The woes of being politically visible in an aspirational global city by School of Public Policy and Governance

School of Public Policy and Governance Tata Institute of Social Science, Hyderabad STUDENT WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 1, DECEMBER 2015

The Woes of Being Politically Visible in an Aspirational Global City : A Case of Auto Rickshaw Drivers in Delhi

Ishita Trivedi

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School of Public Policy and Governance Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad Roda Mistry College of Social Work and Research Centre, Opposite Biodiversity Park, Gachibowli, Hyderabad, Telangana - 500008 Email : sppg-si@tiss.edu Website : http://goo.gl/mQGBpF

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About Student Working Paper Series The Student Working Paper Series, is an attempt by the School of Public Policy and Governance, at Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad to assimilate papers being worked upon the topics that will help enrich the public discourses by improving upon the clarity, accuracy and sophistication of discussions on the nation's Public Policy. About School of Public Policy and Governance The School of Public Policy and Governance (SPPG) is a novel research based teaching and training space designed to equip young professionals to contribute to the policy area research. SPPG provides opportunities to its students to think beyond conventional models of growth and development, and encourages them to generate ideas for developing institutional frameworks for accountable governance and the establishment of a socially equitable society. Its programs and activities are designed to create an environment for the well-trained scholars to access and collect information about contemporary policies and activities surrounding them so that they can produce timely research and undertake analysis on key topics of Public Policy. SPPG TISS - HYDERABAD

The woes of being politically visible in an aspirational Global City - Ishita Trivedi1

Abstract This paper tries to demystify the political economy that motivates commuters in Delhi to perceive auto rickshaw fares as ‘high, and unfair’ and auto drivers as inherently ‘greedy and nonchalant’ people. I argue that the perception about this sector is simplistic and fuelled by the middle class’ need to shoot the messenger- or, the most visible part of that process- i.e. the auto-rickshaw driver. My argument is presented in five sections- a brief introduction of the auto financier’s mafia-like credit systems, and monopoly of permits that allows total control over the operation of three-wheelers on-road; underlining the post-colonial roots of Delhi’s Global City aspirations and how that translates in a regulatory system that is discriminatory to drivers; how the drivers, as a collective, participate in the democratic politics of the city, and relate to the state; the ubiquity of the auto-rickshaw on Delhi roads, and the consequent ramifications of being politically visible; finally, I turn the spotlight on the middle-class milieu, their activism, and the bourgeoisie environmentalism of the Indian Supreme Court.

Ishita Trivedi, M.A. Candidate in Public Policy, OP Jindal Global University presented this paper at the Graduate Seminar on Well Being Growth and Development organised by the School of Public Policy and Governance from 27th 29th April, 2015.

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Introduction In Delhi, auto rickshaw drivers have a reputation of being nonchalant, greedy and, inconsiderate to commuters-charging over and above government approved rates, refusal to take one to their choice of destination, and an unwillingness to go “by meter”, are just a few of the problems city commuters face. (Harding & Hussain, 2013) This behaviour instigates middle-class activists, who are regular users of auto services, to “take up the cause of” protesting against the existence and continuation of auto rickshaws as a part of the urban transport system; the widespread persistence of this problem further gives credence to the cause.

Simon Harding rationalises, that it isn’t

possible for all of one lakh people, the approximate number of auto drivers in Delhi, to be intrinsically corrupt or inconsiderate? Surely, there must be a political economy that is responsible for producing and sustaining such wretched behaviour? This brief introduction, aims to answer the question just posed, and give a succinct overview of the bureaucracy, corruption, and authorities that need to be traversed to get an auto rickshaws to ply on Delhi roads, “legally”. The main actors here are the ownerdrivers, renter-drivers, financiers, the transport department, Delhi government, and the Supreme Court. In the mid-90s, a new auto-rickshaw with permit cost around Rs.1 lakh for the auto and a few thousand more for the permit, taxes and administration costs. Today, the new auto costs a comparable amount but the permit itself now costs three time the cost of the three-seater vehicle i.e. Rs.3 lakhs. (Harding & Hussain, 2013) This spiralling of prices has its origin in the court ruling of 1997, which froze the number of auto-permits in a bid to control vehicular pollution. Later, during the CNG switchover, around 20,000 drivers lost their permits because they weren’t able to afford the new engines. Between 1997 and 2013, Delhi’s population grew by 64.8% whilst there was a clear decline in the number of

