Policy paper climate change policy and pastoralism

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AND FINANCE IN GHANA, KENYA AND BURKINA FASO WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON PASTORAL LIVELIHOODS

By Romy Santpoort & Sebastiaan Soeters

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 3 METHODOLOGICAL NOTES ..................................................................................................................... 3 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN GHANA ..................................................................................................... 4 POLICY CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................ 5 CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE IN GHANA: ............................................................................................. 7 CLIMATE POLICY AND PASTORALISM IN GHANA: ............................................................................... 9 5. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN KENYA ................................................................................................. 10 POLICY CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: ..................................................................... 10 CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE IN KENYA: ............................................................................................. 14 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AND PASTORALISM IN KENYA: ............................................................... 16 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN BURKINA FASO ....................................................................................... 17 POLICY CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: ..................................................................... 18 CLIMATE FINANCE IN BURKINA FASO: .............................................................................................. 20 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AND PASTORALISM IN BURKINA FASO: .................................................. 22 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................... 23 CLIMATE CHANGE AND PASTORALISM: ............................................................................................ 25 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 26

2

INTRODUCTION

T

he varied impacts of climate change inform important policy agendas, in both the Global North and South. At the level of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the push towards reducing global carbon emissions has been highly publicised, most recently, during the COP21 meeting in Paris, where member governments agreed to new, more ambitious targets to reduce emissions. Despite the interest in climate change architectures and their policy outcomes, relatively little attention has been paid to the impact of climate change policies upon African countries, or indeed, the involvement of African countries in formulating international climate change policy. Simultaneously, to date, how adaptation measures, so urgently required in many African contexts, fit within the global climate change policy and financing structures appears to be poorly formulated. Despite this, as a result largely of a strong lobby from developing country blocks, adaptation has steadily gained ground as an important discourse in climate change policy narratives, and the number of adaptation policies, projects, programs and interventions being rolled out is increasing rapidly.

Mitigation discourses have to date included a strong rhetoric of justice in terms of who has contributed the least to creating climate change, and how the costs incurred as a result of engaging climate change are distributed. As a result, powerful lobbies exist championing the rights of indigenous peoples and other local groups affected by, for instance, hydropower dams, reforestation projects and/or land grabs in the context of various biofuel projects. In contrast, very little is known about the local impacts of adaptation strategies, which at the local level (in rural contexts) often work to redistribute natural resource availability, creating winners and losers (new ones, or reinforcing existing lines of marginalisation). Taking Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso as case studies, the report assesses how the increase in conflict (with a focus on farmer-pastoral relations) results in part from formulations of climate change adaptation policies at the national and international level, which reinforce local discriminations against or inclusiveness of local pastoral livelihoods. As a result, in order for adaptation interventions to be more inclusive and less conflictive, changes in adaptation policies are required at the national and international level.

The report examines and compares climate change related policies of Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso, taking into account national policies of the selected countries as well as international (donor) policies. In order to provide a holistic overview of the way in which climate change is addressed in Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso, it will also examine current climate change institutional frameworks and the state and structure of climate change finance in each of the countries. Emphasising farmer-pastoral relations in respective policy contexts, the report highlights the need for conflict-sensitive climate change policy that addresses the resilience and adaptive capacity, not only of sedentary farmers, but takes into account the existing social landscapes that include multiple social actors, such as pastoralist groups.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

A

part from reviewing policy documents and relevant literature, the report also attempts to provide an overview of climate change finances in Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso. This is important in order to compare the alignment of available funding with climate change priorities set by the three respective countries (and the place of pastoral livelihoods therein).

However, tracking climate change finance is very difficult. In recent years, there has been a 3

worldwide proliferation of international funds and arrangements to address and mitigate the effects of climate change through climate finance. Many of these funds are internationally raised but flow through existing governmental bodies. A part of these funds are recorded in national budgets and, therefore, they are relatively easy to trace and review. However, due to inadequate reporting frameworks of (local) governments in developing countries, disparities between estimated expenses and actual disbursements resu lt in financial reporting often based only on the estimated or planned instead of actual expenses, as is the case in Ghana (Cameron, 2011, p.

23; Asante et al., 2015, p.45). It is estimated that, on average, local governments in Ghana have a 50% variance between budgeted and actual expenses (Lawson et al., 2007). In addition, some climate change funds do not make use of existing institutional governmental frameworks and flow directly into projects and programmes. These extra budgetary funds are not always included into the national budgets and can result in ‘atomizing political governance and fragmenting and undermining the overall quality of public financial management’ (Allen & Radev, 2010, p. 11).

Furthermore, there has been some discussion on the topic of ‘additionality’ of climate change funding (see box 2). As is the case in all three countries, donor funds, or official development assistance (ODA) is often relabelled as climate change finance. It is, however, unclear to what extent climate finance is additional or relabelled ODA. Cameron (2011, p. 21) claims that in Ghana, this is due to a lack of capacity of the government, while the government itself claims this is due to a lack of transparency on the side of international donors (EPA, 2015, p. 172).

For this report, the fragmentation of climate change finance and the difficulties in providing a holistic illustration of international climate financing at the national and sub-national level, as described above, is problematic in terms of providing a complete overview of climate-change related policy, incomes and expenditures. It therefore does not claim to do so. Instead, the report synthesises what has already been written about climate change finance in Ghana, Burkina Faso and Kenya.

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN GHANA

C

limate change is expected to have significant impacts on Ghana. The agricultural sector accounted for 22.3% of GDP in 20141 and employs around 50 percent of the workforce.

Coupled with rapid urbanisation rates, variation in rainfall patterns and a rise in mean annual temperatures are expected to have a negative impact especially on rural communities who depend on agriculture, forestry and fishing; and the urban poor, who are least able to adapt to variability in climate conditions such a flooding and variations in food prices (Agyemang-Bonsu, Dougherty, Fencl, & Kemp-Benedict, 2008). However, underestimated or ignored are the effects that climate change will have on Ghana’s pastoral communities, made up of members of the Fulani ethnic group, a largely nomadic group spread across West Africa. Many Fulani, who rely on herding large ruminants for their livelihoods, migrate southwards to Ghana from neighbouring Sahelian countries during the West African dry-season (November-May) in order to access greener pastures and perennial water sources in Ghana. Climate change is likely to induce more Fulani pastoralists to migrate to Ghana during the dry-season, and to migrate further southwards, earlier in the dry-season, as higher temperatures and reduced rainfall impact upon natural resources in the north. Thus, whilst farmer-pastoralist conflicts have a long history in West Africa, including Ghana, new movement patterns, an intensification of the numbers of nomads, as well 1

17-02-2016 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS/countries/GH-BF-KE?display=graph

4

as land- and water-related development and/or climate change interventions will not only change the geography of farmer-pastoralist conflicts, but also increase the number and intensity of conflicts. Cursory evidence suggests that conflicts between farmers and pastoralists are indeed on the rise. Furthermore, adaptation interventions aimed solely at increasing the adaptive capacity and resilience of crop farmers, as is usually the case in Ghana, are likely to further exacerbate conflicts. In order to understand the impact of climate change policies and practices, a more thorough understanding of the policy context and institutional framework is required.

POLICY CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK In the context of climate change in developing countries, Ghana has often been considered a frontrunner in addressing the impacts of climate change. Indeed, at least on paper, the government of Ghana has been actively addressing the causes and effects of climate change, through the ratification of international climate change conventions, as well as developing national policies and strategies to manage the impacts of changing climates since the early 1990s.

In order to understand current policy processes, this section will first explore policy processes that have formed and contributed to the existing policy context and institutional framework in Ghana before describing current policies and the institutional framework that relate to climate change in Ghana. The section concludes with describing the marginalization of pastoralists in Ghana’s policy realm.

In 1994, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established under the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation (MESTI) to advise the government on the formulation of policies related to the protection of the environment (GoG, 1994). Ghana ratified the first Convention of the UNFCCC formulated at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, committing to a global partnership and international agreements to protect the environment and address the issue of climate change.

Ghana has made efforts to align climate change policy with national development policy. In collaboration with the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), issues of climate change have been adopted in Ghana’s most influential development document, the ‘Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda’ (GSGDA II). These national policy strategies should function as guidelines for decentralized planning by MMDA’s, responsible for development strategies on district level. However, although efforts are made to align national policies on climate change with decentralized planning through, for example, planning guidelines, local institutions poorly informed and under-resourced, and therefore responding insufficiently to climate change (Asante et al., 2015).

