School of Public Policy and Governance Tata Institute of Social Science, Hyderabad WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 1, AUGUST 2015
An Elusive Culture: A Socio-Legal Inquiry into Corruption in the Contemporary Indian Public Administration
Amrita Pillai
 
School of Public Policy and Governance Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad Roda Mistry College of Social Work and Research Centre, Opposite Biodiversity Park, Gachibowli, Hyderabad, Telangana - 500008 Email : sppg-si@tiss.edu Website : www.tinyurl.com/tiss-sppg MAPPG TISS - HYDERABAD
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About Student Working Paper Series The Student Working Paper Series, is an attempt by the School of Public Policy and Governance, at Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad to assimilate papers being worked upon the topics that will help enrich the public discourses by improving upon the clarity, accuracy and sophistication of discussions on the nation's Public Policy. About School of Public Policy and Governance The School of Public Policy and Governance (SPPG) is a novel research based teaching and training space designed to equip young professionals to contribute to the policy area research. SPPG provides opportunities to its students to think beyond conventional models of growth and development, and encourages them to generate ideas for developing institutional frameworks for accountable governance and the establishment of a socially equitable society. Its programs and activities are designed to create an environment for the well-trained scholars to access and collect information about contemporary policies and activities surrounding them so that they can produce timely research and undertake analysis on key topics of Public Policy.
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An Elusive Culture: A Socio-Legal Inquiry into Corruption in the Contemporary Indian Public Administration - Amrita Pillai
Abstract In most developing countries including India, allegations of lax, corrupt and inefficient bureaucratic functioning are far too overwhelming. While petty corruption abounds in government agencies and in the delivery of public services, the quantum of money laundered at the highest orders of the bureaucracy has exceeded thousands and lakhs of crores. This issue has outlived its predictions of demise. It continues to thrive and has now moved on to acquire more meanings than decades before; the actual application of the concept adjusts itself to the evolution of the moral sense of public opinion. Public notions of what constitutes as ‘corrupt’ has evidently changed over the years. The question remains whether anti-corruption legal codes have moulded themselves adequately enough to accommodate the changes in perceptions, attitudes and actions. The Kerala public administration is a case in point. Citizens in Kerala have comparatively limited experience with instances of corruption and a low perception of the issue in their state making it crucial to understand the factors that aided the same.
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Introduction 1.1 Relevance The Indian bureaucracy, the legendary steel frame of the British Raj, has come to be perceived and labeled as lax, inefficient and corrupt. While petty corruption abounds in government agencies and in the delivery of public services, the quantum of money laundered at the highest orders of the bureaucracy has exceeded thousands and lakhs of crores. The Indian society seems to have decided to resign to the spread of corruption; that it is inevitable is accepted. The Anna Hazare movement against corruption however was a wakeup call. That the polity still had a voice which they would use to protest when pushed against the wall was made obvious. The twelve days of Anna’s fast saw multitudes of people turning up to support him; the middle class of the country had found its calling, after all. There was an urgency felt for Indian’s apolitical economic class beneficiary – the middle class, to engage with politics and do their bit in cleaning it. th
The Transparency International places India in the 88
position out of 175 countries, in
its CPI for the year 2014. While some of India’s neighbours such as Pakistan and Bangladesh fare worse on this Index, China performs better.Corruption has permeated all forms of human endeavour today; it has seeped into sports, religious institutions and education, not to mention every level of government functioning, adds a ten per cent surcharge on conducting business and has also fuelled terrorism It is so inclusive that it encompasses bribery, nepotism, extortion, vote-fixing, price-fixing, fraud, money laundering, owning assets disproportionate to legal sources of income etc. The general public feels compelled to pay a bribe (whether petty or not) to receive their public provision, it is also a rational choice they make, given that non-payment of such ‘token’ monies or ‘facilitation’ payments would result in excessive red-tape and harassment at the hands of government officials. Why aren’t anti-corruption measures able to catch the delinquent by its throat and choke the aberrant behaviour until it wanes away? Or is it then the matter that the administration of these measures themselves is wrought with a corrupt intention? Studies on corruption have largely been around perceptions of the people regarding the issue, as it is felt in the functioning of the bureaucracy, politics, judiciary, public service provisioning, the police etc. The underpinning with using perceptions is that they are not tangible. While corruption indices worldwide use perceptions on corruption to formulate their country rankings, it does seem as if there is a need to quantify such perceptions into real experiences that can be recorded. One such endeavour in India has been the Ipaidabribe campaign, a hugely successful model especially with the younger populace. It provides a platform to put down real-life experiences of corruption with any government agency across the country, conducts real-time polls on questions of concern.
With a vast number of central anti-corruption legislations and state antiMAPPG TISS - HYDERABAD
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corruption legislations, why is it that the nexus involving politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats still seems to thrive across the country? Are these legislations not addressing ground realities and gaps already prevalent in the administrative structure? Corruption is like a litmus paper and takes on the colour of specific experience. There is a huge variation in corruption levels within the country as well, the history of a region, socio-economic realities, the strength of the institutions play crucial roles in affecting corruption levels in the same country. It is imperative to lasso these factors that exist differently in different places, and work anti-corruption laws around them. It is not enough to merely analyse legal codes to check for loopholes that enable wrong-doers to get away. While it is beneficial to study legislations, it also remains pivotal that a changing society and the ramifications of their changing desires and wants be adequately acknowledged by these legislations. 1.2 Outlining the thesis and sub-questions After drawing and explaining the skeleton framework of the Indian bureaucracy and the factors that make civil servants stand apart from other government servants, a socio-legal inquiry is attempted to understand the prevalence of corruption in the Indian bureaucracy. While societal attitudes towards the issue are traced through developments and changes in their socio-economic structures, their engagement with civil society anti-corruption initiatives etc., the legal analysis involves outlining the different provisions that exist in the most crucial anti-corruption laws of the country. While public perception remains that laws are weak and leave purposeful loopholes, it would be worthwhile to understand whether that is really the case or whether the anomaly lies elsewhere. The Kerala public administration has been looked at carefully through a qualitative lens. The purpose is to discern why and how Kerala has been one of the least corrupt large states in the country. Legal and societal approaches towards answering these questions have been undertaken. The sub-questions for this dissertation are as follows: 1. Do existing anti-corruption laws engage with the all-inclusive and ever-expanding perceived definitions of corruption in public office? 2. What are the socio-legal factors pivotal to the accomplishment of the Kerala anticorruption success story? 1.3 Research Methodology
