The Search for Water in the South Coastal Area of Santa Barbara County

WATER VOL. 13 No. 3

SlUMMER 1967

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The Search for Water In The South Coastal Area of Santa Barbara County PREFACE Master Thesis Prepared by James Eckman

The story of much of the American West has been and still is the story of its search for water. The economic prosperity or the economic failure of many a western town or city can be largely measured by its success in obtaining water. Such has been the story of Southern California, and more particularly, the subject of this jjajx'r—the South Coast region of Santa Barbara County. This area is a narrow band of land about twentyfive miles long and from two to five miles wide, lying between the Santa Ynez Mountains and the Pacific Ocean. In this region are the city of Santa Barbara and the agricultural and suburban lands of Goleta, Montecito, Garpinteria and Summerland. Until the mid-1950's this region’s economy was one largely dependent upon agriculture. Since that time its economy has been based more on manufacturing and gov'crnmentrelated activities, particularly those associated with national defense and space programs.

The purpose of this thesis is to tell the story of how the South Coast has obtained its ^\■ater supply from the Mission jjcriod to the present day.

Much of this story is fi lled with the agonizing details of how man thought he had succeeded, only to realize failure shortly thereafter. The frustrations of a “well run dry” have clouded Santa Barbara’s future for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Too often the residents of this area have been satisfied \vith a supply of water which, while satisfactory for the present, provided no assurances for the future. Only since the mid1950’s, with the completion of the Cachuma Project and the memory of the drought of 1948 still fresh in their memories, have the pcojde of the South Coast looked to the future and its water needs.

A thesis of this nature owes a debt of obligation to many, .\mongst those in Santa Barbara, Mr. Edward Elevatorski. Chief Engineer of the Santa Barbara County ^Vater Agency; Mr. Xeil Mendenall. manager of the Santa Barbara City W’ater l)epartment; and Mrs. Erma Powell, a collector of documents on the Cachuma Project, must be mentioned for their cooperation and encouragement. The staffs of the Santa Barbara City Libraiy, the Santa Barbara Historical Society, and the Santa Barbara News-Press have been most helpful in pro\-iding materials needed for the research of this thesis.

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A special thanks belongs to Dr. Norris Hundley, chairman of the writers committee, who not only has offered encouragement through tlic rigors of writing a master’s thesis, but whose very excitement over the subject of water and the American West has been an inspiration. Special thanks also belongs to the other Committee members. Professors John W. Caughey and James T. Lemon.

The author finally wishes to thank his ^\●ife, Charlene, ^vhose under standing has been most appreciated.

THE EARLY SEARCH Santa Barbara was first settled in 1782 by Captain Jose Francisco Ortega. Four years later, in 1786, Father Fermln Francisco de Lasuen established Mission Santa Barbara. This mission, under the direction of the Franciscan padres, was to serve as the spiritual center not only for the Spanish soldiers who were stationed there, but also for the native Chumash Indians. As was so often the story of Spanish settlements, one of the first tasks facing the soldiers and padres was to fi nd a satisfactory water supply.

The historical recoi'd for this early Mission period of Santa Barbara’s history is almost void of any information relating to the community’s early search for water. Historians of the j)eriod have had to rely upon a study of the ruins of the early water systems in order to obtain a partial jncture as to how water was obtained. ^Vitll water such a basic and commonplace need for these early settlers, it is certainly understandable why they made no special mention of their search for it.

The early water supply for llie presidio came from two sources, The fi rst source was mentioned in George Vancouver’s reminiscences of his travels along llie Pacific Coast. Vancouver had been dispatched by the British government to seek a settlement in the Nootka Sound contro\ersy between England and Spain and, during his travels, he stopped at tlie small settlement of Santa Barbara in November, 1793. Tn the writings of his visit there, lie devoted considerable space to the Presidio's water supply. Vancouver obtained some water for liis ship’s water barrels from a well at the presidio which he described as “a large well of excellent water.” Most of his supply, however, was obtained from a spring which Vancouver, himself, discovered near the shoreline. He was most hajipy to have found this spring, for otherwise he would have had to have used the brackish water from coastal wells that had pre\’iously supplied all vessels stopjiing at Santa Barbara.

The second source from which the presidio obtained ^\-ater was Mis sion Creek. Captain Ortega had directed the construction of a gra\'ityflow aqueduct, some one and one-half miles in length, from the creek to the presidio. Evidence exists that water continued to How in this acjueduct at least until I86f)—long after the jiresidio was in ruin.s—and supplied water to those who lived along its route.

In those same early days, the Fathers at the Mission obtained their water from Mission Creek and several nearby springs. .Although the jjresidio was a distance from the Mi.ssion, there is a strong possibility that the padres obtained some of their water from their neighbors too. It soon

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became apparent to them, liovvcver, tliat the Mission could not exist on such a limited C|uantity of v\alcr. Drouth had made its impression in the years 1794 and 1795, with so few provisions having been grown, that the Indians had to search far and wide for food. Then, too, the Mission was expanding rapidly into a self-sustaining comniunity and would need an ample water supply not only for domestic and agricultural use, but al.so for milling and tanning. With these considerations in mind, plans were submitted in 1799 for a water system which hopefully would suffice for the small community.

The building of the initial reservoir in 1806 witnessed the beginning of a water system which, when completed, stood as a testimonial to the brilliance and j^erscverance of the padres and their Indian helijers. Thou sands of stone blocks for the walls and aqueducts had to be cut by hand.

Foundations iiad to be dug in rocky soil without the use of modern equip ment. Lime needed for cement had to be obtained from scashells by burning them in kilns. When finally completed, the system included two dams, two reseiwoirs, a water power grist mill, a filter house, one fountain, and many aqueducts.

The two dams, built on bedrock and buttressed on the downstream side, were of masonry construction. I'he first dam, Indian Dam, was built in 1807 on Mission Creek, approximately one and one-half miles from the Mission. This dam was fifteen f(;et in height and backed up water for about one hundred yards. This stored water was then directed by way of an aqueduct to the reservoirs. The second dam was built in Rattlesnake Canyon on the east fork of Mission Creek and was solely a diversion structure. It was situated about three miles from the Mission.

Both of these dams can still be seen today.

'Fhese dams diverted water into two reser\oirs which were located some five hundred feet from the Mission. 'J'he lower reservoir, with a capacity of 525,000 gallons, was the main storage deposit, It is still in use today. I'he second reservoir, or mill reservoii, was hexagonal in shape and ser\-ed as a storage depot for the operation of the mill. This reser\’oir was directly above the main reservoir and was separated from it by the grist mill. The water used in operating the grist mill was obtained from the upper reservoir and then, after passing through the mill, flowed on to the lower reservoir. 'The water then left the latter and was carried out to the orchards and fields for irrigation by means of the aqueducts.

Constructed of sandstone, tlie aqueducts’ ciiannels were generalb' ten inches deej) although they \-aried according to the level of terrain.

The filter house stood close to the mill re.ser\-oir and received water from the same aqueduct which brought water to the reservoirs. Tlie water was ])assed over chai'coal and sandstone, and then through a clay pipe system which led to the Mission.

With the completion of the Mission water system, the j^adres had adequate insurance against the dn- summers of the South Coastal area.

Proving to be most adequate for much of the nineteenth centurv. this system, through a series of acjiieducts which were built, was also used to help supplement the i3residio’s water sujjply.

In attempting to discover information concerning Santa Barbara’s .3

water history from the completion of the Mission water works to the estab lishment of Santa Barbara’s first water company in 1872, the author has been frustrated at every attempt. Consequently, what information is avail able had to be gathered from the writings of other historians. Unfortunately, these writers did not cite their sources.

In addition to \vater supplied from the Mission sj'stem, the citizens of the South Coastal area during the nineteenth century’ obtained water from the Dc la Guerra Springs. These springs were located east of the Presidio, and water was distributed from them by means of horse-drawn carts and then sold by the bucketful to the residents. There is no mention as to who sold the water, but it can be assumed that it was the work of a local entrepreneur.

There can be no doubt, however, that there was concern over the lack of water during this period. Becoming an American city in 1850, Santa Barbara began to grow rapidly in the days that followed. On December 11, 1856, the Santa Barbara Gazette reported that a party of young men were boring an artesian well on the property of a Mr. Forbush. Through out the months that followed, the Gazette closely followed the drilling of the well. On January 15, 1857, the Gazette reported: The artesian well in this city, that is being bored by Mr. Forbush on his own premises, has a depth now of 115 feet. Water stands in the well at about five feet from the surface of the ground.

We are glad to see the enterprise of our citizens manifested in this particular. We feel sanguine of their ultimate success, and when the great object shall have been attained, its benefits will be almost incalculable.

In its February 26, 1857, issue the Gazette reported that the pros pecting for city artesian wells was discontinued because it was being prosecuted on private property. This was the first reference, by the Gazette, to any attempt being made by the city. The city evidently be came interested in artesian wells because of the local success of Mr. Forbush’s well.

In April, 1857, the Gazette, in commenting upon the severe drought along the South Coast, made yet another reference to the importance of finding water. In referring to the frequent use of artesian wells on the drought-ridden Great Plains, the paper commented that “unless water can be abundantly obtained from artesian wells, it is quite obvious that the settlement of this locality will not advance with much rapidity. Unfor tunately, this was the last comment made by the Gazette about the need for artesian wells and there is no further record of their use until 1887.

In that year a private water company was formed whose source of supply was a group of artesian wells.

Throughout the decade of the 1860’s, the residents of this area con tinued to feel the need for a greater water sujjply. That this need \vas an urgent one was impressed upon them by the great drouth of 18631864. The severity of this drouth can be realized when one observes the number of cattle that died because there was no grass for them to cat.

In 1863 there were over 200,000 cattle in the Santa Barbara area: in 1864 there were less than 5,000. This drouth closed the era of the ranchos 4

\vliich, in turn, divided these huge land holdings into smaller farms and subsequently brought in more settlers—settlers who put a strain on the already limited water supply.

On December 27, 1872, a group of local investors formed the Mission \Vatcr Company. This was the first, in a series of significant steps which occurred in the final thirty years of the nineteenth century that witnessed community action to resolve the issue of a deficient water supply. Recording a population of 2,889 in 1870, the community could no longer turn away from the problem. The water company purchased the entire Mission water works. The transfer of ownership was consummated between Bishop Amat, the trustee of the Diocese of Monterey and Los Angeles and the Alission Water Company of Santa Barbara.

The water company received: the ownership, use and possession of the dams, reservoirs, ditches and other water works pertaining to utilization of \vaters naturally flowing in said Mission Creek.

The bishop received: one-sixth of all the shares of the capital stock of the company which was 2,000 shares. The company received the use of the waters of the creek, all dams, resen^olrs, ditches and waterworks, all land on which these were located, with rights to construct whatever was neces sary, to lay jnpes on land to convey water, the right of way to and from the waterworks. The bishop retained the absolute right to use the water to sui^ply Mission Santa Barbara, the vineyard and gardens, the parochial church, the Sisters of Charity, all ha\’ing the right of one-half miner's inch, the Mission one miner’s inch with one-half for the vineyard. The pipes ^vere to be laid at the expense of the bishop.

The bishop retained the right to sell land subject to the rights of the water company.

Owned by O. N. Cadwell, the Mission Water Company laid a lateral pipe system to the most settled portions of the city. Its rates were two dollars per month for each tenement occupied by not more than six persons.

For each additional resident the charge was twenty-five cents. If this proved unsatisfactory, ^\-ater consumers could use a meter and pay at a rate of fifty cents per 1.000 gallons of water used.

In spite of the efforts of the Mission Water Company to bring water to the citizens of Santa Barbara, difficulties were still encountered. While satisfactory for the jn-esent, its supplies were not promising for the future.

Owen H. O’Neil reports in his History of Santa Barbara County that in 1876, a year of severe drought, the City Council appointed Fred Harkness and J. Dunshec to examine neighboring creeks in the hope of augmenting Santa Barbara’s water supply. A small sujjply of water was found by them in Cold Springs Canyon that helped carry the city through that year. A year later, O’Neil writes, the city considered issuing a bond for the purpose of improving the public water supply, but then abandoned it.

In 1887, a second water company was organized. This company, the De la Guerra Water Company, used the De la Guerra Springs for its resources. Seven artesian wells, from two hundred to seven hundred feet deep, were drilled by the company. These walls in an average year yielded 5

300.000 gallons daily. The water from tliese wells was discliargcd into one large concrete well or basin at night (twenty-five feet in diameter and tliirty feet deep., with a ca])acity of 110,160 gallons), and then pumped out during the day into the company’s distributive system.

Two years later, in January. 1BB9, the De la Guerra ^Vater Company and the Mission Water Company joined together to form the Santa Bar bara Water Company. Under the direction of its President, R. B. Canfield. the new company desired to offer the citizens of Santa Barbara (in 1890. the census recorded 5.864 residents) a better and more efficient water system. No new sources were found, however, and so, in spite of the con solidation of the community’s supj)ly, the people were still dependent upon Mission Creek and the artesian wells.

Suffering from another of its all too frequent droughts in 1889, the Common Council of Santa Barbara decided to seek a.ssistance in solving the city’s depressing problem. The Council thus appointed City Engineer George I'. Wright ‘’to make a reconnaissance as to the jjossible sources of water supply for the city of Santa Barbara, with an approximate estimate of the cost of bringing the water to tiie city for distribution.” Wright’s rc])ort covered the whole South Coast region including the Santa Ynez River Basin on the other side of the mountains. Submitting his rejmrt on October 19, 1889, Wright dismissed the idea of obtaining water from the South side of the Santa 5^ncv mountains as impracticable, “partly owing to the expense of gathering and conveying the supph’ from so many points and over .so long distances, and partly owing to the fact that all this water is claimed by riparian owners and individual water claimants and water companies organized to siij^ply districts adjacent to some of the streams.” \Vright did, however, have a source of water to recommend to the people of Santa Barbara: “1 considei' the Santa Ync? River above the mouth of Blue Canon to be not only an available source of supply, but the only source ])ossible for the future supply of Santa Barbara with an abundance of good potable water.” Along with this recommendation, lie encouraged the city to purchase 18,000 acres of land on the headwaters of the Santa Ynez River, for future development of this water supj^ly. Within this purcha.se were two reservoir sites, the Juncal (near tlie headwaters of the Santa Ynez River) and the Afain River site (below the mouth of Blue Canyon). In commenting upon the favorable reception the report received from the city, the Santa Barbara Weekly Press stated: “The report is exhaustix’e in its detail and is probably the most important document ever filed in this city.”

