Cheap Price, Beautiful Substance: Mine Warfare in a GPC World

Introduction

By LCDR Tony Leguia, USN

The Gulf War demonstrated that naval mines remain a credible threat to modern, technologically sophisticated navies.1 Easy deployment, tactical effectiveness, and low relative cost make naval mines a powerful force multiplier. They can also be used across the spectrum of conflict, acting as battlespace shapers in war and deterrents of incursion in international disagreements. History is replete with examples that showcase the tactical advantages and capabilities that naval mines provide.2 In the words of one Peoples Republic of China (PRC) analyst they are characterized as “cheap price, beautiful substance.”3

In a world that will become dominated by great power competition (GPC), mine warfare will be a crucial warfare area of competition due to the preponderance of naval mines in the inventories of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF). The transition from legacy Mine Counter Measure (MCM) platforms to next generation platforms offers potential for success, but could be a stumbling block for the U.S. and its allies and partnerships.

A Problem of Leadership

While the deadly effects of naval mines are obvious, the psychological factors surrounding the analysis and decision making of suspected naval mines are just as crucial to their effectiveness. This is proven in historical Mine Warfare (MIW) decision making. When faced with the decision to cross mine infested waters, operational commanders face a high degree of risk and uncertainty. MCM operations reduce this risk, while statistical analysis is used to evaluate it.

Psychological factors can act as impediments to analysis.4 History suggests that commanders will often dismiss or fail to use statistical evidence, discern patterns where none exist, become overly attached to initial quantitative values, become overconfident, or face other fallacies when evaluating data.5 During the mining of the Dardanelles, Sir Roger Keyes noted that commanders refused to transit battleships through unswept minefields without any attempt to calculate or evaluate the risk of the transit.6 German officers later remarked that most mines in the fields had probably sunk or been carried away by currents. It was likely that less than 10% of mines laid were operational.7

Most people do not account for statistical analysis when facing risk and uncertainty. Instead, they employ heuristics and personal biases, regardless of their familiarity with statistics.8 These pitfalls can be avoided with expertise and experience. However, mine warfare subject matter experts (SMEs) are few and far between. Many MCM leaders lack any experience or exposure in the warfare domain, while SMEs typically do not advance to positions where they can make a difference.9 Historically, members of the helicopter mine countermeasures (HM) and EOD communities have acted to fill these knowledge gaps. With the impending loss of HM, and no concrete plan to preserve the MCM community knowledge and experience, U.S. MCM could fall prey to traps that are common in the MCM world. This could lead to failure in future MIW engagements when combined with the technical challenges common to future MCM systems.

Technological Advances

Despite technological advances to reduce the electromagnetic and acoustic signatures of ships, mine manufacturers have advanced the sophistication of mine designs to keep pace. However, older mine designs still remain effective as demonstrated in the cases of the USS Tripoli, USS Princeton, and the USS Samuel B. Roberts.

In modernity, the primary exporters of mines are the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation (RF), Italy, and Sweden.10 These mine producers have begun using odd shapes to enhance mine stealth and burial rates. Additionally, they have designed coatings to reduce sonar return.11 Simultaneously, new sensors and digital technologies have made ship detection systems more sophisticated.

All of these technologies can be found within the inventories of the United States’s primary geo-political competitors. Even as mines have grown in capability, they have received little attention on weapons proliferation treaties or weapons export controls.12 There is effectively no tracking or monitoring systems in place for naval mines like those for land mines and weapons of mass destruction.13 Thus, the proliferation of naval mines will continue for the foreseeable future, largely unregulated and untracked.14 Additionally, adversaries in the GPC context continue to look for U.S. vulnerabilities to exploit in the event of conventional or proxy conflict.15

Legal frameworks governing the undersea domain remain outdated as well, particularly in international waters and exclusive economic zones.16 During the 2014 China-Vietnam oil rig crisis, a state-owned Chinese corporation deployed an oil platform near the Paracel Islands. Vietnam claimed the move infringed on its sovereign space and responded by sending ships to stop the rig’s placement. Several ships were damaged and people injured in the ensuing chaos. In the end, the platform remained in the area for months and completed its mission prior to any significant legal intervention by the international community.17 We might imagine a world where rather than wait for an impotent reaction from the international community, either party may defend its undersea claims through the use of mine warfare.

