Queen's International Observer Vol.8 Issue 3

QUEEN’S INTERNATIONAL

OBSERVER FeaturiNg: PluS latiN ameriCaN lit Boom meet tHe Qiaa exeCutiVe

uN BureauCraCY & geNoCide YemeN: a HiStorY oF iNStaBilitY

gaY rigHtS iN tHe uSa PriVate eQuitY FirmS a PHoto eSSaY

aNd aN iNSider’S guide to tHe PuBliC SerViCe

Spring 2012 - Vol. 8 No. 3

FROM THE EDITOR To the reader, Welcome to the third issue of QIO for this year!

If this is your first time picking up a copy of this magazine, I hope you enjoy it! For those of you who have read QIO before before, I hope you enjoy the new articles that we’ve included and some of the small changes we’ve made in the formatting.

Regardless of whether you’re a first time reader of our print version, or if you read our online magazine (found at our Facebook page!), you will notice that we’ve focused on Conflict in our feature articles this issue.

Maddie Holland’s piece on Rwanda is a somber reminder of how deeply things can go wrong when there is a lack of intervention from the international community in a conflict situation. With the current unrest and, some would argue, burgeoning civil war, in Syria, it is pertinent to revisit situations such as that in Rwanda to discuss how the international community intervenes, or doesn’t, when mass killing, rape and ethnic cleansing are ongoing. While the debate continues in the chambers of the United Nations and amongst world leaders as to how to intervene in the situation n Syria, thousands of Syrians continue to die at the hands of the Assad regime. How can we learn from historical events such as Rwanda to change our perspective on such interventions? Cameron Crawley’s piece on Yemen also focuses on the drawn out conflict occurring within the country, discussing whether, after years of instability, disunity and fractiousness, the country will now find a more stable footing after the fall of President Saleh.

Our other articles focus on a variety of other topics that will hopefully engage you. Moving away from a focus on conflict and war, our Staff Writer, Taylor, wrote a piece on the growth of a distinctive Latin American culture in literature in the 60s and 70s. Alexandra Petre also covers the experience of Gemma Boag with the Public Service, explaining how to get involved and find your dream job with the Canadian Government. If you’d rather look at some beautiful photography instead of reading an article, check out Katriina O’Kane’s photo essay about her extensive world travels. Finally, if you want to find out more about the QIAA exec, check out our Talking heads Section. Who do you think will be the most influential person of 2012? Compare your answer to theirs, and tell us what you think on our Facebook, Twitter or via email! You will also see that the Queen’s International Affairs Association will soon be hiring 2012-2013 Executive members – check qiaa.org and your listserve if you’re interested in applying for any of these positions, including those related to the QIO exec!

Joanna Plucinska Editor-in-Chief Idrees Ali Assistant Editor, Content Tristan DiFrancesco Assistant Editor, Layout Alexandra Petre Marketing Director Malvika Dasani Solicitor of Submissions Wenhan Chen Public Relations Director Maria Rodriguez Sponsorship Director Daniel Hershkop Discussion Coordinator Miriam Bart Staff Reporter Taylor Anderson Staff Reporter

Let us know what you think at our Twitter (@queensobserver), on Facebook (Queen’s International Observer) or via email, at queensuobserver@gmail.com.

If you would like to contribute to our final issue this year, please send all of your internationally themed work to queensuobserver@gmail.com. We accept any opinion, discussion and research pieces, as well as artwork and photography.

Thanks for picking up a copy, and happy reading!

Joanna Plucinska Editor-in-Chief 2011-2012

This publication is licensed & distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) Printed thru Dunning Hall Printing services.

FEATURES 4

Campus Forum

6

Private Inequity

8 9 12 14 18 21

by James Lee

In Public Service

by Alexandra Petre

The World’s Little Curiosities

by Katriina O’Kane

The Latin American Literary Boom

by Staff Writer Taylor Anderson

Gay in the USA

by Staff Writer Miriam Bart

Yemen FEATURED

by Cameron Crawley

Unresponsive FEATURED

by Madeleine Holland

CAMPUSFORUM

/news /events /opinion

This issue, QIO posed the following question to the members of the

Queen’s International Affairs Association (QIAA) 2011-2012 Executive:

Who will be the most influential figure of 2012?

“

Tina Fey is definitely going to be one of the most influential people in 2012. The world can sometimes be a sad place; reality isn’t always rainbows and butterflies, nor should it be. But one of the most influential people of 2012 has to be able to take all the negatives and make people laugh. And that, my friends, is what Tina Fey does and will continue to do - from her work with Saturday Night Live, to her newly published novel Bossy Pants.

”

Michelle Waintraub Co-Chair, QICSim

“I think that the most influential people of will be social media activists.”

Hana Delibasic Co-Chair, QICSim

“Vladmir Putin, if not for his politics then for his bear fighting abilities.”

Hanan Dhanani

Vice President, QIAA Internal

Hiring has already begun for the 2012-2013 team: if you want to get involved, please visit qiaa.org

“

Xi Jinping. Given the rise of China in the global system the significance of its leader, the General Secretary, is highly significant for international affairs. As 2012 marks the end of Hu Jintao’s term as General Secretary Xi Jinping is the most likely successor. As such, I believe he has the potential to be the most influential person in shaping world politics in 2012.

”

Kathleen Gnocato President, QIAA 2011/2012

“The next President of the United States of America.”

“Newt Gingritch, the first US President to build a moon colony.”

Marina Makris

Isabelle Duchaine

Co-Director, Global Passport

Vice President, QIAA External

“

Benjamin Netanyahu has clearly stated that he is willing to launch a pre-emptive attack on Iran - even in light of more prudent hesitations from Barack Obama. This would have enormous implications for the Middle East, and we will feel the reverberations significantly here in North America as well, via the global oil economy, political discourse, and much more. If Netanyahu decides to act unilaterally, he also risks putting Israel into a zone of non-sympathy from Western nations, which could also have great implications for Palestine’s call for statehood by bolstering its legitimacy.