After studying the report, the Common Council decided to act upon its recommendations. The Council announced that a $300,000 bond issue would be voted upon on No\’ember 11, 1889. The bonds would be used to implement Wright’s recommendations for obtaining water on the Santa Ynez River. Before the city could vote on the issue, however, the Santa Barbara Water Company obtained an option on the ))roperty recom mended by Wright, thus temporarily, blocking the purpose of the citv.

When the citizens learned of this purchase, the bond issue was defeated by a \-ote of 204 for to 531 against.

Stifled by the water comijany, Santa Barbara’s city officials did not 6

know where to turn as their city entered the final decade of tlic nineteenth century. In a desperate effort to obtain temporary relief, an attempt ^\●as made at using salt water in the city’s sprinklers, but tliis soon proved to be impractical. As the concern grew, however, rational thinking ]3revailed, and definite proposals appeared from men concerned for the South Coast’s future. These proposals and the action they commenced are the subject of tlie next chapter.

THE SEARCH WIDENS In 1896, Eugene F. Sheffield, a cashier at the Santa Barbara County Xational Bank, provided the initial leadership his community needed in I'csolving its water problems. Sheffield was described as “a far-seeing and resourceful man, a shrewd fi ancier ^vho well knew the value of discreet diplomacy, a man of high honor and deep love for his city, and a man uhose public spirit and command of jjublic respect eminently fi tted him lor leadership.” J. B. Lippincott, head of the Flydrographic Branch of the United States Geological Survey, described Sheffield as “tireless in his ellorts, shrewd in his negotiations and loyal to the interests of the city.”

After having experienced two more years of drouth in 1894 and 1895, Sheffield decided that his city needed a municipally-owned water supply.

I o seek that goal, he advised the boring of a tunnel into the mountains behind Montecito which would yield additional water for the city. \N’hen Sheffield, himself, donated 320 acres in Cold Springs Canyon for the tunnel, the city decided to act. After having secured some additional land from a Mr. C. F. Eaton, the city began boring the tunnel under the direction of City Engineer, John Harrington. There was no intention of drilling the tunnel through the Santa '^hiez mountains to the Santa 5'nez River, but rather the tunnel was to bo a horizontal well, seven feet high and five feet wide at the base, extending 5,100 feet into the mountain side. Water \vas to be obtained from seepage into the tunnel. That this was possible is due to the geological formation of the Santa Ynez range which is favor able for the develojuncnt of underground water supi^lies. Consisting of highly stratified sandstone and shale formations, the mountains readily trap rain waters.

I^y 1897, the tunnel dcveloijcd a flow of aj^proximatelv 290 acre-feet per vear (one acre-foot equals 326,000 gallons) \vhich was sufficient for the city to justify construction of a main supply pipe from the tunnel to the city, a reservoir for water storage, and a distributive system to provide for fi re protection, street sprinkling and other municipal uses. As the cityentered the new century, the succc.ss of the tunnel was so encouraging and the demand for city water so great, it became necessai*)' to create a City Watr Commission.

The fi rst Commission members ^ . , X Tvr Eugene F. Sheffield.

I resident: J. N. Miller, Vice-President; and Thomas D. Wood, Secretarv.

In May, 1901, the local citizens appro\-ed a $60,000 bond issue for the purpose of enlarging the municipal system. On July 23, 1902. the Santa Barbara Independent, in an article “Public Ownership a Great Success” reported that since January 1, 1902, the city had laid 40,000 feet of pipe and installed some seventy-five fi re hydrants, practically completing the 7

water svstcm. The paper also reported that cash receipts for the fiscal vear ending July 1, 1902.. totaled $9,686.79, with a net profit of $1,797.44.

While the city was seeking to develop its own water supply, the Santa Barbara Water Company was also |)ursuing a course which would increase its output. In July, 1896, it put in a Worthington pump at the De la Guerra Springs which wougld produce a maximum of 1,000,000 gallons a day and also laid lines to connect it with tlie company’s distributive system. The Santa Barbara Daily News, perhaps still miffed by the com pany’s purchase of the land at the headwaters of the Santa Ynes River, greeted the new addition with cynicism: “It is given out that the Santa Barbara Water Company is putting down a big well to increase the water supply available to the city. It is well. It would have been better if the company had thought of the people’s wants before.”

Moreover, in that same July, 1896. the water company received a report on the development of a future water supply from its own engineer, Ernest J. S. Purslow. In his introduction, he stated: The present ^vater supply is so inadequate and incomplete, that it is a physical impossibility for the city to increase in size or population or for the surrounding country to advance in development until water is procured from a source other than those in the immediate \4cinity, which arc now all used to their fullest capacity. The scarcity of water is the first impression that visitors receive, and many who have desired to make this their home have abandoned the idea owing to the gravity of this drawback . . . Nothing has retarded the advance of the city, so much as the condition of the water supply, and nothing will pro mote its future prosperity and growth as much as a remedy for this condition.

His remedy was the construction of a masonry dam at the Juncal dam site near the headwaters of the Santa Ynez River. The cost for the construction of the dam and the needed pipe lines was estimated to be $300,000. He rejected the possibility of the company securing any addi tional sources of supply on the south side of the mountains. In this same report, Purslow also estimated the value of the water company’s holdings, inchiding the 17,000 acres it owned in the Santa Ynez basin to be $300,000.

The gross income of the water company was $28,000 a year from its supply of 600,000 gallons a day.

In an introduction to the rej^ort R. B. Canfield, President of the Santa Barbara Water Company, observed that “the city requires one million gal lons of water daily, and its steady growth, .soon to be accelerated by the completion of the railroad to San Francisco, will be constantly increasing this demand. He was, however, very optimistic after reading Purslow’s report and was most confident that his company could meet the challenge.

He wrote : “The sources of supply for the Santa Barbara Water Com pany are ample to meet the demands of the city and neighborhood for all time to come . . .”

Canfield’s enthusiasm subsided a few years later, however, for in May, 1901, the Santa Barbara Independent reported that he was ofl'ering to the city the opportunity to purchase the water works of the company, including all of its property on both sides of the mountains. Originally, the 8

])aper reported, his selling price was $300,000 but now he had lowered it to $175,000. Mayor C. A. Storke thought the price too high and the Independent concurred with him, stating that it was the contention of the paper “that the city should have a completed water distributing system of its own, one adequate to all needs of the city, even if such woi'ks will ]jut a private corporation out of business." The city did not purcliasc the company in 1901, and, in fact, appiwed a $60,000 bond issue for im provement in the city water system that same month.

In spite of the success of their Cold Springs Tunnel, Santa Barbara’s officials were well aware of the fact that they would need more water soon.

The city was growing rapidly and in 1902, alone, it increased in population by more than fifteen hundred people. On August 5, 1902, J. Linn Moyer, the City Engineer, issued a rcj)orl ba.sed on his reconnaissance through |)ortions of the Santa Ynez River basin. He concurred with the earlier reports of \Vright and Purslow in finding that this basin would yield a sufficient water supply for Santa Barbara. lie also discos’ered a new reservoir site, near Mono Creek, and strongly advised that further exam inations be made.

Acting on the recommendations of Aloyer’s report, the city emijloyed, shortly thereafter, J. B. Lippincott of Los Angeles, head of the Hydro graphic Branch of the United States Geological Survey, “to make investi gations and such others as would be necessary to pass intelligently on the water problem of Santa Barbara.” Lipjjincott carried on extensive studies of the South Coast’s water resources for the next few years, issuing a comprehensive report in March, 1903, and a considerably revised report in 1905.

In his intial report, entitled “Available Water Supply for the City of Santa Barbara, California,” Lippincott first reviewed the conclusions of the engineers ^\●ho had studied the j)robleni before him. They (Wright, Purslow and Moyer) agreed that the water supply was inadequate and that no sufficient source of water covdd be found on the south side of the mountains, but that it was “feasible and desirable to obtain an adequate sujjply of water from the drainage basin of the Santa Ynez River, and that this could be done at a profit.” It was frotn these reports that Lippincott took up the problem and prepared his own study. By citing figures, lie dem onstrated the difficulty the city faced. In 1903, the municipal water works was supplying water to 709 taps, while 900 taps were being fed from the Santa Barbara Water Company’s sources, He estimated that the current consumption of water per capita was 100 gallons daily as compared to Los Angeles where it was 242 gallons per day. For proper development of the city, Lippincott estimated that 150 gallons per capita, per day, should be used and it was upon these figures that he based his report.

He further concluded that the city was operating at a deficit of 250.000 gallons of water per day in an average year. He estimated that the present demand (1903) for water was 1,200,000 gallons of water per day for an estimated population of 8,045, but that the city only had 950,000 gallons per day available.

Upon presenting these figures, Lippincott next proceeded to a study of possible dam sites available for the city. He considered the possibility 9

of bringing water from the Ventura River b\' means of a gravity line across tlie mountains, but rejected it, after further study, as too costly and im practical. He also dismissed the Juncal and Main Ri\er sites because they belonged to the Santa Barbara Water Comi^any. He concluded that the Mono site, discosered by City Engineer Moyer, was the best available and was la\'ish \\ ●ith his ])raise of it: “This Mono leseiwoir site is one of unusual merit for Southern California and supreior to any other site that has been so far examined and reported upon in the drainage basin of the Santa Ynez River.’’ His fi nal recommendations in the 1903 rej)ort were; of the Mono (1) That the city of Santa Barbara obtain jjo.ssession Re.servoir site by purchase or condemnation, (21 That a tunnel be run through the Santa Ynez Range of moun tains into the drainage basin of the Santa Ynez River. It is probal)le that during the construction of this tunnel it will fur nish sufficient water which, taken in connection with your present supifiy will sustain you until additional supply is added.

(3) I'hat a rockfill dam be built at the Mono reservoir site to the height of eighty-five feet above the bed of the stream to augment your municipal supply.

One month after Lippincott issued his report he, by chance, when looking for a lost pack mule in the Santa Ynez River basin, came upon a dam site which impressed him e\-en more fa\'orably than the Mono site.

This site, called Giljraltar, was located downstream from the Mono site and was the subject of his next report. Water Problems of Santa Barbara, California, which was published by the United States Geological Survey in 1905. .Vfter discussing the features of both the Mono site and the Gibraltar site. Lippincott concluded that the Gibraltar site was the bettor of the two. 1 le stated: Abutments at Gibraltar reservoir site are much more secure and satisfactory than at the Mono site. The water suj^ply is more than twice as great at the Gibraltar site as at tlie Mono site and its quality is better. dam at Gibraltar In comparing the cost estimates, he projected that a w oulcl cost -HB3,836 while a dam at Mono would cost $574,520. The price per acrc-foot of water stored \\●ould be $24.13 at Gibraltar as com])ared with $93.22 at Mono. This was due to the greater storage capacity at the Gibraltar site. Lippincott concluded: . the only extensive addition that can be made to the water sui)ply of the Santa Barbara coastal plain is by the construction of a tunnel from the Santa Ynez River to the coast side of the mountains and the building of an impouding reservoir foi the holdings of the winter flood waters of the Santa Ynez River.

Lippincott not only issued these reports, but he also took an acti\-e part in seeing that his recommendations were carried out. On January 30. 1903, he wrote a letter to Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the De partment of Interior, urging that the Department of Interior take the land \\-here Santa Barbara would locate its dam into the Federal Forest prescr\e. This land, ^\●hich was wedged between two forest preserves, was 10

pastured to sheep and goats. Lippincott referred to sheep as the hoofed locusts of the mountains because their small hoofs cut up and pulverized the soil, destroying plants and roots. Witliout vegetation, this area was subject to earth slides during se\’ere rain storms. This would not only cause the proposed dam to silt in, but would also contaminate the water.

This private land was also subject to fires, Lippincott contended, because of the numerous fires shee])herders set on their land.

Pinchot re])lied shortly thereafter: There is no doubt whatever of the advisability of adding this area to either the Santa Ynez or Zaca Lake Forest Reserves, but there are difficulties to be overcome in the exchange of lands. If the owners of this grant can be pre\’ailed upon to accept lands of equal value elsewhere, an exchange can undoubtedly be arranged for. The trouble now seems to be that the parties interested are not inclined to be satisfied with a fair exchange, and for tliis reason the proposed addi tion has alread}’ been disapproved by the Secretary of Interior.

I shall be glad to help along in any way possible, k'roni a study of Lippincott’s later correspondence to Eugene Sheffield it appears that this difficulty was surmounted, and in December of that vear tlie government secured the desired land, d'here was one more private grant of land, the Los Frietos Rancho, in the Santa Ynez basin that was needed in order to insure the adequate jjrotection of the dam site, and this was secured secretly by the citv water commissioners. That the negotiations were carried on in secret was becau.se the city commissioners were afraid that the Santa Bai'bara Water Company would rush in and buy the land out from under them as they had done before.

Another recommendation by Lippincott which the city followed, was the closing of the Cold Springs Tunnel by a bulkhead. This bulkhead was ]jlaced 890 feet from the ]jortal and made it possible for the city to draw off water as needed. In actuality, a subterranean reservoir was created with a storage capacity of 45,000,000 gallons.

In order to fulfill Lip|jincotl’s recommendation for a dam on the Santa Ynez River, the city had to build a tunnel through the mountain range to bring it the impounded water. As difficult as that task was going to be for them, another difficulty arose when it was di.sco\-ered that the tunnel would have to pass through large holdings of land in Mission Canyon that was owned by the Santa Barbara Water Company. Due, however, in large part to the excellent diplomacy of Eugene Sheffield, this obstacle was overcome. On January 7, 1904, an agreemetU was entered into by the water company and the City of Santa Barbara, I'he offer, which was most attractive to the water-starved company, was that the citv would guarantee to maintain the flow of Mission Creek—a major source for the comijany—at fourteen miner's inches in the winter and twenly-two miner's inches in the sunmmer—or an average of eighteen inches throughout the year. The company would also be allowed to bring water through the tunnel from its lands on the otlier side of the mountains at a toll charge of three cents per 1,000 gallons. At first glance it appeared that the commissioners ga\'e the company a good bargain, as indeed it had; how11

ever, eighteen inches of water per year scciiied very small to these men who had a vision of thousands of inches per year when their dam was built.

