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Welcome to the first edition of Russia Beyond the Headlines in the International New York Times. In this supplement you will find analysis and opinions written by noted scholars and commentators with a wide range of views about Russia and its place in the world. Although Russia looms large on the global stage, in-depth discussions of the issues facing the country and its international partners are hard to find. RBTH provides readers with a deep analysis of political, economic and geopolitical issues facing the country by focusing each issue on a single topic and looking at it from many different perspectives. This RBTH edition will also feature content from Russia Direct, our forum for experts and senior decision makers to discuss and debate Russia’s place in the international community. Since 2007, RBTH has published supplements in the world’s leading newspapers. Today, RBTH appears in 26 newspapers in 23 countries as well as online in 16 languages. The next issue of RBTH in this paper will appear on May 28. We hope that after reading this supplement, you will visit our flagship website, rbth.com, where you can find more opinion and analysis as well as multimedia content. If you have comments about this supplement, please email us at inyt@rbth.com. We look forward to hearing from you.

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THREE CHALLENGES FOR RUSSIA AND NATO

GETTING TO THE HEART OF THE ORIGINAL FROZEN CONFLICT Amid the ongoing tensions between Russia and Western countries over developments in Ukraine, it should come as no surprise that news of an expedition by the Arctic Research and Design Center for Continental Shelf Development has gone underreported. The expedition is worth noting, however, not least because the Arctic Research Center is a joint project of Russia’s oil giant Rosneft and U.S. firm ExxonMobil. The willingness of the center to go ahead with the expedition indicates that the companies continue to maintain business ties despite political tensions, and they intend to increase their cooperation in a strategically important area — the Arctic. According to U.S. Geological Survey estimates, as much as 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and up to 30 percent of undiscovered gas reserves are located in the Arctic. Half of these reserves are located in the Russian Arctic sector. Given these statistics, it’s not shocking that, so far, political tensions between Moscow and Washington have not disrupted cooperation between energy companies in this region. Many experts compare the challenges of developing the continental shelf to space exploration or the evolution of nanotechnology. The exploration of Arctic reserves will require complex technical solutions for the creation of ships, oil rigs and other equipment that can be used in the region. U.S. and European oil and

Nations stake out their claims as climate change opens up more of the Arctic to exploration. gas companies have the relevant experience and technology, and cooperation with them allows Russia to capitalize on its Arctic assets.

for research trips to study the ocean at high latitudes. In 1914 and 1915, Russian flags were hoisted on the archipelago of Franz Josef Land and on Uyedineniya Island. Soviet Russia was no less active in the Arctic than the Russian empire had been. On Mar. 10, 1921, Vladimir Lenin signed a decree to set up a floating marine research institute based in the Arctic Ocean. Over the course of 10 years beginning in 1923, 19 polar meteorological stations were built on Russia’s Arctic Ocean coast and islands. In 1939 and 1940, the distance of the Northern Sea Route was covered in a single navigation season for the first time ever.

Lessons from history While accessing the latest technologies with the help of international partners makes exploring the Arctic faster and safer for Russia, extracting resources from these regions will not be as difficult as exploring the region in the first place, which Russia did mostly on its own. In the mid-16th century, Russian settlers from the Novogorod region known as Pomors moved up the tributaries of Siberian rivers and made voyages to the Arctic Ocean and along its coast. In 1648, a group of sailors headed by merchant Fedot Popov and Cossack ataman Semyon Dezhnev rounded the Chukotka Peninsula and reached the Pacific Ocean. The Great Northern Expedition of 1733–1742 mapped the shores of the Arctic Ocean from Arkhangelsk to the Kolyma estuary, the coastline of the Honshu Island, and the Kuril Islands. In 1899, on an initiative of Admiral Stepan Makarov the world’s first polar icebreaker, the Yermak, was built. It was intended to be used for regular voyages between the Ob and Yenisei Rivers via the Kara Sea and

Benefits above the surface The Northern Sea Route may well be a more significant Arctic asset for Russia than the energy reserves in the continental shelf. This transport corridor, together with the Northwest Passage located in Canada’s Arctic zone, make it possible to significantly speed up trade between Europe and Asia. For example, the distance between Rotterdam and Tokyo via the Suez Canal is 21,100 kilometers (13,110 miles). The Northwest Passage reduces it to 15,900 kilometers; and the Northern Sea Route, to 14,100. According to logistics experts, the use of the Northern