Kris Yue

Programming Director, QIAA

”

by James Lee

Leveraged Buyout Process

ing the U.S. tax system to acquire enormous amounts of wealth not through management skills, but rather through the “carried interest” loophole in the U.S. tax system.

In a typical deal, a privateequity firm acquires a company, using some of its own capital and some borrowed money, say from government subsidies. Then, its goal is to improve the efficiency of the company with the intent of receiving a return on their investments by either an IPO (initial public offering),performing a merger or acquisition of the acquired company to an interested party (BELOW).

The problem lies in that the key to a successful leveraged buyout is debt; less of a company’s capital and more borrowed money means that there is a bigger potential return on investment. But with piles of debt on the acquired company, and improved performances proving at times to be artificial in the long term, it means that there is a higher chance of acquired companies going bust. Although this is not the intention nor the outcome in most cases, equity-firms began to exhibit an unruly consistency to

take out huge loans from the government as debt prices fell.

Between 2004 and 2011, private equity firms took out more than seventy billion dollars from their companies so they could take out $188 billion in dividends to pay themselves “special dividends.” As a result, even if the company does go under, private-equity firms are increasingly able to reap huge rewards. Although firms are to blame for behaving in such a manner, the U.S. tax system is partly to blame as the tax deductibility of interest payments on debt provides an incentive for firms to pile debt onto acquired companies. This creates an incentive to put the health of acquired companies at risk for the tax benefits and prospects of higher returns. In addition, the profits of private-equity firms are classified as capital gains rather than as income, ultimately causing them to be taxed at a lower rate.

If the work that Mitt Romney did at Bain Capital was as good as he claims, he and the private-equity executives should not have to depend on tax loopholes to make profits. Private-equity firms know the rules too well. The time has come for change. Q Q

Since mid-August, Mitt Romney’s fellow Republican candidates have painted a vivid picture of privateequity firms such as Bain Capital, where he was the co-founder and CEO for fifteen years, as corporate plunderers and job slashers. Given the tepid growth in the economy (only 2.8% GDP increase in the last quarter), and the weak job market, it is understandable that the public and government are outraged with firms specializing in leverage buyouts. Yet a study in 2008 of companies bought by private-equity firms found that, on average, employment declines by only 1% two years after a buy-out; there were a lot of jobs destroyed, but just as many created. And, when private-equity firms purchased an underperforming company, they tended to increase productivity by 2%, on average. If these firms are purchased, restructured, resources are allocated more efficiently, and productivity increases, the economy strengthens.

So what is the concern with privateequity firms?

The main concern about private-equity firm’s powers lies in their adept ability at circumvent-

qiaa.org/apply W O N G N I HIR

Over 20 opportunities to get involved!

INWorking PUBLIC SERVICE for the Federal Government co-workers and shared her opinions about working in a federal department. Gemma pointed out that not all public employees work in downtown Ottawa, and, in fact, some government buildings are far from the city centre, from the buzz of professionals and the endless Starbucks lines. In Gemma’s view, working for the public service is a unique experience that provides different employment opportunities for students, many streams of interesting work, and a dynamic work environment.

Based on Gemma’s experience with the Recruitment of Policy Leaders program, she strongly recommends the Post-Secondary Recruitment programs the Government of Canada offers, including the Federal Summer Work Employee Program. To prepare for a career in the public service, Gemma recommends developing strong time management skills, problem solving abilities, creativity and analytical skills. When asked whether or not she considers a Masters degree to be essential to obtaining rewarding and dynamic employment, Gemma confessed that, while not required, it was a plus in her case because it gave her time to really understand what type of work she was looking for and, further, to understand the type of work she wants to do. She added that her experience in a post-graduate program filled in the gaps in knowledge that her undergraduate degree had failed to tackle.

More details about working for the federal government can be found on their website: jobs-emplois.gc.ca.

Students can also meet with, the Student Ambassador of the Federal Government on campus. The Student Ambassador offers workshops regarding the application process, insight into the recruitment process as well as consultation hours every Wednesday from 1-3 in the Career Services Lounge in Gordon Hall. You can contact the Ambassador at queens2gov@gmail.com or over Facebook – GCAmbassador Queen’s, or Twitter - @Queens2Gov. Q

Q

Regardless of where you think you are headed in your career, there is a way to end up doing what you are passionate about. Gemma Boag, a 2008 Arts and Science graduate holding a Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Development Studies and Political Studies, found herself working for Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, a department of the Government of Canada, right after finishing her Masters degree. If you were to ask Gemma at her graduation if she had ever considered a career in the public service throughout her studies, she would probably admit to having been skeptical about the possibility.

That changed, however, after she decided to pursue a Masters Degree in Water Science, Policy and Management at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, where Gemma stumbled upon the Recruitment of Policy Leaders Program - a recruitment program for post-graduates and recent graduates to join the public service. Through this program, the Government of Canada recruits exceptional leaders from across Canada, including Canadians living abroad. This recruitment stream targets those who have a proven track record as thinkers and self-starters and have proven to be passionate about getting involved in shaping public policy. Through this process, Gemma sought guidance and advice through a mentor located in Ottawa. After going through a series of interviews, Gemma collaborated with this senior public servant in order to network with a series of federal departments and determine which ones best matched her interests and skills.

As a result, Gemma successfully landed a position as a Policy Analyst in the Socio-Cultural division of the Agri-Food Canada Policy Division. This department offers two different streams of work for policy analysts: short-term as well as longterm projects. Working on short-term projects allows employees to work on a range of issues, as new tasks are as-

by Alexandra Petre signed daily with a tight turnaround time. To work in this environment, one needs to quickly gather research, summarize and analyze findings and develop policy statements and briefing notes to provide recommendations on a particular issue. The second stream of work includes long-term projects where research can last up to 4-5 years.

While the daily routine can become repetitive, this type of work often includes large-scale research design, field experiments and the opportunity to impact policy in a fundamental way pending the results of the research.

Gemma’s work experience provided a balance between the two streams, as her daily routine varies between working on a large-scale research project and responding to immediate requests.