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autos on the streets2. It is worth noting that at this time, circa 1997, Delhi had no metro rail connectivity either, so the only affordable way of commuting was the city bus fleet. The public transport system of Delhi was broken and lacked options for last-mile and door-to-door connectivity. With auto rickshaws being the closest answer for those aforementioned lacunae in the transportation system, it was no wonder that there was a high demand of auto-permits. Prices sky-rocketed, and anything up to Rs.6.5 lakhs was the going price for an auto permit on the second-hand or black market which was established by financiers (Harding, 2011). Aspiring owner-drivers took credit from the financiers, and to repay them, overcharged users (VIkram, 2012). Thus, the courts unintentionally created a monopoly for the auto-financiers who took advantage of the now highly priced permits. To date, a few financiers control more than 90% of all permits, which are usually never in the name of the financier, but exist with proxy names or details of the first driver they were sold to. The debt structure is oppressive- a 16-18% interest rate, complete with penalty charges. Many have been paying debts since 10 years with penalty fees amounting to as much as 3 lakh rupees (Harding, 2010). The auto-permit is only transferred in their name once all the debts have been cleared, this means up till that time these autos are plying “illegally” (Aggarwal, 2011). The credit system is constructed to be unsustainable, so that the auto financier never really “sells” its autos; the financier is aware that re-possession is almost inevitable. This vicious cycle of reselling and repossessing can go up to five or six times, in some cases. Those renting autos on a daily basis, pay almost 50% of their day’s earnings to meet the rent and fuel costs. 80% of all drivers rent their vehicles, in contrast to “owning” their three-wheeler, even though owning remains a misnomer. Renter-drivers usually pay 250-300 rupees for a 10-12 hours shift, and earn the same amount in profit (Harding & Hussain, 2013). Many drivers are also cheated as they are coerced to sign blank contracts, which can be used against them to

Delhi’s population in 1997, at 122.8 lakhs increased to 202.24 lakhs in 2013 (http://www.delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/ connect/DoIT_Planning/planning/economic+survey+of+dehli/content/demographic+profile) Also, the Delhi Government filed an application in the Supreme Court in November 2014 requesting permission for 2 lakh more autos to ply and highlighted that the population of Delhi had doubled since 1997, resulting in a steep demand for cheaper modes of public transport. (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Delhi-govt-seeks-SC-nod-for-2-lakh-moreautos-in-capital/articleshow/45040426.cms)

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increase interest rates without warning; as most migrants are illiterate, they may not possess an understanding of how much, and when they owe payments. This is just the proverbial tip of the iceberg- the drivers are also at the behest of the traffic police and transport officials, who arbitrarily challan them for not carrying any one of the sixteen documents3 that they are required to carry at all times- most of them superfluous, as they are forged by the financier anyway (Faruqui & Sud, 2001). Section I: Post-colonial roots of Global City aspirations Delhi is the archetype of a city in transition- its aspirations to be a world-class, or global city skews its sensibilities and policies in a direction that disjoints it with its reality. Through most of the subcontinent’s history, Delhi has been many kingdoms’ choice to be their seat of power, and is the current administrative capital of the country- it has always sustained a political discourse that is telling of the nation’s modus operandi, at large. Since the country’s economic liberalization in the 90s, Delhi is no more content in being called one of only fifteen mega-cities, a category based on its size, but has aspirations of being what Sheila Dikshit refers to as a “world-class” city i.e. a Sassen-esque city that is closely linked to globalized trade and politics- a Delhi which can yield power beyond its national borders (Hasan, 2014). The liberalisation had a far-reaching impact on India’s urban economies (Fernandes, 2004) (Khilnana, 1999), and was responsible for the rise of the ‘new’ Indian middle class which was both materially, and discursively tied to economic liberalization and globalization (Ellis, 2011). This was because of the growth of new forms of employment, particularly information and communication technologies, and other “new economy” work; the class of people who were in a position to take advantage of the turning tide of the 90s, are now intolerant of any feature of their urban setting that mars their sanitised idea of it. The work towards Saskia Sassen’s conception of the definitive, global city has already begun; the removal of industrial activity from within the city to its peripheries and neighbouring 3

