Wolfgang Krieger • German Intelligence Partnerships in the Early Cold War
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erations from there. The significant element in terms of their intelligence partnership was the presence of German operatives on British soil under British protection.39 Another was the proposal to conduct joint operations against the Soviet embassy in Bonn and on various other official Soviet representatives in West Germany. This marked a change in atmosphere since British intelligence now indirectly recognised German sovereignty in intelligence matters. In practical terms the Germans had a wealth of useful information to contribute such as construction plans of the buildings, identity checks files on Soviet staff and access to native Germans employed by them.
Long-term Perspectives
In summary one could say that the Anglo-German intelligence partnership was in large part a professional training opportunity for the Germans. The British had a long tradition in foreign intelligence and a remarkable cadre of seasoned, well-trained officers while the BND was largely made up of ex-Wehrmacht soldiers with little or no intelligence proficiency who practised “learning by doing”. Still, the British could not pressure and manipulate the BND as much as the Americans could (given the legacy of the Org) and they were not as much concerned with the painful World War II legacy as the French. Each of those three relationships helped in shaping the BND and giving it a chance not only to improve but also to widen its professional horizons. By way of those three intelligence partnerships the BND eventually found its place in the international community, particularly in NATO. And it served to lay the foundations for today’s close partnerships, some 70 years later.
39 Bericht über die Besprechung mit GBR-Dienst am 17.5.1962 in Nikolaus, Weigandt
[Wierss], 18. 5. 1962, BNDA, DA 120295 – 0510.