In reflecting upon her experience working as a public service employee, this balance between the two types of work was the one thing Gemma valued most. In addition to these responsibilities, she also manages assistants performing primary research functions; handles press inquiries and urgent cases, while simultaneously coordinating a team of researchers on a daily basis.

Having been both the recruiter and the recruited within the federal service, Gemma has a few words of wisdom. Most notably, she believes that the government is structured in a way that supports its employees in carrying out their duties - ensuring that all employees have the tools and materials to do their job well, and are provided learning and development opportunities to continue their careers in the public service. She is particularly impressed by the concept of bridging, which allows employees the chance to work in different departments and develop new skills within other areas of the government.

One point that struck me about Gemma’s talk was her desire to demystify the experience of working for the government. She explained her daily routine and her interactions with her

The World’s little Curiosities by: Katriina O’Kane Often when we observe our surroundings, we often overlook the small details. We capture the broad landscape, we gaze at wide-spanning views, we run after the main attraction. But details can be unsuspecting windows into little cultural curiosities, and in the end, reveal a lot more then we expect ! Let’s explore…

Alicante, Spain Walking down quiet back streets in Alicante, I heard a chipper from above - I looked up. A small songbird was sitting on a balcony railing. Then, much to my delight, I noticed the tiles on the bottom of that balcony. They looked like they had been laid upside down, with their decorative side revealed to the street below! They must have tasteful downstairs neighbours.

eskĂŠ Bud jovice, Czech Republic

The history of Czech is rich. Beginning in the 14th century, the country saw the construction of countless beautiful buildings, as anyone who has been to Prague can testify. But under the Soviet Union, it fought poverty and demise of its historic monuments. Now, many buildings are being restored slowly, but reminders of the Soviet era remain.

Events of September 11, 2001 shocked the world.

For many people, especially some of those living in New York, they held vivid memories and personal stories. Ten years later, a new building is slowly rising in its place, but small reminders of the effects can still be found around the city.

New York City, USA

Kluane Lake, Yukon, Canada Little details matter in science too.

While doing research around Kluane, my supervisor pointed out to me how the ground cover changes depending on where you are – from moist moss to exposed sand. In science we have a name for these details – microenvironments.

I stood in a little metal store, waiting for the store clerk to weigh my bowl and tell me how much I owe. I gazed around at the metal items that lined the room from floor to ceiling; they were unorganized, chaotic, and I felt claustrophobic. But at the same time, all the little bowls had such carefully carved and beautiful patterns, and many manifested bright colours in their paintings. I guess it was a bit like the city just outside the doors – busy, chaotic, but filled with unique and colourful life.

Q

Kathmandu, Nepal Q

THE LATIN AMERICAN LITERARY

BOOM A BRIEF HISTORY BY TAYLOR ANDERSON “Yes, but who will cure us of the dull fire, the colorless fire that at nightfall runs along the Rue de la Huchette, emerging from the crumbling doorways, from the little entranceways, of the imageless fire that licks the stones and lies in wait in doorways, how shall we cleanse ourselves of all the sweet burning that comes after, the nests us in us forever allied with time and memory…”

So begins Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch, one of the key pieces of literature associated with the Latin American Literature Boom of the 1960’s and 1970’s.

Although it is difficult to tell exactly what Cortázar was referring to in the opening passage of his seminal novel, his ‘colorless fire’ could easily be seen burning in colonial Spanish America in the late sixteenth century. The Spanish Crown strictly forbade works of fiction from importation, and the native populations were forced to express their creativity in other forms: disguised as history texts, or chronicles.

This led to the type of mindset that permeated throughout Latin America for centuries afterward.

Authors of the region felt that they had a great national identity to uphold. The novelist Miguel Angel Asturias perhaps said it best: “Our Latin American literature has always been a committed, a responsible literature ...the great works of our countries have been written in response to a vital need, a need of the people, and therefore almost all our lit-

Julio Cortázar (ABOVE), a leader of the boom period, dissatisfied with contemporary trends in Latin American literature, and likely inspired by the world events of his day, such as the Cuban Revolution (OPPOSITE).

erature is committed. Only as an exception do some of our writers isolate themselves and become uninterested in what is happening around them; such writers are concerned with psychological or egocentric subjects and the problems of a personality out of contact with surrounding reality” As Asturias mentions, there was a great dislike and disregard for the psychological, individualistic novel that Europe was so interested in. The writers at that time were more enamored with the criollista, or the regional piece, responding to the ‘vital need of the people’. This type of novel usually dealt in binary values: good vs. evil; nature vs. urban progress; civilization vs. barbarianism.

Certain writers of Latin American origin quickly grew tired of this format though. They were the ones that began the movement, later to be known as the ‘Boom’—Jorge Luis Borges, Julio Cortázar, Gabriel García Márquez, among many others.

Their growing dissatisfaction with the predominant criollistas of the time was spurred by many differ-

tice of the rejuvenation of Latin American literature and began to publish and circulate these books throughout their respective markets. The first of these publishers was Alfred Knopf, but even they were initially stiff in their approval of this new type of literature—they rejected both Jorge Luis Borges’ Ficciones and Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch among others, and thus missed a lot of classic Latin American literature that was picked up by other publishers.

From that point on, the writers of Latin America have demanded the world’s attention.

The works of Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Julio Cortazar, Mario Vargas Llosa, Jose Domoso, Carlos Fuentes, and many others have become beloved and studied by millions. Their goal—of creating an entire, self-contained world within a few hundred pages— has been expertly and uniquely realized in hundreds of different ways. Q Q

ent disparate factors, not the least of which was the Cuban Revolution. The violent coup against the Cuban regime gave Latin American literature the shot in the arm it needed to begin a revolution of its own.

This revolution was overwhelmingly shifted literature towards the ‘Novel of Synthesis’— a novel that, instead of focusing on the notions of good versus evil or civilized versus uncivilized, tried to present an entire worldview in its pages. This isn’t to say that they denied the locality that had been treasured by so many of their predecessors—as Alexander Coleman put it, “The authors involved are resolutely engaged in a transfiguration of Latin American reality, from localism to a kind of heightened, imaginative view of what is real—a universality gained by the most intense and luminous kind of locality.”

