QIO 11.4: Contested Lands

THE ROHINGYA: MYANMAR’S “ILLEGALS” ENVIRONMENT & INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AFRICA: CHINA & INDIA’S VENTURES PASHTUN SELF-DETERMINATION THE DEATH OF MULTICULTURALISM? ISSUE 11.4

APRIL 2015

CONTESTED LANDS

QUEEN’S INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER A LETTER FROM THE EDITOR Emerson Murray Dear Reader, Welcome to the last issue of Queen’s International Observer Volume 11, “Contested Lands.” The QIO is a quarterly publication on campus that has informed the Queen’s student body on global political affairs since 2003, and our team has sought to provide you with the same high quality of writing and research over the past year.

Issue 11.4, “Contested Lands,” aims to cover a broad range of topics in ethnic conflict and nationalism. To begin, Corey Goldberg exposes the mistreatment and ethnic cleansing that Myanmar’s Rohingya have endured under the country’s authoritarian regime. Georgie Giannopoulos examines how borders created in the colonial era have resulted in irredentist tensions between Laos and Cambodia. Furthermore, Harrison Jarvis discusses the ongoing territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands.

The QIO is pleased to feature the work of a number of external contributors. Alexandra MacKenzie reveals the need for greater participation by Indigenous peoples in the upcoming 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. Meanwhile, David Orr contrasts China and India’s approaches to trade with Africa as two rising powers. Kylee Pedersen analyses the possibility that the Dalai Lama will forego reincarnation and and its implications for the Tibetan independence movement. Furthermore, Irfan Tahiri brings to light the question of self-determination for the Pashtuns, a people divided by a colonial-era border for more than a century. Finally, I assess recent claims that multiculturalism in Europe has failed.

To conclude this volume of the QIO, I would like to thank this year’s team for their hard work, creativity, and enthusiasm in writing and editing. I would also like to thank Raine Storey, our layout editor, for the time and effort that she dedicated to the QIO’s covers and design, as the publication would not have been possible without her.

This past year with the magazine has been incredible, and I look forward to what next year’s team has in store.

Emerson Murray, Editor-in-Chief Vol. 11 Holly Kallmeyer & Hayley McNorton, Assistant Editors Vol. 11

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ISSUE 11.3

THE TEAM

Emerson Murray Editor-in-Chief

Holly Kallmeyer Assistant Editor

Hayley McNorton Raine Storey Assistant Editor Layout Editor

Kanivanan Chinniah Staff Writer

Dylan Edmonds Staff Writer

Georgie Giannopoulos Staff Writer

Corey Goldberg Staff Writer

Harrison Jarvis Staff Writer

Darcy Wilford Staff Writer

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 5. MYANMAR’S “ILLEGALS” 7. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES & PARIS 2015 9. IRREDENTISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 11. CONTESTING THE SENKAKUS 12. CHINA & INDIA IN AFRICA 13. THE NEXT DALAI LAMA 15. PASHTUN SELF-DETERMINATION 17. THE MULTICULTURAL QUESTION

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CONTACT US EMAIL: CONTACT@QUEENSOBSERVER.ORG WEBSITE: WWW.QUEENSOBSERVER.ORG The views expressed by the authors are their own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board or the Queen’s International Affairs Association.

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The Rohingya:

ILLEGALS ON THEIR OWN SOIL Corey Goldberg, Commerce 16’

“We do not have the term Rohingya.”

– Thein Sein, President of Myanmar (2013)

THE ROHINGYA aren’t hingya has been so severe, in fact, welcome in Myanmar (Burma). Ac- that the United Nations (UN) has cording to Myanmar’s current gov- declared this group to be one of the ernment, they don’t actually exist. most persecuted on the planet.

With a population of ap- The Rohingya have been vicproximately one million, the Ro- tim to over 35 years of state-sponhingya–whose members are pre- sored attacks, aimed at legitimizing dominantly Muslim and speak their exclusion and destroying their their own language–are a stateless ethnic identity. Beginning with mass minority group who reside main- expulsions under General Ne Win’s ly in the country’s western state of military dictatorship in 1978, MyanRakhine. Unrecognized by the Bur- mar’s treatment of the Rohingya has mese Citizenship Act (1982) as an continued to worsen over the years. indigenous ethnic minority group, It culminated in mass violence in the Rohingya have been deemed 2012, during which hundreds of illegal immigrants from neighbour- Rohingya people died and approxing Bangladesh by the government imately 125,000 were displaced. at Naypyidaw. This claim resounds Moreover, Human Rights with many Myanmar Buddhists, Watch released a report a year after who comprise the majority of the the 2012 massacre titled, “All You country’s population.

Can Do is Pray.” It detailed, among

The oppression of the Ro- other things, how Myanmar’s se-

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curity forces failed to protect the Rohingya during the violence, and it accused Myanmar’s current government of war crimes and ethnic cleansing.