For step-by-step information on all the permits required, and from where auto-rickshaw drivers must procure them, please see (Faruqui & Sud, 2001)

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rural hinterlands has been underway from over a decade4. It’s no wonder that today’s Delhi is less equal and more intolerant of the poor. Now, those migrating from rural areas have no industrial jobs to get successfully proletarianized, and must, somehow, imperfectly, get absorbed by the predominant service industry, which is only creating polarised job profiles in the cities. The idea of belonging to a global city is seductive to a post-colonial society- the elite classes, not pressed by the nagging vicissitudes of daily subsistence, are preoccupied with nursing their imperial hangover. The discourse of urban order that gets espoused by middle-class groups still resonates with notions of sanitation and containment that sought to order the colonial city (McFarlane, 2008). The semantics of this was clearly visible in the statement Sheila Dikshit, then Chief Minister of Delhi, made about banning auto rickshaws during before the 2010 Commonwealth Games; the CM’s desire to see visitors return home “with the impression that they have been to a truly civilised city” (Harding, 2010) led her to comment that, “Auto rickshaws are not a good option - they are uncomfortable and pollute the environment. Also, auto rickshaw drivers are unruly and harass passengers. Most of them ply illegally.” This statement typifies Amita Baviskar’s (2003) understanding that Delhi’s special status and visibility as national capital has made state anxieties around the management of urban spaces all the more acute: Delhi matters because very important people live and visit there; its image reflects the image of the nation-state. I will return to this statement from time to time to highlight the gap between perception, and fact of who congests and pollutes the city, and what is meant by “illegal” in this context. The characteristics of citizen-state relations in India are very different among the urban middle class, and the informal working class. People of the informal working class of Delhi, like the auto-rickshaw drivers, relate to the state as defined “populations” and are

Re-location of industries from Delhi’s centre to its periphery was the outcome of a PIL filed by environmental lawyer, and Magsaysay awardee, M.C. Mehta in 1985

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defined as such, to be the targets of policy, and to be controlled by the state (Harris, 2006). Chatterjee (2001) theorises that their relationship of being governed by the state opens up a space of negotiation where they make demands for their rights to welfare, which is defined as the ‘political society’- this is distinct from the conception of a ‘civil society’ which is based on participatory dialogues of the elites with the political class. This ‘new politics’ centred on the civil society and middle-class associational activity disregards the participation of the informal working class (Jodhka & Prakash, 2011). As political bargaining may be the only resource available to the informal workers, they are thus more active in electoral politics. Poorer people have a higher propensity to secure representation through political parties, as compared to wealthier people i.e. they are more likely to be politically active- defined in terms of electoral participation as well as presence in political rallies and demonstrations. Political parties respond to this by mobilising electoral support centred around the auto rickshaw drivers’ occupational identity, and participation. Therefore, party politics, is generally oriented towards the denizens of political society, rather than the middle class citizens of the civil society (Harris, 2006) . Section II: The politics of visibility Auto rickshaws, known as tuk-tuks in other parts of Asia, have been long romanticised for their novelty value in western pop-art. In a bid to cater to such “western” audiences, organisers of the Delhi Commonwealth Games managed to fetishize their own banality with a showcase of pimped-up models of auto rickshaws and push street carts in the