Ghana delivered its Initial National Communications (INC) to the UNFCCC in 2000, in which climate change activities were formulated after a completing a C02 inventory and vulnerability assessment. The document aimed to ‘highlight the nation’s efforts towards sustainable development and to re-emphasize the support Ghana needs if it is to fully participate in the climate debate and contribute meaningfully and effectively towards finding solutions to a global problem’ (EPA, 2000, p. viii). The proposed measures largely emphasised mitigation measures, such as reforestation, and the increased use of renewable energy. Little, albeit some, attention was given to climate change adaptation. The INC stressed that both external technical and financial assistance was required to meet the country’s objectives (EPA, 2000).

5

Ghana’s Second National Communication (SNC) was presented to the UNFCCC in 2011. Apart from reporting updated assessments (of for instance, C02 inventories) the SNC emphasized measures and policies considering both mitigation and adaptation, and expressed the need for a national climate change policy framework. The SNC furthermore aimed to contribute to integrate climate change policy into the existing sustainable development policy framework, in particular the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA)(EPA, 2011). The same pattern for integrating climate change in developmental and sectoral policies is visible the document ‘Ghana Goes Green’, which served as a discussion document for developing the final national climate change policy. Ghana has been lauded for also framing climate change as a social and economic issue within its policy frameworks.

A National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) was formulated and came into effect in 2014, providing an overall national policy framework for climate change activities in order to ‘ensure a climateresilient and climate-compatible economy while achieving sustainable development and equitable low-carbon economic growth for Ghana’ (MESTI, 2013, p. vii). The NCCP sets out five themes and strategic focus areas, namely: agriculture and food security; disaster preparedness and response; natural resource management; equitable social development; and energy, industrial and infrastructural development (MESTI, 2013). The Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation (MESTI), through the EPA, takes the technical lead in coordination of all climate change activities in Ghana. In this function, MESTI hosts the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC), a multi-stakeholder committee, to review and direct policy development and, coordinate activities (MESTI, 2013). However, there have been serious challenges regarding the financial and human capacity of the NCCC to lead on climate change issues (Sarpong & Anyidoho, 2012, p. 5). The NCCC, for instance, like so many of Ghana’s committees, has apparently not convened since 2012 (Asante et al., 2015; EPA, 2014). Finally, a unit under the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the National Resources and Climate Change Unit (NRECCU), oversees budgetary and planning issues relating to climate change activities.

The NCCP requires a budget of US$ 9.3 billion for the period of 2014-2020 (Asante et al., 2015) in order to be fully implemented. The largest share of the $9.3 billion is earmarked for ‘Equitable Social Development’ which aims to address the impact of climate change on health, access to water and sanitation, gender issues and migration (47% - see FIGURE 1 below). This is followed by ‘Natural Resource Management’ (27%) and ‘Energy, Industry and Infrastructural Development’ (12%). Interestingly, whilst some of these categories undoubtedly overlap with the agriculture sector, only 10% of the total climate change spending is allocated to directly to agriculture and food service, despite the fact that the agricultural sector employs around 50 percent of the workforce, contributes around 25% to GDP, and constitutes the groups most exposed climatic changes. Budget allocations are made for 22 ministries, departments and agencies, with the Ministries of Lands and National Resources (MLNR), Energy and Petroleum (MoEP), Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) and the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MGCSP) accounting for half the projected spending (Asante et al., 2015). Further implementation is done by Municipal, Metropolitan and District Assemblies (MMDA’s), who are responsible for development planning at the district level. Whilst the working structure is appropriate on paper, a number of district assemblies in northern Ghana have indicated that whilst they were aware of the NCCP, they had never seen the document. Needless to say, the roll-out of climate change activities financed through the government (from external funding) has been slow, both as a result of the difficulty the GoG has faced in securing 6

international climate change financing, as well as due to the inefficiency of the relevant linkages between national and local levels of government. A separate funding stream, and by far the most visible one at the local level, is channelled from institutional donors directly to national and local NGOs.

FIGURE 1: NCCP PROJECTED SPENDING, 2014-2020

Energy, Industry and Infrastructural Development, 12%

Equitable Social development 47%

Agriculture and Food Security 10%

Disaster Preparedness and Response 4%

Natural Resource Management 27%

SOURCE: NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY MASTER PLAN 2015-2020, MESTI, 2014. IN: ASANTE ET AL., 2015

One of only a handful of African countries, Ghana submitted a Third National Communication (TNC) to the UNFCCC in July 2015. The communication describes current progress in tackling climate change and addresses major gaps and challenges that Ghana is facing, such as the ongoing lack of coordination, duplication of activities and the need for external technical assistance (EPA, 2015). Furthermore, for the first time, it maps the main national and international climate change-related financial flows from 2011-2014.

CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE IN GHANA: According to OECD data, Ghana received over US$ 214 million of climate-related development aid in 2014. In Ghana’s Third National Communication to the UNFCCC in July 2015, the GoG provides an additional overview of climate change related financial in- and outflows between 2011 and 2014. It calculates that the total of direct climate change related financial inflow was over US$1.2 billion, spread out over 63 projects and programmes, representing 3.7% of the country’s GDP (EPA, 2015). FIGURE 2 below shows the origins of these financial flows. It shows that 92% of funds originate from bilateral and multilateral sources, while 5% comes from Ghana’s own national income, which could be income from taxation or through the minerals development fund (MDF). Some major bilateral donors are the United States of America (USA), The Netherlands and Denmark and major multilateral donors are the World Bank and the International Development Association (IDA), the Africa Catalytic Fund and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

7

FIGURE 2: SOURCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCING FOR GHANA

SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM GHANA’S THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNICATION TO THE UNFCCC, 2015

Most climate change financial flows are provided through project support, implemented by either MDA’s, DP’s or NGO’s, although one main exception was found: the National Resources and Environmental Governance Programme (NREG) (Cameron, 2011), which provides budget support of nearly US$ 113 million from 2010-2014 to the Ministry of Finance.

FIGURE 3 below shows the Ghana’s climate financing according to their objectives: Mitigation, Adaptation, Means of Implementation (MoI), Sustainable Development and Enabling Activities. A clear conclusion that can be drawn from this figure is that most of the funds, over 80% (US$ 990 million), is destined for mitigation activities, a small part of US$ 40 million is earmarked for adaptation activities and a notable part of US$ 178 million is earmarked for means of implementation (finance, technology and capacity building).

Recipient sectors that benefitted the most of climate finance in Ghana were the energy sector, which accounted for almost US$750 million (approximately 62%); the forestry sector, which accounted for over US$ 160 million (approximately 13%) and the financial sector, which accounted for over US$ 117 million (approximately 10%). Sectors that received the least climate funding were interior (0.4%), health (0.2%) and water (0.1%) (EPA, 2015). Although these figures might be striking considering the importance of the health and water sectors, for instance, for climate change adaptation, they are not surprising taken into consideration that the largest share of climate finance flows into mitigation activities, which are strongly related to the energy and forestry sectors. It must be said, however, this is not at all coherent with the policy goals set out in the NCCP, which focuses primarily on the need for adaptation.

FIGURE 3: SOURCES OF FUNDS (IN US$) ACCORDING TO ACTIVITY

8

$700

$17

$600

Millions of USD

$58 $500

$2

Adaptation Adaptation + MoI Mitigation Mitigation + MoI Sustainable Development + MoI Enabling Activities

$85 $400

$300 $515 $362 $200

$100 $32 $28

$8

$0 Bilateral Funds

Multilateral Funds

$4 GEF

SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM GHANA’S THIRD NATIONAL COMMUNICATION TO THE UNFCCC, 2015

CLIMATE POLICY AND PASTORALISM IN GHANA: From a policy perspective, Ghana has made impressive progress in strengthening the adaptive capacity of vulnerable group (although this policy is yet translate into meaningful action). Despite this, the policy framework neglects or ignores the vulnerability of Fulani pastoralists. There is no good data on the number of Fulani in Ghana at any given time. According to Bukari and Schareika (2015), Fulani numbers are estimated around 18 million across West Africa, although others have suggested the number may be closer to 30 million. Whilst many Fulani have settled in Ghana, a large number continue to move southwards into Ghana during the Sahelian dry-season with large herds of cattle in search of seasonal pasture and water. The destruction of crops by Fulani-owned cattle is a major source of local conflict. Many Fulani have also settled in Ghana (some for more than 50 years), being employed by indigenes to heard their cattle, or owning their own herds.