The Boom gained a lot of ground as European and North American publishers took no-

Submit your own work to

queensuoberver@gmail.com by

Friday 16th March

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY

by Staff Writer Miriam Bart In preparation for the upcoming 2012 American election, it is important to know about the history and controversial roots of gay marriage in the United States. Traditionally, “marriage” means a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife1. The legalization of gay marriage is a contentious issue throughout the world.

Roughly a dozen nations have taken progressive steps towards recognizing gay marriages in the past decade.

The legalization of gay mar-

riage first occurred in 2000: Canada was the fourth, altering the definition of marriage in the Civil Marriage Act accordingly: “Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others.”

In the United States, however, gay activists have only recently started to make judicial progress. It is now legal for gay couples to marry in a handful of states, and gay couples can receive civil recognition in even more.

While this represents progress, there are still thirty-one states strictly prohibiting marriage between anyone besides one woman

and one man. This is likely due to the large number of Evangelical and fundamentalist Christians within the United States. Of course, many denominations respect gay rights and even allow gay clergy members; however, the text of the Christian faith is clear - marriage is between one man and one woman - and the fundamental religious groups that so dominate the US political landscape interpret no ambiguity. This united fundamentalist force is what continues to prevent the legalization of gay marriage nationally.

Beyond basic suffrage, gay

marketing, editorial, journalism, fundraising, layout, PR & more.

Baptist Churches struggle with how to minister the homosexual members.

Legislatively, the Democrats have capitalized on the blatantly leftwing and liberal movement, supporting gay marriage for the most part, while the Republicans - who draw strongly from the religious South - tend to oppose gay marriage with few exceptions. In February 2011, President Barack Obama ordered the Justice Department to stop using the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which is a law that restricts federal recognition of same-sex marriages against lawsuits, as he claimed it was unconstitutional. Though Obama’s policy shift is substantial for gay marriage progress, the House is divided and may intervene.

Currently, marriage in the United States lies within the jurisdiction of individual states. As such, in the religious South, legalization seems unlikely. With the country so divided similarly on nearly every social issue, a universal resolution must come from the top down.

The state of California has become the home front of the gay movement. The notorious Harvey Milk, and countless others organized and mobilized to retaliate against the vocal noise of hatred and intolerance.

Yet even in the Sunshine State, there has only recently been legal provision.

In 2008, a California court decided barring gay marriage was unconstitutional at the state level. By referndum, however, the counter-active Proposition 8 would come to define marriage in the state of California as

JOIN

a union between only one man and woman. In weak rebuttal, the California Supreme Court ruled in May 2009 that Proposition 8 would be in effect in California, but that marriages of the same-sex couples who had gotten married before Proposition 8 was passed would remain valid. In August 2010, a federal judge found Proposition 8 unconstitutional.

Proposition 8 passed with 52% of the vote and it was massively sponsored by the group “Protect Marriage”. The campaigns for and against Proposition 8 raised $39.9 million and $43.3 million respectively, making it the most expensive political campaign on one vote and one social issue.

On that note, the gay marriage front in the US has made a great deal of progress over the past decade.

However, the country’s religious beliefs have never remained insular from it’s politics - the conservative population is vocally opposed, with a great deal invested in the status quo.

By not allowing gay marriage, each state deprives its gay minority a basic civil right. Discrimination based on sexuality may soon be internationally regarded as a universal human rights issue, truly bringing a top-down legal reolution. However, the United States is rife with civil strife and point of contention - many more topical issues seem to take precedence in the public eye. As a liberal neighbour, Canada cannot remain silent, as gay rights are a fundamental freedom that must be guaranteed. Perhaps external pressure is the skeleton key to unlocking the contentious legalization debate. Q Q

rights are generally focused on the legalization of marriage, civil unions and the visible empowerment of openly gay citizensin both the public and private spheres.

Again, there is far from consensus among the Christian faith on the topic of homosexuality. There are those who believe that gay marriage is incompatible with the beliefs, namely those sects that adhere to a more literal interpretation of the Bible. At the same time, there are strong religious allies to the gay rights movement. For example, in 2005 the United Church of Christ became the first Christian denomination to support gay marriage with the resolution “equal marriage rights for couples regardless of gender.” Also, delegates at the Episcopal Church, including bishops and clergy members, voted to open ordained ministries to homosexuals.

The orthodox Christian outlook on gay marriage is that God created Adam and Eve - not Steve.

Orthodox Christians believe that the divinely intended method of sex is between male and female - and vaginal. Violating this sexual tradition constitutes sodomy and is a heinous sin. With over three-quarters of the US population self-identify as Christian, the vocal hostility to gay rights movements is less surprising.

Other religious communities within the United States have their own stance on the topic of gay rights.

Islam prohibits same-sex marriage, while Judaism has allowed same-sex ceremonies for years, and Methodists, Presbyterians and American

details in the next & final issue.

YEMEN A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF INSTABILITY AND CIVIL UNREST

by Cameron Crawley

The civil unrest currently occurring in Yemen is a product of generations of infighting between individuals, ideologies and religious groups. The most generous terms with which to describe the history of contemporary Yemen include such words as fractious, bitter, bloody and farcical. The country has only been a single entity since 1990 and has since experienced a multitude of misfortunes. These include being under the thumb of one ruler, the autocratic Ali Abdullah Saleh, a civil war, a plethora of smaller insurgencies and conflicts, and gross civil mismanagement and corruption.

Currently, it would appear that the country is once again on the brink of civil war, as various different groups vie for power to fill the vacuum created by the soon to be departed President Saleh. Unfortunately for Yemen, it would seem that the more things change, the more they stay the same; the current situation is the continuation of a litany of feelings of unrest, despair and anger that manifests itself through anger and violence.