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Commonwealth Games’ dining hall - ironically, just months before, for the purpose of these very Games, Sheila Dikshit had called to phase-out autos, and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was busy evicting street vendors. This inimical attitude of officials towards autos, though, is something of a universal phenomenon. Thailand, another place famous for its tuk-tuk rides, banned them briefly in the 1980s. Mumbai, India’s biggest city, and Mombasa, Kenya’s second-biggest, ban them from parts of the central business district to keep the streets clear. Rickshaws are forbidden in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. Sri Lanka’s government has sharply raised customs duties on them. The tuk-tuk’s rising popularity in Egypt worried its establishment and on February 12th, it imposed a one-year ban on imports of three-wheelers. Unlikely as it sounds, ministers claim they are being used as getaway vehicles by criminals. (The Economist, 2014) The construction of Delhi’s working class identity is also bound to the perpetuation of their identity as migrants, which signals that they belong elsewhere and keeps them from being recognised as full residents of Delhi. This perception disenfranchises them from civic citizenship (Baviskar, 2003) There are 1.25 lakh auto rickshaw drivers in Delhi, and they constitute a sizeable chunk of the migrant population from Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar; this is a number political parties cannot afford to ignore. Their ubiquity and visibility on Indian roads means they aren’t “invisible” informal workers with no leverage. Though they may reside there, they can’t be rendered invisible like the countless shanty towns that were hidden behind impassive screens for the benefit of the global audiences of the Commonwealth Games. Yet, what is not to be forgotten is that these ‘visible’ auto rickshaw drivers aren’t fully immune to the whims of the state- indeed, Sheila Dikshit did want to phase-out auto rickshaws from Delhi’s streets in 2010- though she was unsuccessful, it shows the highly precarious state of this skewed “quid pro-quo” arrangement. Till the early 1990s, before the mass advent of internet and related communication channels, autos were a crucial part of election campaigning in Delhi, with political parties SPPG TISS - HYDERABAD

using them to display their flags. A party's chances of victory was presumed to be dependent on the number of auto rickshaws displaying its flag (Danish, 2013). In other countries too, auto rickshaws have a long history of displaying political statements. In Pakistan, radical Islamists have long used the rickshaws as a canvas to market slogans in support of religious warfare, and to foster hatred against the United States, but in February 2013 that legacy was modified to promote peace. Syed Ali Abbas Zaidi, head of the Pakistan Youth Alliance, is turning this strategy on its head with a fleet of rickshaws emblazoned with peace slogans and decorated with colourful designs, similar to those found on many trucks and buses in the country. "We need to take back this romanticized art form and use it for peace sloganeering and conflict resolution." (Abbot, 2013) One would think political strategies have evolved, but the high stakes, minutely covered Delhi elections of 2013 were telling of the significance that auto rickshaws occupy in the tug-of-war of vote banks. The new entrants in the electoral race for the Delhi Legislative Assembly- the Aam Aadmi Party- managed to display their posters on around 10,000 auto rickshaws for no charge, through the support of NyayaBhoomi, an NGO, working for the rights of auto rickshaw drivers. In an open letter to Arvind Kejriwal, the Chief ministerial candidate from AAP for the 2013 elections, Pawan Khera, the political secretary of Sheila Dikshit, then sitting ChiefMinister, said: “I write to bring to your attention a rather uncouth campaign on autorickshaws hitherto not seen in this city known for a dignified political culture.” Consequently, many auto rickshaws were caught in the cross-fire - drivers of vehicles carrying these ads were fined by the traffic police. AAP’s campaign strategy did not go down well with the state government. In the first week of June 2013, the Delhi government issued an order banning the display of advertisements on auto rickshaws, a move that AAP claims was taken to muzzle its campaign. On 19 June, the Delhi High Court stayed the ban after AAP member, and prominent lawyer, Prashant Bhushan, argued that the ban was discriminatory, as it dealt only with auto rickshaws and was silent about similar advertisements displayed on other modes of transport (Danish, 2013).

