AIRLINE OPS MIKE GOUGH
SPLIT SECOND DECISIONS
“This will be a go-orientated takeoff. However, in the event of a decision to stop before V1, I will call STOP, close the thrust levers and apply full reverse thrust. You will monitor and call DECEL, Reverse Green and notify ATC. I will bring the aircraft to a stop, set the park brake, and tell the cabin crew to Standby or remain seated.”
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HIS WAS A PART OF EACH and every working day for me and my colleagues until the industry, and specifically my current employer, (up till this point) went to hell in a handbasket. The ‘sing song’ was performed during the preparation for the first flight of the day, and for subsequent sectors (flights) we were permitted to simply mention ‘Standard RTO’, to save a bit of time and verbiage. This is how we were to prepare ourselves for that one-in-three-thousand chance of having to decide that it was safer to stay on the ground than to continue with the take-off, in a worst case scenario, at around 260 kilometres per hour.
flights per day globally (pre-pandemic) that means we should be seeing at least one or two rejected takeoffs per day. The statistic for runway over-run events (being unable to stop and barrelling off the end of the runway) as a result of a high-speed RTO happens once every 4 500 000 takeoffs, which is somewhat more reassuring that the calculations we make actually work. I have been fortunate that within the 25 years of airline operations that I have been exposed to, I have had one, low-speed, RTO.
spectacular deceleration, with scant regard for passenger comfort
A quick look at that statistic – one in three thousand – is a little scary. That is the average of rejected takeoffs (RTOs) in commercial transport aircraft versus normal takeoffs, globally. Considering the entire industry does around 5670 20
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My situation occurred during a training flight in an Airbus 319. It was literally a dark and stormy night at Johannesburg, departing for Maputo, with a trainee First Officer in the right hand seat. It was his sector, so he was Pilot Flying for the take off.
As per the RTO briefing, the Captain is responsible not only for the decision to stop, but also for the actions to initiate it, irrespective of whose sector it is. The FO in this case stabilised thrust (as per Standard Operating