However, despite this, Fulani are still commonly regarded as ‘strangers’. Bukari and Schareika note that ‘…at the national and community levels, Fulani pastoralists are excluded from sociopolitical participation and access to resources’ (Bukari & Schareika, 2015, p.2). This is especially true of Fulani who have maintained nomadic livelihoods and move seasonally between Ghana and the Sahelian countries to the north. This general exclusion has extended also into Ghana’s climate change policy framework and processes. The needs and/or or adaptive capacities of Fulani pastoralists is not addressed in any of the communications to the UNFCCC, nor in the National Climate Change Policy or the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy. In contrast, Fulani and their cattle are characterized as causes of environmental degradation. For example in the SNC, the EPA notes that: 9

Apart from these adverse climatic trends, other negative factors influencing environmental degradation include; annual migration of Fulani Herdsmen (…)(EPA, 2011).

After mentioning an overall increase in cattle, Ghana’s Third National Communication to the UNFCCC states: (…)The little available rangelands are therefore subjected to overgrazing and ‘planned’ bush burning for grass regeneration. Socially, the insufficiency of rangelands has also led to the creation of friction between the Fulani herdsman and food crop farmers in the country. Unfortunately overgrazing leads to desertification while especially large ruminants are sources of methane emission (EPA, 2015, p. 23) Fulani pastoralists are thus often marginalized and considered as invading sedentary farmer’s lands when searching for pastures and water sources. Local authorities, whilst highly ambiguous on how to deal with the ‘Fulani question’, tend to lean towards actions to expel Fulani pastoralists from their area. ‘Operation Cow–Leg’, an operation to ‘flush out’ Fulani herdsmen, is perhaps the most pervasive government action to expel Fulani (Olaniyan, Francis, & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). Recent clashes between in Ghana’s Agogo area has ignited calls for a relaunch of Operation Cow Leg, with the Eastern Region Police Commander charged security personnel in the Agogo to ‘shoot-to-kill’ any Fulani-owned cattle which destroyed crops (Ghanaweb, 15-02-2016). To date, there is no policy that recognizes Fulani pastoral livelihoods.

Furthermore, policy that enables the strengthening the adaptive capacities of Fulani pastoralists to climate change is, so far, non-existent.

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN KENYA

M

ore than 85% of Kenya’s 670,000 km2 land is classified as arid or semi-arid zone. The coastal zones are characterised as hot and humid, while the north and north-eastern regions are mostly dry (RoK, 2015, p. 7). The Maasai lands in and around the Rift valley, to the west and south of Nairobi are mostly semi-arid. Climate change is expected to have a major impact on Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs). In the north and north-east, where an expected rise in temperature of up to 2.5 degrees Celsius is anticipated by some models, serious impacts on food security and water availability is expected. Other areas in Kenya, such as in and around the Rift Valley, are also expected to suffer from an increase in extreme weather events, such as droughts and floods. The coastal areas are expected to suffer from rising sea levels and salt intrusion. Kenya’s agricultural sector generates 26% of the country’s GDP and 98% of crop cultivation is rain-fed. Pastoralism is of major importance in Kenya’s ASALs. It is anticipated that droughts will increasingly lead to a loss of livestock (NCEA, 2012), leaving many Kenyan livelihoods vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

POLICY CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: Kenya has a relatively long history of environmental policy frameworks. The first frameworks regarding environmental protection in Kenya stem from the colonial period in the late 19 th and early 20th centuries and were directed towards the protection of forest reserves and wood supply.

In 1942, the Forest Act was adopted and in 1957, the first policy was formulated, aiming at sustainable forest management for, among other things, water catchment and forest products. In 1965, the government of Kenya ‘recognized the need to conserve natural resources for all future generations and expressed concern about the quality of the environment’ (Ongugo et al., 2014, p.

10

11). From the 1970’s, it integrated environmental issues into the national development plans and established the National Environment Secretariat (NES), mandated to increase environmental awareness and to regulate the country’s use of natural resources (MENR, 1987). These and other policy actions led to the development of a National Environmental Action Plan and the ratification of the UNFCCC in 1994.

In 2002, Kenya responded to the requirements of the UNFCCC with an Initial National Communication (INC). This document formed the basis for the development of the National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) in 2010, in which the government of Kenya recognized the threats that climate change pose to development as well as the opportunities that emerge from carbon markets for low-emission development. It also recognized the need for both mitigation and adaptation strategies, harmonized within all sectors, proposed awareness creation interventions and recommended an institutional structure. Implementation of the strategy is estimated to cost around US$ 3 billion annually over the period of 2010-2030 (GoK, 2010), which is further elaborated on in the National Climate Change Action Plan 2013-2017 (NCCAP) (GoK, 2013a).

The NCCAP aimed to operationalize the NCCRS through policy, legislation and institutional frameworks and in addition, aligned itself with Kenya’s long-term development goals described in the development masterplan set out in a document entitled Vision 2030. It furthermore gave an overview of the projected costs for mitigation and adaptation per sector, summarized in chart 3 and 4 below. For the period of 2013-2017, US$ 7.5 billion is budgeted for adaptation activities, and almost 80% of this amount is earmarked for projects relating to water and sanitation, environment and infrastructure in ASALS. Regarding mitigation, for which a minimum of US$ 4. 6 billion is required, priorities are set for projects regarding energy and reforestation. These figures refer to projected spending, not actual expenditures (GoK, 2013a).

FIGURE 4A: PROJECTED SPENDING ON ADAPTATION ACTIONS Livestock 4% Agriculture 7% Sustainable livelihoods in ASALS 9%

FIGURE 4B: PROJECTED SPENDING ON MITIGATION ACTIONS

Energy infrastructure 1%

Transport 12%

Agroforestry 5%

Water & sanitation 44% Reforestation 17%

Infrastructure in ASALS 17%

Energy 66%

Environment 18%

11

Kenya has yet to adopt a National Climate Change Policy. However, with the National Environmental Policy, published by the Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources (MEWNR)2 in 2013, Kenya has officially adopted a National Environmental Policy Framework NEPF), aiming to align environmental policy including climate change. Despite this, the GoK recognises that that aligning environmental policy in Kenya is not an easy task. It notes, for instance, that; Many sectoral policies and laws are not harmonised with each other and with the Constitution. These include policies and laws concerning agriculture, land, water, forests, trade and industry, which have significant implications on the environment. The sectoral rather than integrated and ecosystem approach to management of natural resources has proved inadequate in addressing environmental challenges. In addition, weak enforcement of laws and weak implementation of policies remain a major issue of concern in Kenya’s environment sector (GoK, 2013, p. 5).

Notable is that only small sections of the NEPF are devoted to climate change, recognising that it is one of the many drivers of environmental degradation. Furthermore, there is no mention of either the NCCRS or the NCCAP in the NEPF. It does, however, promise the development and implementation of a National Climate Change Bill and Policy. This bill was drafted in March 2014, and provides a legal framework and a coordinating mechanism for climate change activities. The bill proposes the establishment of a National Climate Change Council as an advisory and coordinating body and a National Climate Change Fund (GoK, 2014) was passed in parliament in 2015. The National Climate Change Policy is, according to the latest news, soon to be published (GoG, 2015).

The latest developments in Kenya’s climate change policy have been included in Kenya’s Second National Communication (SNC) and its Intended National Contribution, both sent to the UNFCC in 2015. Building on the NCCAP and emphasizing the country’s limited responsibility but high vulnerability to climate change, the SNC and INC set out adaptation strategies as a priority, but also stress the ambition to reduce GHG emissions by 30% by 2030 (MENR, 2015) (GoG, 2015).

Many institutions exist, have been established and are yet to be established for policymaking and implementation of climate-change activities. In a study by Maina et al. (2013), the Kenyan situation is referred to as ‘Climate Chaos’, involving many actors and interests, while Kenya’s environmental policy also recognises the need for harmonization (GoK, 2013b, see also section 4.2) With recent developments considering the Climate Change Bill and Policy, the institutional framework is not becoming any less complicated, continuously being subjected to changes and shifting responsibilities. Below, the main actors and their roles in current climate change policy and implementation of the Kenyan government are described, illustrating the proliferation of many actors dealing with climate change with many interests and overlapping responsibilities.

