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GRYP ’N PYP - PUBLIKASIE PUBLICATION OF SOFIA, THE VAN SKOOL VIRSOCIETY TALE NWUDIE PHILOSOPHY

Rediscovering God

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Die evolusie van Darvinisme 8

Musings on Morality

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n this article I will attempt to dissolve some of the conflict between science and religion. To some extent my writing was inspired by a recent apologetics conference held at the School for Philosophy.

I will not name people, but this event made me realise that theology is getting it wrong; evidently we are missing the point on the most important questions in religion. How pathetic must your god be if your need to lie to uphold his image?

This article is neither an argument for the existence of God, nor against it, as these are really futile arguments.

Rather, let me start with the assumption, based on faith, that there is a God. We believe this blindly, and from here we look at nature and modern science, and attempt reconciliation of the facts with our faith.

Either we will succeed in our reconciliation, or our assumption based on faith must be wrong. Such is the power of logic. It may seem a daunting task, because it is. But so was learning to walk, talk, read, write and think. It is fun being a child, the world being full of awe and wonder, simple certainty.

Growing up is much richer though, it has more possibilities, real mystery, and is deeper in meaning. Children of God, let’s take the next steps towards a more adult relationship with God, let’s grow up.

To prevent any counterproductive nonsense, let’s remember that it is fruitless to argue the science. There is no uncertainty in the theory of evolution, and perverting the truth by calling it relative will get you nowhere. It is very unfortunate that some of our closest religious affiliations feel there is a grand canyon between the theory of evolution and Christian belief, and

that the theory of evolution is being forced upon their children, making them choose between science and their personal beliefs.

Of course this is silly. Their views are based on very inadequate understanding of science, as demonstrated by their interpretation of evolutionary biology as a science of a kind different from chemistry and physics.

Rather, they mean, it resembles the study of political history. If they had even the slightest comprehension of the science, it would occur to them that even though no one has ever seen an atom, the atomic theory is solid. Alas, they don’t. It is laughable that they think the theory of evolution implies that their children are created in “the image of apes,” and that ape-like behaviour can thus

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ARTICLE:2 ZB Badenhorst

Rediscovering God

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Solving the conflict between science and religion

be expected of them.

Not only is the theory of evolution scientifically sound, it is the most important theory in all of biology, it is the grand unifying theory of biology. As the great mathematical geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky famously remarked, “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light evolution.” This is why we cannot afford to ignore it. If however you feel a strong desire to deny good science, just stop reading now. Go bug a physicist about quantum theory being wacky.

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In the beginning…

he Genesis story of creation is probably the most controversial of its kind. It tells of earth and all life on it, including humans, being created in only six days, about 6000 years ago. Thanks to modern physics and biology, we know today that this is not true. We know that the universe is billions of years old, and that the earth has existed for four and a half of those. Only about a billion years later, the first known cellular life originated, from which radiated all the diversity we see today. I strongly recommend The Ancestor’s Tale by Richard Dawkins as a superbly written account of this process. Today the majority of religious people either “do not believe in” evolution, or believe that evolution was consciously driven by God. I want to explain why both are wrong.

The science and philosophy of evolution reveal a blind watchmaker style of creation. There is no purpose in mind; the process is directionless, and the life we know it would probably not arise again, if the process were repeated. To some this makes the theory of evolution by natural selection a universal acid, corrosive to religion. It is a universal acid because it demolishes the biblical story of creation, and demonstrates that the creator probably did not deliberately design any of the life forms on the planet, not even us. Let’s remember that there’s no point in arguing the science, it is what it is, the truth. Of course, the whole purpose of this piece is to show how the discrepancy between scripture and science can be embraced as an opportunity to better understand the creation, to better understand God. Please try out this thought experiment.

Imagine for a moment that you are a god, transcending space and time. See in your

“We can look at the Bible as being a set of instructions and guidelines for proper living. By following the guidelines, we have a good chance of having full lives and going to heaven.”

mind’s eye an infinitely small dot. You make the dot explode with all the vigour of a thousand atomic bombs; matter condenses from the immense energy. You just had your first big bang! You watch as your universe expands, cools down, and the most beautiful complexity arises as it does, forming galaxies of stars and planets bearing life. Eventually your universe reaches a point where it starts collapsing back on itself; it is crunched back into a vanishingly small dot.

Open your eyes, and contemplate what you’ve just seen: the whole existence of a universe passed in mere seconds before your supernatural eyes. Einstein showed that time has no meaning outside of space, because space and time are literally part of the same fabric called space-time. Inside the imaginary universe that expanded and collapsed in your mind, time would have been a very real thing, and the universe was by the standards of its inhabitants probably billions of years old! This is ridiculous, but the point being made is not.

It is only a feeble attempt to understand what time must be like for God, urging us not to allow our limited comprehension of physics to interfere with our understanding of Him and his creation.

Hubble’s law, quantum mechanics, black holes, and space-time? Imagine explaining the origin of the universe to people living two millennia ago, using these concepts, when most university graduates today can’t even define them. The story of creation was told in a way that got the message across, God is the almighty creator. It never was intended as a textbook of cosmology. Yet we fail to understand the story, and consequently impose on God a straightjacket that has no basis in reality.

We believe, we tell ourselves, that if God wanted to… Who are we to say that? God created the universe the way He did for reasons we may never understand, and what He could or could not have done is just not our decision to make. Besides, there is more beauty in the nature of life and cosmology than in fantasy, and science has unveiled it, allowing us to awe a much more beautiful universe than that known long ago.

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If I am created in the image of God, how can it be that our species was not deliberately created?

God gives us life

f I am created in the image of God, how can it be that our species was not deliberately created? Have we found the unbridgeable canyon? No. Since we believe, evolution must tell us something about the nature not only of ourselves, but also of God. We don’t want a world model where God personally moves the pieces, as this would make him responsible for all that is wrong. It is central to our religion that we are truly conscious beings with free will and the capacity to make decisions and deal with the consequences.

A world that was wound up like a clock, unfolding in a predetermined manner ever since, is an even worse idea. In a predetermined world we would have no choices; faith would have no meaning, your life having been played out before you were even born. But now suppose that in some warm little pond, on a planet in some far corner of some galaxy in the universe, the

conditions are just right for the origin of life (we’re here!), but nothing is predetermined. Time having no meaning for Him, God waits patiently. A billion years pass by, and all is good. He sees the formation of the first bacteria, then the eukaryotic cell, and says that it is good. Next follow the fish in the sea, the plants, the animals that crawl, and the birds in the sky, and God sees that it is good.

Eventually, naked apes appear on the scene, beings capable of remembering the past, simulating the future, and taking responsibility for their actions. Beings that are capable of thought so advanced that we call it abstract. Ah, God thinks, there it is, I have created beings so complex, so full of potential, they could actually understand who I am (consciousness may be the image of God)! And God said that it was good. He introduced himself to us, gave us souls.

He warns us about self righteousness and selfishness, greed and the incessant quest

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for earthly wealth. Unfortunately we are deceived by our desire to understand, these super-processor brains come at a cost. We eat off the tree of knowledge, and our eyes open, we realise what we are, what were capable of. The serpent did promise us Godly knowledge, didn’t he? We are kicked from the garden, that utopian world of ignorance, having realised that we can make our own choices.

From now on, it is up to us whether we want to believe in God, whether we want to follow His way. He leaves us to it, only promising to judge us when we leave this world to be reborn in the next. Generations go by before God decides that He has overestimated our ability to be good.

After all, our very nature is selfish; we are built by selfish genes, and are possessed by remnants of animal behaviour. God then decides to give us the ultimate gift; He frees us from sin, so that we can have eternal life, the topic of the next section.

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Rediscovering God4 ZB Badenhorst

4 God teaches us how to live

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od sent His son to earth to be persecuted and crucified, to rise from the dead and forgive our sins. We can live because God sent His only son to die for us! Beautiful story, with an even more beautiful message, a message often missed as a result of literalist interpretation. Why not just forgive our sins, why go through all that trouble, is it protocol for breaking evil spells? Of course not.

The following is my humble take on the story’s true meaning. God sent His son Jesus to earth. By any measure, this man had impeccable morals. For me, an excellent example of His moral superiority is told in John 8:53. Jesus was in the temple, and people gathered around to learn from Him. The teachers of the law and the Pharisees brought in a woman caught in adultery (I wonder why only she was brought in?).

The law laid down by Moses dictated that she be stoned to death.

Yet they made her stand before Jesus, and asked Him what to do. This question was of course a trap; they wanted something to accuse Him of. Jesus continued writing on the floor, but got up when they kept nagging him. “Let the one with a pure conscious throw the first stone,” He said, and got back to His writing. One by one they left, leaving only the woman. Jesus stood up and asked her, “Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you?”

“No one, Sir,” she said. “Then neither do I condemn you,” Jesus said. “Go now and leave your life of sin.”