The Rohingya’s condition in Myanmar continues to be desperate. The majority of this group lives in three townships in the north Rakhine State, while more than 125,000 people, most of whom were displaced in the 2012 violence, are contained in internment camps and unable to return to their homes. After a visit to Myanmar in 2014, senior U.N. official Kyung Wha-Kang described the conditions in these camps as, “appalling,” adding that “many people have wholly inadequate access to basic services including health, education, water and sanitation.”

As a result of their status in Myanmar as non-citizens, the Rohingya have been deprived of many fundamental rights. This includes restrictions on their movement, their ability to have more than two

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MYANMAR //

LEFT: “Boy by the Tents” by Steve Gumaer via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0. Modified from original.

RIGHT: “Widow with 7 Children” by Steve Gumaer via Flickr. Licensed CC BY-NC 2.0. Modified from original.

children, and their access to jobs, education, and healthcare. Maternal mortality rates among the Rohingya are staggeringly high while eighty percent of Rohingya adults are illiterate. Altogether, these conditions have led more than 100,000 Rohingya to flee Myanmar since 2012, hundreds of whom have died making the long sea journey to Thailand or Malaysia.

State-backed revisionist histories have legitimized the mistreatment of the Rohingya at the hands of the Myanmar government. The widely held belief, promoted by ultra-nationalist Rakhine Buddhists and the Myanmar government, is that the Rakhine state was historically home to only an indigenous Buddhist population. The one million Rohingya Muslims who now reside in Rakhine are, according to these myths, migrants of East Bengal who arrived during the colonial era.

Official state histories and laws written in the past four decades confirm this story. The word “Ro-

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hingya” has notably been excluded from authoritative documents that instead refer to Rakhine’s Islamic population as “Bengalis.” By depriving the Rohingya of their ethnic identity and cultural heritage, the government of Myanmar has been able to dismiss the Rohingya’s claim to citizenship and justify their mistreatment.

The historical basis for this justification, however, is false.

The Rohingya have, in fact, a long and documented history as a distinct ethnic group residing in the region that’s now the Rakhine State. In fact, there are clear references to the Rohingya in Rakhine’s pre-colonial histories. For example, in 1799, before the British colonization of Myanmar, Francis Buchanan referred to a group of “Mohammedans,” who “call themselves ‘Rooinga,’ or natives of Arakan,” in his study of Indian languages. The Paton Report of 1826, published when the British first entered Rakhine State, notes that 30% of Rakhine’s population was “Massulman,” or Muslim.

It’s important to understand that Rohingya is not a self-imposed group identity, but an official ethnic and religious identity that’s recognized by the international community at large. Even Myanmar’s post-colonial state recognized the Rohingya as a legitimate ethnic group with indigenous roots in Myanmar. In fact, it wasn’t until 1982–34 years after the end of British colonial rule–that the Rohingya lost their rights to citizenship.

For more than 35 years, the government of Myanmar has sought to destroy the Rohingya people and their ethnic identity. The government’s attempts to erase the Rohingya’s history are particularly chilling.

It’s therefore critical to understand the historical context of Myanmar’s campaign against the Rohingya. The ability see past the national myths and revisionist histories will be crucial to protecting the Rohingya’s future.

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\\ ENVIRONMENT & INDIGENOUS PEOPLES “INMClimateNYC2014-122” by Allan Lissner/Idle No More via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.

Paris 2015:

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES CAN’T BE IGNORED Alexandra MacKenzie, Political Studies 16’

IN DECEMBER, state leaders will congregate in Paris for the 2015 U.N. climate summit, with the aim that states will sign the world’s next global climate agreement. This summit, as the culmination of years of climate change discussions, is being heralded as the meeting that “will make or break … international efforts to curb global warming.”

Although the summit remains ten months away, the next few months will be critical for negotiations as governments set the conference agenda and discuss funding. As these discussions un-

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fold, however, global leaders must remember to engage Indigenous Peoples. They must remember that Indigenous Peoples are highly vulnerable to the effects of environmental degradation, and that they may provide unique insight on the issue of climate change that will spark meaningful action.

While these climate summits represent the global movement towards environmental sustainability, they’ve also faced harsh criticism due to the minimal participation of indigenous groups. At the Paris negotiations, it’s likely that they’ll once

more be relegated to the back seat.

Despite current efforts to prepare for the conference, global leaders need to take steps to shift their focus to include Indigenous peoples in a more meaningful way.

This is particularly important as these groups often face the bulk of climate change’s harmful effects.

According to a recent report by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Indigenous peoples tend to be most seriously affected by climate change due to “their dependence upon, and close relationship with the environment

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ENVIRONMENT & INDIGENOUS PEOPLES // and its resources.”

