Anton Marty & Karl Bühler

Laurent Cesalli ist Professor fßr Philosophie des Mittelalters an der Universität Genf. Er studierte Philosophie (Promotion 2003 ßber Semantik und Ontologie im 14. Jh.). Seit 2004 war er an den Universitäten Freiburg i. Br., Genf, Lausanne, Fribourg und Cornell (NY) tätig. Von 2011 bis 2014 arbeitete er als Forscher am CNRS. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte sind Philosophie der Sprache, Philosophie des Geistes, Ontologie im Mittelalter (12.–14. Jh.) sowie in der Schule Brentanos.

Janette Friedrich ist Dozentin an der Fakultät fßr Psychologie und Erziehungswissenschaften der Universität Genf. Sie studierte Philosophie und promovierte 1993 an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Zu Forschungsaufenthalten weilte sie am CNRS, an der EHESS und arbeitete als Programmdirektorin am Collège Internatio­ nal de philosophie in Paris. Ihre Forschungsschwerpunkte sind Geschichte der Psychologie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Sprache sowie der Wissensbegriff.

Anton Marty & Karl BĂźhler

Between Mind and Language Zwischen Denken und Sprache Entre pensĂŠe et langage Edited by Laurent Cesalli and Janette Friedrich

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Schwabe Verlag Basel www.schwabeverlag.ch

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Anton Marty (1847−1914) und Karl BĂźhler (1879−1963) verbinden in ihren wegweisenden philosophischen Ansätzen sprachphilosophische, linguistische und psychologische Erkenntnisse und haben damit einen tiefgreifenden Einfluss auf die Entwicklung dieser Disziplinen ausgeĂźbt. Zu Unrecht sind die beiden grossen Denker bisher im Hintergrund der Forschung geblieben – ihre Positionen werden deshalb in diesem Band eingehend untersucht, und ihre Beziehung zu anderen Traditionen (zur Phänomenologie, analytischen Philosophie und kognitiven Pragmatik) wird näher beleuchtet.

Im Zentrum der vorliegenden Studien steht die Frage des Verhältnisses von Denken und Sprache, ein Verhältnis, das zugleich den gemeinsamen Nenner und den Scheidepunkt von Martys und Bßhlers Denken darstellt. Beide Denker sind sich einig, dass Denken und Sprache aufs Engste verbunden sind. Ihre Meinungen gehen jedoch auseinander, wenn es darum geht, die Rolle der Sprache genauer zu bestimmen. Während Marty die Hauptfunktion der Sprache im Erwecken ­bestimmter psychischer Phänomene im Anderen sieht, besteht fßr Bßhler das Wesentliche der Sprache in ihrer Darstellungsfunktion, in der objektiven Ko­ ordination von Sprachmitteln mit Sachen und Sachverhalten.

SCHWABE PH I LOSOPH I CA

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SCHWABE PH I LOSOPH I CA

SCHWABE

SCHWABE PHILOSOPHICA XVI

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON HELMUT HOLZHEY UND WOLFGANG ROTHER

SCHWABE VERLAG BASEL

ANTON MARTY & KARL BÜHLER BETWEEN MIND AND LANGUAGE ZWISCHEN DENKEN UND SPRACHE ENTRE PENSÉE ET LANGAGE

EDITED BY LAURENT CESALLI AND JANETTE FRIEDRICH

SCHWABE VERLAG BASEL

Publiziert mit Unterstützung des Schweizerischen Nationalfonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung.

Copyright © 2014 Schwabe AG, Verlag, Basel, Schweiz Dieses Werk ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Das Werk einschliesslich seiner Teile darf ohne schriftliche Genehmigung des Verlages in keiner Form reproduziert oder elektronisch verarbeitet, vervielfältigt, zugänglich gemacht oder verbreitet werden.