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However, the example of Delhi’s political process cannot be extrapolated even within India. There are a breadth of circumstances that change the fortunes of the informal working class from place-to-place. For example, In Mumbai, the strategy of right-wing regional parties like Shiv Sena, and Maharashtra Navnirman Sena has been to explicitly harass and target the rickshaw drivers by magnifying their occupations’ correlation with their “outsider” identity. Whilst Delhi’s political parties choose to use the same migrant identity to get leverage for their electoral opportunities in neighbouring states by keeping up appearances of being tolerant of them. The middle class concerns itself with the quality of regulation by the state, and rightfully so, as its interests are affected by this sort of vote-bank politics. Yet, they do not consider the side-effects of these politics on the ‘vote-banks’ themselves, before they denounce it as a perversion; the informal working class are mocked for being no more instrumental than a ‘vote bank’-the elites are convinced that this politics is somehow a poor, illegitimate substitute to the grand, normative design of democracy. Section III: Ramifications of being politically visible Why is it that any and every tangential issue of urban crisis somehow manages to boil down to the harrowing auto-rickshaw driver? Does the middle class perception of them as forever-venal and inherently criminal allow the city’s government to pass the buck to their stand-in scape-goats? The insidiousness with which social justice and anti-graft messaging5 has been framed by the middle class against them, which is perpetuated by mainstream media and promoted through social media, is astonishing in its conclusive dismissal of the urban poor as their fellow citizens- they are only regarded as criminals, leeching off the prosperity and slickness of their gleaming metropolitan space. This is evident by the responses of the Delhi Government to the Nirbhaya rape case of December 2012. After the death of the rape victim, one of the first in a slew of

Read the full text of the Change.org petition that appeals for need of an efficient system to complain against errant auto drivers in Bangalore: https://www.change.org/p/ma-saleem-need-an-efficient-system-to-complain-against-errantauto-drivers-in-b-lore

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“ c o r re c t i v e ” m e a s u re s b y t h e D e l h i Government, was to re-tout a directive made by the Delhi High Court, earlier in the same year, for the compulsory installation of GPS meters, and ticket printing machines in autos. In 2014, this has still not been actualised because of its infeasibility, and the reluctance of auto rickshaws to buy from another gover nment created monopoly- GPS monitors costing 5,000 rupees in the open market are available to auto-rickshaws at an inflated cost of 13,000 rupees. (Harding, 2012) After another recent rape case that was highlighted by the media i.e. the Uber cab rape case, there were again renewed calls to make GPS systems mandatory for all autos (Pereira, 2014). So, no matter where, or why a rape takes place- the former rape case took place in a bus, and the latter happened in a private cab- the first call for regulation, and stricter control always falls on the auto rickshaws. In addition to the above, there have also been numerous attempts to ameliorate the “unruly” migrant to the sensibilities of the city by conducting Basic English language classes, gender-sensitivity programs etc. It’s as John Harris phrases in his paper, rather than citizens, they are treated as people “to be done unto”. This makes me wonder whether it could be a strategy for the political class to preserve the numbers of such groups. Even though there are currently only around 80,000 autos plying on the streets, which is a small number considering the total population of Delhi is 2.5 million, it allows for the subsistence of a much larger number of auto drivers, as there may be more than one driver who rents the same auto in shifts of 6-7 hours. To consider then are the dependants of these drivers, that are also by an extension, a part of this