The authors of the 2012 U.N. publication, Weathering Uncertainty, note that Indigenous groups occupy “22% of the global land area, which in turn harbour 80% of the world’s biological diversity.” Their connection to the environment means that these groups are exposed far more often to what ActionAid calls the “extreme … and ‘slow-onset’ effects” of climate change. As a result, the livelihoods of community members are being compromised, posing serious risks to human security.

In Latin America, this human risk has become evident with Indigenous women who’ve been forced to abandon their livelihoods as a result of Canadian mining operations. The Working Group on Mining and Human Rights in Latin America cited 148 socio-environmental conflicts in the Latin American mining sector, all involving Canadian mining companies such as Barrick Gold, Goldcorp Inc., and Gran Columbia Gold. Environmental degradation in these mining regions is so severe, according to this group, that massive displacement of communities results “due to the death of their animals, the death of their water supply, and fencing off of their roads”.

The agendas of previous summits have failed to recognize the concerns of Indigenous Peoples, largely because they’re neither state actors nor the key contributors to environmental degradation. Instead, the focus remains on countries such as the United States or China–the two countries that together produce one third of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.

The U.S. and China will con-

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tinue to be the most relevant actors in the Paris Conference discussions, given the legally binding deal that the two are negotiating. This deal, according to the White House, aims to “cut [the United States’] greenhouse gas emissions 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025” and “to increase the non-fossil fuel share of all energy [in China] to around 20% by 2030.”

In targeting U.S. and Chi-

“Eiffel Tower - Paris” by Sam Valadi via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY 2.0. Modified from original.

nese energy practices, the deal has further narrowed the focus of climate discussions to these two major players. Despite the importance of this deal, leaders must remember that they’re doing more than drafting agreements – they’re deciding the fate of our environmental future, and the interests of Indigenous peoples can’t be overlooked.

D.J. Nakashima and his colleagues at McGill University dis-

cuss the critical contributions that Indigenous Peoples have to offer to climate discussions and why their exclusion in discussions could be damaging. According to Nakashima and his group, Indigenous Peoples are able to draw upon traditional ecological knowledge from several generations. Indigenous groups use this knowledge to adapt to climate change, which also gives them unique insight into environmental degradation itself.

Indeed, the U.N., through other initiatives such as their Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, recognizes that climate change cannot be addressed without the involvement of Indigenous Peoples.

It would be valuable, however, for the UN to also include the values of inclusive participation and open discussion seen in other initiatives and apply them to the Paris summit. While panel discussions on Indigenous perspectives have typically been the norm, D.J. Nakashima and his colleagues demonstrate why more meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples would benefit everyone–not just major global powers.

As world leaders negotiate the terms of environmental sustainability in preparation for Paris 2015, it’s imperative that they go beyond listening to just China, the U.S. and Europe. If they truly want to call this the next big ‘global’ climate agreement, all parties must be engaged in a meaningful way. If there’s ever been an important time to do this, it’s now.

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Laos & Cambodia:

RECLAIMING THE BORDER Georgie Giannopoulos, Political Studies 17’

ROUTE 13 is said to be the most important highway in Laos.

Beginning at the Chinese border, it follows the Mekong River where it connects with Cambodia. Today, it’s a physical representation of a turbulent history between these two former French colonies.

While being historic rivals, Laos and Cambodia have shared a common destiny as buffer states between Thailand and Vietnam.

Nonetheless, nationalist movements in both Cambodia and Laos harbour fears of national extinction that have led to irredentist conflicts along their border.

The Stung Treng province in Cambodia isn’t high on the list of ideal tourist destinations. Once part of Laos, French officials transferred this province to Cambodia in exchange for the return of the history province of Champasak. Today, it remains home to a wealth of ethnic minorities.

At the time of the transfer, of the 12,034 inhabitants recorded, only nine were Khmer while over 1000 were Lao, calling into question the legitimacy of this action. Calls to review the 1945 French documents regarding the border have been avoided by officials. One can appreciate the irony of France’s unwillingness to get involved in the issue, as this problem was arguably caused

by France’s historic willingness to arbitrarily carve up territory to suit colonial interests.

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After the transfer of the Stung Treng province to Cambodia, French colonial officials never felt a sense of urgency to demarcate the border between the two countries as both were part of French Indochina.

Today, this history highlights two important border claim issues between Laos and Cambodia. The first is territory west of the Mekong River known as Xemphao. The second, and more contentious of the two, lies between the Attapeu and Stung Treng province.

While these geographic contests persist, relations between Laos and Cambodia in addressing them have remained relatively productive and hospitable. University of British Columbia Professor Ian G. Baird argues, however, that a serious issue with the potential to damage these good relations are the Lao government’s plans to allow foreign companies to build hydroelectric dams near the border–less than 1km upstream from the Stung Treng province. By having portions of the border remain fluid, the potential for tensions to escalate between the two countries remains.

While the resolution of geographic disputes seems promising (86% of the border has now been demarcated) irredentist sentiments persist in the form of ethnic identity.