Gesamtherstellung: Schwabe AG, Muttenz/Basel, Schweiz Printed in Switzerland ISBN Printausgabe 978-3-7965-3214-6 ISBN E-Book (PDF) 978-3-7965-3332-7 rights@schwabe.ch www.schwabeverlag.ch

Inhalt Laurent Cesalli, Janette Friedrich Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII Abstracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XVII Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXV

Erster Teil Phenomenological, pragmatic, and semiotic approaches to language Phänomenologische, pragmatische und semiotische Annäherungen an die Sprache Approches phénoménologique, pragmatique et sémiotique du langage Claudio Majolino Par-delà la suppléance. Contributions à une sémiotique phénoménologique: Bühler et Marty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Frank Liedtke Ausdrücken und Bedeuten: Anton Martys Sprachphilosophie im Lichte der Kritik Karl Bühlers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Laurent Cesalli Marty, Bühler, and Landgrebe on Linguistic Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Zweiter Teil Contributions to descriptive psychology Beiträge zur deskriptiven Psychologie Contributions à la psychologie descriptive Guillaume Fréchette Fixer, interpréter, déterminer. Éléments de psychologie descriptive de Brentano et Marty à Bühler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

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Denis Fisette Phénomènes sensibles et fonctions psychiques: Karl Bühler et le programme de Stumpf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Janette Friedrich Disposition d’attention, schèmes et sphère de signification Comment Bühler défend-il une psychologie de la pensée?. . . . . . . . . . . 141

Dritter Teil Semantic and ontological issues Semantische und ontologische Fragen Questions sémantiques et ontologiques Robin D. Rollinger Brentano and Marty on Logical Names and Linguistic Fictions: A Parting of Ways in the ­Philosophy of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Arkadiusz Chrudzimski Marty on Truth-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Vierter Teil Empirical approaches to language Empirische Dimensionen der Sprache La dimension empirique du langage Didier Samain Wegener, Gardiner, Bühler Une problématique ou deux modes d’empiricité?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 Jacques Moeschler Remarques sur la Théorie du langage du point de vue de la pragmatique contemporaine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Clemens Knobloch Was die Neo-Evolutionisten in puncto Signalevolution von Bühler und Marty lernen könnten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 Personenregister. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

Introduction Laurent Cesalli, Janette Friedrich

In 1908, Anton Marty (1847–1914) publishes his opus maius, the Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, a work which is presented to Brentano at the occasion of his 70th birthday.1 In this monumental work, Marty develops what he labels a «descriptive theory of meaning» (deskriptive Bedeutungslehre) which provides an explanation of linguistic meaning based on Brentano’s descriptive psychology. In 1909, Karl Bühler (1879–1963) publishes a long review of Marty’s book, in which he sets the foundations of what would become, some twenty-five years later, his own Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache.2 This

1

On Marty’s philosophy of language, see Robin Rollinger: Philosophy of Language and Other Matters in the Works of Anton Marty (Amsterdam 2010); Wilhelm Baumgartner (ed.): The Philosophy of Anton Marty, in: Brentano Studien 12 (2009); Denis Fisette, Guillaume Fréchette (eds.): A l’école de Brentano. De Würzburg à Vienne (Paris 2007); Paolo Spinicci: Il significato e la forma linguistica. Pensiero, esperienza e linguaggio nella filosofia di Anton Marty (Milano 1991); Kevin Mulligan (ed.): Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty (Dordrecht 1990); Savina Raynaud: Anton Marty, filosofo del linguaggio: uno strutturalismo presaussuriano (Roma 1982).

2 On Bühler’s philosophy of language, see Robert Innis: Karl Bühler. Semiotic Foundations of Language Theory (New York, London 1982); Achim Eschbach (Hg.): Bühler-Studien Bd. 1 & 2 (Frankfurt a.M. 1984); Achim Eschbach (ed.): Karl Bühler’s theory of language: proceedings of the conferences held at Kirchberg, August 26, 1984 and Essen, November 21–24, 1984 (Amsterdam, Philadelphia 1988); Sandrine Persyn-Vialard: La linguistique de Karl Bühler. Examen critique de la Sprachtheorie et de sa filiation (Rennes 2005); Janette Friedrich: Présentation, in: Karl Bühler, Théorie du langage. La fonction représentationnelle du langage (Marseille 2009) 21–58; Janette Friedrich (éd.): Karl Bühler. Une pensée du langage, Verbum, vol. XXXI, 1–2 (2009); Perrine Marthelot: Karl Bühler. Du contexte à la situation, la signification (Paris 2012); Karl Bühler: Schriften zur Sprachtheorie, hg. v. Achim Eschbach (Tübingen 2012). For a list of