Upon completion of the agreement with the Santa Barbara Water Company, the city accepted bids for the construction of Mission Tunnel.

One month later the contracts were awarded to F. J. Smith and E. J. Hunt of Santa Barbara for work on the south portion of the tunnel, and to Robert Beryle of Los .Angeles for the north portion. The contractors work ing on the south portion were to bore into the mountains 11,000 feet, \\●hile the contractor working from the north side ^^●as to bore 8,560 feet.

The gravity How tunnel was to be seven feet high, with a width of five feet at the ^ base and three and one-half feet at the ceiling. The estimated cost of the tunnel was $109,125 for the south portion and $90,267 for the north portion, for a total of $199,392.

The expenses of building the tunnel were to be paid eventually by three bond issues approved by the people. That each of these issues, $200,000 apiece, was needed was due to the unbelievable difficulties en countered in building the tunnel. Work on the tunnel was started in April, 1904, and was not completed until December, 1912. The fi rst bond issue was ;approved eleven months before work on the tunnel began on May 3, 1903. When it was learned by the public, some eight months later, lliat the bond issue they approved was to be used in constructing Mission Tunnel, many thought they had been deceived. It was originally thought by some that this fi rst bond issue was to be used for an extension of Cold Springs Tunnel, but, through the convincing logic of Eugene Sheffield, tempers cooled, and the public accepted the new plan. The two other bond issues were approved during the construction of the tunnel on fuly 22. 1908, and .August 21, 1910. These additional monies were needed to comjtlete the tunnel and particularly to concrete it because timbers could not hold up the sides of the tunnel.

The boring of the tunnel began on .April 12, 1904, with work com mencing at the soutli portal. On July 15, three months later, construction was started at the north portal. Lee Hyde of Los .Angeles was employed as the ju'oject engineer tlirough the recommendation of J. B. Lippincott. .Almost from the start, difficulty was encountered, and after five years of laborious work the contractors could only show a combined total of 5,000 feet bored into the mountains. Quicksand was encountered after 1,700 feet had been excavated from the south portal and twenty-one days were spent in removing this danger. The workers struggled with sulphur water so heavily charged with hydrogen gases that they could only work in one hour shifts, or otherwise face blindness for two days. Finally, after having driven a little less than fi fty per cent of the tunnel, the contractors were forced to relinquish theier contracts with the city. J. B. Lippincott, who remained in an advisory capacity to the city throughout the construction of the, tunnel, wrote of the incident; Their [the contractors] inability to prosecute the work was partially the result of adverse conditions of formation, gas and water encoun tered, which had not been given sufficient weight in preparing their estimates; but largely as the direct result of inefficient equipment. The city took ov(;r the construction of the tunnel and completed it under a force account basis.

12

But trouble did not cease merely because of a change in contractors.

On October 16, 1909, an explosion occurred deep in the tunnel which killed one man and almost fatally injured five others, rendering one of them a cripple for life. Work came to a coiujfiete halt, near the close of 1910, at the north end of the tunnel due to the difficulty of pumping out water; thus the work was continued only at the south end. The north end had been bored to a depth of 6,607 feet. .Another near catastrophe was averted on April 7, 1912, at a point 7,360 feet from the south portal because of the heroics of one man—Frank Fixer. Fixer was leaving the tunnel on his small electric muck train when he encountered a cave-in that was caused by muck seeping through the overhead timbers. Rather than leave the tunnel promptly, he remembered that eight men were working some 2,000 feet behind him in the tunnel. Immediately he reversed his train and returned to pick them up. On their way out of the tunnel, the men had to wade in muck up to their armpits for over fifty feet. For his heroic action. Fixer was awarded the Carnegie medal. The cave-in the men encountered delayed the tunnel’s completion for several months were required to remove the debris.

Besides these unusual delays and difficulties, the day-to-day work was extremely tedious. Lippincott gave a vivid description of the work: The writer [Lippincott] has been connected with the driving of nearly one lumdred and fifty tunnels and none has ever been found that equals in difficulty of construction the Mission Tunnel of Santa Barbara. Only those who have lived with the work can appreciate these troubles.

The flow of water at the south end of tire tunnel ranged from 200 to 800 miner’s inches or from four to sixteen cubic feet per second.

Men were working constantly up to their knees in water. Material and supplies had to be transported by electric motors, the currents through which were frequently short-circuited and grounded. A track had to be maintained that was out of sight beneath the water levels. Drilling at the face was carried on usually in a perfect shower. So many noxious gases were encountered that the timbers that were used for temporary lining rotted frequently, causing break-ins.

There was one benefit which the city gained from the tunnel, how ever, that encouraged it to continue the boring through the mountains.

That benefit was water. Lij^pincott, in his discussion of the working con ditions in the mines, referred to the great amounts of water the workers had to contend with. This water, as it rushed out of the tunnel, was diverted into the city’s pipelines and stored in reservoirs. From March 5, 1905, to December 3, 1912, the value of the water from Mission Tunnel that was used by the city, was estimated to be $435,495.69, with a net profit of $367,763.71. This profit was more than enough to pay the interest on the city’s ^vatcr bonds.

The tunnel was finally completed on December 21, 1912, after nine weary years of diligent work and at a final cost of $621,712.16. I'he city had secured a temporary supply of water from the tunenl itself and hope fully. in time, the tunnel would bring additional water from tlie proposed Gibraltar Dam. Completion of the tunnel—at iliat time the longest irri13

gation tunnel in llie world—brought praise from others. The Los Angeles Times, a year before the tunnel was completed, wrote: “From an engineer ing standjjoint it is looked upon as a marvel, and as an exanijjle of munici pal enterprise it is admitted that no other city in the West of equal popu lation has e\er attempted anything to compare with it." The Morning Press, perhaps in a nionicnt of unguarded optimism commented: “Santa Barbara has accomplished more than many other cities of the countn'— for all time it has solved the problem of municipal water supply.’’

When completed, Mission Tunnel stood as a testimonial to the early water seekers of Santa Barbara. Convinced that their community would fail if water was not found, these men searched until they found it. One leader, Eugene F. Sheffield, never saw the comitletion of the tunnel for he died in 1905.

A year before the completion of the tunnel on December 28, 1911, the Santa Barbara Water Company sold its corporation to the city. The future no doubt appeared dismal to the stockholders whenever they looked in the direction of Mission Tunnel. For -$150,000, to be j^aid in equal installments for ten years, the company sold its entire plant, distributing system (some twelve to fifteen miles of pipe), and all water rights, including those on the north side of the Santa Ynez Mountains. To add to the former owners’ gloom, the city netted $18,268 in the first year it operated the company’s holdings—$3,268 more than its yearly payments.

With the completion of Mission Tunnel, the energies of the city were turned to fulfilling the second recommendation of the Lippincott report— the building of a storage dam at the Gibraltar site. The dam was not to be com])leted until 1920, due, in part, to some difficulty in raising the necessary funds, but mainly because the attention of Santa Barbara, as well as the rest of the world, was diverted to World War I. By the end of 1914, however, the city, through the approval of a $120,000 bond issue, had built a diversion dam at the Gibraltar site. This structure, which was also to serve as the foundation for the future dam, diverted water into the conduits which led to Mission Tunnel.

'Fhe construction of this early dam created interest and some contro versy in two communities near Santa Barbara. In October, 1913, Lippincott suggested that Montecito, the suburb east of Santa l^arbara, join with the city in the extension of the water system and the construction of the dam.

His proposed ]jlan for Montecito was that it form an irrigation district and bond itself for $187,500 in order to buy 375 perpetual inches of water and to build a distributing system which would cost roughly $145,000.

Lippincott believed that the whole South Coast would be retarded if it did not join with Santa Barbara in its ^vater plans.

Lippincott’s suggestion was met with little enthusiasm by the residents of Montecito, and they refused to join with Santa Barbara. 14. _]. Doulton, the county suj)ervisor from Montecito and a property owner there, replied that the plan was unfair: “One-half of the \-alley is now provided with plenty of water and is in need of no more. And yet we who have water are asked to bond ourselves to buy water from Santa Barbara and to con struct a distributing system at a great cost.” In response to this charge.

Lippincott |Joinled to statistics \vhich indicated that Montecito only had 14

use of one-seventeenth of its supposed supply and then curtly remarked that Doulton “may have enough [water] but his neighbors do not.”

The second community which showed an interest in the proposed dam was the residents of the Santa Ynez Valley. I'hese residents, most of whom owned ranches along the Santa Yncz River, were concerned about their riparian rights to the water. In a letter to their attorney, Floyd G. Dessery, Lippincott assured them that their rights \vould be protected: It is the winter floods (of January, February, March) which pass on to the sea unused and which are frequently very destructive on the lower courses of the river that the City of Santa Barbara expects to impound from this fraction of drainage basin. It is a true saving of a natural resource that is othenvise lost and one that is necessary for the people of Santa Barbara.

A few months later the Lompoc Record (Lompoc is a town in the Santa Ynez Valley) made some observations about the dam. It commented that there were only two matters about tlie dam which concerned the property owners along the Santa Ynez River: (1) that the normal lowwater flow past the dam should be guaranteed in all seasons and (2) in the event that the dam should sometime go out, the pei-sons responsible for its existence should indemnify the peo|3lc along the river for any re sulting damage. Admiring the cnerg}’ of Santa Barbara in building this project, the Record commented : So long as storm waters alone arc her [Santa Barbara’s] object we will be more than glad to sec them put to some beneficial use. Protect the rights of land owners along the river and no ground of objection can be found.

Some questions was also raised over tlie possibility that ● the dam would "silt in” if there were many rain storms in the mountains. Lippin cott rejected this idea, however, and pointed to tests made by the United States Gcologoical Sui-vey which concluded that it would take over one hundred years for tiie dam to fill with silt. This problem, he said, could be dealt with by future generations without any undue burden. Little did he realize that this problem would be a great burden on the very next generation.

Uj)on the completion of the diversion dam, the city found tliat its bonded indebtedness was so clo.se to the maximum allowed by the city that it was not legally possible for it to vote sufficient funds to complete the remainder of the dam. Realizing, however, that unless the dam was built the city would be in serious trouble, the residents of Santa Barbara \oted in 1915 to extend their indebtedness limit, and then approved a $590,000 bond issue for the comjjletion of the project.

Because of the World War, work did not begin on liie storage dam until May, 1918. The general contract was awarded to Bent Construction Company which submitted the low bid of $342,981. Over one hundred men worked on the project which was completed in January. 1920.

In June, 1919, witli one-tliird of the dam completed, an additional .$110,000 in water bonds was submitted to the public for approval. These funds were needed for the comjdetion of the dam and for the laying of a pipe conduit to the recently completed Sheffield reservoir. This rcserv'oir.

15

CEMENT ON FLAT CAR FOR DAM

namedaftc-r Eugene Sheffield, was to serve as a storage depot, widi a capacity of 40.000,000 gallons. The bond was approved on June 17, by a vote'of 786 for to 144 against. That the vote registered approval was not nearly as amazing as was the small turnout of voters. Only one of nine registered voters went to the polls.

The dam was officially completed on January 26, 1920. It rose 175 feet above bedrock and 150 feet above the level of the stream. It ^\●as 75 feel thick at its base and had a 270 foot .spillway which was 10 feet below the crest of the dam. When filled to cajjacity, which first occurred in the winter of 1921-1922. it could retain 14.500 acrc-fecl of water.

Santa Barbarans were jubilant with the latest addition to their water w.;orks. The Mornm^ Press declared that “when Gibraltar Dam impounds water, this city will be as nearly safe from a water famine as it is humanly possible to make it.” And a few months later, the paper v\’rolc: “Santa Barbara is suffering an embarrassment of riches. There is more water in Gibraltar resenoir than the city can use.”

Certainly there was reason to rejoice along the South Coast. The past twenty-five years had witnessed magnificent additions to the city's w -ater system—Cold Springs Tunnel, Mission 'runnel, and Gibraltar Dam. To the people, in 1920, water problems did indeed appear to be solved.

Unknown to them, however, was that their search would be resumed in onlv a few short vears.

16

THE CONFIDENT YEARS While Santa Barl)arans were celebrating and enjoying the completion of new additions to tlieir water works, tlie cojinnunity of Montccito was intensely studying its supply of water. Having rejected the wooings of Lippincott to join with Santa Barbara in die building of Gibraltar J)am, Montecito had decided to “go it alone’’ and develop its own sources. For years, this area of exclusive estates had relied mainly upon private wells, and upon the resources of nine “water companies,” which supplied some thirty-nine miner’s inches of water a year to the community. These sources, howexer, were proving “inadequate, unsatisfactorv- and costly.” and so, on November 10, 1921. the Montccito County AVater District was organixed for the purpose of “supplying water for domestic and irrigation use to die Montecito estates.”

The new district immediately eniplo)’ed Bailey Willis, an engineer from Stanford University, to study possible sources of supply for Montecito.

Willis recommended the boring of a tunnel tlirough the mountains on a direct line to the Juncal dam site, and in conjunction with this tunnel, he urged the district to enter into negotiations with Santa Barbara for the })urchase of tliis site. (Santa Barbara had secured tlic Juncal site when they purchased the Santa Barbara Water Company.1 \Villis believed that the tunnel itself would provide enough water for the district until it hope fully purchased the Juncal site. With Willis' recommendations in mind, the residents of Montecito approved a bond issue (300 for to 29 against) for the boring of a tunnel tlirough the mountains. 'I’he boring of the tunnel, called Toro Tunnel (later changed to Doulton Tunnel), commenced in .\ugust, 1924, and was completed in Ajiril, 1928.

GIBRALTAR DAM FULL

17

While their neiglibors to the east were seeking to sol\-e their water ])roblems, the residents of Santa Harbara were convinced that they had few ^\●orries. That forty-two per cent of the Gibraltar Drainage area had been destroyed by separate fires in 1922, 1923, and 1925 did not seem to alTect the optimism that their water problems had been solved. Perhaps they should not be judged too harshly, however, for their attention, after June 29, 1925, was devoted to the reconstruction of their city which had been struck by a massive earthquake on that day. The earthquake, which killed thirteen persons, left the business district of Santa Barbara in comjfiete rubble. Sixty buildings were cither destroyed or demolished and the linal estimate for cost of reconstruction and new buildings was approxi mately $15,000,000.