According to Professor Baird, irredentism is the doctrine that people or territory should be controlled by a country that is ethnically or historically related to it. Irredentism is

frequently complex, and generally can only be explained through examining relationships with others in terms of geography and history.

In the case of Laos and Cambodia, irredentist sentiments may no longer persist geographically, but the trying history between these countries is still visible in Lao and Khmer nationalism.

The two main ethnic groups in contention in the Stung Treng province are the Khmer (ethnically Cambodian) and the Lao. Today, many ethnic Lao people feel obliged to refer to themselves as Khmer, regardless of their ancestry.

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IRREDENTISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA //

Interestingly, the Cambodian government has adopted what Baird calls a “discourse of silence” toward the Laotian minority. For example, in a standard Grade 12 social studies textbook that outlines the ethnic minority groups of Cambodia, the Lao people aren’t mentioned once.

Through the education system and national narratives, it would seem that the Lao were forgotten in Cambodia or that they never existed in the first place. Moreover, the Cambodian government has adopted measures to ‘Khmerise’ the Lao. Tellingly, in northeastern Cambodia, many ethnic Lao people see themselves as being legitimate members of the Cambodian state.

History gives one explana-

tion for the Cambodian government’s silence on the question of its Lao minorities. Verlang, an author and academic, argues that Lao and Cambodian nationalism emerged and developed in response to French colonialism but also with their respective historical experiences with the Thailand and Vietnam.

An example of the divergent paths taken by Cambodian and Laotian nationalists is obvious: historically, the Lao national revolutionary movement adopted a friendly attitude towards the Vietnamese, whereas the Cambodian counterpart adopted a strong anti-Vietnamese orientation. Indeed, Lao independence was only granted by the French in an effort to avoid a direct war, as they had experienced

in Vietnam.

Colonial impacts are still felt today, as border conflicts are consistently traced back to French involvement even after 1945.

Today, the Lao people seem to blend seamlessly into the controversial Stung Treng province, but nothing about their presence is natural. The province’s borders represent years of colonial manipulation by the French, and serve to contain different ethnic minorities.

Although irredentist sentiments amongst the Lao are no longer geographically visible, they continue to persist in the form of ethnic identification.

“Laos-032” by Nick Hubbard via Flickr.

Licensed under CC BY 2.0. Modified from original.

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The Senkakus:

THE RISK OF A FEW ISLANDS Harrison Jarvis, Economics & History 15’

POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS on contemporary East Asia have typically revolved around China and its pursuit of regional hegemony — evident with its military build-up, economic consolidation, and general foreign policy of refusing to “play ball.” A recent development, however, has troubled the U.S. Department of State and reopened power politics in Asia-Pacific geographic neighbourhood: a territorial dispute between China and Japan over a group of uninhabited islands.

They’re recognized in Japan as the Senkaku Islands. Japan owns them, but China has designs on them. The dispute over these islands lies at the core of growing tensions between China and Japan, with the two countries’ diplomatic relation having been frozen since 2012.

The Senkakus are a group of eight major islands in the East China Sea. While situated northeast of Taiwan, east of the Chinese main-

land, and southwest of Japan, they fall within Japan’s southernmost administrative district, the Okinawa Prefecture.

With a total surface area of about seven square kilometres, the islands are coveted for their proximity to important shipping routes, oil and gas reserves, and abundant fishing grounds. The location of the islands in strategic waters make them quite valuable, especially as the U.S. military maintains 84 facilities in Japan with two important bases in Okinawa.

In recent years, China has taken financial measures to turn its “green-water navy” into a “blue-water navy,” a designation shared only

by France, India, the U.K. and the U.S. that makes vessels operational in deeper waters. In fact, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is expected to overtake its American equivalent in size by 2020, a prospect that’s worrisome and unlikely

“PLA Navy’s three fleets meet in South China Sea for rare show of force” by Times Asi via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY 2.0. Modified from original.

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to be welcomed by Japan.

Recognized as the Diaoyu Islands in China, the Senkakus were discovered in 1890 by Japanese fisherman and merchants. The islands were annexed into Japanese territory in 1895, the year the Empire of Japan defeated China’s Qing Dynasty. This reaffirmed, historically, the legitimacy of Japan’s claim to the Senkakus.

Until 1945, the islands were under Japanese administration and as such, the government was able to manage the land and collect taxes.

After Japan’s defeat in World War II, ownership of the islands was transferred to the U.S. In 1972, the U.S. relinquished the Senkakus to Japan after singing the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.

Later in the 1970s, three of the Senkakus were sold to the Kurihara family. It was at this time that China first advanced its claim to ownership of the Senkakus, cit“Made based on [http://w3land.mlit.go.jp/WebGIS/ National Land Image Information (Color Aerial Photographs)], Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.”.