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original link of Marty’s and Bühler’s thoughts offers an obvious reason for devoting a volume to their philosophies of language.

As many of the contributions gathered in this book show, the discussion of Marty is far more than a mere occasion for Bühler to express his central insight in matters of language; as a matter of fact, Bühler’s functional approach to language and more precisely the idea that the function of representation (Darstellungsfunktion) is the fundamental one directly emerges from a tight discussion of Marty’s intentionalist semantics (i.e. the claim that meaning is to be explained primarily in terms of speakers’ intentions): From Marty’s own point of view, one should therefore add, besides the functions of conscious manifestation (of expression) and of influencing others’ psychic life (of meaning), a third function, that of representing [Darstellen]. 3

Furthermore, both authors converge in the idea that philosophy of language and psychology (or philosophy of mind, as we would call it nowadays) are undissociably linked. In this short introduction, we shall have a glance at the main lines of affinity and divergence existing between Marty and Bühler, but also at the origin and posterity of their theories of language. The papers gathered below take up different aspects of such a narrative and often widen the perspective by integrating other protagonists of the Austro-German tradition into the picture.

1. Psychology and philosophy of language According to Marty’s conception and division of philosophy, the descriptive theory of meaning (deskriptive Bedeutungslehre – i.e. the field of research to which he devoted most of his works) is one of the two branches of psychology of language (Sprachpsychologie), the other being of genetic nature. As its name tells it, the descriptive part is concerned with the general structure and

Bühler’s lingustic works, see Brigitte Schlieben-Lange: Bühler, Karl [revised by Janette Friedrich], in: Harro Stammerjohann (ed.): Lexicon grammaticorum: a bio-bibliographical companion to the history of linguistics, vol. 1, 2nd edition, revised and enlarged (Tübingen 2009) 224.

3 AMU 965.

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functioning of language as it exists and functions now, while the genetic one is interested in the historic and causal processes which lead from the origins of language to its actual form. Psychology of language, in turn, is the theoretical branch of philosophy of language (Sprachphilosophie), the other being practical philosophy of language (Glossonomie), itself divided into aesthetics, logic, ethic and praxis.4 As a consequence, semantics is to be considered as a part of psychology of language.

The predominant role of psychology also appears in Marty’s conception of philosophy as «that domain of knowledge comprising psychology as well as all the disciplines which, according to the work division principle (Prinzip der Arbeitsteilung), are to be intimately linked with psychological research».5 The same holds for his definition of philosophy of language – «to the philosophy of language belong all those questions from the science of language which are directed upon that which, in the science of language, is general and governed by laws (das Allgemeine und Gesetzmäßige), questions which are of psychological nature or cannot be answered without the essential help of psychology»6 – and even for his definition of language itself – «‹language› is the deliberate manifestation (absichtliche Kundgabe) of psychic life by means of sounds, in particular by means of sounds which are not understandable in themselves but only in virtue of convention and habit».7 As for linguistic meaning – Marty’s object of investigation par excellence – its analysis is also based on psychology. Meaning is a matter of speakers’ intentions primarily aimed at triggering psychic phenomena in hearers: We said that language, within the science and philosophy of language, is primarily understood as the intentional indication (absichtliche Kundgabe) of the inner life.

However, what is primarily intended in this indication is a corresponding influence of the foreign inner life. As a rule, one expresses one’s own presentations, judgments, feelings etc., in order to bring about presentations, judgments and emotions in another psychic being, and indeed, ones which are analogous to one’s own.8 4

On that division, see UGS 21–33.