The crisis in Yemen will be analyzed by referring to the two major contingent events that have led to the current situation. The first contingent event is the assassination of YAR President Ahmad al-Ghashmi in 1978, an event that allowed Ali Abdullah Saleh to take power. The final contingency is the signing of the 1990 unity agreement between the YAR and the PDRY and the civil war that ensued. Following the discussion of the contingent events, the current situation in Yemen and how they are inextricably related to the past will be elucidated.

In essence, this work shall attempt to prove that it is not surprising that Yemen is once again under threat of being torn asunder and is teetering

on the brink of civil war; the contingent events of history show that unrest is an uncomfortable and unfortunate constant for the Yemeni people.

From the late 1970s, the relationship between the YAR and the PDRY can be seen as one of concealed hatred. As mentioned above, both countries supported antigovernment groups in the others’ country, as well as being diametrically opposed ideologically. The North represented conservative values under the banner of Arab nationalism, whilst the South was more radical in espousing socialism. However, a uniting factor between the two countries was their shared difficulty in being able to maintain a Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen (ABOVE), firmly enlong serving leader. Both President trentched in power until the Arab Spring and massive poputhe YAR and the PDRY lar uprisings (OPPOSITE) called his legitimacy into contest. suffered from a chronic case of having their leaders removed and coup attempt made against Saleh, from office, usually by violent means. with the attempted coup of southernWith this in mind, when YAR Presi- backed leftists taking some time to dent Ahmad al-Ghashmi was assassi- defeat (Brehony, 2011: 112). However, nated on June 24 1978 after only eight Saleh managed to cling to power due months in office by a southern-based to his shrewdness and willingness to suicide bomber posing as an envoy be efficiently merciless, qualities that from the PDRY, everyone expected have cemented his 33-year reign until his successor to meet a similarly grue- now. He has also become a master of some end shortly thereafter (Peterson, networking as a means to stay in pow1982: 123). Appointed to replace al- er, utilising Yemen’s highly important Ghashmi was the young military gov- and integrated tribal network to his ernor of the city of Ta’izz: Ali Abdul- advantage (Brehony, 2011: 114). lah Saleh. Saleh was not expected to By 1990 however, Ali Abdullast long - a contingency that almost lah Saleh was firmly entrenched as the became true. Between July and Octo- undisputed ruler of the YAR due to ber of 1978 there was an assassination his myriad family, friends and cronies

whom he had appointed to important posts in the military and security apparatus (Brehony, 2011: 183). In comparison, due to the disappearance of Soviet global influence by 1990, the socialist PDRY under General Secretary Ali Salim al-Bidh could not claim to have such a reliable base on which to stand. As a result of this, as well as simple lack of marketable resources, the PDRY attempted to unify with the YAR. The official proclamation of the new united Republic of Yemen with Saleh as President and al-Bidh as Vice-President occurred on May 22 1990 (Brehony, 2011: 182). This was meant to be a gesture of good will and of equality; the two Yemens were finally coming together after their long fraternal estrangement as two equals.

However this was not to be the case.

The 1994 civil war was brusque and ended with the defeat of the South in July of that same year.

As Victoria Clark so succinctly puts it, unity was not the panacea for Yemen’s problems, with the war costing “some 7,000 lives, as much as eight billion dollars and any last hope of a happy marriage.” (2010: 144) Despite the best intentions, unity was a disaster for the people of Yemen. Even six years earlier in 1984, when murmurings of Yemeni unity appeared to be

specks upon the horizon, political commentators appeared wholly unsold on the concept of unity.

As shown above, the history of Yemen has been characterised by a fractiousness seldom seen elsewhere in the world.

Yemeni history is defined more by conflict than calm, autocracy rather than democracy and animosity rather than familiarity. By stating that structural legitimacy has been prevented from taking firm root in the country because of “the long and debilitating civil war, the state’s continuing poverty and the pernicious divisions between competing individuals, cliques and ideologies,” J.E. Peterson sums Yemen’s political situation best (1982: 29). The state under President Saleh is not just wracked with poverty; it is also inherently selfserving, cynical and corrupt. When asked of the prospect of attempting to help develop Yemen into a democracy, the Public Relations minister for President Saleh replied “’What we need here right now is a dictatorship, not democracy…We should just leave people as they are – illiterate and without electricity – they’ve been that way for hundreds of years’” (Clark, 2010: 263). Even more telling, as of 2010 Yemen is ranked 146th for global cor-

ruption with other paragons of virtue such as Libya, Iran and Cote D’Ivoire (Transparency International, 2010).

As a result of these current problems that are manifested due to past experiences, as well as events elsewhere in the Arab world, the people of Yemen have been protesting against President Saleh since the beginning of the “Arab Spring “.

Although protests have been largely peaceful, the state security apparatus has dealt with the protestors the only way Yemen has known for some time: by using extreme extra-judicial force. In March of this year government snipers opened fire on unarmed students protesting in Sana’a’s main square, killing 28 and wounding 100 (Death toll soars in Yemen violence, 2011). Such reprehensible actions caused old factionalisms and power relations to arise once more, creating multiple anti-government groups. Most powerful amongst these is General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmad, a longtime confidant of Saleh who announced that he would support the protestors by sending soldiers under his command to protect those gathered in the Sana’a (Finn, 2011: Yemen showdown looms as army loyalties divide). Joining dissident army groups are powerful tribes such as the Hashid, who, under the leadership of Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, have created a coalition against the government under the auspices of protecting the protestors (“Yemeni tribes form coalition against Saleh.”

2011). Whether these claims of protecting the protestors are true, or if the coalition represents something altogether more insidious, one more in a long line of attempted power grabs, remains to be seen.

to cope due to historical precedents.

It is too early to tell whether the problems such as corruption, social reform, state-sanctioned violence and the north-south divide will be solved by whoever fills the current power vacuum. However, as shown by the contingent historical events that have shaped Yemen, this is an unlikely outcome. The creation of the YAR and the PDRY during the 1960s institutionalised a bipolar Yemeni identity between North and South.