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While review of literature has been followed throughout the dissertation, the legal analysis has involved a clause by clause detailing of provisions in various central legislations and analysing the obiter dicta in some of the most transforming apex court judgements. An understanding of the verdicts of the judiciary plays an important role in gauging the growing needs of society as well. While taking up a matter and pursuing it in a court of law is often the last resort for many, given people’s perceptions and stark realities of late justice or no justice at all, certain matters moved in a court of law have radically altered the meaning of seemingly narrow legal provisions. The study of Kerala’s public administration has involved semi-structured interviews with fourteen (14) bureaucrats, some of whom have served at the Centre and states both, cutting across cadres, ranks, sex and age. One (1) bureaucrat from the state of Telangana has been interviewed in a bid to discern whether the factors that check corruption in the state of Kerala are in fact known to exist here in any capacity. The answers from the interviews have been collated and disaggregated by the recurrent themes emerging in them, to understand which factors in most bureaucrats’ opinions, have played the most crucial roles. Informal interviews have been conducted with fifteen (15) respondents in the districts of Thiruvananthapuram and Thrissur, chosen randomly. These respondents were found standing near government offices and interviews were held with them during their exit from these offices. The purpose was to gauge their levels of awareness about public service provisioning and their legal rights in abstaining from and unrelenting to corruption by government servants. Since these are not semistructured interviews, the questions asked were to be answered in a yes/no fashion. The answers were collated and disaggregated by the most affirmations to a particular factor. Informal interviews have been conducted with ten (10) civil service aspirants between the ages of 24-30 years, to understand their reasons for wanting to join the civil services and their perceptions about corruption in the bureaucracy including what they think could be changed to curb it. 2. The Anti-Corruption Legal Framework There is an enduring perception in the Indian polity, economy and society in general that legal safeguards meant to ensure equality and equity in the application of law have been used aplenty to shield and vindicate those who have used public office for private gain. The very tenets of the aforementioned rule of law are thus reduced
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to non-applicable scruples. The vast body of Indian jurisprudence wherein judicial precedents have given diverse meanings to a concern at different points in time make it difficult to rationalize and simplify procedures that are seen as roadblocks. Corruption has been a long-standing concern, one whose elimination is not only a moral imperative but also a necessity of economic nature for an emerging economy. However, the legal framework to check corruption is often seen as one that is lax and falls short of establishing transparency and fairness. Anti-corruption legal codes are considered incompetent in setting strict standards of probity in public life, which then is the commonly acknowledged justification for scams involving a nexus of political leaders, industry and high ranked bureaucrats not to mention the corruption that abounds in public agencies and in the delivery of public services. For the absence of graft to be realized, it is apparent that legal rules and procedures must
contain
and
prevent
the
trespass
of
democratic mechanisms. The
widespread cynicism around anti-corruption legal interventions will only end if they are found to be effectual and are not obvious bigoted political weapons of the party in power to harass their adversaries. The execution of the rule of law and firm punitive action in order to deter public servants from indulging in graft are crucial to building accountability and bringing back the citizenry’s faith in their government. It is imperative that the vast legal verbiage jungle on anti-corruption strategies be simplified and examined in detail to understand how and where the lacunae lie. 2.1 India’s Anti-Corruption Policy 2.1.1. Draft National Anti-Corruption Strategy The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)1 drafted the first ever national strategy on combating corruption in India in an all-inclusive, synchronized and sustainable manner, in the year 2010. The strategy was developed after rounds of discussions with legal practitioners, civil servants, politicians, civil society organizations and representatives of the private sector, seeking to acknowledge that endemic corruption is a reflection of social and political values and fragile institutions (CVC, 2010). To tackle such corruption, it primarily suggested that a more participatory approach ought to be undertaken wherein the citizen must be specifically made aware of anti-corruption laws and his own rights and obligations in his fight against being abused by corrupt public officials.
A statutory body constituted by the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (45 of 2003) as the apex body for the prevention of corruption and exercise superintendence over the administration of vigilance activities. 1
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Although the CVC sought public opinion on the matter and was keen that the strategy would not remain a mere document but that annual monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of its proactively promulgated strategies would be rigorously followed, this policy document still remains a draft. It has not seen the light of day as an officially ratified National Anti-Corruption Strategy as envisaged by the CVC. 2.1.2
The
Prevention
of
Corruption
Act
(PCA),
1988,
the
Prevention
of
Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2008 and the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2013 The PCA, 1988 remains the most crucial codified legislation on criminalizing corrupt activities in the country. It repealed the aforementioned PCA, 1947. An amendment to the Act, 1988 was envisaged in the year 2008 although it lapsed with the dissolution of the Fourteenth Lok Sabha. Another amendment was envisaged in the year 2013, touted to bring Indian anti-corruption efforts in line with international decrees on the issue. This amendment currently sites tabled at the Rajya Sabha. It is vital to this legal analysis that the four Prevention of Corruption Acts and Amendments be studied in detail to outline the differences in their approach towards containing graft activities by public servants. The table that follows elucidates on these legal codes further in Table 1 that follows:  Issues
Public servant
PCA, 1947 As is defined in Section 21 of the IPC, 1860; (i) Officers of the Armed Forces; (ii) Judges, Officers of the Government responsible for citizens’ health, safety and convenience; (iii) Officers in charge of the pecuniary interests of the Government; (iv) Officers whose powers cover taking, receiving or expending property for the Government.
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PCA 1988
Persons in the service of and remunerated by the Government for the performance of public duties, (ii) working in entities established under Central or State Acts; (ii) Judges, Arbitrators appointed by Courts; (iii)Members of institutions that have received financial assistance from Central or State Governments.
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2008
Defines public servant as the PCA, 1988 does.
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2013
Defines public servant as the PCA, 1988 does.
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Issues
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2008
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2013
PCA, 1947
PCA 1988
Taking of a bribe
The acceptance or agreement to accept or an attempt to accept any valuable thing or gratification other than legal remuneration.
The acceptance or agreement to accept or an attempt to accept (i) gratification other than legal remuneration as a (ii) motive or reward for the performance or the nonAs is defined in the performance of PCA, 1988 an official act that could (iii) Favour or disfavour other persons, by a public servant. Punishment: Imprisonment from 6 months up to 5 years and liable to fine.
The acceptance or agreement to acceptor attempt to obtain (i) financial or other advantages intended to improperly perform a public function or activity or (ii) mere inducement of another public servant, by a public servant. Punishment: Imprisonment from 3 years up to 7 years and liable to fine.
Giving of a bribe
Bribe giving not given the status of an offence, thus the bribe giver would not be prosecuted.
The acceptance of bribe giving would not subject the person to prosecution under the Act.