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electorate. Clamping down on the auto-finance mafia may affect political dynamics in two ways- either, directly, if the mafia is in cahoots with the politicians and indirectly, it will be likely that once the financier’s grip is lost on the permits- in the short run, it may immediately push many renter-drivers out of a job, and the city; this might significantly diminish the size of the politician’s major vote bank. Auto rickshaws are paradoxically oppressed by the very identity that makes them visiblethey’re instrumental to the state by serving as the face of quick fixes for complex problems, and various governance failures. Section IV: Bourgeois Environmentalism & the Courts Sheila Dikshit’s hastiness to get rid of the auto rickshaws in favour of “non-polluting” erickshaws and shuttles for last mile connectivity is especially shameful because it brings to the fore, either how little politicians and administrators really understand what’s going on, or how little they care for anything other than popular perception. “Clean” e-rickshaws operate on electrically-charged batteries that does nothing more than export the pollution to wherever it is that electricity is being produced, most of our electricity needs are still met by combusting coal in thermal power plants; it’s also well-known that coal is a dirtier fuel than Compressed Natural Gas- a fuel on which all public vehicles, including auto rickshaws, have been mandated to ply since 1998.6 Mohan and Roy (2003) in their paper further evaluate why auto rickshaws are more environmentally sound than cars/ taxis. Autos have the capacity to carry, on an average, the same number of people, it takes one-third the parking area and half the space while in motion, when compared to a car. Since it weighs one-third of a car, it also wears out the road much less, has less tyre/rubber use. These facts show that autos are a much more resource-efficient answer to a growing metropolis’ urban transport crisis; it uses one-third of the national resources private vehicles would consume. Autos also have a considerably smaller engine, even when compared to cars with the most frugal motors 6

It is also true that mega power plants which produce electricity are subject to economies of scale and thus produce energy more efficiently, and are more closely regulated for meeting certain emission norms.

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(175 c.c. vs 800 c.c. for Maruti 800). This means they pollute much less, per passenger, and because of the small capacity of the engine, they can't go faster than 50 km/h. These speeds have the potential to streamline the traffic on the congested roads of Delhi. Lower speeds and lighter weights, also means that they are less likely to result in fatal road accidents. (Mohan & Roy, 2003) Surely, the urban middle class who use the autos to commute in the city face considerable hardships in the form of constant haggling to negotiate for fares; they believe they are being fleeced when charged above the government approved rates- but just because these fares are government approved, doesn’t make them fair. The auto rickshaws and the middle class to some extent bear the cost of the inefficiencies cause by the graft in the transportation department, and the auto-finance mafia that is given tacit approval by the Government. So, when the middle-class public misunderstands the auto rickshaw drivers, it’s excusable, but when voices from the administration make such ignorant statements, it’s unforgivable. Sheila Dikshit’s statement is the ultimate articulation of the elite bias that gets rebooted time and again in our policies. In this case, the auto rickshaw drivers were unable to protect their own interests because the democratic political channels through which they exercised voice and agency were rendered null and void by the adjudication intervention (Gill, 2010). The Supreme Court for all its judicial activism, in spite of its well-intentioned introduction of Public Interest Litigations, staunchly remains the saviour of the middle class, or those who have the privilege to access the courts via its language and grammar. It is infamous for making wide-ranging rulings which results in policies that are skewed in the favour of the litigator or self-proclaimed activists. The Court’s disdain for procedure leads to under-examined policies which have ramifications on sectors that were never considered; it’s a state institution that clearly doesn’t command the resources or jurisdiction for making policy.

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M.C. Mehta’s bourgeois environmental7 litigation for vehicular pollution, though resulted in many favourable outcomes for the health of the city, caused unfair hardships to the auto rickshaw drivers, and had unintended consequences on the public transport system in Delhi. In July 1998, the Supreme Court came out with a judgement in the M.C. Mehta v/s Union of India which directed that all buses, auto rickshaws and a part of the city taxi fleet should now use CNG fuel. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case invoked the constitutionally enshrined, Right to Life to extend to the right to a clean and healthy environment, as a response to a “deteriorating public health situation” (Down To Earth: Science and Environment Online, 2014). Owner-drivers were faced with a cost of 30,000 rupees for a CNG conversion kit and the threat of having their permits cancelled if they did not get their engines changed in time. In 2000, just before the switch, there were 83000 auto-rickshaws on the roads, but just eighteen months later there were 55000. (Harding, 2010) The Delhi Finance Corporation was aware that owner-drivers wouldn’t have disposable cash to comply with this regulation and made “soft’ loans available, but the auto finance mafia and the Transport Department are allegedly well-known to be hand in glove- they came to an arrangement whereby they stalled the loans for six months, in addition to arbitrarily cancelling thousands of permits. This meant thousands of drivers were forced to sell their autos and accompanying permits to financiers at throwaway prices. This way, nearly 35,000 auto rickshaw drivers were cheated off their livelihood by government officials, and many more were adversely affected. Ironically, the same provision, i.e. Article 21, the Right to Life, was applied to stop eviction of hawkers without prior notice under the Olga Tellis & Ors vs. Bombay Municipal Council, where the court observed that "no person can live without the means of living, which is the means of livelihood. If, the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of