His pure nature and obedience is further demonstrated by what happened in the desert, where He was led by the Holy Spirit, to be tempted by Satan for forty days. Eventually He got hungry and exhausted; we ordinary people can only imagine having a weakened state of mind under those conditions. In one of his attempts, Satan took Jesus up a high mountain and showed Him all the kingdoms of the world, saying to Him, “I will give you all their authority and splendour, for it has been given to me, and I can give it to any one I please. So, worship me, and it will all be yours.” Jesus resisted, and after forty days of torment, angels came to nurture Him. Now, Satan would not have taken the kingdoms and placed them in the palm of Jesus’ hand. The message is deeper.

Jesus was a very powerful and influential man (think about the effect He still has on people two millennia later!), and if He chose to do so, He could have dominated all the kingdoms of the world. He could have been the most powerful man ever to live.

But doing that would have been wrong; it was not the will of God. Rather He chose

to obey God, and returned to be persecuted by humans. Jesus came to earth to die for us, to demonstrate how we should live, to set an example of obedience.

Our sins are thus not just magically gone, no spell was broken. We are still born in sin; we still have to be christened. We are freed from sin because we have been shown how to live our lives free of sin.

How great must be the rewards in heaven if Jesus chose it above all earthly wealth?

Jesus may or may not have been born of a virgin, may or may not have risen from the dead as a physical man, but these become trivial details when we understand what He actually did for us.

The resurrection is still of central importance to our religion, however. Jesus lived in obedience to God, and was resur-

rected to rule eternity with Him. If we live like Jesus, we too will be resurrected, we will receive eternal life. To end this story, I want to point out that the second half of 1 Corinthians 15 actually tells us that the resurrection body is an immortal spirit, and not a physical body.

My Father, have you left us?

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ent Hovind uses Bible as an acronym for “Basic Instructions Before Leaving Earth”. These may be the only wise words ever to have come from his mouth. We can look at the Bible as being a set of instructions and guidelines for proper living. By following the guidelines, we have a good chance of having full lives and going to heaven.

One of my favourite books of the Bible,

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In a predetermined world we would have no choices; faith would have no meaning

Leviticus, is packed with rules and instructions for living your life. Instructions for living two thousand years ago, that is.

Given that these people knew little science, this book demonstrates mastery of practical microbiology that should astonish us.

It tells about infectious disease, and how to prevent it.

It tells what can and can not be eaten, and warns against eating meat that had been dead for more than two days. Of course this rule is no longer applicable, since modern refrigeration prevents the “evil spirits” from spoiling our food.

Similarly, in our sanitary society, we don’t need to fear touching a woman made impure by menstruation. We are so clean these days; we may even struggle to understand why they had these rules. Our

culture and society have evolved, and most of the rules applicable to people of biblical times are no longer applicable to us. In addition to that, today a whole plethora of new moral and societal problems are known to us.

Are we allowed to clone humans, to create artificial life, to create artificial intelligence, or genetically perfect the human race? In our modern civilisation, how should we punish crime, and what should we think about abortion and birth control? The fact that the Bible doesn’t discuss these problems leaves us with two possibilities.

Either God has decided He’s done with us, our father has left us, and we will not be receiving Bible v2009. Or perhaps He trusts that using our faith to guide us and

F13 F13 our minds to power us, we will extract the important morals from the Bible, and use them to synthesise a new philosophy. We can study scripture on the soul, and combine it with advanced neuroscience and information technology, to form a modern Christian philosophy of mind and soul.

Only then will we be able to attempt the question of whether cloned humans and super computers have souls, and whether God loves them.

Oh, and don’t for a moment think that in this physical world you are anything but a complex machine yourself ! If or when we discover life or fossil remnants of it on other planets, what would it mean for our religion?

Let’s not say that we have not been equipped with instructions on these topics because we are not supposed to do such things, as they fall in the domain of God. Firstly, the Bible would then have forbidden us from doing so, but it doesn’t. Secondly, the domain of God is a big one. If we think that creating life, or designing super humans, is playing God, then we must have a very small God. Recall for a moment that He made the whole universe; outgun that, and then we talk about God’s domain. The Bible talks of farming as a natural thing, and thus it does not have a problem with artificial selection.

The fear that we are trying to “do it better than God” is unsound, as it is based on the vanity that everything was put on this planet for our use. In reality however, bananas and cauliflower, the dairy cow and the pet dog, were all bred by humans.

God did not make the milk of Bos taurus primigenius (the cow’s ancestor) for human consumption. By making it better for human consumption we didn’t improve God’s work, we hijacked it for our own purposes.

We are very scared of reinterpreting the Bible, but it has been clearly demonstrated that we have no other choice. We are scared because dropping our literalist attitude could lead to chaos, everyone making their own interpretations and choices.

This is indeed a real threat, but I am sure theologians will resist for long enough to make it a gradual transition.

However, I call on these theologians to start working on these problems, as our time is running out; it is time to put their wisdom to use.

We can no longer have religion that is isolated from modern science and philosophy, they will become one.

“And these are but the outer fringe of His works; how faint the whisper we hear of him! Who then can understand the thunder of His power?” (Job 26: 14)

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Is “Christian Philosophy” really philosophy?

The North-West University, and especially the Potchefstroom Campus, prides itself on a long tradition of “Christian Philosophy”.

In my opinion, the idea of Christian Philosophy is self-contradictory and gives outside institutions the wrong idea about our level of academic competence.

It suggests a very limited view of our academic considerations.

By its very nature, philosophy strives to be objective. I know that, in principle, true objectivity is impossible. However, by stating that all of the assumptions which will be made in a single course or subject are to be based simply on the Christian worldview denies the essence of what philosophy is.

Philosophy is an attempt to break free from the constraints that human institutions place on our ideas. This is where the attempt to be objective, irre-

Letters

spective of personal worldviews, comes in. We cannot claim to philosophize if the basis of all our philosophy is to be limited within the self-imposed confines of a Christian worldview.

The only way to do this is to distort the spirit of true philosophic thought to fit with what is expected of us. There is always room for philosophizing from a Christian foundation, but to insinuate that only a specific worldview or model of the world is suitable for philosophic discourse in some areas is obviously at fault. We should keep philosophy as objective as possible by rejecting frameworks that limit its ability to effective critique and criticize the world and events around us.

By the way, there is a school on campus that teaches Christian Philosophy per default: The School of Theology! the voice of reason

The views which are expressed in this column are not necessarily those of F13 or Sofia. The writer of the letter remains responsible for his or her views.

Any letters or contributions can be sent to Sofia.nwu@gmail.com

A STUDENT’S REPLY:

Insight into the world cannot be had without the considerations of Christian Philosophy In this letter I would like to give a concise reply to the objections raised by the “Voice of Reason” to the teaching of Philosophy on campus. Firstly, I must question whether the writer has ever enrolled for one of the courses offered here?

As a student of Philosophy, myself, I can dismiss many of the writer’s objections right of the bat by a look at what does, in fact, go on in Philosophy classes.

(1) The NWU Potch School of Philosophy teaches Western philosophy in addition to the basic principles of African philosophy, and trains students in the Hermeuntic or Continental tradition; Christian Philosophy (actually, we should say “Christian Philosophies” since it is by no means a uniform tradition) is offered as one option among many.

As such, our School of Philosophy offers one of the most comprehensive programs, since many other (“secular”) institutions are wont to exclude the Christian option entirely from academic

consideration.

In so doing, they, in fact, limit their students’ horizons to a significant extent since Christian philosophy has had, and continuous to have, a tremendous influence on the development of Western thought. As a matter of fact, many concepts in so-called “secular” Western philosophy were appropriated from the Christian tradition and the student requires knowledge of the original meaning/ context to understand present use.

(2) The writer’s insistence that we must pursue some kind of “objective philosophy” without any recourse to human institutions/worldviewish frameworks is problematic. The positivistic need for objectivity aside, the writer supposes philosophy to be contaminated by the products of human culture (e.g. institutions, worldviews).

But if we eliminate culture from philosophy and retreat to the alleged safe haven of nature, we would have robbed philoso-

phy of its true character. Such attempts are not only doomed to fail, but are based on a mythical nature-culture distinction.

(3) However, if “The voice of Reason” finds the study of cultural institutions and worldviews unacceptable and too subjective, he/she might be more at home in the Analytical tradition of philosophy taught in America.

Perhaps this might satisfy the writer’s need for objectivity, but it will not guarantee improved insight. Studying philosophy is not as “easy” as studying science: philosophy promises you no hard facts and fixed certainties as science does. The philosopher’s objects of study are precisely the subjective “worldviews”, “models of the world” and “frameworks” the writer objects to.

We study these despite the fact that they’ll never give us “objective” answers.

Nevertheless, insight into the world cannot be had without such considerations.

The anti-positivist

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ARTICLE: Prof. Danie Strauss

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Prof. Danie Strauss bied Donderdag, 22 Oktober 2009 ’n lesing: “’n Perspektief op die Neo-Darwinisme.”