Bribe giving made a punishable offence. Punishment: Imprisonment from 3 years up to 7 years and liable to fine.
Commercial organizations
Did not take into account the bribing of public servants by firms, business associations.
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No mention regarding the same
Stays as is defined in the PCA, 1988
No mention regarding the same
Included a provision for bribes given by (i) commercial organizations (firms, partnerships undertaking business activities); (ii) to gain advantage for the conduct of their business. The head of the organization is guilty of the offence, also. Punishment: Imprisonment from 3 years up to 7 years and liable
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Issues
Criminal misconduct
Abetment of offences
PCA, 1947 Habitual acceptance, attempt to obtain or an agreement to obtain (i) gratification other than legal remuneration, any valuable thing in connection with official functions, (ii)misappropria tion of property entrusted to a public servant (ii)using corrupt means to obtain pecuniary advantage or (iv)being in possession of property disproportionat e to income.
No mention of abetment of offences.
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PCA 1988
Stays as was defined in the PCA, 1947 except that known sources of income have been explained to be income from legal sources whose receipt is in accordance with rules, orders applicable to the public servant.
Abetting the taking of a bribe or obtaining a valuable thing for no consideration in a proceeding or business that the public servant is part of. Punishment: 6 months up to 5 years and liable to fine.
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2008
Does not include (i) obtaining any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without public interest; (ii) explanation regarding known sources of income was omitted.
Stays as is defined in the PCA, 1988
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2013
Entails (i) dishonest and fraudulent misappropriation of property entrusted to a public servant, (ii) being in possession of pecuniary resources that cannot be accounted for or(iii) property disproportionate to the person’s known (legal) sources of income.
Abetment of all offences mentioned in the Amended Bill 2013 would be made punishable. Punishment: 3 years up to 7 years and is liable to fine.
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Issues
Powers of inquiry and investigation
Attachment and forfeiture of property
PCA, 1947
Investigation of the offence of criminal misconduct must be done by a police officer not below the rank of (i) Deputy Superintendent of the Police, with the orders of a (ii) First Class Magistrate; (iii) no arrest to be made without a warrant.
Attachment and forfeiture of the property acquired through corrupt means not provided for.
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PCA 1988 Investigation of the offences in the case of; (i) The DSPEA, 1946: not be performed by an officer below the rank of the Inspector of Police. (ii) Metropolitan areas as prescribed by the Cr. PC, 1973: not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police. (iii) Elsewhere: the DSP or an equivalent officer may investigate with the orders of a Metropolitan or a First Class Magistrate; arrests to be made only with a warrant.
Stays as was defined in PCA, 1947
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2008
Stays as is in the PCA, 1988
Provides for the confiscation of illegally acquired property by public servants, provides (i) procedure for application, (ii) execution of orders, (iii) inquiry of objections, (iv) duration, administration as well as evaluation and disposal of the property attached (upon termination of proceedings).
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2013
Stays as is in the PCA, 1988
Stays as is provided in the Amended Bill, 2008
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Issues
PCA, 1947
Prior sanction for prosecution
Habitual offenders
PCA 1988
Sanction provided by the Central or Provincial Government, as the case may be.
Required for offences of (i) taking gratifications, (ii) influencing public servants, (iii) abetting these acts or (iv)criminal misconduct, from the Union or State Governments; as the case of employment may be.
Habitual acceptance of (i) gratifications other than legal remuneration as motive or reward; (ii)valuable things for inadequate or no consideration. Punishment: Imprisonment upto7 years or fine or both
Includes the taking of gratification to influence public servants, as well. Punishment: Imprisonment from 2 years up to 7 years and liable to fine.
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2008
Protection of prior sanction extended to retired public servants as a safeguard from vexatious prosecutions.
Stays as is defined in the PCA, 1988.
PC (Amendment) Bill, 2013
Stays as is defined in the PC Amended Bill, 2008.
The term for habitual offenders increased. Punishment: Imprisonment from3 years up to 10 years and liable to fine.
(Table 1)
Issues of concern: a. Making the bribe-giver liable for prosecution The PCA Amendment 2013 which now lies tabled at the Rajya Sabha with promises from the Modi-led government of passing it soon, has certain provisions which have sparked unending debate in socio-legal circles all over the country. ‘Prosecution of the bribe-giver’ has been widely contended by the likes of economists such as Kaushik Basu2 who argues that it would be impossible to control ‘harassment ‑
bribery’, possibly the most prevalent form of everyday bribery in India, if no immunity was provided to a bribe giver. While under the Act, 1988, the bribe-giver (treated only as an abettor) could pay the bribe and then scream thief at the bribe-taker, if the amendment were to be duly passed, the bribe-taker would be prosecuted and liable
2
http://finmin.nic.in/workingpaper/act_giving_bribe_legal.pdf
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for punishment for the same number of years. It is however crucial that such a provision be re-considered given that there has to remain some impetus for whistleblowers and bribe-givers to report harassment that they experience. b. Status of MPs, MLAs and MLCs The CBI and the judiciary have time and again sought to interpret whether MPs, MLAs and MLCs fall within the purview of the definition of a ‘public servant’ under the PCA, 1988. The famous A.K. Antulay case3 ‑
ruled that an MP is not a public
servant and sanction for prosecution must come from the judiciary and not the Centre, as is proposed under the PCA, 1988. The CBI has recommended that, there must be a specific provision underpinning the exact status of such office bearers and that this interpretation must not be left to the varied interpretations of the Courts. c. Requirement of proving ‘intention’ for the possession of disproportionate assets While the principal Act only required that proof of disproportionate monetary resources or property with a public servant be established, the Bill, 2013 seeks to modify this quite dramatically. It mandates that two things must be proven to establish this offence hernce forth, one that the existence of money or property disproportionate to his ‘legal’ sources of income be proven and two, that the ‘intention’ of the public servant to enrich himself illegally also be proven. By adding the second provision to this clause, it almost seems as if the threshold to prove corruption is being raised unreasonably. It is imperative that this element of ‘intention’ be removed from the Amendment, 2013. d. Definition of corruption It is about time that a definition be provided to include within itself more cultural specific elements of corrupt practices such as nepotism or patronage and differentiating between collusive and coercive bribery. Retired public officials, who are now only covered under the sanction for prosecution provision must be covered under the definition of ‘public servant’ expressly so. e. Others It seems almost necessary now to cover private sector enterprises which provide public utility services, given that a larger share of health and education services across rural and urban areas in the country are being provided by private players. 3
1984 AIR 684
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NGOs being funded over a pre-determined threshold, by the state governments must also be covered soon enough. 2.1.3. The Central Vigilance Act, 2003, the Right to Information Act, 2005, the Whistle Blowers Act, 2011 and the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 The Right to Information (RTI) has been lauded as the most revolutionary tool in the fight against corruption in the present decade. It essentially reversed the Official Secrets Act and made mandatory that public offices and officials provide information of their activities in a time bound manner (within 30 days) at the behest of the general polity. Access to information assumed new standards after the RTI was introduced. Government decisions and procedural actions which were earlier kept away from the public eye are now open for perusing, assessing and reviewing. The other three aforementioned Acts need a critical understanding of the different objectives they seek to achieve and the ways in which they seek to achieve them. Table 3 that follows elucidates on their provisions further while comparing them with general penal laws and the PCA Amendment Bill, 2013.