Sea Route cuts cargo delivery times by 40 percent as compared with traditional routes. This allows shipping companies to save on fuel, payroll and freight costs. In addition, there are no waiting lists or restrictions on the size of ships moving through the Arctic like those that limit operations on the Suez Canal. The role of the Northern Sea Route is also expected to rise considerably due to a growing use of liquefied natural gas (L.N.G.). L.N.G. allows gas producers to sell their product without being tied to the geography of pipelines. The Yamal L.N.G. project, which is currently being implemented by Russian firm Novatek jointly with France’s Total and China’s CNPC on the Yamal Peninsula in the Russian Arctic, will ship L.N.G. via the Northern Sea Route. In the future, Yamal L.N.G. capacities could be used to liquefy gas produced on the Arctic continental shelf. Ecological experts have also noted that as a result of global warming and the melting of Arctic ice, which is shrinking at a rate of 5 percent every 10 years, the Northern Sea Route could be open for year-round shipping as early as the 2020s.

Legal issues Russia is committed to having a de-

NADEZHDA ARBATOVA

marcation of borders in the Arctic that is in no way ambiguous and is recognized by the international community. Currently, the borders are set on the basis of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Under this convention, a country’s territorial jurisdiction covers only its continental shelf, while the seabed and reserves underneath it belong to no state. In other words, any country can file an application with the United Nations and other relevant international organizations to develop these offshore reserves. However, also under the convention, states fronting the Arctic Ocean can make a claim for an extended continental shelf. In December 2001, Russia made a claim for an extension of its Arctic territory up to but not past the North Pole and within the Russian Arctic sector. The claim was based on the argument that two ridges, the Lomonosov Ridge and the Mendeleev Ridge, are extensions of the Eurasian continent. This November, Russia followed up, asking the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which oversees Arctic jurisdiction, to declare the Lomonosov Shelf part of Russia. ■VADIM YERSHOV JOURNALIST

Vadim Yershov is a Moscow-based writer with 15 years’ experience who specializes in Russia’s economic strategy and the geopolitical role of the country.

WHY GIVING UP RUSSIAN GAS IS NOT AN OPTION FOR THE E.U. rbth.com/35809

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t an emergency meeting on April 1, NATO foreign ministers decided to suspend practical military and civilian cooperation with Russia in protest against the annexation of Crimea and the rapid build-up of Russian troops on the border with Ukraine. This effectively means Russia will no longer take part in joint military exercises and cease to cooperate in combating terrorism, piracy and disasters. It is not the first time that NATO leaders have used the tactic of freezing cooperation. During the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, NATO countries accused Russia of using disproportionate force, and announced the suspension of NATORussia Council meetings at all levels. In response, Russia decided to freeze a number of joint programs. Cooperation was restored in March 2009. However, the post-crisis political rhetoric, which supported a partnership between NATO and Russia, could not outweigh the inherent contradictions of the two parties’ positions on the most pressing issues of international and regional security, which became fully manifested in the conflict over Ukraine. It seems that relations between Russia and NATO are locked in a vicious circle, from Kosovo to Georgia to Ukraine, with no exit in sight.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3

Opinion

RUSSIA BEYOND THE HEADLINES Section sponsored by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Russia www.rbth.com

HEATED DEBATE OVER A COLD REGION ARCTIC PAYOFF IS WORTH THE COST ALEXANDER KURDIN EXPERT

Firms that learn how to carry out operations in the Arctic will score points in the race for leadership in the international energy markets. ventional hydrocarbons, at the current oil and gas prices, Arctic projects will still be quite profitable. According to International Energy Agency estimates, the cost of production in the Arctic may be $40–100 per barrel of oil and $150–460 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas. Oil is currently trading at $100 per barrel and, in the long term, is likely to go up in price. At the moment,

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Alexander Kurdin is the head of the directorate for strategic energy research at the Analytical Center of the Government of the Russian Federation.

ARCTIC DEVELOPMENT MORE THAN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS ALEXANDER PILYASOV ANALYST

eighing the costs of developing the Arctic against the potential benefits is a crucial question for Russia, but it is no less crucial a question for other Arctic states. Take Norway, for example, which has for several decades been engaged in offshore oil and gas production, investing considerable funds in the development of its Arctic territories, and has been a global leader in Arctic innovations. Then there is Canada, which has a very modest Arctic population compared to Russia, but has for the past decade been building up its research and intellectual presence in the region, primarily through setting up new polar research centers at its universities. Given these developments, Russia cannot even question the expediency of its efforts to return to the Arctic after the crisis decade of the 1990s. These efforts are perfectly in line with global trends. In the 1990s, the Russian Arctic fell out of favor domestically. Severe cuts affected the funding of the icebreaker fleet; support for the indigenous peo-

ples of the North dried up; and the Arctic polar research programs, including the North Pole drifting station project, were canceled altogether. Now Russia is only partially restoring the scale of its Soviet-era presence in the Arctic region. For Russia, there is no alternative except to develop the Arctic. Today, the status of an Arctic nation is not granted automatically, but requires painstaking work and a daily commitment to discover new knowledge about the natural and social processes under way in the Arctic zone. Russia is ready to make this commitment. After all,