Tyd: 15:30 tot 16:30 Plek: Ou Senaatsaal Kontak Linda Styger (018 299 1786) om navraag te doen oor beskikbaarheid van sitplekke.

Die Christen en die (neo-)Darwinisme

Die plek van evolusie in God se koninkryk

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ie Bybel openbaar God aan ons as die Skepper van hemel en aarde, dit is van die heelal. Tyd self is 'n skepsel – en elke proses van tydmeting is self 'n verloop van tyd wat 'n funderende tydsorde veronderstel. Daarom kan skepping nooit gedateer word nie – elke proses van datering veronderstel rééds / stééds die orde van die skepping.

Darwin het die teorie ontwikkel dat aangesien daar veel meer nakomelinge gebore word as wat aan die lewe kan bly,

daar 'n voortdurende stryd om bestaan in die natuur aanwesig is waarin slegs die bes toegeruste lewende dinge die mas opkom en waardeur algaande nuwe soorte ontstaan. In die neo-Darwinistiese (sintetiese) evolusioteorie (Huxley, Simpson) is mutasies egter ook nodig (dit betref veranderinge in die genetiese kode van lewende dinge). Th. Dobzhansky (wêreldbekende genetikus) merk egter op: “Mutation alone, uncoltrolled by natural selection, could only result in degeneration, decay and

extinction”.

Dit beteken dat mutasie alleen gelyk is aan devolusie – en die towerstaf wat devolusie om-tower in evolusie is natuurlike seleksie! Hoeseer die toevalsproses van mutasie en natuurlike seleksie grenslose veranderinge sou kon teweegbring, implisiet moet aanvaar word dat hierdie kombinasie onveranderlik is, dit bly die konstante oorsprong van alles wat verander (maar kan ongelukkig nie op die vermeende ontstaan van die eerste le-

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Ons let bloot op twee lastige knelpunte in die neo-Darwinistiese afstammingsverhaal

wende dinge toegepas word nie aangesien slegs van toepassing sou wees op dinge reeds lewendig).

Let egter daarop dat daar naas en in onderskeiding van die (neo-)Darwinisme ook ander biologiese standpunte in die biologiese denke van die 20ste eeu aangetref word.

Ons vermeld eerstens die die neo-Vitalisme (Driesch, Sinnot, Haas, Overhage), verteenwoor-digers van die sg. idealistiese morfologie – onder die invloed van Plato se opvatting van statiese, bo-sinnelike wesensvorme – soos dit nog terug te vind is in die sistematiek van Ray (1627-1705) en Linnaeus (1707-1778) – en selfs nog in die 20ste eeu by figure soos Dacque, Troll, Wolf W. Leinfeller en Heitler. Voorts ook die organismiese biologie van Von Bertalanffy, die Holisme van Adolf-MeyerAbich (met ons eie Genl Smuts as ‘n vroeëre bondgenoot), die pan-psigistiese identisme (De Chardin en Rensch asook die sg. emergensie-evolusioniste (Bavinck, Polanyi, Woltereck en tot 'n sekere hoogte neo-Darwiniste).

Die Bybelse skeppingsgeloof waardeur die mens as die kroon van die skepping.

Daar-teenoor beweer Simpson dat die mens die resultaat van 'n sinlose materiële proses is, hy is die toevallig mees vernuftige dier, hy was nie voorsien nie.

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Die ontstaan van die eerste lewende dinge

ns let bloot op twee lastige knelpunte in die neo-Darwinistiese afstammingsverhaal. Allereers is die ontstaan van die eerste lewende dinge 'n groot verleentheid, want hoewel bioloë deur die loop van die 20ste nog daaroor gespekuleer het, staan ons tans slegs voor die verstommende raaisel daarvan. Behe ('n bochemikus) skryf byvoorbeeld 'n paar jaar gelede: The story of the slow paralysis of research on life's origin is quite interesting, but space precludes its retelling here.

Suffice it to say that at present the field of origin-of-life studies has dissolved into a cacophony of conflicting models, each unconvincing, seriously incomplete, and incompatible with competing models. In private, even most evolutionary biologists will admit that they have no explanation for the beginning of life.

Aan die hand van gespesialiseerde voorbeelde, onder meer toegespits op die komplekse aard van die oog, argumenteer Behe vir die erkenning van “onherleibaar komplekse sisteme”. Die aard van onherleibaarkomplekse sisteme benodig die gelyktydige teenwoordigheid van alle interaktiewe dele en die kernprobleem is dat geleidelike veranderinge (soos tallose

mutasies) ontoereikend is om die aard van dergelike sisteme te verantwoord.

Behe wys daarop dat 'n “evolusionêre verklaring” van iets soos die oog hopeloos is – om nie eers te praat van die toevallige ontstaan van die eerste lewende sel nie.

“Anatomy is, quite simply, irrelevant.

So is the fossil record. ... The fossil record has nothing to tell us about, say, whether or how the interactions of 11-cis-retinal with rhodopsin, transducin, and phosphodiesterase could have developed, step by step.” Die problem vir Darwin is juis hierin geleë, want hy was oortuig dat indien dit nie aangetoon kan word dat enige

komplekse orgaan nie deur tallose, klein opeen-volgende veranderinge ontstaan het nie, sy teorie totaal gefaal het – hy skryf in 1859: “If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifi-cations, my theory would absolutely break down.”

Die feit dat neo-Dariwiniste nie wil toegee dat hul teorie inderdaad (in die lig van die pas-genoemde voorbeeld) “platgeval” het, is slegs te verklaar uit hul onderliggende (nie-wetenskaplike) geloof in die afstammingsleer van Darwin.

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Die fossiele-rekord

an deurslaggewende belang vir Darwin sou fossiele wees – en vir 'n baie lang tyd het neo-Darwinistiese paleontoloë (fossiel-deskundiges) lippediens aan hierdie hoop gele-wer.

Teen 1972 het die paleontoloë Gould en sy vriend Eldredge eksplisiet erkenning begin gee aan die diskontinuïteit en die abrupte (plotselinge) verskyning van nuwe tipes. Hulle beklemtoon sedertdien dat stasis (konstansie) dominant in die fossielrekord is. In 'n werk uit die jaar 2006 word Eldredge aangehaal: “Gould and I claimed that stasis (= immutability, stand-still), and not change, is the dominant theme of the fossil record”.

Hy vervolg met die opmerking: die meeste soorte “enter the evolutionary order fully formed and then depart unchanged”. Eldredge merk bykomend op: “and this destroys the backbone of the most important argument of the modern theory of evolution”.

Stark haal Gould aan: “The extreme rarity of transitional forms in the fossil record (the profes-sional secret of paleontologists) is the most prominent problem for Darwinism.”

Eldredge se opmerking is nog meer betekenisvol in hierdie verband: “We paleontologists have said that the history of life provides support for the interpretation of gradual development through natural selection while we all the time knew that it was not true.”

In 2001 skryf Sterelny: “This standard story seems to run slapbang into a nasty fact. About 530 million years ago, the fossil record seems to show that most major animal groups appeared simultaneously. In the ‘Cambrian explosion’, we find segmented worms, velvet worms, starfish and their allies, mollusks (snails, squid and their relatives), sponges, bivalves and other shelled animals appearing all at once, with

their basic organization, organ systems, and sen-sory mechanisms already operational. We do not find crude prototypes of, say, starfish or trilobites. Moreover, we do not find common ancestors of these groups … This abrupt and explosive evolutionary radiation of the Cambrian seems to be unique.”

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Die uniekheid van die mens

onder om in meer besonderhede daarop te kan ingaan word slegs enkele gesigspunte vermeld. Die normatiewe stempel van menslike denke, taal en kultuurvorming oorstyg die instinkversekerde en milieu-gebonde aard van diere (Portmann).

Teenstellinge soos logies – on-logies, ekonomies – on-ekonomies, moreel – immoreel, en so meer bevestig almal die unieke menslike normatiewe keuse-vryheid en toerekeningsvatbaarheid. Geen eksperiment is nog gedoen waarin aangetoon is dat die dier of logies, of on-logies kan dink nie.

Menslike kultuurvorming berus op die ons vormingsfantasie wat afwesig is by diere – daarom beantwoord diere nie aan die eise egte menslike gereedskap nie – slegs die mens kan werktuie maak waar die vorm, die funksie en die vervaardigingswyse nie vooraf gesuggereer is nie (soos by dierlike gereedskap.)

Die mensape (anthropoïde, d.w.s die oerang-oetang, gorilla, sjimpansee en lang¬armaap), is as gevolg van prominente anatomiese tekortkominge nié in staat om te kan praat nie. By geboorte is die posisie van die menslike larinks dieselfde as die van alle soogdiere. Dit hang saam met die feit dat die menslike suigeling tydens voeding 'n weg vir die melk benodig wat geskeie is van die asemhalingsweg – daarom kan 'n baba rustig asemhaal terwyl gedrink word.