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Issues of concern a. The Whistle Blower’s Protection Act, 2011 does not entertain anonymous complaints, thus leaving the complainant with no choice but to reveal his complete identity. Moreover, there are no specific conditions provided under which the Vigilance Departments may report the identity of the complainant to the Heads of Departments. It is thus left to these departments to use their own discretion in these matters. It is would also be extremely beneficial if complaints against Ministers of states also be included under this Act, but this would then mandate that they be included in the definition of a public servant under the PCA, 1988 as well. Vigilance Departments in certain states are infamous for being under the direct control of local political parties and it is injustice in such cases to those who wish to file complaints against high ranking officials. It is to be noted that countries such as the United State of America, United Kingdom and Australia do have provisions in place to investigate even anonymous complaints. It is unclear why India cannot attempt to do so. b. That the victimization of complainants shall be met with punitive action is mentioned in the Act, 2011 but what constitutes this ‘victimization’ is left to courts of law to interpret. Guidelines for witness protection programmes, as is undertaken in the aforementioned foreign countries must be administered in India as well. c. The Act is seen to be in contravention with provisions of state Lokayukta Acts which prescribe a time bar on investigation and differences in procedures of trials of public servants. The Karnataka Lokayukta4 legislation states that prosecution may be undertaken without prior sanction from higher authority, if commission of a criminal offence by a public servant is in question whereas the Delhi Lokayukta5 code contains a provision where if the Lokayukta is not satisfied with the action taken by the directed competent authority upon the complaint received, a special report may be made to the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi. With ‘competent’ authority taking on different meanings in different states, the purpose of the central legislation to protect whistle blowers is clearly diluted. d. The body of the Lokpal has still not seen the light of the day. While the present political executive re-iterates that it shall be set up soon, it remains to be seen how soon. Considering that the highest political offices of the country shall be under the direct scrutiny of the Lokpal, it is a challenge for the politico-bureaucratic nexus to give in to creating this body. Given the large scale clamour over the Anna propagated Jan Lokpal, the media has made 4
Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 2002
5
Delhi Lokayukta and Uplokayukta Act, 1995
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certain that masses know of the Act and what it seeks to check. Any new amendments or emergency decrees to the already passed Act could possibly lead to another ambush by the masses. The lack of independence of the CBI and including the Prime Minister under its scrutiny has been a point of contention ever since the Jan Lokpal was introduced. The Act passed by both Houses has incorporated the Prime Minister and his ministers within its ambit while not providing a specific provision laying down the autonomy of the CBI in specific matters concerning public servants above a certain rank. However, a recent Supreme Court Judgement, on a plea by Subramanian Swamy6, has laid down that in matters of investigation concerning civil servants of the rank of Joint Secretary and above, prior sanction need not be taken from the Centre since it is seen as a delaying tactic time and again; the CBI can proceed with investigation if it has reasonable proof enough to believe that the allegations of corruption against these high ranking officers are true.
Landmark anti-corruption judgements While the legal analysis has involved a clause by clause detailing of provisions in various central legislations, it shall not be complete without an analysis of the obiter dicta in some of the most transforming apex court judgements. An understanding of the verdicts of the judiciary plays an important role in gauging the growing needs of society as well. While taking up a matter and pursuing it in a court of law is often the last resort for many, given people’s perceptions and stark realities of late justice or no justice at all, certain matters moved in a court of law have radically altered the meaning of seemingly narrow legal provisions. Single directives issued by the Supreme Court of India have aided the country’s fight against corruption at high ranking levels of the administrative structure. a. The ‘Jain Hawala’ case7 Popularly known as the Jain Hawala case, the petition filed by Mr. Vineet Narain in the year 1997, led to the uncovering of a vicious politician-bureaucrat-criminal nexus in the capital city. When it was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, it was not known that this writ petition had the propensity to uncover the ugly truth of highly respected politicians and celebrated bureaucrats. It was following certain statements made by an arrested member of a terrorist organization that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the foremost criminal investigation agency in
6
(1998) 1 SCC 226
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the country, conducted raids in the premises of businessmen and recovered diaries and notebooks with detailed accounts of enormous amount of money paid to persons identified only with initials. These initials later corresponded with those of senior politicians, both in power and retired and high ranking bureaucrats. The CBI was severely criticized for its inertia in investigating and placing on record its findings in this matter. Justice Bharucha and Justice Sen formed the division bench of the Supreme Court of India, for this matter. They left no stone unturned in expressing their discontent and anger at the way CBI and other governmental agencies had abrogated their public duties. That the CBI was controlled by the political executive became clear, the lack of autonomy for the investigation agency caused serious harm to its status in the country. The judges pointed out, “even after this matter was brought to this court complaining of the inertia of the CBI and other agencies to investigate this matter because of the alleged involvement of persons in high positions in the political executive, the disinclination of the agencies to proceed with investigation has been apparent for quite some time. The accusation if true revealed a nexus between high ranking politicians and bureaucrats who are alleged to have been funded by a source closely linked to the sourced funding terrorists; some undesirable foreign elements also appear to be involved. This serious threat posed to the Indian polity cannot be ignored. The continuing inertia of an investigation agency to even commence its investigation cannot be tolerated any longer. We find it necessary to direct the CBI not to report the progress of its investigations to persons occupying high offices in the executive; this is being done to eliminate any impression of bias or lack of fairness or objectivity and to maintain the credibility of investigations.� The Central Vigilance Commission was proposed to be given statutory status by a single directive. It was to review all the cases handled by the CBI and maintain a record of its progress which would have to be published in its Annual Report. The primary question however was whether the judiciary had the power to review the working of an investigation agency that was under the control of the executive. With the answer being in the affirmative, this landmark judgement has played a pivotal role in future decision-making and functioning of public authorities. It must be pointed out however, that convictions in this case were few, major acquittals were allowed because according to procedure established by law, the Court had to hold the diaries as inadequate evidence for prosecution of members of the political executive and the bureaucracy.