Surprisingly, the water works sustained only minor damage in compari.son to the rest of the city. Gibraltar Dam and Mission Tunnel were left intact with only Sheffield Reser\-oir receiving the full blow of the tremor. When the shock occurred, the south side of the dam crumbled, and the 40,000,000 gallons of water in the dam rushed out through a 500 foot hole, Although it claimed no lives, the torrent of water carried away three houses, uprooted trees in its path, and left a sea of mud and desolation in Sycamore Canyon on its wild rush to the ocean. With the loss of Sheffield Resen-oir (not to be rebuilt until 1936), the city's storage of water was greatly reduced and the burden of supply fell upon Gibraltar Dam and Mission Tunnel. For a few days after the c|uake, there was actually an increase in flow from Mission Tunnel by about seventy-five jjcr cent or 1,000,000 gallons a day due to the opening of additional springs in the tunnel by the earthquake; but even this added supply had to be supplemental by water released into the city’s mains from Doulton Tunnel --Montecito’s supply.

Almost one year after the earthcjuake, on June 17, 1926, the city’s attention was once again turned to its water supply, or lack of it, by a studv which reviewed the \vater resources of both Santa Barbara and Montecito in the Santa Ynez watershed. Written by Bailey Willis, the report stated that “the present supplies of the cities are scarcely more than adequate to meet the needs of the growing jjopulation five years hence, and that it is therefore urgently necessar)- to consider what steps should be taken in the immediate future to increase the storage in the Santa Ynez River Basin . . ." Willis studied three po.ssible steps: the enlargement of Gibraltar Dam. the building of Mono Dam, and the building of Juncal Dam. He soundly rejected the enlargement of Gibraltar Dam for safety reasons. He belie\-ed that the archway could not be raised unless the entire dam was thickened from the bottom up. Willis felt that this could only be accomplished by biulding a second structure directly behind Gibraltar Dam. but even this would not be as strong as one whole dam. Instead, he stronglv recommended construction of two new dams at the Mono and Juncal sites. Both sites were o\vncd by Santa Barbara, but Willis urged the citv of Santa Barbara to transfer all rights of the later to Montccito.

Willis’ recommendations ^\●ere taken under consideration and, after a thorough study. Santa Barbara’s water department came out in favor of transferring the Juncal site to Montccito. The projjosed exchange involved 18

CAMUSA CREEK

no money transaction, but rather a guarantee tliat Moniecito would give Santa Barbara 300 acre-feet of water per annum and also the right to use the tunnel train in liauling equij)inent to its dam site—Gibraltar and Mono.

A referendum was held March 20, 1928. on the proposed transfer and was approved by a comfortable margin—1,867 for to 399 against. By giving its approval to this issue, the city sa\'ed itself the expense of building another dam, and yet inipro\-ed its water supply by 300 acre-feet j)cr annum. liy obtaining the site, Montecito was able to build a storage dam, completed in .August. 1931, which bolstered up its diminishing supjdy of water. When coiujjleted, Juncal Dam had a reser\-oir capacity of 7,228 acre-feet and controlled practically all water available from the headwaters of the Santa Ynez kiver down to its location.

The year 1928 also witnessed the beginning of anotlier episode in the South Coast's search for water—an episode which threatened the future of the entire area. C^n .August 6. 1928, a suit. Gin S. Chow ct al. vs. the City of Santa Barbara and the Montecito County Water District, was brought against Santa Barbara and Montecito to restrain them from using the Santa A'nez River flood waters to supjjlement their water supplies. The plainiiOs, forty in number, owned thirtv-eight portions of land which they claimed to be riparian to the Santa A'nez Ri\'er. Apjjointed as attornevs for the cities were Francis Price and .Arthur Ellis. J. F. Peck of San Franci,sco represented the ranchers.

The suit, which |)roved to be one of California's most important water rights cases, was finally decided December 21, 1929, after the court had recorded 10,000 pages of testimony, obseiwed 250 maps and photographs, and had listened to o\-er 100 witnesses. The decision, which was handed down by Judge Frank Collier of Los .Angeles, was in favor of Santa Bar19

bara and Montocito. In giving his decision, Judge Collier cjuotcd from the case, Miller vs. Bay Cities (157 Cal. 287) which staled: In many parts of the state, es])ecially in the large interior \-alleys, practically all of the Hood waters are waste waters. They contribute little or nothing to the saturation of any stibterranean gravel beds wliich are rc.sorted to for a supply of water for useful purposes. They rush in great \ olume to the sea earn ing great destruction in their path and overflowing the lowlands to the great damage of the owners.

Collier noted that the engineering evidence, statistics relating to runolT, stream flow, rainfall absorption and replenishment of gravels, went uncontradicted by the plaintiffs. This evidence, gathered by Raymond Hill and Louis Hill, two engineers hired by the defendants, ]U‘oved conclusively that the landowners had no need for the floodwaters above Gibraltar.

The engineers produced flgures which showed that of the a])])roximatcly 900 square miles of drainage area in the Santa Ynez River Basin only 219 square miles were above Gibrtaltar Dam. fLven more convincing to Justice Collier were the statistics which sho\ved that while the annual runoff above Gibraltar was 5.5,000 acre-feet per year, the runofl’ below Gibrtaltar was between 150,000 and 200,000 acre-feet per year.

In giving his decision, Collier surprised both the plaintiffs and defend ants. bv granting the defendants the right to divert annually 16,000 acrefeet of water in dams already built and in dams to be built. (Of this 16,000 acre-feet, Santa Barbara was iJermitted to divert up to 14,000 acre-feel and Montecito iqj to 2,000 acre-feet.) I’hat this was a surprise was because Santa Barbara had been diverting only 4,189 acre-feet per yeear and had been content with that amount. Collier also stated that the cities must release the ordinary flow of the river during the summer and fall months, but not in excess of 616 acre-feet yearly. In concluding his review of the decision. Collier charged the jflaintifl's to cooperate with the defend ants in building dams that would trap all the flood waters for the benefit of all the people in that region.

4'he cooperation Collier recommended, however, was lacking, for the j^laintifTs, unsatisfied with the decision reached in the Superior Court, carried their cause to the California Supreme Court. The failure of the plaintifTs to refute the e\-idence which had led to their defeat in the lower court led to their demise here too. In handing down its decision in favor of the defendants on April 3, 1933, the Court referred to the fact that less than one-third of the water in the Santa Ynex. River originated above Gibraltar Dam and then stated: ‘‘The water imijoundcd is not and can not be of any use or benefits to, or cajiable of being put to any beneficial use or purpose by the plaintilTs, or any of them, on tlieir respective riparian lands.” The Court upheld the lower court's decision of allowing 16,000 acre-feet to be annually diverted by the cities and observed that, even after what was taken by Santa Barbara and Montecito, 121.000 acre-feet would be washed into the sea.

L'ljon completion of the trial, the residents of the South Coast could finally be assured of their water rights in the Santa Ynez Basin. If they had failed, the future of their cities would have been one of stagnation and decline. I'or years, engineers had pointed out that only the tapjnng of the 20

Santa Ynez Kivcr would yield the water they needed in order to grow.

With success in the Gin Cliow case, their future prosperity was insured.

During the years in which the Gin Chow case was under consideration by the courts (1928-1933), the residents of the South Coast were faced with severe water shortages due, in part, to the increased siltation of Gibraltar reservoir, but chefly because of the severe drought the region was experiencing, .After the winter rains of 1930-1931, there remained less than eight months normal supply in the city reser\oir. The problem was compotinded by a seventy-three per cent increase in Santa Barbara’s population during the decade of the 1920’s. Constructed for a population of 20.000, Gibraltar Dam was called ujjon to supply water in 1930 to a population of 33,613.

Faced with this severe problem, the water commission received four engineering reports within one year’s time, all of which urged the city to seek new sources of supply. 'Fhe first report was from geologist A. E. Sedgwick on May 25, 1930. Sedgwick was emidoyed to determine if \vater could be found on tlie south side of the mountains, and, if so, if it could be used as an emergency source for the city. He rejected the jjossibility of damming up the small creeks around Santa Barbara as impractical due to their small runoff and determined that the only source of emergency supply was through the drilling of wells. Emphasizing that this supply would onlv be temporary, he recommended the drilling of at least six wells to a depth of 200 feet. These \vells, he beleieved, would produce three million gallons a day \vhich would relieve the water shortage for sufficient time in order to allow the city to secure a more |)ermanent supply.

These findings received the apju'oval of Stanford geologist, Dr. C. F. Tolrnan, who was employed by the city to check Sedgwick’s survey. Tohnan confirmed that these wells could only be considered as a temporary source, and that if they were used on a permanent basis, the city would run the risk of lowering the underground water table to a j)oint where it could no longer be used in emergency situations for fear of salt water encroachment.

'I'hrce months later, on September 9, 1930, the engineering firm of Quinton. Code and TTills-Leeds and Barnard submitted a report to the Board of Water Commissioners which dealt extensively with the develop ment of permanent sources of supply for the city. The study determined that bv 1937 the normal consumption of water would be as great as the safe stipply available and that in order to meet the need of the next generation, a much larger reservoir should be ])romptly built. The firm I'ecommended the construction of a rock fill dam immediately below Gibraltar Dam with a capacity for an addtional 25,000 acre-feet; and the development of storage and distributing reservoirs on the south side of the mountains to accommodate the increased supply. 'I’he engineers esti mated that such a project, which also included repairs to Mission Tunnel, would cost a]3iDroximately $2,000,000 and could be paid for through a bond issue and through revenues from the City Water Department. Nine days later W. E. Flodges, chairman of the City Water Commission, asked the City Council to order a bond election for $2,100,000 in order to carry out the above recommendations. The election was set for June 2. 1931.

21

The fourth and final report to be received by the city was from a local geologist, Huglr B. Martin, who was employed to study the geology of the Mono and Gibraltar Dam sites. Martin studied three possible alternatives: (1) the erection of a 150 foot dam at the Mono site; (2) the raising of the present Gibraltar Dam by additional concrete construction; (3) the rising of the level of Gibraltar Dam by adding of an earth and/or rock-fill structure immediately behind, and integral with, the present concrete dam.

He rejected the first two alternatives as geologically unfeasible but strongly recommended the third choice which was essentially what the firm of Quinton, Code and Ilills-Leeds and Barnard had recommended. Armed with these reports, city officials conducted an all out effort to secure the necessaiy funds needed to complete the proposed project—the enlargement of Gibraltar IDam from a capacity of 14,500 acre-feet to almost 40,000 acre-feet; the construction of small storage reservoirs: and repairs in Mission Tunnel.

The bond issue appeared to receive city-wide support. Mayor Harvey T. Nielson stated that ‘‘the construction of the proposed rock fill addition to Gibraltar Dam is not only insurance to ])ropert\- values against the effect of water shortage but is also insurance against damage which would follow any possible injury to the present concrete structure.” Both local news papers urged the passing of the bond issue. In an editorial in the Daily News, T. M. Storke wrote that the red flag had been hoisted over the seriousness of the water situation, and he urged all citizens to give their approval to the bonds. The Morning Press saw the bond issue as an oppor tunity “to insure Santa Barbara of an adequate never-failing supirly.”

In spite of what appeared to be a general endorsement by the public and in spite of no organized opposition to the proposal, the bond issue was defeated on June 2, 1931, by a vote of 3,327 for to 1,705 against—28 votes shy of the two-thirds majority needed.

No definite reasons were given for the defeat, but some sought to blame it on the Gin Chow case which was still pending before the Cali fornia Supreme Court. It was generally agreed upon by civic leaders, however, that overconfidence was as much to blame as anything else was.

The Morning Press in an editorial entitled “Our Interests” commented: “Let George do it” should replace ‘U Pluribus Ununf as our [Santa Barbara’s] national motto. The truth of the matter is that we just don’t care about our community .. .”

With the defeat of the bond issue, city officials decided to drill the emergency wells recommended by A. E. Sedgwick. By October 21, 1931, five new wells were i)ut into use at a cost of $60,689.94. Through those last days of October the wells averaged 2,000,000 gallons of water per day, but production rapidly declined so that by January, 1932, the wells were producing only 1,4B0,000 gallons per day. Amazingly, however, the drought that had plagued the city for the past four seasons ended, and in the vear between July 1, 1931, and June 30, 1932, 22.13 inches of rain fell in Santa Barbara with even more falling in the Santa Ynez watershed. 'When it 22

was realized that the drought period had ended, the wells were shut down on January 12, 1932, and the city returned to Gibraltar for its principal supply of water. For the remainder of the decade and until the late 1940's, the South Coast enjoyed generally wet years. This rain assured them of a water supply, which, however temporary it was, proved to be adequate for several years.

In spite of the rain, Santa Barbarans could not forget their most j)er])lexing problem, for when fires razed the forests above and around Gibraltar Dam in 1932 and 1933, the question of siltation in the dam was raised again. A Citizen's Committee rej^orted on July 26, 1934, to the City Council that the reservoir’s ca])acity had been reduced by one-third due to the silting in of the dam and urged iiniuediate revegetation of the affected areas. In all, sixty-fi\'e j^er cent of the forest area had been denuded by fires since 191 1 . Fortunately, the residents of Montecito did not have this problem with their reservoir, or at least to the extent that their neighbors had, since their dam was located higher up in the drainage area and did not have as large a silt contributing area.

In an attempt to .solve this problem, Mayor Harvev T. Nielson of Santa liarbara sent a letter to Secretary of Agriadture, Henry Wallace, asking him for federal assistance: A few more bad flood years, under present water conditions, and Santa Barbara would have no water supply reserve. It is to prevent such a calamity that wc now ask you to help us.

Nielson contended that since the fires occurred in federal forest preserves the federal government was at least partially responsible for the difficult straits the city was in. He pointed out that, in one of the areas burned in 1933 {21.2 square miles) and out of which came major silt floods, “there is not one firebreak, not one mile of fire roadway, not one check dam or detrital barrier, somewhat insufficient trails, and no rejdanting of this burned over area." He strongly urged the Secretary that immediate steps be taken to eliminate this problem : The City of Santa Barbara is financially unable to meet the prob lem of its watershed and accordingly pleads for federal assistance to protect and save not alone the city’s investment in its water system, but the actual water supply upon which the life of the city depends.