Anton Marty: Was ist Philosophie?, in: Josef Eisenmeier, Alfred Kastil, Oskar Kraus (Hg.): Anton Marty. Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. I,1 (Halle a.S. 1916 [1896]) 69–93 (here 82–87).

6 PST 83.

7 PST 81.

8 UGS 22.

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Consequently, at the core of the elucidation of linguistic meaning lies the question of what it means for a subject to think of an object – in short: the theory of meaning is closely related to the one of intentionality.

As for Bühler, he is primarily interested in questions regarding the psy­ chology of thought (Psychologie des Denkens), questions which are dealt with in his Habilitation of 1907.9 The influence of Brentano’s descriptive psychology is manifest in this work. In defining his task as consisting in the determination of the so called constituents of thought by means of the introspective method (or, more precisely, of the mnemonic observation, as Brentano would say),10 Bühler claims at the same time that such an analysis is to be viewed as the quest for psychic correlates of what Husserl describes as the functioning and contents of the laws of logic.11 In following such an experimental approach and confirming the distinction between psychic functions and formations (Gebilde), already observed by Stumpf in his works of 1906,12 Bühler delineates his field of investigations for the years to come. Bühler’s aim is to elucidate and give a detailed analysis of the mutual dependence between ­psychic functioning and formations (as language or gestalt, for example). Such an aim also explains two programmatic remarks he makes at the turn of the ­thirties. The first describes his own position as the one of a believer sided by two prophets – psychology on one side, and philosophy on the other: Prophet to the right, prophet to the left, and the child of this world in the middle.

The theory of language must be the child of this world, that is, the simple tip of the empirical work of language researchers. If philosophy perceives the danger of epis 9

Karl Bühler: Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge: I. Über Gedanken, in: Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie 10 (1907) 297–365; Karl Bühler: Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge: II. Über Gedankenzusammenhänge, in: Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie 12 (1908) 1–23; Karl Bühler: Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge: III. Über Gedankenerinnerungen, in: Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie 12 (1908) 24–92.

10 Karl Bühler: Remarques sur les problèmes de la psychologie de la pensée, in: ­A rchives de psychologie 6 (1907) 376–377; PES chap. 2.

11 Bühler: Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge: I., 298– 299.

12 Carl Stumpf: Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften, in: Abhandlungen der Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Classe V (Berlin 1906) 33–37 (here 9–10).

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temologism, that is, a declaration extorted from language in favour of one of the fundamental epistemological attitudes, it is only right and proper for it to demand the same respect for its independence from the prophet to the left. Psychology is the prophet to the left.13

The second remark is to be found in Die Krise der Psychologie (1927) where Bühler states without ambiguity: «I did not come in order to reform psychology, but in order to discover the axioms of the theory of language. A book which is nearly achieved, The Theory of Language, will tell more about that.»14 This interest for language did not arise in 1927. In the foreword of the Theory of Language, he mentions the §16 of his Habilitation on the psychology of thought as a first reflexion on language. Two years later (1909), he writes his long review of Marty’s Untersuchungen and announces that «further ca­ sual writings on that topic»15 will follow. One could wonder, then, if with the publication of the Theory of Language, Bühler definitively leaves the domain of psychology in order to be on the side of the sciences of language, to which he now intends to contribute. One could adopt such a reading, provided that one considers that the Theory of Language contains only the instrumental model of language (Organonmodell) discussing the three functions of appeal (Appell), expression (Kundgabe), and representation (Darstellung), as well as the semiotic nature of language.16 It is this first part of the Theory of Language which is most often referred to in language sciences when Bühler is mentioned. However, his Theory of Language contains also – in the first place – a description of the way linguistic phenomena function, a description given in terms of fields (Felder) and which necessarily involves the psychological subject, without which the representation by language is not possible. Thus, even if Bühler neither defends an intentionalist theory of meaning, nor pleads for a phenomenological description of language (see the contribution of Claudio Majolino in the present volume), psychology remains an essential piece of his conception, for he constantly seeks to determine what it means for a subject to speak (to use language).17 Bühler’s Theory of Language is therefore 13

TL 65.