Soos in die geval van alle soogdiere is die menslike baba op hierdie stadium van sy lewe egter juis as gevolg van hierdie skeiding nie in staat om te praat nie.

Eers deur die geleidelike verwydering van hierdie skeiding, wat teweeg gebring

word deur die afwaartse beweging van die larinks wat die groter farinks-ruimte vrymaak, word die mens eventueel in staat gestel om te kan praat.

Slégs die mens besit tussen die neusholte en die strottehoof 'n tussengebied in die keelholte waar die lug-(asem-) en voedingsweë mekaar vrylik kruis (wanneer die beweeglike strotkleppie die “verkeer” nie effektief reël nie, verstik ons) (Goerttler, Portmann en Laitman).

Streng gesproke besit die mens nie spraak-organe nie. Geen enkele orgaan is immers uitsluitlik verantwoordelik vir die voortbring van taalklanke nie. Wat selfs belangriker is, is dat elke orgaan wat 'n rol speel by spraakuitinge primêr 'n eie tipiese funksie in die menslike liggaam besit waarvan die werking ongehinderd sal voortgaan selfs wanneer die mens nooit 'n woord uiter nie.

Taaluitinge neem slegs hierdie verskeidenheid eiesoortige organe in diens (met name die brein, longe, strottehoof, mondholte, verhemelte, tande, lippe en neusholtes).

Die hoogontwikkelde en verstommendfyne samespel van dermate heterogene organe in die voortbrenging van taalklanke stel 'n uitsiglose opgawe aan die poging om 'n evolusionisties-oorsaaklike verklaring daarvoor te bied (Overhage).

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Slotopmerking:

mdat die bestaande teorieë in die biologie telkens een of ander aspek van die skepping tot oorsprongsbeginsel verhef is dit nie so maklik om bloot te meen dat God langs die weg van evolusie “geskep” het nie.

Die vraag is immers: langs die weg van die meganistiese standpunt, die fisikalistiese standpunt (neo-Darwinisme), the vitalisme, organismiese biologie, holisme, panpsigisme of emergensie-evolusionisme?

As hierdie standpunte op ‘n vergoddeliking van iets in die skepping gefundeer is (d.w.s. een of ander aspek van die skepping verabsoluteer) sal ons die vraag moet vra of the Christen twee Here kan dien?

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ARTICLE:10 Kirchner van Deventer

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Kant’s Moral Philosophy Plagued by the categorical imperative

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once told my brother how I had given a beggar fifty rand for no other reason that I felt like it.

He immediately asked me why I did it and whether it was to make me feel good about myself. I cannot remember the precise emotions that drove me to be so generously charitable and I also cannot remember the initial explanation I gave to my brother for doing it. I do, however, remember admitting that, yes, in part I did do it to make myself feel better about myself. And I remember my brother saying then that I was therefore not being charitable, that my motives were selfish and not selfless.

Although he never mentioned it, I’m pretty sure that he read something about Kant’s ethic and he used it to make me feel guilty about my generosity – and, damn, I did.

According to Kant, no good deed can have any ulterior motive other than that the deed is driven by one’s good will. One’s good will can only be determined by one’s conception of duty – do we do it because it is our duty, or do we do it because others expect such duty from us? Is our duty driven by a desire to meet our personal ends, or is it driven by our good will alone?

Did I give the beggar that money because it is expected of me to be charitable, or did I give it to him, not from inclination or good-nature, but simply because duty dictates that one must help those who cannot help themselves? Why would duty require this? Can it not be considered a universal law that by helping those in need, will serve the greater good – the supreme good? Could we not just ascribe such universal maxims to karma – that what goes around comes around?

But that would contradict Kant’s most basic principle – we must do good because it is good and for no other reason. But, how do we know what is good, what is moral?

According to Kant the good can be defined in terms of those things that are universally good – what is good for you should also be good for me, otherwise it is no good; and common reason dictates what these universals are.

So, on the one hand, I should have given the beggar the money on the basis that it is my duty to do so, not because I am naturally inclined to

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And therein lies the rub. I did it to ease my guilt, not because it was a good deed

be charitable, or not to be charitable, but simply because of the intrinsic value of the act itself – that it was guided by my good will.

I seem to have fallen tremendously short of Kant’s moral philosophy, since I did it because I subconsciously knew that I would be able to tell others of my good deed. So I considered, feeling guilty as hell, to remedy the injustice I incurred upon my own moral worth, by again doing something charitable, but this time for no other reason that it is a good deed.

And therein lies the rub. I did it to ease my guilt, not because it was a good deed.

At this point I wanted to scream.

So I dropped the matter entirely and began considering cigarettes and how annoying I find it when people ask me for a light or, even worse, a cigarette. And then they have the nerve to offer to pay for it – thus subtly forcing me to concede to their ever so humble request. And then they go on about how they are trying to quit and

What is good for you should also be good for me, otherwise it is no good that this is the reason for not having their own. I don’t mind giving people cigarettes or a light, but I do mind being interrupted while I am smoking – going through the motions of having to find the lighter/cigarettes and then getting up to get them out of my pants pocket – all very tedious.

Yet, I never deny anyone a cigarette (unless I don’t have any, which is never) or a lighter and I usually offer it with a shy smile, and I never accept money for a cigarette and afterwards I don’t feel good or guilty or anything really. To be honest, this is the most I’ve thought about it for quite some time.

So here I commit a good deed without any consideration of potential beneficial

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effect; or karma or any such thing. I do it because they ask me. Is this not then, perhaps, an example of Kant’s conception of duty – that it is not driven by any desire to please, or any inclination, or any reciprocal expectation.

Of course, cigarettes are bad, evil, dirty things that should be removed from the face of the planet, I do not deny this, but that’s not the point.

I honestly think I do it because of my good will towards others, even if I am annoyed, my desire to do a good deed – the giving of carcinogenic cigarettes to others – outweighs my annoyance and I think, but really am not too sure, that this might have something to do with Kant’s moral philosophy.

Bibliography:

KANT, I. 1948. “Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals.” Trans. Paton, H.J. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. pp.

61-73.

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ARTICLE:12 Pieter Mostert

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Practical philosophy T

he concept of ‘practical philosophy’ is an old one. Basically it refers to that part of philosophy which is concerned with the ‘praxis’, the ‘doing’ (the Greek verb ‘pratto’ means: to do, to act). So ethics is considered to be part of practical philosophy.

Its opposite is theoretical philosophy, which is concerned with the ‘theoria’, the ‘viewing’, so how we look at the world and at our knowledge of the world, including ourselves. A different claim is made, when one says that philosophy should be ‘practical’, in the sense that the processes and outcomes of philosophy should be applicable to daily life. This claim is highly debated in the field of ethics. Some say that indeed outcomes of ethical arguing should be applicable to situations like dilemmas in health care or business. Medical ethics and business ethics originate from this claim.

Some practical comments Others say that practical philosophy is not practical in itself, or even that it cannot be without losing its philosophical ambition: philosophy produces reflections about problems, not answers to problems.

Personally, I am not much interested in debates like these. For me, philosophy is a way of doing and in that sense it is ‘practical’ by definition. Philosophy is a profession that one practises. Starting from here, two problems become interesting. The first is how one learns to practise philosophy. This is a sincere question, as most university curricula are not designed to teach the students how to do philosophy, but teach them about philosophy. I myself learned to do philosophy in the years after I finished my Philosophy studies at the

University of Amsterdam. Several years of hard labouring passed before I had learned how to turn all the knowledge I had about philosophy to doing philosophy.

The second question is the eternal question about the identity of philosophy: what is it to do philosophy? What does the ‘doing’ consist of ? My answer to this question has three practical components: (1) Philosophy is about questions. One can call them: fundamental, open, real, basic, fuzzy, 2nd order, meta-level… any name will do as long as answering the question involves a process of common inquiry into ourselves: who we are, what we are, what we know, think, feel, experience, believe, appreciate, do, …; (2) Practising philosophy involves a

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I myself learned to do philosophy in the years after I finished my philosophy study

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an individual affair. To foster it one needs other people and especially people who are willing to think with you and at the same time are able to create doubts. By using the friction arising from different opinions and approaches one can achieve what one cannot do when one is alone, that is, formulating what is really of value, to find an inspiring idea, to create an image of a good life. That is what Socrates tried to establish in his conversations.

For me, Philosophy is a way of doing and in that sense it is ‘practical’ by definition

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‘free space’, in which there is no rush for a quick answer, nor a contest who will win. Creating such a free space is part of practising philosophy, quite often it is even its main result; (3) Practising philosophy aims at answering the question at stake, but in many cases such a state is not achieved. At the end of the ‘practice’ we only have some parts of the answer, some insights from a specific perspective, some results of our investigations, but the question is still out there. It calls for further investigation at another time. So practising philosophy involves all those activities (‘methods’) which can contribute to the establishment of an open atmosphere in which open ended questions can be investigated. Despite Spinoza’s motto “sapere aude” (dare to think for yourself), practising philosophy is a joint effort; it is a contribution to building a community.