Other technologies lie in the rich soil of the cutting edge. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are becoming increasingly proliferated and it’s a short leap from a

minehunting UUV to a mine laying UUV. Low cost and easy production likely mean that UUVs will become common among low to middle income countries. If constructed from plastics and composite materials and powered by batteries, minelaying UUVs could be nearly invisible to many detection systems.18

PRC

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) describes naval mines as “easy to lay and difficult to sweep; their concealment potential is strong; their destructive power is high; and the threat value is long-lasting."19 Furthermore, PLAN strategists have evaluated the U.S. Navy’s capability to combat a mine threat as “extremely weak” compared to other combat mission areas.20 For this reason, PLAN members refer to naval mines as an Assassin’s Mace, a reference to Chinese folklore whereby a hero slew a much more powerful enemy with cleverness and wile, and is roughly equivalent to the English idiom “silver bullet."21

China has no modern naval history. Its last major naval engagement was during the Qing dynasty in 1895 during a catastrophic defeat against the Japanese Fleet, only a few years after the Qing had boasted possessing the strongest navy in East Asia in 1888.22 Thus, in modernity, PRC war planners engage in kaifang, the systematic study of foreign war experiences.23 They have noted the historical effectiveness of naval mines. In particular, the Gulf War jarred the PLA into confronting their lack of capability and propelled them into an aggressive modernization program, including within the domain of MIW.

Fu Jinzhu, a PRC specialist, notes that MIW provides one of the most effective methods by which a weak nation can deter a strong one, and concludes that MIW played an unexpectedly large role in the Gulf War.24 His analysis focused on the fact that despite the failures of Iraqi minelayers to carry out an effective MIW plan, they succeeded in crippling two U.S. Navy vessels.25 Another PRC analyst noted, “The U.S. will need to move supplies by sea. But China is not Iraq. China has advanced sea mines . . . this is a fatal threat to U.S. seaborne transport . . . it would not be easy for the U.S. military to sweep all the mines that the PLA might lay.”26 Thus, the PLAN has undergone a frenzied attempt to advance and upgrade its naval mine inventory, which includes relatively simple (but robust) contact mines, advanced deepwater rising mines, and potentially nuclear-armed mines.27 Since at least 2007, they have also engaged in research towards the development of anti-aircraft naval mines, with a focus against helicopters, due to their seeming invulnerability during MCM operations.28

Russian Federation

China’s leading naval publication refers to the Russian Federation as “the world’s sea-mine kingdom."29 The title is well deserved as the RF claims the largest naval mine inventory in the world and has set the standard for mine production for the last century. Indigenous copies of Russian designs account for a startling portion of inventories across the world. The M-08, named for its production year and designed under the Russian Empire of Tsar Nicholas II, remains among the most numerous and proliferated mines in the world.30 Into the 21st century, the RF has upgraded its mine inventory and possesses many of the same capabilities, and is engaged in similar research areas, as the PRC.

U.S. Navy Response

As a response to these threats, the U.S. Navy began a program to move away from dedicated MCM assets in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s towards what was dubbed “organic MCM." In this construct, expeditionary forces would have assets to conduct in-stride MCM operations to avoid or quickly neutralize potential MIW threats. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) equipped with the mine warfare package eventually became the keystone of this program, along with the MH-60S equipped with AMNS, the AQS-20A, OASIS, ALMDS, and RAMICS. Later, the MQ-8B/C and its package systems became another element.31 Other systems that began development in the intervening years were the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV), the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis System (COBRA Block I and II), the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS, which achieved milestone C February of 202032 and IOT&E August of 2021),33 Knifefish, and the MK-18 Family of Systems.

Twenty years later, many of these systems are no longer funded, are experiencing serious delays, or have only recently been introduced to the Fleet. Perhaps the RMMV presents an archetypal example of the recent history of MCM development. In 2015, it was described as having plateaued in its development since 2005, and demonstrated no significant improvements. Due to these long standing testing problems and scheduling delays, it was cancelled in 2016.34 Difficulties meeting design requirements and fielding schedules plague MCM programs.

Some systems experienced difficulty meeting their key performance characteristics (KPPs). For instance, ALMDS was derived from Magic Lantern, an experimental system deployed from SH-2Gs during the Gulf War. It was initially envisioned as a single pass system, but the system produced too many contacts to remain operationally relevant and required inordinate amounts of post-mission analysis.35 ALMDS has not significantly improved from Magic Lantern and remains subject to many of the same limitations despite decades of development. Currently, its tactical employment requires three passes to reduce the number of false contacts. A singlepass system became a multi-pass one.