KP 29.

15 TL 69.

16 See the first part of ST entitled «The Principles of Language Research».

17 Cf. Janette Friedrich: Karl Bühler. Une pensée du langage, in: Janette Friedrich (ed.): Karl Bühler. Une pensée du langage, 3–26.

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not to be viewed only as an extremely rich contribution to the sciences of language, but also as a sketch of Bühler’s original conception of the domain stud­ ied by psychology, a conception according to which it is difficult to consider this domain and language separately.

Thus, the starting point, but also the challenge of this book have been to assess the indissoluble link between psychology and philosophy of language in the thought of Bühler and Marty. As the different contributions gathered in this book show, the dialogue between Marty and Bühler sheds a different light on both protagonists, either in balancing or sharpening the established readings of their works (and thereby considerably enriching this reading) or in suggesting readings diverging from the ones which are usually found in the reception of both thinkers. Bühler and Marty are discussed as representatives of the Austro-German tradition of philosophy of language, a perspective which enables to highlight certain elements of their doctrine which are too often ignored by reductive disciplinary approaches (either from linguistics or from psychology) and would otherwise probably remain unnoticed. In this respect, the analysis of linguistic expressions offered by Marty and Bühler lies beyond the traditional opposition between semantic, semiotic and pragmatic approaches. This is even true of contributions centred on one author only, but which appear to be orientated by the interdisciplinary exchange aimed at in this book.

2. The reception of Marty and Bühler The present volume is the newest piece in the reception of Marty and Bühler.

As far as the former is concerned, one can distinguish three phases in the hitherto rather modest reception of his thought. The first is so to speak immediate for it takes place either in Marty’s lifetime, or immediately after his death. The most important contributions of this first phase are the review by Husserl of Marty’s Über subjektlose Sätze, published in 1896,18 and the one

by Bühler of Marty’s Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen

18

Edmund Husserl: Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910), hg. v. Bernhard Rang (Den Haag 1979) [Husserliana XXII] 135–136, 236–258.

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Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, published in 1909,19 as well as the monographs of Funke and Landgrebe.20 The second phase of the reception of Marty’s ideas takes place in the eighties and early nineties of the last century. Its main pieces are Raynaud’s book presenting Marty as a pre-structuralist, the monograph of Spinicci appropriately relating Marty with Husserl, and above all, the volume edited by Mulligan gathering some thirteen studies covering Marty’s philosophy of language and mind, but also his metaphysics.21 A third phase is presently taking place. Besides the volume at hand, one should mention the special issue of the Brentano Studien on Marty, as well as Rollinger’s monograph22 associating an extensive historical and doctrinal introduction with the English translation of four texts: Marty’s first book, Über den Ursprung der Sprache, his inaugural speech as Rector of the university of Prag (1896), Was ist Philosophie?, extensive reviews of James: Anzeige zu William James’ Werk: The Principle of Psychology and of Meinong’s first edition of Über Annahmen.

For what regards the reception of Bühler’s ideas, one can recall that his institute of psychology in Vienna was, in the beginning of the thirties, one of the most prominent ones in Europe at the time. As a consequence, Bühler’s writings, and his Sprachtheorie in particular, were discussed in numerous reviews and papers.23 However, the scientific debate around Bühler’s ideas stops 19 AMU. 20

Otto Funke: Innere Sprachform. Eine Einführung in Anton Martys Sprachphilosophie (reprint: Hildesheim 1974 [Reichenberg 1924]); NW; Two monographs in Japanese must be mentioned here: Chikahira Kobayashi: Maruti no gengogaku (Tokyo 1937) [«On Marty’s theory of language»]; Fumio Nakajima: Imiron: bunpo no genri (Tokyo 1939) [Semantics. An Introduction to Marty’s Philosophy of Language].