The assassination of YAR President Ahmad al-Ghashmi by Southernbacked dissidents in 1978 allowed Ali Abdullah Saleh to take power and cement his hold on Yemeni society. Finally, the rushed signing of the 1990 unity agreement between the YAR the PDRY created the 1994 civil Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar (ABOVE), leader of the Hashid tribe and co-conspirator with dissident and war which once again brought northforces in the opposition against the Yemeni government’s anti-protetester attacks. south tensions to the forefront. These Other ghosts from Yemen’s being widely unpopular. Indeed the three contingent events continue to past have appeared in the recent up- 1962 revolution in the north against influence daily life in Yemen, esperising. However, these spectres are Imam Badr mirror the ousting of cially that of the protestors currently not of the violent kind; rather they President Saleh; the people rioted in railing against the government from are ideological. Recent protests have Sana’a and Ta’izz demanding change Sana’a to Aden. These protestors are been populated mostly by the youth, and reform after the Imam’s “aura as a demanding the same reforms that but there has also been representation commanding personality had eroded their historical counterparts have from members of Yemen’s opposi- considerably.” (Zabarah, 1984: 79) Al- been asking for since the 1960s. Untion coalition, including the Social- though this signals the end of 33 years fortunately, as the history of Yemen ist and Nasserite parties (Finn, 2011: of oppressive rule by Saleh, it is not shows us, it would appear that the Yemenis take to the streets calling for immediately clear who amongst the Yemeni people will continue to sufPresident Saleh to step down). Other multitude of groups vying to be heard fer the injustices of living in a country groups have ingratiated themselves will replace him. This leaves the Ye- which has been systematically voided with the protest movement. These in- meni people in a situation that they of all legitimacy, and whose instituclude the Houthi, a persecuted Shia have unfortunately experienced many tions are bereft of scruples. Q minority from the North, as well as times before; a country with a litany the Southern Movement, a secession- of problems that is seemingly unable ist group from the south (Carlstrom, 2011: Profile: Ali Abdullah Saleh).

Al-Haj, Ahmed and Lee Keath. 2011. Yemen’s slippery leader finally signs deal to resign after months of revolt.

These protestor’s demands echo those http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/yemens-slippery-leader-finally-signs-deal-to-resign-aftermonths-of-revolt/article2246116/ (November 23, 2011). voices of the past. From the disafAl Jazeera and agencies. 2011. Death toll soars in Yemen violence. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middlee fected post-unification Southerners ast/2011/09/201191913558115259.html (November 23, 2011). to the Imamate northerners, Yemenis Braun, Ursula. 1984. “Prospects for Yemeni Unity.” In Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background, ed. have wanted the same thing. They B.R. Pridham. London: Croom Helm. are simply demanding improvements Brehony, Noel. 2011. Yemen Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris.

Carlstrom, Gregg. 2011. Profile: Ali Abdullah Saleh. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/ye in living conditions and political remen/2011/02/201122812118938648.html (November 23, 2011). form (Finn, 2011: Yemenis take to the Clark, Victoria. 2010. Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes. London: Yale University Press. streets calling for President Saleh to Finn, Tom. 2011. Yemen showdown looms as army loyalties divide. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/21/ step down). yemen-regime-army-chiefs-defect (November 23, 2011).

The protests in Yemen have Finn, Tom. 2011. Yemenis take to the streets calling for President Saleh to step down. http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2011/jan/27/yemen-protests-president-saleh (November 23, 2011). resulted in what appears to be the McMullen, Christopher. 1980. Resolution of the Yemen Crisis, 1963: A Case Study in Mediation. Washington D.C.: deposition of President Saleh, who Georgetown University Press. signed an agreement to transfer powPeterson J.E.. 1982. Yemen: The Search for a Modern State. London: Croom Helm. er on November 23 of this year. (AlTransparency International. 2010. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results Haj, Ahmed and Lee Keath, 2011: Ye(November 23, 2011).

“Yemeni tribes form coalition against Saleh.” 2011. The Straits Times. http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/ men’s slippery leader finally signs deal World/Story/STIStory_696854.html (November 23, 2011). to resign). This is not the first time a Zabarah, Mohammed. 1984. “The Yemeni Revolution of 1962 seen as a Social Revolution.” In Contemporary Yemen: Yemeni leader has been ousted for Politics and Historical Background, ed. B.R. Pridham. London: Croom Helm.

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UNRESPONSIVE HOW A BUREAUCRACY FAILED TO STOP GENOCIDE

by Madeleine Holland Many have tried to explain why the United Nations’ 1994 peace operation in Rwanda failed to prevent the genocide of 800,000 people. This failure cannot be attributed to a lack of knowledge, as the UN was warned of the violence in Rwanda, first preemptively and later instantaneously. The inadequacy of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) lay unequivocally in its inability to use force, despite the permission of intervention in contemporary missions. How was a mission intended for peacekeeping prohibited from using force to intervene into large-scale ethnic conflict? It will be argued that the bureaucratic structure of the United Nations in 1994 inherently prioritized bureaucratic function over

its own mandate for moral responsibility. Constrained by ideological regression, inflexible organization, and selfinterested members, the bureaucracy of the United Nations in 1994 inhibited its peace operation from preventing the abhorrent Rwandan genocide.

The Rwandan genocide occurred during a transitional period within the UN, wherein new conceptions of peacekeeping were being created and implemented at large. The end of the Cold War incited widespread optimism about the role that international peacekeeping would play now that the prolonged Security Council deadlock had been eliminated. Then SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali advocated for the reinvigoration of UN en-

forcement efforts in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, hoping to “bring to fruition the early hope …of the UN that the Security Council would serve as a global peacekeeper” (Totten 2005, 2). This text became the central policy document for peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era, outlining an array of peacekeeping activities that the UN would be accountable for, including peacekeeping, peace-building, and most notably, peace enforcement (Fortna and Howard 2008, 287). The UN implemented this optimism, launching twenty new peacekeeping missions between 1988 and 1993, compared to the period from 1978 to 1987, when not a single new mission was initiated. (Fortna and Howard 2008, 287).