2

In the policy documents, there seems to be an inconsistent use of the name of the ministry, due to many ministerial changes in a short timespan. In the NCCSR (2010), it is the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, the same as is used in in the NCCAP (2013). However, in the Environmental Policy (2013), it is the Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources. Currently, it is the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Regional Development Authorities.

12

The main institution providing the lead on climate change policy and practice is the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MENR), which is also the focal point for the UNFCCC. The MENR leads the way through the Directorate of Environment (DoE), which covers policy formulation and implementation, programmes and projects and multilateral agreements through three directorates. Within DoE, a National Climate Change Secretariat leads the implementation of policy, strategies and action plans. Also hosted by MENR is the National Climate Change Activities Coordinating Committee (NCCACC). This committee, in which actors from the government, academia, the private sector and CSO’s are involved, has an advisory role and was established after ratifying the UNFCC in 1994 (GoK, 2010). However, it has not been functioning as it should, due to a lack of capacity and resources and seems, in some ways, replaced by the Kenya Climate Change Working Group, an association of civil society organisations. In addition to the NCCACC, MENR hosts research institutes such as the Kenya Meteorological Department, and the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), which is the Designated National Authority (DNA) for the Clean Development Projects (CDM). Chaired by MENR, the National Environment Council (NEC) is responsible for policy formulation under the Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA), mandated to develop policies and strategies for the protection of the environment. It has, however, not played a significant role in climate change related policy formation (GoK, 2013a)(IDLO, n.d.). Finally, the Climate Change Unit was established under the Office of the Prime Minister and is mandated to also participate in developing and implementing policy, strategies and action plans.

Apart from MENR and its agencies, several ministries play a role in climate change, all of which have instated Climate Change Desks or Units. From 2008-2013, the Ministry of Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands have played an important role opening policy space for the ASALs and pastoralists, setting policy goals for climate change adaptation and mainstreaming climate change into sectoral policies (Elmi and Birch, 2013). But with very little institutional continuity, this ministry has now evolved into the Ministry of Devolution and Planning. The Ministry of Planning and National Development is now leading the alignment of climate change into national developing planning, while the ministry of Finance manages revenues, expenditures and allocates funds to other ministries and agencies. Among the sector-specific ministries that are important are the Ministries of Energy, Agriculture, and Water and Irrigation. On decentralized level, the 47 autonomous county governments are required to align national policy with county policy.

In order to coordinate and align activities within the agricultural sector, the Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU) was established in 2005. However, alignment and coordination with other sectors of importance for agriculture is still problematic. For example, most of the agricultural sector in Kenya is rain-fed, which indicates direct links to the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, mandated to ensure water resource availability and accessibility. Within the MWI, there is the Water Resource Management Authority and on local levels and there are Irrigation Water Users Associations, all concerned with the management of water resources. However, uncertain coordination between these actors and overlapping responsibilities leads to weak enforcement and mismanagement and this has severe effects on the agricultural sector and ultimately, on the availability and accessibility of water resources (Mutimba & Wanyoike, 2013)(UNECA, 2013).

In a study commissioned by the Heinrich BĂśll Stiftung, it is argued that the effects of climate change have severe effects on Kenya and its economy. These effects, the authors argue, ‘are 13

further aggravated by the emergence of policy incoherence’ (Mutimba & Wanyoike, 2013, p. 52).

The agricultural sector is regarded as one of the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change but is also of major importance for the country’s economy and many people’s livelihoods. A coherent set of agricultural and climate change policies, combined with strong management and coordination is thus very important for Kenya, but is currently scattered over 130 pieces of legislation and many different institutions, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, NEMA, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife, county governments and communities (Mutimba & Wanyoike, 2013).

With all the above mentioned actors, in combination with the non-governmental actors such as civil society and the private sector, there is a clear need for harmonization, policy coherence and better coordination of activities. The government of Kenya recognizes the need for institutional strengthening and more harmonization, and, according to the SNC and INDC, is working on improving governance systems through the above mentioned Climate Change Bill and National Climate Change Policy.

CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE IN KENYA: As is the case for many developing countries, tracing climate change finance in Kenya is not easy.

The government has no public finance management tools in place to track climate change-related funds that flow into the country through the official budgets or as extra-budgetary funds.

Financial flows that are recorded are already outdated and stem from the NCCAP (2013).

Furthermore, there is no budget code for climate finance and it is hard to distinct ODA from the ‘additional’ climate finance (see box 5). However, the government of Kenya has governance structures planned to manage climate finance through the National Climate Fund, which was already described by the MENR in the annexes of the NCCAP (2013).

Unfortunately, current data on climate change finance in Kenya is fragmented and the latest data on actual inflows of finance for climate change were published in the NCCAP of 2013. As briefly discussed in section 4.2, the government of Ghana estimated in the NCCAP that it needs US$ 7.5 billion for mitigation and adaptation activities between 2013 and 2017. Since the NCCAP does not specify sources of funding, it is hard to know if and how this budget is realized. It does, however, briefly describe estimates of climate finance over the period 2005-2015, summarized in chart 6 below. It estimates that over US$ 2.7 billion was spent as climate finance. Of this amount, US$ 400 million was funded by the Kenyan Government, while over US$ 2.3 billion was provided by development partners. A summary of funds per sector and source is shown in chart 5 above.

With OECD data, it is possible to analyse external funding over 2014. It estimates that in 2014, over US$ 813 million climate change finance was committed by international donors through both multilateral and bilateral funding. Almost 80% of this funding originated from three donor institutions: the EU (37%), the IDA (22%) and Germany (20%).

14

FIGURE 6: EXTERAL COMMITMENTS TO CLIMATE FINANCING IN KENYA (VALUE IN MILLION USD AND PERCENT OF TOTAL), 2014 Integrated (Adaptation and Mitigation), $75, 9%

Adaptation, $266, 33% Mitigation, $472, 58%

SOURCE: OECD, 2016

FIGURE 6 shows that 58% of the total $813 million required from external funding in 2014 is earmarked for mitigation purposes, 33% for adaptation and 9% for projects with integrated (adaptation and mitigation) objectives. The data over 2014 furthermore shows that, in line with the data presented by the NCCAP in FIGURE 4a and FIGURE 4b, the energy, water & sanitation sectors were the top recipient sectors, with 57% and 27% committed respectively to these sectors (OECD, 2016) Both NCCRS and NCCAP, regard carbon-offset mechanisms be an opportunity for Kenya development (GoK, 2010, 2013a). Currently, there are about twenty Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in operation in Kenya, significantly more than in Ghana and Burkina Faso (and indeed many other African countries). While setting adaptation activities as main priority of climate change policy in Kenya, the NCCAP recognizes the opportunity of carbon markets for climate finance and sustainable development. This is currently done in Kenya through many CDM projects, one of which is the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project, which has raised discussions recently. Some quarters have praised the KACP for its innovative ‘triple-win’ scenario, addressing both mitigation and adaptation by using agricultural land (soil sequestration) instead of forests to store GHG emissions. It is argued that through this ‘climatesmart agriculture’, a triple win is created in the need of carbon credits by developed countries, the environment, and small-scale farmers in developing countries who, through the project, are able to adapt to climate change with improved farming techniques and profit from access to carbon markets (Maina, Newsham, & Okoti, 2013). However, a number of CSO’s have contested this ‘triple win’ for multiple reasons, including the fact that carbon-offset mechanisms such as the 15

European Union-Emissions Trading Scheme are currently not accepting carbon credits generated through soil sequestration, which means that, apart from a much smaller voluntary carbon market, there is no real market for carbon credits from soil sequestration. It is questioned if soil carbon is a good way of carbon storage since the process is easily reversed by fires, droughts or ploughing activities, thus easily releasing carbon back into the atmosphere. It has also been questioned whether financing climate change adaptation through carbon markets is sustainable since the price of carbon credits has been highly volatile (mostly downwards) and adaptation relies by definition on stability.The fourth reason to be highlighted here, is that small-scale farmers do not actually profit from the carbon trading, earning only US$ 1-5 per year on the carbon market (GaiaFoundation, n.d.). By way of conclusion, various authors argue that through soil sequestration and projects such as the KACP, developing countries who contribute the least to GHG emissions, are directed towards mitigation activities instead of their priority to adaptation, hereby shifting ‘the burden of emissions reduction onto the poor’(Maina, Newsham, & Okoti, 2013, p. 13; ) (Sharma & Suppan, 2011). Supported by the data on external climate finance that mostly funds mitigation activities (see FIGURE 6 above), this example illustrates the way national policy and practice are not always aligned. In Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, projects and climate finance do not always align with a clear need to prioritise adaptation to climate change, and climate change agenda’s in developing countries like Kenya are rather driven by external interests entrenched in international climate change architectures.