21 S. Raynaud: Anton Marty, filosofo del linguaggio; P. Spinicci: Il significato e la forma linguistica; K. Mulligan: Mind, Meaning, and Metaphysics. One should also mention here the works of the linguist S. Y. Kuroda, who studied Marty from the perspective of Chomsky’s tranformational grammar («Anton Marty and the Transformational Theory of Grammar», Foundation of Language, 9 [1972] 1–37; «The Categorical and the Thetic Judgement», Foundation of Language, 9 [1972] 153–185).

22 W. Baumgartner: The Philosophy of Anton Marty; R. Rollinger: Philosophy of Language and other Matters.

23 See for example Hellmuth Dempe: Was ist Sprache? Eine sprachphilosophische Untersuchung im Anschluss an die Sprachtheorie Karl Bühlers (Weimar 1930).

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abruptly in 1938 as he, like many other intellectuals, is compelled to leave ­Europe (Bühler lived in the United States from 1938 to his death in 1963). An extended period of silence followed, interrupted only by the publications of Kainz, Ungeheuer and Hörmann in the sixties.24 An important event in Bühler’s reception is the publication of the Bühlerstudien by Eschbach who, in his introduction, gives an appreciation of Bühler’s position in the intellectual landscape at the beginning of the eighties. Eschbach talks about a Critique of semiotics, required, at that time, in order to go beyond a weakly differen­ tiated theory of signs according to which the primary function of signs is the transmission of information – the so called cybernetic model of language which bypasses the question of the specificity of linguistic signs and their difference with respect to other types of signs. It is a well known fact that numerous theoretical and empirical researches have been conducted, notably in Germany, on the functioning of deictic signs, on the idea of fields (Felder), on the concept of linguistic action (Sprechakt) and many other topics.25 In the eighties and nineties, the interpretation of Bühler as a forerunner of pragmatics led to his recognition, notably in English speaking countries, but also in France.26 The contributions of this volume are part of the reception history sketched above. They intend to reflect critically on this history and thus, to add a brick of a somewhat different stone to the existing edifice. The specificity of the studies gathered in the present book consists in relating Marty’s and Bühler’s 24 Friedrich

Kainz: Geleitwort, in: ST V–XIX; Gerold Ungeheuer: Die kybernetischen Grundlagen der Sprachtheorie Karl Bühlers, in: To honor Roman Jakobson: essays on the occasion of his 70. birthday, 11. October 1966 (The Hague 1967) 2067–2086; Hans Hörmann: Psychologie der Sprache (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York 1967) Kap. 2; Dieter Wunderlich: K. Bühlers Grundprinzipien der Sprachtheorie, in: Muttersprache 79 (1969) 52–62.

25 For an overview of the available literature on those themes, see B. SchliebenLange: Bühler, Karl.

26 See Brigitte Nerlich, David Clarke: Language, Action, and Context: The Early History of Pragmatics in Europe and America, 1780–1930 (Amsterdam, Philadelphia 1996) in particular 224–239; Brigitte Nerlich, David Clarke: Protopragmatic Theories of Language in Europe, 1780–1930, 1. Protopragmatic insights in German speaking countries, in: Peter Schmitter (Hg.): Geschichte der Sprachtheorie, vol. 4, Sprachtheorien der Neuzeit, 1: Der epistemologische Kontext neuzeitlicher Sprach- und Grammatiktheorien (Tübingen 1999) 257–272.

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thoughts to the tradition of the Austro-German philosophy of language as a whole – thus, our two protagonists will be put in a dialogue like situation with many other linguists and philosophers (Brentano, Mill, Stumpf, Husserl, Meinong, Martinak, Hillebrand, Landgrebe, Wegener, Gardiner, and Grice).

This volume and the conference whose proceedings it gathers could not have been realised without the support of several institutions: the Swiss ­National Fund for Research (SNF), the Société Académique de Genève, the ­Faculty of Humanities, the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, the Department of Philosophy, and the Department of Linguistics of the Univer­sity of Geneva. We take this opportunity to express our deep gratitude to these Institutions, as well as to all the colleagues who took part to the confer­ ­ence, gave papers and animated the discussions.