Additionally, most organic MCM packages for the MH60S have been cancelled. RAMICS was cancelled in 2011, towing the AQS-20A sonar from a MH-60S was discontinued in 2012, and OASIS was cancelled in 2013.36 This leaves ALMDS and AMNS as the only remaining AMCM specific devices for the MH-60S. As these and other MCM systems

have been canceled, they have left behind exposed gaps in capability they were meant to cover.37

In the meantime, legacy systems have limped along in an attempt to mitigate MIW risks while future systems complete their development and fielding cycles. The Avenger Class MCM Ships have served long past their original service life, and are in the process of decommissioning. Despite several changes to its decommissioning date, the MH-53E continues carrying out its mission, having had its maximum flight hours extended beyond its original intended service life. Both platforms suffer from a host of maintenance, supply chain, and training issues.

Another threat to the MCM capability is complexity. Attacking an MIW problem is a compound, multiprong endeavor, requiring extensive communication and adaptability. A minelayer does not simply lay one type of mine in a uniform, homogenous environment. Instead, an assorted variety of mines of different degrees of sophistication are laid in a complex maritime environment. This environment will vary in bottom types, which might affect sonar return, burial rates, and acoustic and electromagnetic transmission. Different depths along a body of water introduce the problem of system limitations. Some systems will not work in deep water, others cannot operate in the surf zone. Mines will be laid throughout the water column, with some mines floating from a tether near the surface, and others lurking on the cold ocean floor (to say nothing of floating mines). Contact with a ship hull will be required for the detonation of simpler mines. Others will sense coming ships with an array of sensors, while digital processors identify an incoming target as a merchant ship, and determine it would be optimal to delay detonation until a higher value military target comes within range.

To combat this problem, even for legacy platforms (often imagined as a triad of air, surface, and EOD assets), no one system can perform all required MCM tasks. Different mine threats and environments require different countermeasure techniques and systems. Therefore, different members of the MCM triad must perform tasks for which they are best suited. Ideally, multiple MCM assets will perform some portion of the MCM solution simultaneously in different areas. When complete, they will pass information gathered and proceed to the next area. Alternatively, they may change employment to a new device to begin peeling the next layer of the onion.

Most legacy MCM platforms provide some degree of full detect-toengage capability against mines, with some allowance for limitations that are covered by a device in another platform. Integrated MCM operations compensate for the limitations and lack of effectiveness of individual systems. Integration is achieved via coordination of tasking and the exchange of information and data between units. However, numerous data handoffs and the need for subsequent reacquisitions of mine-like contacts introduces the possibility of error and degradation to operations.38

The desire to remove the “man out of the minefield” had led to a substantial increase in complexity to what was already a complex warfare domain.39 Future MCM systems implement revolutionary technologies that were ahead of their time when they were being designed. Additionally, they were meant to be modular. Once the organic MCM concept shifted to revolve around the LCS, the systems had to work together, requiring integration at the hardware and software level. Thus, “complex machines (all unproven and unprecedented) were wrapped in a complex package, to be employed on a complex vessel” while many systems were still in development.40 The technical difficulties associated with a complicated system of systems aggregates onto the already existing problem of data handoff and subsequent acquisition that legacy platforms experience. Analysts suggest that the cost overruns, reliability problems, failure to meet KPPs, and delays associated with many of these systems are due to this complexity. 41

Conclusion

The military environment has shifted to a competitive GPC world. Our adversaries are observing our activities and identifying our weaknesses, and MCM has been identified as a key one. As we transition from legacy to future we have the potential to meet the advanced capabilities of 21st century MIW threats. Yet, it offers our competitors a potential assassin’s mace, whereby they can exploit our weakness to their benefit. Additionally, naval mines could become a tool utilized in international conflicts short of war as disagreements in the exploitation of undersea resources become more common. The U.S. Navy must be ready to face these lurking threats, or we risk the economic and military consequences of being unprepared.

To prevent this undesirable future, the U.S. Navy must ensure two things. First, the transfer of MCM knowledge must be preserved and the personnel must have ways of transferring the information to future system platforms. Additionally, career paths must be maintained so these individuals can rise to positions where they can effect change and apply their knowledge at the highest levels. Second, funding must be provided so that legacy systems can execute the MCM mission to their full extent while future systems finalize testing and fielding. Even after fielding, it will take time for the warfighter to become proficient in the operational employment of this system of systems. The price of failure is an unsuspecting ship being crippled in contested waters, incapable of projecting force abroad. It is too high a price.