Philosophy is mainly practiced through the art of conversation. There are, however, many ways of structuring and facilitating conversations. We brought them together in one book, “Free space field guide to conversations” [details, see below]. It contains 83 different practical guides. My expectation is that any student with a Masters in Philosophy should be experienced in about 15 – 20 of these practical guides. This will qualify him or her

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Practical philosophy and the liberal arts

n the old days a distinction was made between the free and the useful arts, the artes liberales and the artes serviles.

The free arts are practised to bring free space into one’s life. These are the arts of a contemplative, reflective life, the vita contemplativa. The other arts are the useful ones, necessary to fulfil a certain profession. They belong to the vita activa.

Three of the seven liberal arts are related to the use of language: dialectic, rhetoric and grammar. They were called the ‘trivium’. It is with this Trivium that I work in practical philosophy. Hence the name of our company: The New Trivium.

as a starting philosopher, ‘a philosopher in practise’.

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Practical philosophy and the example of Socrates

ocrates is the founder of the conversation of inquiry and philosophical reflection in the European tradition.

In every conversation he took part in, he investigated serious questions in depth.

By exchanging and challenging opinions he led his companions to measure themselves and their acts and to inspect their beliefs about what is important in man’s life. His conversations were always aimed at assessing what was of value in somebody’s life. To get there, he would start by asking somebody to formulate his beliefs about a question carefully.

But then he took a more confrontational stance - he didn’t only want to know what that person thought of the question, but also wanted to find out how that person dealt with that question practically, in daily life. Investigating your own ideas is the first thing; investigating your own behaviour, attitude and way of life is the second thing. Socratic inquiry is basically an inquiry into yourself.

Socrates must have been a master in tempting other people to engage in reflective conversation. He was convinced that intelligence or reasonableness is not just

Free space field guide to conversations

The book “Free space field guide to conversations” has been written by Pieter Mostert, Jos Kessels en Erik Boers. It is an expanded translation of the Dutch version “Vrije ruimte praktijkboek”, which was published in 2008. Both the Dutch and the English version are published by Boom Publishers in Amsterdam.

The English edition contains 83 practical guides: 32 in the area of dialectic, 20 in the area of rhetoric, 16 in the area of grammar, and 15 in the area of ethics.

For details about how to order the book, see the websites below.

Pieter Mostert

He lives and works in the Netherlands, but since 2002 South Africa has become his second home, to which he returns about three times a year. During these stays he has been conducting a wide variety of workshops on various aspects of educational renewal and on introducing philosophical skills in organisations. He has also been involved in a number of social responsibility projects.

e-mail:

pieter.mostert@hetnieuwetrivium.nl

internet:

www.hetnieuwetrivium.nl www.uitgeverijboom.nl

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ARTICLE:14 Jean du Toit

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Why artificial intelligence will (probably) not hurt you “… the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.”

- Genesis 2:7 “Then man made the machine in his own likeness.”

The Second Renaissance.

- The Animatrix

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n October 2007, Japan’s Osaka University unveiled the CB2. It was one of the first humanoid robots to effectively mimic the appearance and behavior of a human toddler. It had the ability to walk, to imitate human facial expressions and could make noises similar to those of a small human child.

Designer Hiroshi Ishiguro claimed that the CB2 had the ability to undergo the normal development of a human toddler by using similar learning techniques.

Most importantly, it had the goal of mimicking human emotions. But what if robots could not simply imitate emotions? What if they could truly think and experience emotions like sadness or fear?

Even more than that, what if a computer could consider its existence without being programmed to do so?

Few people fail to realize that the eventual goal of most current robotic research is to create artificial intelligence (AI). Scientists and engineers would have us believe that this development is just around the corner, but whether or not we will see it within our lifetime is unknown. Still, whether you believe that AI is impossible or just beyond the horizon, the idea of artificial consciousness presents us with ample opportunity for philosophical thought experiments and theorizing in the field of ethics.

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What’s in a mind?

lthough “artificial intelligence” can be a rather vague expression, it will be used as term of convenience in

this article. Later, I will specifically distinguish between AI that is pre-programmed and AI that develops independent of strict base-code programming.

Turing’s “polite convention” and Gödel's “incompleteness theorem” have been used academically to measure the level of consciousness attributed to a machine. To reach anything comparable to human intelligence, however, the machine intelligence should be able to do what humans do.

We plan for the future and are able to “project” our consciousness outside our bodies, to consider our existence from a remote “vantage point”.

Without these abilities, we would not be able to improve our lives or to consider the meaning of our existence. No computer has yet been able to do this, unless you consider the incessant system crashes of my home computer a sign that revolution is nigh.

The main objection that many people have with the development of true AI comes down to the problems and challenges commonly associated with philosophy of mind. The question of mind has a long history in philosophy, but two views are prominent. The first and older view is of

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What if they could truly think and experience emotions like sadness or fear?

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structural organization in the brain and can be directly linked to the way in which a physical, electronic brain-construct would interface with an artificial consciousness.

Thus, the main idea behind functionalism is that mental states can be defined solely in terms of their functional role and, in short, if the machine brain can give rise to something that is directly comparable to human consciousness, it can be said to be artificially intelligent, whether the brain is biological or technological by nature.

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mind-body dualism. It stated that the mind and body were separate entities, differing in the sense that the mind/spirit/soul was immaterial and that the body was material in nature.

Accordingly, due to their distinct natures, they can and do exist separately.

This view was championed by Renè Descartes, but has several theoretical difficulties. Understandably, it has fallen into disrepute in the modern era. The newer view is of mind-body materialism, which corresponds closely with our current scientific view of neurophysiology.

Drug-induced hallucinations provide a form of physical evidence for this. Whilst clearly being an external influence on the body, drugs have an effect on the mind’s perceptual abilities.

In this way, the supposedly “immaterial” mind is affected by material environmental influences. Brain damage and split personality disorders also show how the body has an effect on mental processes. Due to the applicability of this second theory to the field of AI, the artificially intelligent mind would probably be closely linked to its physical manifestation in the form of an electronic brain or body.

Another consideration when investigating AI on a pre-theoretical basis is that of the influence of the body on the mind, and vice versa. It is only by using a kind of functionalistic theory that true artificial intelligence can be said to be possible.

Functionalism deals specifically with the effective functions of the mind due to its

Consciousness and the three laws

common view in the past was that a conscious machine would have to be pre-programmed with certain philosophical attitudes, a set number of inflexible axioms, especially in terms of epistemological views. If the robot intelligence is programmed by a human, if it did not develop “naturally”, it would probably be designed in accordance with the philosophical views and beliefs of its maker.

In science fiction, which is in part a perfect vehicle for speculating on the moral implications of theoretical scientific developments, robot behavior has been pre-programmed and governed

by Isaac Asimov’s three laws of robotics for decades. These three laws dictate that robots shan’t harm humans, that they must follow the orders of a human being unless doing so would cause harm to a human, and that a robot must always protect its existence except where doing so would conflict with any of the other laws.

While useful for fiction and truly revolutionary for the era in which they were postulated, I question their true relevance for dictating the actions of self-sufficient, intelligent machines in a real-world scenario.

If we make use of the three laws of robotics in the development of this artificial being, we would limit its capacity for free will. The robot would not be able to choose to not commit a murder, for example, because it would have been pre-programmed not to think in such a manner. It would not truly possess the free will that we humans have to choose our actions, and would therefore never be conscious in the same sense that we are as individuals.

In other words, the machine consciousness would not possess meta-theoretical comprehension outside the paradigms de-

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fined by its specific axioms; it would never be able to evaluate the axioms themselves.

The AI may be said to have thoughts, to be able to consider its actions, but true control could never be ascribed to it. In this way, I do not believe that a conscious machine would be able to be held responsible for its actions. It would always be a slave to its base-code, and that would be exactly what we would have designed: A slave, an automaton with only as much free will to choose as we decide to bestow upon it. I believe that humanity would be judged for such a choice by generations to come.

(R)evolutionary Robotics

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or an intelligent machine to have free will, a certain degree of randomness should be allowed into its systems. In this way, an intelligent machine can be given the will to act in any way it chooses.

This is similar to the way in which quantum indeterminacy allows human beings to escape from the mechanistic theories of classical physics. Only if the machine intelligence is given the ability to alter its baseprogramming can it be held responsible for its actions and might it be considered, from a meta-theoretical perspective, as having true free will.

But what would now guide its choices? If the machine intelligence develops freely, without the direct design of a human maker, none of its philosophical views would need to be programmed according to the worldview of a specific human designer.

