
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ing entire cities and their inhabitants, an unpalatable option. Keeping these logistical considerations in mind, it becomes easier to see that though naval guns and naval-launched air assets provided extraordinary assistance to land forces, ground forces were still essential to achieving victory. They will continue to be necessary for urban combat in the future. As such, the lesson from Desert Storm: high levels of naval and air power, given enough time, and an open terrain environment, can largely defeat land forces on their own and must be tempered by the recognition that not all battlefields will match these conditions.
Case Study: Counterinsurgency Operations
This case study is exceedingly short, since recounting the role of naval assets in Iraq and Afghanistan’s counterinsurgencies can be done in one sentence: naval assets played the role they had for thousands of years, i.e. ferrying troops to the battlefield and keeping them resupplied, and little more. Whereas regular forces, marching in divisions, are easy pickings for air and naval units, insurgents hiding deep in mountainous terrain and embedded in urban centers are not so vulnerable. As Douglas Porche explains, US counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts during the Iraqi Surge beginning in 2006 took inspiration from David Galula’s work in the 1960’s (Celeste Ward Gventer et al., 2014). Galula stressed that when fighting irregular units, the population, not the terrain, was the primary battlefield, and heavy weaponry such as tanks, artillery, and fixed-wing aircraft all took a distant back seat to the infantry man on the ground (Galula & Nagl, 2010). While the strategy was later abandoned in favor of drone-centric warfare due to the political cost of a heavy ground troop presence, the pendulum never swung to include a substantial role for naval forces. Indeed, it was noteworthy when naval officers began taking non-combat leadership roles on the ground, such as running construction crews, given their lack of mission responsibilities prior to this (Virginian-Pilot, 2006). This overview of the tactical prowess of CSGs explains in part why the US has such a strong naval advantage over its opponents and why its naval dominance has provided such robust strategic benefits. Though Russia and China have large navies, these navies do not possess large numbers of carriers and carrier-based aircraft. They, therefore, lack the requisite power-projection capabilities to sustain a global military presence such as the US'. Currently, Russia has one carrier, and China has two, compared to the US' eleven supercarriers (Mizokami, 2020b). However, this balance is shifting substantially against the US, particularly relative to China, in both the offensive and defensive spheres. China is developing an extensive array of Area Access/Area Denial infrastructure, including innovative new kinds of land-based anti-ship missiles (Osborn, 2021b), and a modern air force capable of naval strike missions. If these technologies are brought to maturity, they may threaten the US’ historic ability to use its carriers at a safe stand-off distance (Couture, 2016). The Navy’s ability to project force in the East and South China Seas is now questionable, and Pentagon war games have repeatedly shown US defeats (Brown, 2021). Moreover, China is also developing substantial offensive capabilities. In addition to building a large number of modern escort vessels in recent years, China also built its first aircraft carrier in 2012; it has since completed a second and is currently building its third (Mizokami, 2020b), and is suspected of having a total of six to ten planned (The Economist, 2021). This comes while the US, over cost concerns, is considering downsizing its own carrier fleet
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(LaGrone & Shelbourne, 2021). This is potentially acceptable if the Navy increases overall firepower through “distributed lethality” as they have been discussing (Osborn, 2021a). However, considering that this carrier reduction is occurring at the same time as an overall reduction in fleet size, that supposed increase in lethality is not translating from paper to steel (McLeary, 2021). Given these trend lines, US naval superiority in the entire Western Pacific will be at risk in the next couple of decades (Tayloe, 2017). That naval superiority is one of the chief obstacles to China becoming the world’s leading power (Takala, 2018); if the US wants to retain its overall supremacy, it needs to begin making the appropriate investments, because a Chinese fleet capable of matching US carriers one-for-one is on the horizon.
Conclusion As stated at the outset, weapons change, but men remain the same. The motivations for these three empires, Athens, Britain, and the United States, to both establish and maintain naval supremacy were markedly similar. The initial establishment was brought on by an acute military emergency, while maintenance was due to an unwillingness to relinquish the economic, soft power, and hard power benefits it provided. However, the tactical advantages that naval power provides have shifted somewhat over time. Originally, naval assets could blockade a harbor, transport troops quickly, and resupply forward positions cheaply and easily. With the advent of cannons, those capabilities expanded to include shoreline shelling, which provided a cover for landing marines and a force multiplier effect for efforts to take coastal forts. The rise of the modern CSG has extended that advantage even further, enabling a complete blockade of military bases from air, land, and sea resupply, thereby permitting naval assets to decimate land troops hundreds of miles inland under the correct conditions and providing a valuable force-multiplier for conventional land forces, even in tricky terrain. With so many advantages from naval power, maintaining naval supremacy is a core national security interest. Still, presently, the US is losing ground to China both in terms of powerprojection and the ability to deny China access to certain waters. If the US wants to remain the world’s sole superpower, it needs to take its naval development more seriously going forward.
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