Recognizing that the responsibility for the damage caused by the fires was at least partially theirs, the government took steps to help Santa liarbara. Not only did the government plant mustard seed along the mountain slopes, but, with the aid of the Civilian Conser\-ation Corps, it constructed two debris dams on Mono and Agua Caliente Creeks in 1936 and 1937.

The purpose of the dams was to catch silt and to prevent its deposit in Gibraltar Dam. They were both single arch concrete dams with silt capacities of approximately 800 acre-feet in the Mono Dam and 500 acrefeet in the Agua Caliente Dam. For Santa Barbara, these two dani.s, like the drilling of wells in 1931, offered only temporary relief. As the city and its suburbs jn-epared to enter the decade of the 1940’s, it recognized that a more permanent and lasting solution was needed in order for it to survive, The search for that solution, and its discoverv. are the subjects of the following pages.

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THE SEARCH IN EARNEST In early 1938, the Board of Supervisors of Santa Barbara County directed the engineering firm of Quinton, Code and Hill, Leeds and Barnard ‘to investigate and report upon the available water supply, the need for water, and other factors having material bearing upon the utiliza tion of the water resources of the southern portion of Santa Barbara County.” The report, completed in 1939, recommended through some type of cooperative scliemc “the jn'ompt execution of a plan for the stor age of the surplus ^\●ater whicli cannot be put to beneficial use on lands along the Santa Ynez River . .

The report reviewed the history of the county and how the limitation of water had affected its domestic and agri cultural growth. Noting that the ground water level was dropj>ing of!' at an alarming rate, the report declared that more water was being used annually in the South Coastal area tlian the combined safe supply now available. The engineering firm suggested that two projects be started: tlte fi rst being the enlargement of Gibraltar Dam to a capacity of 40,000 acre feet; tlie second, the building of a new dam “on the Santa Ynez River between the mouth of Santa Cruz Creek and Cachuma Creek . . . which would store 85,000 acre-feet of water.” These two dams would capture at least part of the average 176,000 acre-feet per year which escaped into the Pacific Ocean from the Santa Ynez River. In its fi nal recommendation, the report stated; In our opinion the future of Santa Barbara County dejK-nds upon the prompt execution of a plan for the storage of the flood waters of Santa Ynez River in a reservoir at Tequepis and for the diversion of ^\●ater so conserved to the South Coast area ^\●here the available sup plies are so deficient that a critical situation exists. To the end that this program be expedited, an organization should be formed with authority to represent all lands along the Santa Ynez River which might be affected by the operation of a reservoir at Tequipis, and another organization—perhaps patterned upon the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California—should be formed to act for all of the agricultural and urban communities in the South Coastal area which would benefit from the conser\’ation of flood waters that now ^vaste to the ocean.

Upon receiving the report, C. Leo Preisker, Chairman of tlie Board of Supervisors, believed that it was now possible for Santa Barbara County to solve and finance the solution to the entire county’s water problems.

Pic urged that immediate action be taken noting that wells in the Carpinteria area had already been pumping up salt water.

Thomas M. Storkc, the publisher and editor of the Santa Barbara NewsPress. has been a life-long resident of the city. A \-ery dynamic and forward looking individual, Mr. Storke often fought for projects which he thought would improve his beloved Santa Barbara. Once convinced that the South Coast’s water had to be obtained from the Santa Ynez River, he put Ins newspaper behind any effort that would achieve that goal. ^Vriting in his autobiography, California Editor, Storke said of Santa Barbara’s quest for water; “The News-Press held the view that the question [of water] was one of protecting Santa Barbara’s very existence. It was a fight for 24

survival.” Donald Welch, who was Chairman of the Citizens’ Committee for Cachuma Water and whose role will be discussed later, said that Storke held his paper’s presses open, long after they should have been printing, in order to give the Citizens’ Committee a chance to answer the oppositions’ ad\'crtisemcnts in the same edition of the paper. Aside Irom his outward show of support for Santa Ynez water, Thomas Storke moved forcefully and confidently behind the scenes. .Mthough he never ran for an elected office, Mr. Storke acquired many political friends not only in his own state, but also in the national arena. Having developed close friendships with many of President Franklin Roosevelt’s intimates through his role at Democratic National Conventions and also during his short term as an appointed United States Senator in 1938, Storke was able to call upon these friends \vhen Santa Barbara needed them most.

The first oj)j)ortunily Storke had to use his influence was in February, 1941. He was in \S'ashington with C. Leo Preisker, chairman of the County Board, who had become seriously disturbed about Santa Barbara County’s lack of water and who sought iintnediate measures to alleviate the prob lem. Preisker and Storke met with Oscar Chapman, the head of the Bureau of Reclamation with whom Storke had a “warm personal relation ship.’' Up until this meeting, all previous Reclamation projects had been contracted no lower than the State level. Preisker, however, in seeking to avoid “red tape,” wanted the Bureau to deal directly with the county.

Surprisingly, Chapman agreed. Storke writes that after tliis meeting “Santa Barbara County always enjoyed top ])rlority, ([insofar] as the western rep resentatives of the Bureau of Reclamation were concerned,” Upon the return of Preisker and Storke from Washington, the Santa Barbara County Supervisors entered into a cost-sharing contract with the Bureau of Rec lamation for a report which would have as its goal the study of the county’s water resources. The Bureau would be able to recommend a program which it could build and finance on a plan that the county could afford to pay. It was estimated that the report would take four years to complete. ^Vhile the South Coastal area awaited the report, its ^\'ater problems became the cause of even more anxiety. Prominent citizens began to speak out, urging the spirit of cooperation among the pcojjle of the county—a spirit that had been lacking in past crises. The citizens of the South Coastal region were warned of the impending dry cycle which was almost certain to occur. Dry cycles were nothing new for these residents as they were not and still are not for all people in Southern California. This region of the country is noted for its recurring droughts, and certainly the South Coast region was overdue for such a drought, having enjoyed a plentiful supply of rain since 1931. Santa Barbarans relied entirely on rain to re plenish their only source of supply—the Santa Ynez River. This difficulty was compounded by their geographical location which rendered any other supply of water, such as the Colorado River, impossible to obtain, And. finally, the enigma of Gibraltar Dam would not disappear. The dam con tinued to silt in .so that by April 30, 194,5, it only held aj^proximately 7,500 acre-feet or one-half of its original capacity. By the early 1940’s, it was called upon to supply a population of almost 40,000 with water—20,000 more than it was capable of siijjplying when empty of silt. Simply put, a

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reservoir which held only one-half of its original capacity was expected to take care of an hundred per cent increase in population. On August 25, 1945, the American Dredging Company wrote to the City Water Com mission suggesting that the 9,000,000 cubic yards of accumulated sill in the reservoir could be remo\x“d by hydraulic dredging. The company estimated that such a project would take two years and cost approximately $2,600,000. In studying this projiosal, Raymond Hill, the City Engineering Consultant, estimated that such a project would cost $375 per acre-foot while water from new facilities would cost around $100 per acre-foot.

4'here would also be the jiroblem of what to do with the silt once it was taken out of the reservoir. .After some discussion, this proposal was dismi.ssed.

On December 4. 1944, the Santa Barbara County Supervisors rec ommended a six point program based upon the long-awaited report of the Bureau of Reclamation. 'I'he program recommended: (1) the forma tion by the State Legislature in early 1945 of a special master water district covering the entire county; (2) that the county enter into a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation whereby the Bureau would build the Camuesa Dam two miles u])stream from the present Gibraltai' Dam, a water dis tribution system for the dam to Goleta, Santa Barbara, Montccito and Carpinteria areas, and the Vaquero Dam eight miles northeast of Santa Maria: (3) the construction of Camuesa Dam should be started in 1945.

Its capacity should be 125,000 acre-feet or sixteen times as large as Gibraltar Dam. The dam would cost ten million dollars and the distributive system another $800,000. This money would be appropriated by Congress and repaid over a forty year period at no interest with the exception that the amount used for j^roviding city water must be repaid at an interest rate not to exceed three and one-half pei- cent; (4) the Vaquero Dam should be built not later than 1948: (5) the repayment of the monies owed for these dams should start in 1950: and finally (Gl the eventual construction of five additional dams.

Two of these recommendations created immediate controversv. The first was the recommendation of the formation of a County Water District, This tvas similar to the suggestion in the report received by the Su]Der\'isors in 1939 from the engineering firm of Quinton, Code and Hill, Leeds and Barnard. And .secondly, the building of Camuesa Dam above Gibraltar Dam. Because of the appalling need for water in the South Coastal area and also because of the complications raised b\- the Santa Maria jiroject which sought to combine flood control with water conservation, the Bureau of Reclemation and the Board of Su])er\-isors agreed to concentrate first ui?on bringing water to the South Coastal area and the Santa Ynez Valley.

This decision, in spite of the extensive delays that were to follow, was most important for the South Coast’s future.

The first controversy that developed was whether or not the City of Santa Barbara should enter into a county ^\●ater plan. This controversy dc\-eloped in spite of the speedy consent to the plan by the other districts invoB’ed and the recommendation to join by its engineering consultant, Raymond I-Iill. Hill continually urged acceptance and said that the city was faced with the choice of either “going it alone and making enemies, plus enduring more expense, or the city could go along with the group and 26

enjoy clieaper water rates, The city fathers expressed the desire to enter into a countwide developnient program but would not do so until they were satisfied that their water rights and their already develojx-d water supjdy would be either guaranteed or adequately ])aid for under such a program. Some question was also raised as to the rationale of Santa Bar bara having to pay forty-three per cent of the cost of Camuesa Dam and yet having only one vote on tlie County Board.

Finally convinced that its water rights would not be hurt, the City Council, with the exception of a lone dissenter, gave its unofficial approval to the water plan. I'hat one man was City Councilman, George MacLcllan, and. because of his opposition to a County Water Agency, final approval of the .^genev was delayed for several months. MacLellan’s attacks against such an agency appeared to be based on fact, but when analyzed closely by his opposition, his rather convincing statements were proven false. His first charge was tiiat Santa Barbara was giving away its water rights—water rights that it had fought for. This argument was refuted by the simple fact that Santa Barbara's water rights would be protected under any contract signed—a fact that was guaranteed by the Bureau of R.eclamation.

MacLellan’s second contention was that Santa liarbara would be forced to pav interest on federal fund advances which the rest of the county would obtain free. The argument used against this claim, and indeed it appeared to be the most difficult to refute, was as follows: admitting that the Rec lamation Law of 19.39 stated that no rural area in any Reclamation project is cliargcd interest and that no municipality could be charged more than three and one-half per cent, the proponents of the County Water Agency plan observed that since the law’s inception no municipality had been charged interest. They also rested their argument on the fact that, since Santa Barbara was an agricultural community dependent upon agricultural products, there would probably be no interest charged. .-Mthough MacLcllan’s arguments collapsed when faced with the facts, he did not relent in his opposition. Instead, he changed his tactics and opened up a personal attack against Santa Barbara’s Mayor, Patrick J. Maher. Maher, who was openly for the County Water Agency, was accused of not caring about Santa Barbara’s water rates because he owned land in Carpinteria where he could piircha.se, water for thirteen dollars per acre-foot with the buildintc of Camuesa Dam. while Santa Barbarans ^\●ould have to pay twenty-three dollars an acre-foot. Maher simply refuted MacLellan’s argument by pointing out lliat his land was in Montecito and that he was paying $52.55 an acre-foot. Throughout these long spring months when MacLellan’s opposition was holding up the approval of the Countv Water Agency, the News-Press conducted a steady campaign against him. .-\ccusing him of deceiving the public, MacLellan was dubbed a ‘'political scarecrow.’’

Finally, however, MacLellan’s opposition was worn down and, with the approval of the city of Santa Barbara, and the state legislature, the Santa Barbara CountyWater Agency was established on July 18, 1945.

The Countv Board of vSuper\'isors scivecl as the ex-officio directors of the .Agency and were given the authority to enter into contracts with the United States Government for water development of the entire county. In turn.

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they would enter into contracts with tlic various nieniber units for the supplying of water, second controversy winch arose in the fall of 1945 wkh the Bureau of Reclamation's report was the proposed building of Canuiesa Dam, at a site two miles above Gibraltar. This proposal raised many questions con cerning water rights, since the building of this dam would necessarily mean the transfer of Gibraltar Dam and Mission Tunnel from the city of Santa Barbara to the County of Santa Barbara. With the recent difficult)’ in e\en obtaining the city's ajjproval of a County Water Agency still fresh in their minds, plus the discovery that the Cainuesa price estimates had doubled (the estimates were based on 1940 prices) and that a dam further down stream would be needed within twenty-five years, the Countv Sujier\‘isors decided to dismiss the Camuesa project in fa\’or of a dam ncaer Cachuma Creek. This decision had the ajtproval of the Bureau of Reclamation and it proposed to study the dam sites near Cachuma Creek. The Bureau \\’as expected to keep tlie costs of such a project at about -$18,000,000.

I'he start of a new year along the South Coast did not bring any relief from the water plight which this area found itself in. In fact, the situation was deepening and becoming more desjterate each month. Xot only had there been a shaip drop in rainfall the |)receding year, but Gibraltar Reservoir was running so short of water that there was only a twelve months’ sujtply left. The situation took on serious o\ertones in August, 1946, when homeowners were urged to keep the springling of their lawns to a minimum.

Raymond Hill, engineering consultant for the City of Santa Barbara, had long had an interest in the South Coast's water problems. Sometimes subject to criticism, there can be little doubt, however, that Hill's ad\’ice and opinions were most readily sought and. with the advantage of hind sight. generally correct. By June, 1946, Hill was becoming increasingly worried about the water situation. Having recei\'ed no report as of yet from the Bureau of Reclamation, Hill believed that .serious consideration should be given to the raising of Gibraltar Dam, a proposal which he had discredited only the month before. Perhaps IliH’s change of mind resulted from a trip to JDenver, the headciuarters for the Bureau of Reclamatioivs Western Projects. On May 22, 1946, he wrote to Warren Mapes. the Chairman of the Santa Barbara Water Commission, that, while in Demer, he Iieard “that the Cachuma plans were Ix’ing made to increase the dam to a capacity of 275,000 acre-feel—100.000 acre-feet in e.xcess of what had been informally agreed upon after the Camuesa site had been rejected.”