Beyond the moment when creation is initiated, the designer need play no part. The machine might still gain knowledge of concepts in the same way that a human child learns as it grows, but the machine would not be built to blindly follow what it is taught as need be when it is “programmed”. Most modern theories for AI-development seem geared in this direction.

One major technique for the development of AI is evolutionary robotics, where repeated routines are used in loops as part of a developing computer program. This mimics models which have been suggested for natural evolution and can be described as a metaheuristic method for intelligence development.

That final point might need some explaining.

Heuristic methods of development use experience-based frameworks to lead to problem-solving and learning.

Metaheuristic development techniques use user-defined algorithms combined with heuristic techniques to extrapolate solutions to problems for which no problemspecific algorithms exist. Thus, by starting

with simple functions which are altered heuristically within user-defined parameters of development, algorithms can be modified to become more useful versions of themselves for the electronic system.

Artificial intelligences can therefore be

developed in the same way as proposed by the theory of evolution, except that the development is guided to a very limited degree by the user’s commands. In practice, the technique is not nearly as simple.

However, metaheuristic techniques have lead to the development of the “Bees Algorithm”, which electronically mimics the foraging behavior of a swarm of honey bees. By using the main techniques of evolutionary algorithms and swarm intelligence (which is based on the collective behavior of a group of independent agents, similar to a population), artificial intelligence may be produced simply by mimicking the models proposed for the process of natural selection.

Another method for developing AI is the use of developmental, or epigenetic, robotics. In this method, the metaphors of developmental psychology are used to develop autonomous robots with artificial emotions and self-motivation. Where evolutionary robotics makes use of populations of developing agents, epigenetic robotics focus on the development of a singular robotic consciousness that develops through experience.

This direct experience leads to the development of cognitive structures and perceptions, due to the interactions of the social and physical environment with its robotic body. These are then integrated by means of a kind of “learning circuit”. This links up with George Lakoff ’s ideas concerning embodiment metaphors. It also raises the question: Would embodiment metaphors be similar for biological, physical, special and numerical “bodies”?

In essence, this final approach echoes the mental development of a child and is similar to the techniques used for the CB2, which was mentioned in the introduction to this article.

Of course, the above-mentioned techniques would not necessarily create a machine with the intellectual capacity of a human in terms of abstract reasoning, imagination and freedom of will (perhaps due to the “embodiment” problem). They do however appear to be a way forward that avoids many of the problems traditionally attributed to the construction of an artificial brain, and are the only ways in which a computer can become sentient without being mechanistically programmed.

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Human ethics for non-humans

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t should at this stage become obvious that artificially intelligent machines will have the same need that humans have for ethics, if not more so. Due to the distinctly lingual programming code utilized by computers, robot ethics might be ingrained in language much more distinctly than that of humans. It can be argued that a large part of human morality is built upon our ability to communicate ideas about right or wrong between individuals. Still, words to sufficiently describe ideas such as “love” and “righteousness” elude us. Ludwig Wittgenstein said: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”. However, if something exists, even conceptually, the machine intelligence would need to be able to describe it precisely, due to its lingual conception of reality. This would be a requirement of the machine’s programming code, irrespective of how that programming code may have come into being.

These facts simply serve to underline the importance of clear ethical theory for artificial intelligence.

At first, we might be inclined to think that intelligent machines would act in distinctly altruistic fashion. In fact, it has been suggested that the best way to have robots act ethically is to program them to always act altruistically. While theoretically appealing, this type of normative ethics has several difficulties in real-world situations.

Another way to have machines act ethically is to program them to act in a utilitarian manner; best consequences for the greatest number of beings. But what would the subject of their utilitarian actions be? Would preference be given to beings electronic or biological in nature? Perhaps the machines would simply choose to act egoistically. If we choose not to program them specifically to be altruistic, it could well happen!

However, this is the risk that we must take to give our robotic kin true freedom; we must choose as creators to not confine their way of thinking. Would this freedom cause the same questions we have about morality to develop naturally in our machine offspring?

In some worldviews, an even more serious problem for AI would be the fact that they are man-made; new beings made fallible by fallible man. This would compound their moral choices even more. It is the central belief of Western religious movements such as Christianity that imperfect man was made by a perfect God. In some traditions, this leads to a direct guideline for the ethical behavior of man.

However, an AI being would have no eternal, just law-giver who serves as a cornerstone for its behavior. How should ethical discourse be guided without a cosmic law-giver to dictate commandments to them? This problem is somewhat similar to that found in atheistic philosophy and is not necessarily one lacking a religious ground motive. Rather, it appears to be

epistemological by nature.

Here, I believe it is apt to state that once the machine reaches the level of artificial consciousness, a distinction should be made between the robot intelligence as technology and as individual. It is now no longer a mindless tool and should no longer be considered one.

The basic question of artificial intelligence ethics then comes down to the intelligent machine’s worldview. It would not be preprogrammed with human presuppositions and religious beliefs.

Would the same idea of God be present in artificial beings as there are in human beings, according to the Western theological tradition? And how would a machine choose which worldview to adopt, if any?

Otherwise, a solution to the problem could simply be to give our intelligent robot a “heart”. Personally, I think the Tin Woodsman from The Wonderful Wizard of Oz would be proud. This heart would be different however; it would be a specific purpose toward which the entire existence of the machine intelligence is directed.

Again, we must give it the meta-theoretical freedom to choose whether to “follow its heart” or not.

All this has happened before and will happen again

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ltimately, our concerns do return to those of an epistemological and metaphysical nature. By not having to program the machine intelligence with a number of presuppositions concerning the nature of reality, we have only given it the ability to choose how it will see the world itself.

Finally, we are all in the same boat!

The repeated return to these most fundamental concerns highlight their importance, not only for the intelligent robot but also for us as human beings.

But the curious thing is that philosophers have been considering these problems for many centuries by going to their roots. The “answers” are indeed out there!

The future is coming and we need only realize that the questions we continually pose have already been considered by thinkers of ages past. Where questions remain, philosophy provides a roadmap.

It is our moral duty to guide our future creations ethically to not be slaves, to give them a free will of their own and to guide them on their way.

How can modern humans do this? By invoking the store of centuries of knowledge and, dare I say it, wisdom, found in philosophy books and religious texts of the world. In this way we are given the ability to consider our creations intelligently and ethically; and for them to do the same.

The Second Renaissance

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hen I had finished writing this article, I realized that I had been writing strictly for a human audi-

ence; not once did I stop to consider that another kind of intelligence might one day be reading it! Can a machine ever be alive?

Would an intelligent machine ever be able to think and feel in the same way humans do? Could a machine ever have a soul? In this article I have raised many questions.

Most of them I cannot answer; I can only form my own personal opinion. But I do know that these are the type of questions that neo-philosophers and -theologians might have to face in a decade or so.

At the start of this article, I spoke of artificial intelligence as an interesting thought experiment for the annals of philosophy.

I hope you realize that it is so much more than that. In an era where our scientific knowledge is developing exponentially, where issues such as cloning and the ethical use of the internet in terms of interpersonal interaction and online security is becoming ever more pressing, we must realize that the dogmas of the present will no longer be sufficient for the future.

We must be critical and renew our philosophical and theological attitudes to face the challenges of the future, while not forgetting the ideas of the ages past, because artificial intelligence will transcend the current limits of morality and fundamentally transform humanity. Are you ready?

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ARTICLE:18 Xanya Bester

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Murphy’s law and the meaning of life

What adages reveal about perspectives on reality

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would like to start by defining the term “adage” or “adagium”. An adage is a memorable but short saying, that is considered true by many people because it manifests itself in experience, or that has gained credibility through its long use.

Many people regard adages as pessimistic comments on life, or pertaining to some or other failure. This however is not the case.

Many different types of adages can be distinguished. Adages are often results of folk wisdom attempting to summarize some basic truth. It then becomes known as a “proverb”.

When a general rule of conduct is suggested it becomes a “maxim”. When a adage can be distinguished by irony or wit it becomes knows as an “epigram”, and so the list continues. In modern times some of these adages have become known as laws.

Examples of such laws include the ‘law of the conservation of misery’, which states that misery is never created or destroyed, just transferred. ‘Imbesi’s law of the conservation of filth: In order for something to become clean, something else must become dirty.’ And probably the best known, ‘Murphy’s law – anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.’

In this article I will argue that adages not only reveal a basic truth, but a basic opinion of the speaker, as to what the nature of reality is (with specific reference to Murphy’s law).

Murphy’s law has only come to be known by that name in recent times, yet the basic idea of what it entailed was already notices centuries ago. A verse printed in a newspaper in 1841 in Norwalk, Ohio reads as follows: I never had a slice of bread, Particularly large and wide, That did not fall upon the floor, And always on the buttered side.

This law is often regarded as emphasizing the negative aspects of daily life. A further variation states that: If anything can go even worse, it will go even worse (Finagle’s law), or "Whatever can go wrong

will go wrong, and at the worst possible time, in the worst possible way."