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b. The 2G spectrum allocation case8 The Supreme Court’s verdict on the second generation spectrum allocation case led to the conviction of the former telecom minister, A. Raja, his DMK party colleagues including the DMK chief’s daughter Kanimozhi, bureaucrats who aided and colluded with 12 others. In the year 2008, nine telecom companies were issued scarce airwaves, a national resource, and licences for 2G mobile services at around 1,650 crores, 122 circle wise licenses were issued. Interestingly, the licenses were issued at prices for the year 2001 which was probably one-fourth of the price they were in fact. The Opposition Party stepped up attacks against the issuing of licenses to two companies, Swan Telecom and Uninor, both of which sold more than half of their stakes to foreign players thereby increasing their valuation by billions, without a single subscriber in hand. A money trail was later revealed, illegal of course, all part of the DB group which promoted Swan Telecom ending at Kalainagar TV, where the DMK party had major holding. The presence of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) was crucial to this case; it estimated losses to the Exchequer to the tune of somewhere close to 38 billion dollars. The official auditor claimed that the allocation was arbitrary, did not follow the rule of law and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was kept out of the loop in all major decisions made. The country was stunned by the quantum of money involved and Raja was forced to resign from the Cabinet soon after. Janata Party leader Subramanian Swami filed a petition in the Supreme Court for a directive on the proceedings against Raja. The Supreme Court questioned Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s late sanction for prosecution against Raja. The Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mr. T.K.A. Nair has also been summoned and questioned by the CBI in this case. It is to be noted that Mr. Nair has been one of the respondents for this dissertation but no direct question was asked to him regarding this matter since it is a matter of grave concern and high secrecy. The Vineet Narain judgement was used extensively in this case, especially to invoke the time-barred investigation directive that was issued by the Supreme Court back then. The 2G scam could possibly be the most expensive scam till date. The losses to the exchequer appear unparalleled before.
" Writ Petition (Civil) No. 423 of 2010 with No. 10 of 2011 8
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c. The A.R. Antulay case9 The petition for this case was filed by a certain R.S. Nayak, accusing A.R. Antulay, then Chief Minister Of the state of Maharashtra, of abuse of the office of the Chief Minister. The problem was that by the time the Governor approved prosecution sanction for the CM; he had already resigned from the post himself but continued to remain a Member of Legislative Assembly. Thus, his claim was that he could not be tried for such allegations since he was not serving in the public office. Another question that arose was whether a Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) could fall within the purview of the term ‘public servant’ to be charged under provisions of the PCA, 1947. While the trial judge was of the opinion that since an MLA fulfils public duties, he is a public servant, the Supreme Court refused to support the claim. The seven judges Bench of the Supreme Court was of the view that an MLA is not a public servant and prosecution for sanction must come from the judiciary for specific cases such as this. Antulay was stigmatized throughout the conduct of the proceedings and the Supreme Court held that such stigma thrown upon a person who has been highly respected as the Chief Minister of an Indian state would not be tolerated. d. The Satyendra Dubey case It was only six years after the cold blooded murder of IES officer Satyendra Dubey in November, 2003 that a special CBI Court convicted three accused to life imprisonment, in March 2010. He was shot dead for blowing the lid off various instances of gross violation of rules in a project of the NHAI. His murder marked the beginning of the country’s calls for a legislation which would shield ‘whistle blowers’ who expose corruption. A Central Government Resolution in 2004 bestowed the Central Vigilance Commission with powers to act on complaints by whistle blowers. It is imperative to note that this resolution was passed after the aforementioned Dubey murder gained widespread media coverage and the polity stirred with the brutality of it. Statutory protection was however not provided by this resolution and there was thus a need for the same. The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2011 received Presidential assent only on the 9th of May, 2014. The legislation seeks to institute a mechanism to receive complaints relating to disclosures made in public interest, on allegations of corruption or the wilful misuse of power by a public servant; to make inquiries into such disclosures and very importantly, to safeguard victimisation of persons making such complaints, namely the whistle blowers. 9
1984 AIR 684
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e. The Right to Know The Supreme Court recently coined the term ‘right to know’ and traced it back to the right to freedom of speech and expression, in the case of State of U.P. v. Raj Narain10, wherein Justice Mathew observed that “the people of the country have the right to know public acts, everything that is done in a public way by public functionaries. The right to know, which is derived from the right to freedom of speech and expression, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can at any rate have repercussions on public security. To cover with the veil of secrecy, the common routine business is not in public interest. Such secrecy may seldom be legitimately desired. It is generally desired for the purpose of parties and politics or personal self-interest or bureaucratic routine. These cases do trace a change in the perception of rights of persons. That the judiciary wilfully acknowledges the concerns and needs in a changing society is encouraging in itself. 3. The Kerala Model
The southern Indian state of Kerala is considered to have forged its development trajectory rather distinctively as a state with high social development and low per capita income. However, it is a state that ‚has demonstrated that poverty alleviation can be achieved with a reduction in spatial and gender gaps, the two important gaps that are prominent in the development experiences‛ (Kanan, 2000). The state achieved prominent success in reducing poverty and social inequalities through resolute mobilizations of people, public action was fortified. Class and caste based mobilizations through the nineteenth century led post- colonial Kerala to inherit a social structure based on the same lines. With highly favourable social indicators, the state was portrayed as a ‘model’ for the Third World regions where the conspicuous impression was that a better quality of physical life could not be achieved without rapid capitalist development or a socialist revolution (Parayil & Sreekumar, 2007). Kerala had been through neither of the two aforementioned development trails. John Dreze and Amartya Sen in the year 1997 contrasted the state of Kerala with both China and India and provided a set of explanations for Kerala’s development experience. The role of support-led security and public action in the state supplemented by demand for social provisions articulated
10(1975)
4 SCC 428
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by a literate and politically alert population remained the most prominent in their set of explanations (Ramachandran, 1997). Corruption – a matter of grave concern for the country is seemingly less in Kerala. Citizens in Kerala have comparatively limited experience with instances of corruption and a low perception of the issue in their state (Charron, 2009). An ‘Indian Corruption Study’ was undertaken by Transparency International (TI) and the Centre for Media Studies in the year 2005. Touted as the largest survey on corruption perceptions, there were a total of 14,405 respondents spread over 151 cities, 306 villages within 20 Indian states. The focus of this massive survey remained corruption in the public sector spanning 11 government departments. The figures below denote that the state of Kerala on all three counts including others, is among the lesser corrupt states in the country. It is worthwhile to point out here that although Kerala has low per capita income, remittances to the state from countries abroad account for a huge sum and are cumulated to make up the Gross State Domestic Product used for the purpose of the discussed econometric study.