That a dam this l)ig was being considered would no doubt serloush’ disturb Hill for he had long recommended, since 1989 when his firm issued its report, that a dam that would impound more than 175,000 acre-feet would cause too heavy a financial burden upon the area.

Hill had heard correctly, for in July, 1946, the Bureau of Reclamation submitted to the South Coastal area figures for the building of a dam with a 275,000 acre-feet capacity, a tunnel that would carry the water through the mountains, and a conduit that would distribute the water along the South Coast, at a total cost of $.87,400,000. The \Vater Agency repav the go\-ernment at a set price o\-er a forty year period (under the 9 (e) section 28

of the 1939 Bureau of Reclamation Law), at the end of which a new contract would have to be negotiated to repay the remaining debt. The Bureau's justification was that such a dam would satisfy all ultimate needs of water and would eliminate the enlarging of the rcscr\-oir at a later date.

The reaction to this proposal was immediate. On July 31, 1946, Hill wrote to the Citv Water Commission: The cost as proposed by the Bureau of Reclamation is too much.

The city might have been justified in going along with the government if tlic cost had been reasonable. Unfortunately, however, there seems to be no disposition on the part of either the Bureau of Reclamation or the Board of Supervisors to modify their program of full develop ment for ultimate needs and to embark ui)on a more modest idan m which the city could justifiably participate, because of an apparent delusion that the city is fi nancially heljdess to proceed inde])cndently of the county and must in the end accede to the program now projjosed.

Hill reconiinended in the same letter that it was time for the city to act independentlv and that a municipal water district be formed so that the city could be free to develop its full water supply when and where it desired.

With the water situation becoming desperate, Hill was recommending that the city “go it alone,'’ and forget the Bureau of Reclamation and County Water Agency. Not only did he advise raising the level of Gibraltar Dam, but he also propo.sed the building of a dam immediately below the Gibraltar site which would add 40,000 acre-feet to the city’s supply. It appears from rc\-iewing the historical record that Hill, although to be sure he was serious about the city going it alone (Gibraltar Dam was raised), was also calling the Bureau of Reclamation and the County Water Agency’s bluff. I'or both knew that no jjroject could be completed, let alone even started, without the City of Santa Barbara’s jjartiepation. With the aj^parent collapse of all discussion, I'homas Storke, in an editorial entitled "It was always thus—about ^\-ater in Santa Barbara.” echoed the feeling of many citizens: Nature is patient. The Santa Ynez River will not go dry. The coastal climate and scenery will not disappear. Our delays may let most of the peo])le now living die before this area has the great beauty and prosperity that water can give it. But, sometime, some generation will enjov what can be had whene\'er man joins with nature to give this Santa Barbara coastal area the beauty and iirospcrity it should have . . . Meanwhile this most beautiful of the world’s lands is less beautiful and prosperous than it could be because its people cannot agree on the details of the ways in which tliey will finance and develoj:) for 40 years the only water source they ha\-c.

'I'hroughout the fall of 1946 no compromise plan could be readied between the county and the city. The city went ahead with plans to raise Gibraltar Dam, setting December 17, as the day when the citizens of Santa Barbara would vote on the bond issue. Hill recommended that, if the dam was raised thirteen feet, it could be restored to its original capacity of 14,500 acre-feet. Such a project would satisfy Santa Barbara's water sujjply for the pre.sent and ofl’er temporary relief until a larger dam could be com pleted. hie estimated the cost to be $600,000.

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On November 23, a steering coininittce which had been formed from the various water districts proposed a compromise plan to solve the stale mate between the Bureau of Reclamation and County Water Agency vs. the City of Santa Barbara. The plan called for the btiilding of a dam at the Tequepis site on the Santa Ynez River which would cost from eighteen to twenty million dollars. This “Compromise dam” was basically the same dam that Hill’s engineering firm had recommended in 1939.

Once again the Bureau of Reclamation agreed to revise its report stating that it wanted a project which the majority of the local citizens desired.

While the Bureau was returning to the drawing boards, Santa Barbarans turned their attention to the $600,000 Gibraltar bond issue. They gave their approval to the raising of the dam on December 17. Santa Barbarans appeared to have given themselves a temporary respite, but when the bids were received on May 17, 1947, the lowest bid was $848,000 as compared with Hill’s estimate of $.592,000. Since all bids were too high, they were rejected. In a letter to the mayor. Hill, after discussing the estimates with the bidders, wrote that the bids were too high because the construction companies believed that there was considerable risk of the construction period extending into the winter flood season and that there would be problems in getting the materials. Hill had believed that con struction of the dam could be finished before the winter rains came.

Because of the rejection of Inds, the water so desperately needed from Gibraltar would not be acquired that year. Santa Barbarans did not take kindly to this defeat, and many, including the News-Press, blamed it on Raymond Hill. In an editorial, the newspaper urged that Santa Barbara's -water problems need “new people with new ideas.” The situation appeared even more hopeless when it was learned on May 29, that th city’s emergency wells would have to be put into operation for the first time since 1931. This was a necessary step because it liad rained only 13.35 inches during the 1946-1947 .season and this did not jirovidc enough runoll to Gibraltar to satisfy the city’s needs.

With the proposed raising of Gibraltar Dam temporarily forgotten, the South Coast now awaited the Bureau of Reclamation’s report. On June 3, Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug spoke in Santa Barbara.

He urged the people of this region to divorce politics from water and also remarked that the South Coast’s water problems were too big to be handled locally. He said that the government should help people in projects stich as the one in Santa Barbara County. As the summer dragged on in Santa Barbara, the people began to realize that the dreaded dry cycle had arrived.

In July they were informed that earlier in the year the Santa Ynez River had its first zero runofT in thirty-one years, and in .August, a report from the California Division of Water Resources, noted that the greatest under ground water table declines in the state were located in Santa Barbara Countv.

On .August 25, 1947, a meeting was called between the water districts and the County AS^atcr Agency to receive the Bureau of Reclamation’s recommendations on the Tequepis Dam site, and the Cachuma Dam site.

The Bureau estimated that the cost of the new dam, the tunnel through the mountains, the distributing system, and the various rights-of-way \vould 30

be $28,510.00. This estimate was considerably less than the previous $37,000.000 proposal of the Bureau. The new reservoir would hold 210,000 acre-feet of water as compared with the {previous estimate of 275,000 acrefeet. This new reservoir was much closer to Raymond Hill's estimates.

The Bureau recommended that no interest be charged the city of Santa Barbara on its share of construction costs and advised that the 9 (e) contract form would be the best method of repayment. The 9 (e) contract basically stipulated that each water district would agree to l3uy so many acre-feet in increasing amounts over forty years. In this manner they would repay the government. The Bureau fi nally recommended the Cachuma site over the Tequepis site. Its reasons were: (1) The Cachuma cost estimates were more reliable because diamond drill tests have been made on the Cachuma site ^^●hile they have not been made at the Tequepis site.

(2) If more water was needed in the future, Cachuma’s capacity could be raised to 275,000 acre-feet by merely increasing the flood gate capacity without raising the dam. I'o raise Tequepis would be very expensive because natui'al buttresses fl are out above the 200,000 acre-foot level.

(3) Cachuma would have more acre-feet of dead storage, thus allow ing it to collect more silt.

(4) The Cachuma site would trap thirty-four more square miles of drainage area than would the Tequepis site.

After several weeks of studying the report, the various member units ap]jeared to be in substantia! agreement on the Cachuma site. Little diffi culty was encountered with the exception that the Bureau of Reclamation had to assure the residents of the Santa Ynez Valley that their water rights would be fully protected, and that the only water taken would be the flood waters which wasted into the ocean. On October 28. 1947, the County Water Agency formally selected the Cachuma site, with fi nal approval by the member districts coming on December 8, 1947.

While the appiwal of Cachuma Dam was indeed an event to rejoice about, the residents of the South Coastal area were sobered by the fact that as 1947 drew to an end, Gibraltar Dam was at its lowest level since 1931. The water was twenty-two and one-half feet below the s])illway and unless rain came in the next few months, there would be only enough water to last until April, 1948.

Santa Barbara was not the only community running short of water.

Montecito’s Juncal Reservoir was twcnt)-.seven feet below the spillway.

Water became so scarce down the coast at Ventura that two of its three reservoirs were ];ractically dry. In fact, by early 1948, all of Southern California was facing the driest winter in historv. Governor Earl Warren declared a water emergency and jjlaced the State on Daylight Saving Time in order to save power.

In one more attempt to ease the situation, the City Council of Santa Barbara in December, 1947, decided to pul a $2,000,000 water bond issue before the people on March 2, 1948. Five hundred thousand dollars of the bond was to be added to the $600,000 already approved for use in the raising of Gibraltar Dam. The balance of the money was to be used in repairing the city’s water distribution system.

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One month later, on January 9, 19-48, the City Council of Santa Barbara urged the voluntary conservation of water. After experimenting with this proposal for six days, and observing that water consumption was actually being increased, the City Council passed an emergency water rationing ordinance. The use of water was limited to domestic and sani tary purposes. A Water Emergency Committee was appointed and was granted the following power: Tlie Committee shall have e.xclusive jurisdiction to hear and grant or deny any request of any person, firm or corporation for relief from the terms of this ordinance, providing, however, such relief can not be granted unless proper showing of undue hardship or emergency warrants such relief. The Committee has the j)ower to deny any request for relief.

The ordinance prohibited: (1) the sprinkling of lawns or gardens.

(2) the use of water for wetting open ground.

(3) the washing of walks, courts, driveways or other hard-surfaced areas.

(4) the washing of autos or other vehicles, both commercial cr private.

(5) the use of water in ornamental pools or other types of fountains or pools except for drinking jjurposes.

The Council stated that the reason for this i-ationing was because the water in Gibraltar was only twelve feet abo\e the bottom outlet and would be dry by April 1, unless filled by rain. A minimum amount of water had to be kept in the dam for fire emergencies and to keep the fish alive.

As tlie days of rationing passed, the consumption of water decreased.

For e\-ery three days of rationing, the city earned about one day of addi tional consumption. One week after the ordinance was put into effect the Water Emergency Committee met with the City Water Commission. It was concluded that, in spite of rationing, the crisis was worsening day by day and rain was the only hope to save the city. In order to conserve even more water, it was announced that all commercial users of water ^\’Ould have to obtain special permits from the Committee or be subject to prose cution. The major objections to rationing were reported to be coming from jjrivate home ovsmers who desired to save their lawns and gardens.

When it appeared that rationing was going to continue for some months, as indeed it did, the citizens of the South Coast devised various means of conserving water. Home owners were encouraged to re-use their ^vater by washing everything from dishes to their teeth in a ]^an. This used water could then be rc-used in watering flowers and gardens. In March, the City Council issued a commendation to a Mr. Peter Riedel for suggesting that home owners place bricks in their toilets. These bricks would save water by displacing it. ^Vater was not even seiwed in restau rants unless specifically asked for.

In spite of these water saving techniques and the strict enforcement of the rationing ordinance, water consumption by the end of February had not been reduced below the desired level of 2,500,000 gallons per day.

Normal use for the city ^vas 7,000,000 gallons per day. In order to achieve this goal it was necessary for the Emergency Committee to turn down 32

pleas from several residents who needed only one watering to save their gardens and orchards. On February 18, a ‘'Water Chiseler’s Coiniiiittee was formed whose duty it was to check all water bills in order to determine if anyone was using too much water. In forming this committee, William B. Cater, the head of the Water Commission, said that “there are too many green lawns next to the [dry] ones.”

As the month of February drew to a close, the people of Santa Bar bara were once again faced with an election that dealt specifically with their water jn'obleni. Tlie referendum of March 2, 1948, was to determine whether an additional $2,000,000 in bonds would be sold in order to im prove the water system. Five hundred thousand dollars of the bond issue earmarked as additional funds for the raising of Gibraltar Dam. Sur prisingly, this bond issue did not receive the required two-thirds majority needed for approval. This defeat came in spite of water rationing, and the knowledge that, unless the city obtained a new supply of water imme diately. it could very well become a ghost town. The primary cause for this defeat appeared to be the activities of a few “presumed water authori ties” who were able to convince a sufficient minority that the South Coast could obtain its water from wells. That this suggestion had been refuted bv every engineering and government report seemed to matter little.

Thomas Storkc wrote in his editorial column after the election: The News-Press today charges that anyone and everyone who had any part in raising the false hopes for a cheap and permanent ^vell water supply in Santa Barbara betrayed himself and his neighbors— and the memory of men who gave the best in their lives to this city.

We must go on and solve our water problem the hard way. We cannot leave the most beautiful city in America to become worse than a natural desert jjlace where man tried and failed.

But where was the city to go? Already under severe water restrictions and with the proposed Reclamation project still in the planning stages, there seemed little hope for temporary relief. On March 11, however, Santa Barbara's Assemblyman, .Alfred W. Robertson, with the support of the State Public Health Dejjartnient, introduced in the state legislature an emergency bill which would make more than $300,000 available for im mediate use to the South Coast to help them in solving their water einergenev. One week later, tho\igh, the bill was killed in a Senate screening committee as “not urgent.” In refusing Santa Barbara the money, the committee noted: If Santa Barbara is faced with an emergency it is one which surely the ])coj)lc of Santa Barbara arc aware of. They recently had an opportunity to vote bonds to remedy that emergency and rejected it.

We can see no reason, in view of this, why the State should be called upon for funds that the people refused to vote for themselves.

The following day, March 20, Mayor Norris Montgomery of Santa Barbara went to Sacramento in one final efi'ort to change the Screening Committee’s mind. Appearing before the Committee and outlining the desperate situation his region faced, he was able to persuade the Com mittee to reverse its decision. With its approval that $310,578.00 be granted to Santa Barbara, the bill rapidly passed in both Houses by unani33

mous votes and, on April 9, Governor Earl Warren signed tlie bill which allocated the emergency funds to Santa Barbara.