Aside from deep-sea exploration, why are the plans for Russia’s large-scale return to the Arctic being implemented so slowly? without the Arctic, what would Russia be in terms of its area and gross domestic product? Its international standing would be much diminished. Russia needs to develop the Arctic if only to build on the development already established during the Soviet era. The country already has substantial investments in development there, and not only in terms of natural re-

KONSTANTIN MALER

hen we consider the expected outcomes of the development of natural resources in the Arctic, it is necessary to first of all understand who will benefit, who will bear the costs, who will make the decisions about development and, finally, if the loser will find a way to compensate the winner. Where does Russia fall in this analysis? In developing Arctic resources, Russia and Russian companies must ask all these questions. One important, perhaps primary, objective for Russia of developing Arctic reserves is to ensure the country’s energy security. Russia’s proven oil and gas reserves are great and its resources are even greater. Yet, they will inevitably be depleted, and the task of developing difficult and remote oil and gas fields, including those in the Arctic, is becoming more and more relevant for Russia. For example, in 2010, gas production on the Yamal Peninsula, which is located beyond the Arctic Circle, and in sparsely populated territories of East Siberia and the Far East made up only 5 percent of Russia’s total gas production; by 2035, their share may grow to as much as 43 percent. Estimates of oil and gas resources in the Arctic vary, but even as a rough approximation, it can be said that the oil and gas reserves in the Russian sector of the Arctic are comparable to all of Russia’s proven oil and gas reserves. Having said that, oil and gas fields in the Arctic are yet to be found. Still, this huge treasure trove may become an important element of energy security, all the more so since Russia for the foreseeable future will retain its high dependence on oil and gas production. In this analysis, Russia is clearly the winner, but also the party that will bear the costs. So, for Russia, is searching for oil and gas in the Arctic and learning how to carry out exploration and production in the northern seas or on permafrost worth the effort and expense? Given the presence of huge undiscovered resources there and the tangible depletion of the existing oil and gas fields, the answer to the question is yes. While the Arctic also has relevance for global energy security, Russia has a particular need to develop these resources. According to International Energy Agency estimates, only 2 percent of the world’s oil and 6 percent of the world’s gas resources are located in the Arctic. While this is still substantial, the Arctic could hardly be called a critical factor for global energy security. Unconventional oil and gas, such as the kind that can be obtained through fracking, offer far more opportunities for other energy producing countries. And even though Russia, too, has shale oil resources that can be explored — the Bazhenov Formation may have oil and gas reserves as great as those in the Arctic — developing the lands above the Arctic Circle is still important. The future competitive ability of the Russian oil and gas sector depends on it. Long-term competitive advantage is based not so much on low costs as on knowledge and skills. The firms that learn how to carry out efficient and safe operations in the Arctic will score numerous points in the race for leadership in the international energy markets. Developing this technology is of interest to Russian companies and their foreign partners alike. However, from the point of view of the public and the state, the situation is not that straightforward. Certainly oil and gas projects in the Russian North can contribute to economic growth, generating taxes, creating jobs and producing orders for the domestic industry. But opponents of these ventures argue that investing in these

projects also leads to an ever-deeper dependence on oil and gas production and processing, taking the country farther away from the task of diversifying its economy. State subsidies and other incentives given for Arctic exploration could be used with just as much benefit in other sectors, the argument goes. Perhaps Russia should not be pouring more money into the oil and gas sector while the prospects for the country’s economy as a whole are not that bright. But while the cost-benefit analysis is worse in the Arctic when compared with the development of con-

Russia is selling gas in Europe at about $400 per 1,000 cubic meters and the price is unlikely to fall. Despite the apparent profitability of Arctic projects, companies will not be able to cope without additional incentives. Last year, the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation carried out an assessment of means of state support for Russian offshore oil and gas projects. It turned out that it was only an extensive package of incentives and preferential terms that allowed a majority of those projects to break even. The reason for this was not only that the projects were costly, but also that the tax burden on this sector in Russia is quite heavy and not amortized very effectively. Now the authorities have concluded that the sum total of the positive effects of developing Arctic oil and gas reserves is such that they should be given a chance. For society as a whole, the question of whether the development of the Arctic is the right move does not have a clear “yes” or “no” answer. We simply do not yet know enough about the Arctic, and the region itself is quite diverse. The solution to this problem is to do more research in the Arctic zone, develop and test the necessary technologies and make a decision on developing each specific oil or gas field taking into account a range of economic, environmental and social costs, alternative options and the long-term priorities of Russian and global energy security.