‘Bourgeois environmentalism’ is a term coined by Amita Baviskar in 2002, which terms this phenomenon as the emergence of middle and upper class concerns with visual beauty, entertainment, cleanliness, and safety in a bid to shape metropolitan space solely according to this vision.

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constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his (sic) right to life would be to deprive him of his means of his livelihood to the point of abrogation."

Conclusion The attitude of the officials and middle-class citizenry must shift, to understand that alienating the drivers by simply â&#x20AC;&#x153;banningâ&#x20AC;? them from the urban political space narrows the conception for the future of our cities; it leaves the crux of the matter unresolvedone cannot simply shoot the messenger. The analysis in my paper points to the need for deregulation of permits, which will allow this consistently mis-regulated sector some breathing space, and create potential for auto-drivers to take the lead in guiding the sector towards decent employment. This will allow auto rickshaw drivers to participate in urban spaces as more than just vote banks for politicians, and would give them agency to be part of a capable, and streamlined urban transport sector that can consequently reflect in a genuinely world-class city.

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Harding, S. (2011, November 20). A few questions about a few thousand new autorickshaws in Delhi. Retrieved from Kafila: http://kafila.org/2011/11/20/a-fewquestions-about-a-few-thousand-new-auto-rickshaws-in-delhi-simon-harding/ Harding, S. (2012, September 27). GPS and receipts will not stop Delhiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s auto-wallahs from overcharging. Retrieved December 24, 2014, from Kafila: http://kafila.org/ 2012/09/27/gps-and-receipts-will-not-stop-delhis-auto-wallahs-from-overchargingsimon-harding/ Harding, S., & Hussain, A. (2013). On the road to nowhere? Auto-rickshaws in Delhi: The System, Problems and Recommendations. Delhi: AMAN Charitable Trust. Harris, J. (2006). Middle-class Activism and the Politics of the Informal Working Class. Critical Asian Studies, 38(4), 445-465. Hasan, A. (2014). Between the People and the Polis: South Asia's megacities and the urban future. HIMAL Annual Lecture. Delhi. Jodhka, S., & Prakash, A. (2011). The Indian Middle Class: Emerging Cultures of Politics and Economics. Kas International Reports, 42- 56. Khilnana, S. (1999). Chapter 3: Cities. In S. Khilnana, The Idea of India (pp. 107-149). New Delhi: Penguin. McFarlane, C. (2008). Governing the Contaminated City: Infrastructure and Sanitation in Colonial and Postcolonial Bombay. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(2), 415-435. Mohan, D., & Roy, D. (2003, January 18). Operating on Three Wheels: Auto-Rickshaw Drivers of Delhi. Economic and Political Weekly, 38(3), pp. 177-180. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4413089 Pereira, A. (2014, December 9). Live: After Delhi cab rape, activists demand GPS in all auto-rickshaws, taxis. Retrieved from Firstpost: http://www.firstpost.com/india/liveafter-delhi-cab-rape-activists-demand-gps-in-all-auto-rickshaws-taxis-1838045.html The Economist. (2014, February 22). Tuk-tuking the world by storm. Retrieved December 23, 2014 VIkram, K. (2012, December 2). Auto mafia continues to flourish in Capital: Delhi government's insistence on permits and GPS fails to curb overcharging. Retrieved from Mail Online India: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/ SPPG TISS - HYDERABAD

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