United Nations forces (ABOVE) were largely ineffective during UNAMIR mainly due to the bureaucratic machinations that stalled the operational efficiency of the mission. General Assembly resolutions (OPPOSITE) or those directly from the security council were not responsive enough.

The Secretariat recurrently responded to Dallaire’s pleas for an expanded mandate with a deferral of responsibility to the Rwandan government. Then Under-Secretary-General Kofi Annan was particularly firm in his instruction that UNAMIR must remain an impartial, non-violent presence in deference to Rwandan state authority. Dallaire’s “January cable” provided inside evidence of the impending genocide, and he requested guidance from the Secretariat on how to proceed (Carlsson 1997). In response, Annan merely “emphasized that public security was the responsibility of the authorities and must remain so,” and UNAMIR was not permitted to take action (Carlsson 1997). A series of more dire requests came from Dallaire in the days that followed the presidential plane crash, once genocide had erupted in the form of widespread massacre of Tutsi by Hutu aggressors. Yet a cable from Annan on April 9 commanded that Dallaire “make every effort not to compromise [his] impartiality…this should not, repeat not, extend to participating in possible combat” (Carlsson 1997). Given that the new doctrine was implemented in UNITAF before UNAMIR was deployed, this presence of the old doctrine in Rwanda demonstrates a reversion to a peacekeeping approach that the United Nations had already recognized as inappropriate in

the post-Cold War era. The UN’s experience in Somalia had led Annan to believe that “the inspiration for acceptable and viable peace can only spring from the leaders and the people in the country” (Totten 2005, 8). As a result, Dallaire was forced to wait for a broken Rwandan government, whose representatives were under attack and later killed, to enforce public security in the midst of “the swiftest genocide in the history of the planet” (Totten 2005, 7).

However, the ideological regression was not absolute, and the general disposition for non-intervention began to change as the situation worsened. The mandate for UNAMIR was governed by an understanding of the situation in October, which was very different from the events that transpired in April. The original purpose for UNAMIR was to oversee the end to a four-year civil war, and to support the Arusha Peace Agreements that had been settled between the opposing factions (Safty 2003, 310).

Dallaire retrospectively recognized that “the UNAMIR mission was a peacekeeping operation. It was not equipped, trained or staffed to conduct intervention operations” (Carlsson 1997). This mandate was not necessarily ill suited to the October situation in Rwanda, but it became increasingly irrelevant in the months leading up to plane crash in April. It was the inflexibility of UN organization culture that made decisional

fluidity unattainable when the situation in Rwanda deteriorated.

While the preceding examples demonstrate that the Secretariat played its own role in determining the fate of UNAMIR, it was the Security Council that ultimately confined UNAMIR to inaction. The exclusivity of decision-making within the United Nations is evident of a bureaucracy wherein power is prioritized over experience and morality. The Security Council refused to expand the UNAMIR mandate in spite of the urgent recommendations of a more knowledgeable Dallaire, and in neglect of the resurgence of moral commitment that infiltrated the UN in April of 1993.

Notably, “a window of opportunity for the employment of such a force extended roughly from about April 7 to April 21, 1994, when the political leaders of the violence were still susceptible to international influence” (Safty 2003, 339). The Security Council’s decision for the reinforcement of UNAMIR occurred on May 17, 1994, in revision of a April 21 Council decision to diminish the operation to a meager 270 troops (Carlsson 1997). Tragically, the decision proved to be far too little, far too late As the former Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), Dallaire had been stationed in the region since June of 1993 and was familiar with the history of the political conflict in Rwanda (Carlsson 1997). Ethnic tension had permeated the country since it gained independence from Belgium in the 1960s, driving, among a string of conflicts, the four-year civil war that preceded the deployment of UNAMIR in October of 1993 (Safty 2003, 310). It was becoming clear to Dallaire throughout the final months of 1993 that acts of violence and increasing armament throughout society were challenging the stability of the peace agreements. In November, Dallaire submitted a draft set of Rules of Engagement that included the right for UNAMIR to use force in response to crimes against humanity, predicting that “there may also be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them” (Carlsson 1997). In addition to his past experience, Dallaire had the most accu-

The tragic losses of UNITAF (OPPOSITE) lead to US reluctance in supporting UNAMIR directly, further depriving LGen. Romeo Dallaire (Ret.) (LEFT) of a strong resource base and an aegis in New York to hold international focus.

rate conception of the situation, simply given the fact that he was on the ground in Rwanda. Yet this advisory was not even acknowledged by UN Headquarters (Carlsson 1997). With the outbreak of genocide following the April 6 plane crash, Dallaire was denied an expansion of the UNAMIR mandate on several occasions. According to Dallaire, the death of the Belgian soldiers on April 7 occurred in part because of “the shortcomings and lack of resource of UNAMIR” (Carlsson 1997). Paradoxically, it was these casualties, followed by a unilateral withdrawal of Belgian troops on April 19, that led the Security Council to consider the suspension of UNAMIR altogether (Carlsson 1997).

The Security Council made no formal acknowledgment of the massacres, calling instead for a ceasefire supervised by UNAMIR (Carlsson 1997).

Alternatively, other organs of the UN had come to grips with the severity of the situation in Rwanda, and supported the rapid reinforcement of UNAMIR. An April 19 report to the

Security Council

by Boutros-Ghali included three options for the future of UNAMIR: the reinforcement of UNAMIR under Chapter VII, the downsizing of UNAMIR as an intermediary between parties, and the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR, the first of which he supported. In a unanimous vote on April 21, however, the Security Council resolved to reduce troops from the 2,539 that remained, to 270 (Carlsson 1997). By this point, some 200,000 Rwandans had been killed (Carlsson 1997). Boutros-Ghali felt as though he was “fighting alone,” and deplored the Council’s decision, as it “did not give UNAMIR the power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres” (Carlsson 1997). Despite Boutros-Ghali’s reservations against peace enforcement transpired after the UNITAF mission, he had come to recognize the moral responsibility for UNAMIR to intervene once the violence had officially become genocidal. He joined Dallaire in the camp of the maddeningly frustrated, and was forced to await the Security Council’s decisions.