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sources extraction. Several major cities in the region could use infrastructure support. However, the question of how to ensure the country’s presence in the Arctic economically and efficiently is a crucial one. How much is Russia really spending on developing the Arctic? One project that has been cited as a huge expenditure is the program to upgrade the Soviet-era fleet of icebreakers. So far this program is being carried out on a very modest scale and a very unambitious timetable. This program is moving slowly despite the fact that Russia’s geological knowledge and degree of exploration of its Arctic continental shelf is very much behind the relevant U.S. and North European achievements, yet efforts to bridge this gap have so far been clearly inadequate. Additionally, Russia has not implemented any major infrastructure projects in the Arctic over the past decade. The infrastructure that has been developed is mostly on the individual scale, such as the development of the Prirazlomnoye oil field by Russian oil major Lukoil. The most visible and sizable resources over the past several years have been spent on collecting data to substantiate Russia’s claim to several million square kilometers of continental shelf near the Mendeleev Ridge. Russia has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on this work. This is an absolutely unprecedented price of“staking a claim.” It cost 19th-century gold prospectors much less to stake a claim to gold fields in California, the Yukon Territory and Alaska. These costs, however, were necessary expenditures. In 1997, Russia signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as part of its drive to further integrate into the international community. The convention grants signatories exclusive economic rights to sea and continental shelf 200 miles from the sea baseline. However, the convention also allows signatories to make claims to an extended continental shelf within 10 years from signing the convention. In December 2001, Russia filed such a claim. In the years since, the country has spent substantial amounts on Arctic exploration to support its position. But aside from this exploration, why are the plans for Russia’s large-scale return to the Arctic being implemented so slowly? Here it is necessary to make one clear distinction between Arctic development projects being carried out by the government and those being carried out by companies, both private and state-owned. Firms like Lukoil, Rosneft, Gazpromneft and others are focused on implementing a specific project, be it on land or offshore. These projects, as a rule, are governed by the principles of the market economy and envisage a generation of profit in the medium term. But the broad approach of the state goes beyond a simple balance sheet of costs and benefits, and it goes beyond a specific project. This approach is concerned with the development of the entire Russian segment of the Arctic and focuses on infrastructure development for present and future generations of Russians. This approach is concerned with sustainable development for centuries to come. Naturally this approach is broader than pure economics. It involves ideas of sovereignty and Russian statehood, and the role the Arctic plays in these ideas. It is important to realize that these are two different approaches that should not be compared or confused, but should coexist. The best kind of state Arctic policy will ensure harmony between them, so that as a result of public-private partnership, the interests of all players are integrated for the sake of a sustainable development of the Russian Arctic in the interests of people living there and all Russians. Alexander Pilyasov is the director of the North and Arctic Economy Center under the Council for the Study of Productive Forces and a professor of economics and management.

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Opinion

RUSSIA BEYOND THE HEADLINES Section sponsored by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Russia www.rbth.com

IN THE ARCTIC, A CAUTIONARY TALE OF TWO CITIES ALASTAIR GILL JOURNALIST

he Komi Republic is a vast swathe of wilderness located in the northeast of European Russia, extending up beyond the Arctic Circle toward the Kara Sea. The region’s northernmost city,Vorkuta, lies at the far end of a railway line that stretches 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles) from Moscow. Surrounded by an alien landscape of barren tundra stretching to the horizon, this city of planned streets and apartment blocks seems absurdly out of place. Vorkuta was founded in the early 1930s on the site of a large seam of coal, and soon became one of the most notorious “islands” in the “Gulag Archipelago”,with 73,000 inmates by 1951. The camps eventually grew into a city, and the population topped 100,000 as people came in search of work, lured by the hardship pay given to those who braved the harsh climate and dark winters of Russia’s north. By the late 1980s, the coal was running out and most of the mines had closed. Rising unemployment led many inhabitants to leave the city in search of work further south. The city’s population has been in continuous decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has almost halved since 1992. To walk the streets of the city today is to take a step back in time: Communist-era slogans proclaiming the glory of the city’s miners still adorn the rooftops and walls of many buildings; many apartment blocks lie empty; and the oldest district, Rudnik, has been completely abandoned and is now derelict. Outside the city, shuttered mines and Soviet-era industries slowly sink into the tundra between rotting gulag camps. Vorkuta epitomizes the problematic legacies that Soviet central planning left upon Russia’s Arctic settlements — the drive to colonize the Arctic was largely based on the construction of mono-towns that grew out of what were originally labor camps. Russia is the only one of the Arctic nations that experimented with building whole cities from scratch in permafrost zones. While the pioneering spirit of the Soviets was laudable, the idea of establishing entire communities in the tundra clearly has significant drawbacks — for a start, what do you do with the inhabitants of a city that has outlasted its raison d’être? It is difficult to be optimistic about Vorkuta’s future. Many inhabitants have taken advantage of a state resettlement program that offers them housing in other Russian cities, allowing the city to reduce outlay — but this is heavily oversubscribed and does not solve the essential problem. Others remain trapped in the city with no pros-