Geneva, December 2012

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Abstracts The present volume gathers papers based on talks delivered at the conference «Anton Marty et Karl Bühler, philosophes du langage. Origines, relations et postérité de leur pensée» (Geneva, 10th−11th September 2010). Since most of the contributions are in French or German, it is appropriate to give a short account of each of them in English.

First section: Phenomenological, pragmatic, and semiotic approaches to language – Phänomenologische, pragmatische und semiotische ­Annäherungen an die Sprache – Approches phénoménologique, ­pragmatique et sémiotique du langage Claudio Majolino – Par-delà la suppléance. Contributions à une sémiotique phénoménologique: Bühler et Marty. In the Sprachtheorie, Bühler claims that «linguistic phenomena are signitive (zeichenhaft) through and through». As a consequence, he develops a ‘many-sided’ and ‘many-levelled’ account of language based on the key notion of the sign, whose formal structure is summarized by the formula aliquid stat pro aliquo. As for Marty, although his Sprachphilosophie takes the form of a descriptive semasiology and revolves around the key notion of the sign too, his understanding of the signitive nature of linguistic phenomena is quite different. More specifically, Marty does not share with Bühler the same formal account of sign as substitution, and tries to justify the notion of sign behind his ‘semasiological’ framework through phenomenological-descriptive arguments. In this paper Bühler’s and Marty’s accounts of signs will be described and contrasted as to show the difficulties related to the articulation between a general theory of signs (dealing with ‘signs’ as scientific objects, whose formal structure can be spelled out in terms of substitution) and a phenomenological description of sign-phenomena (considered as specific varieties of conscious experiences).

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Abstracts

Frank Liedtke – Ausdrücken und Bedeuten: Anton Martys Sprachphilosophie im Lichte der Kritik Karl Bühlers. In his seminal work «Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie» (1908), Anton Marty draws several distinctions which are highly relevant for his own and also for contemporary theories of language. One distinction is that between several language devices such as emotives, judgements and suggestives of ideas. This distinction is drawn in a classificatory perspective. Another distinction is that between expression und meaning, which is not primarily relevant for the classification of utterances, but which concerns the mode in which they are performed, depending upon whether a hearer shall be influenced by their performance (meaning) or not (expression). It will be argued that the criticism of Karl Bühler concerning Marty’s theory of language, namely that the dimension of presentation (Darstellung) is neglected, has to be seen in another light if the distinction between the classificatory perspective and the perspective of the different modes, in which utterances may be performed, is being recognized.

Laurent Cesalli – Marty, Bühler, and Landgrebe on Linguistic Functions. Marty conceives of philosophy of language as a descriptive theory of meaning. Meaning (or Bedeutung) in turn, is conceived of as a linguistic function. Bühler and Landgrebe develop their own ideas on language on the base of Marty’s, and both insist that the Swiss philosopher had correct basic theoretical intuitions. Marty, Bühler and Landgrebe share a functionalist conception of meaning and the conviction that theory of language and psychology are intimately related. However, Bühler and Landgrebe thought that Marty’s theory had to be amended with respect to the number, nature and status of linguistic functions. The chapter shows that whereas Marty’s linguistic function of meaning is the use of words by speakers with the intention of triggering specific psychic phenomena, Bühler’s function of representation is the performance of words taken in themselves as linguistic signs. Furthermore, Marty clearly holds that linguistic phenomena in general must be described in psychological terms; while rejecting the etiquette of Sprachpsychologie, Bühler insists that Marty’s account is incomplete and, more importantly, that it misses the essential character of human language. In this respect, Landgrebe seems to occupy an intermediate position: original nomination (the linking of a sound with a presenting) is per definition a psychological cate-

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gory, but predicative nomination is not: what is named by a name in actual discourse is ultimately determined not by its meaning, but by the concrete situation of discourse.