Bids were immediately accejjted lor tlie raising of Gibraltar Dam, and, on May 13, a contract was awarded to the V. D. Case Company which had submitted the lowest bid. Construction was begun and eight months later, on February 18, 1949, the raising of Gibraltar Dam was officially completed at a cost of aj^proximately $900,000. Having been restored to its original capacity of 14,500 acre-feet, Gibraltar Dam would su])ply Santa Barbara with water during the construction of Cachuma Dam, water that was so sorely needed.

On April 30, 1948, the first let-up in the water rationing ordinance was observed. The City Water Commission permitted the watering of lawns and shrubbery for one hour, twice a week. The ComiuLssion urged the homeowners to water their trees and bushes first, stating that lawns could always be rejdacecl. This jjolicy was continued throughout the dry summer of 1948 until, with the addition of sufficient emergency wells and with the hope that winter rains would come, water rationing was officially ended on August 6, 1948. Mayor Norris Montgomery, in ])roclaiming the end of rationing, stated that he believed Santa Barbarans were now ‘'water conscious enough to not overstep the bounds [of safe water use].” Santa Barbai'a had thus survived her most serious water crisis. With the raising of Gibraltar Daiti almost completed and the construction of Cachuma Dam in sight, the South Coast could look to a future, which, a few months before, appeared none too bright.

Even though much of 1948 was spent b\' the residents of the South Coast in soh-ing their immediate water problems due to drought, they did not forget the solution that would ease their water problems in the future.

With the approval of the Cachuma site by the County Water Agency on December 8, 1947, attention turned to Washington, where final approval, and the needed funds to start the project would have to come from.

Locally, the jmpulace appeared to be in complete accord with the County Water Agency’s decision, except for the significent exception of the ranchers in the Santa 5’ncz Valley. These ranchers, in spite of the Gin Chow case of 1928 and the continual assurances b\' the Bureau of Reclamation that their water rights would be protected, hesitated in their support of the dam. Leading this attack against the Cachuma site was the owner of the 37,259 acre San Fernando Rcy Ranch, Mr. Lewis W. Welch. A resident of Michigan and the president and owner of the Novi Equipment Companv, Welch was against the Cachuma site because the bulk of the property flooded by the building of the dam would be his. He favored the Camuesa site two miles abo\-e Gibraltar Dam, a site that had been rejected in 1945.

DesjMte tlic warning he received from the Countv \V’ater Agenev that part of his land would be Hooded. Welch continued to make vast imjjrovcments on his ranch. Throughout 1948 and 1949, Welch led the opposition against Cachuma Dam not only in Santa Barbara, but also in Washington. A \’ery personable man, Welch was able to convince many of his confused neighbors to join with him in the attack on Cachuma.

In Wa.shington, Secretary of Interior Julius Krug approved the Bureau of Reclamation’s re])ort of the Cachuma site on January 7, 1948. 'J'his 34

In

report superseded tlic Ikireau’s |?rcvious report of December, 1944. accordance with the law, all Bureau of Reclamation projects had to be a])proved by the state in which the project was to be built and by the U. S. Army lingineering Corps. On February 18, Governor Bari Warren approved the Cachuma project witli a strong appeal for a “speedy start on the construction of the rescr\-oir. The Army Engineers approved the report on March 2. \Vith the approval of these two, the Department of the Interior authorized the Cachuma project on March 24, 1948, thus making an appropiration possible. The department recommended .$3,000,000 as the initial appropiration so that work could begin on the proposed tunnel and conduit which w'ould carry the water from the reservoir to the South Coast.

Upon receiving notice that the Caclumia appropriation was about to be considered by the House Appropriations Committee, officials of the County Water Agency departed on tlieir first venture, although by no means their last, to the nation’s capital in order to defend their need of this monev. Through the urging of the Bureau of the Budget, which termed the Cachuma project as “not only urgent but outstanding,” and the sincere ])leas for aid by County Supervisors Clifford Bradbury and T. A. Twitchell, the House Appropriations Committee, on May 26, 1948, ai)proved $2,500,000 for Santa Barbara County. The committee restricted the money to tile construction of Tecolote Tunnel and stated that future funds for the rest of the project would be dependent upon the approval of the project by the residents of the South Coast. This ajjproval was necessary, for, while the Countv \Vater Agency could, and indeed, had decided to enter into a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation, final approval was contingent upon the endorsement of the six water districts included in the Cachuma Project. These water districts—the Goleta, Summerland, Montecito, Carpinteria, Santa Ynez Valley and City of Santa Barbara districts—had, in turn, to seek approval from the citizens by means of a special election. On June 13, the Senate Appropriations Committee appro\-ed the Cachuma apiJrojDriation. making an additional allowance of .$200,000. In the Con ference Committee, however, $100,000 was deleted and, on June 19, both Houses approved the $2,600,000 ai>j>ropriation. Eleven days later President Harrv Truman signed into law the Apjjropriation Bill for fiscal year 1949 which included the Santa Barbara County Projects funds. This first appro))i'iation was to be sijecifically used for: (1) (2) (3) (4)

the start of a six mile tunnel through the mountains: the start of construction on a thirty mile conduit: the purchase of the rights-of-way for the tunnel and conduit: the investigation, plans, specifications and preconstruction work on the dam itself.

On receiving this initial outlay from the government, attention along the South Coast was, for the remainder of the year, turned to the negotia tions between the County Water Agency and the Bureau of Reclamation in their seeking of a satisfactory master contract for repayment of the cost of the project. Subsidiary contracts were also being negotiated between the County Water Agency and each member unit. Much of this delaywas due to the Santa Ynez Valley ^Vater District ^vhich was continually 35

rejecting proposed contracts because it charged tliat tlie contracts did not contain sufficient assurances that its water rights would be fully protected.

As the months passed by without approval of the necessary contracts, tlio familiar uneasiness over water problems which had only recently re laxed began to ajjpear again. In early January, 1949, the Neifs-Press reported that civic leaders were talking of forming a Citizen’s Advisoiy Committee to inform the people of the urgent need for Cachuma water.

On January 27, Francis Price, the city’s attorney in the Gin Chow case, delivered a ^vell-publicized address at the Santa Barbara Lion's Club in which he attempted to refute the critics of Cachuma Dam. In noting that water had always been the South Coast’s chief problem, he urged the build ing of Cachuma Dam as the only real solution to their dilemma. A few days later, on February 2, Cliflord W. Bradbury. Chairman of the County Board of Supervisors, said that: “The jmoposed Cachuma project is an investment in Santa Barbara County’s future and over the long-term scale will save tax money for county residents. This is due to the fact that if tlie water situations gets [any] worse, assessed \-aluations of the properties will go down and taxes wiW go uj).”

On January 27, the eleventh draft of the master contract was com pleted and once again submitted to the water districts. By March 10. all of the districts had approved this contract with the usual exception of the Santa Ynez Valley Water District. This time the district stated that it would withhold its approval of the master contrat “until [the district] received and studied a separate contract which [it] insisted upon to ])rotcct the water rights of [the] area.” On March 21, however, the County Board of Supervisors, acting in its ex-officio role as the County Water ●Agency, approx'ed the eleventh draft of the master contract and sub mitted it to the Department of Interior for ai:)proval. Acceptance of the jjroposcd contract ^vas received on May 11, and one week later the Santa Ynez Valley entered into a separate contract with the Bureau of Recla mation which assured the Valley of its riijarian rights. On June 8, this same district approved the master contract which had previouslv been ajjproved by the other five districts. With the approval of the master con tract by all Water Districts and the clarification of a few minor items in the contract, the master contract was formally signed between the County Water Agency and the Federal Government on September 12. 1949. The government agreed to construct Cachuma Dam, the Tecolote Tunnel, and the South Coast Conduit. The .Agency agreed to purchase for the member units specific amounts of water over a forty year period and to be repaid by them on the basis of the subsidiary contracts. ^V’ater rates were not to exceed $25.00 per acre-foot for agricultural use and $35,000 per acre-foot for municipal use. Although the master contract was approved, it could not become effective until the subsidiary contracts were voted on bv the residents of the South Coast. That election was scheduled for November 22.

Meanwhile attention had turned to the Senate Appropriations Com mittee which had deleted, on July 13, President Truman’s $5,185,000 budget request for the Cachuma project. (The original request had been $6,100,000 but had been reduced by fifteen per cent along with all other Bureau of Reclamation projects. On March 28, the money had been approved by 36

the House Appropriations Committee without any difficulty.) The money was eliminated on grounds that it should not be appropriated until after the local elections on the project. That the money was deleted can be attributed largely to the intensive lobbying of Lewis Welch. Welch had hired “smootli-talking, top-flight” lawyers to argue that it would be wrong to appropriate money for a project which the people had not yet approved.

To counter Welclvs initial success, the Santa Barbara waterseekers used every avenue possible.

In an attempt to get the money reinstated, Supervisors T. A. Twitchell and Clifford W. Bradbury were dispatched to Washington to appear before the Senate Apirropriations Committee. Thomas Storke wrote that both men “enjoyed the confidence of the Truman administration.” On August 25, California's Senator Sheridan Downey, in urging the Senate to rein state the funds for Santa Barbara told of Welch’s distortions of the truth.

He noted that Welch had sent telegrams to senators telling them of a new well jiroducing one million gallons of water a day in Santa Barbara. No such well had ever been found. Senator Downey, along with the County Water Agency, attempted to get the money back into the Appropriations Bill on a contingency basis in which the money would not be spent until the elections were held. This attempt proved unsuccessful because of the Senate rules against a contingency appropriation. The contingency clause could, however, be reinstated by the House and Senate Conference Com mittee if it so desired. With the possibility of regaining the money and becoming increasingly irritated by Welch’s attacks against him personalj)-, Thomas Storke called upon his friends in "Washington. ^Vrote Storke: “To match this man’s [Welch] unlimited financial resources, I had to call on even' last ounce of influence I could gleam from a lifetime’s association with men in high places, dating back sixty years.”

Two of these men in “high places,” Senator Carl Hayden, Storke’s classmate at Stanford University, and Representative Mike Kirwin, a friend of his from “the New Deal Days,” were Chairmen of the Senate and House A])])ropriations Committees respectively. By using these friendships to help solve Santa Barbara’s water problems, Storke, along with the other able men of the County Water Agency, was able to convince the Conference Committee that none of the funds appropriated would be used until such an election was held that would approve the project.

As the November 22 election, in which the voters of each water district were to be asked whether or not their district should enter into a contract with the County Water Agency, drew closer, the proponents and opponents of the Cachuma Project became more active and much more vocal. There ^\-as never a doubt that the majority was in fa\-or of the ])roject: how ever. it was belie\cd by both sides that an overwhelming majority was needed in order to convince the government that the ])roject was necessary.

On October 1, the Citizens’ Committee for Cachuma \\'ater was formed. The News-Press reported that it was the outgrowth of several meetings over the jjast few months of small groups of citizens who were wondering what to do about getting the truth before the voters on the Cachuma Project. Its one broad aim was “to secure an overwhelming ‘yes’ vote on the Cachuma project.” Establishing a modest goal of 1,000 37

members, the Committee attained a membership of 3,870 individuals and 109 civic organizations by November 22. The financial support of the Committee was obtained largely from local businessmen and a one dollar donation from each member. The Committee was headed by Mr. Donald C. \Velch (no relation to Lewis Welch), a local funeral director, and a small group of men around him. Welch had long been a “promotional expert," having been involved in many other ci\-ic campaigns and was the logical choice for such a j)osition. While the Committee gave the impres sion of being a mass mo\eincnt and well-organized, the actual work was done by Welch and this small "ruling clique” of promotional experts. The Committee had the full supi>ort of the Ncivs-Press which not only held open its jjresses in order to give the Committee an opportunity to answer the oj^position’s ad\-ertisements in the same edition, but also published a complete list of the members of the Citizens' Committee, thus significantly contributing to the idea that it was a mass movement.

Ardent support also came from the Mayor of Santa Barbara, Norris Montgomery. In his speeches throughout the autumn of 1949, and especially in an open letter he wrote to the jjeople of the South Coastal area, the citizens learned of his pro-Cachuma Dam position. In that letter of Novem ber 18, Mayoi- Montgomery wrote: Santa Barbara is a rapidly growing city with an ever increasing demand for water. A few years ago three million gallons a day was our peak ennsumption. It is not unusual for us to consume eight million gallons a day now. No one can foresee this community's ultimate demand, but it is clearly evident that waters impounded by Gibraltar Dam and watei- produced by wells within the city, are inadequate for our present or future growth, and that another and larger source of water must be developed . . . The Cachuma project offers to the people of Santa Barbara their only hope for an adequate water supply in the years to come, at a cost within our reach.

The Cachuma Project earned the praise of those who sought more recreational areas for the South Coast. These advocates cited the National Park Service’s Report on the recreational potentialities of the Cachuma Project. Tliat I'ejjort stated : By creation of the reservoir very desirable recreational areas adjacent to the resei-voir will be formed, The Cachuma Reservoir will assist in fulfilling recreation needs to many living as far awav as Los Angeles. It will furnish recreation of such varied types as day use, cam|)grounds, organized group camps, summer homes,^ watersports and recreational concessions. The anticipated use is 49,000 visitor-days per v'car.

The opposition, in an attempt to defeat the Cachuma Project, jmesented varied attacks against it. Wild claims and inaccurate statements characterized its campaign. While the opposition forces still centered around Lewis Welch, others who were even more vocal entered into the campaign. Common Sense, a newspaper published and written by a Mr. Plarry Howard, as.sailed the Cachuma Project as “the most insidious and farthest reaching government encroachment this area has ever been threat ened with.” Another voice against Cachuma was W. Edwin Gledhill. His 38

arguments bordered on tlie fantastic. Me placed several advertisements in the News-Press, all of wliich carried the same general message and idea that if the South Coast built Cachurna Dam, more people and industry would move into the area, thus making Santa Barbara more subject to a nuclear attack.

As an influential figure in the area, his statements were not discarded by everyone and no doubt some voted against Cacliuma for this reason. The loudest attacks against the dam, however, still belonged to Lewis Welch.