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GREAT POWERS // ing a “Chinese portolano” or book of sailing directions from 1403 that named the islands. According to China, Japan had no right to sell the islands as they didn’t belong to it in the first place. Nevertheless, the dispute was pushed aside in light of other geopolitical circumstances and domestic affairs.

The Japanese government agreed, however, in September 2012 to buy back the islands for Y2.05 billion from the Kurihara family.

Following the transaction, a diplomatic crisis ensued that was spearheaded by Chinese nationalists and the CPC. Adding to the tensions,

Japanese nationalists sailed to the islands, where they raised Japanese flags.

While no cross-fire has occurred since the nationalization of the Senkakus, the situation has been described by Christopher Hughes, East Asia analyst for the BBC, “as the most serious for Sino-Japanese relations in the post-war period in terms of the risk of militarized conflict.” To China, the acquisition of the Diaoyu’s isn’t just a matter of good economics, but of political principle and national honour.

To make things difficult for the Japanese, China has increased its

maritime warfare exercises in the region. Chinese boats, both commercial and military, can be found within 40 nautical miles of the Senkakus.

With growing diplomatic animosity and the prospect of naval conflict, Shinzo Abe has maintained, “The Senkaku Islands are an integral part of Japanese territory based on international law as well as in the context of our history. We presently have control over the islands, and we will continue to do so in the future.”

Trade in Africa:

INDIA’S “PERSONAL” APPROACH David Orr, Political Studies 16’

LOOKING AT the gleaming glass skyscraper twenty stories up, you’d be forgiven for thinking you were in Manhattan–but that’s 7000 miles away. Entirely out of place in Ethiopia’s dusty capital of Addis Ababa, this building houses the African Union. And it was built for free.

Symbolizing China’s massive investment within Africa over the past decade, the $200-million building was a goodwill gesture from former Chinese Premier Hu Jintao to reassure Africans that “China will forever be a good brother of Africa.”

Trade figures between the two parties are stunning. China surpassed the West as Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009, and now exchanges $160 billion in goods each year. A staggering 30% of African oil ends up in the Middle Kingdom, and Chinese firms are now sniffing around Mozambique and Tanzania’s newfound and lucrative

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gas reserves. One million Chinese workers on the continent direct mine and literally harvest Africa’s resources. China is clearly the elder brother.

But the little brother is losing patience with his big brother’s swagger. Africans are increasingly suspicious of Chinese firms, who are seen to flout environmental and labour laws. The Economist argues that Africa’s thriving civil society fuels this opposition; an unfamiliar challenge for authoritarian China “with little appreciation of the gulf between African rulers and their people.”

Political elites are also becoming more vocal. The former central bank governor of Nigeria, Lamido Sanusi, notably branded China a neo-imperialist. A rather brave move, considering China is currently funding a Nigerian trans-country railroad.

The deep-rooted anti-Chi-

nese sentiment is harboured by many African politicians and citizens. China’s focus on importing temporary Chinese labour provides fodder for populist politicians that the Chinese are taking African construction jobs. China’s poor human rights record also doesn’t sit well with progressive African leaders, no matter how much tarmac they promise to pour. And it certainly doesn’t help that China is propping up corrupt family-regimes, like the Mugabes of Zimbabwe and oil-rich dos Santos’ of Angola. If China wants the continent’s politicians and civil society groups to view it in a better light, its brand image requires work.

This isn’t to say that Africa should turn their back on China as a trading partner. South-South trade is beneficial. It creates more competitive markets, promotes the exchange of ideas, and reduces dependencies on colonial powers. But

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\\ GREAT POWERS China simply isn’t going about it the right way. Is there another emerging power that can do better?

India can, and it’s doing rather well. Distrustful of Chinese foreign policy since their border skirmishes in the sixties, cynics believe India is attempting to limit the influence of their great power rival by entering Africa in a big way. Focusing on the construction of hospitals and manufacturing industries, Indo-African trade is expected to reach $100 billion in 2015 and is growing faster than Chinese trade.

But most importantly, in the ‘Great Power African Popularity Contest’, India is taking home the crown.

History plays a big part in this popularity. The extensive South Asian diaspora along Africa’s east coast has kept ties with the subcon-

tinent, enabling greater social, cultural, and economic interaction and understanding between Africans and Indians. Consequently, International Relations professor Ian Taylor argues that “Indian actors have largely avoided the sorts of criticism from rights groups that China has endured.”

India also has a fundamentally different approach to African trade. Rather than importing their own nationals, the Nordic Africa Institute finds that Indian firms acquire established businesses and keep local staff. This runs in stark contrast to Chinese state-owned behemoths that typically undercut and drive out local competition. Simply put, India’s approach to trade is more perceptive to local needs and

communities.

However, African governments should be cautious about cozying up to India too quickly. Although its more nuanced approach to African investment brings major benefits, India isn’t perfect. Taylor argues that if India can’t tackle corruption and enforce stronger government back home, “any goodwill that India possesses in Africa will be squandered.”