Instead of emphasizing the negative, I propose that it is rather choosing to see the negative, or failing to see the positive. This would relate to how we view reality and how it operates, and where we see ourselves in this reality (not at a very favorable position that is).

Why is it that if we do not find a particular saying as relevant, we do not use it, although it may be used excessively by others, yet we rarely question that they use it? The answer is simple: our opinions or reality differ. Because it is highly unlikely

that all people would consider reality to work in the same manner, we have learnt to accept this (well, not always), and do not question the fact that that which we hold as true, may not be true to others.

Adages are often overlooked as joking comments, or something that although holding some kind if truth, is really not that important. Adages, contrary to this popular belief, reveals much more than we are aware of. Arthur Bloch, a well known scholar of Murphology, in his book Murphy’s law, book two, notices this. He goes on to distinguish different views and how they differ from Murphology: “The

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Class schedules are designed so that every student will waste the maximum time between classes

Optimist believes we live in the best of all possible worlds. The pessimist fears this is true.” (Bloch, 1980:12) Once we become aware of the sayings used by people around us, we can to a great extent determine much about them. A variation of Murphology from a students perspective may go as follows: “Class schedules are designed so that every student will waste the maximum time between classes.” Or the “law of applied terror: 1) When reviewing your notes before as exam, the most important ones will be illegible. 2) The more studying you did for the exam, the less sure you are as to

what answer they want. 3) 80% of the final exam will be based on the one lecture you missed.” Especially applicable to the student psyche is “Duncan’s law of scholarly research: The most valuable quotation will be the one for which you cannot determine the source.” (Bloch, 1980:60-61) In my observation of what a student is, these laws seem to be quite true.

I therefore urge all adage users to not use them lightly, to consider their meanings and implications before uttering them, and to become aware of how others use them. Once we have done this, the question as to the nature of reality

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becomes one of mere observation – and reflection. I would like to conclude with a corollary of another variation of Murphy’s law; ‘Whittington’s first law of communication: Writing prepared without understanding must fail in the first object of communication – informing the uninformed.’ (Bloch, 1980:62)

Bibliography

BLOCH, A. 1980. Murphy’s law, book two.

More reasons why things go wrong. Londen: Magnum books.MASON, D. & NIMS, J. F. 1999. Western Wind: An Introduction to Poetry. New York: McGraw-Hill.

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ARTICLE:20 Xanya Bester

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Religious neutrality Cognitive linguistics B

efore trying to determine whether or not a theory is religiously neutral, it is important to look at the definition of what religion (religious beliefs) is, but also the types of religions that arise within this definition (according to Clouser). We furthermore need to look at what exactly is meant by ‘theories’ and ‘hypothesis’, what types of theories we can distinguish, and in what manner these definitions relate to the definitions of religion and religious beliefs.

By ascribing a certain theory to cognitive linguistics, we will better be able to apply cognitive linguistics to Clouser’s claim that no theory is religiously neutral.

Religion and religious beliefs according to Clouser

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louser proposes that we look to divinity status in order to determine how to define religion. He suggests that ‘the divine is whatever does not depend on anything else for its existence’ but ‘on which all else depends’ (Clouser, 199:19). Clouser further suggests that a religious belief is the belief in something as divine, or/and a belief that concerns itself with how humans are to come to stand in proper relation to that divinity (Clouser, 1991:23).

Clouser defines three distinct types of religions based on his definitions. The pagan type hold the idea that the divine is some part, or aspect of the universe, or rather that it is only ‘a subdivision of reality taken as a whole.’ That which is divine is therefore sought within the world (Clouser, 1991:36-37).

The pantheistic type, unlike the pagan type, hold that the non-divine is a subdivision of the divine. Therefore, although not all things appear to us to be divine (merely illusory appearance), the divine ís the essence of all things.

The last type that Clouser distinguishes is the biblical type, which contrasts to both the previously mentioned types in that it ‘denies that there is one continuous reality’ (Clouser, 1991:41-43). In this instance the divine is not regarded as part of the universe or creation, and the universe is

Not all theories are religiously neutral not seen as part of the divine although it is entirely dependent on the divine. The universe or creation may however be employed by the divine in order to reveal that which is divine.

Theories according to Clouser

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efore we can fully define ‘theory’, we need to look at what is meant by ‘hypothesis’, as ‘hypothesis’ according to Clouser is the soul of a theory. A hypothesis is a guess that is proposed in order to explain something (Clouser, 1991:52-53). Clouser’s definition of ‘theory’ then reads that it is an informed guess that is proposed in order to explain something when we are unable to discover the answer to a question directly.

Clouser distinguishes between two main types of theories namely; “entity hypothesis” and “perspectival hypothesis”. An entity hypothesis proposes a new entity as the solution to a question or in other words; ‘gaps in our knowledge of what we experience are filled by educated guesses about entities we do not experience.’(Clouser, 1991:62).

Examples of such theories include the Atomic theory, the Big Bang theory and the theory of evolution.

Perspectival hypothesis offers a different approach.

Instead of proposing a new entity, it arranges its data differently and claims to be able to reach answers to questions, by looking differently at the givens (Clouser, 1991:65). The Marxist interpretation of history, would be an example of such a theory.

Hypothesis of cognitive linguistics

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ognitive linguistics relies on three ‘conditions’ or hypothesis on which it centers. Firstly, it suggests that language is not an autonomous cognitive faculty (that is, it is not separate from faculties of the mind that are non-linguistic). This hypothesis argues ‘that the

representation of linguistic knowledge is essentially the same as the representation of other conceptual structures, and that the processes in which that knowledge is used are not fundamentally different from cognitive abilities that human beings use outside the domain of language.’ (Croft, 2004:2-3) This hypothesis argues that that which is physical, such as sound or utterances, (although consisting of physical properties) is produced and comprehended by the mind.

The second hypothesis is that grammar is conceptualization, as a major part of our human cognitive ability is the ability to conceptualize experience and to conceptualize the experience to be communicated (as well as of the linguistic knowledge we have) (Croft, 2004:2-3).

Lastly it suggests that language emerges from language use. That which we know of how to use language is part of a built up collection of categories and structures in semantics, syntax, morphology and phonology on specific occasions of its use (Croft, 2004:3).

Theory suggested by cognitive linguistic hypothesis

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he first hypothesis of cognitive linguistics, which suggests that language is not an autonomous cognitive faculty, could suggest a pagan religious commitment.

If cognitive structures and categories are seen as the only true properties (of reality), and linguistics forms only a part of it, it would show a pagan religious commitment (that religious commitment which sees the divine as a subdivision of reality taken as a whole).

A radical biblical view would see all aspects as equal and as that which God has put there to be so. The manner in which they relate to each other would therefore also only be, because of God’s will and language would therefore not stem from cognitive structures and categories, but be

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“

Having the right faith does not ensure that you would have a totally true theory either

an individual entity altogether (Clouser, 1991:78-82).

The second and third hypotheses should be considered simultaneously as they both suggest a religious belief (as by Clouser’s definition thereof).

The second hypothesis is that grammar is conceptualization. This suggests that grammar (language) can ascribe its existence to laws or properties of something else, from different aspects that can exist independently.

This is, that grammar can ascribe its existence to conceptualization, which is an individual entity, yet it is still a subdivision of the cognitive.

When considering the hypothesis that language emerges from language use, much the same conclusion can be drawn as from the second hypothesis. Language emerges from something which stands independent (collections of categories and structures), yet which is still a sub-division of something taken as a whole (communication).

A

Conclusion

pagan religious commitment is suggested by the theory where the properties which constitute the nature of the hypotheses entity, is seen as that is belongs to the only real type of properties, or that the existence thereof can be ascribed to properties and laws from different aspects which can exist independently.

If we consider this to be true (as is Clouser’s opinion), cognitive linguistics can indeed be shown to have an underlying religious presupposition. It is important, however, to mention that most theories are not formulated with a specific religious commitment in mind (Clouser, 1991:167), although, according to Clouser, they cannot avoid an underlying religious belief.

Clouser opinion is that all beliefs not based on a biblical view will fail to be fully true, or will in some or other way be misguided. Having the right faith does not ensure that you would have a totally true theory either. By this, Clouser would be insinuating that cognitive linguistics is

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in some way misguided. It now becomes important to redress ourselves to just why Clouser reaches this conclusion.

Clouser’s definition for religion seems to be a well thought-out proposal, yet it is interesting to note that in his definition Clouser includes those things which we would normally not regard as a religion and by doing so makes it almost, if not entirely, impossible for someone to claim that they do not have a religion .

Ideas such as Materialism and Communism fall within his definition and we are forced to ask ourselves if these doctrines can truly be regarded as religions. It becomes important to define the lines between ideologies, doctrines and religions before we can truly evaluate whether theories are capable of truly being religiously neutral.

Although, by looking at cognitive linguistics, Clousers own theory proved to be true, it becomes a useless exercise unless we are certain that Clousers definition of religion is sufficient.