KONSTANTIN MALER

WHO CONTROLS THE ARCTIC? ANDREY GUBIN RESEARCHER

he Arctic has recently gained a new significance in geopolitics. The loss of Arctic ice cover has made it possible to drill for previously inaccessible oil and gas deposits and further opened up the Northern Sea Route. This increase of economic activity in the Arctic has led to an increase in competition for control of the region as well. Speaking at an international Arctic forum in the northern Russian city of Salekhard in late 2012, PresidentVladimir Putin laid out Russia’s plans for the region and its importance for the country. “Russia intends to considerably expand its network of specially protected natural areas in the Arctic and to step up security there,” Putin said. And Russia is not alone. The number of foreign military exercises in the Arctic is on the rise, with the United States, Canada and Denmark being even more active than during the Cold War. The Arctic states are rapidly modernizing their armed forces, with special consideration being given to the technology needed to operate in the Arctic. Because the Arctic region has become a focal point for the interests of several states, Russia has recently taken decisive actions in order to solidify its claim over an area of more than 1 million square meters (10 million square feet) of sea bed stretching to the North Pole as well as upgrad-

CO N V E RT I N G M O N O LO G U E I N TO D I A LO G U E Russia Direct is a forum for experts and senior decision makers from Russia and abroad to discuss, debate and understand the issues in geopolitical relations from a sophisticated vantage point.

Hard Lessons and New Opportunities

RD’s fourth quarterly report analyzes a unique program in the history of nuclear disarmament and nuclear energy: the Megatons to Megawatts program. In this Quarterly, a group of outstanding experts — including some of those involved in designing and developing the program — look into the origins of that program, analyze its effects, and suggest ways this program could set an example for future U.S.-Russian cooperation.

ing its military hardware and presence in the region. In October 2013, a force of 10 warships headed by the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Velikiy and accompanied by nuclear icebreakers made a 2,000-mile voyage across the Barents, Kara and Laptev seas. Speaking about the operation, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Arkady Bakhin said: “The operation was part of a big mission to master the Northern Sea Route and develop the Arctic zone.” Russian Navy commander Viktor Chirkov added, “The expedition had accomplished its tasks of collecting data on hydrographic changes, revising sea navigation charts, collecting hydrometeorological observations and exploring the possibility of nonice-breaking ships sailing in high latitudes.” However, the destination of the expedition was the New Siberian Islands in the estuary of the Lena River, where they delivered hardware, fuel and housing modules to Kotelny Island as part of an effort to revive the Soviet-era air base there. The plan is to upgrade the base to make it possible to use transport aircraft there year round, regardless of weather conditions. Answering questions about the base, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said: “The airfield was important as a support link in the development of transport infrastructure and would, of course, also be used as a base for Arctic expeditions and for scientific research.” The base on Kotelny Island is only one of several being revived to protect Russian interests in the region. On the Franz Josef Land archipelago, the airstrip at the Rogachevo airfield has undergone refurbishment. The

airfield will house interceptor aircraft to ensure missile defense and protect Russia’s borders from an air attack from the north. It is possible that the world’s northernmost airfield, on Graham Bell Island, which forms part of the Franz Josef Land archipelago, may be restored in the next several years. Russia is also expanding its Arctic naval capacity. New warships capable of operating in the Arctic zone are currently under development and a new class of nuclear submarines is also in production. The first of these submarines was delivered in January 2013 and eight more are expected by 2020. Russia’s state policy in the Arctic to 2020 and beyond envisages a strength-

Russia has recently taken decisive actions to solidify its claim over an area of more than 1 million square meters of Arctic seabed. ening of the coast guard and border control functions. To this end, Russian special-purpose military units have performed a number of operations on the Kola Peninsula, paying particular attention to practicing combat actions beyond the Polar Circle. Over the next several years, Russia may deploy two brigades in the Arctic to protect its military facilities and the infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route. The Russian section of the Arctic is under constant foreign watch: NATO aircraft, ships and submarines as well as representatives of various research bodies and N.G.O.s are actively exploring the region.