With more investment piling into Africa than ever before, it remains to be seen whether the generous Chinese or the personable Indians will emerge on top. The African chapter of this great power saga will continue.

Tibet:

TENSIONS REINCARNATE Kylee Pedersen, Global Development 15’

DISCONTENT HAS beenstirring in Tibet, spurred by controversy over what will happen to the 14th Dalai Lama when he dies.

Tibet’s spiritual leader-in-exile has fuelled fears about the continuation of his spiritual lineage by raising the possibility that he’ll fail to choose a successor prior to his death, leaving the future of his position up in the air.

The 79 year old is the most prominent leader of Tibetan Buddhism and currently resides in Dharamsala in northern India. His suggestion that he may not reincarnate has coincided with protests by Tibetan nationalists at a Chinese

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Embassy in India on March 10th: the 56th anniversary of the failed 1959 Tibetan uprising against the Chinese state.

Relations between Tibetan ethnic groups and the Chinese state have been tense since the 1959 uprising, which ultimately led to the exile of the Dalai Lama and the fleeing of over one hundred thousand Tibetans across the Himalayas to India.

The political implications of the Dalai Lama’s recent actions are critical. They set back the plans of China’s Communist government to install its own successor who would approve of the occupation of Tibet

“Dalai Lama” by Jan Michael Ihl via Flickr. Licensed under CC BYNC-SA 2.0. Modified from original.

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GREAT POWERS // and state policies in the region.

But this isn’t the first move of resistance by the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan people. Animosity towards the Chinese state has surfaced not only across the Tibetan diaspora in India, but also among those who have remained in Tibet since its annexation in 1951.

Unsurprisingly, accounts of China and Tibet’s historic relations with each other differ greatly between the two, as China claims that it’s been in control of Tibet for the past seven centuries. Tibetans, on the other hand, argue that they had been independent for the first half of the twentieth century before Communist China took control.

After the Chinese military occupied Tibet in 1951, the state introduced hard-line policies for Tibetan culture in line with the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. These policies mostly sought to dismantle the religious influence of Tibetan Buddhists across China.

The Chinese government targeted Tibetan monks as a cornerstone of this faith, deeming them threats to the new industrial-minded cultural movement. In Tibet and China,

temples and monasteries were destroyed while the use of the Tibetan language was forbidden.

Relations between the Chinese government and Tibet improved in the 1980s, as Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama held a series of talks over the situation in Tibet.

This era of cordial relations soon ended as strings of protests in 1987 and 1989 put diplomacy between the two actors on hold. Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, efforts by the Chinese state and the Dalai Lama have yielded little progress for calming Tibetan unrest within Chinese borders or satisfying the aims of Tibet’s exiled diaspora.

Independence for Tibet may seem unlikely due to the asymmetrical power dynamic between Tibet and China and the lack of strong international support for Tibetan non-alignment. The Chinese state, however, will certainly continue to take nationalists in Tibet and those in exile seriously. Tibet remains important for a number of strategic, military, and economic purposes, which is why China has continued to keep a firm grasp over the region and inserted itself into discussions

on the fate of the Dalai Lama.

If the Dalai Lama decides that he won’t reincarnate, it’ll be a last act of defiance against the oppressive Chinese central government, which has claimed to be the sole authority over the leader’s succession. More importantly, it could reinvigorate the spirit of rebellion in Tibet.

That being said, there’s no convincing evidence that a Chinese appointed Dalai Lama would have any credibility within the Tibetan community, which may cause the state’s plan to backfire. The Dalai Lama has asserted that whether or not he reincarnates is up to the wishes of the Tibetan people, leaving the central government highly vulnerable.

While at this point the Dalai Lama hasn’t shown any physical signs of slowing down, he holds a powerful hand against the Chinese state that’ll be played at the time of his passing. Until that moment, however, Tibetan nationalism and land-claims will leave Beijing feeling anxious.

“Tibetans in Exile Protest” by lecercle via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0. Modified from original.

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The Pashtuns: A QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION Irfan Tahiri, Master of Public Adminstration 15’

THE PASHTUNS are an ethno-national group indigenous to areas of southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. With roughly 13-14 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan and 30 million more in Pakistan, the group’s presence in the region is substantial.

When Pakistan was born in 1947, the Pashtuns were divided into two countries. Ever since, their calls for self-determination have been ignored. The forces of Pashtun self-determination that were historically strong are now ambiguous, threatening prospects for peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan moving forward.

The question of Pashtun self-determinations roots back to 1947, when Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s admission into

the United Nations. With the encouragement of India, Afghanistan began a rallying cry for the self-determination of the Pashtun, who resided primarily in the region known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

Afghans claim that the Durand Line, a border from the colonial era that separated Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns, denoted a zone or sphere of influence but not a demarcated territory. Such an argument gave legitimacy to the idea of self-determination for the Pashtun as a group divided by a mere line in the ground. In response, Pakistan held a referendum that gave its Pashtun citizens two choices: to remain with Pakistan, or to join India.