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AND PASTORALISM IN KENYA: In Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs), the primary mode of production is pastoralism.

Kenya’s ASALs, the country’s poorest regions with the lowest human development rates, are marginal in many respects. It has been argued that ‘mobile pastoralism, was irrational and environmentally destructive, and that the ASALs contributed little to the national economy’ (GoK, 2009). The first policy document addressing the ASALs and, indirectly, pastoralists, was the Economic Recovery Strategy, published in 2003, considered the ASALs as a new development frontier and focused on modernisation and sedentarisation. It aimed to settle pastoralists, thereby rejecting the mobility of pastoral livelihoods (Elmi & Birch, 2013, p.4). In 2008 the Ministry of state of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands, was established to directly address the neglect and challenges of rising inequality and vulnerability of the regions inhabitants. After the adoption of the new constitution in 2010, which required the state to accept diversity, the Kenyan government adopted the African Union’s Policy Frameworks for Pastoralism in Africa (2010) and with support from civil society originating from the ASALs, the ministry established the ASAL Policy, which was approved by Parliament in 2012 (Elmi & Birch, 2013). The ASAL Policy recognised the differences of the ASALs and its inhabitants and, acknowledged the presence, importance and legitimacy of mobile populations: (…)until recently, most governments particularly in Africa viewed pastoral areas as net consumers of national wealth that offered poor prospects of return on investment.

Pastoralism was therefore less valued than other forms of land use and less well-supported.

Recent studies have shown that these views were misplaced. As a result, Governments in several countries, including Kenya, now recognize the strengths of pastoralism and have formed ministries or other authorities to enhance the contribution of pastoralism to food security, environmental stewardship, and economic growth. i.e. pastoralists (GoK, 2009).

In addition, the negative effects of climate change and the vulnerability of pastoralists in the ASALs are addressed in the ASAL Policy. Policy measures are described in the policy, such as a 16

drought emergency strategy and the mainstreaming of climate foresight and climate change adaptation into development planning on all levels. Considering existing conflict with sedentary farmers, most land in the ASALs is community land with an insecure tenure system. In order to reduce and minimize conflict over natural resources such as land, the policy states that the Government will ‘ensure all land is registered as either public, community or private in order to facilitate investments and minimize land use conflicts and insecurity (GoK, 2009).

In short, through the ASAL Policy, the Government of Kenya acknowledges and respects the needs and importance of pastoralist livelihoods in the country and, in policy, aims to strengthen climate change resilience of pastoralists and reduce conflict. However, the quality of a policy document is rarely matched by the quality of its implementation (Morris, 1999, as cited in Elmi & Birch, 2013).

The Ministry of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands, first of all, had very limited implementing capacity and a relatively small budget for such a large area. Furthermore, there was, and still is, very limited accountability as well as weak financial control systems to ensure that funds reach their allocated destinations. Finally, institutional discontinuity, the continuous restructuring of the institutional framework and ministries resulted in the overtaking of responsibilities of the ASALs into the new Ministry for Devolution and Planning, which is not particularly focused on Kenya’s ASALs.

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN BURKINA FASO

W

ith a population of over 17 million and a GNI per capita of US$ 700 in 2014, Burkina Faso is classified by the World Bank as a low-income country and by the United Nations as a least developed country. With very limited access to natural resources, the economy of Burkina Faso is heavily reliant on the agricultural sector, which employs for over 80% of the workforce and 60% of the total exports, which consists of mostly cotton and, increasingly, gold (GoBF, 2014). Still, the economy has seen and average growth of 6% over the last years, which has fallen to 4% in 2014. 3 Burkina Faso’s climate is characterized by the dry, Sahel climate in the northern regions, and the Sudan savannah in the south and southwestern region. Although rainfall patterns in the whole country are variable, overall, rainfall increases from north to south. An expected increase in water scarcity in Burkina Faso, with rainfall decreasing up to 11% in 2050, combined with an expected increase in water demand poses a major challenge for multiple sectors of the country. With a history of food insecurity and several food crises, but also regular flooding, climate change will have a negative effect on future food security, the agricultural sector and the energy sector, among others. For example, the agricultural sector and its heavy dependence on water availability is recognized as extremely vulnerable to a rise of temperature, land degradation and droughts(GoBF, 2014). In addition, climate change is expected to have major impacts on public health, through for example climate-sensitive infectious and parasitic diseases (such as meningitis and malaria), in particular in Sahelian areas (Doumbia, Jalloh, & Diouf, 2014).

Pastoralists, mostly the Peul (this is the name given to Fulani’s in Burkina Faso), are mostly concentrated in the arid northern areas of the country, but move throughout (as well as from and beyond) the country with large herds of cattle. Due to high levels of transnational mobility patterns, exact numbers of pastoralists in the country are not known. Although Peul pastoralists are becoming increasingly sedentary, a large number, who belong to the poorest groups in the 3

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/1W-BF?display=graph

17

county, continue to adopt nomadic livelihoods. These nomadic groups are often highly marginalized and, in part as a result, are highly exposed to the effects of climate change.

POLICY CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: Extreme climate variability is not new to Burkina Faso. As a result of extreme droughts and food crises during the 1970’s and 1980s, Burkina Faso is relatively aware of vulnerability and the need to address and adapt to natural hazards, climate variability and its effects. This is reflected in several actions by the Government to provide a framework and strategy that addresses environmental challenges, including climate change. However, policies and programmes often overlap or are not accompanied by means of implementation (World Bank, 2009). Furthermore, a comprehensive policy framework related to climate change adaptation and mitigation still lacks.

Burkina Faso ratified several international conventions on environmental protection, one of which is the UNFCCC climate convention, ratified in September 1993. Burkina Faso responded to its obligations of the UNFCCC with an INC in 2002, providing an overview of climate change contributions of, and impacts in, Burkina Faso and a strategy for future interventions. This was followed by a Second National Communication to the UNFCCC, and the formulation of a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) in 2015. The latter is a more comprehensive national strategy relating to climate change.

The main legal instrument in place is the Environmental Code, which was adopted in 1997. The Environmental Code, despite not specifically mentioning climate change, addresses the need for a legal framework to integrate environmental protection into its development strategies and prevent future degradation of ecosystems, with the ultimate goal to, ‘establish the fundamental principles to preserve the environment and improve the living conditions of Burkina Faso’ (GoBF, 1997). In addition, the bill instated the Fonds d’Intervention pour l’Environnement (FIE), or the Environmental Intervention Fund, as a funding instrument for environmental interventions.

Other legal instruments include the bill on Agrarian and Land Reforms (RAF), the Forestry Code and the Orientation Law on Pastoralism, the Orientation Instruments on Decentralization, the Orientation Instruments on Water Management and the decree to establish CONASUR. However, ‘these legislative instruments are quite often incomplete and some too old, without any implementing instruments’ (World Bank, 2009).

In 2011, the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development 2011-2015 (SCADD) replaced the former Strategic Framework for the Fight against Poverty (CSLP) in which climate change adaptation and mitigation priorities are mainstreamed into development policy.

Following the National Action Plan for Adaptation, adopted in 2008, the government published the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) in 2015, prioritizing activities and sectors for adaptation interventions. The NAP estimates that the total cost of the climate change adaptation in the country will be around US$ 6.6 billion for 2011-2015. FIGURE 7 shows the priority sectors in terms of budgeted spending, showing that over 60% of projected spending is earmarked for the agriculture and energy sectors. Notable is the fact that Burkina Faso has no elaborative mitigation strategies planned out. On this subject, the INDC (GoBF, 2015b)states: ‘Since adaptation is at the heart of mitigation and gives rise to it, one could logically imagine that a percentage of mitigation revenues would be mobilised to finance the adaptation options’. Thus, mitigation is also integrated in adaptation strategies, for example through the use of renewable energy and measures to reduce urban pollution (GoBF, 2015a).