The situation is being further complicated by the lack of effective international security regimes in the Arctic and a growing number of countries outside the region hoping to work on joint projects in the Arctic with one of the countries bordering the region. Former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, who on Oct. 1, 2014, will assume the post of NATO secretary general, has called for strengthening multilateral military cooperation in the Arctic between Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland. Stoltenberg considers it necessary by 2020 to form a joint rapid-reaction naval force, a fleet of icebreakers, amphibious units, a civil defense force, cyber security units and a satellite fleet. The Arctic Council, a high-level intergovernmental body made up of Arctic states and observers, is supposed to address issues related to the Arctic region. However, Russia has few friends on the Council, whose other permanent members are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States. Given the recent developments in Ukraine and tensions in Russia’s relations with the West, relations are unlikely to improve. At the current phase, a natural choice for Moscow is to strengthen the security of the Arctic region in order to retain its economic and strategic positions, at the same time developing mutually beneficial options for cooperation with foreign partners, primarily from among influential states outside the Arctic region. Andrey Gubin is the head of research programs at the Asia-Pacific Center of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies.

THREE GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES FOR RUSSIA AND NATO CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

The causes of the tension between NATO and Russia, which today has reached unprecedented levels since the end of the Cold War, are firmly rooted in the post–Cold War period of international relations. Typically, large-scale wars in Europe ended with a peace conference, such as the Peace of Westphalia or Yalta, both of which established a new order and new rules of behavior in international relations. But the end of the Cold War did not lead to a new system of European security to fill the void. As a result, the existing system of European security still needs to address three fundamental contradictions.

Challenge 1: Territorial integrity or self-determination? The first issue to address is the contradiction between the principle of territorial integrity and the right of nations to self-determination. The Helsinki Act of 1975, in recognizing the right of nations to self-determination, undoubtedly gave preference to the principle of territorial integrity, due to the high risk of global conflict that stemmed from the military-political standoff between East and West. After the end of the bipolar geopolitical situation, these principles began

to be applied selectively in accordance with the preferences and interests of international players. The disintegration ofYugoslavia and the Soviet Union showed that the most immediate threat to peace in Europe comes less from an act of aggression than from the separation of ethnic minorities sufficiently numerous to demand autonomy, which in turn could (and did) lead to conflicts and wars. If the principle of countries’ territorial integrity still retains its former value, then how are we to deal with the precedents of Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea? Are they exceptions to the rule established by the Helsinki Act? And under what conditions do national minorities have the right to self-determination? It is evident that a policy of genocide by a titular nation against a national minority and mass violations of human rights can provide grounds for independence. However, the question of who will be the arbiter of such disputes and impartially determine the facts of genocide and human rights violations, free of double standards, is far from trivial. And another question arises: Do oppressed nations have the right to seek independence by force and, if so, under what conditions? If nations have the right to seek independence peaceful-

ly, should a time frame be set for the achievement of this goal?

Challenge 2: National sovereignty vs. humanitarian intervention The second challenge is the contradiction between the right of nations to sovereignty and noninterference of external forces in their internal affairs, and the right of nations to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. When in 1999 NATO countries cited the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo as justification for their military intervention against Yugoslavia, they did not for a moment imagine that someone else might apply the same principle. The conflict in South Ossetia showed that it was possible. It is worth noting that United Nations–sanctioned humanitarian interventions in their purest form have been few and far between. However, the aim of peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement and the preventive deployment of peacekeepers is to avert humanitarian catastrophes whether man-made or natural disasters. The main question in the debate on humanitarian intervention seems to be who should define (and how) the parameters of a humanitarian catastrophe, the decision-making procedure for intervention, and the mechanism of military involvement to prevent it.