Tliwarted in liis attempt to get the Cachuina approjjriation deleted, Welch sought other avenues of attack. Having failed to convince the jDopulace that the Camuesa Dam would supply sufficient water to the area or that Cachurna Dam would fill with silt, he turned his final attack on Thomas Storke. Welch accused him of being for Cachuina Dam merely to en hance the value of Storke’s 250 acre ranch which was near the proposed site of Cachurna Dam. That Storke had supported Santa Barbara's search for water long before the Cachurna site had been decided upon mattered little to Welch. It was not surprising that the editor of the News-Press should become the final object of attack, for he had long led the fight for water and, through his impassioned editorials and maneuvers “behind the scene.s,” he had accomplished much. Common Sense attacked Storke not so much for his supposed desire for financial gain but because of his desire to rule—“to prove his power, which is almost an obsession with him."

In spite of these noisy and vitriolic attacks, the opponents of Cachuina Dam made little headway. Donald Welch, Chairman of the Citizens’ Committee, believed that the “foolish statements and inconsistencies of the opponents’ arguments” made liis committee’s task much easier than if the opposition had remained silent.

On November 22. 1949, the South Coastal area of Santa Barbara County went to the polls to decide an issue which would determine tlie future of the region. For years, even decades, the .scarcity of water had been their major jjroblem. In order for the Master Contract to go into effect between the County Water Agency and the Bureau of Reclamation, a majority of the voters in the City of Santa Barbara and in the Carpinteria and Goleta County Water Districts had to ap]3rovc the separate subsidiar\’ contracts between themselves and the County Water Agency. In addition, the majority of voters in eitlier the Montecito County Water District or the Santa Ynez River Water Conservation District had to approve their contract.

When the official returns were tabulated, the water-seekers of Santa Barbara County enjoyed an overwhelming victory. The final results showed 15,734 in favor of the proposal and 5,135 against it. Thus, approximately 75.4 per cent of the residents along the South Coast were in support of the construction of Cachurna I4am.

THE COMPLETION OF THE CACHUMA PROJECT — AND THE FUTURE The proposed Cachurna Project, which had been so overwhelmingly approved by the residents of the South Coast, |)romised to be an endeavor of vast undertaking. The major features of the ])roject included the erec39

tion of Cachunia Dam, the boring of Tecolote Tunnel, and the construction of the South Coast Conduit. Aside from these principal works which were to be built, four regulating reservoirs were necessary along the conduit as well as distribution systems for the Goleta, Summerland, and Carpintcria County Water Districts.

The funds for the project were, of course, loaned by the federal gov ernment to the Santa Barbara County Water Agency and are being repaid through a forty year contract. The money for repayment is obtained from the districts through their purchases of Cachunia water each year (the five districts and Santa Barbara must each purchase a certain minimum of water per annum). The three distributing systems arc being paid for under separate contracts, by the districts in which they were constructed.

The total cost of the project, when completed in 1956, was $43,360,000 or $14,850,000 more than the original estimate of $28,510,000. The reason for this sharp increase in cost was due chiefly to the difficulties encountered in boring *Teco!ote Tunnel (original cost estimate was $4,080,000 as com pared with a final cost of $14,550,000). Costs were akso raised by the need to purchase more rights-of-way and by a general rise in ])rice levels during the 1950’s. I'he needed funds were obtained with little difficulty from the Congre.ss, and, in fact, after fiscal year 1955, unused appropriations from prior years were sufficient to complete the project. .Vlthough a great storage dam was being constructed the residents did not forget that water would be needed until the Cachuma Project was completed. Throughout the first two years of the I950’s, the South Coast was dependent upon what water could be obtained from Gibraltar and Juncal Dams and from its emergency wells. In a desperate effort to obtain more water, an attempt was made at cloud seeding in the upper Santa Ynez drainage basin by the North American Weather Consultants from December, 1950. through April, 1951. Employed by the City of Santa Barbara and the Montecito County Water District, this firm met with little success in bringing water to the ])archcd region. The company reported that “due to the exceptional dearth of cloud forms suitable for seeding this year, insufficient precipitation fell in the watershed area, in spite of the increases from seeding . . .” Fortunately water was encountered in Tecolote Tunnel in July, 1951, and on August 3, its flow was sufficient enough for it to be turned into the mains. From that date, and until the Cachunia Project was completed, the flow of water from Tecolote Tunnel was to provide an ample supply of water for tlte South Coast.

The first of the three principal features of the Cachuma Project to be completed was the dam. With a winning Ijid of $6,722,520, the con tract was awarded to Mittry Constructors, Inc., of Los Angeles and they began work on August 16, 1950. Completing their work June 17, 1953, the contractors used some 6,695,000 cubic yards of earth and rock fill to build the dam. When filled to capacity, the reservoir formed behind the dam contains 205.000 acre-feet with an annual safe yield of 31,600 acrefeet. The dam impounds water from an area of 421 square miles. *The Tunnel is named “Tecolote” because at first it was to “davlight” in Tecolote Canvon.

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The second major feature of the project to be completed was the South Coast Conduit. The conduit, a reinforced concrete pipe line (the diameter ranges from 27 inches to 48 inches), was extended twenty-six miles along the South Coast from the outlet of Tecolote Tunnel to the Carpinteria Regulating Reservoir in the heart of the Carpintcria County Water District’s service area. Work commenced on the conduit on July 6, 1950, and was completed October 21, 1953. Four reservoirs, the Glen Anne, Lauro, Ortega and Carpinteria reservoirs, were constructed along the conduit in order to regulate the flow of water. Although it is a regu lating reservoir, Glen .'\nne also directly serves a portion of the Goleta County Water District. The final cost for the South Coast Conduit was $6,410,000, while the combined cost for the four reser\-oirs was $3,780,000.

Tecolote Tunnel extends 6.4 miles through the mountains from Cachuma Reservoir to the headworks of the South Coast Conduit. Work was started on the tunnel March 2, 1950, and completed six years later on March 23, 1956. When the final blast through the mountains occurred, “Terrible Tecolote” was described by L. N. McClellan, Chief Engineer of the Bureau of Reclamation, as “the toughest tunnel job ever tackled by the Bureau of Reclamation.”

The story of its construction was similar to that of Mission Tunnel built almost fiftv years before. One hundred and forty men, employed by the Carl Halvorson engineering firm of Portland, Oregon, and Spokane, Washington, worked around the clock in fifteen man crews. Drilling from both ends of the tunnel, the workmen had bored a combined total of 10,300 feet by October 13, 1950, and were confident that the job would be com pleted by December, 1951. No doubt this confidence began to diminish, however, when less than three months later, on January 13, 1951, a gas explosion ripped through the north end of the tunnel and injured eleven men. Not only were injuries sustained, but hot sulphur water was en countered which flowed out at 1,250 gallons per minute. Unable to halt the flow of water, sand, and gas, the excavation was eventually stopped at the north end for thirteen weeks. To add even further gloom to the situation, a line worker was killed when his mining car derailed inside the tunnel.

Although water was encountered at the outlet of the tunnel, it did not stop work and, in fact, plans were formulated to deter the water for use along the South Coast. Entering into a cost-sharing agreement. Santa Barbara and Montecito built a pipeline which they hojjed would bring them at least 3,000,000 gallons of water daily. On August 3, 1951, Tecolote Tunnel water was turned into the pipeline. In noting the significance of this occasion, the Santa Barbara News-Press commented: The water flowing through the tunnel represents the fulfillment of a dream as only people of the West can know.

Spirits were dampened, however, only a few days later, when, on August 8th, forward progress was stopped at the south ]3ortal because of the excessive water encountered. Unable to solve tlie situation, the con tractors continued boring on the inlet side for the next t\vo years, until July 21, 1953, when work could no longer be carried on at either side of the tunnel. Faced with 112° F. water discharging at a rate of 3,600 gallons 41

per minute, tons of crushed shale, and stinking sulhde gas, the job appeared impossible to comjdete.

The Bureau of Reclamation conducted series of studies throughout the remainder of 1953 and, based upon rejjorts by its engineers, concluded that (1) the coolest portion of the hot area inside the tunnel should be concrete lined as a means of reducing flow and (2) special equipment should be installed that would deliver large volumes of cooled air into the tunnel. The second major decision by the Bureau was to relieve the Hal\'orsen engineering firm of its responsibilities and turn over tunnel operations to Coker Construction Company and Peter Kiewit Son’s Company.

With the recommended preparations completed, drilling operations resumed on April 12, 1954. An unusual feature of the project was the “cooling ofT” cars the workers used. Experiencing temperatures of 117° F. with 100 per cent humidity at the heading, the miners rode to work in muck cars filled with cool water and returned to them when they needed cooling off. With the aid of these new impros'cments and a more deter mined effort, the tunnel was fi nally holed through on January 15, 1955.

I'hroughout 1955, the tunnel was concrete lined with final \vork being completed on March 23, 1956. A few days later, on April 5th, the first water from Lake Cachuma to reach the South Coast was received.

The completion of the Cachuma Project did not, however, signify the final triumph for the water seekers of Santa Barbara County. For that triumph—the spilling rf water over Cachuma Dam which would prove that the dam could store several years supply for the South Coast—they had to wait two more years. Finally, on April 12, 1958, Cachuma spilled.

Mayor Floyd O. Bohnett said of that event: This is undoubtedly the most important event in the modern history of Santa Barbara—the success of the community endeavor to develop this water resource for the city and the whole South Coast area.

'F. M. Storke, long a leader in the fight for Cachuma, editorialized: 'I'oday the Nnvs-Prass publishes the most significant local story of this century. Cachuma Lake has filled. Nearly a quarter of a million acre-feet of water are stored behind the three dams in the Santa Ynez River watershed. What a heritage for one generation to pass along to the next.

The spilling of water over Cachuma Dam was indeed a significant event in the South Coast's long search for water. But what is even more significant to this writer was that the completion of this project did not allow the j^eople to overlook the fact that they would eventually need more water. 'Foo often in the past, the residents had believed their water prob lems soK’cd when they had completed projects such as a Mission Tunnel, a Gibraltar Dam, or a Juncal Dam. 'i'hey had forgotten that the need for water in Southern California is always insatiable. This time they did not.

Francis Price, attorney for the city in the famed Gin Chow case of 1928, best summed up the people’s feelings: [Cachuma] marked a beginning, 1 mean the beginning of intensive planning for the future.

That “intensi\’e planning ’ has begun.

"The South Coastal area will urgently need more water by 1975,” -12

stated Edward Elcvatorski, Chief Engineer of the Santa Barbara County Water Agency. In that year, the South Coast is expected to require 45.800 acre-feet per year as compared to the safe yield of the South Coast’s sources of supply—45,500. By 1980, the estimated demand will be 49,100 acrefeet, leaving the area with a deficit of 3,600 acre-feet.

These estimates arc, of course, based upon the population projections for the county. All of Santa Barbara County has experienced a rapid population growth since the mid-1950’s. Before this time, the county had exhibited an extremely slow rate of growth in population as compared to the remainder of the state. This was due, in part at least, to the county’s relatively remote geographic location, a lack of an economic base to sup port population growth and resistance on the part of the existing populace significant toward increased growth. Since the mid-l950’s, however, change in the rate of growth has occurred. This is due primarily to: {11 the external j^ressure from metro[)olitan Los y\ngeles; (2) the establishment of electronic industries; (3) the establishment of Vandenberg Air Force Base and to a lesser extent the Naval Missile facility at Point Arguello (military population in the county: 1957_500: 1966 17,125; and (4) the rapid growth of the University of California at Santa Barbara.

Where is the South Coast to obtain the additional water it needs in order to sustain its growth? In 1961, the Santa Barbara County Water Agency sub.scribcd to the California Water Plan. The J’lan, a state-wide project which will bring water from tlie abundant sources in Northern California to the water-poor regions in the southern sections of the State, was strongly recommended to Santa Barbara County by R. M. Edmondston, Consulting Engineer for the Santa Barbara County Water .-\gency. He concluded that the only definite assurance of .satisfying the water demands for the county in the next tliirty years would be obtained through con tracting witli the State of California for an imported water supply of not less than 50,000 acre-feet per year—15,000 acre-feet of wliich will belong to the South Coastal area. Under the proposed plan, the County will participate with San Luis Obispo County in the construction of a coastal aqueduct which will draw water from tlie main California Aqueduct just north of the Avenal Gap in the San Joaquin Valley. The Coastal Aqueduct will then carry water to a proposed Santa Maria Valley terminus. From this terminus, water will be pumped over the mountains into Caclmma Lake, through Tccolote Tunnel, and finally into the homes along the South Coast.

The estimated cost of this project to the county is $180,439,627. ●\ second ]30ssible .source of water for the South Coast is still under consideration. On January 17, 1966. Robert J. Pafford, Jr., the Regional Director of tlie Bureau of Reclamation, announced that $100,000 had been allocated for a study of the possibility of locating a nuclear desalination plant along the South Coast, which would produce from 75.000 to 200,000 acre-feet of water per year. 'I'he study, the first ever in\-olving the Bureau of Reclamation, was undertaken "to determine the broad possibilities of integrating jiroduction of water from a de.salination plant into existing Reclamation facilities.” Because of sucli facilities along the South Coast and because of the e\’ident future need of new water sources, this region was selected. The study, to be concluded in early 1967, will not specify 43

the exact cost of such a plant, but rather will indicate the potential benefits it has to offer. “If, after receiving the report,” stated F. G. Macias, Chief that they want such a plant, we will go ahead at their request.”

The possibility of using sea water for its fresh water supply would of the Bureau’s Centrol Coast Field Operations, “the local people decide certainly ease the jDroblenis of the South Coast's water seekers. At jDresent there is no assurance that the cost of desalination will be reasonable, but, if it were successful, such a ])lant would eliminate water worries in the future, for such an operation could be enlarged if more water were needed.

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Hopefully, this chapter has indicated that a significant change of attitude has occurred amongst the jx-ople along the South Coast follow ing the completion of the Cachuina Project. No longer does one witness the overconfident optimism that water problems are solved forever with the completion of a major project, as was so often the case in earlier times.

Ironically, however, this change of attitude encourages optimism. For by facing this j^roblem of how to obtain more water now, the South Coast is insuring its growth in the future—a growth that can only be maintained by the addition of more sources of water supply.

GIBRALTAR DAM UNDER CONSTRUCTION

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Non-Profit Org. QUARTERLY BULLETIN OF THE SANTA BARBARA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 136 EAST DE LA GUERRA STREET SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA

U. S. Postage PAID Santa Barbara, Calif.

Permit No. 534