Bibliography

Broyles, David A. A Prognosis for Mine Countermeasures: Getting the Mine out of the Minefield (CNA, February, 2017).

Erickson, Andrew S. and Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray. Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability (Naval War College, June 2009).

Freedberg, Sydney J. Minefields at Sea: From the Tsars to Putin (Breaking Defense, March 2015). https://breakingdefense. com/2015/03/shutting-down-the-sea-russia-china-iran-and-the-hidden-danger-of-sea-mines/.

Katz, Justin. Fielding LCS Minehunting Mission Package Now a Key Priority (Naval Warfare, July 2021). https:// breakingdefense.com/2021/07/fielding-lcs-minehunting-mission-package-now-a-key-priority/.

Landreth, James. Evolving Naval Mine Warfare for the 2020s and Beyond, (DAU, March 2020). https://www.dau.edu/ library/defense-atl/blog/evolving--naval-mine-warfare--for-the-2020s-and-beyond/.

Program Executive Office Unmanned and Small Combatants Public Affairs. US Navy’s UISS System Achieves Milestone C (NAVSEA, Feb, 2020). https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Media/News/SavedNewsModule/Article/2094860/us-navys-unmannedinfluence-sweep-system-achieves-milestone-c/.

Rios, John J. Naval Mines in the 21st Century: Can NATO Navies Meet the Challenge? (NPS, June 2005).

Savitz, Scott. Psychology and the Mined: Overcoming Psychological Barriers to the Use of Statistics in Naval Mine Warfare (CNA, May, 2006).

Vavasseur, Xavier. US Navy’s UISS Completes IOT&E (Naval News, Aug 2021). https://www.navalnews.com/navalnews/2021/08/u-s-navys-unmanned-influence-sweep-system-completes-iote/.

Footnotes

1. John J. Rios, Naval Mines in the 21st Century: Can NATO Navies Meet the Challenge? (NPS, June 2005), 1.

2. Ibid, 2-3.

3.Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability (Naval War College, June 2009),

4. Scott Savitz, Psychology and the Mined: Overcoming Psychological Barriers to the Use of Statistics in Naval Mine Warfare (CNA, May 2006), 17.

5. Ibid,

6. Ibid, 18.

7 . Ibid, 18

. 8. Ibid, 18.

9. David A. Broyles, A Prognosis for Mine Countermeasures: Getting the Mine out of the Minefield (CNA, February 2017), 31.

10. Rios, 8.

11. Ibid, 9.

12. Ibid, 9.

13. Ibid, 9-10.

14. Ibid, 10.

15. Erickson et al., 22.

16. James Landreth, Evolving Naval Mine Warfare for the 2020s and Beyond, (DAU March 2020) https://www.dau.edu/library/ defense-atl/blog/evolving--naval-mine-warfare--for-the-2020s-andbeyond/.

17. Ibid.

18. Landreth.

19. Erickson et al., 1.

20. Ibid, 1.

21. Ibid, 2

22. Ibid, 3.

23. Ibid, 3.

24. Ibid, 4.

25. Ibid, 4.

26. Ibid, 5.

27. Ibid, 22-24.

28. Erickson et al., 25.

29. Erickson et al., 21.

30. Sydney J. Freedberg, Minefields at Sea: From the Tsars to Putin (Breaking Defense, March 2015), https://breakingdefense. com/2015/03/shutting-down-the-sea-russia-china-iran-and-thehidden-danger-of-sea-mines/.

31. Rios, 35-36. 32. Program Executive Office Unmanned and Small Combatants Public Affairs, US Navy’s UISS System Achieves Milestone C (NAVSEA, Feb 2020), https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Media/ News/SavedNewsModule/Article/2094860/us-navys-unmannedinfluence-sweep-system-achieves-milestone-c/.

33. Xavier Vavasseur, US Navy’s UISS Completes IOT&E (Naval News, Aug 2021), https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/08/ u-s-navys-unmanned-influence-sweep-system-completes-iote/.

34. Justin Katz, Fielding LCS Minehunting Mission Package Now a Key Priority (Naval Warfare, July 2021), https://breakingdefense. com/2021/07/fielding-lcs-minehunting-mission-package-now-akey-priority/.

35. Broyles, 8. 36. Ibid, 9. 37. Ibid, 31. 38. Broyles, 31. 39. Ibid, 17. 40. Ibid, 21. 41. Broyles, 22.