Challenge 3: National security vs. expanding military blocs The third challenge is the contradiction between the right of nations to freely choose the organizations that ensure their security and the right of nations to resist the expansion of military alliances, if perceived as a threat to national security. In both the conflict in Georgia and the current crisis in Ukraine, this contradiction played no minor role. The post-bipolar architecture of European security is a chaotic jumble of old and new institutions, with no clear dividing line between them in terms of roles and functions, which presupposes competition between institutions and partners, and leads not only to paralysis of the entire system of security, but to the emergence of new conflicts. To break this vicious circle, Russia and NATO must do what was not done in the post-Cold War period: Hold a “Helsinki+”peace conference to frame a set of mutually acceptable rules of conduct in the new multipolar world. Nadezhda Arbatova is the head of the Department of European Political Studies at the Center for European Integration at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow.

pect of relocation. Tourism could alleviate the city’s woes, but a lack of infrastructure and investment makes success unlikely. The outlook is bleak. Yet a day’s journey by train from Vorkuta will take you away from the dead mines and empty streets of this dying city to a symbol of the new Russian Arctic. Cutting east through the valleys of the pristine Polar Urals and into Siberia, the train ends its journey at the banks of the great Ob River. Here a ferry operates in the summer, carrying passengers and traffic the five kilometers or so across the river to one of Russia’s most affluent towns. Like Vorkuta, the city of Salekhard is a former gulag whose economy is built on mineral resources, but this superficial similarity is deceptive. Salekhard has been standing on the tundra banks of the lower Ob for more than four centuries. Originally founded in 1595 as an outpost named Obdorsk, modern-day Salekhard is the capital of theYamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region. Tens of thousands of prisoners were put to work here in the late 1940s to build the Transpolar Mainline, Stalin’s grandiose project to link Salekhard with Igarka, on theYenisei River, with a 1,360-kilometer railway across northern Siberia.Work ground to a halt after Stalin’s death in 1953 and the unfinished railway was abandoned. In the late Soviet period, Salekhard was an insignificant fishing town, but its fortunes were transformed in the 1990s when preparations began to yield vast wealth from the nearbyYamal Peninsula, which holds Russia’s biggest reserves of natural gas. To date, 11 gas fields and 15 oil, gas and condensate fields have been discovered on the peninsula and its offshore areas — with a staggering 16 trillion cubic meters of explored and evaluated gas reserves, an estimated 230.7 million tons of condensate reserves and 291.8 million tons of oil. The Yamal fields have made Salekhard one of Russia’s richest cities. Modern Finnish-style apartment blocks, new roads and shiny office buildings have sprouted in place of many of the city’s dilapidated old districts, along with a sparkling steel and glass airport. Part of the Transpolar Mainline has even been resurrected, with a section linking Salekhard and the nearby city of Nadym currently under construction. Meanwhile, the population has grown by 50 percent since 1992 as workers flood into the city to work on the gas fields or provide labor for construction projects. Fishing remains a mainstay of the local economy and the city is planning an Arctic tourism center. With a standard of living that ranks among the highest in the country, it seems the future is bright for Salekhard — as long as the gas keeps flowing. Alastair Gill is a St. Petersburg–based journalist.

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April Monthly Memo: Crisis in Ukraine

The events in Ukraine and Crimea have clearly highlighted the existing conflict in global politics between Russia and the West. The Ukraine situation is just one example of the serious crisis in post-Cold War international relations. This memo analyzes five key ways negotiators and diplomats could bring the conflict under control and begin working toward a new framework for geopolitical debate and discussion.

Feature

RUSSIA BEYOND THE HEADLINES Section sponsored by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Russia www.rbth.com

GAIA RUSSO

A DAY OUT IN MOSCOW

APPS

Tech to make the most of your visit Yandex.metro Free/iOS/Android

LORI/LEGION MEDIA (7)

Want to experience the world-famous Moscow metro system? This app creates the most convenient route to your destination based on either your current location or a station name you type in.

Wheely Free/iOS/Android This is the car service app for the business traveler. Users can order a car for now or for later and be assured that a private driver in a business-class car will appear at your door.

iTranslate Free/iOS/Android With no really competent RussianEnglish translation app on the market, iTranslate is the next best thing. It will translate words and phrases and read them to you.

In your pocket Free/iOS This app provides useful information for getting around, including offline maps, as well as local weather and currency exchange rates. The app also has sightseeing suggestions.

Time Out Free/iOS/Android Although the interface of this map is in multiple languages, the content is only in Russian. However, it has a useful function that suggests events or sites based on your location.

GLOBAL RUSSIA BUSINESS CALENDAR May 22–24 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum St. Petersburg, Russia