Figure 111 relates how rich the state is, measured in terms of GSDP and its degree of variance with levels of perceived corruption.
11
Source: (Charron, 2009)
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Figure 212 correlates education with levels of corruption; education is measured in terms of literacy levels.
Figure 313 measures the decentralization variable to measure how it affects corruption.
Decentralization is measured by calculating how much of its own revenue the state uses from the total revenue it receives from the Centre as well. It is almost a decade since this survey and
these
results
were
concluded, Kerala was
evidently joined in the less corrupt states brigade by states such as Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. In the present times however,
12
ibid
13
ibid
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the extent of the perception of corruption and the prevalence of the issue itself seem to have increased14. Data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) spanning the calendar years 2000-2009 shows that cases registered and the conviction rate in the year 2005 stood at 143 and 49% respectively, however, the figures for the same in the year 2009 stood at 198 and 77% respectively15. It is heartening to see that a rise in registered cases has resulted
in
a
commensurate
rise
in conviction as well.
Although the flip side to that is that instances of corruption are evidently rose. It is to be noted that the Right to Information was introduced in the year 2005 and it common knowledge that the RTI has proven to be the single most effective tool in spurring transparency and accountability in public agencies. While this is not to say that the rise in registered cases in Kerala is to be attributed to the RTI alone, it would be worthwhile to concede that the period onwards of 2005 has evidentially shown
an increase in corruption complaints against public officials.
The most recent data on persons in public office convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and related sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is to be found in the NCRB statistics Report for the year 2013. Chapter 9 of this Report termed ‘Economic Offences’ provides a detailed state wise disaggregation of persons charged for corruption and related offences in various stages of corruption proceedings, from the number of cases reported to persons punished departmentally. For the year 2013, the percentage of cases charge-sheeted to the total cases investigated remained very low at 9.3% where the highest percentage was attributed to the state of Gujarat which had a high number of cases chargesheeted as well. The conviction rate for the state is high at 62.7% wherein 32 public officials were convicted in the year 2013. This is low figure considering that the most number of officials convicted were from the states of Maharashtra and Punjab with 85 public officials each. Barring the Union Territories, Kerala still retains its spot as a less corrupt state, though it doesn’t remain the ‘least’ corrupt anymore16.
14
http://www.cmsindia.org/mediacoverage/expressbuzz_corruption5.pdf
15
Source: National Crime Records Bureau Report, 2000-2009
16
Source: National Crime Records Bureau Report, 2013
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4.1 The Kerala Public Administration: The Findings While most corruption perception interviews and surveys focus on the general public in order to gauge their experiences and notions on bureaucratic corruption, this dissertation has earnestly sought to focus on what the bureaucratic apparatus ascertains as determinants of corruption and what could be done to reform ground realities. Since Kerala, as has been elucidated upon before, falls into the lesser corrupt category of states, all questions from the Interview
Guide
have
been
asked with a specific focus on Kerala and how and why instances of corruption are lesser in the state. Semi-structured interviews were used to gain insight on civil servants’ perspectives on customary corruption and its repercussions for their fraternity and the administration and implementation of the government’s policies and programmes writ large. Fifteen (15) bureaucrats, serving and retired, male and female, from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), the Indian Police Service (IPS), the Indian Revenue Service (IRS), the Indian Audit and Accounts Service (IA&AS), and the Indian Postal Service (IPoS). Fifteen (15) respondents from the general public chosen at random during their exit from government offices have
been
interviewed
to
gain
their
perspectives
on
their
political
representation, to know how aware they were of their legal rights on service delivery mechanisms, etc. The table that follows outlines the details of the bureaucrats interviewed.
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Table 3 Name
Status of Service
Cadre
Mr. T.K.A. Nair
Retired
IAS, Punjab Cadre, 1963
Mr. E.K. Bharat Bhushan
Serving when interview was taken; retired
IAS, Kerala Cadre, 1979
st
on 31 January,2014
Post Retired as Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Retired as Chief Secretary to the State of Kerala
Dr. Babu Paul
Retired
IAS, Kerala Cadre
Retired as Additional Chief Secretary to the State of Kerala
Mrs. M.S. Jaya
Serving
IAS conferred, 2004
District Collector Thrissur
Mr. V. Hariprasad
Serving
IA&AS, 2000
Mr. A. Ramachandran
Serving
IPS, Kerala Cadre, 1996
Deputy Superintendent, Vigilance and Anti- Corruption Bureau, Thrissur
Mr. T. Chandran
Retired
IPS conferred, 1998
Retired as Superintendent of Police, Thrissur
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Deputy Accountant General – Thrissur
27
Name
Status of Service
Cadre
Dr. K. Vasuki
Serving
Mrs. E.V. Susheela
Serving
Mr. Mir Mohammed Ali
Serving
IAS, Kerala Cadre, 2011
Mr. N. Vijaykumar
Serving
IPS conferred, 2011
Dr. Navjot Khosa
Serving
IAS, Kerala Cadre, 2012
Mr. K.V. Joseph
Serving
IPS conferred, 2013
Mr. A.V.B. Menon
Retired
IPoS, 1965
Mr. Kumar Vishwajeet
Serving
IPS, 1994
It is
IAS, Kerala Cadre, 2008 IRS, 1990
Post Executive Director of the State Suchitwa Mission Deputy Collector, Elections – Thrissur Sub-Collector–Thrissur
District Police Chief (Rural) – Thrissur
Sub-Collector, Thalassery
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and AntiCorruption Bureau, Eastern Range Kottayam Principal Chief Post Master General, Chennai Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh
pointed out here that Mr. Kumar Vishwajeet has not served in the state of Kerala and
hence his views on corruption have no specific reference to the state. For this reason, the histograms that follow will measure the views of only 14 respondents. For the dissertation however, his views are critical and provide a picture of corruption very different from what all the other 14 bureaucrats mentioned as being factors highly correlated with corrupt activities. The following were determined, by bureaucrats, to be the most important determinants of corruption, specifically the most important factors whose effective functioning shall ensure lesser corruption, presented the way they have gathered from their experiences in Kerala.
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•
History of the formation of the state: After India and Pakistan were partitioned, the royal states of Travancore and Cochin were united on the 1st of July, 1949. Through a re-organization in the year 1956, the state of Kerala as it is known today was formed. It must be pointed out here that both Travancore and Cochin have witnessed major revolts and uprisings in the early 1920s. The most prominent of these uprisings remain the Malabar Rebellion and the social revolts in Travancore, where the Muslims agitated against the Hindu zamindars colluding and feeding off the British Raj.
