Focus - Force of the Future Cheap Price, Beautiful Substance: Mine Warfare in a GPC World By LCDR Tony Leguia, USN
Introduction The Gulf War demonstrated that naval mines remain a credible threat to modern, technologically sophisticated navies.1 Easy deployment, tactical effectiveness, and low relative cost make naval mines a powerful force multiplier. They can also be used across the spectrum of conflict, acting as battlespace shapers in war and deterrents of incursion in international disagreements. History is replete with examples that showcase the tactical advantages and capabilities that naval mines provide.2 In the words of one Peoples Republic of China (PRC) analyst they are characterized as “cheap price, beautiful substance.”3
(HM) and EOD communities have acted to fill these knowledge gaps. With the impending loss of HM, and no concrete plan to preserve the MCM community knowledge and experience, U.S. MCM could fall prey to traps that are common in the MCM world. This could lead to failure in future MIW engagements when combined with the technical challenges common to future MCM systems.
Technological Advances Despite technological advances to reduce the electromagnetic and acoustic signatures of ships, mine manufacturers have advanced the sophistication of mine designs to keep pace. However, older mine designs still remain effective as In a world that will become dominated by great power demonstrated in the cases of the USS Tripoli, USS Princeton, competition (GPC), mine warfare will be a crucial warfare and the USS Samuel B. Roberts. area of competition due to the preponderance of naval mines In modernity, the primary exporters of mines are the in the inventories of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF). The transition from legacy People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation Mine Counter Measure (MCM) platforms to next generation (RF), Italy, and Sweden.10 These mine producers have begun platforms offers potential for success, but could be a stumbling using odd shapes to enhance mine stealth and burial rates. Additionally, they have designed coatings to reduce sonar block for the U.S. and its allies and partnerships. return.11 Simultaneously, new sensors and digital technologies have made ship detection systems more sophisticated. A Problem of Leadership While the deadly effects of naval mines are obvious, the All of these technologies can be found within the inventories psychological factors surrounding the analysis and decision making of suspected naval mines are just as crucial to their of the United States’s primary geo-political competitors. Even effectiveness. This is proven in historical Mine Warfare (MIW) as mines have grown in capability, they have received little decision making. When faced with the decision to cross mine attention on weapons proliferation treaties or weapons export infested waters, operational commanders face a high degree of controls.12 There is effectively no tracking or monitoring risk and uncertainty. MCM operations reduce this risk, while systems in place for naval mines like those for land mines and weapons of mass destruction.13 Thus, the proliferation statistical analysis is used to evaluate it. of naval mines will continue for the foreseeable future, largely Psychological factors can act as impediments to analysis.4 unregulated and untracked.14 Additionally, adversaries in History suggests that commanders will often dismiss or the GPC context continue to look for U.S. vulnerabilities to fail to use statistical evidence, discern patterns where none exploit in the event of conventional or proxy conflict.15 exist, become overly attached to initial quantitative values, Legal frameworks governing the undersea domain remain become overconfident, or face other fallacies when evaluating data.5 During the mining of the Dardanelles, Sir Roger outdated as well, particularly in international waters and Keyes noted that commanders refused to transit battleships exclusive economic zones.16 During the 2014 China-Vietnam through unswept minefields without any attempt to calculate oil rig crisis, a state-owned Chinese corporation deployed or evaluate the risk of the transit.6 German officers later an oil platform near the Paracel Islands. Vietnam claimed remarked that most mines in the fields had probably sunk or the move infringed on its sovereign space and responded by been carried away by currents. It was likely that less than 10% sending ships to stop the rig’s placement. Several ships were damaged and people injured in the ensuing chaos. In the end, of mines laid were operational.7 the platform remained in the area for months and completed Most people do not account for statistical analysis when its mission prior to any significant legal intervention by facing risk and uncertainty. Instead, they employ heuristics and the international community.17 We might imagine a world personal biases, regardless of their familiarity with statistics.8 where rather than wait for an impotent reaction from the These pitfalls can be avoided with expertise and experience. international community, either party may defend its undersea However, mine warfare subject matter experts (SMEs) are few claims through the use of mine warfare. and far between. Many MCM leaders lack any experience Other technologies lie in the rich soil of the cutting edge. or exposure in the warfare domain, while SMEs typically do not advance to positions where they can make a difference.9 Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are becoming Historically, members of the helicopter mine countermeasures increasingly proliferated and it’s a short leap from a Rotor Review #154 Fall '21
32