While the United Nations was affected by a regressive conception of peacekeeping, its organizational culture did not accommodate the change in sentiment that occurred in April.

Dallaire’s exposure to early warnings of the genocide suggests that the genocide may have been preventable if he had more authority. Moreover, the revival of a commitment to morality, as

expressed by Boutros-Ghali, should have manifested itself in a rapid, albeit late, response to the conflict in early to mid April. Yet the power to make decisions lay entirely in the hands of the Security Council, who faced internal dilemmas of its own. Burdened by an internal hierarchy of power, and the conflicting views of Council members, deliberations were slow. With Britain, France and the United States in strong opposition to a UNAMIR intervention in Rwanda, the prospects were bleak for those Council members in support of enforcement, such as Nigeria (Carlsson 1997). The Council was, above all, reluctant to acknowledge the Rwandan conflict as genocide, despite graphic reports of the massacres from Dallaire, which dated back to the January cable’s evidence of the militia’s ability to kill 1000 Tutsis per minute (Carlsson 1997).

Finally, the UN was governed by the composite mentality of its bureaucracy, which was by and large directed by the self-interest of member states.

Rwandan Charles Murignade notes that the genocide demonstrated that “without political will, international law and other commitments are impotent” (Murignade 2008, 2). While self-interest is often argued to be an intrinsic element of state behaviour, the propensity of self-interest during UNAMIR’s mission was driven by several factors that, again, were context-specific.

Firstly, Rwanda was not of significant political or economic importance to the global community; with no tangible interest in the protection of Rwanda, states were not inclined to support a costly intervention into its “civil war”. The unwillingness was exacerbated by the concentration of reluctant states within the Security Council, who have a monopoly on the UN decision-making process. Political unwillingness permeated the walls of the Security Council, as is “evident in the recurrent difficulties to get the necessary troops” even after the May 17 decision to expand UNAMIR (Carlsson 1997). With the withdrawal of Operation Turquoise in late July, “UNAMIR only had the bare minimum number of troops to permit it to take over the areas which had been controlled by the French-led operation” (Carlsson 1997).

The United States was stung by their recent commitment in Somalia, during which nineteen American

infiltrated the Secretariat, the Security Council and much of the General Assembly. Adel Safty summarized the mood of the bureaucracy in 2004 well: “the UN, stung by intervention in Somalia, fearful of another mission of ambiguous intent, participation and support… did not take decisive action to intervene” (2003, 308). Ideology, organization and composite mentality positioned UNAMIR for inaction in October of 2003, and the regression, inflexibility, and unwillingness that flared in the following months, ensured that this disposition stuck. While these three elements of the United Nations bureaucracy invoked a particularly di-

sastrous result in Rwanda, they have by no means been eradicated since 2004; today, they continue to feed one another, as they did during the deployment of UNITAF. In other aspects of its work, the UN operates as more than the sum of its parts. But on matters of intervention, the organization is governed by the permanent members of the Security Council, whose self-interest often confine the UN to inefficiency and inaction.

Will the UN ever be able to prevent an interstate conflict based on motivations of moral responsibility alone? Or is the bureaucracy of neglect a manifestation of unalterable human nature? Perhaps only time will tell. Q Q

servicemen were killed, and seventyseven more wounded, in an ambush attack by Somalian warlords (Allen 1997). The event received enormous press coverage, and was met with outrage throughout the United States (Allen 1997). This tragic event had colossal implications within the United States, and its timely concurrence with increasing violence in Rwanda discouraged an American commitment to UNAMIR. White House officials had “s h e l v e d … t h e i r emerging blueprint for committing large numbers of American combat forces to UN command in a significant move to embrace expanding UN peace operations” (Allen 1997). A previous attack on Pakistani soldiers additionally contributed the member states’ fear of committing troops.

Unfortunately, without the commitment of the United States, the UNAMIR mission was impeded not only by Security Council negligence, but also by its inability to access American resources. While UNITAF was officially a “UN sanctioned multinational coalition,” the United States had provided 28,000 military forces towards the operation (Allen 1997). Additionally, it was under complete American operational control, a significant asset as “the attainment of any political objective would have been virtually impossible without the clout and capabilities of the United States” (Allen 1997). Peace enforcement of UNAMIR required the “transportation and logistics capabilities, maintained by only a few nations in the world” (Safty 2003, 333). In the shadow of Somalia, however, UNAMIR was to receive no support from the United States, stripping the mission of the important consent and resources that were provided in Somalia.

The Rwandan genocide occurred when a sense of defeat had

Allen, Robert D. 1997. “Lessons From Somalia: The DILEMMA OF Peace Enforcement.” GlobalSecurity.org, 1997. Ac cessed November 17, 2010. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Allen.htm Murigande, Charles. 2008. “Lessons Learned from the 1994 Rwanda Genocide.” Mediterranean Quarterly 19, no. 2 (Spring) 5-10. Journal on-line. Available at http://mq.dukejournals.org Piiparinen, Tuoko. 2008. “The Rise and Fall of Bureaucratic Rationalization: Exploring the Possibilities and Limitations of the UN Secretariat in Conflict Prevention.” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (Decem ber) 697-724. Journal on-line. Available from http://journals1.scholarsportal.info.proxy.queensu.ca/ Safty, Adel, ed. “Leadership and Conflict Resolution: The International Leadership Series Book Three” (United States: Universal-Publishers, 2003).

Totten, Samuel. 2005. “The United Nations and Genocide.” Society 42, no. 4 (May/Jun) 6-13. Journal on-line. Available from www.ebscohost.com.

United Nations. 1999. “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Geno cide in Rwanda.” Accessed October 5, 2010. http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/RwandaReport1.htm Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morje Howard. May 2 2008. “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature.” The Annual Review of Political Science 20, no. 8 (May) 283-301. Journal on-line. Available from http://www.an nualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022

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