•
Literacy levels: In the year 1991, Kerala became the first state to be recognized as a completely literate state even though effective literacy stood only at 90%. It was in the year 2007 that net enrolment in elementary education shot up to 100% and interestingly was balanced across sex and castes, a phenomenon not observed in any other state in India. The Census 2011 records the highest literacy levels of 93.91% amongst the state, with the national average standing at 74.04%.
•
Female literacy levels: According to Census 2011, Kerala again tops the list of highest female literacy rates, with 92% of its females being literate. Females are generally encouraged to study and take up an occupation, preferably in government service. Also, the upper caste Hindus of Kerala, who form a slightly higher chunk of society, have traditionally had a matriarchal society, wherein the women of the house take all the important socio-economic decisions. Education thus is seen as a medium to further enhance empowerment of women, to enable them to take better decisions in the household and at work.
•
General Awareness Levels: The society remains well-aware of the happenings in the state. Levels of media exposure, whether print, radio or television is very high. The society itself is highly opinionated, mostly for the better and sometimes for the worse. These opinions are formed from knowledge known and shared. It is commonplace to hear heated discussions on public spending or party politics, at a local tea-shop or a bus stop.
•
Legal Awareness Levels: By legal awareness, the implication is that persons of the general public know their legal rights, for instance their most basic Fundamental Rights or their rights when detained by the police etc. Since there is a lot of debate and discussion around current issues and there has always been a culture of social movements’ more than political movements, the public is generally aware of their basic rights as a citizen of the country.
•
Income levels: The state witnesses and propagates a lot of out-migration, mostly to richer countries such as the Gulf countries and the United States of America.
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While the state gross domestic product is not very high at all, the remittances from these foreign regions give people living in the state much more purchasing power. Thus while they may be earning reasonably fair money in government service or in a private enterprise, much more additional money comes in by way of relatives abroad. •
Religious fragmentation: The state is evidently less sectarian than other states in the country. While Hindus are more in number, the Muslim and Christian population is not extremely low in number. Post formation of the state, there has been next to no violence meted onto any group on the grounds of religion.
•
Political representation: Political representatives in the state have never been brought to book on charges of inciting the public along the lines of caste, sex or religion. The representation has been well distributed across religions. This has been pointed out by civil servants as being an important factor in lesser corruption perceived. As is already clear, politics and bureaucracy are intertwined in a way that it is impossible for one to not affect the other, in a good way or bad. For Kerala, this symbiotic relationship is seen to work for the better.
•
Digitalization of service delivery: While only the younger officers have suggested this factor, it is one that does deserve mention. An interesting point made in this regard has been that the already high literacy levels have helped in effective and faster digitalization. Irrespective of how many machines are introduced, people have to man these machines and it is important that they know, understand and assimilate the basics of using a computer.
•
Newspaper Readership: Print media remains exceptionally free and strong in the state of Kerala. Each Malayali is estimated to read about 2 newspapers every day, based on figures of readership and circulation by the prominent newspapers such as Malayala
Manorama
and
Matrubhumi.
There
are
nine
official
newspapers distributed in the state. The more space there is for publication, the more is the news that will be published, even more so, the more news that is published, the more it is being read. Even the slightest activity makes it news columns the next day! Some of the retired and high ranking bureaucrats have called the print media hyperactive in printing ‘news’. •
Media: Television viewership is also always in a boom, it is as followed as much and as passionately as the print media.
•
Presence of unions: Labour and trade unions are exceptionally strong in the state; they follow from the Communist regime culture. These unions are most
MAPPG TISS - HYDERABAD
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often the ones to declare strikes and crackdowns if they feel their rights are being neglected or denied to them. •
Political Opposition: This is yet another area of hyperactivity! An Opposition ever ready to rake up issues against the Ruling part, is one that sits in Kerala. The strikes are more often than not imposed by the Opposition’s labour or trade unions.
•
Stability of the Kerala Cadre: This is a factor that has been mentioned by the senior officers during their interviews. Also, it was specified that Kerala has a unique swing program between the field and Secretariat so that young officers experience both up till they reach a certain rank.
These variables have been disaggregated by the i. sex, ii. cadre and iii. status of service of the bureaucrat to ascertain the most important variable most seen to affect the incidence of corruption, specifically in the state.
Clearly, the most important factors perceived to have resulted in lesser corruption are literacy levels, religious fragmentation, political representation, newspaper readership, political opposition and the media. The lowest perceived factor is the digitalization of services; it has been mentioned only by two young sub-collectors.
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ii. Disaggregated by Cadre
The results divided across cadres portray similar results except with an addition of the factors of general awareness levels and legal awareness levels which all the cadres agree as important factors in checking corruption in Kerala.
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iii. Disaggregated by Occupational Status
The results don’t show a very varied picture from those produced on the two parameters above. They show a similar pattern. Fifteen (15) respondents from the general public were interviewed during their exit from public offices (in Thrissur district) and their answers were collated in a similar fashion to ascertain their levels of awareness regarding their rights in service delivery, awareness of their fundamental rights, their perceptions about their political representation and the state’s welfare activities and lastly they were asked to mention at least three acts by public officials that would tantamount to be termed ‘corrupt’. Their answers have been disaggregated by their i. sex, ii. their occupations and iii. their status of passing the Higher Secondary School Certificate.
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i. Disaggregated by Sex
It must be noted here that questions pertaining to ‘perceptions’ were to be answered with a good or bad whereas questions pertaining to awareness were to be answered with a yes or no. Both males and females seem to best know their state’s welfare activities, additionally, they seemed to want no change in the existing system of administration which is quite laudable in itself! They were also very happy with their political representatives; almost all of them knew the names of their MLAs and specifically mentioned that the current Chief Minister, Mr. Oomen Chandy is exactly what they needed. The KRSA is an acronym used for the Kerala state’s Right to Services Act, passed in the year 2012 which provides for time-barred delivery of certificates such as marriage, caste, birth etc. It also provides for some other delivery services which the public interviewed were aware of. Interestingly enough, the male particularly even remembered the punitive action involved in case a government official denied them a service.
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ii. Disaggregated by Occupation
The ‘Housewife’ and ‘Municipal Sweeper’ category clearly perceive the state administration to be doing a good job and are also aware of at least 3 illegal acts amounting to corruption. Bribery was an answer every respondent gave to this question, while some other couldn’t think of another act, the ones who did answer this question successfully mentioned owning assets disproportionate to legal sources of income, nepotism and stashing black money as other answers.