18

FIGURE 7: PROJECTED COSTS OF NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLAN PER SECTOR FOR BURKINA FASO Health 5%

Water security 2%

Infrastructure and housing 10%

Agriculture 34% Environment 10%

Animal resources 10%

Energy 29% SOURCE: GoBF, 2015

Apart from multi-sector strategies, climate change is mainstreamed through several sectoral policies. Of major importance is the agricultural sector, for which Burkina Faso is often praised for its performance, strong commitments and progressive policies (Loada, 2014), despite constraining climatic conditions. By signing the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Agreement in 2010, Burkina Faso recognised agricultural sector development as crucial for sustainable development and committed to spending at least 10% of the national budget to agricultural development (NEPAD, 2013). However, literature shows that increasing agricultural growt not necessarily contributes to poverty reduction and increased resilience (see box 10) Policies in the agricultural sector are led by the Rural Development Strategy (SDR) and the National Programme for the Rural Sector. Concerning the water sector with a focus on the importance of water management in all sectors, the government adopted the Action Plan for the Integrated Water Resources Management (PAGIRE), proposing an integrated approach to water management instead of sectoral and in addition, founding the National Water Council (CNE) as an coordinating body (GoBF, 2003). This explains the relatively small budget allocation to the water sector: instead, water management is integrated in multiple sectors.

During the last two decades, Burkina Faso has established several institutional structures for the creation and implementation of climate change related policies. However, although the institutions are in place, a general lack of funding and capacity seems to hinder a strong

19

institutional framework in the country. Below, some of the main institutional structures and their performances are described.

As the Focal point to the UNFCCC and the CDM, the National Council on Environment and Sustainable development and its Permanent Secretariat (SP/CONEDD) plays a leading role in policy and implementation of environmental issues. It is operating under the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development and entails three divisions: the division of environmental policy (DPE), the division of competence development, information and environmental monitoring (DCIME) and the division for the participation and coordination of international conventions on the environment (DPCIE) (CONEDD, 2016). Recently, it has also founded the National Observatory of the Environment and Sustainable Development, as an overarching body for environmental monitoring and evaluation, working closely with the National Environmental Information Programme, which coordinates and facilitates information exchange between governmental agencies working on sustainable development (UN, 2016).

Operating on the same institutional level is the National Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (SP/CONASUR). Although working with different mandates, Both CONEDD and CONASUR are operating in the same field of climate change adaptation and mitigation, but coordination and coordination between the two agencies lacks. (World Bank, 2009) In 1995, Burkina Faso established an inter-ministerial committee for climate change implementation actions (CIMAC). However, this committee has ceased its activities due to a lack of resources (GoBF, 2014). Although institutional structures seem to be present on paper, many policy documents refer to a lack of capacity and resources of institutions and agencies to be operational, for example the institutional framework in the agricultural sector as described by the SNC: Burkina Faso still did not find the pertinent institutional framework to boost the development of its agriculture. Worse than that, the regional directorates in charge of agriculture do not have the staff or means to be operational. The few agents there are becoming old due to the fact that recruitments are decreasing down. The situation is practically identical in research centres and agricultural training. (GoBF, 2014, p. 57.)

CLIMATE FINANCE IN BURKINA FASO: As in the case of Ghana and Kenya, it is unclear how much climate finance has been committed in the country so far and to what extent this is funding is additional or relabelled ODA (see box 2).

Burkina Faso does not have the public finance systems in place to track climate or environmental finance (GoBF, 2013b). As a result, there exists no comprehensive data on climate change finance in Burkina Faso. Recent estimations of projected spending to address climate change in Burkina Faso stem from the NAP (2015). However, the Environmental Intervention Fund (FIE), described in box 9, should provide the country with a comprehensive and transparent way of managing climate finance by the ministry in charge, the MEDD. The FIE has been created under the Environmental bill in 1997, but it is up to this date not operational yet. The fund has been officially established through a decree in May 2015. The establishment has been supported by Luxemburg and Sweden but the fund is still in the developing phase. In the future, the fund is meant to be managing internal as well as external funds and revenue created by emission reductions for any intervention regarding to the environment, including adaptation and mitigation activities (GoBF, 2015b).

20

FIGURE 8a: CLIMATE FINANCE COMMITMENT BY OBJECTIVE

Integrated (Adaptation and Mitigation) 9%

FIGURE 8b: CLIMATE FINANCE COMMITMENT BY SECTOR

Health 3%

Other multisector 2%

Education 2%

Banking & financial services 2%

Water supply & sanitation 4%

Adaptation 33%

Energy 48%

Mitigation 58% Agriculture, forestry, fishing 39%

SOURCE: OECD, 2016

As briefly discussed in the previous section, the NAP is estimated to cost US$ 6.6 billion, to be funded from the national budget, bilateral and multilateral development partners, international foundations, NGO’s and the private sector. According to the INDC, the private sector is expected to contribute up to 50% of funding, that should be accomplished through ‘establishing mechanisms likely to urge the private sector to further invest in the issues related to climate change through for examples improvement systems for industries or companies meeting certain criteria related to the consideration of the climate change dimension in their activities’(GoBF, 2014).

As said, there is very little data on actual spending from the national budget and the private sector, but there is data on contributions from multilateral and bilateral development partners, which accounts for most of climate finance (GoBF, 2013b). Data on climate finance from OECD members to Burkina Faso shows that in 2014, over US$ 150 million has been committed. As shown in chart 9, US$ 88 (59%) has been earmarked for mitigation purposes, US$ 50 million (33%) has been earmarked for adaptation purposes and US$ 13 million has been earmarked for both mitigation and adaptation. Top recipient sectors in 2014, shown in chart 10, were the energy sector, receiving US$ 58.2 million (or 38.7%) and the Agriculture, forestry and fishing sector, receiving US$ 48.2 million (or 32.1%). The most important donors for Burkina Faso’s climate finance were EU institutions, France and the IDA, counting for over US$ 83 million (or 55%) of total OECD funding in 2014 (OECD, 2016).

21

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AND PASTORALISM IN BURKINA FASO: As described in the above, Peul pastoralists are an important indigenous group in the northern regions of Burkina Faso. Many Peul maintain their nomadic livelihoods, travelling hundreds of kilometres from Burkina Faso to cross the borders into neighbouring countries in search for pastures and water for their cattle. This is sanctioned by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which allows for the free movement of people between member states.

Peul pastoralists in Burkina Faso, as is the vase in Ghana, although perhaps less intensively, are routinely marginalized. Conflicts between sedentary farmers and pastoralists not uncommon.

Indigenous groups, like the Peul, are not recognized by the constitution, and although they formally have rights to education and healthcare, in practice, they have very limited access. ‘The fear is that one day, they may decide to take up arms like some other nomadic pastoralists have already done in Nigeria’ (IWGIA, 2015), resulting in more insecurity and conflict in the country.

In 2002, Burkina Faso adopted the Code Pastoral, or Pastoral Act, which ‘guarantees pastoralists right to grazing lands, equitable natural resource use, and the movement of their herds’(Hughes, 2014, p. 20). It was complemented by the 2009 Rural Land Tenure System Law, that aimed to ensure equitable access to rural land, promoting investments in agriculture, forestry and pastoralism, reducing poverty and promoting sustainable resource management (Hughes, 2014, p. 20). However, implementation of these laws are very limited and do not take into account coexisting customary laws, that vary from locality to locality. In addition, as Hesse and Thébaud (2006) argue, policies that aim to assign fixed grazing lands to pastoralists, such as the Pastoralist policy act, undermine the adaptive capacity of pastoralists to continuously (re)negotiate access to land and natural resources, limiting their flexibility to move when climatic variation requires them to do so.

A relatively new development in Burkina Faso has been the creation of a network of Pastoralists in West-Africa, such as the establishment of an indigenous movement association, after several meetings between pastoral leaders in 2014. The Association, named Association Finaatawaa, is meant to stand up for the rights of pastoralists and address their challenges. Boureima (2009) describes the West-African Bilital Maroobe, ‘the promotion of livestock farmers’ and is a network of Pastoralist and Livestock Farmer Organisations (RBM), defending economic, political, social and cultural interests of pastoralists. In Burkina Faso, national level platforms are, for example the Féderation des Eleveurs du Burkina (Federation of Livestock Framers of Burkina), Réseau de Communication des Pasteurs (Pastoralist Communication Network) and the Comité Régional des Unités de production du Sahel (Regional Committee for Sahelian Production Units/CRUS).