The referendum was unfruitful, and Afghan Prime Minister

Daud Khan would attempt to secure statehood for the Pashtun over the next two decades. After a failed appeal to the United States for financial assistance, Daud turned to the Soviets. Moscow, looking to create an alliance with Kabul and Delhi, vehemently supported the claims for Pashtun self-determination, giving Daud millions in funding and support.

For Pakistan, the prospect of Afghanistan and India forging a stable alliance was unsettling, and therefore Pashtun self-determination had to be stopped.

During the Soviet offensive in Afghanistan, Pakistan became an indispensable ally for the CIA. Along with Saudi Arabia, the CIA began covertly supporting various rebel factions, collectively known

“Durand Line” by John Burke from British Library via Flickr. Public Domain.

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PASHTUNS // as the Mujahideen, who were also fighting against the Soviets.

Pakistan, increasingly fearful of the Soviet presence at its border, wanted to defeat the Soviet invasion while choosing a faction of the Mujahideen to lead the country once the conflict settled. Thus, the doctrine of “strategic depth” was born in an attempt by the Inter-Services Intelligence Unit (ISI) to install a government in Kabul that would thwart Pashtun nationalism and therefore prevent an alliance with Delhi.

The most powerful faction within the Mujahideen was the alliance of non-Pashtuns, headed by Ahmad Shah Masoud and Berhanuddin Rabbani. Both parties within the alliance rejected the Durand Line as the border and supported Pashtun self-determination, if only to retaliate against Pakistan’s backing of Pashtun Islamist factions during the war.

However, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia gave their support to another group which emerged in 1992 – the Taliban. By 1996 the Taliban became the de facto government of Afghanistan. While the Taliban never formally recognized the Durand Line as the border, they also avoided stoking Pashtun nationalism. Furthermore, it was the first time that an Afghan government received no assistance from Delhi. Pakistan’s strategic depth policy had achieved its mission.

However, the events of September 11th placed Pakistan in an uncomfortable position. The United States needed Pakistan’s logistical help, and under this position Pakistan joined the War on Terror. This secret was revealed last month by former President Pervez Musharraf to have been a guise: Pakistan covertly supported the Taliban insur-

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gency during their fight with the US.

As explained by Musharraf, this was necessary if the country was to have any support in its own conflict with India: “We were looking for some groups to counter this Indian action against Pakistan…

That is where the intelligence work comes in. Intelligence being in contact with Taliban groups. Definitely they were in contact, and they should be.”

Former President Hamid Karzai’s relationship with Islamabad was at times cordial. But by the end of his term, he began openly chastising and condemning Pakistan for its role in helping the insurgency.

Now in 2015, the intersection between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Pashtuns is still an ambiguous one. No Afghan sovereign since the birth of Pakistan has recognized the Durand Line as a legitimate border.

Most interestingly, the motivations and desires of Pashtuns in Pakistan are unknown and undisclosed. Whether Pakistani Pashtuns still have strong nationalist sentiments and a desire to seek self-determination has yet to be clear. Increasing hostility between Afghan Pashtuns and Pakistani Pashtuns has further complicated achieving a unified position amongst them.

A referendum could be ideal for reaching a conclusion, but getting Pakistan to agree to establish and run such a vote appears impossible. Should Pakistan lose the NWFP, the Baloch of Balochistan, who are also currently fighting for their independence, would have a precedent case for requesting one.

Pakistan is hesitant to initiate a process that could lead to its dissolution.

Last election season, how-

ever, Afghanistan’s president and Chief Executive Officer hinted that the best way to settle this ambiguous question would indeed be through some kind of referendum. Last March, President Ashraf Ghani said: “Peoples, not governments, are to take a decision on the Durand Line.

It is hoped people will be enabled to make the decision.”

Ironically, Ghani has recently been working hard to repair relations with Islamabad. So far, the issue of Pashtun self-determination and the recognition of the Durand Line hasn’t surfaced. Afghan popular sentiments, however, tend to be hostile toward Pakistan because many Afghans know the ISI supports the insurgency in their country. Furthermore, Ghani’s move could backfire domestically if Pakistan fails to take steps to make meaningful amends toward peace.

But for Pakistan to take these steps, it needs to be sure that the Durand Line will remain formally recognized and that the Pashtun question won’t be reignited. If Ghani wants a referendum, then it will be difficult to see how relations will improve.

Peaceful relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan will be a major step towards stabilizing the region and ending the insurgency.

But to keep the question of Pashtun self-determination buried is impossible.

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\\ DIVERSITY & DEMOCRACY

Europe: THE DEATH OF MULTICULTURALISM? Emerson Murray, Editor-in-Chief MULTICULTURALISM IS apparently in decline.