Second section: Contributions to descriptive psychology – Beiträge zur deskriptiven Psychologie – Contributions à la psychologie descriptive Guillaume Fréchette – Fixer, interpréter, déterminer. Éléments de psychologie descriptive de Brentano et Marty à Bühler. Descriptive psychology had a tremendous influence on Brentano’s students and was soon to be identified by early 20th century psychologists like Bühler as the most important contribution to psychology of the School of Brentano. In my paper, I am interested in the reception of the methodology of descriptive psychology, and more precisely in the third step of descriptive analysis, namely interpretation (Deutung). I suggest that the meaning of interpretation as a descriptive cate­ gory undergoes important changes from Brentano to Bühler. First, I show that Brentano’s understanding of interpretation relies much on the writings of 19th century British philosophers like Mill, Bain and Whewell. Following Mill, Brentano sees interpretation as a constitutive part of the description.

According to him, this step of the analysis corresponds to the second class of mental phenomena: judgments. Second, I show how Marty integrated Brentano’s basic theory of interpretation in his theory of meaning, especially concerning the distinction between intended and non-intended manifestation (Kundgabe). Finally, I argue that this conception of the role and nature of interpretation in descriptive psychology was one of the reasons why Bühler rejected Marty’s conception of manifestation.

Denis Fisette – Phénomènes sensibles et fonctions psychiques: Karl Bühler et le programme de Stumpf. This study focuses on the influence of the work of Carl Stumpf on the thought of Karl Bühler. Our working hypothesis is based on the philosophical program that Bühler attributes to Stumpf and to which several of his works are largely indebted. It is divided into five parts.

The first is intended to establish a relationship between Bühler and the school of Brentano to which Stumpf belongs. In the second, I show that Bühler became aware of Brentano’s ideas and of Stumpf’s program during a stay in the

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Institute of Psychology of Berlin during the winter semester 1904−1905, and I briefly comment, in the third part, Bühler’s references to the work of Stumpf and two of his books in which he defended Stumpf’s program against his critics. After having established the solid knowledge that Bühler had of Stumpf’s work, I outline, in the fourth part, the main aspects of this program and evaluate, in the fifth, how Bühler uses it in the field of sensory phenomena (Gestalt). I conclude this study with several remarks on Stumpf’s positive evaluation of Bühler’s work.

Janette Friedrich – Disposition d’attention, schèmes et sphère de signification. Comment Bühler defend-il une psychologie de la pensée? The chapter focuses on Bühler’s conception of thought-psychology (Denkpsychologie) which he developed in his writings between 1907 and 1918. Two theses emerge from this study. The first regards the discovery of a special kind of facts, the so-called «conscious elements» which play a mediating role in the process of thinking. Bühler shows that the thinking operations which are observable in the domain of sense perception are based on «dispositions of attention» or ­«a relation-consciousness» (Beziehungsbewusstsein) which are known immediately and guide the operations of abstracting, comparing, and putting together (abstrahieren, vergleichen, zusammenfassen). Along the same lines, Bühler introduces the notion of schemes, which he defines as abstract representations allowing a coordination or intuitive disposition of things. This notion, which will be mentioned in most of his later works, is used primarily in order to show how thought is realized through a symbolic use of perception.

One will see that Bühler ascribes to this notion a heuristic force which is often ignored in the secondary literature. Hence our second thesis, which postulates that the Bühlerian reflexions on thought are indispensable for the understanding of language’s function of representation (Darstellungsfunktion) on which the Sprachtheorie focuses. The end of the chapter is devoted to a point of disagreement between Bühler and Brentano’s pupils. Although Bühler constantly refers to the project of a descriptive psychology, notably in the form Carl Stumpf gave to it, his field of interest seems to be a different one.

Whereas Stumpf, in his reflexions on psychic functions, was interested, among other things, in the link between the functions and their contents (‘phenomena’ and ‘formations’), Bühler prefers to analyse those mediating elements which lead to the very constitution of the functions themselves.