Although the RBM has done well so far, by, for example, advocating activities, giving training courses to its members on advocacy, conflict management and planning. This level of organisation by pastoralists is not evident in Ghana. Despite the progress in integrating pastoral livelihoods in national development and climate change policy frameworks, a remaining challenge is the lack of active involvement on all levels of policymaking and the need for a more thorough and technical understanding of the challenges faced by pastoralists, such as those resulting from climatic changes (Boureima, 2009).

22

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

I

n the above, main policies regarding climate change of Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso were described. All countries, middle- and lower-income, are increasingly vulnerable to climate change, with large differences between regions on a national level. In addition, this paper briefly reviewed climate change financing in the same countries and furthermore illustrated ways in which policies often lack, are not aligned or coordinated with other (developmental) policies or are not consistent with the practice of climate change mitigation or adaptation. This section will discuss the overall trends, similarities and differences between policies and climate finance in the three countries.

When comparing Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso on specific climate change policies (see table X below), it is noted that so far, only Ghana has adopted a National Climate Change Policy in which it provides a framework for addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation in the entire country. Although Kenya is in the process of providing such a policy document, it is, at the time of writing, not available or in use. For now, climate change is integrated as part of the Environmental policy, as is the case in Burkina Faso. With a lack of a national climate change policy, both Kenya and Burkina Faso operate from their environmental policies in combination with strategy plans.

Main CC policy

Ghana National Climate Change policy (2013)

Main strategy document

National Adaptation Strategy

Priority sectors in national policies

1. Equitable social development 2. Natural resource development 3. Energy

Most funded sectors

1. Energy 2. Water & Sanitation 3. Financial sector

Kenya National Environmental Policy (2013) National Climate Change Response Strategy (2010) 1. Energy 2. Water and Sanitation 3. Forestry 1. Energy 2. Water and Sanitation

Burkina Faso Environmental Code (1997) National Adaptation Plan (2015) 1. Agriculture 2. Energy 3. Animal resources 3. Environment 3. Infrastructure & housing 1. Energy 2. Agriculture 3. Water and sanitation

Considering the priorities set by different policy documents, Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso all emphasize that, being developing countries, they are no major contributors to climate change, while experiencing the most effects of climate change. Increasing their resilience through climate change adaptation is therefore the priority in climate change policy discourse. Table X above shows the top 3 priority sectors to which countries projected most shares of their spending, according to their policy documents and strategies. While Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso all prioritize the energy sectors, other priority sectors differ from equitable social development in Ghana to water and sanitation in Kenya and agriculture in Burkina Faso. It must be emphasized that, although these sectors are prioritized within policy and strategy documents, actual spending patterns do not always follow the priorities set by the countries, which is most evident in Ghana when looking at priority sectors and the most funded sectors. Furthermore notable is the fact that the energy sector in all countries is the most funded sector regarding climate-related spending.

23

Regarding climate finance, there are major differences in the amounts of climate finance. Kenya, which received over US$ 814 million received by far the most climate finance of all three countries in 2014 (OECD, 2016). Ghana received US$ 214 million and Burkina Faso received US$ 150 million. In all three countries, the major share of climate change funding originates from donor countries, which might explain the inconsistency between national policies and actual spending on climate change in the three countries. For example, Sarpong and Anyidoho (2012) argue that, ‘climate change processes in Ghana are driven less by an independent assessment of the problem than by international climate change negotiations and available financing for climate change policy making and programming’ (Sarpong & Anyidoho, 2012, p.4) This discrepancy becomes clearer when looking funding spent on either mitigation or adaptation activities. While Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso all prioritize adaptation, most funding is destined for mitigation activities (see chart X below)

FIGURE 9: CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCING FROM OECD COUNTRIES PER OBJECTIVE IN GHANA, KENYA and BURKINA FASO IN 2014 900 800

75

700 600 500 472 400 300 11

200

12 266

136

88

100 67

0

50

Ghana

Kenya Adaptation

Mitigation

Burkina Faso Both

In other words, the climate change agenda is considered to be dominated by the needs and provided funds of donor countries instead of the needs of the developing countries, which focuses more on mitigating the effects of climate change and reducing global GHG emissions. This results, for example, in the major emphasis on mitigation projects and very little attention towards adaptation. It is reflected in the climate finance figures, (see chart X in the above) that shows that the majority of available funds are destined for mitigation activities. However, when aiming to align funds with national policies of developing countries, difficulties might arise when national policies or institutional frameworks are inexistent, inadequate or incoherent. This shows the importance of a strong national climate change policy and institutional framework, which has

24

been found in all three countries to be characterized by uncoordinated activities and responsibilities between institutions and often lacks the capacity to implement policies.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND PASTORALISM: In the above, this synthesis paper has paid specific attention to policies regarding the position of pastoralist communities in Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso. In all three countries, pastoralist livelihoods are of major importance in the arid and semi-arid areas, where they have been marginalized for a long time. Climate change has increased scarcity over natural resources, forcing pastoralists to migrate further and hereby contributing to further conflict, marginalization and increased vulnerability of groups that already belong to the poorest groups of society.

In the past decades and still, pastoralists are considered by local and national policymakers as inefficient and environmental destructive livelihoods, even though research has proven it to be economically efficient and viable within an environment of scarcity of arid and semi-arid lands (IICD, 2006). In Ghana, Kenya and Burkina Faso, pastoralists groups are barely involved in any political process and have very limited access to resources and services such as healthcare and education.

In recent years, marginalisation of pastoralist groups has been increasingly addressed in Africa.

In 2010, the African Union published its Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities (2010). It thereby began actively addressing the marginalization of pastoralists in the policy spheres.

Although this message has been picked up by many African governments, from this analysis, Ghana seems to lag behind in addressing the vulnerability to climate change of Fulani pastoralists in the northern regions. Fulani pastoralists are being heavily marginalised and there is no legal instrument or policy document that enables them to migrate, entitles them to pastoral lands and other natural resources.

Kenya and Burkina Faso both have several policy documents in place that acknowledges and protects pastoral livelihoods and addresses their vulnerability to climate change. Some examples are the Pastoral act (2002) and the Rural Land Tenure System Law (2009) in Burkina Faso, and the ASAL Policy (2012) in Kenya. The presence of pastoral policy in Kenya and Burkina Faso has positively affected the position, security and rights of pastoralists. However, a lot of work still needs to be done to fully acknowledge and address pastoralist rights and vulnerability to climate change. For example, as Hesse and Thébaud (2006) argue, the assignment of designated grazing lands to pastoralists, which is one of the aspects of pastoralist policies in the Sahel, still embodies old-fashioned ideas of sedentarising and modernizing pastoralists, by assigning them to fixed lands: (…)[pastoralist policy] seeks to replace customary systems of resource access, driven by what is perceived by outsiders to be a rather ‘messy’ process of social and political bargaining between actors, with a more orderly and technical system. This, it is believed, will make pastoral production in the Sahel more secure. Yet, this could not be further from the truth.

Customary systems, for all their apparent ‘messiness’, allow pastoralists to respond in a very flexible and opportunistic manner to the unpredictable Sahelian environment where pastures and water resources are highly dispersed in time and space (Hesse & Thébaud, 2006) 25

The effect of a measure like this, is the inability for pastoralists to continually negotiate access to natural resources according to varying local climatic conditions and might result in decreased resilience to climate change. The core of the problem, Hesse and Thébaud argue, lies with inadequate understanding of policymakers and local government officials of the dynamics of Sahelian livelihoods and the significance of pastoralism. This knowledge is necessary to make adequate policy (Hesse & Thébaud, 2006).

REFERENCES Actionaid. (2011). Say No to Soil Carbon Markets !, (June).

Agyemang-Bonsu, W. K., Dougherty, B., Fencl, A., & Kemp-Benedict, E. (2008). Ghana Country Report. Retrieved from http://fs.wa4.lucklaboratories.com/knowledgebase/wikiadapt/images/0/0e/FINAL_DRAFT_-_Ghana_16FF5D-1-.pdf Allen, R., & Radev, D. (2010). Extrabudgetary Funds. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/2010/tnm1009.pdf Asante, F. A., Bawakyillenuo, S., Bird, N., Trujillo, N. C., Tagoe, C. A., & Ashiabi, N. (2015). Climate change f inance in Ghana.