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iii. Disaggregated by status of passing the Higher Secondary School Certificate  
Having a good notion about state welfare activities is a factor common to both those have cleared HSC and the ones who have not. Awareness of services under the KRSA, 2012 is evidently more in those have cleared their Higher Secondary Certificate.
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4. Conclusion That efficient and effective governance is a compelling factor in promoting development and eradicating poverty in general, is well-acknowledged. It is also well-established that the civil services in India have made critical contributions to the nation, through its services and the advice it has rendered to the political executive. But the fact remains that the services are wrought with systemic corruption and are ill-equipped to function efficiently in an ever dynamic economy. Wide ranging reforms across the services are necessary to transform them into one which exemplifies best practices and incorporates contemporary management techniques. It is from the extensive interviews with civil servants from the Kerala public administration, engaging with the general public to learn their attitudes towards corruption and from studying the central anti-corruption laws that the following inferences and suggestions are being laid. a. Civil Services Law The clamour for a unified civil services law has been around for a long time. With the Second Administrative Reforms Commission specifically suggesting the ratification of such a legal code at the earliest, it is disheartening that the recommendation has not been put into practice yet. Of the fifteen civil servants interviewed for the purpose of this dissertation, ten (out of which nine were bureaucrats having served for more than 15 years) were of the opinion that an Indian civil services law was much needed and that it must be specifically drafted to combat newer modes of economic corruption. The fundamental principles of the civil service — professionalism, anonymity, integrity and neutrality, seen to be pronouncedly withering away must be brought back to force with enforceable provisions in this law. There must also be provisions that counter acts of proven favouritism, patronage or inappropriate ministerial interference; this necessitates that modes of proving them in a court of law be detailed in the legal code itself and must take into account the technological advances made in the past decades. b. Judicial Activism This is a new dimension to keeping a tighter check on corruption indulged in by the politician-bureaucrat nexus. It is one that is strongly advocated by the general public respondents and civil service aspirants from Kerala. The 2G scam is probably the most famous instance of judicial activism checking and bringing corruption to book.
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It asserts the supervisory role played by the court in asking the CBI to perform its duty in acting against ‚persons who consider themselves to be the law‛ and also demanded to review the charge-sheets before they were filed. The FIR in the 2G scam was filed in the year 2009 but it wasn’t until PILs were filed as a follow up to the status of the case and the Supreme Court severely criticized the CBI for dragging its feet purposely that the investigation gained speed. The Supreme Court has taken an extraordinary step in barring the PMO from having superintendence over investigation matters of the CBI. It issued a single directive stating that the powers of superintendence over the CBI rests with the statutorily established CVC. While the judiciary ideally must stick to its Constitutional mandate of interpreting the law and must not tread into the arena of the executive or the legislature, in a country where the notion of justice is constantly subverted for those in positions of power and influence, the judiciary must go beyond their traditional domain and remind the executive its constitutional duties towards its polity. With judicial activism and the expansion of locus standi, the apex court has been more impartial and serious about issues of corruption and black money, in the recent years. c. Lowering of the age of entry into the services Civil service aspirants all over the country including those interviewed for this dissertation have expressed their disappointment with the central government’s idea of lowering the age limit for entry into the civil service. Serving and retired civil servants however, have vehemently argued in favour of this proposal. They insist from their own experiences that the lower the age of an entrant, the higher the chances are of instilling the fundamental principles of the bureaucracy, in the person. Also, an early entrant must be that dedicated and wilful of working with the government to have cleared all the rounds of exams at the young age. He shall also not view the services as being a comfort zone given the public perception of a lazy and inefficient government administration system after being over-worked in a corporate or private enterprise. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission has also strongly advocated for the lowering of ages of aspirants, it was due to the urgency shown by this report that the Centre had taken up this proposal seriously. d. Reforms in senior position placements Fair competition and transparency in the placements and postings of senior officers is crucial. Since these officers are immediate high level policy advisors to the political executive, it is imperative their postings be made public and their previous records
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and accomplishments also be made available to the general public. An unbeatable combination of performance and seniority is necessary to ensure that upright and responsible officers man the highest positions in the bureaucracy. A system based primarily on seniority would render the higher levels weak. For this purpose, there should be different assessments by a UPSC adjudged panel on the completion of 20 years of service across board. These assessments must play a part in deciding placements for officers as they move up the ladder. Intellectual and fiscal compromises made by officers must be taken up very seriously and must result in ‘retirement’ or suspension of these officers, if proven guilty. To ensure that investigations do not continue for years together, it is imperative that a time bar be kept on investigations of officers above a certain determined rank. e. Legal awareness While higher levels of literacy evidently do affect public reactions to instances of corruption, as is seen with the state of Kerala, it is legal awareness that is most important. If the general public were to know their rights in public service provisioning and were empowered enough to make lawful claims on denial of these services, it would in turn lead to public servants having no choice but to perform their duties. It is beneficial to point out here that the serving civil servants were interviewed in their offices, during office hours, but it was observed that there were no sign boards saying ‘paying a bribe is a criminal offence’ or that ‘there are CCTVs in this office’. While legal awareness in Kerala is generally high due to massive exposure to media, this is an aspect that may be cultivated in other states as well. Punitive action that an accused public servant is liable for must also be made available in the public forum. f. Media It is imperative that the media, print and visual, be free and accountable to the people of the country. The media has become an all pervasive medium in the past few years; with the onslaught of social media, the reactions to particular reporting are stronger than ever before. While senior journalists of media houses have also been recently attacked for being part of the politician-businessman-bureaucrat nexus, it is crucial that the traditional media remain free from such vicious allures. An upright media must have the audacity to publish the truth, for the people of the country to build their perceptions right. The onus of spurring access to information rests with this important leg and it is their moral imperative to lay bare the truth.
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While a hyperactive media is also not the need; one that reports and keeps a tab on issues of corruption in public service, the kind that hampers everyday life and the kind that involve the bigger, most powerful fish in the sea of public administration, must be encouraged. Public perception to a large extent is guided by what they see and read. While political parties are known to hire marketing houses to fulfil their political propagandas, the media must not give in to such shenanigans and become yet another marketing agent for the political executive. 
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Legislations Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 Criminal Law (Amendment) 1952 and 1964 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 Delhi Lokayukta and Uplokayukta Act, 1995 Indian Penal Code, 1860 Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2011 Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2008 Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2013 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 Prevention of Corruption, 1988 Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2013
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Editorial Board Co-ordinator: Shreya Dixit Editors: Abhay Yadav, Abhishek Acharya, Akheela Ashraf, Ashwin Jangalapalli, Gopal Gajbhiye, Krishna Teja Inapudi, Rajasindhura Aravalli, Rajeev Agur, and Yeshwanth Kumar
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