Moscow’s historic center is easy to explore, whether you have a few days or just a few hours It’s easy for visitors to be overwhelmed by Moscow’s size. From the 16-lane Garden Ring that contains the city center to the Seven Sisters Stalin-era skyscrapers that dominate the skyline, Moscow puts the big in big city. But the historic center is quite accessible to those in town for a brief visit or who want to tack an extra day on to a business trip. The starting point for any first-time visitor to Moscow is Red Square (metro station Okhotny Ryad). This iconic center of the Russian capital is home to the State History Museum, St. Basil’s Cathedral, the Lenin Mausoleum and Lobnoye Mesto (the“Place of Skulls”) — the place from which royal decrees were read to the people, from the 14th to 17th centuries. On one side, the square is bordered by the Kremlin; on the opposite side is the GUM Department Store building. Built at the end of the 19th century, today GUM is more like a high-

end mall filled with luxury brands and expensive souvenirs. Still, a visit to GUM is a must, if only to see the elaborate marble-faced halls and the glass atrium with steel arches that were designed by architect Vladimir Shukhov. For those who have already visited these sites, there are several other mustsee destinations not far from the Kremlin walls. Leaving Red Square by the Vosnensenky Gates (near the Historical Museum) leads visitors to the Alexandrovsky Gardens, beneath the Kremlin walls. The Kremlin visitors center and ticket office is on the main path through the garden, but to get a little off the beaten track, turn left through the tunnel behind the statue of galloping horses. This popular bronze fountain is a reminder of the horse guards who used to ride in the huge Manezh building nearby, once an imperial parade ground, now an exhibition hall.

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Climb the steps to Manezh Square and continue down Mokhovsky Street to visit the Cathedral of Christ the Savior — a site that has become known around the world as the venue for Pussy Riot’s“punk prayer.”The tallest Orthodox church in the world, it was built to commemorate the 1812 victory over Napoleon. The cathedral was demolished by Josef Stalin in the 1930s and replaced by a swimming pool, but reconstructed as an exact replica 60 years later. Just across a bridge from the Cathedral is Red October (metro station Kropotinskaya), a large area of factorystyle, red-brick buildings on Bolotny Island, right in the very heart of the city. Until the mid-2000s, the buildings were the home of the Red October Chocolate Company factory. Today, however, they are full of exhibitions, lectures and concerts. Every day of the week, visitors will find events going on — perhaps an exhibition at the Lumiere Brothers Gallery, a concert in the bar at Gipsy, or an art-house movie screening at Dome club. Over the canal from Red October is the Zamoskvorechye district. This area, whose name means simply“beyond the Moscow River,”is packed with churches, cafes, restaurants and galleries. The

most famous of these is the Tretyakov Gallery (metro station Tretyakovskaya). The building may look small, but it houses one of the world’s most important collections of late 19th– and early 20th–century Russian art. Not only is it a fabulous museum, but it provides a crash-course in Russian history and culture. Note in particular how the gold-backed icons and stiff portraits of tsars gave way to landscapes and historical epics as the country’s art flowered in the 18th and 19th centuries. Because of the size of the collection, visitors should decide in advance which exhibits to visit. The Russian icons, with the icon of the Old Testament Trinity by master iconographer Andrei Rublev, is a favorite, as well as works by Viktor Vasnetsov,Vasily Surikov, Alexei Savrasov and Mikhail Vrubel. From the Tretyakov Gallery, a short stroll through a garden leads to Gorky Park (metro stations Oktyabrskaya and Park Kultury), both an artifact of the recent Soviet past and a focus of the popular cultural trends of the present. Once best known for its role in a Soviet-era American novel and film of the same name, the park today is a riverside Wi-Fi paradise of outdoor art and yoga classes, frequented by every-

one from grannies and hipsters to young families with strollers. Gorky Park is full of food stands and also boasts several restaurants with a modern take on traditional Russian food, such as pelmeni, but for those who would like to experience Russian cuisine in a different setting, visit the legendary Yar restaurant (metro station Dinamo). Today’s Yar is the successor to the long line of restaurants of the same name dating from the late 19th century. The restaurant was once famous for wild evenings out and gypsy dance shows, but today guests come for the delicious king-crab dumplings, duck-liver borsch and the atmosphere of Old Moscow. For a classic Russian dining experience closer to the center, the 19th-century-style Chemodan restaurant, along Gogolevsky Boulevard, offers a great range of Siberian game, fish and traditional herb and spice“yerofeich”vodkas — and features a menu in English. ■TATYANA SHRAMCHENKO AND PHOEBE TAPLIN RBTH

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This annual gathering of global business leaders will have as one of its main topics how to promote growth while mitigating risks. The program includes discussions in formats including panel talks and teledebates. › forumspb.com

June 4–5 Russo-British Chamber of Commerce Business Forum London, U.K. This annual event focuses on bilateral economic relations between Britain and Russia. The event, which is attended by business leaders, features a mix of panel discussions and networking events. › rbcc.com

June 30-July 4 Russia-Chinese Expo Harbin, China This first-ever conference is designed to boost trade ties and increase investment beween Russia and China. The event is being organized by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the government of Heilongjiang Province. › ruschinatrade.ru

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