Boureima, D. (2009). Regional Networking among the Pastoralist Communities of West-Africa: the Billital Maroobe Network. Indigenous Affairs - International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, (1-2/09), 54–59. doi:10.1016/j.midw.2010.11.002 Bukari, K. N., & Schareika, N. (2015). Stereotypes, prejudices and exclusion of Fulani pastoralists in Ghana. Pastoralism, 5(1), 20. doi:10.1186/s13570-015-0043-8 Cameron, C. (2011). Climate Change Financing and Aid Effectiveness, Ghana Case Study. Retrieved from http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Climate+Change+Financ ing+and+Aid+Effectiveness+Ghana+Case+Study#2 CONEDD. (2016). Cadre Institutionnel. Retrieved March 21, 2016, from http://www.oneddburkina.info/index.php/institutionel Doumbia, S., Jalloh, A., & Diouf, A. (2014). Review of research and policies for climate change adaptation in the health sector in West Africa.

Elmi, M., & Birch, I. (2013). Creating Policy Space for Pastoralism in Kenya. Future Agricultures, (July Working Paper).

EPA. (2000). First National Communication to the UNFCCC. doi:10.1002/ejoc.201200111 EPA. (2011). Ghana’ s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC , 2011. UNFCCC Focal Point, Ghana Energy Resources and Climate Change Unit, (2), 168. Retrieved from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/ghana_second_nationalcommunication_final_versio n.pdf EPA. (2014). Climate Finance Architecture and Readiness in Ghana. Retrieved from http://www.peerevaluation.org/data/98e6f17209029f4ae6dc9d88ec8eac2c/PE_doc_302 31.pdf EPA. (2015). Ghana ’ s Third National Communication Report to the UNFCCC. GaiaFoundation. (n.d.). Farming Carbon Credits a Con for Africa: The many faces of Climate 26

Smart Agriculture. Retrieved March 11, 2016, from http://www.gaiafoundation.org/blog/farming-carbon-credits-a-con-for-africa-the-manyfaces-of-climate-smart-agriculture GoBF. Code de l’environnement au Burkina Faso (1997). Presidence du Faso.

GoBF. (2003). Resources Action Plan for Integrated Water Resources Management in Burkina Faso. Water Resources.

GoBF. DECRET N° 2015-838/PRES-TRANS/PM/MEF/MERH du 13 juillet 2015 portant création, missions, organisation et fonctionnement du Fonds d’Intervention pour l’Environnement (FIE). JO N°41 DU 08 OCTOBRE 2015 (2013). Retrieved from http://www.legiburkina.bf/m/Sommaires_JO/D%C3%A9cret_2015_00838 .htm GoBF. (2013b). Politique Nationale de Développement Durable (PNDD) Au Burkina Faso.

GoBF. (2014). Second national communication of Burkina Faso on climate change.

GoBF. (2015a). BURKINA FASO NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PLAN ( NAP ).

GoBF. (2015b). Intended National Determined Contriution of Burkina Faso.

GoG. (1988). Envrionmental Action Plan.

GoG. Environmental Protection Agency Act (1994).

GoG. (2015). Ghana’s intended nationally determined contribution ( INDC ) and accompanying explanatory note. GH-INDC. GoK. (1999). Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1999 on evironment and development. Retrieved from http://www.fankenya.org/downloads/Kenya’sDraftEnvironmentPolicy.pdf GoK. (2009). National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands “ Releasing Our Full Potential .”

GoK. (2010). National Climate Change Response Strategy.

GoK. (2012). NCCAP Subcomponent 8: Finance. Kenya National Climate Fund. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 GoK. (2013a). National Climate Change Action Plan 2013 -2017.

GoK. (2013b). National environment policy, 2013. Retrieved from http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken147906.pdf GoK. Climate Change Bill (2014).

Hesse, C., & Thébaud, B. (2006). Will pastoral legislation disempower pastoralists in the sahel?

Indigenous Affairs, 1, 14–23.

Hughes, O. (2014). Literature review of land tenure in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Context and Opportunities.

IDLO. (n.d.). Kenya National Climate Change Action Plan : Enabling Policy and Regulatory Framework Output 1 : Legal Preparedness Assessment Report KENYA NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN ENABLING POLICY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OUTPUT 1 : LEGAL PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMEN.

27

IICD. (2006). Making decentralisation work for sustainable natural resource management in the Sahel.

IWGIA. (2015). Yearbook 2015: Burkina Faso (Vol. 262). doi:10.1787/aid_glance-2011-22-en Knoke, I., & Duwe, M. (2012). Climate Change Financing : the Concept of Additionality.

Lawson, A., Boadi, G., Ghartey, A., Killick, T., Agha, Z. K., & Williamson, T. (2007). Joint Evaluation of Multi-Donor Budget Support to Ghana Based on OECD-DAC methodology Volume One : Evaluation Results and Recommendations on Future Design & Management of Ghana MDBS. Loada, A. (2014). The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) process in Burkina Faso: from false start to restart towards rural development? Working Paper - Future Agricultures (Vol. 85 pp. 19). Retrieved from \nhttp://www.futureagricultures.org/publications/re..

Maina, I., Newsham, A., & Okoti, M. (2013). Agriculture and Climate Change in Kenya : Climate Chaos , Policy Dilemmas, (June), 7–10.

Mcgray, H., Hammill, A., & Bradley, R. (2007). r e p o r t Weathering the Storm Options for Framing Adaptation. World Resources Institute. Retrieved from http://pdf.wri.org/infosheet_weathering_the_storm.pdf MENR. (1987). Evaluation report on the national environment secretariat.

MENR. (2015). Kenya’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. doi:10.1007/s13398-0140173-7.2 MESTI. (2013). Ghana National Climate Change Policy, 88.

Mutimba, S., & Wanyoike, R. (2013). Towards a coherent and cost-effective policy response to climate change in Kenya: Country Report.

NCEA. (2012). Climate Change Profile Kenya.

NEPAD. (2013). Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme - Factsheet. doi:Website: http//www.nepad.org; E-mail: sundayd@nepad.org; E-mail: mkandawirer@nepad.org OECD. (2016). Climate-related development finance in 2014 from OECD DAC statistics.

Retrieved March 23, 2016, from https://public.tableau.com/views/Climate-RelatedAid_new/Recipientperspective?:embed=y&:showTabs=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizH ome=no#1 Olaniyan, A., Francis, M., & Okeke-Uzodike, U. (2015). The cattle are “ghanaians” but the herders are strangers: Farmer-herder conflicts, expulsion policy, and pastoralist question in agogo, Ghana. African Studies Quarterly, 15(2), 53–67.

Ongugo, P. O., Langat, D., Oeba, V. O., Kimondo, J. M., Owuor, B., Njuguna, J., … Russel, A. J. M. (2014). A review of Kenya ’ s national policies relevant to climate change adaptation and mitigation. Insights from Mount Elgon.

Roe, A., & Samuel, J. (2007). Ghana Country Case Study The challenge of mineral wealth : using resource endowments to foster.

RoK. (2015). Kenya: Second National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on climate change. Executive Summary.

28

Sarpong, D. B., & Anyidoho, N. A. (2012). Climate Change and Agricultural Policy Processes in Ghana (No. 45). Working paper, 45.

Sharma, S., & Suppan, S. (2011). Elusive Promises of the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project, (September), 5. Retrieved from http://www.iatp.org/documents/elusive-promises-of-thekenya-agricultural-carbon-project UN. (2016). INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN BURKINA FASO. Retrieved March 21, 2016, from http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/burkfaso/inst.htm UNDP. (2011). Blending Climate Finance Through National Climate Funds, 1–64. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment and Energy/Climate Change/Capacity Development/Blending_Climate_Finance_Through_National_Climate_Funds.pdf UNECA. (2013). An Assessment of Agricultural Sector Policies and Climate Change in Kenya : Nexus between Climate Change Related Policies , Research.

UNFCCC. (2009). Copenhagen Accord.

World Bank. (2009). Country Note on Disaster Risk Management and Adaptation to Climata Change in Burkina Faso, (2), 1–13.

29

ANNEX 1. Ghana’s Institutional Framework for climate change activities. Source: (EPA, 2015)

Comparative analysis

Examples:

https://public.tableau.com/views/Climate-RelatedAid_new/Recipientperspective?:embed=y&:showTabs=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome= no#1

30

http://glopolis.org/en/articles/impacts-biofuel-production-developing-countries/ file:///C:/Users/F122383/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/Downloads/sustainability-0604587.pdf COMPARATIVE:

31