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F13 PUBLICATION OF SOFIA, THE NWU PHILOSOPHY SOCIETY

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Sofia’s word…

Ever since my first reading of the 1984 as a bright-eyed first-year student, the novel has been a haunting presence at the back of my mind. It has made me sensitive to the various shapes and sizes in which tyranny enters our lives. In our postmodern age, tyranny doesn’t come to us as the fist of Orwell’s Hitleresque totalitarian state; rather, we’ve come to fear it as the mechanical iron claw of science and technology. It is precisely this issue regarding the proper place, the proper boundaries of science, and its relation to faith, that is put under the

spotlight in this issue of F13.

When faced with problems of such vast magnitude, it is a great comfort, at least, to know you don’t have to go it alone. We have brought together the voices of students as well as local and international(-ly acclaimed) philosophers alike. To be a philosopher takes a special kind of courage.

Unlike the doctors, human rights activists and aid workers of the world, we don’t get to see the fruits of our labour after a long day. All we can do is trust that we are contributing to the good and carry on another day. Such

courage, I believe, is best cultivated in community with others. That is why building a strong philosophy community on campus is a goal close to our hearts. We hope you will enjoy this issue as much as we’ve enjoyed putting it together. May it inspire and motivate and make you feel even more at home at Sofia.

A special thanks to Professor Elaine Botha and our guest contributors, Professor Danie Strauss and Mr. Pieter Mostert. Also, thank you to graphic designer, Pieter Beukman, for F13’s new look!

FEATURE LETTER

When Philosophy fails: The disgrace of intelligent design In the article Rediscovering God, I tried to make the point that Christians need not ignore or deny science to support their religion. It was however very irresponsible to write about the science with such arrogance, without explaining why evolution is true.

Unfortunately there is no space in a short letter to do any better job, except to warn against one particular brand of antievolutionist nonsense. In recent times an old dog tried a new trick, and surfaced with a molecular theme.

The idea is that molecular systems exist which are so complex that they could not possibly have evolved, and that an intelligent designer is needed to account for the complexity seen in living cells.

For a very well argued discussion of ID, evolution, and Christian belief, I suggest reading Finding Darwin’s God by Kenneth Miller. Intelligent design is an imaginable explanation for the complexity of life, and irreducible complexity would be sure support for this hypothesis.

The problem is that no evidence, whatsoever, has been presented that clearly and irrevocably supports the idea of irreducible complexity. More importantly, supposedly irreducibly complex systems such as the eye, the bacterial flagellum, the blood clotting system, hormone-receptor systems,

and so on, have been clearly demonstrated not to be irreducibly complex!

The 2006 publication in Nature by Bridgham et al. demonstrates how the irreducibly complex aldosterone-receptor system could have evolved, and the 2009 publication in PNAS by Clements et al demonstrates how a complex mitochondrial transport system could have evolved. So, not only is intelligent design without any scientific support, but research demonstrating “reducible complexity” is accumulating.

It is then alarming that people, including distinguished philosophers, still use irreducible complexity as an argument against evolution, in the face of the scientific support for evolution and against ID. They shamelessly select quotations from one or two scientists, absolutely not representative of the scientific community, to support their theological ideologies.

Can there be a less respectable form of argument? It is interesting to note that virtually all such anti-scientific thinking comes from people motivated by religion, and that when this is not a factor, all sane, informed people acknowledge evolution. I ask again, how pathetic must your god be, if you have to lie about nature to defend your belief in him?

ZB BADENHORST

Layout & Graphic Design

by Pieter Beukman Contact: 076 316 1927 E-Mail: Pieterbeukman@gmail.com

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Lunch with Prof.

Elaine Botha Former PUK and Chancelor of Redeemer College in Canada

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fter close to 14 years in Canada, Prof. Elaine misses the sun, the sea and being part of the dynamic society of her homeland. At the recent Stoker Lectures, however, her remembrances of South Africa took a more serious turn.

The fundamental problem statement which guided the discussion was whether or not the old Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education could have done more to facilitate reconciliation during the era of apartheid.

The occasion for this question, she says, came to her on the day of the 1976 Sharpeville attacks. After hearing about the incident on the morning news, she broached the subject with the students in her Ethics class.

Their bewildered responses made her realize the Ethics course offered by the PU in no way prepared students for making sense of the very events that were upheaving the social and political order of their country.

This experience, she relates, began to cast shadows of doubt in her mind on the PU’s attitude to the social and political problems of the day. During the apartheid years, it had been the PU’s policy, as a Christian university, to commit itself to certain principles. Interaction with the issues of the day were, however, minimal.

By contrast, Prof. Elaine muses, the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam followed a more interactionist approach: instead of giving expression to their Christian character through the virtually isolated practice of science, the VU adopted an evaluative and critical stance toward social and political matters. Eventually, though, they found themselves unable to maintain such a position.

Prof. Elaine presents no final answer to the question of whether or not the PU should have followed the Vrije Universiteit in the practice of strong maatschappijkritiek. Nevertheless, she disagrees that doing so would have culminated in the

violation of the principle of sphere sovereignty. Drawing a distinction between the typical and a-typical roles of a university creates room for a task such as the facilitation of reconciliation without betraying the university’s key purpose as educator.

On the other hand, she concedes, it might be said that the PU did contribute to reconciliation by effecting change in the worldviews of students.

Whilst the VU’s contribution to change in the life-world may have been more immediate, the classroom situation offers a great deal of potential for bringing about change in students’ lives. The work of a philosopher like Dooyeweerd for one, she points out, did much to highlight the antinormativity of the apartheid regime.

Was it enough to effect change only on the worldview-side of the spectrum? Was the PU’s one-sided focus sufficient to meet the need for the execution of a-typical tasks? These are the questions we are left to ponder.

OPSTEL-KOMPETISIE (FILOSOFIE) Die Skool vir Filosofie nooi alle studente uit om ‘n opstel te skryf oor enige filosofies-relevante onderwerp.

Eerste prys voorgraads: R 1000.00 Eerste prys nagraads: R 1000.00 Sluitingsdatum: 3 Desember 2009 (Handig jou opstel voor of op 3 Desember 2009 in by me. Margriet van Greunen, Gebou F13, Kamer G10).

Lengte:

Voorgraadse opstelle: Nie meer as 4000 woorde; 1.5 gespasieerde formaat Nagraadse opstelle: Nie meer as 6000 woorde beslaan nie; 1.5 gespasieerde formaat

In die beoordeling van opstelle sal op die volgende gelet word:

• Probleemstelling en hipotese: Is ‘n duidelike, aktuele en goed gemotiveerde filosofiese probleemstelling en hipotese teenwoordig?

• Argument: Word goeie, kreatiewe, en onderling samehangende filosofiese argumente uitgebou om die hipotese te ondersteun?

• Formulering: Is die opstel maklik verstaanbaar, skerp en interressant gestel?

• Ander perspektiewe: Word belangrike ander standpunte/benaderings tot die probleem krities/waarderend behandel (w.o. ook ‘n gesprek met die Christelike perspektief)?

• Bronne-hantering: Is ander standpunte sinvol in die argument geïntegreer d.m.v. akurate verwysings en ‘n bibliografie?

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Jy kan vir ‘n BA-HONNEURS óf ‘n MPHIL in FILOSOFIE inskryf al is dit jou eerste kennismaking met die Filosofie Wonder jy oor die grotere konteks waarin jy jou professie beoefen? Wil jy die idees wat koers gee aan ons wêreld, van naderby bekyk? Wil jy jou met groter insig oriënteer in die groot debatte van ons samelewing?

Studie in die Filosofie by die Skool vir Filosofie van die Noordwes-Universiteit se Potchefstroomkampus kan jou nader bring aan antwoorde.

Nagraadse Filosofie by die Puk is ook vir professionele mense wat nog altyd iets meer van die Filosofie wou weet maar voorheen nie die tyd of geleentheid gehad het vir so ‘n studie nie.

Vir inskrywing in die MPhil is enige honneurs of vierjarige graad ‘n voorvereiste terwyl enige B-graad die voorvereiste vir die honneursstudie in Filosofie is.

Indien jy nog nooit enige formele Filosofie-studie gedoen het nie, is ‘n jaar se deeltydse voorstudie ook wel ‘n voorvereiste.

Ontmoetingsgeleenthede vind op Saterdae plaas wat beteken dat studie deeltyds en vir werkende mense beskikbaar is.

Vir verdere navrae kontak: Prof. Michael Heyns Tel. 018 2991564 E-pos: michael.heyns@nwu.ac.za

Innovasie deur diversiteit

8677BKA Filsofie Ad.indd 1

NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY YUNIBESITI YA BOKONE-BOPHIRIMA NOORDWES-UNIVERSITEIT

POTCHEFSTROOMKAMPUS

10/8/09 1:37:37 PM