Talk of such a decline began when German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared in 2010 that multiculturalism was an “utter failure.”

During a speech in Munich the year after, British Prime Minister David Cameron condemned the “doctrine of state multiculturalism” for being divisive in U.K. society. He called for a shift to a “muscular liberalism” that would actively foster democratic values among all.

In Europe and North America, fears about radicalization and home-grown terrorism in the name of fundamentalist religion have become all too common. Multiculturalism–the icon of a diverse society– will only continue to be challenged.

The accusations against it are endless. Multiculturalism fails to integrate newcomers and encourages them to self-segregate into ethnic ghettos. Spineless leaders have succumbed to political correctness, catering to the demands of these unyielding immigrant communities that refuse to adapt to the local environment. Too often have European governments allowed immigrants to bring backward practices from their homelands that threaten secularism, human rights, and gender equality.

But these criticisms boil down to unease on the part of native Europeans with cultural change in their diversifying societies. Wanting to protect liberal democracy is more palatable in conversation than being uncomfortable with non-Europeans

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“Illegal Immigrants Demonstration (55) - 05Apr08, Paris (France)”

by Philippe Leroyer via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

as your neighbours.

Racism and xenophobia– not multiculturalism–are the problem.

Indeed, multiculturalism debates in the post-9/11 era have largely focused on Muslim communities and their integration–or lack thereof–into the mainstream societies of Europe. Efforts to ban the burqa in public spaces in France and Belgium and block the construction of minarets in Switzerland suggest that these anxieties are directed at the foreign and unfamiliar.

Yet the Muslim question is a useful political weapon for some.

With sweeping gains in the 2014 Europarliament elections, right-wing populist parties have mobilized their support over the threat to Europe that Muslim communities and multiculturalism allegedly pose. Although the parties are far from acting as a unified bloc, they’ve used Europe’s Muslim minority as a com-

mon scapegoat.

Farid Hafez, a political scientist at the University of Salzburg, argues that the populist right has targeted Muslim communities because Islamophobia has on the large part become more acceptable than anti-semitism in contemporary Europe. He points to a rhetorical strategy of “victim reversal” in which Muslims are the “new fascists” and Europeans are the “new Jews.” According to right-wing populist actors, uncontrolled multiculturalism that encourages group belonging over integration and national solidarity allowed this “new fascism” to emerge.

The hostility generated by right-wing populist parties has only grown with concerns over radicalization and foreign fighters going abroad to join the Islamic State. Just a day after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front, called for the

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DIVERSITY & DEMOCRACY // floodgates to close on immigration to France. In March, the leader of the UK Independence Party, Nigel Farage, accused Muslims of wanting to “change who we are and what we are” with a smaller segment–the extremists–who sought to create “a fifth column and kill us.”

These comments merely reflect the wider racism and xenophobia that afflict European societies today. For example, an anti-Muslim rally in Dresden, Germany attracted tens of thousands last January to protest the “Islamisation of Europe” while smaller demonstrations took place in Sweden, Austria, and the U.K. In the weeks that followed the Paris attacks, the number of “anti-Muslim” acts recorded in France soared to over a hundred.

In fact, the Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey by the Pew Research Centre found that negative attitudes toward Muslims in Europe ranged from a low of 26% of Britons to 63% of Italians. Figures in between these two included 27% of the French, 33% of Germans, 46% of

Spaniards, and 53% of Greeks.

The environment in Europe for Muslim communities is indeed hostile. But to blame multiculturalism for the supposed failure of immigrants to integrate would be short-sighted. Consider how racism, scapegoating, and discrimination would make such integration more difficult.

While Europe’s Muslims are frequently accused of failing to adapt to their European societies, the burden of integration rarely falls on the Europeans and North Americans who live and work abroad.

Instead of immigrant ghettos, they live in what we call expat communities. We rarely question the lifestyles of globetrotting (white) expats and whether they prioritize interacting with locals and learning their language and culture.

Europe’s Muslim communities face a double standard.

These distinctions, more importantly, are colonial at heart. They recall old ideas of the civilised European and the untrustworthy, im-

moral native. Even now, the media bombards us with images of a barbaric and oppressive Middle East, where patriarchy is inherent and Sharia dictates the lives of all.

And a tendency to view Europe’s Muslim population as a homogenous bloc, having come from this fundamentally opposite Middle East, underlies much of today’s anti-multiculturalism rhetoric. It fails to distinguish between the Muslims–and non-Muslims–who’ve succumbed to radicalization and the majority who reject extremism and embrace democratic values. It ignores, furthermore, how many of Europe’s Muslims are just as vulnerable to terrorist attacks as any other European. After all, a police officer killed in the Charlie Hebdo attack was Muslim, but this fact was largely overlooked.

Multiculturalism, in and of itself, hasn’t failed. Racism and xenophobia are greater threats to European democracies today.

Pegida Dresden via blu-news.org via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0. Modified from original.

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